2020 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW

CHAIR’S CASES Handout No. 45

Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may
still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning
of the Constitution.

At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have

biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must
consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling,
remains unknown. Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation. Discerning
constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign’s purpose so as to identify
which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable
construction. Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they are situated within the whole
document — context — govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e.,
verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless,
even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may
still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning
of the Constitution. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538
September 20, 2016

Verba Legis Doctrine

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the
basic precept of verba legis. The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and
approved by a direct act of the People: exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it
through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the
People’s consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus: We
look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness,
its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced

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to a minimum. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September
20, 2016

The Constitution should be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat
quam pereat.

Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the
Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework
of the Constitution that animates each of its components through the dynamism of these
components’ interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a
peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole
unit — ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each provision must be understood and effected in a way
that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest
fixings. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when
the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.

It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even
when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous
construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading. David vs.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which
principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born
citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a
reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual
milieu of this case.

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for
an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution
provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and
the implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels. xxx
The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted

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circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent’s Filipino parentage.

David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

BASIC CONCEPTS

DECLARATION OF POLICIES AND STATE PRINCIPLES

Under the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the family and the state to care for its elderly
members.

Pursuant to this provision and the constitutional principles on social justice and priority of the
elderly to an integrated and comprehensive health delivery system, Republic Act No. 7432,
otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act, was passed into law on April 23, 1992. Republic Act
No. 7432, as amended by Republic Act No. 9257, grants certain privileges and benefits to senior
citizens in accordance with the following declared policies: (a) To motivate and encourage the
senior citizens to contribute to nation building; (b) To encourage their families and the
communities they live with to reaffirm the valued Filipino tradition of caring for the senior
citizens; (c) To give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of the elderly and
their full participation in society considering that senior citizens are integral part of Philippine
society; (d) To recognize the rights of senior citizens to take their proper place in society. This
must be the concern of the family, community, and government; (e) To provide a comprehensive
health care and rehabilitation system for disabled senior citizens to foster their capacity to attain
a more meaningful and productive ageing; and (f) To recognize the important role of the private
sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.
Republic Act No. 9994, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizen Act of 2010, further
amended the policies and objectives, as follows: (a) To recognize the rights of senior citizens to
take their proper place in society and make it a concern of the family, community, and
government; (b) To give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of the elderly
and their full participation in society, considering that senior citizens are integral part of
Philippine society; (c) To motivate and encourage the senior citizens to contribute to nation
building; (d) To encourage their families and the communities they live with to reaffirm the
valued Filipino tradition of caring for the senior citizens; (e) To provide a comprehensive health
care and rehabilitation system for disabled senior citizens to foster their capacity to attain a more
meaningful and productive ageing; and (f) To recognize the important role of the private sector
in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.
Canlapan vs. Balayo, 784 SCRA 135, A.C. No. 10605 February 17, 2016

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, “[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service[.]” This, however, does not guarantee “a constitutional right to
run for or hold public office[.]”

To run for public office is a mere “privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.” Among these
limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Timbol vs. Commission on Elections, 751
SCRA 456, G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015

STATE IMMUNITY

Money claims and judgments against the government must first be filed with the Commission
on Audit (COA).

Money claims and judgments against the government must first be filed with the Commission on
Audit. Trial courts have already been strongly cautioned against the issuance of writs of execution
in cases involving the disbursement of public funds in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
10-2000. Republic vs. Cortez, 817 SCRA 19, G.R. No. 187257, G.R. No. 187776 February 7, 2017

Money claims against the government cannot be the subject of writs of execution absent any
showing that they have been brought before the Commission on Audit, under this Court's
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 and Commission on Audit Circular No. 2001-002.

The general rule is that government funds cannot be seized by virtue of writs of execution or
garnishment. This doctrine has been explained in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

For its part, Commission on Audit Circular No. 2001-002 dated July 31, 2001 requires the
following to observe this Court's Administrative Circular No. 10-2000: department heads; bureau,
agency, and office chiefs; managing heads of government-owned and/or controlled corporations;

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local chief executives; assistant commissioners, directors, officers-in-charge, and auditors of the
Commission on Audit; and all others concerned.

Chapter 4, Section 11 of Executive Order No. 292 gives the Commission on Audit the power and
mandate to settle all government accounts. Thus, the finding that government is liable in a suit
to which it consented does not translate to enforcement of the judgment by execution.

As a rule, public funds may not be disbursed absent an appropriation of law or other specific
statutory authority. Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445,
requires that all money claims against government must first be filed before the Commission on
Audit, which, in turn, must act upon them within 60 days.

Only when the Commission on Audit rejects the claim can the claimant elevate the matter to this
Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the state. Carabao, Inc. v. Agricultural Productivity
Commission has settled that "claimants have to prosecute their money claims against the
Government under Commonwealth Act 327 . . . and that the conditions provided in
Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly
observed." Republic vs. Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008 February 4, 2019; see also Roxas vs. Republic
Real Estate Corporation, 792 SCRA 31, G.R. No. 208205, G.R. No. 208212 June 1, 2016

As a rule, public funds may not be disbursed absent an appropriation of law or other specific
statutory authority.

Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, requires that all
money claims against government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit, which, in
turn, must act upon them within 60 days. Only when the Commission on Audit rejects the claim
can the claimant elevate the matter to this Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the state.
Carabao, Inc. v. Agricultural Productivity Commission, 35 SCRA 224 (1970), has settled that
“claimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth
Act 327 . . . and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims
against the Government must be strictly observed.” Roxas vs. Republic Real Estate Corporation,
792 SCRA 31, G.R. No. 208205, G.R. No. 208212 June 1, 2016

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Generally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) “represent[s] the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.”

The exception to this rule is when it acts as the “People’s Tribune.” As such, it represents the best
interests of the State, and may take an adverse position from the government agency under
litigation. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 586 (1998): True, the Solicitor
General is mandated to represent the Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
a lawyer.

However, the Solicitor General may, as it has in instances take a position adverse and contrary to
that of the Government on the reasoning that it is incumbent upon him to present to the court
what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run
counter to a client’s position. Republic vs. Cortez, 817 SCRA 19, G.R. No. 187257, G.R. No. 187776
February 7, 2017

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great government branches
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere.

The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive. When
the trial court issued its October 9, 2006 Order granting preliminary injunction on the transfer of
the regional center to Koronadal City when such transfer was mandated by E.O. No. 304, the
lower court did precisely that.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great government branches
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted “will neither direct nor
restrain executive [or legislative] action x x x.” Republic vs. Bayao, 697 SCRA 313, G.R. No.
179492 June 5, 2013

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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

Although public health, safety, morals and general welfare may justify intrusion into private
commercial interests, the exercise of police power entails considerations of due process, fitness,
and propriety.

Even when these considerations are invoked, they do not peremptorily and invariably set aside
private property rights. When acting in view of these considerations, state organs must still do
so with restraint and act only to the extent reasonably necessary. Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) vs. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, 808 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 182944
November 9, 2016

Republic Act (RA) No. 8975 was enacted to ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation
and completion of government infrastructure projects.

Republic Act No. 8975 was enacted to “ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and
completion of government infrastructure projects,” specifically for the purposes of “avoid[ing]
unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to immediately enjoy
the social and economic benefits therefrom.” Its scope and aims are clear. Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) vs. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, 808 SCRA 53, G.R. No.
182944 November 9, 2016

Removing or dismantling billboards, banners, and signages cannot qualify as acts relating to
the implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects, or of national
government projects within the contemplation of Republic Act (RA) No. 8975.

They do not involve the construction, operation, maintenance, repair, or rehabilitation of

structures for public use. Neither do they involve the acquisition, supply, or installation of
equipment and materials relating to such structures; nor the reduction of costs or the facilitation
of public utility. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) vs. City Advertising
Ventures Corporation, 808 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 182944 November 9, 2016

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The Supreme Court has brushed aside invocations of the non-impairment clause to give way to
a valid exercise of police power and afford protection to labor.

This court has brushed aside invocations of the non-impairment clause to give way to a valid
exercise of police power and afford protection to labor. In Pacific Wide Realty and Development
Corporation v. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., 605 SCRA 503 (2009), which similarly involved corporate
rehabilitation, this court found no merit in Pacific Wide’s invocation of the non-impairment
clause, explaining as follows: We also find no merit in PWRDC’s contention that there is a
violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no
law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an
executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors
and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked.
Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., even assuming that the same may be invoked, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and
contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the general
public. Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,
employees, and the economy in general. The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over
the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon the debtor and
all persons who may be affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not such persons have
participated in the proceedings or have opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have
been scheduled. Pryce Corporation vs. China Banking Corporation, 716 SCRA 207, G.R. No.
172302 February 18, 2014

Elements of Taking

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ reliance on Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree
is erroneous. Section 50 contemplates roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public
thoroughfares built on a private property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A
public thoroughfare is not a subdivision road or street. More importantly, when there is taking
of private property for some public purpose, the owner of the property taken is entitled to be
compensated. There is taking when the following elements are present: 1. The government must
enter the private property; 2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or
permanent; 3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property; 4. The property is
devoted to public use or purpose; 5. The use of property for public use removed from the owner
all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership,
717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use, remain
private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by donation or through
expropriation proceedings.

An owner may not be forced to donate his or her property even if it has been delineated as road
lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even choose to retain said
properties. If he or she chooses to retain them, however, he or she also retains the burden of
maintaining them and paying for real estate taxes. Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited
Partnership, 717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014

An owner of a subdivision street which was not taken by the government for public use would
retain such burden even if he or she would no longer derive any commercial value from said
street. However, the owner may not force the government to purchase the property.

To remedy such burden, he or she may opt to donate it to the government. In such case, however,
the owner may not force the government to purchase the property. That would be tantamount
to allowing the government to take private property to benefit private individuals. This is not
allowed under the Constitution, which requires that taking must be for public use. Republic vs.
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014

When the road or street was delineated upon government request and taken for public use, the
government has no choice but to compensate the owner for his or her sacrifice, lest it violates
the constitutional provision against taking without just compensation.

Since the Constitution proscribes taking of private property without just compensation, any
taking must entail a corresponding appropriation for that purpose. Public funds, however, may
only be appropriated for public purpose. Employment of public funds to benefit a private
individual constitutes malversation. Therefore, private subdivision streets not taken for public
use may only be donated to the government. In contrast, when the road or street was delineated
upon government request and taken for public use, as in this case, the government has no choice
but to compensate the owner for his or her sacrifice, lest it violates the constitutional provision
against taking without just compensation, thus: Section 9. Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited
Partnership, 717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

The right to compensation under Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put in place to
protect the individual from and restrain the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain, which
is the government’s power to condemn private properties within its territory for public use or
purpose.

This power is inherent and need not be granted by law. Thus, while the government’s power to
take for public purpose is inherent, immense, and broad in scope, it is delimited by the right of
an individual to be compensated. In a nutshell, the government may take, but it must pay.
Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March
3, 2014

In a negotiated sale, the government offers to acquire for public purpose a private property,
and the owner may accept or reject it.

A rejection of the offer, however, would most likely merely result in the commencement of an
expropriation proceeding that would eventually transfer title to the government. Hence, the
government’s offer to acquire for public purpose a private property may be considered as an act
preparatory to an expropriation proceeding. Therefore, a private owner’s initiative to segregate
a property to accommodate government needs saves the government from a long and arduous
expropriation proceeding. This is a commendable act on the part of the owner. It must be
encouraged, not dampened by threats of property deprivation without compensation. Republic
vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014

Taking of private property without just compensation is a violation of a person’s property right.

In situations where the government does not take the trouble of initiating an expropriation
proceeding, the private owner has the option to compel payment of the property taken, when
justified. The trial court should continue to proceed with this case to determine just
compensation in accordance with law. Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership,
717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Expropriation proceedings for national infrastructure projects are governed by Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court and Republic Act (RA) No. 8974.

The power of eminent domain is an inherent competence of the state. It is essential to a

sovereign. Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly define this power but subjects it to a
limitation: that it be exercised only for public use and with payment of just compensation.
Whether the use is public or whether the compensation is constitutionally just will be determined
finally by the courts. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 191945
March 11, 2015

Expropriation, the procedure by which the government takes possession of private property, is
outlined primarily in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It undergoes two (2) phases.

The first phase determines the propriety of the action. The second phase determines the
compensation to be paid to the landowner. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA
550, G.R. No. 191945 March 11, 2015

Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 “provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property
owner than Rule 67” since it requires the immediate payment of the zonal value and the value
of the improvements on the land to the property owner before the trial court can allow the
government to take possession.

In contrast, Rule 67 only requires the government to deposit the assessed value of the property
for it to enter and take possession. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R.
No. 191945 March 11, 2015

Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8974, unlike Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires immediate payment to the landowner of one hundred percent (100%) of the value of
the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).

It is the Bureau of Internal Revenue, not the court, which determines the zonal value. The law
also requires the immediate payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures on the
land before the trial court can issue the Writ of Possession. National Power Corporation vs.
Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 191945 March 11, 2015

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The statutory requirement to pay a provisional amount equivalent to the full Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation does not substitute for the judicial determination of just
compensation.

The payment to the property owner of a preliminary amount is one way to ensure that property
will not be condemned arbitrarily. It allows frontloading the costs of the exercise so that it is the
government instrumentality that bears the burden and not the owner whose property is taken.
National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 191945 March 11, 2015

The payment of a provisional value may also serve as indemnity for damages in the event that
the expropriation does not succeed.

In City of Manila v. Alegar Corporation, 674 SCRA 378 (2012): [T]he advance deposit required
under Section 19 of the Local Government Code constitutes an advance payment only in the
event the expropriation prospers. Such deposit also has a dual purpose: as prepayment if the
expropriation succeeds and as indemnity for damages if it is dismissed.

This advance payment, a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of possession, should not be
confused with payment of just compensation for the taking of property even if it could be a factor
in eventually determining just compensation. If the proceedings fail, the money could be used to
indemnify the owner for damages. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R.
No. 191945 March 11, 2015

Once the amount of just compensation has been determined, it stands to reason that this is the
amount that must be paid to the landowner as compensation for his or her property.

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, taking of private property necessarily includes
its possession. Government, then, must pay the proper amount of just compensation, instead of
the provisional value in order to enter and take the private property. National Power
Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 191945 March 11, 2015

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It is the State that bears the burden of proving that the taking of private property is for a public
purpose.

If it fails in discharging this burden, it must return the property to the private owner, subject to
whatever damages were incurred in the course of the taking. National Power Corporation vs.
Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R. No. 191945 March 11, 2015

The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be for public
use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having
jurisdiction over the proceedings.

The rule, therefore, is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is determined
that it is not for a public purpose, except when: First, the trial court’s order already became final
and executory; Second, the government already took possession of the property; and Lastly, the
expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner. The expropriation case is not
automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be for public use. The state must first file
the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over the
proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding is
always subject to judicial discretion. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, 752 SCRA 550, G.R.
No. 191945 March 11, 2015

Before the state may expropriate private property for a national infrastructure project, it must
first comply with the requisites in Republic Act (RA) No. 8974, otherwise known as An Act to
Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes.

A Writ of Possession may be issued only upon full compliance with Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8974. Republic vs. Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez, 754 SCRA 298, G.R. No. 175493 March 25, 2015

The provisional value that must be paid under Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 should
not be confused with the payment of just compensation required by the Constitution in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.

Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency must, upon filing of the
expropriation complaint, immediately pay the property owner an amount equivalent to 100% of

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the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the value of any improvements or structure on a replacement cost method. The
law further mandates that courts may issue a Writ of Possession only upon the presentation by
the implementing agency of a certificate of availability of funds. Republic vs. Heirs of Gabriel Q.
Fernandez, 754 SCRA 298, G.R. No. 175493 March 25, 2015

Any payment made by the Republic as to the expropriated property’s provisional value is not
equivalent to the payment of the present fair market value of the property.

It only serves as a prepayment so that the government may take possession of the property.
Moreover, the value need not be judicially determined; rather, the value has already been set by
the current relevant zonal value of the area as classified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This
prepayment must also be paid immediately to the owner of the property before a Writ of
Possession may be issued. Republic vs. Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez, 754 SCRA 298, G.R. No.
175493 March 25, 2015

For the Republic to be able to take possession of the property, the law mandates that it must
first pay to the landowner one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on
the current relevant zonal valuation of the property by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

The payment of less than the amount required by law cannot be considered substantial
compliance. Republic vs. Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez, 754 SCRA 298, G.R. No. 175493 March
25, 2015

While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the property, an
easement of right-of-way on a private property can be considered a taking under eminent
domain under certain conditions.

Petitioner is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee on the
basis that its acquisition of a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents’ land was a
taking under the power of eminent domain. While expropriation normally involves a taking of
title to and possession of the property, an easement of right-of-way on a private property can be
considered a taking under eminent domain under certain conditions. In Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA
620 (1969): Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason

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appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way. National Power
Corporation vs. Asoque, 802 SCRA 582, G.R. No. 172507 September 14, 2016

A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent domain when there is
material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the
property for an indefinite period.

The intrusion into the property must be so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s
full enjoyment of the property and to limit his or her exploitation of it.

The right-of-way easement resulting in a limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” National Power
Corporation vs. Asoque, 802 SCRA 582, G.R. No. 172507 September 14, 2016

Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation." This rings true for agrarian reform cases where
private lands are taken by the State to be distributed to farmers who serve as beneficiaries of
these lands.

The amount of just compensation must be determined based on the fair market value of the
property at the time of the taking. In National Power Corporation v. Spouses Ileto, this Court
defined fair market value.

The full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensity the
meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of
a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of
money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." [The market
value] is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values
determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values may serve as
factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property.

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To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner, the nature and character of
the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion. The Special Agrarian Court must ensure
that the amount determined at the end of the proceedings is equivalent to the fair market value
of the property at the time of the taking, and not based on a strict adherence to a particular set
or series of rules imposed by agricultural reform laws or administrative orders. Landbank of the
Philippines vs. Manzano, et al., G.R. No. 188243 January 24, 2018

The power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked only by the
legislature.

Moreover, this plenary power of taxation cannot be delegated by Congress to any other branch
of government or private persons, unless its delegation is authorized by the Constitution itself.
Hence, the discretion to ascertain the following — (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b) person or
property that is subject to tax; (c) exemptions and exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of
collecting the tax — may not be delegated away by Congress. La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory
vs. Court of Appeals, 739 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 165499 November 11, 2014

For double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense to exist, “the same property must
be taxed twice, when it should be taxed but once.”

The contention that the cigarette manufacturers are doubly taxed because they are paying the
specific tax on the raw material and on the finished product in which the raw material was a part
is also devoid of merit. For double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense to exist, “the
same property must be taxed twice, when it should be taxed but once.” “[B]oth taxes must be
imposed on the same property or subject- matter, for the same purpose, by the same . . . taxing
authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during the same taxing period, and they
must be the same kind or character of tax.” La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory vs. Court of
Appeals, 739 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 165499 November 11, 2014

There is no double taxation in the prohibited sense, if the specific tax is imposed by explicit
provisions of the Tax Code on two (2) different articles or products: (1) on the stemmed leaf
tobacco; and (2) on cigar or cigarette.

Excise taxes are essentially taxes on property because they are levied on certain specified goods
or articles manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sale or consumption or for

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any other disposition, and on goods imported. In this case, there is no double taxation in the
prohibited sense because the specific tax is imposed by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two
different articles or products: (1) on the stemmed leaf tobacco; and (2) on cigar or cigarette. La
Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory vs. Court of Appeals, 739 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 165499 November
11, 2014

The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is inherent in the state. Provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays are mere territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They
act only as part of the sovereign. Thus, they do not have the inherent power to tax. Their power
to tax must be prescribed by law.

Consistent with the view that the power to tax does not inhere in local government units, this
court has held that a reserved temperament must be adhered to in construing the extent of a
local government unit’s power to tax. As explained in Icard v. City Council of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870
(1949): It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no
inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in
strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must
be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions — all these — have no
place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation. Demaala vs.
Commission on Audit, 750 SCRA 612, G.R. No. 199752 February 17, 2015

CITIZENSHIP

The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right
to petition the government for redress of grievance.

Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the “right to have rights.” It is one’s
personal and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of citizenship is
the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievance. Citizenship also entails obligations to the political
community of which one is part. Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that
loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is
particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the

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citizen’s birth. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September
20, 2016

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines
“from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.” By
necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.

Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), articulates this
definition by dichotomy: [O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It
is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-
born Filipino. Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of
naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are
“former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.” David vs. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole
purpose.”

As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2),
constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light
of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection
of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They
must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution’s reasons for requiring natural-born status
for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction
that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and
international instruments. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538
September 20, 2016

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Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no
fault of their own.

They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state scholarships,
which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated
by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged proceedings, the direct
objective of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that
foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to
suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803
SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and RA No. 8171 specifically
“to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.”

“Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.” Commonwealth
Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on
October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . .
[b]y naturalization in a foreign country.” Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship
when she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3)
days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition
for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. David vs.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the
effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this
status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for
specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became
citizens of another country before the effectivity of RA No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine
citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain
solemnities.

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Read in conjunction with Section 2’s declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is
not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition
works to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all. David vs. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

Requisites which Natural-born Filipinos who Have Been Naturalized Elsewhere and Wish to Run
for Elective Public Office Must Comply.

Natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public
office must comply with all of the following requirements:

First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or reacquisition of
one’s status as a natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political
rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.

Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is
to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections. Third,
“mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.” This, along with satisfying the other qualification
requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office. David vs. Senate
Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to comply with Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen.

It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of
acts to perfect citizenship. To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of
permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as
illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen’s
naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status. David vs.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

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Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of
Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating
the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship itself.

Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in
keeping with Republic Act No. 9225’s policy of permanence and immutability: “all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.” In
Bengson’s words, the once naturalized citizen is “restored” or brought back to his or her natural-
born status. There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the
interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status
expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from
the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine
citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de facto. Republic Act
No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and
requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of
other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself.
Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular, extended process
with which the former natural-born citizen must comply. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal,
803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members.”

As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391 (1988):
The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as “intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature.” Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm
“as full, clear and complete.” Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Locsin vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 635, G.R. No. 204123 March 19, 2013

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Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral
tribunals.

It is only before them that post-election challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice President,
in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated. The judgments of these
tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17’s stipulation of electoral
tribunals’ being the “sole” judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1’s express
statement that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” David vs. Senate
Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) or the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), makes manifestly gross errors in its
factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not
accounted for.

A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a

misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse
of discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law. David vs.
Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538 September 20, 2016

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

The president is the head of the executive branch, a co-equal of the judiciary under the
Constitution. His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of government.
Inter-branch courtesy is but a consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers. As such, the
president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature, during his or her
incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's immunity from suit.

This Court explained why it is improper to implead the incumbent President of the Philippines.
The doctrine has both policy and practical considerations: Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the

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dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great
and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of
the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone.
Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office
only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Aquino,
G.R. No. 210500 April 2, 2019

A foreign loan agreement with international financial institutions, such as a multilateral

lending agency organized by governments like the Asian Development Bank, is an executive or
international agreement contemplated by our government procurement system.

This Court has held that a foreign loan agreement with international financial institutions, such
as a multilateral lending agency organized by governments like the Asian Development Bank, is
an executive or international agreement contemplated by our government procurement system.
Department of Public Works and Highways vs. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, 839
SCRA 397, G.R. No. 179732 September 13, 2017

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

The Supreme Court (SC), in construing the law, merely declares what a particular provision has
always meant. It does not create new legal obligations. The Supreme Court does not have the
power to legislate. Interpretations of law made by courts necessarily always have a
“retroactive” effect.

When Team Energy filed its refund claim in 2004, the 1997 NIRC was already in effect, which
clearly provided for: (a) 120 days for the Commissioner to act on a taxpayer’s claim; and (b) 30
days for the taxpayer to appeal either from the Commissioner’s decision or from the expiration
of the 120-day period, in case of the Commissioner’s inaction. “Rules and regulations [including
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95] or parts [of them] which are contrary to or inconsistent with [the
NIRC] are . . . amended or modified accordingly.” This Court, in construing the law, merely
declares what a particular provision has always meant. It does not create new legal obligations.
This Court does not have the power to legislate. Interpretations of law made by courts necessarily
always have a “retroactive” effect. Team Energy Corporation (formerly: Mirant Pagbilao

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Corporation and Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.) vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 859 SCRA
1, G.R. No. 197663 March 14, 2018

Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass.

Similar to Montesclaros v. COMELEC, 384 SCRA 269 (2002), petitioner is asking this court to stop
Congress from passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has
explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is “not subject to
judicial restraint[.]” A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the
Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule
on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition,
therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court’s
determination. In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal
Autonomy Movement vs. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal
Autonomy , 746 SCRA 352, UDK-15143 January 21, 2015

Judicial power includes the power of the courts to declare the acts of the executive and
legislative branches of the government void, when they act beyond the powers conferred to
them by law.

This second dimension does not operate independently of, but within the parameters delimited
by, the first dimension. The first dimension of judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution delimits the subject of judicial inquiry, that is, to “actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.” The exercise of this power, then,
is proper only when a judicial question is raised, as opposed to a matter that is better left to the
competence of the other branches of the government. Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta vs. Land Bank of
the Philippines, 836 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 205128 August 9, 2017

The constitutionality of an official act may be the subject of judicial review, provided the matter
is not raised collaterally.

In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008): Judicial review of official
acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions

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cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. . . The constitutional
issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is
necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota presented. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted) The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces
Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition. Petitioners started their Petition with a claim that
their right to access to justice was violated, but ended it with a prayer for a declaration of the
Visiting Forces Agreement’s unconstitutionality. They attempt to create the connection between
the two by asserting that the Visiting Forces Agreement prevents the transfer of Pemberton to
Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is tantamount to the impairment of this court’s authority.
Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde, 775 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015

The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain
limitations.

Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take
cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. In the
Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs.
Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy , 746 SCRA
352, UDK-15143 January 21, 2015

There is an actual case or controversy when the case presents conflicting or opposite legal rights
that may be resolved by the court in a judicial proceeding.

Respondent’s withdrawal of its application for registration has rendered this case moot and
academic. This court’s power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. There is an actual case or controversy when the case presents conflicting or
opposite legal rights that may be resolved by the court in a judicial proceeding. In David v.

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Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006): An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest”; a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief. Republic vs. Moldex Realty, Inc., 783 SCRA 414, G.R. No.
171041 February 10, 2016; see also In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy , 746 SCRA 352, UDK-15143 January 21, 2015

A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue
that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist.

A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue
that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable controversy
that may be resolved by the court. This court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve
issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts generally “decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.” Respondent’s Manifestation stating its
withdrawal of its application for registration has erased the conflicting interests that used to be
present in this case. Respondent’s Manifestation was an expression of its intent not to act on
whatever claim or right it has to the property involved. Thus, the controversy ended when
respondent filed that Manifestation. A ruling on the issue of respondent’s right to registration
would be nothing but an advisory opinion. “[T]he power of judicial review does not repose upon
the courts a ‘self-starting capacity.’” This court cannot, through affirmation or denial, rule on the
issue of respondent’s right to registration because respondent no longer asserts this right.
Republic vs. Moldex Realty, Inc., 783 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 171041 February 10, 2016

Instances When Courts Assume Jurisdiction Over Cases Otherwise Rendered Moot and
Academic.

It is true that this court does not always refuse to assume jurisdiction over a case that has been
rendered moot and academic by supervening events. Courts assume jurisdiction over cases
otherwise rendered moot and academic when any of the following instances are present: (1)
Grave constitutional violations; (2) Exceptional character of the case; (3) Paramount public
interest; (4) The case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or (5)
The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Republic vs. Moldex Realty, Inc., 783 SCRA
414, G.R. No. 171041 February 10, 2016; see also Timbol vs. Commission on Elections, 751 SCRA
456, G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015

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Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, petitioner
has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has
been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006): Locus standi is defined as “a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed
by the “real parties-in-interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.” Accordingly, the “real party-in-interest” is “the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In
the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement
vs. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy , 746 SCRA
352, UDK-15143 January 21, 2015

The Supreme Court (SC) has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved
are of “transcendental importance” to the public.

Specifically, this court has stated that: the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can
be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. Transcendental importance
is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol
ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 415 SCRA 44 (2003): There being no doctrinal definition of
transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional
or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised. A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for
this court to set aside procedural rules: Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a
matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental
importance must be supported by the proper allegations. In the Matter of: Save the Supreme
Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs. Abolition of Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy , 746 SCRA 352, UDK-15143 January
21, 2015

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What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is
a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has
been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act.

In Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), this court previously elaborated on the concept of
what constitutes a political question: What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their
primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. (Emphasis omitted) It is not
for this court to rehearse and reenact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In
political forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the text of the law is based on a
general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general
application by the executive branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and
specific facts that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se. The Diocese of Bacolod vs.
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of

different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the legislature. The political
question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that
are exclusively within the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the
Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference. It
will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so as
to amount to grave abuse of discretion. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

The Constitution allows the exercise of the power of judicial review in cases where grave abuse
of discretion exists.

It is true that the Constitution allows the exercise of the power of judicial review in cases where
grave abuse of discretion exists. In this case, however, a petition for certiorari before this Court
was not the “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” because, as
discussed, the trial court already acquired jurisdiction over the case. The proper remedy for
Napoles was to proceed to trial and allow the exhaustive presentation of evidence by the parties.
During the pendency of this Petition, the main case from which the Petition for Certiorari
stemmed was decided by the trial court. In its April 14, 2015 Decision, Branch 150 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City found Napoles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious illegal
detention, punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. She was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay Benhur Luy P50,000.00 as civil

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indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Napoles vs. De Lima, 797 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 213529
July 13, 2016

Grave Abuse of Discretion

Grave abuse of discretion is the “arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice
or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law.” Ong Lay Hin vs. Court of Appeals, 748 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 191972 January
26, 2015

The constitutional requirement that the basis of the decision of our courts should be clearly
articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely assure fairness.

It is likewise crucial to assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions on the basis
of reasonable inference from credible and admissible evidence and the text of law and our
jurisprudence. Decisions of all courts should not be based on any other considerations. Not only
will fully coherent and cogent reasons have greater chances to convince the litigants of their
chances on appeal; they also make appeals possible. After all, appellate courts cannot be
assumed to have so much omniscience that they can read what the trial judge has not written.
Philippine National Bank vs. Heirs of the Late Ireneo and Caridad Entapa, 802 SCRA 392, G.R.
No. 215072 September 7, 2016

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Fiscal Autonomy

We must, however, differentiate the guidelines for the grant of allowances and benefits to
officials and employees of members of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group. The
judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman are granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. The fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group is an aspect of the members’
independence guaranteed by the Constitution. Their independence is a necessary component for
their existence and survival in our form of government. Maritime Industry Authority vs.
Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 185812 January 13, 2015

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Real fiscal autonomy covers the grant of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and
properties at will, free from any outside control or interference.

This includes the judgment to use its funds to provide additional allowances and benefits to its
officials and employees deemed to be necessary and relevant in the performance of their
functions in the office. Due to the nature of the functions of the Constitutional and Fiscal
Autonomy Group and the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy, an issuance by the Department
of Budget and Management or any other agency of the government is not necessary to exclude
an allowance or benefit from the standardized salary. Maritime Industry Authority vs.
Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 185812 January 13, 2015

Allowing the President or his or her alter ego to dictate the allowances or benefits that may be
received by the officers and employees of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group will
undermine their independence.

Allowing the President or his or her alter ego to dictate the allowances or benefits that may be
received by the officers and employees of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group will
undermine their independence. This arrangement is repugnant to their autonomy enshrined by
the Constitution. As said in Velasco v. Commission on Audit, 681 SCRA 102 (2012), the grant or
regulation of the grant of productivity incentive allowance or similar benefits are in the exercise
of the President’s power of control over these entities. Not being under the President’s power of
control, the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group should be able to determine the
allowances or benefits that suit the functions of the office. Maritime Industry Authority vs.
Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 185812 January 13, 2015

Article IX(B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
shall be “the central personnel agency of the Government.”

In line with the constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a public trust, the
Commission was tasked with the duty “to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules
governing the selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants.” Light Rail transit
Authority vs. Salvaña, 726 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

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The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the Government, may
“establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service.”

Although it conceded that no law prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of their tenure, this court in Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 590 SCRA 110
(2009), upheld Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 010988, which prohibited local elective
officials from making appointments immediately before and after elections. In addition,
Resolution No. 010988 prohibited “mass appointments,” or those “issued in bulk or in large
number after the elections by an outgoing local chief executive and there is no apparent need
for their immediate issuance.” The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco, 757 SCRA 222,
G.R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015

The Commission on Audit (COA) has the power to withhold payment of money due to persons
indebted to the government.

Imposing liability on cashiers for lost money or property in their custody means that the value of
the money or property becomes their debt. The Commission on Audit has the power to withhold
payment of money due to persons indebted to the government. Section 37 of Presidential Decree
No. 1445 provides: Section 37. Retention of money for satisfaction of indebtedness to
government.—When any person is indebted to any government agency, the Commission may
direct the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due such person or his estate to
be applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness. Gutierrez vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 435,
G.R. No. 200628 January 13, 2015

Under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, only the Commission on
Audit (COA) has the jurisdiction to settle claims “of any sort” against the government.

The back payment of any compensation to public officers and employees cannot be done through
a writ of execution. Under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, only
the Commission on Audit has the jurisdiction to settle claims “of any sort” against the
government: SECTION 26. General Jurisdiction.—The authority and powers of the Commission
shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and
controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers
pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books,
records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of
all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as
well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or

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owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or -controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries, and other self-governing [sic] boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government,
and as herein prescribed, including nongovernmental entities subsidized by the government,
those funded by donation through the government, those required to pay levies or government
share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded
by the government. Republic vs. Cortez, 817 SCRA 19, G.R. No. 187257, G.R. No. 187776
February 7, 2017

The Commission on Audit (COA) is the guardian of public funds and the Constitution has vested
it with the “power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property [of] the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations with original charters.”

The Constitution likewise empowered the Commission on Audit with the: exclusive authority . . .
to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Granada vs. People,
818 SCRA 381, G.R. No. 184092, G.R. No. 186084, G.R. No. 186272, G.R. No. 186488, G.R. No.
18657 February 22, 2017; see also Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Commission on Audit, 840
SCRA 163, G.R. No. 213581 September 19, 2017

The 2009 Rules have expanded the Commission Proper’s original jurisdiction provided for under
the 1997 Rules by authorizing it to act not only on money claims but also on several kinds of
request. These requests are: (a) for hiring of legal retainers, (b) for write-offs of unliquidated
cash advances and dormant amounts, and (c) for relief from accountability for losses due to
acts of man.

Nonetheless, despite the Commission Proper’s expanded jurisdiction, the Commission on Audit’s
2009 Rules still prescribe the proper procedure to be followed for the resolution of the original
case. Money claims against the government continue to require the submission of a petition and
an answer, with the petitioner having the option to file a reply at his or her discretion. On the
other hand, a request of a government agency to hire a legal retainer is to be filed with the
Commission on Audit Office of the General Counsel, who shall then act on the request in
respondent’s behalf. The procedure for requests for write-offs of unliquidated cash advances and

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dormant accounts and for relief from accountability for losses due to acts of man can be found
in Rule VIII, Section 4, which states: Section 4. Other Cases.—Requests for write-off of accounts
receivable or unliquidated cash advances exceeding P1 million; or relief from accountability for
acts of man such as robbery, theft, arson in excess of P5 million; or approval of private sale of
government property; or other matters within the original jurisdiction of the [Commission
Proper], shall be filed with the Commission Secretary. The Commission Secretary shall refer the
case to the Central/Regional Office concerned for comment and recommendation and thereafter
to the Legal Services Sector, for preparation of the draft decision for consideration of the
Commission Proper. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Commission on Audit, 840 SCRA 163, G.R.
No. 213581 September 19, 2017

A corporation, whether with or without an original charter, is under the audit jurisdiction of
the Commission on Audit so long as the government owns or has controlling interest in it.

The Commission on Audit generally has audit jurisdiction over public entities. In the
Administrative Code's Introductory Provisions, the Commission on Audit is even allowed to
categorize government-owned or controlled corporations for purposes of the exercise and
discharge of its powers, functions, and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

The extent of the Commission on Audit's audit authority even extends to non-governmental
entities that receive subsidy or equity from or through the government.

Therefore, it is absurd for petitioners to challenge the competency of the Commission on Audit
to determine whether or not an entity is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong,"62 and the determination of whether or not an entity is the
proper subject of its audit jurisdiction is a necessary part of the Commission's constitutional
mandate to examine and audit the government as well as non-government entities that receive
subsidies from it. To insist on petitioners' argument would be to impede the Commission on
Audit's exercise of its powers and functions. Oriondo vs. COA, G.R. No. 211293 June 4, 2019

The definition of “government funds” indicates that for funds to be considered government
funds or public funds, it must be shown that the funds properly belong to a government agency.

We rule that the subject funds belong to Pantranco and are in the nature of private funds. Hence,
the subject funds can be garnished and be used to satisfy the claims of respondents Tatlonghari,
Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, Hinosan Motors, and Western Guaranty Corporation. The

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definition of “government funds” is provided under the Revised Administrative Code and
Presidential Decree No. 1445: “Government funds” includes public moneys of every sort and
other resources pertaining to any agency of the Government. The phrase “pertaining to any
agency of the Government” distinguishes government funds from private funds. The definition
of “government funds” indicates that for funds to be considered government funds or public
funds, it must be shown that the funds properly belong to a government agency. To determine
whether an entity is a government agency, we are also guided by the definition provided under
the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 1445: “Government agency” or
“agency of the government,” or “agency” refers to any department, bureau or office of the
National Government, or any of its branches and instrumentalities, or any political subdivision,
as well as any government-owned or -controlled corporation, including its subsidiaries, or other
self-governing board of commission of the Government. Republic vs. Tatlonghari, 775 SCRA 79,
G.R. No. 170458 November 23, 2015

The general rule is that government funds cannot be garnished.

The determination of the nature of funds is important especially in cases where there are
allegations that the funds involved are government funds. The general rule is that government
funds cannot be garnished. The reason for this rule is explained in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, 410
SCRA 432 (2003). City of Caloocan involved the garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan
in order to satisfy the claim for backwages of Delfina Hernandez Santiago. The City of Caloocan
raised the defense that its funds are public funds and cannot be garnished. Republic vs.
Tatlonghari, 775 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 170458 November 23, 2015

There are government entities whose funds may be garnished even without an appropriation
law.

National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, 404 SCRA 389 (2003), involved an action
for eminent domain. The computation of just compensation for the property belonging to the
Heirs of Guivelondo was P11,200.00 per square meter. Subsequently, the National Housing
Authority moved to dismiss its Complaint for eminent domain, claiming that the amount of just
compensation was too high. The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the trial court. A Notice of Levy
was served by the trial court’s Sheriff. This court held that the funds of the National Housing
Authority are not exempt from garnishment and explained that: Generally, funds and properties
of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. . . . . However, if the funds
belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or -controlled corporation which is

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clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its
funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. Republic vs. Tatlonghari, 775 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 170458 November 23, 2015

Although the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) is a government agency, it

does not follow that Pantranco’s funds were converted into public funds by the mere fact that
its conservator was a government agency.

When Pantranco was under sequestration, it remained to be a private corporation, and its funds
also remained to be private. Although the Presidential Commission on Good Government is a
government agency, it does not follow that Pantranco’s funds were converted into public funds
by the mere fact that its conservator was a government agency. Republic vs. Tatlonghari, 775
SCRA 79, G.R. No. 170458 November 23, 2015

Forfeiture is another mode where ownership of a private corporation is transferred to

government.

In Major General Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 460 SCRA 600 (2005), it was discussed that the effect
of forfeiture “is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power.”
In this case, there was no mention of whether Pantranco was forfeited. Thus, in the absence of
evidence that Pantranco and its assets are ill-gotten, or that it has been forfeited, Pantranco
remains to be a private corporation. Republic vs. Tatlonghari, 775 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 170458
November 23, 2015

The Supreme Court (SC) has defined “escrow” as: [A] written instrument which by its terms
imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his
agent with a stranger or third party, to be kept by the depositary until the performance of a
condition or the happening of a certain event, and then to be delivered over to the grantee,
promisee, or obligee.

If petitioner believed that the subject funds were public funds, then the words “in trust for” and
“for escrow” should not have been used when it deposited the subject funds with the Central
Bank. Republic vs. Tatlonghari, 775 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 170458 November 23, 2015

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BILL OF RIGHTS

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Requisites of Administrative Due Process.

This court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), ruled that
administrative due process requires only the following: (a) The party should be allowed to
present his or her own case and submit supporting evidence; (b) The deciding tribunal must
consider the party’s evidence; (c) There is evidence to support the tribunal’s decision; (d) The
evidence supporting the tribunal’s decision must be substantial or such “relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”; (e) The tribunal’s decision
was based on the evidence presented or the records of the case disclosed to the parties; (f) The
tribunal’s decision must be based on the judges’ independent consideration of the facts and law
governing the case; and (g) The tribunal’s decision must be rendered such that the issues of the
case and the reasons for the decisions are known to the parties. Gutierrez vs. Commission on
Audit, 745 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 200628 January 13, 2015

Due process in administrative proceedings does not necessarily require a trial type of hearing.

Neither does it require an exchange of pleadings between or among the parties. Due process is
satisfied if the party who is properly notified of allegations against him or her is given an
opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such defense was
considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own independent conclusions. Gutierrez vs.
Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 200628 January 13, 2015

When the adverse party has actually had the opportunity to be heard, and has indeed been
heard through pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the rule is
deemed duly served.

This court held that “when the adverse party has actually had the opportunity to be heard, and
has indeed been heard through pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind
the rule is deemed duly served.” Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, 477
SCRA 781 (2005), was quoted with approval in Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development
Corporation, 621 SCRA 636 (2010). In Preysler, this court ruled that “a liberal construction of the
procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has
not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority.” City of Dagupan

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vs. Maramba, 728 SCRA 520, G.R. No. 174411 July 2, 2014; see also Pemberton vs. De Lima, 790
SCRA 128, G.R. No. 217508 April 18, 2016

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.”

