G.R. No.

97906 May 21, 1992

Facts:
On September 9, 1967 the two year old Maximo Wong was adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos, but prior to this petition his adoptive father Hoong
Wong already passed away.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, Maximo Wong was already married and was a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University in Cotabato City, he then filed a petition to change his
name to Maximo Alcala, Jr., He claimed that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact
he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to
revert to his former surname.

On July 2, 1986, the trial court ruled that, the jurisdictional requirements have been fully complied
with,and that Maximo’s prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was
granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of court aquo, Hence, this petition
seeks to set aside the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals

Issue:
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid,
sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court uphold the decision of the appellate court on the following matters:
1. The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated by the provisions of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and
to provide his best interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721).
2. In granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory
to the court and not all the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov.
25, 1965; Nacionales vs. Republic, L-18067, April 29, 1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA 843).

The Supreme court ruled that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b. When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c. When the change will avoid confusion;
d. Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her
alien parentage;
e. A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody;
f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Furthermore the court ruled that the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any
other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction.
What the law does not prohibit, it permits.

The court reiterated that If they were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion,
then there will never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to change his
name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in
the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile.
This could hardly have been the intendment of the law.

A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to the
mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may
be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission granted
in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of
said remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a
legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court
for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of
such a remedy by an adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it
bar resort, to Rule 103.

Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that Maximo’s adoptive mother emphasized that she executed
the above affidavit "without affecting the legal adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967,
making him as one of my legal and compulsory heir/s." This is incontrovertible proof that she never
entertained any misgivings or reservations with respect to her consent to his petition. This likewise
dispels any possible confusion as to private respondent's legal status or adoptive paternity and his
successional rights. Concordantly, the court held that a change of name does not define or effect a
change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter
one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name.

The petition was denied and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in toto.