136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Puig, et al. vs. Peñaflorida, et al.
No. L-15939. January 31, 1966.
ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
EsTELA MAGBANUA PEÑAFLORIDA, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
Donations; Void donations mortis causa.—Where the donor expressly
and consistently declared her conveyance to be one antly indicated that the
conveyance was not intended to produce
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VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 137
Puig, et al. vs. Peñaflorida, et al.
any definitive effects, nor to finally pass any interest to the grantee, except
from and after the death of the grantor. Hence, the reservation in the deed of
donation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her
lifetime does not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime
but that the donor merely reserves the power to destroy the donation at any
time and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her
death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere. Which in the
last analysis signifies that the liberality, herein expressed, is testamentary in
nature, and must appear with the solemnities required of last wills and
testaments in order to be legally valid.
Salonga & Ordoñez for the plaintiffs and appellants.
Fulgencio Vega for the defendants and appellants.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION
TO RECONSIDER
(Main opinion was promulgated on November 29, 1965).
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peñaflorida, et al., insist
that the reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the
property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949
indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise,
it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous, and they cite
American authorities in support.
This thesis would be plausible if the reservation of the power to
dispose were the only indication to be considered in deciding
whether the donation of December 28, 1949 was mortis causa or
inter vivos. But such is not the case. The Court in its decision took to
account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact that
the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to
be one of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the registration
of the deed until after her death. All these features concordantly
indicated that the conveyance was not intended to produce any
definitive effects, nor to finally pass any interest to the grantee,
except from and after the death of the grantor.
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Puig, et al. vs. Peñaflorida, et al.
We see nothing in the deed itself to indicate that any right, title or
interest in the properties described was meant to be transferred to
Dona Estela Magbanua prior to the death of the grantor, Carmen
Ubalde Vda. de Parcon. Not ownership, certainly, for the stipulation:
“Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no se registrara en la oficina
del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues del fallecimiento de la
Donante”
necessarily meant, according to section 50 of the Land Registration
Act, that the deed in question should not take effect as a conveyance
nor bind the land until after the death of the “donor”.
Neither did the document operate to vest possession upon Dona
Estela Magbanua, in view of the express condition that (paragraph
3) if at the date of her death the donor had not transferred, sold, or
conveyed one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other persons
or entities, the donee would be bound to pay to Caridad Ubalde,
married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00, and such
payment was to be made on the date the donee took possession of
Lot No. 58. As the obligation to pay the legacy to Caridad Ubalde
would not definitely arise until after the death of the donor, because
only by then would it become certain that the “donor” could not
transfer the property to someone else, and such payment must
precede the taking possession of the property “donated”, it
necessarily follows that the “donee’s” taking of possession could not
occur before the death of the donor.
It being thus clear that the disposition contained in the deed is
one that produces no effect until the death of the grantor, we are
clearly faced by an act mortis causa of the Roman and Spanish law.
We thus see no need of resorting to American authorities as to the
import of the reservation of the donor’s right to dispose of the
donated property, for the Spanish authorities are very clear on this
point:
“Desde el momento en que la muerte del donante es la que determina la
adquisición ó el derecho a los bienes; desde el momento en que la
disposición puede ser revocada voluntariamente, se salva la linéa divisoria
entre unos y otros actos: la donación equivale a un legado; más aún que
esto: es un le-
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VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 139
Puig, et al. vs. Peñaflorida, et al.
gado en realidad.” (5 Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 107)
“Ahora bien: si el mal llamado donante no solo dilata la fecha de la
ejecución para el momento de su muerte, sino que además se reserva la
facultad de revocar a su arbitrio la disposición, entonces el acto no es
válido bajo la forma de contrato; hay en renlidad una disposición mortis
causa que exige las solemnidades del testamento.” (V Manresa, 5th Ed., p.
109) (Italics supplied)
The presence of an acceptance is but a consequence of the erroneous
concept of the true nature of the juridical act, and does not indicate
that in the same is a true donation inter vivos.
Appellant Magbanim further argues that the reserved power of
the donor to convey the donated property to other parties during her
lifetime is but a resolutory condition (albeit a potestative one) that
confirms the passing of the title to the donee. In reality, tins
argument is a veritable petitio principii; it takes for granted what has
to be proved, i.e., that some proprietary right has passed under the
terms of the deed, which, as we have shown, is not true until the
donor has died.
It is highly illuminating to compare the condition imposed in the
deed of donation of December 28, 1919 with that established in the
contract dealt with in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tau Liuan, 43
Phil. 874, invoked by appellants.
In the alleged deed of donation of December 28, 1919, the late
Dona Carmen Ubaldo imposed expressly that:
“Que antes de ssu muerte, la Donante podrá enajenar, vender, traspasar é
hipotecar a cualesquiera personas ó entidades los bienes aqui donados a
favor de la Donataria en concepto de Donación mortis causa.”
In the Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao case, on the other hand, the
condition read:
“It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be installed m said
factory fail, for any reason, to arrive, in the City of Manila within the period
of six (6) months from date hereof, this contract may be cancelled by the
party of the second part at its option, such cancellation, however, not to
occur before the expiration of such six (6) months.” (pp. 874-875 cas. cit.).
In the Uy Tieng Piao case the contract could only be cancelled after
six months, so that there could be no doubt
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Galima, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
that it was in force at least for that long, and the optional
cancellation can be viewed as a resolutory condition (or more
properly, a non-retroactive revocatory one); but no such restriction
limited the power of the donor, Dona Carmen Ubalde, to set at
naught the alleged conveyance in favor of Doña Estela Magbanua by
conveying the property to other parties at any time, even at the very
next instant after executing the donation, if she so chose. It requires
no argument to demonstrate that the power, as reserved in the deed,
was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it meant
that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it
impossible to channel the property elsewhere. Which, in the last
analysis, as held in our main decision, signifies that the liberality is
testamentary in nature, and must appear with the solemnities
required of last wills and testaments in order to be legally valid.
Wherefore, the motion to reconsider is denied.
Chief Justice Bengzon and Justices Concepcion, Dizon,
Regala, J.P. Bengzon and Zaldivar, concur. Mr. Justice Barrera took
no part. Mr. Justice Makalintal, on leave, did not take part.
Motion denied.
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