We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates
the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. Petitioner as well as the Solicitor
General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us
to revisit the precedent. We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting
wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both
a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Equal protection
of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class
are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.” It is a guarantee
against “undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality.” Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Cabiles, 732 SCRA 22,
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within
the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling
within the class and those who do not fall within the class.

In creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make distinctions and classifications.” In
exercising such power, it has a wide discretion. The equal protection clause does not infringe on
this legislative power. A law is void on this basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily. There
is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same
class and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class
and those who do not fall within the class. A law that does not violate the equal protection clause
prescribes a reasonable classification. A reasonable classification “(1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.” The reinstated
clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification. Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc. vs. Cabiles, 732 SCRA 22, G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

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There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden
of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored
sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged
sector is composed of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands.

The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest
is odious.” Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It
is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid
purpose. Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly.

Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is
entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. “To rule otherwise would be iniquitous
to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers
and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.” Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Cabiles, 732
SCRA 22, G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden
or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women.

In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this narrow
interpretation, which may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. This constitutional provision provides
a more active application than the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
does, which simply states that no person shall “be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden
or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the State to
actively pursue “affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy — that complex of political,
cultural, and economic factors that ensure women’s disempowerment.” Racho vs. Tanaka, 868
SCRA 25, G.R. No. 199515 June 25, 2018

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RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution.

It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution: The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.

As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this
provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after
asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an
offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law
enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.
People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.

In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate
warrant. This court has taken into account the “uniqueness of circumstances involved including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.” The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and
seizures are: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ; 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain
view,” . . . ; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6.
Stop and frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427,
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

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Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto,
and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to
ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk.” “Stop and frisk”
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.
People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

The “stop and frisk” search should be used “when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and
potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure a
search warrant.”

“Stop and frisk” searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the
search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 (1990), was similar “to a ‘stop and frisk’
situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.” This court
stated that the “stop and frisk” search should be used “[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding
and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure
. . . a search warrant.” People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person.

This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.
Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s
person and effects. People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there
is compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997): [A] “stop-
and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and

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detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. (Emphasis supplied) The “stop and frisk” search was
originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. As in
Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997), jurisprudence also allows “stop and frisk” for
cases involving dangerous drugs. People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30,
2014

The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated: Appellant’s
silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee. (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive
objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s
excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free
from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. People vs. Cogaed, 731
SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer
must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to
a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
search.

The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is
about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police
officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s

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constitutional right to privacy requires no less. People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427, G.R. No.
200334 July 30, 2014

Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”

The Constitution provides: Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known
as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision
originated from Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967). This rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. People vs. Cogaed,
731 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally
observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is
committing an illicit act.

Stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime. People v. Cogaed underscored that they
are necessary for law enforcement, though never at the expense of violating a citizen's right to
privacy: "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to
the suspicion of an illicit act. Manibog vs. People, G.R. No. 211214 March 20, 2019

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There should have been "more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity" to uphold the validity of a stop and frisk
search.

Chief Justice Bersamin cautioned against warrantless searches based on just one (1) suspicious
circumstance. There should have been "more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity" to uphold the validity of a stop
and frisk search.

Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have
personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then
create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate
further. Manibog vs. People, G.R. No. 211214 March 20, 2019

Searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports.

With port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991), is inapplicable in the present case.
Dela Cruz vs. People, 779 SCRA 34, G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016

The Supreme Court (SC) lays down the exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed
legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in “plain view”; (3)
search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the
exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrant-less search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in “plain view”; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. Dela Cruz vs. People, 779 SCRA 34, G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016

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Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when
“persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in
the enforcement of customs laws.”

The Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such warrantless search, as this court
ruled in Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al., 22 SCRA 857 (1968): The Code authorizes persons having
police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or
search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or
any person onboard, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. Dela Cruz vs. People, 779
SCRA 34, G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016

Requirements for a Valid Customs Searches.

Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the
search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the
enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house. Here,
the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port security measures. The search was not
conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions
of the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur
within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs
laws. Dela Cruz vs. People, 779 SCRA 34, G.R. No. 209387 January 11, 2016

If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the
exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these
actions must be done “at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable.”

As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical
inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must
be done. As to when, it must be “immediately after seizure and confiscation.” As to where, it
depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. Lescano vs. People, 781
SCRA 73, G.R. No. 214490 January 13, 2016

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At least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and photographing. These
persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an
elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service.

Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were
seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution
Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused
or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her
representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National
Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place. Section 21
spells out matters that are imperative. “Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate
compliance but do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice.”
This is especially so when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia
is the result of carefully planned operations, as is the case here. Lescano vs. People, 781 SCRA
73, G.R. No. 214490 January 13, 2016

As amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10640, Section 21(1) uses the disjunctive “or,” i.e., “with
an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the
media.” Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from the National
Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other.

Section 21(1) was simultaneously relaxed and made more specific by Republic Act No. 10640. It
was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No. 9165, the use of the
conjunctive “and” indicated that Section 21 required the presence of all of the following, in
addition to “the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel”: First, a representative from the media; Second, a
representative from the Department of Justice; and Third, any elected public official. As amended
by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21(1) uses the disjunctive “or,” i.e., “with an elected public
official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media.” Thus, a
representative from the media and a representative from the National Prosecution Service are
now alternatives to each other. People vs. Que, 853 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994 January 31, 2018

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The presence of third-party witnesses is imperative, not only during the physical inventory and
taking of pictures, but also during the actual seizure of items.

The requirement of conducting the inventory and taking of photographs “immediately after
seizure and confiscation” necessarily means that the required witnesses must also be present
during the seizure or confiscation. This is confirmed in People v. Mendoza, 727 SCRA 113 (2014),
where the presence of these witnesses was characterized as an “insulating presence [against] the
evils of switching, ‘planting’ or contamination.” People vs. Que, 853 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 212994
January 31, 2018

Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not only that the transacted
drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined are the same
drugs presented in court.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires “that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing
the corpus delicti — the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug.” Moreover,
“every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.” The rule on chain of custody
plays this role in buy-bust operations, warranting that there are no doubts on the identity of
evidence. “Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not only that the
transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined are the
same drugs presented in court.” This is a pre-condition “for conviction as the drugs are the main
subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be
proven for the crime to exist.” People vs. Segundo, 833 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 205614 July 26, 2017

Every person in the chain must attest to the precautions observed while in his or her possession
to guarantee that the item’s condition has not been altered and that there is no opportunity
for anyone not in the chain to take hold of it.

Although the meaning of chain of custody is not explicitly provided for under Republic Act No.
9165, it is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002: b.
“Chain of custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.] Chain of custody is composed of

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testimonies on each link of the sequence. The account starts from the time the item was taken
until it was presented as evidence such that each person who had contact with “the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in [his
or her] possession, the condition in which it was received and . . . in which it was delivered to the
next.” Every person in the chain must attest to the precautions observed while in his or her
possession to guarantee that the item’s condition has not been altered and that there is no
opportunity for anyone not in the chain to take hold of it. People vs. Segundo, 833 SCRA 16, G.R.
No. 205614 July 26, 2017

A buy-bust operation is prone to abuse, “the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion.”

A buy-bust operation, however, poses a danger “that has not escaped the attention of the
framers of the law.” Thus, it is prone to abuse, “the most notorious of which is its use as a tool
for extortion.” As explained in People v. Tan, 348 SCRA 116 (2000), [B]y the very nature of anti-
narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as
informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets
or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals,
the possibility of abuse is great. (Emphasis provided) For this reason, Republic Act No. 9165
provides for a definite procedure relevant to the confiscation and handling of prohibited drugs.
Accordingly, the prosecution is mandated to prove that this procedure has been complied with
to establish the elements of the charge. People vs. Segundo, 833 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 205614 July
26, 2017

The step-by-step process under Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is “a matter of substantive law,
which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.”

The prosecution’s initial witness, SPO1 Balsamo, admitted that no pictures of the alleged
confiscated items were taken. Contrary to this assertion, PO2 Yumul testified differently. While
he insisted that he took photographs of the seized items, which he also inventoried, the photos
purportedly got lost. Apparently, these were the only testimonies that comprise the entirety of
the prosecution’s evidence on the inventory and photographs of the confiscated items. To
underscore, the step-by-step process under Republic Act No. 9165 is “a matter of substantive
law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.” The law has been
“crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially
considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment.” People vs. Segundo, 833 SCRA
16, G.R. No. 205614 July 26, 2017

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Failure to comply with Section 21 “is not fatal to the prosecution’s case provided that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers.”

Failure to comply with Section 21 “is not fatal to the prosecution’s case provided, that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers.” This exception, however, “will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that
justifies departure from the general rule.” In this case, the prosecution offered no justifiable
reason why they failed to comply with the conditions provided for under the law. To underscore,
“for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been
preserved.” Simply put, “the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact.”
Hence, courts cannot assume what these reasons are, if they even exist at all. People vs.
Segundo, 833 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 205614 July 26, 2017

The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid down in
jurisprudence: (1) a “warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,” (2) search of “evidence
in ‘plain view,’” (3) “search of a moving vehicle,” (4) “consented warrantless searches,” (5)
“customs search,” (6) “stop and frisk,” and (7) “exigent and emergency circumstances.”

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any
given situation, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable . . . search . . . is purely a judicial question,” the
resolution of which depends upon the unique and distinct factual circumstances. This may
involve an inquiry into “the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured.” Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200370
June 7, 2017

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made.

Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; “the process cannot be reversed.” For
there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an
arrest may also be effected without a warrant. There are three (3) grounds that will justify a
warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

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committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense

has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R.
No. 200370 June 7, 2017

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires that
an offense has just been committed. It connotes “immediacy in point of time.” That a crime was
in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is
committed up to the point of arrest. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200370 June
7, 2017

Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.

In this case, petitioner’s arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of
the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police
officers relied solely on the tip they received. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No.
200370 June 7, 2017

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense. A hearsay tip by itself

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does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based
on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is
what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No.
200370 June 7, 2017

Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a
valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence.

Petitioner’s silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless
search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered
through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence. Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be “unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion.” The validity of a consented
warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances. This may involve an inquiry
into the environment in which the consent was given such as “the presence of coercive police
procedures.” Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied
acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. In People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014), this
Court observed: Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a
coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private
space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases,
such waivers are not to be presumed. The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim
that petitioner consented to the warrantless search. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R.
No. 200370 June 7, 2017

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. The extent of routine

inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers
carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing
searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical
purposes. Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search
warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating
transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles. However, the inherent mobility of
vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches. Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable

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cause. A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Due to the number of
cases involving warrantless searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is
imperative to discuss the parameters by which searches in checkpoints should be conducted.
Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the
lives of individuals and ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the
government’s survival is in danger. Considering that routine checkpoints intrude “on [a]
motorist’s right to ‘free passage’” to a certain extent, they must be “conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists.” The extent of routine inspections must be limited to a visual search.
Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.
Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200370 June 7, 2017

A search where an “officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein” is not
unreasonable.

In Valmonte v. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990), this Court clarified that “[f]or as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s
right against unreasonable search[es].” Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200370
June 7, 2017

An extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle’s passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle
contains instruments of an offense.

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to
a visual search. This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where
individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive
searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence
obtained will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution. Veridiano vs.
People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200370 June 7, 2017

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Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still
hearsay no matter how reliable it may be.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an
extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis
of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is
not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion. Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based
on tipped information, there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches
conducted by the authorities. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200370 June 7, 2017

In Dela Cruz v. People, 779 SCRA 34 (2016), the search conducted on the accused was considered
valid because it was done in accordance with routine security measures in ports.

There are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v. People, 779 SCRA
34 (2016), the search conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in
accordance with routine security measures in ports. This case, however, should not be construed
to apply to border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se; there is a “reasonable
reduced expectation of privacy” when travellers pass through or stop at airports or other ports
of travel. Veridiano vs. People, 826 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200370 June 7, 2017

Probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was being,
or was about to be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search
may be valid, as long as these two (2) acts were substantially contemporaneous, and there was
probable cause.

Accordingly, this Court held that the arrest in People v. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142 (2003), was invalid,
since the appellants in that case were not performing any such overt acts at the time: Appellants
in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that would
hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers’
testimonies are to be believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box.
Although appellant Tudtud did appear “afraid and perspiring,” “pale” and “trembling,” this was
only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box. Aparente vs. People, 841 SCRA 89,
G.R. No. 205695 September 27, 2017

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“Entrapment” and “Instigation,” Distinguished.

Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation. In
Chang v. People, 496 SCRA 321 (2006), this court explained that: There is entrapment when law
officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual
commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime.
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the
mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime
comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. People vs. Casio, 744
SCRA 113, G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014

With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an
entrapment operation’s validity.

In People v. Padua, 625 SCRA 220 (2010), this court underscored the value of flexibility in police
operations: A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust
operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of
the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom
thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need
for prior surveillance. People vs. Casio, 744 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

In a democracy, the citizen’s right to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance
of political decision-making is recognized.

It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation in nation-
building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free
expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court. The Diocese of Bacolod
vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

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The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the
right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes.

In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech
and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid
down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future,
especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for
one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the
hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily
includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental
constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court. The Diocese of
Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post the tarpaulin in their
private property, as an exercise of their right of free expression.

The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and
weak, on their equal opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom
of expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post the
tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the
invocation of the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from
deciding on the merits of this case. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of
either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the Reproductive Health Law
(RH Law). Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.

True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and
political parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be “designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.” The
Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

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The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances
made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.

Communication exists when “(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions
because he or she reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the
manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the actions.” “[I]n communicative action[,] the
hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing
them with criticism or requests for justification.” Speech is not limited to vocal communication.
“[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’” such
that “‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’
the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to
freedom of expression].’” The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R.
No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent,
should be protected and encouraged.

Proponents of the political theory on “deliberative democracy” submit that “substantial, open,
[and] ethical dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity.” This theory may
be considered broad, but it definitely “includes [a] collective decision-making with the
participation of all who will be affected by the decision.” It anchors on the principle that the
cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in
running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or
nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on
deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government accountable.
Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental
functions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political
discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission
on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

The Supreme Court (SC) has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as “highly ranked
in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights enjoy precedence and primacy.

Petitioners invoke their “constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and beliefs
about issues and candidates.” They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and
appreciation of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism
toward those who voted in its favor. It was “part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law,”

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which was not paid for by any candidate or political party. Thus, “the questioned orders which .
. . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared
unconstitutional and void.” This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as
“highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights enjoy precedence and
primacy. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973), this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of
expression: Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is
a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against
the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political,
economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions.” The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

“Political Speech” and “Commercial Speech,” Distinguished.

We distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech “both
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “foster[ing]
informed and civic-minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. The Diocese
of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be
protected by the Supreme Court (SC).

Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression “is not the god of rights to which all other
rights and even government protection of state interest must bow.” The right to freedom of
expression is indeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still subject to some
restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or
content-neutral. Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker
or the subject of the expression. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA
1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

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Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.

Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is
not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008): A content-based regulation, however, bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The
latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions
imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. (Citations omitted) Under this rule, “the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.” The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on
Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There
is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as
to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.

There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of noncandidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No.
205728 January 21, 2015

“Content-Based Restraint” and “Content-Neutral Regulation,” Distinguished.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The Diocese of Bacolod vs.
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

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In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), this court summarized the
steps that permit applicants must follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead
of time as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly.

This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if there would be valid objections,
provided that the clear and present danger test is the standard used for his decision and the
applicants are given the opportunity to be heard. This ruling was practically codified in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Subsequent
jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the
2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226 (2006), this court discussed how Batas Pambansa
Blg. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and manner. In 2010,
this court found in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518 (2010), that
respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally
permit by changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first affording
petitioners the opportunity to be heard. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections,
747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and
violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.

In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the
maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their
right to exercise freedom of expression. The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the
tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences. These should be
encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to
suffrage. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728
January 21, 2015

The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political
candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected.

It is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidate’s
real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have
an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy
that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more
effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental freedom. The
Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

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In an equality-based approach, “politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,]

but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.”

This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as
protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically
subdued within society’s ideological ladder. This view acknowledges that there are dominant
political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities
that may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging
economy that is part of the majoritarian world like ours. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission
on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members
of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and
manner.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate. The Diocese of
Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech
of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they
are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has
for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message.

The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the
objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy
of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve
that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis
of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private
property. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728
January 21, 2015

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Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property.

There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made.
COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches
out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech. The Diocese of Bacolod vs.
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to every
single association that comes into existence.

The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to every
single association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize themselves
as a collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to not only be formally recognized
by the state, but also bedecked with all the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official
status. In pursuit of public interest, the state can set reasonable regulations — procedural,
formal, and substantive — with which organizations seeking state imprimatur must comply.
Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education, 784 SCRA 505, G.R. No. 188720
February 23, 2016

Passionate and emphatic grievance, channeled through proper public authorities, partakes of
a degree of protected freedom of expression.

Whether e-mailing or, as in this case, sending e-mails to the persons named in the Informations
— who appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium is found — is sufficiently “public,” as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the
Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be
properly raised during trial. Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper
public authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom of expression. Certainly, if we
remain faithful to the dictum that public office is a public trust, some leeway should be given to
the public to express disgust. The scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in
abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise, this Court exercises
barren abstractions that may wander into situations only imagined, not real. Dio vs. People, 792
SCRA 646, G.R. No. 208146 June 8, 2016

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FREEDOM OF RELIGION

The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral
standards according to a specific religion.

Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious

beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and
rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose. In the same way, this court, in resolving
cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its
judgment on secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts
should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to
keep its part in upholding constitutionally guaranteed rights. There is the danger of “compelled
religion” and, therefore, of negating the very idea of freedom of belief and non-establishment of
religion when religious morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies. Perfecto
vs. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22, 2015

Benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield respondent judge from
liability for misconduct under our laws.

Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first husband. She knew its
effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with her second husband while her first marriage
was subsisting. Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another
person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression. Legal
implications and obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is
regardless of how civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion. Perfecto vs. Esidera, 763
SCRA 323, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22, 2015

NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS

It is settled that “the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited by the exercise

of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general
welfare.”

“It is a basic rule in contracts that the law is deemed written into the contract between the
parties.” The incorporation of regulations into contracts is “a postulate of the police power of the
State.” Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 124, G.R. No.
208062 April 7, 2015

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RIGHTS AGAINTS SELF-INCRIMINATION

Extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid waiver of the right
to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence.

It is undisputed that Dela Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced
into writing. Further, when the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the
latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a valid waiver of his right to
remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel. Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution states that “[t]hese rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.” Dela Cruz was merely told of his Constitutional rights, but he was never asked whether
he understood what he was told or whether he wanted to exercise or avail himself of such rights.
People vs. Opiniano, 832 SCRA 504, G.R. No. 181474 July 26, 2017

When several accused are tried together, the confession made by one (1) of them during the
trial implicating the others is evidence against the latter.

In People v. De la Cruz, 130 SCRA 169 (1984): An accused is always a competent witness for or
against his co-accused, and the fact that he had been discharged from the information does not
affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the relevancy, as well as the weight that
should be accorded his declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence. And in this
connection, it has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory
and convincing, may be the basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused. People vs.
Opiniano, 832 SCRA 504, G.R. No. 181474 July 26, 2017

RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the
statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made “in writing and in the presence
of counsel.”

The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that: . . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain
silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right
to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning
if he so desires. The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to

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include the statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made “in writing and in
the presence of counsel.” The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation,
which begins “when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.” People
vs. Chavez, 735 SCRA 728, G.R. No. 207950 September 22, 2014

Republic Act (RA) No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to “include the
practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for
any violation of law.”

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised
of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario.
Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional
pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the
police station. People vs. Chavez, 735 SCRA 728, G.R. No. 207950 September 22, 2014

An out-of-court identification such as a police show-up is inadmissible if it is tainted with

improper suggestions by police officers.

However, this Court recognizes that the "probative weight of an in-court identification is largely
dependent upon an out-of-court identification." Thus, it is necessary to determine if the conduct
of the latter is above suspicion. People v. Teehankee, Jr. enumerated the ways on how the police
may conduct out-of-court identification and provided guidance on its admissibility, thus: “Out-
of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru
line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.
Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness
and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and

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the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.” Concha vs.
People, G.R. No. 208114 October 3, 2018

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

The fundamental rights of the accused are provided in Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution.

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable. Liong vs. People, 864 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 200630 June 4, 2018

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and
detained but “whose guilt has not yet been proven” in court beyond reasonable doubt.

The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v.
Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573 (2006): The right to bail emanates from the [accused’s constitutional]
right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by
reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon
filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court, as required under
specified conditions. People vs. Escobar, 833 SCRA 180, G.R. No. 214300 July 26, 2017

The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, if
the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment — “regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution” — and when evidence of
one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial
court.

Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. xxx In this case, the imposable penalty for
kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar’s bail is, thus, a matter

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of judicial discretion, provided, that the evidence of his guilt is not strong. People vs. Escobar,
833 SCRA 180, G.R. No. 214300 July 26, 2017

A Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal
proceedings.

Escobar’s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in
criminal proceedings. Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the
dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman,
539 SCRA 415 (2007), declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, is a principle in civil law and “has no bearing on criminal proceedings.”

Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states: Section 18. Application of certain
rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.—The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56
relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed
civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule. Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure
may be applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the
enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. People vs. Escobar, 833 SCRA
180, G.R. No. 214300 July 26, 2017

An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does
not give rise to res judicata.

As in Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415 (2007), even if we are to expand the
argument of the prosecution in this case to contemplate “res judicata in prison grey” or double
jeopardy, the same will still not apply. Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated
without his express consent. Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar’s First Bail Petition,
Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated. People
vs. Escobar, 833 SCRA 180, G.R. No. 214300 July 26, 2017

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A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter — whether accused is
entitled to provisional liberty — and is not a final judgment on accused’s guilt or innocence.

Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately “avoid[s]
unnecessary thoroughness” and does not try the merits of the case. Thus: Summary hearing
means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion
of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on
details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing. People vs. Escobar, 833 SCRA 180,
G.R. No. 214300 July 26, 2017

An accused may file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or
a new matter or fact which warrants a different view.

Appellate courts may correct “errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine
of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.” Thus, an
accused may file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a
“new matter or fact which warrants a different view.” Rolando’s release on bail is a new
development in Escobar’s case. The Court of Appeals has pointed out that the other alleged
coconspirators are already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because Cubillas’
testimony against him was weak. “[Escobar] and [Rolando] participated in the same way, but
[Escobar]’s bail was denied.” Escobar’s fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the
meantime. People vs. Escobar, 833 SCRA 180, G.R. No. 214300 July 26, 2017

The right to counsel under Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution applies in criminal
proceedings, but not in administrative proceedings.

It is a right given to persons accused of an offense during criminal investigation. Any proceeding
conducted by an administrative body is not part of the criminal investigation or prosecution.
Gutierrez vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 200628 January 13, 2015

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“Criminal Proceedings” and “Administrative Proceedings,” Distinguished.

While the purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine if a person suspected of committing

an offense has indeed committed an offense, the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to
determine if a person in public office has violated the trust reposed in him or her by the public.
In a criminal proceeding, if a person is found guilty of an offense, corresponding punishment is
imposed primarily to protect the public being exposed to and correct his or her deviant behavior.
In an administrative proceeding, if a person is found administratively liable, the corresponding
penalty is imposed primarily to preserve public trust and protect the integrity of public service.
Gutierrez vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 200628 January 13, 2015

An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. To secure conviction, the
prosecution must overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of the accused's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt.
— In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense: Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not
demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the immense
responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is not
merely engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a constitutional
imperative The burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this burden
warrants an accused's acquittal. People vs. Turemutsa, G.R. No. 227497 April 10, 2019

A plaintiff’s failure to vigilantly pursue his or her case also affects respondent’s right to speedy
trial.

Nevertheless, we can apply by analogy Regner v. Logarta, 537 SCRA 277 (2007) ruling that
“[a]lthough Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules . . . imposes upon the clerk of court the duty to serve
summons, this does not relieve the petitioner of her own duty as the plaintiff in a civil case to
prosecute the case diligently[,] [and] [i]f the clerk had been negligent, it was petitioner’s duty to
call the court’s attention to that fact.” A plaintiff’s failure to vigilantly pursue his or her case also

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affects respondent’s right to speedy trial. CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 763 SCRA 553, G.R. No. 203928 July 22, 2015

It is a basic right of the accused under our Constitution to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven.

Thus, the quantum of evidence required to overcome this presumption is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 2. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt.—In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. People vs.
San Jose, 828 SCRA 543, G.R. No. 206916 July 3, 2017

An important component of due process is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
of the charges against him or her.

A proper appraisal of the accusations would give the accused an opportunity to adequately
prepare for his or her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be undermined. Iglesias vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, 838 SCRA 114, G.R. No. 180745 August 30, 2017

“To meet the witnesses face to face” is the right of confrontation. Subsumed in this right to
confront is the right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him or her, i.e., to
propound questions on matters stated during direct examination, or connected with it.

The cross-examination may be done “with sufficient fullness and freedom to test [the witness’]
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue.” Liong vs. People, 864 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 200630 June 4,
2018

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Rule 115 of the Rules of Court with its lone section is devoted entirely to the rights of the
accused during trial.

Rule 115, Section 1(f) on the right to cross-examine provides: Section 1. Rights of accused at the
trial.—In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: . . . . (f)
To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as
part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due
diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. Liong vs. People, 864 SCRA 11, G.R.
No. 200630 June 4, 2018

Denying an accused the right to cross-examine will render the testimony of the witness
incomplete and inadmissible in evidence.

“[W]hen cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable
to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.”
However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It “is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination.” When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have waived this right. The witness’ testimony
given during direct examination will remain on record. If this testimony is used against the
accused, there will be no violation of the right of confrontation. Liong vs. People, 864 SCRA 11,
G.R. No. 200630 June 4, 2018

The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a basic, fundamental human right vested
inalienably to an accused.

This right ensures that courts can confidently ferret out the facts on the basis of which they can
determine whether a crime occurred and the level of culpability of the accused. It is a basic
requirement of criminal justice. However, this right does not exist in isolation. The State,
representing the people that may have been wronged by a crime, also has the right to due
process. This means that the prosecution must not be denied unreasonably of its ability to be
able to prove its case through machinations by the accused. When the accused abuses its option
to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to have waived his right to confrontation
and cross-examination. The pattern of postponements and changes of counsel in this case is so
obvious and patent. Petitioner should have been dissuaded by any of the lawyers, unless they,

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too, connived in such an amateurish strategy, which wastes the time and resources of our judicial
system. Liong vs. People, 864 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 200630 June 4, 2018

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay
in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of
the case against the accused.

Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the
examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a
reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must
invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered
by the courts as a waiver of right. Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division; Office of the
Ombudsman; and People, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, & 210141-42 July 31, 2018

The Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases, under Article III, Section
16. The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused with the right to a speedy
trial, a right guaranteed under Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution.

The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The right to
speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before them. As Abadia v. Court of Appeals noted:
The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive
fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those
rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy
disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This
protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before,
during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees
merely the right to a speedy trial.

Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in the administration of
justice. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan: The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in
the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the
trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry

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as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative tem1 and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division; Office of the Ombudsman; and
People, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, & 210141-42 July 31, 2018

While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to speedy disposition
of cases may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in proceedings that
are adversarial and may result in possible criminal liability.

The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations
and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these
proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division; Office of the Ombudsman; and People, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, & 210141-42 July
31, 2018

When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu
proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused
is invited to attend these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these are merely
preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will
not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.

This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as
unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too long, it can result in the
extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of the offense.

Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against the
accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the determination of whether the right
to speedy disposition of cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of
determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the
filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In
People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in
the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned.

With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman must provide for
reasonable periods based upon its experience with specific types of cases, compounded with the
number of accused and the complexity of the evidence required. He or she must likewise make
clear when cases are deemed submitted for decision. The Ombudsman has the power to provide

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for these rules and it is recommended that he or she amend these rules at the soonest possible
time. Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division; Office of the Ombudsman; and People, G.R.
Nos. 206438, 206458, & 210141-42 July 31, 2018

This Court now clarifies the mode of analysis in situations where the right to speedy disposition
of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked.

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the
rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal
prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be
invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the
accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases
to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a
preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and
nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period
taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be
included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked
within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and
the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the
burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time
period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by
malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second,
that the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it
followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the
prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence
made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of
the delay.

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Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire
context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity
of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely
motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of
the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and
substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis
of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases
or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the
constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid
out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised.
The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory
or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy
disposition of cases. Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division; Office of the Ombudsman; and
People, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, & 210141-42 July 31, 2018

The right against double jeopardy serves as a protection: first, “against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal”; second, “against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction”; and, finally, “against multiple punishments for the same offense.”

This Court disagrees with the trial court’s ruling that charging Udang with both rape, under Article
266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
7610, would violate his right against double jeopardy. The right against double jeopardy is
provided in Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution: Section 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act. The first sentence of the provision speaks of “the same offense,” which this Court has
interpreted to mean offenses having identical essential elements. Further, the right against
double jeopardy serves as a protection: first, “against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal”; second, “against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction”;
and, finally, “against multiple punishments for the same offense.” Meanwhile, the second

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sentence of Article III, Section 21 speaks of “the same act,” which means that this act, punished
by a law and an ordinance, may no longer be prosecuted under either if a conviction or acquittal
already resulted from a previous prosecution involving the very same act. People vs. Udang, Sr.,
850 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 210161 January 10, 2018

Appealing the withdrawal of an information does not violate the right of the accused against
being placed in double jeopardy.

In First Women’s Credit Corp. v. Baybay, 513 SCRA 637 (2007): As to what mode of review
petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accused’s motion to withdraw information and/or
to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
instructs: “Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed
in double jeopardy.” In availing of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, petitioners claim that
they had no plain, adequate and speedy remedy to question the MeTC’s grant of the motion. The
records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC before
respondents were arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against appeal in case a criminal case is
dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply. Personal Collection
Direct Selling, Inc. vs. Carandang, 844 SCRA 475, G.R. No. 206958 November 8, 2017

The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the
right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to
address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. De
Lima vs. Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013

The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the
right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to
address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. De
Lima vs. Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013

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A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a

status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the
following circumstances: SECTION 1. Scope.—This rule shall govern the summary procedure in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: A. Civil
Cases: (1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x. (2) All other cases, except
probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x. B.
Criminal Cases: (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; (2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances; (4) All other criminal cases where the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine
not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x. x x x x It is clear from this rule that
this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this
rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the
application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. De Lima vs. Gatdula, 691
SCRA 226, G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the
Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented
in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that
will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty
or security. A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.
Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as “granting the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo.” De Lima vs. Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 204528 February
19, 2013

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LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

No one has a vested right to public office. One can continue to hold public office only for as long
as he or she proves worthy of public trust.

The fundamental notion that one’s tenure in government springs exclusively from the trust
reposed by the public means that continuance in office is contingent upon the extent to which
one is able to maintain that trust. As Chief Justice Enrique Fernando eloquently wrote in his
concurrence in Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34 (1969): [W]e must keep in mind that the Article on
the Civil Service, like other provisions of the Constitution, was inserted primarily to assure a
government, both efficient and adequate to fulfill the ends for which it has been established.
That is a truism. It is not subject to dispute. It is in that sense that a public office is considered a
public trust. Everyone in the public service cannot and must not lose sight of that fact. While his
right as an individual although employed by the government is not to be arbitrarily disregarded,
he cannot and should not remain unaware that the only justification for his continuance in such
service is his ability to contribute to the public welfare. (Citation omitted) No one has a vested
right to public office. One can continue to hold public office only for as long as he or she proves
worthy of public trust. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Regalado, 855 SCRA 54, G.R. Nos. 208481-
82 February 7, 2018

Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to the lowliest clerks,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at
all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond
suspicion. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gesultura, 694 SCRA 337, A.M. No. P-04-1785
April 2, 2013

A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color
of authority.

De facto means “in point of fact.” To speak of something as being de facto is, thus, to say that it
is “[a]ctual [or] existing in fact” as opposed to “[e]xisting by right or according to law,” that is, de
jure. Being factual though not being founded on right or law, de facto is, therefore, “illegitimate
but in effect.” The concept of a de facto officer was explained in Civil Service Commission v. Joson,

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Jr., 429 SCRA 773 (2004). The broad definition of what constitutes an officer de facto was
formulated by Lord Holt in Parker v. Kent, and reiterated by Lord Ellenborough and full King’s
Bench in 1865 in Rex v. Bedford Level, “One who has the reputation of being the officer he
assumes and yet is not a good officer in point of law.” A de facto officer is one who is in possession
of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By color of authority is meant
that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) A de facto officer is
distinguished from a de jure officer, as follows: The difference between the basis of the authority
of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation.
It may be likened to the difference between character and reputation. One is the truth of a man,
the other is what is thought of him. Re: Nomination of Atty. Linda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President,
as Replacement for IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, 711 SCRA 715, A.M.
No. 13-06-11-SC December 10, 2013

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.

In Funa v. Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013), a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding
concurrent positions as the acting Secretary of justice and as Solicitor General. This court, while
ruling that the appointment of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice violated Article VII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, held that he was a de facto officer during his tenure in the
Department of Justice: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties
under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of
the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order to be clear, therefore,
the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming
that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer
legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the
sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from
the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the
promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the
issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal
cases. (Emphasis supplied) Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the
President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he
renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective. Espiritu vs. Del Rosario,
738 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 204964 October 15, 2014

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As against a mere usurper, it is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes
an officer de facto from a usurper.

Thus, a mere usurper is one “who takes possession of [an] office and undertakes to act officially
without any color of right or authority, either actual or apparent.” A usurper is no officer at all.
The expanse of the de facto doctrine was established early in the development of our
jurisprudence. In Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186 (1917), the doctrine was established to
contemplate situations: where the duties of the office were exercised: (a) Without a known
appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were
calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to
be the officer he assumes to be; (b) under color of a known or valid appointment or election,
where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, for
example, a failure to take the oath or give a bond, or similar defect; (c) under color of a known
election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want
of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public; and (d) under
color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such. Re: Nomination of Atty. Linda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President, as
Replacement for IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, 711 SCRA 715, A.M. No.
13-06-11-SC December 10, 2013

Elements that Must be Present to Consider One a De Facto Officer.

To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present: 1) There must be a de jure
office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must
be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. (Underscoring supplied) In the present
case, there is no dispute that a de jure office — that of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon — exists.
Neither is there any dispute that Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions
of such office. In fact, the Motions submitted as part of the first Administrative Matter were
precisely intended to put a stop to her performance of these functions. Likewise, Atty. Chaguile
took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon through
a process, albeit “irregular or informal, so that [she] is not a mere volunteer,” that is, not through
her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, she did so under “color
of authority,” as defined in settled jurisprudence (e.g., Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., 429
SCRA 773 [2004], Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit, 291 SCRA 322, 330 [1998], and Dennis A.B.
Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra, 691 SCRA 196 [2013]). Re: Nomination of Atty.
Linda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President, as Replacement for IBP Governor for Northern Luzon,
Denis B. Habawel, 711 SCRA 715, A.M. No. 13-06-11-SC December 10, 2013

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On the validity of actions made by de facto officers, it is settled that “the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.”

The de facto doctrine was devised to benefit the public. xxx This is premised on the reality that
“[t]hird persons x x x cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important
office. They have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally
such.” Re: Nomination of Atty. Linda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President, as Replacement for IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, 711 SCRA 715, A.M. No. 13-06-11-SC December
10, 2013

It is settled that “the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a
de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.”

One that is de facto is “illegitimate but in effect.” Thus, it is settled that “the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned.” This is necessary so as to protect the sanctity
of their dealings with those relying on their ostensible authority: “[t]hird persons x x x cannot
always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office. They have a right to
assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such.” Re: Nomination of Atty.
Linda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President, as Replacement for IBP Governor for Northern Luzon,
Denis B. Habawel, 711 SCRA 715, A.M. No. 13-06-11-SC December 10, 2013

The clear policy of Section 12, Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 is “to standardize salary rates among
government personnel and do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages
and the resulting differences in compensation among them.” Thus, the general rule is that all
allowances are deemed included in the standardized salary.

Being a new rule, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 raised several questions among
government employees. Petitions were filed before this court involving the Commission on
Audit’s disallowance of the grant of allowances and incentives to government employees. This
court already settled the issues and matters raised by petitioner Maritime Industry Authority.
Maritime Industry Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 185812 January
13, 2015

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Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 was enacted to promote “the policy of the State to provide equal
pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions.”

The law lists down the factors that should guide the Department of Budget and Management in
preparing the index of occupational services, to wit: 1. the education and excellence required to
perform the duties and responsibilities of the position; 2. the nature and complexity of the work
to be performed; 3. the kind of supervision received; 4. mental and/or physical strain required in
the completion of the work; 5. nature and extent of internal and external relationships; 6. kind
of supervision exercised; 7. decision-making responsibility; 8. responsibility for accuracy of
records and reports; 9. accountability for funds, properties, and equipment; and 10. hardship,
hazard, and personal risk involved in the job. Maritime Industry Authority vs. Commission on
Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 185812 January 13, 2015

Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits received by government officials
and employees as incorporated in the standardized salary, unless excluded by law or an
issuance by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).

Respondent Commission on Audit counters that the disallowed allowances is tantamount to

additional compensation proscribed by Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. This is
because these allowances are not authorized by law. Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances
and benefits received by government officials and employees as incorporated in the standardized
salary, unless excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management.
The integration of the benefits and allowances is by legal fiction. The disallowed benefits and
allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority’s officials and employees were not
excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, these were
deemed already given to the officials and employees when they received their basic salaries.
Their receipt of the disallowed benefits and allowances was tantamount to double
compensation. Maritime Industry Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No.
185812 January 13, 2015

Before public funds may be disbursed for salaries and benefits to government officers and
employees, it must be shown that these are commensurate to the services rendered and
necessary or relevant to the functions of the office.

Article VI, Section 29 of the 1987 Constitution provides, “[n]o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Further, before public funds may

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be disbursed for salaries and benefits to government officers and employees, it must be shown
that these are commensurate to the services rendered and necessary or relevant to the functions
of the office. “Additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to
the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and employees.”
Maritime Industry Authority vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 185812 January
13, 2015

Government officials and employees who received benefits or allowances, which were
disallowed, may keep the amounts received if there is no finding of bad faith and the
disbursement was made in good faith.

With regard to the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and allowances of

government employees, prevailing jurisprudence provides that recipients or payees need not
refund these disallowed amounts when they received these in good faith. Government officials
and employees who received benefits or allowances, which were disallowed, may keep the
amounts received if there is no finding of bad faith and the disbursement was made in good faith.
On the other hand, officers who participated in the approval of the disallowed allowances or
benefits are required to refund only the amounts received when they are found to be in bad faith
or grossly negligent amounting to bad faith. Maritime Industry Authority vs. Commission on
Audit, 745 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 185812 January 13, 2015

Officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations without original

charters are covered by the Labor Code, not the Civil Service Law. However, non-chartered
government-owned or controlled corporations are limited by law in negotiating economic
terms with their employees. This is because the law has provided the Compensation and
Position Classification System, which applies to all government-owned or controlled
corporations, chartered or non-chartered.

Social Security System Employees Association v. Court of Appeals explains that instead of a
collective bargaining agreement or negotiation, government employees must course their
petitions for a change in the terms and conditions of their employment through the Congress for
the issuance of new laws, rules, or regulations to that effect: Government employees may,
therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment
of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate
with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by
law.

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Republic Act No. 10149 defines a non-chartered government-owned or controlled corporation as

a government-owned or controlled corporation that was organized and is operating under the
Corporation Code.[107] It does not differentiate between chartered and non-chartered
government-owned or controlled corporations; hence, its provisions apply equally to both.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10149 also categorically states, "Any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, no [government-owned or controlled corporation] shall be exempt from the
coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System developed by the [Governance
Commission] under this Act."

Furthermore, Republic Act No. 10149 directed the Governance Commission to develop a
Compensation and Position Classification System, to be submitted for the President's approval,
which shall apply to all officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether chartered or non-chartered.

On March 22, 2016, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 203, which approved the
compensation and classification standards and the Index of Occupational Services Framework
developed and submitted by the Governance Commission.

When it comes to collective bargaining agreements and collective negotiation agreements in

government-owned or controlled corporations, Executive Order No. 203 unequivocally stated
that while it recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with their
employers, "the Governing Boards of all covered [government-owned or controlled
corporations], whether Chartered or Non-chartered, may not negotiate with their officers and
employees the economic terms of their [collective bargaining agreements]." GSIS Family Bank
Employees Union vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210773 January 23, 2019

Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 “was passed to standardize salary rates among government
personnel and do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages and the
resulting differences in compensation among them.”

As a guide in the standardization of salary rates Republic Act No. 6758 [Section 9] lists down the
factors that should guide the Department of Budget and Management in preparing the index of
occupational services, to wit: 1. the education and excellence required to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the position; 2. the nature and complexity of the work to be performed; 3. the
kind of supervision received; 4. mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the
work; 5. nature and extent of internal and external relationships; 6. kind of supervision exercised;
7. decision-making responsibility; 8. responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; 9.
accountability for funds, properties, and equipment; and 10. hardship, hazard, and personal risk

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involved in the job. Development Academy of the Philippines vs. Pulido-Tan, 806 SCRA 362, G.R.
No. 203072 October 18, 2016

For the purpose of standardization, “the general rule is that all allowances are deemed included
in the standardized salary.”

Precisely for the purpose of standardization, “the general rule is that all allowances are deemed
included in the standardized salary.” However, Republic Act No. 6758’s standardized salary rates
and guidelines in Section 9 “do not take into consideration the peculiar characteristics of each
government office where performance of the same work may entail different necessary expenses
for the employee.”

By way of examples, marine officers and crew stationed in government vessels, as well as foreign
service officers stationed abroad incur certain expenses by the mere fact of their stations.
Avoiding these expenses would be tantamount to preventing the performance of their functions.
Considering the value of these expenses as already included in the concerned personnel’s salary
would mean that they would then have to exhaust their personal funds, just so they could
perform their official functions. Development Academy of the Philippines vs. Pulido-Tan, 806
SCRA 362, G.R. No. 203072 October 18, 2016

The key consideration for allowances and other incentive packages to be deemed exceptional
and permissible under Section 12 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 is a showing that they “are
given to government employees of certain offices due to the unique nature of the office and of
the work performed by the employee.”

Petitioner has not shown that its Financial Performance Award, as obligated and paid for calendar
year 2002, is an exceptional incentive package sanctioned by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758.
Petitioner has neither alleged nor established that it (as an office) or the work done by each of
its employee-recipients is of such a “unique nature” that a deviation from Republic Act No. 6758’s
standardization must be resorted to. On the contrary, it justifies the award by claiming its
employee’s “collective effort for the furtherance of [its] mandate.” Development Academy of
the Philippines vs. Pulido-Tan, 806 SCRA 362, G.R. No. 203072 October 18, 2016

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In cases involving the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and allowances due to
government employees, jurisprudence has settled that recipients or payees in good faith need
not refund these disallowed amounts.

For as long as there is no showing of ill intent and the disbursement was made in good faith,
public officers and employees who receive subsequently disallowed benefits or allowances may
keep the amounts disbursed to them. On the part of the approving officers, they shall only be
required to refund if they are found to have acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent
amounting to bad faith. Development Academy of the Philippines vs. Pulido-Tan, 806 SCRA 362,
G.R. No. 203072 October 18, 2016

The Compensation and Position Classification System established under Republic Act No. 6758
applies to “all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or
hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and government financial institutions.

Legislation on the compensation and position classification of government employees reflects

the policy of the State to provide “equal pay for substantially equal work” in government and “to
base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions.” At present, Republic Act No. 6758 or the
“Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989” governs the compensation and position
classification system in government. Mendoza vs. Commission on Audit, 705 SCRA 306, G.R. No.
195395 September 10, 2013

The term “government” in Republic Act No. 6758 “refers to the Executive, the Legislative and
the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be
limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils,
authorities, administrations, center, institutes, state colleges and universities, local
government units, and the armed forces.”

“Government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions,” on the other hand,

include “all corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National
Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform governmental or
proprietary functions.” Mendoza vs. Commission on Audit, 705 SCRA 306, G.R. No. 195395
September 10, 2013

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The general manager position of a water district is covered by the Salary Standardization Law.

The rationale for setting the maximum salary grade for a general manager of a government-
owned or controlled corporation to Salary Grade 30 is to maintain, as much as possible, the same
salary of general managers across all government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions. All told, the general manager position of a water district is covered by the Salary
Standardization Law. The Commission on Audit did not gravely abuse its discretion in disallowing
petitioner Mendoza’s compensation for exceeding the rate provided in the Salary
Standardization Law. Mendoza vs. Commission on Audit, 705 SCRA 306, G.R. No. 195395
September 10, 2013

The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 18 of the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973,
members of the board of directors of water districts are only entitled to per diems and nothing
more.

In Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit, 374 SCRA 482 (2002), members of the water
district’s board of directors questioned Commission on Audit’s disallowance of their
representation, transportation allowance, and rice allowances. Mendoza vs. Commission on
Audit, 705 SCRA 306, G.R. No. 195395 September 10, 2013

Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper
government authority.

Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper government
authority. In Republic v. Singun, 548 SCRA 361 (2008), this court stated: Resignation implies an
expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To
constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an
intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by
the proper authority . . . . . In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public
officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer
remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in
terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor.
A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer
is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive
act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not

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be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified
therefor. Light Rail transit Authority vs. Salvaña, 726 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

In general, retirement laws provide security to the elderly who have given their prime years in
employment whether in the private sector or in government.

Retirement laws are social legislation. In general, retirement laws provide security to the elderly
who have given their prime years in employment whether in the private sector or in government.
These laws ensure the welfare of individuals who are approaching their twilight years and have
limited opportunities for productive employment that give them a steady income stream. In the
private sector, retirement packages are usually crafted as “forced savings” on the part of the
employee. Re: Application for Surviviorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act No. 9946 of
Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate
Judge, 709 SCRA 603, A.M. No. 14155-Ret November 19, 2013

In government, lucrative retirement benefits are used as an incentive mechanism to encourage

competent individuals to have careers in government.

This Court often states: [R]etirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts
of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or employment. They
serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce competent
persons to enter and remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient service while
so employed. (Emphasis supplied) Due to this extraordinary purpose, the Constitution provides
guidelines on periodically increasing retirement benefits. On several occasions, this Court has
liberally interpreted retirement laws in keeping with its purpose. In Government Service
Insurance System v. De Leon, 635 SCRA 321 (2010): Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally
construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance
and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency,
security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws
are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and
all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose. Re:
Application for Surviviorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act No. 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A.
Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, 709 SCRA
603, A.M. No. 14155-Ret November 19, 2013

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Retirement benefits are usually conditioned on compliance with certain requirements. Common
requirements include age and years in service. An exception to compliance with age and service
requirements is disability retirement.

Upon reaching a certain age and compliance with the years of service, an employee becomes
entitled to benefits by operation of law. An exception to compliance with age and service
requirements is disability retirement. It is still considered a form of retirement, but the condition
for compliance is not usually age or years in service. Disability retirement is conditioned on the
incapacity of the employee to continue his or her employment due to involuntary causes such as
illness or accident. The social justice principle behind retirement benefits also applies to those
who are forced to cease from service due to disabilities beyond their control. Re: Application for
Surviviorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act No. 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving
Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, 709 SCRA 603, A.M. No.
14155-Ret November 19, 2013

In line with the doctrine of liberal interpretation of retirement laws, this Court has often
construed death as disability retirement.

“[T]here is no more permanent or total physical disability than death.” The term “retirement,”
when used in a strict legal sense, refers to mandatory or optional retirement. However, when
used in a more general sense, “retire” may encompass the concepts of both disability retirement
and death. All of these concepts involve events that happen to an employee beyond his or her
control. In case of mandatory or optional retirement, reaching a certain age due to mere passage
of time is beyond the control of the individual. In the case of disability retirement and death,
acquiring an illness or accident is beyond the control of the individual. Re: Application for
Surviviorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act No. 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving
Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, 709 SCRA 603, A.M. No.
14155-Ret November 19, 2013

Providing retroactivity to judges and justices who died while in service conforms with the
doctrine that retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of
persons intended to be benefited.

“[T]he liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the
efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.” Ensuring the
welfare of families dependent on government employees is achieved in the changes made in
Republic Act No. 9946. It will be consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the law if the law

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is made retroactive to benefit the heirs of judges and justices who passed away prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946. Re: Application for Surviviorship Pension Benefits Under
Republic Act No. 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba,
Former CTA Associate Judge, 709 SCRA 603, A.M. No. 14155-Ret November 19, 2013

Considering that incumbent justices receive the annual year-end bonus and cash gift every
December and that such grant is deemed an increase in the monthly salary for December,
retired members of the judiciary are entitled to receive the same amount, with the caveat that
this grant is only for the period when they have yet to receive their monthly pensions from this
court.

At present, Republic Act No. 9946 has amended Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 910 to state
“retired members of the judiciary” instead of “justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals.” From the provision of law, Court of Tax Appeals justices are now included. Considering
that incumbent justices receive the annual year-end bonus and cash gift every December and
that such grant is deemed an increase in the monthly salary for December, retired members of
the judiciary are entitled to receive the same amount, with the caveat that this grant is only for
the period when they have yet to receive their monthly pensions from this court. The five-year
lump sum amount that a member of the judiciary receives at the time of retirement does not
include the year-end bonus and cash gift because doing so would mean that the retirees benefit
earlier than the incumbents. However, once the retirees receive their monthly pensions, the
equivalent of the year-end bonus and cash gift shall form part of their pension and be released
to them at the same time that the incumbents receive the year-end bonus and cash gift. Re:
Request of Retired Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Justices for Increase/Adjustment of
their December 1998 Pensions, 767 SCRA 109, A.M. No. 99-7-01-SC August 18, 2015

The power to decide “who, what, where, when, and how” to grant retirement benefits is within
this court’s exercise of administrative supervision over courts and its personnel.

Any outside interference would violate this court’s fiscal autonomy. Republic Act No. 9946
specifies what is included in the pension of retired members of the judiciary as follows: SEC. 3.
Upon retirement, a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan
or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari’a district
court, shari’a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically entitled
to a lump sum of five (5) years’ gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus
the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as

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personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance he/she was
receiving on the date of his/her retirement and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of
five (5) years, to further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his/her natural life
pursuant to Section 1 hereof. Re: Request of Retired Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
Justices for Increase/Adjustment of their December 1998 Pensions, 767 SCRA 109, A.M. No. 99-
7-01-SC August 18, 2015

Considering that the payment of the year-end bonus and cash gift is deemed part of the
retirement benefits of retired members of the Supreme Court (SC), the Court of Appeals (CA),
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), and the Sandiganbayan, the funds for this purpose should come
from the appropriations for Pension Benefits.

Since part of the retirement benefits granted to the retired Court of Appeals justices is the annual
year-end bonus and cash gift pending receipt of monthly pensions, retired Court of Tax Appeals
justices are entitled to the same. Re: Request of Retired Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
Justices for Increase/Adjustment of their December 1998 Pensions, 767 SCRA 109, A.M. No. 99-
7-01-SC August 18, 2015

Section 12 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 states the general rule on integration. That is to say,
all allowances are generally integrated into the government employee’s standardized salary
rates.

Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation.—All allowances, except for

representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew onboard government vessels and hospital personnel;
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall
be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989
not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. (Emphasis
supplied) By exception, Section 12 provides for seven (7) types of allowances that do not form
part of basic pay, or nonintegrated allowances. All other allowances, save for these items, are
deemed included in the government employee’s standardized salary. These are as follows: (1)
representation and transportation allowances (RATA); (2) clothing and laundry allowances; (3)
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew onboard government vessels; (4) subsistence
allowance of hospital personnel; (5) hazard pay; (6) allowances of foreign service personnel
stationed abroad; and (7) such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section

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12 as may be determined by the [Department of Budget and Management]. In National Tobacco

Administration v. Commission on Audit, 311 SCRA 755 (1999), this Court has held that these
enumerated exceptions “have one thing in common — they belong to one category of privilege
called allowances which are usually granted to officials and employees of the government to
defray or reimburse the expenses incurred in the performance of their official functions.”
Ronquillo, Jr. vs. National Electrification Administration, 790 SCRA 611, G.R. No. 172593 April
20, 2016

The Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) falls under “all allowances” referred to in the first sentence
of Section 12: “All allowances . . . shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates
herein prescribed.” Nothing in the exceptions found in Section 12 mentions the COLA.

The second sentence of Section 12 plainly provides that its application is subject to two (2)
conditions: that the recipients must be incumbents when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, and
that the additional compensation must not have been integrated into their standardized salary
rates. The second condition is not true of the COLA. Ronquillo, Jr. vs. National Electrification
Administration, 790 SCRA 611, G.R. No. 172593 April 20, 2016

The back payment of the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to petitioners amounts to double
compensation.

Unless otherwise provided by law, government employees cannot be paid an extra remuneration
for the same office that already has a fixed compensation. In Maritime Industry Authority v.
Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 300 (2015): Article VI, Section 29 of the 1987 Constitution
provides, “[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.” . . . [B]efore public funds may be disbursed for salaries and benefits to government
officers and employees, it must be shown that these are commensurate to the services rendered
and necessary or relevant to the functions of the office. “Additional allowances and benefits must
be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the
government officers and employees.” Ronquillo, Jr. vs. National Electrification Administration,
790 SCRA 611, G.R. No. 172593 April 20, 2016

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Under Article IX(B), Section 8 of the Constitution, “[n]o elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law[.]” This provision serves as a constitutional limitation on the government’s
spending power.

This provision serves as a constitutional limitation on the government’s spending power.

In Peralta v. Auditor General Mathay, 38 SCRA 256 (1971): [A] public office is a public trust. It is
expected of a government official or employee that he [or she] keeps uppermost in mind the
demands of public welfare. [One] is there to render public service. . . . There is then to be an
awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the government that he [or she] is to receive
only such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, [one] is expected not to
avail himself [or herself] of devious or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached
to [one’s] position. Ronquillo, Jr. vs. National Electrification Administration, 790 SCRA 611, G.R.
No. 172593 April 20, 2016

Disability retirement is conditioned on the incapacity of the employee to continue his or her
employment for involuntary causes such as illness or accident.

Disability retirement is conditioned on the incapacity of the employee to continue his or her
employment for involuntary causes such as illness or accident. The social justice principle behind
retirement benefits also applies to those who are forced to cease from service for disabilities
beyond their control. Re: Medical Condition of Associate Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo,
Sandiganbayan, 820 SCRA 249, A.M. No. 16-10-05-SB March 14, 2017

Conditions Where the Law Grants Full Retirement Benefits to Judges and Justices.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, grants full retirement
benefits to the following: a) Justices and judges who have rendered at least fifteen (15) years
service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, and retires for
having attained the age of seventy (70); b) Justices and judges who have rendered at least fifteen
(15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, and
resigns by reason of his/her incapacity as certified by the Supreme Court; and c) Justices and
judges who have attained the age of sixty (60) years and rendered at least fifteen (15) years
service in the Government, the last three (3) of which have been continuously rendered in the
Judiciary. Re: Medical Condition of Associate Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, Sandiganbayan,
820 SCRA 249, A.M. No. 16-10-05-SB March 14, 2017

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Public officers and employees who actively petition for retirement or separation benefits
willfully affirm their separation from service. They are bound by their own voluntary departure.

Absent any indication that their choice was vitiated by confounding predicaments, like desperate
financial need, they cannot renege on their self-imposed state, and later importune the
government to reinstate them to the position they readily relinquished and to pay them
backwages in the intervening period. This is especially so when the voluntary severance of their
employer-employee relationship with the government was done as part of an attempt to forestall
a finding of administrative liability and to evade a dishonorable removal from service. To rule
otherwise condones a preposterous predicament rendered unworkable by their own abdication,
rewards their desertion and duplicity, and exposes an adjudicatory body's inability to come to
terms with the reality foisted by the fact of willful separation from service. Civil Service
Commission vs. Moralde, G.R. No. 211077 August 15, 2018; Province of Misamis Oriental vs.
Moralde, G.R. No. 211318 August 15, 2018

While retirement benefits differ from separation benefits, a public officer who applies to receive
either of them nevertheless acts out of the same contemplation: the complete and unequivocal
termination of his or her employer-employee relationship with the government. This is because,
by their very nature, retirement and separation benefits become available only when
employment ceases.

This Court's treatment of retirement is definite and unmistakable: it is "a withdrawal from office,
public station, business, occupation, or public duty," the "very essence [of which] . . . is the
termination of the employer employee relationship."

Concerning the retirement of private sector employees, jurisprudence states that retirement
arises as the result of "a voluntary [employer-employee] agreement . . . where the latter, after
reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his employment with the former." Retirement, in this
context, is a bilateral act of the employee and the employer. In Gerlach v. Reuters Limited, Phils.,
this Court considered three (3) categories of retirement in the private sector: The first type is
compulsory and contributory in character. The second type is one set up by agreement between
the employer and the employees in collective bargaining agreements or other agreements
between them. The third type is one that is voluntarily given by the employer, expressly as in an
announced company policy or impliedly as in a failure to contest the employee's claim for
retirement benefits.

Retirement from the civil service operates differently from retirement from private employment.
By no means, however, does it lose its fundamental character as a mechanism for severing an
employer-employee relationship. Retirement as a public officer or employee is no less "a

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withdrawal from office, public station, . . . occupation, or public duty." Civil Service Commission
vs. Moralde, G.R. No. 211077 August 15, 2018; Province of Misamis Oriental vs. Moralde, G.R.
No. 211318 August 15, 2018

The Supreme Court (SC) in Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619 (1997), ruled that
payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a civil service member who is
subsequently ordered reinstated is allowed if “[1] he [or she] is found innocent of the charges
which caused the suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.”

This court in Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619 (1997), ruled that payment of back
salaries during the period of suspension of a civil service member who is subsequently ordered
reinstated is allowed if “[1] he [or she] is found innocent of the charges which caused the
suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.” The two conditions must be complied
with to entitle the reinstated employee payment of back salaries. “[I]n case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal” if his or her appeal is meritorious. Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Delos Reyes, Jr., 784 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 208976 February 22, 2016

It is settled that public officers are entitled to payment of salaries only if they render service.

“As he [or she] works, he [or she] shall earn. Since [respondent] did not work during the period
for which [he is] now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order the
payment of such salaries.” Respondent did not perform any work during the period of November
8, 2008 to November 10, 2013. The amount he received from PCSO minus the days he reported
for work in November 2013 should be returned. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Delos Reyes, Jr.,
784 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 208976 February 22, 2016

The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct which
are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first offense.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does
the judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly
administration of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and
grave misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even
the first offense. Time and again, we have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of

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court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized
government depositories the various funds they have collected, because they are not authorized
to keep funds in their custody. In Re: Deceitful Conduct of Ignacio S. Del Rosario, Cash Clerk III,
Records and Miscellaneous Matter Section, Checks Disbursement Division, FMO-OCA, 656 SCRA
731 (2011), the Court dismised from the service cash clerk Ignacio S. Del Rosario who had
admitted to misappropriating money entrusted to him by one Noel G. Primo. In In Re: Report of
Regional Coordinator Felipe Kalalo on Alleged Anomalies Involving JDF Collections in MTCC,
Angeles City and MCTC, Minalin, Pampanga, 256 SCRA 690 (1996), the Court found sufficient
evidence for the guilt of Records Officer and officer-in-charge of JDF Collections Josephine
Calaguas for the misappropriation of P92,737.00 worth of JDF collections; Calaguas had admitted
to using the JDF collections for the medical treatment of her father. She was accordingly
dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Gesultura, 694 SCRA 337, A.M. No. P-04-1785 April 2, 2013

Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are not
station-specific may be reassigned to another station in the exigency of public service. The legal
concept of transfer differs from reassignment. Most notably, a transfer involves the issuance
of another appointment, while a reassignment does not.

Transfer and reassignment are defined in Section 24 of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil
Service Law. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank,
level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. xxx The transfer
may be from one department or agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in
the same department or agency: Provided, however, That any movement from the non-career
service to the career service shall not be considered a transfer. Meanwhil, a reassignment is when
an employee is reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided,
That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.

Osea v. Malaya differentiates a reassignment from a new appointment, which is necessary in a

transfer: Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be
defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a
movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or
agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
issuance of an appointment. Yangson vs. Department of Education, G.R. No. 200170 June 3,
2019

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When reassignment is to be considered a demotion or constructive dismissal

A demotion means that an employee is moved or appointed from a higher position to a lower
position with decreased duties and responsibilities, or with lesser status, rank, or salary.

Constructive dismissal occurs whether or not there is diminution in rank, status, or salary if the
employee's environment has rendered it impossible for him or her to stay in his or her work. It
may be due to the agency head's unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations, hardship
because geographic location, financial dislocation, or performance of other duties and
responsibilities inconsistent with those attached to the position.

A reassignment may be deemed a constructive dismissal if the employee is moved to a position

with a more servile or menial job as compared to his previous position. It may occur if the
employee was reassigned to an office not in the existing organizational structure, or if he or she
is not given a definite set of duties and responsibilities. It may be deemed constructive dismissal
if the motivation for the reassignment was to harass or oppress the employee on the pretext of
promoting public interest. This may be inferred from reassignments done twice within a year, or
during a change of administration of elective and appointive officials. Yangson vs. Department
of Education, G.R. No. 200170 June 3, 2019

“The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original
charters.” Thus, all appointive local government employees are covered by civil service laws
and rules.

“The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charters.”
Thus, all appointive local government employees are covered by civil service laws and rules.
Appointive local government employees must possess the qualifications provided by law for the
positions they hold. Abad vs. Dela Cruz, 753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

In local government units (LGUs), the Personnel Selection Board is headed by the local chief
executive and is composed of members appointed by the sanggunian concerned.

Candidates for appointment to first and second level positions are generally screened by the
Personnel Selection Board. In local government units, the Personnel Selection Board is headed
by the local chief executive and is composed of members appointed by the sanggunian

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concerned. The Personnel Selection Board of each local government unit “assist[s] the local chief
executive in the judicious and objective selection of personnel for employment as well as . . .
promotion[.]” Abad vs. Dela Cruz, 753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

Next-in-Rank Rule

In promotions, the appointing authority must automatically consider the employees next in rank
as candidates for appointment. Section 21, paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Civil Service Law provide
for the next-in-rank rule: SEC. 21. Recruitment and Selection of Employees.—. . . (2) When a
vacancy occurs in a position in the first level of the Career Service as defined in Section 6, the
employees in the department who occupy the next lower positions in the occupational group
under which the vacant position is classified, and in other functionally related occupational
groups and who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility shall be
considered for promotion. (3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second level of the
Career Service as defined in Section 8, the employees in the government service who occupy the
next lower positions in the occupational group under which the vacant position is classified and
in other functionally related occupational groups and who are competent, qualified and with the
appropriate civil service eligibility shall be considered for promotion. Abad vs. Dela Cruz, 753
SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

Promotion is the advancement of an employee from one position to another with an increase
in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in
salary.

Employees next in rank are those “who occupy the next lower positions in the occupational group
under which the vacant position is classified, and in other functionally related occupational
groups and who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility[.]” Abad
vs. Dela Cruz, 753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

The next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does
not give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that
position become vacant.

The reason behind the next-in-rank rule is to maintain the policy of merit and rewards in the civil
service. Since appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed that

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the appointments of employees next in rank are equally meritorious. Appointments that consider
rank, salary grades, and seniority promote progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service. Still,
the next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not
give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that
position become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority. So
long as the appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid.
Abad vs. Dela Cruz, 753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank must prove
his or her status as a qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall be dismissed.

Being next in rank is a legal conclusion that would be the result of inference from evidence
properly alleged and proven. The burden of proof rests on the employee alleging that he or she
is next in rank. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified next-
in-rank. He failed to prove that his position of Local Assessment Operations Officer V has been
previously determined to be next-in-rank to the position of City Government Department Head
III in the Office of the City Assessor of the City Government of Muntinlupa. Abad vs. Dela Cruz,
753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

Three-Salary-Grade Rule

Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular, Series of 2001 on the three-salary-
grade rule states that “[a]n employee may be promoted or transferred to a position which is not
more than three (3) salary, pay or job grades higher than the employee’s present position[.]”
However, this rule is subject to the exception of “very meritorious cases.” These “very
meritorious cases” are provided in Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 03-0106 dated
January 24, 2003. Abad vs. Dela Cruz, 753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

Analogous to a de facto officer, respondent’s title to his office may only be attacked through a
petition for quo warranto filed by the Government or by the person claiming title to the office.

In any case, we cannot order the invalidation of respondent’s appointment in the present
proceedings. To do so would necessarily result in his removal from an office he has physically
possessed for almost nine (9) years. Respondent has been discharging the duties of the City
Assessor, at the very least, under a color of title to the position especially since he possesses the

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qualifications for it. Analogous to a de facto officer, respondent’s title to his office may only be
attacked through a petition for quo warranto filed by the Government or by the person claiming
title to the office. Abad vs. Dela Cruz, 753 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 207422 March 18, 2015

Under the civil service law, positions in the Career Executive Service are: “Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service, and other officers of equivalent rank as may be
identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.”

In the exercise of its legal mandate, the Career Executive Service Board issued Resolution No. 945
dated June 14, 2011, where it set the following criteria to determine whether a position belongs
to the Career Executive Service: 1. The position is career; 2. The position is above division chief;
and 3. The position entails performance of executive and managerial functions. Aside from
satisfying the criteria set by the Career Executive Service Board, the holder of the position must
also be a presidential appointee. Buena, Jr. vs. Benito, 738 SCRA 278, G.R. No. 181760 October
14, 2014

It is settled that the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the Career
Executive Service. Permanent appointment to positions in the Career Executive Service
presupposes that the appointee has passed the Career Executive Service examinations.

In this case, respondent Dr. Benito does not possess the required career executive service
eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed to the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil Service Commission cannot be compelled to
attest to the permanent appointment of respondent Dr. Benito. Buena, Jr. vs. Benito, 738 SCRA
278, G.R. No. 181760 October 14, 2014

Once the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he or she is entitled to receive the
salaries corresponding with the position though the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has not yet
approved the appointment.

Under Rule IV, Section 1 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40-98, an
appointment takes effect immediately upon issuance by the appointing authority. Once the
appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he or she is entitled to receive the salaries
corresponding with the position though the Civil Service Commission has not yet approved the

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appointment. Should the appointment be initially disapproved, it nevertheless remains effective

if a motion for reconsideration or an appeal of the disapproval is seasonably filed with the proper
office. Therefore, during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the appointee remains
entitled to his or her salaries until the appointment is finally disapproved by the Civil Service
Commission. The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco, 757 SCRA 222, G.R. No. 202331
April 22, 2015

A midnight appointment “refers to those appointments made within two (2) months
immediately prior to the next presidential election.”

Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution: SECTION
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is “duty-
bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he [or she]
should not do acts which he [or she] ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of
his [or her] successor.” An outgoing President should not “deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.” However, the constitutional prohibition
on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to
appointments made by local chief executives. The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco,
757 SCRA 222, G.R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015

Delegated governmental power, no matter how miniscule, is not to be abused. Rather, it is to

be used with the expectation that it be wielded justly in the interest of society in general and
not for the personal disposition of the public officer who wields it.

The public’s impression of its government is sketched by its experiences with the behavior of
their acquaintances who are public officers when these officers are part of one’s social circles
and communities. Between them and the public officers they read about in the newspaper and
encounter in other media, the former’s presence is more immediate and more concrete, and this
impression is more salient in their daily lives. Delegated governmental power, no matter how
miniscule, is not to be abused. Rather, it is to be used with the expectation that it be wielded
justly in the interest of society in general and not for the personal disposition of the public officer
who wields it. Titles of public officer are burdens on their holders as much as they are privileges.
While they enjoy tenure, these titles accompany them. It is thus a stewardship that they should

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carry responsibly. It is, while they sit as public officers, a public trust. Abos vs. Borromeo IV, 764
SCRA 78, A.M. No. P-15-3347 July 29, 2015

Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.

Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code, it is the Civil Service Commission
that has the power to “[h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal.” Light Rail transit Authority vs. Salvaña, 726 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 192074
June 10, 2014

When the government office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed
by law, it exercises its discretion.

The employer has the right “to select honest and trustworthy employees.” When the government
office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its
discretion. This discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that “[p]ublic officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.” This is a principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the government office
employing the public officer. Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for
dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense that challenges the integrity of the public servant
charged. To bar a government office from appealing a decision that lowers the penalty of the
disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the civil service employs only
those with the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. Light Rail transit
Authority vs. Salvaña, 726 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service.

Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in public service. If all decisions by
quasi-judicial bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and
unappealable, it would, in effect, show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The
quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens would end up suffering for it. Light Rail
transit Authority vs. Salvaña, 726 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

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An application for sick leave supported by a false medical certificate would have been
considered as improperly filed, which made all of the absences during this period unauthorized.

Respondent’s application for sick leave, if approved, would allow her to be absent from work
without any deductions from her salary. Being a government employee, respondent would have
received her salaries coming from government funds. Since her application for sick leave was
supported by a false medical certificate, it would have been improperly filed, which made all of
her absences during this period unauthorized. The receipt, therefore, of her salaries during this
period would be tantamount to causing damage or prejudice to the government since she would
have received compensation she was not entitled to receive. This act of causing damage or
prejudice, however, cannot be classified as serious since the information falsified had no direct
relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from hypertension is a matter that
has no relation to the functions of her office. Given these circumstances, the offense committed
can be properly identified as less serious dishonesty. Light Rail transit Authority vs. Salvaña, 726
SCRA 141, G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

Where there are circumstances that should have alerted heads of offices to exercise more
diligence in the performance of their duties, they cannot escape liability by claiming that they
relied on good faith on the submissions of their subordinates.

In such cases, this Court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309 (1989), does not apply.
Escobar vs. People, 845 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 205576 November 20, 2017

The Local Government Code (LGC) provides that local officials, other than those considered
accountable officers by reason of their duties, may be held accountable for local government
funds.

The Local Government Code provides that local officials, other than those considered
accountable officers by reason of their duties, may be held accountable for local government
funds: Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds.—Any officer of the local
government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government
funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the
provisions of this Title. Other local officers who, though not accountable by the nature of their
duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds
through their participation in the use or application thereof. Thus, local government officials,
such as petitioners Escobar and Telesforo, may become accountable officers by reason of their

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participation in the application of public funds. Escobar vs. People, 845 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 205576
November 20, 2017

Minor or explainable errors in the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), which
cannot be related to an attempt to conceal illicit activities, should not be punishable.

This Court endeavors to strike a balance between the accountability of public officers as a result
of public office being a privilege, on the one hand, and their right to privacy as protected in the
Bill of Rights, on the other. Although this Court has held that the requirement of submitting a
SALN does not violate the right to privacy of public officers, it does not mean that they should
completely shed this right. Therefore, minor or explainable errors in the SALN, which cannot be
related to an attempt to conceal illicit activities should not be punishable. This Court may relax
the rule on strictly complying with the SALN in cases where minor errors were committed since
these may simply be used to harass and obstruct public officers in the performance of their
duties. However, the errors in this case were so substantial and glaring that they should not
escape prosecution. Iglesias vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 838 SCRA 114, G.R. No. 180745
August 30, 2017

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth
are also called civil forfeiture proceedings.

Republic Act No. 1379 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted against public officers or employees who “[have] acquired during his [or her]
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as
such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired.” Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016

In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 603 SCRA 348 (2009), the Supreme Court (SC) reaffirmed the
doctrine that forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act (RA) No. 1379 are civil in nature.

Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated from plunder cases: . . . a forfeiture case
under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case. . . . In
a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts
in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand, all that the court

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needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of

respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired
said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the
properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific
overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal
wealth. Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016

The Supreme Court (SC) has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the
assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees.

Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases
involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth: In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG,
this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or
impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the
Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not
mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two
decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten
wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof
of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought
out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved
with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural
sidetracks. Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016

Policy of Non-Interference

This Court generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings of probable cause. In
Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, 813 SCRA 273 (2016): As a general rule, this Court does
not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman
wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees.
The rule on noninterference is based on the “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]” An independent
constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is “beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people[,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” Thus, it has the sole
power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case

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against an accused. This function is executive in nature. The executive determination of probable
cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the “existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or
she] was prosecuted.” The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It
is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand
needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the
sound judgment of the Ombudsman. Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in
interfering with the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause. Republic v.
Ombudsman Desierto explains: [T]he functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. Reyes vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, 825 SCRA 436, G.R. No. 208243 June 5, 2017

No matter the identity of the complainant, the Ombudsman may act on the matter. Moreover,
it may, on its own, inquire into illegal acts of public officials, which may be discovered from any
source.

For administrative complaints, the following are the cases which the Ombudsman is bound to act
on: Section 19. Administrative Complaints.—The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited to acts or omissions which: (1) Are contrary to law or regulation; (2) Are
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) Are inconsistent with the general course
of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law; (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an
arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. However, if
the “the complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance,”
the Ombudsman may choose not to investigate the administrative act complained of. Section 20
of Republic Act No. 6770 provides: Section 20. Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombudsman may
not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it
believes that: (1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body; (2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman; (3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; (4) The
complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or (5) The
complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
Canlas vs. Bongolan, 864 SCRA 335, G.R. No. 199625 June 6, 2018

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The power of the Ombudsman to act on an administrative complaint by a person without any
personal interest in the case is, thus, discretionary.

Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770 uses the word “may” which signifies that it is permissive and
not imperative. The power of the Ombudsman to act on an administrative complaint by a person
without any personal interest in the case is, thus, discretionary. In Bueno v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 735 SCRA 432 (2014): Petitioners are mistaken in asserting that Section 20(4) is a
bar to the Ombudsman’s investigation into their acts or omissions in the case of Ranchez based
on the supposed lack of personal interest on the part of private respondents who are the
complainants in OMB-C-A-0065-B. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, the Court
noted that Section 20 of RA 6770 has been clarified by Administrative Order No. 17 (AO 17), which
amended Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07), otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 4, Rule III of the amended Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, reads: Section 4. Evaluation.—Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall
be evaluated to determine whether the same may be: a) dismissed outright for any grounds
stated under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, Provided, however, That the dismissal thereof
is not mandatory and shall be discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy
Ombudsman concerned; b) treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be referred
to the Public Assistance Bureau, this Office, for appropriate action under Section 2, Rule IV of this
Rules; c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, R.A. 6770 for
the taking of appropriate administrative proceedings; d) referred to the appropriate
office/agency or official for the conduct of further fact-finding investigation; or e) docketed as an
administrative case for the purpose of administrative adjudication by the Office of the
Ombudsman. x x x Thus, even if the ground raised is the supposed lack of sufficient personal
interest of complainants in the subject matter of the grievance under Section 20(4), the dismissal
on that ground is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman evaluating the administrative complaint. Canlas vs. Bongolan, 864 SCRA 335, G.R.
No. 199625 June 6, 2018

The Ombudsman may prosecute or investigate the complaint with or without the complainant’s
personal interest in the outcome of the case.

There is clearly no question on the legal standing of private respondents to file the administrative
complaint against petitioners before the Ombudsman. Indeed, the Office of the Ombudsman is
mandated to “investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” The Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaints
and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official acts or omissions from whatever source,
e.g., a newspaper. Thus, any complainant may be entertained by the Ombudsman for the latter

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to initiate an inquiry and investigation for alleged irregularities. Canlas vs. Bongolan, 864 SCRA
335, G.R. No. 199625 June 6, 2018

The Ombudsman’s decision may not be appealed if it dismisses the complaint or imposes the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine
equivalent to one (1)-month salary.

Otherwise, it may be appealed to the Court of Appeals under the requirements and conditions
set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Canlas vs. Bongolan, 864 SCRA 335, G.R. No. 199625
June 6, 2018

Both Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006 were issued
by the Ombudsman, an independent Constitutional office, pursuant to its rule-making power
under the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 to effectively exercise its mandate
to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office, or agency, when this
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

For this Court to not give deference to the Ombudsman’s discretion would be to interfere with
its Constitutional power to promulgate its own rules for the execution of its decisions. Lee vs.
Sales, 870 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 205294 July 4, 2018

The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective measure with a

purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to prevent public officers from using
their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper with records.

After a ruling supported by evidence has been rendered and during the pendency of any motion
for reconsideration or appeal, the civil service must be protected from any acts that may be
committed by the disciplined public officer that may affect the outcome of this motion or appeal.
Lee vs. Sales, 870 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 205294 July 4, 2018

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In case the suspended or removed public official is exonerated on appeal, Administrative Order
(AO) No. 17, Rule III, Section 7 itself provides for the remedial measure of payment of salary
and such other emoluments not received during the period of suspension or removal.

Public office is a public trust. There is no vested right to a public office or an absolute right to
remain in office that would be violated should the decision of the Ombudsman be immediately
executed. In case the suspended or removed public official is exonerated on appeal,
Administrative Order No. 17, Rule III, Section 7 itself provides for the remedial measure of
payment of salary and such other emoluments not received during the period of suspension or
removal. No substantial prejudice is caused to the public official. Lee vs. Sales, 870 SCRA 516,
G.R. No. 205294 July 4, 2018

Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal, it follows
that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an injunctive writ.

It bears noting that for an injunction to issue, the right of the person seeking its issuance must
be clear and unmistakable. However, no such right of petitioner exists to stay the execution of
the penalty of dismissal. There is no vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to hold office.
Petitioner is deemed preventively suspended and should his motion for reconsideration be
granted or his eventual appeal won, he will be entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not
receive in the meantime. Further, it is the legally mandated duty of respondents to implement
the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision. If they refused or failed to comply with the
Ombudsman’s order to dismiss petitioner from service, then they would be liable for disciplinary
action, pursuant to Rule III, Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended. Lee vs. Sales,
870 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 205294 July 4, 2018

The Office of the Ombudsman's power to determine probable cause is executive in nature, and
with its power to investigate, it is in a better position than this Court to assess the evidence on
hand to substantiate its finding of probable cause or lack of it.

This Court generally does not interfere with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman's finding
or lack of finding of probable cause out of respect for its constitutionally granted investigatory
and prosecutory powers. Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman pointed out that the Office of
the Ombudsman's power to determine probable cause is executive in nature and with its power
to investigate, it is in a better position than this Court to assess the evidence on hand to

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substantiate its finding of probable cause or lack of it. Presidential Commission on Good
Government vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 187794 November 28, 2018

For the Court to review the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and
prosecutorial powers in criminal cases, there must be a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, this Court does not generally interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsman's findings. "[Disagreement with [its] findings is not enough to constitute grave
abuse of discretion." There must be a showing that it conducted the preliminary investigation
"in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law."

In Casing v. Ombudsman: The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to
pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the
determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be
filed or not is basically its call.

As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of
its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent
in the Office of the Ombudsman which, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
and the preserver of the integrity of the public service." While the Ombudsman's findings as to
whether probable cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court, where there is an
allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsman's act cannot escape judicial scrutiny
under the Court's own constitutional power and duty "to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary
or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law —
in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention. Republic vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
198366 June 26, 2019

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.

For their part, administrative agencies are statutory constructs. Thus, they are limited by the
statutes which created them and which spelled out their powers and functions. “It is a
fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof[.]” Administrative agencies
may exercise quasi-judicial powers, but only to the extent warranted by administrative action.
They may not exercise judicial functions. This is illustrated in Philex Mining Corporation v.
Zaldivia, et al., 43 SCRA 479 (1972), which distinguished between judicial questions and
“questions of fact.” Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Chua, 762 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 187491
July 8, 2015

“Power of Supervision” and “Power of Control,” Distinguished.

The power of supervision involves oversight of a subordinate to ensure that the rules are
followed. On the other hand, the power of control is broader as it involves laying down the actual
rules to be followed. If the rules are not followed, the power of control allows the controlling
officer to order that the act be done or undone, or even to supplant the subordinate’s act with
his or her own act. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Fetalvero, Jr., 872 SCRA 463, G.R. No. 211450
July 23, 2018

It is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and
administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like
the Secretary of Finance in this case.

However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement
and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like
the Secretary of Finance in this case. This court in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771 (1991),
explained the rationale behind the permissible delegation of legislative powers to specialized
agencies like the Secretary of Finance: The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation
of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the
increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental functions as in
matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the legislature
to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has

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ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have
the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions. La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory vs. Court of Appeals,
739 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 165499 November 11, 2014

Administrative agencies are created to aid the government in the regulation of the country’s
“ramified activities.”

The creation of these agencies has become necessary because of “the growing complexity of the
modern society.” These agencies are considered specialists, which “can deal with the problems
[in their respective fields] with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice.” Administrative agencies are part of the executive branch of
the government. However, due to their highly specialized nature, they are not only vested
executive powers but also with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta
vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 836 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 205128 August 9, 2017

A quasi-judicial agency is a government body, not part of the judiciary or the legislative branch,
which adjudicates disputes and creates rules which affect private parties’ rights.

It is created by an enabling statute, and thus, its existence continues beyond the resolution of a
dispute and is independent from the will of the parties. Its powers are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied in the enabling law. Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power has been defined as the power: “(1) to hear and determine questions of fact to which
legislative policy is to apply, and (2) to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.” Metro Rail Transit Development
Corporation vs. Gammon Philippines, Inc. , 851 SCRA 378, G.R. No. 200401 January 17, 2018

Quasi-judicial power is “the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.”

It is limited to the adjudication of the rights of the parties that are incidental to the agency’s
functions under the law. Its exercise does not amount to the executive’s overreach into or

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appropriation of actual judicial competence: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power

is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an
act which is essentially executive or administrative in nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. (Emphasis supplied) Quasi-judicial power is vested in
administrative agencies because complex issues call for “technical knowledge and speed in
countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.” Congress may, by
law, grant administrative agencies the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases within their
competence. Consistent with their specialized but narrowly limited competencies, the scope of
the quasi-judicial power vested in administrative agencies is delineated in an agency’s enabling
statute: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative
agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to
which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the
provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta vs. Land
Bank of the Philippines, 836 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 205128 August 9, 2017

Under no circumstance may an administrative agency arrogate unto itself the power of judicial
review and to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari.

It should suffice, to settle the present controversy, for us to state, as this Court did, that under
no circumstance may an administrative agency arrogate unto itself the power of judicial review
and to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari. However, it does not also escape our attention
that the predicament that respondent Landbank finds itself in is no less the result of its own
unrefined legal maneuver. Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 836 SCRA
367, G.R. No. 205128 August 9, 2017

A quasi-judicial function is “the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or

bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature.”

The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the
findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against “any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” A quasi-judicial function is “the action,

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discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts,
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Otherwise stated, an
administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the
rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court.
De Lima vs. Reyes, 779 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016

While the Department of Justice (DOJ) may perform functions similar to that of a court of law,
it is not a quasi-judicial agency.

In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, 688 SCRA 109 (2013), a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus was filed against the Secretary of Justice’s issuance of a department
order. The assailed order directed all prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Celso
de los Angeles of the Legacy Group to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the
Department of Justice. This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or executive
function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform functions
similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency. De Lima vs. Reyes, 779 SCRA 1,
G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016

Valid exercise of the power of subordinate legislation

Furthermore, the "delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies

is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern life." In EquiAsia Placement, Inc. v.
Department of Foreign Affairs: Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the
members of today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the
minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the
principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.

For a valid exercise of delegation, this Court enumerated the following requisites: All that is
required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must
be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. Under the first test
or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do

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is to enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Simply put, what are needed for a valid delegation are: (1) the completeness of the statute
making the delegation; and (2) the presence of a sufficient standard. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs.
Aquino, G.R. No. 210500 April 2, 2019

Delegation of Powers

The three powers of government —executive, legislative, and judicial — have been generally
viewed as non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary
governance must address, our legal system has recognized the validity of “subordinate
legislation,” or the rule-making power of agencies tasked with the administration of government.
In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 166 SCRA 533
(1988): The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of
the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or
judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case
of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This has led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task
of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities
and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this
power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling
in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations

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have the force and effect of law. Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education,
784 SCRA 505, G.R. No. 188720 February 23, 2016

When notice and hearing are not essential in administrative agencies

Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-
making power. Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education, 784 SCRA 505,
G.R. No. 188720 February 23, 2016

All that is required for the validity of rules promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing
of three (3) certified copies with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center.

Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner decries the non-publication, by
the Department of Education itself, of the assailed Department Order. This does not invalidate
the Department Order. As is evident from the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter
2 of the Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules promulgated by
administrative agencies is the filing of three (3) certified copies with the University of the
Philippines Law Center. Within 15 days of filing, administrative rules become effective. Quezon
City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education, 784 SCRA 505, G.R. No. 188720
February 23, 2016

An administrative agency’s procedural rules expressly prohibiting an intervention by third

parties is limited only to the proceedings before the administrative agency.

Once the matter is brought before the Court of Appeals in a petition for review, any prior
prohibition on intervention does not apply since the only question to be determined is whether
the intervenor has established a right to intervene under the Rules of Court. E.I. Dupont de
Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, 801 SCRA 629, G.R. No. 174379 August 31, 2016

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As held in Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 553 SCRA 357 (2008), when there are facts that
point to an irregularity and the officer failed to take steps to rectify it, even tolerating it, the
Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309 (1989), doctrine is inapplicable.

This court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309 (1989), that heads of offices may rely
to a certain extent on their subordinates, will not exonerate respondent in this case. As held in
Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, 553 SCRA 357 (2008), when there are facts that point to an
irregularity and the officer failed to take steps to rectify it, even tolerating it, the Arias doctrine
is inapplicable. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Delos Reyes, Jr., 738 SCRA 240, G.R. No. 208976
October 13, 2014

Arias Doctrine

This Court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309 (1989), cannot exonerate petitioners
from criminal liability. Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of offices may, in good faith, rely
to a certain extent on the acts of their subordinates “who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or
enter into negotiations.” This is based upon the recognition that heads of offices cannot be
expected to examine every single document relative to government transactions. Abubakar vs.
People, 868 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 202408 June 27, 2018

The application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official has no
foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or her to investigate or
exercise a greater degree of care.

In a number of cases, this Court refused to apply the Arias doctrine considering that there were
circumstances that should have prompted the government official to inquire further. In the
present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, or Guiani from
criminal liability. There were circumstances that should have prompted them to make further
inquiries on the transactions subject of this case. In Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24969 on the early
mobilization of contractors, the irregularity was already apparent on the face of the certificates
of mobilization, which bore dates earlier than the scheduled public bidding. This should have
already roused suspicion from petitioners Baraguir and Guiani, who were the last signatories and
final approving authorities. Abubakar vs. People, 868 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 202408 June 27, 2018

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Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the concerned administrative

agency must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action
is brought before the courts, otherwise, the action will be declared premature.

In this case, CIAC found and correctly ruled that respondent had duly complied with the
contractual obligation to exhaust administrative remedies provided for under subclause 67.1 of
the Conditions of Contract before it brought the case before the tribunal. Department of Public
Works and Highways vs. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, 839 SCRA 397, G.R. No.
179732 September 13, 2017

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts’ intervention.

The administrative officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter
within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party’s cause
of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to
filing a case in court. However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not affect the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v.
Jareno, 144 SCRA 116 (1986): Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long
line of decisions. The only effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the
complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case
and try it. Republic vs. Gallo, 851 SCRA 570, G.R. No. 207074 January 17, 2018

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, like the doctrine on hierarchy of courts,
is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-defined exceptions.

It admits of several well-defined exceptions. Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of

Appeals, 342 SCRA 549 (2000), has held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be dispensed in the following instances: (1) [W]hen there is a violation of due
process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action
is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the
part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when

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the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12)
when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency
applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot. Aala vs. Uy, 814 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 202781 January 10, 2017; see also Buena, Jr.
vs. Benito, 738 SCRA 278, G.R. No. 181760 October 14, 2014

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue deals with
a question of law.

According to respondents, the case is premature as petitioners failed to exhaust administrative

remedies. Respondents are mistaken. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply when the issue deals with a question of law: [The case] does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question
of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and
not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question [of law] at best could be
resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests
not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not
require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Issues dealing with the interpretation
of law solely involve a question of law. A question of law exists when the law applicable to a
particular set of facts is not settled, whereas a question of fact arises when the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts is in doubt. Ronquillo, Jr. vs. National Electrification Administration, 790 SCRA
611, G.R. No. 172593 April 20, 2016

If a party can prove that the resort to an administrative remedy would be an idle ceremony
such that it will be absurd and unjust for it to continue seeking relief that evidently will not be
granted to it, then the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will not apply.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires recourse to the pertinent

administrative agency before resorting to court action. This is under the theory that the
administrative agency, by reason of its particular expertise, is in a better position to resolve
particular issues: One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is

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that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their
particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be
rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that
administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule
could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would
burden their heavily loaded dockets. When there is an adequate remedy available with the
administrative remedy, then courts will decline to interfere when the party refuses, or fails, to
avail of it. International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. The City of Manila, G.R. No. 185622
October 17, 2018

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has

jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its
proper jurisdiction.

This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Republic vs. Gallo, 851 SCRA 570, G.R. No. 207074 January 17, 2018

The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take
cognizance of a case at first instance.

Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived. However, for
reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to raise
the issue of noncompliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an
opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way
of laches. Republic vs. Gallo, 851 SCRA 570, G.R. No. 207074 January 17, 2018

As a general rule, government-owned and -controlled corporations are not allowed to engage
the legal services of private counsels.

However, both respondent and the Office of the President have made issuances that had the
effect of providing certain exceptions to the general rule, thus: Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3,
Section 10 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,

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provides that the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the principal
law office of all GOCCs, their subsidiaries, other corporate off-springs, and government acquired
asset corporations. Administrative Order No. 130, issued by the Office of the President on 19 May
1994, delineating the functions and responsibilities of the OSG and the OGCC, clarifies that all
legal matters pertaining to GOCCs, their subsidiaries, other corporate off[-]springs, and
government acquired asset corporations shall be exclusively referred to and handled by the
OGCC, unless their respective charters expressly name the OSG as their legal counsel.
Nonetheless, the GOCC may hire the services of a private counsel in exceptional cases with the
written conformity and acquiescence of the Government Corporate Counsel, and with the
concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA). (Emphasis supplied) The rules and regulations
concerning the engagement of private counsel by government-owned and -controlled
corporations is currently provided for by Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2,
1986, and Office of the President Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated August 27, 1998. The Law
Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 269,
G.R. No. 185544 January 13, 2015

It is only in “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” or “exceptional cases” that it is

allowed to engage the services of private counsels.

According to these rules and regulations, the general rule is that government-owned and -
controlled corporations must refer all their legal matters to the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel. It is only in “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” or “exceptional
cases” that it is allowed to engage the services of private counsels. The Law Firm of Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 269, G.R. No. 185544
January 13, 2015

Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986 and Office of the President
(OP) Memorandum Circular No. 9 also require that “before the hiring or employment” of
private counsel, the “written conformity and acquiescence of the [Government Corporate
Counsel] and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be secured.”

Petitioner fails to understand that Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-255 requires not only the
conformity and acquiescence of the Office of the Solicitor General or Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel but also the written conformity of the Commission on Audit. The hiring of
private counsel becomes unauthorized if it is only the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel that gives its conformity. The rules and jurisprudence expressly require that the
government-owned and -controlled corporation concerned must also secure the concurrence of

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respondents. It is also erroneous for petitioner to assume that it had the conformity and
acquiescence of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel since Government Corporate
Counsel Valdez’s approval of Clark Development Corporation’s request was merely conditional
on its submission of the retainership contract. Clark Development Corporation’s failure to submit
the retainership contract resulted in its failure to secure a final approval. The Law Firm of
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. Commission on Audit, 745 SCRA 269, G.R. No.
185544 January 13, 2015

As a general rule, all government procurement must undergo competitive bidding. This ensures
transparency, competitiveness, efficiency, and public accountability in the procurement
process.

The ratification of respondent’s unauthorized acts does not necessarily mean that the May 7,
2004 contract was validly executed. To determine if respondent committed grave misconduct
when he entered into this contract, it must first be determined if public bidding was necessary.
As a general rule, all government procurement must undergo competitive bidding. This ensures
transparency, competitiveness, efficiency, and public accountability in the procurement process.
However, the government entity may, subject to certain conditions, resort to alternative
methods of procurement namely: (1) limited source bidding, (2) direct contracting, (3) repeat
order, (4) shopping, and (5) negotiated procurement. The procuring entity must ensure that in
any of these methods, it secures the most advantageous price for the government. Office of the
Ombudsman vs. De Guzman, 841 SCRA 616, G.R. No. 197886 October 4, 2017

In negotiated procurement, “the Procuring Entity directly negotiates a contract with a

technically, legally and financially capable supplier, contractor or consultant.”

Resort to negotiated procurement is allowed only under the following conditions: Section 53.
Negotiated Procurement.—Negotiated Procurement shall be allowed only in the following
instances: (a) In cases of two (2) failed biddings, as provided in Section 35 hereof; (b) In case of
imminent danger to life or property during a state of calamity, or when time is of the essence
arising from natural or man-made calamities or other causes where immediate action is
necessary to prevent damage to or loss of life or property, or to restore vital public services,
infrastructure facilities and other public utilities; (c) Take-over of contracts, which have been
rescinded or terminated for causes provided for in the contract and existing laws, where
immediate action is necessary to prevent damage to or loss of life or property, or to restore vital
public services, infrastructure facilities and other public utilities; (d) Where the subject contract
is adjacent or contiguous to an ongoing infrastructure project, as defined in the IRR: Provided,

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however, That the original contract is the result of a Competitive Bidding; the subject contract to
be negotiated has similar or related scopes of work; it is within the contracting capacity of the
contractor; the contractor uses the same prices or lower unit prices as in the original contract
less mobilization cost; the amount involved does not exceed the amount of the ongoing project;
and, the contractor has no negative slippage: Provided, further, That negotiations for the
procurement are commenced before the expiry of the original contract. Whenever applicable,
this principle shall also govern consultancy contracts, where the consultants have unique
experience and expertise to deliver the require service; or, (e) Subject to the guidelines specified
in the IRR, purchases of Goods from another agency of the Government, such as the Procurement
Service of the DBM, which is tasked with a centralized procurement of commonly used Goods for
the government in accordance with Letter of Instruction No. 755 and Executive Order No. 359,
Series of 1989. Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Guzman, 841 SCRA 616, G.R. No. 197886
October 4, 2017

Negotiated procurement under Republic Act (RA) No. 9184, Section 53(b) involves situations
beyond the procuring entity’s control. Thus, it speaks of “imminent danger . . . during a state
of calamity . . . natural or man-made calamities [and] other causes where immediate action is
necessary.”

Following the principle of ejusdem generis, where general terms are qualified by the particular
terms they follow in the statute, the phrase “other causes” is construed to mean a situation
similar to a calamity, whether natural or man-made, where inaction could result in the loss of
life, destruction of properties or infrastructures, or loss of vital public services and utilities. The
expiration of the mail carriage drivers’ employment contracts is not a calamitous event
contemplated under Republic Act No. 9184, Section 53(b). Office of the Ombudsman vs. De
Guzman, 841 SCRA 616, G.R. No. 197886 October 4, 2017

Republic Act (RA) No. 9184, Section 5(j)(ii) defines head of the procuring entity as “the
governing board or its duly authorized official, for government-owned and/or -controlled
corporations.”

Respondent claims that even if public bidding was necessary, he cannot be held liable for its non-
conduct since he is not the head of the procuring entity. On the contrary, Republic Act No. 9184,
Section 5(j)(ii) defines head of the procuring entity as “the governing board or its duly authorized
official, for government-owned and/or-controlled corporations.” As previously discussed,
respondent’s acts, while initially unauthorized, were eventually ratified by the Philippine Postal
Corporation Board of Directors’ silence. Thus, he was considered “its duly authorized official” in

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procuring Aboitiz One’s services. Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Guzman, 841 SCRA 616, G.R.
No. 197886 October 4, 2017

Administrative bodies are not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure.

Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are
unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before
them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Palao vs. Florentino III International, Inc., 814 SCRA 448, G.R. No. 186967 January
18, 2017

ELECTION LAW

Ballots contain a mark intentionally written or placed by the voter for the purpose of identifying
the ballot or the voter.

In Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 496 (1921), The distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be
placed in the ballots is that which the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating
the means of identifying said ballot, for the purpose of defeating the secrecy of the suffrage
which the law establishes. As this is a question of fact, it should be resolved with the ballot itself
in view. Marks made by the voter unintentionally do not invalidate the ballot. Neither do marks
made by some person other than the voter. Moreover, the Omnibus Election Code provides
explicitly that every ballot shall be presumed valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify
its rejection. Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter to
serve as identification marks, commas, dots, lines, or hyphens between the first name and
surname of a candidate, or in other parts of the ballot, traces of the letter “T”, “J”, and other
similar ones, the first letters or syllables of names which the voter does not continue, the use of
two or more kinds of writing and unintentional or accidental flourishes, strokes, or strains, shall
not invalidate the ballot. Locsin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 635,
G.R. No. 204123 March 19, 2013

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Ballots with an over-voting count occur when a voter shaded more than two or more ovals
pertaining to two or more candidates for representative.

The HRET admitted 10 ballots in favor of Lagdameo owing to the untenability of the objections
raised. On the other hand, all 597 ballots in favor of petitioner Locsin were admitted. Locsin vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 635, G.R. No. 204123 March 19, 2013

Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 342 SCRA 244 (2000), laid down the
“four inviolable parameters” in determining the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election
based on a reading of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941.

In Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 342 SCRA 244 (2000), we reversed the
Commission on Elections’ ruling that the respondent parties, coalitions, and organizations were
each entitled to a party-list seat despite their failure to reach the 2% threshold in the 1998 party-
list election. Veterans also stated that the 20% requirement in the Constitution is merely a ceiling.
Veterans laid down the “four inviolable parameters” in determining the winners in a Philippine-
style party-list election based on a reading of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941: First,
the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to
have a seat in the House of Representatives. Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation — the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their
total number of votes.” Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. vs. Commission on
Elections, 712 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

Party-list groups may be national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

The most recent Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, 694 SCRA 477 (2013), does not in any way modify
the formula set in Veterans. It only corrects the definition of valid party-list groups. We affirmed
that party-list groups may be national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. We
abandoned the requirement introduced in Ang Bagong Bayani that all party-list groups should
prove that they represent a “marginalized” or “under-represented” sector. Alliance for Rural and
Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 712 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 192803
December 10, 2013

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Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. The total votes cast do not
include invalid votes.

Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of
the petitioner, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the
party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation: (b)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats. (Emphasis provided) The total votes cast do not include
invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the denominator, may be votes that
were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper shading or having no shade at
all; existence of stray or ambiguous marks; tears in the ballot; and/or ballots rejected by the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-based automated election system.
All these are causes that nullify the count for that vote that can be attributable to the voter’s
action. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 712
SCRA 54, G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

Votes cast for the party-list system should include all votes cast for party-list groups contained
in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by
our courts.

Thus, the content of the divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list
component of the House of Representatives should be amended accordingly. We qualify that the
divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast for the party-
list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise a
substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all
the votes validly cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on the ballot when
making his or her choices. To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents
the extent of his or her choices for an electoral exercise. He or she is entitled to the expectation
that these names have properly been vetted by the Commission on Elections. Therefore, he or
she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his or her choice based on the listed names in
the ballot will be counted. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. vs. Commission
on Elections, 712 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

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The counting of votes for party-list groups in the ballot but subsequently declared as
disqualified is corollary to the “fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people
should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them.”

It is also part of the right of suffrage, and the law’s intention to ensure a more representative
Congress should be given priority. Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for
party-list groups that are subsequently disqualified for so long as they were presented as a choice
to the electorate. If his or her vote is not counted as part of the divisor, then this would amount
to a disenfranchisement of a basic constitutional right to be able to choose representatives of
the House of Representatives in two ways. First, his or her vote will be nullified. Second, he or
she will be deprived of choosing another party-list group to represent his or her interest should
the party listed in the ballot be declared disqualified. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian
Reconstruction, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 712 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 192803 December 10,
2013

The party-list group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final
disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on Elections should also
not be included in the divisor.

There are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list group
in the ballot but such group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and
interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, we said in Cayat v. Commission
on Elections, 522 SCRA 23 (2007), that votes cast in favor of a candidate “disqualified with
finality” should be considered stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list group in
the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final disqualification was made
known to the electorate by the Commission on Elections should also not be included in the
divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as well as accord respect to the inherent
right of suffrage of the voters. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 712 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups
indicated in the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or
petitions before any tribunal in relation to their cancellation or disqualification cases.

The formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth
be: Number of votes of party-list = Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
divided by Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates. The total votes cast for the party-

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list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in the ballot regardless of the
pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to their
cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is
notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also
shall not include invalid votes. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 712 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

Section 17 of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9615, the rules and
regulations implementing the Fair Elections Act, regulating the posting of campaign materials
only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.

Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above
provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political
parties, and petitioners are neither of the two. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006 on “Lawful
Election Propaganda” also states that these are “allowed for all registered political parties,
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party list elections
and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the
limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . .” Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These provisions show that election
propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with candidates and
political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties for whom
the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political parties
maintain within the authorized expenses limitation. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on
Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Nuisance candidates

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.” Timbol vs. Commission on Elections, 751 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 206004 February 24,
2015

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To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of

candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent.

This denial or cancellation may be “motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested
party,” “subject to an opportunity to be heard.” Timbol vs. Commission on Elections, 751 SCRA
456, G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015

In a multi-slot office, all votes cast in favor of the nuisance candidate whose name is confusingly
similar to a bona fide candidate shall not be automatically credited in the latter's favor. If the
ballot contains one (1) vote for the nuisance candidate and no vote for the bona fide candidate,
that vote will be counted in the latter's favor. However, if the nuisance candidate and the bona
fide candidate each gets a vote, only one (1) vote will be counted in the latter's favor.

Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for petitioner alone should be counted in
favor of private respondent; if there are votes for both petitioner and private respondent in the
same ballot, then only one (1) vote should be counted in the latter's favor. This will not only
discourage nuisance candidates, but will also prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.

In Santos vs. COMELEC, this Court clarified how the votes of nuisance candidates in a multi-slot
office should be treated: In a multi-slot office, such as membership of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, a registered voter may vote for more than one candidate. Hence, it is possible that
the legitimate candidate and nuisance candidate, having similar names, may both receive votes
in one ballot. The Court agrees with the OSG that in that scenario, the vote cast for the nuisance
candidate should no longer be credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise, the latter shall
receive two votes from one voter.

Therefore, in a multi-slot office, the COMELEC must not merely apply a simple mathematical
formula of adding the votes of the nuisance candidate to the legitimate candidate with the similar
name. To apply such simple arithmetic might lead to the double counting of votes because there
may be ballots containing votes for both nuisance and legitimate candidates.

As properly discussed by the OSG, a legitimate candidate may seek another person with the same
surname to file a candidacy for the same position and the latter will opt to be declared a nuisance
candidate. In that scenario, the legitimate candidate shall receive all the votes of the nuisance
candidate and may even receive double votes, thereby, drastically increasing his odds.

At the same time, it is also possible that a voter may be confused when he reads the ballot
containing the similar names of the nuisance candidate and the legitimate candidate. In his
eagerness to vote, he may shade both ovals for the two candidates to ensure that the legitimate

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candidate is voted for. Similarly, in that case, the legitimate candidate may receive two (2) votes
from one voter by applying the simple arithmetic formula adopted by the COMELEC when the
nuisance candidate's COC is cancelled.

Thus, to ascertain that the votes for the nuisance candidate is accurately credited in favor of the
legitimate candidate with the similar name, the COMELEC must also inspect the ballots. In those
ballots that contain both votes for nuisance and legitimate candidate, only one count of vote
must be credited to the legitimate candidate.

While the perils of a fielding nuisance candidates against legitimate candidates cannot be
overemphasized, it must also be guaranteed that the votes of the nuisance candidate are
properly and fairly counted in favor of the said legitimate candidate. In that manner, the will of
the electorate is upheld. Zapanta vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 233016 March 5, 2019

The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey
firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Elections Act.

We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or pay for
election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section
5.2(a) of the Fair Elections Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police
power and effects the constitutional policy of “guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for
public service[.]” Section 5.2(a)’s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails
petitioners’ free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment
of contracts. Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 124, G.R. No.
208062 April 7, 2015

Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 was adopted with the end in mind of “guaranteeing or ensuring
equal opportunity for public service” and to this end, stipulates mechanisms for the
“supervision or regulation of the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication or information.”

Hence, its short title: Fair Elections Act. Situated within the constitutional order, the Fair Elections
Act provides means to realize the policy articulated in Article II, Section 26 of the 1987
Constitution to “guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service[.]” Article II, Section
26 models an understanding of Philippine political and electoral reality. It is not merely hortatory
or a statement of value. Among others, it sums up an aversion to the perpetuation of political
power through electoral contests skewed in favor of those with resources to dominate the

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deliberative space in any media. Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 755
SCRA 124, G.R. No. 208062 April 7, 2015

Fair Elections Act, Section 5.1 defines election surveys as “the measurement of opinions and
perceptions of the voters as regards a candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters’ preference for
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period.”

Sections 5.2 and 5.3 provide regulations that facilitate transparency with respect to election
surveys. Section 5.4 is no longer in effect, having been declared unconstitutional in this court’s
May 5, 2001 Decision in Social Weather Stations and Kamahalan Publishing Corp. v. COMELEC,
357 SCRA 496 (2001). Section 5.5 pertains to exit polls. Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 124, G.R. No. 208062 April 7, 2015

The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair Elections Act is a
recognition that election surveys are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data.

As with all the other provisions of the Fair Elections Act, Section 5 is a means to guarantee equal
access to the deliberative forums essential to win an elective public office. Any reading of Section
5 and of its individual components, such as Section 5.2(a), cannot be divorced from this purpose.
The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair Elections Act is a
recognition that election surveys are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing
surveys are a means to shape the preference of voters, inform the strategy of campaign
machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election surveys have a similar
nature as election propaganda. They are expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the
outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences on election results. Social Weather
Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 124, G.R. No. 208062 April 7, 2015

Election surveys have been critiqued for amplifying the notion of an election as a “horse race”
and for reducing elections to the lowest common denominator of percentage points or a
candidate’s erstwhile share in the vote market rather than focusing on issues, principles,
programs, and platforms.

Several possible, albeit conflicting, effects of surveys on voter behavior have been postulated:
First, there is the bandwagon effect where “electors rally to support the candidate leading in the

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polls.” This “assumes that knowledge of a popular ‘tide’ will likely change voting intentions in
[favor] of the frontrunner, that many electors feel more comfortable supporting a popular choice
or that people accept the perceived collective wisdom of others as being enough reason for
supporting a candidate.” Second, there is the underdog effect where “electors rally to support
the candidate trailing in the polls.” This shift can be motivated by sympathy for the perceived
underdog. Third, there is the motivating effect where “individuals who had not intended to vote
are persuaded to do so,” having been alerted of the fact of an election’s imminence. Fourth, there
is also the demotivating effect where “voters abstain from voting out of certainty that their
candidate or party will win[.]” Fifth, there are reports of a behavior known as strategic voting
where “voting is influenced by the chances of winning[.]” Lastly, there is also the theory of a free-
will effect where “voters cast their ballots to prove the polls wrong[.]” Election surveys published
during election periods create the “politics of expectations.” Voters act in accordance with what
is perceived to be an existing or emerging state of affairs with respect to how candidates are
faring. Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 124, G.R. No. 208062
April 7, 2015

Politics in the Philippines has been criticized as “a lucrative means of self-aggrandizement.”

Ours is an exclusive system that perpetuates power and provides sanctuary to those who have
already secured their place. Traditional Filipino politics connotes elite families that, with the
state, are “engaged in a reciprocal relationship that constantly defines and redefines both.” As
recounted by Alfred McCoy, this reciprocal relationship, typified by rent-seeking (i.e., “taking
advantage of their access to state privileges to expand proprietary wealth”), is a vicious cycle
propagated for as long as the Philippines has been a republic: “The emergence of the Republic as
a weak postcolonial state augmented the power of rent-seeking political families — a
development that further weakened the state’s own resources.” Social Weather Stations, Inc.
vs. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 124, G.R. No. 208062 April 7, 2015

The right of voters to verify whether vote-counting machines properly recorded their vote is not
only a statutory right; it is one that enables their individual participation in governance as
sovereign.

It is not often that this court requires the filing of a comment within a non-extendible period. This
is resorted to when the issues raised by a party is fundamental and the ambient circumstances
indicate extreme urgency. The right of voters to verify whether vote-counting machines properly
recorded their vote is not only a statutory right; it is one that enables their individual participation
in governance as sovereign. Among all government bodies, the Commission on Elections is the

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entity that should appreciate how important it is to respond to cases filed by the public to enable
these rights. It perplexes this court that the Commission on Elections failed to immediately
transmit relevant documents to the Office of the Solicitor General to allow them to respond
within the time granted. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 787
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 222731 March 8, 2016

One (1) of the laws that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) must implement is Republic
Act (RA) No. 8436, as amended by RA No. 9369, which requires the automated election system
to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT).

Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to
“[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” One of
the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system to have the capability
of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail. Based on the technical specifications during the
bidding, the current vote-counting machines should meet the minimum system capability of
generating a VVPAT. However, the Commission on Elections’ act of rendering inoperative this
feature runs contrary to why the law required this feature in the first place. Under Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended, it is considered a policy of the state that the votes reflect the genuine will
of the People. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 787 SCRA 1, G.R.
No. 222731 March 8, 2016

A mechanism that allows the voter to verify his or her choice of candidates will ensure a free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed election.

By setting the minimum system capabilities of our automated election system, the law intends
to achieve the purposes set out in this declaration. A mechanism that allows the voter to verify
his or her choice of candidates will ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and
informed election. The voter is not left to wonder if the machine correctly appreciated his or her
ballot. The voter must know that his or her sovereign will, with respect to the national and local
leadership, was properly recorded by the vote-counting machines. Bagumbayan-VNP
Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 787 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 222731 March 8, 2016

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A “voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT)” requires the following: (a) individual voters can
verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification
at minimum should be paper based.

The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the
transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections. The law is clear. A
“voter-verified paper audit trail” requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether
the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should
be paper based. There appears to be no room for further interpretation of a “voter-verified paper
audit trail.” The paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical ballot, because there may be
instances where the machine may translate the ballot differently, or the voter inadvertently
spoils his or her ballot. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 787
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 222731 March 8, 2016

There is no legal prohibition for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to require that after
the voter reads and verifies the receipt, he or she is to leave it in a separate box, not take it out
of the precinct.

Definitely, the availability of all the voters’ receipts will make random manual audits more
accurate. The credibility of the results of any election depends, to a large extent, on the
confidence of each voter that his or her individual choices have actually been counted. It is in
that local precinct after the voter casts his or her ballot that this confidence starts. It is there
where it will be possible for the voter to believe that his or her participation as sovereign truly
counts. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 787 SCRA 1, G.R. No.
222731 March 8, 2016

As the Supreme Court (SC) has earlier observed in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 574 SCRA
782 (2008), members of the bench and the bar have “indiscriminately interchanged” the
remedies of a petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy (CoC) and a petition
for disqualification, thus “adding confusion to the already difficult state of our jurisprudence
on election laws.”

The remedies, however, have different grounds and periods for their filing. The remedies have
different legal consequences. Chua vs. Commission on Elections, 788 SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607
April 5, 2016

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The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of certificates of candidacy (CoCs). However, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the Commission may deny due course or cancel a CoC through a verified petition filed
exclusively on the ground that “any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false.”

The “material representation” referred to in Section 78 is that which involves the eligibility or
qualification for the office sought by the person who filed the certificate. Section 78 must,
therefore, be read “in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office.” Moreover, the false representation “must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.” A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also possess
none of the grounds for disqualification under the law. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his
Dissenting Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), “that
an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice
versa.” Chua vs. Commission on Elections, 788 SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016

Other grounds that may likewise be raised in a petition for disqualification.

Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, any of the grounds in Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code as well as in Section 40 of the Local Government Code may likewise be raised in a
petition for disqualification. Chua vs. Commission on Elections, 788 SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607
April 5, 2016

A petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy (CoC) may likewise be filed
against a permanent resident of a foreign country seeking an elective post in the Philippines on
the ground of material misrepresentation in the CoC.

Private respondent Fragata alleges in her Petition that petitioner is a permanent resident in the
United States, a green card holder who, prior to the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy for
Councilor, has resided in the State of Georgia for 33 years. She anchors her Petition on Section
40 of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies permanent residents of a foreign country
from running for any elective local position. It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code, persons who file their certificates of candidacy declare that they are not a

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permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country. Chua vs. Commission on Elections, 788
SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016

Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a petition for
disqualification “shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
(CoCs), but not later than the date of proclamation.”

Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing either a
petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner’s certificate of candidacy or a petition for
disqualification. In her Petition, private respondent Fragata did not argue that petitioner made a
false material representation in her Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner was a
permanent resident disqualified to run for Councilor under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. Private respondent Fragata’s Petition, therefore, was a petition for disqualification. It
follows that private respondent Fragata timely filed her Petition before the Commission on
Elections. Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a petition for
disqualification “shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but
not later than the date of proclamation.” Private respondent Fragata filed her Petition on the
date of petitioner’s proclamation on May 15, 2013. The Commission on Elections did not gravely
abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of private respondent Fragata’s Petition. Chua vs.
Commission on Elections, 788 SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016

Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the Oath of
Allegiance.

The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are
separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for
public office. In Jacot v. Dal, 572 SCRA 295 (2008): [T]he oath of allegiance contained in the
Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a
general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship. With petitioner’s
failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, petitioner was
a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012. Under Section
40 of the Local Government Code, she was disqualified to run for Councilor in the Fourth District

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of Manila during the 2013 National and Local Elections. Chua vs. Commission on Elections, 788
SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016

The permanent vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those arising “when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.”

In these situations, the vacancies were caused by those whose certificates of candidacy were
valid at the time of the filing “but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law
that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.” Chua vs. Commission on Elections, 788 SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016

In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio certificates of candidacy (CoCs), the
person legally entitled to the vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next
highest number of votes among those eligible.

The rule on succession under Section 45, however, would not apply if the permanent vacancy
was caused by one whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically with respect to
dual citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio because they possess “a substantive
[disqualifying circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to the filing of their certificate of candidacy.”
Legally, they should not even be considered candidates. The votes casted for them should be
considered stray and should not be counted. In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab
initio certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the vacant position would be the
candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes among those eligible. In this case, it is
private respondent Bacani who is legally entitled to the position of Councilor, having garnered
the sixth highest number of votes among the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections
correctly proclaimed private respondent Bacani in lieu of petitioner. Chua vs. Commission on
Elections, 788 SCRA 413, G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016

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Petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified from running
for the position of Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local
Elections. With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy
(CoC), her CoC was void ab initio.

She was correctly considered a noncandidate. All votes casted for her were stray, and the person
legally entitled to the position is private respondent Krystle Marie C. Bacani, the candidate with
the next highest number of votes among the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections
did not gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua’s proclamation and subsequently
proclaiming private respondent Bacani. Chua vs. Commission on Elections, 788 SCRA 413, G.R.
No. 216607 April 5, 2016

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The Supreme Court has held that while the power to merge administrative regions is not
provided for expressly in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments.

This Court has held that while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for
expressly in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President
to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. This power
of supervision is found in the Constitution as well as in the Local Government Code of 1991, as
follows: Section 25—National Supervision over Local Government Units—(a) Consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions. The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly
urbanized cities, and independent component cities; through the province with respect to
component cities and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to
barangays. Republic vs. Bayao, 697 SCRA 313, G.R. No. 179492 June 5, 2013

An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for
provincial elective officials.

Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or
component cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered

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cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, 31 Phil. 524 (1915), this Court recognized
the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the
charter of Baguio City. Jadewell Parking System Corporation vs. Lidua, Sr., 706 SCRA 724, G.R.
No. 169588 October 7, 2013

Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own “organizational structure and
staffing pattern” also implies the power to revise and reorganize.

Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that “any provision on a power of
a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any
question thereon shall be resolved in favor or devolution of powers x x x.” Section 5, paragraph
(c) also provides that “the general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to
give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.” These rules of interpretation
emphasize the policy of local autonomy and the devolution of powers to the local government
units. Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own “organizational structure and
staffing pattern” also implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local
governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient
governmental services especially at the local government level require rational and deliberate
changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time. City of General Santos vs.
Commission on Audit, 723 SCRA 77, G.R. No. 199439 April 22, 2014

In addition to stating that local government units (LGUs) have the power to tax (subject to
Congressional guidelines and limitations), Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution adds the
phrase “consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.” Consistent with the 1987
Constitution’s declared preference, the taxing powers of local government units (LGUs) must
be resolved in favor of their local fiscal autonomy.

Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution is more emphatic in empowering local government
units in the matter of taxation compared with Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution. In
addition to stating that local government units have the power to tax (subject to Congressional
guidelines and limitations), Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution adds the phrase
“consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.” Further, it is definite with the use of funds
generated by local government units through the exercise of their taxing powers, providing that
“[s]uch taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.” Demaala vs.
Commission on Audit, 750 SCRA 612, G.R. No. 199752 February 17, 2015

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Fiscal autonomy entails “the power to create . . . own sources of revenue.”

In turn, this power necessarily entails enabling local government units with the capacity to create
revenue sources in accordance with the realities and contingencies present in their specific
contexts. The power to create must mean the local government units’ power to create what is
most appropriate and optimal for them; otherwise, they would be mere automatons that are
turned on and off to perform prearranged operations. Demaala vs. Commission on Audit, 750
SCRA 612, G.R. No. 199752 February 17, 2015

It is basic that laws and local ordinances are “presumed to be valid unless and until the courts
declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal terms.”

Thus, the concerned officials of the Municipality of Narra, Palawan must be deemed to have
conducted themselves in good faith and with regularity when they acted pursuant to Chapter 5,
Section 48 of Provincial Ordinance No. 332-A, Series of 1995, and collected the additional levy
for the special education fund at the rate of 0.5%. Accordingly, it was improper for respondent
to attribute personal liability to petitioner and to require her to personally answer to the
deficiency in special education fund collections. Demaala vs. Commission on Audit, 750 SCRA
612, G.R. No. 199752 February 17, 2015

City councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on the basis that the
city mayor had no authority to do so because the city mayor’s authority to bind the city to
obligations must emanate from the City Council.

Under Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section 455(b)(1)(vi) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, the city mayor may sign all bonds, contracts, and
obligations on behalf of a city only upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to
law or ordinance: Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation.—. . . . (b) For
efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall: (1) Exercise
general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the city
government, and in this connection, shall: . . . . (vi) Represent the city in all its business
transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents
upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance. Lao, Jr. vs. LGU
of Cagayan de Oro City, 839 SCRA 466, G.R. No. 187869 September 13, 2017

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As the City Council is the source of the mayor’s power to execute contracts for the city, its
members have the authority, interest, and even duty to file cases in behalf of the city, to restrain
the execution of contracts entered into in violation of the Local Government Code (LGC).

Under such circumstances, in the same manner that a stockholder of a corporation is permitted
to institute derivative or representative suits as nominal party plaintiff for the benefit of the
corporation which is the real party-in-interest, more so may plaintiffs as city councilors
exclusively empowered by the city charter to “make all appropriations for the expenses of the
government of the city” and who were the very source of the authority granted to the city mayor
to enter into the questioned transactions which authority was later revoked by them, as per the
allegations of the complaint at bar, be deemed to possess the necessary authority, and interest,
if not duty, to file the present suit on behalf of the City and to prevent the disbursement of city
funds under contracts impugned by them to have been entered into by the city mayor without
lawful authority and in violation of law. Lao, Jr. vs. LGU of Cagayan de Oro City, 839 SCRA 466,
G.R. No. 187869 September 13, 2017

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Chapter XIII (Settlement of Conflicts) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7942 known as the Mining Act of
1995 provides for the powers of the panel of arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB).

Section 77 states that “the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide
on the following: a. Disputes involving rights to mining areas; b. Disputes involving mineral
agreements or permits; c. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires; and d. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department
at the date of the effectivity of this Act.” Section 78 provides for the MAB’s appellate jurisdiction
over the decision or order of the panel of arbitrators. Section 79 enumerates the MAB’s powers
and functions, including the power “to conduct hearings on all matters within its jurisdiction.”
Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association, Inc. [MISSMA] vs. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., 744 SCRA 328, G.R. No. 149916 December 10, 2014

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Section 26 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7076 reiterates the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary’s power of control over “the program and the activities of the
small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale mining area.”

Section 26. Administrative Supervision over the People’s Small-scale Mining Program.—The
Secretary through his representative shall exercise direct supervision and control over the
program and activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale mining area. The
Secretary shall within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act promulgate rules and
regulations to effectively implement the provisions of the same. Priority shall be given to such
rules and regulations that will ensure the least disruption in the operations of the small-scale
miners. Section 21.1 of DAO No. 34-2, the implementing rules and regulations of Republic Act
No. 7076, states that the DENR Secretary has “direct supervision and control over the program
and the activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale mining area.”
Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association, Inc. [MISSMA] vs. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., 744 SCRA 328, G.R. No. 149916 December 10, 2014

League of Provinces v. DENR, 696 SCRA 190 (2013), discussed that “the Local Government Code
(LGC) did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial
government.”

League of Provinces v. DENR, 696 SCRA 190 (2013), discussed that “the Local Government Code
did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government,
as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in-
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country’s natural
resources.” Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association, Inc. [MISSMA] vs. Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., 744 SCRA 328, G.R. No. 149916 December 10, 2014

The Constitution provides that “[t]he State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty (60%) per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens[.]”

The Constitution provides that “[t]he State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens[.]” Moreover, “[t]he President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned

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corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country[.]” Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners
Association, Inc. [MISSMA] vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., 744 SCRA 328, G.R. No.
149916 December 10, 2014

Republic Act (RA) No. 1899 delegated to local government units (LGUs) the state’s sovereign
right to reclaim foreshore lands.

RREC argues that the phrase “share and share alike” should be interpreted to mean that “RREC
and Pasay City should receive their share of the payment depending on each’s [sic] share in the
[reclamation] project.” It concludes that since Pasay City contributed nothing, it alone should
receive the full amount. This is erroneous. Republic Act No. 1899 delegated to local government
units the state’s sovereign right to reclaim foreshore lands. Section 1, in relation to Section 9, of
Republic Act No. 1899 mandates that the reclamation must be carried out by the municipality or
chartered city concerned (that is, Pasay City) and not by a private entity (that is, RREC). RREC was
able to undertake reclamation work on behalf of the city only through a special power of
attorney. Thus, Pasay City cannot be deprived of its share in the compensation. Roxas vs.
Republic Real Estate Corporation, 792 SCRA 31, G.R. No. 208205, G.R. No. 208212 June 1, 2016

Power generation is no longer considered a public utility operation, and companies which shall
engage in power generation and supply of electricity are no longer required to secure a national
franchise.

Indeed, the enactment of EPIRA separated the transmission and sub-transmission functions of
the state-owned Napocor from its generation function, and transferred all its transmission assets
to the then newly-created TRANSCO, which was wholly owned by PSALM Corporation at that
time. Power generation is no longer considered a public utility operation, and companies which
shall engage in power generation and supply of electricity are no longer required to secure a
national franchise. National Power Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Bataan, 819 SCRA
173, G.R. No. 180654 March 6, 2017

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Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) effectively removed power generation from the
ambit of local franchise taxes.

EPIRA effectively removed power generation from the ambit of local franchise taxes. Hence, as
regards Napocor’s business of generating electricity, the franchise taxes sought to be collected
by the Provincial Government of Bataan for the latter part of 2001 up to 2003 are devoid of any
statutory basis. National Power Corporation vs. Provincial Government of Bataan, 819 SCRA
173, G.R. No. 180654 March 6, 2017

Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM) was created as a government-owned
and -controlled corporation to take ownership over all of National Power Corporation’s
(NAPOCOR’s) assets and liabilities for the sole purpose of managing its sale, disposition, and
privatization.

Under EPIRA, PSALM acts as the conservator of NAPOCOR’s assets. Until NAPOCOR’s assets could
be sold or disposed of, PSALM operates and maintains NAPOCOR’s assets and manages its
liabilities in trust for the national government, thus: SECTION 51. Powers.—The PSALM Corp.
shall, in the performance of its functions and for the attainment of its objective, have the
following powers:. . . . (b) To take title to and possession of, administer and conserve the assets
transferred to it; to sell or dispose of the same at such price and under such terms and conditions
as it may deem necessary or proper, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations. Power
Generation Employees Association-NPC vs. National Power Corporation, 835 SCRA 645, G.R.
No. 187420 August 9, 2017

Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) provides that National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) may generate and sell electricity only from Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management’s (PSALM’s) undisposed generating assets and is not allowed to incur any new
obligations, signifying that PSALM exercises complete ownership over all of NAPOCOR’s
generating assets.

SECTION 51. Powers.—The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the
attainment of its objective, have the following powers:. . . . (j) NPC may generate and sell
electricity only from the undisposed generating assets and IPP contracts of PSALM Corp. and shall
not incur any new obligations to purchase power through bilateral contracts with generation
companies or other suppliers. Power Generation Employees Association-NPC vs. National
Power Corporation, 835 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 187420 August 9, 2017

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Under Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management (PSALM) was given ownership over the generating assets but was not granted
functions to operate these assets.

As a corporation operating a necessary public utility, NAPOCOR continues to function in the

course of its privatization. Under EPIRA, PSALM was given ownership over the generating assets
but was not granted functions to operate these assets. Thus, it entered into the Operation and
Maintenance Agreement with NAPOCOR to ensure NAPOCOR’s continued operations. Power
Generation Employees Association-NPC vs. National Power Corporation, 835 SCRA 645, G.R.
No. 187420 August 9, 2017

Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM) was given a lifespan of twenty-five
(25) years, during which it would have ownership over all of National Power Corporation’s
(NAPOCOR’s) generation assets.

Among the attributes of ownership are that of the right to possess or enjoy (jus utendi), the right
to the fruits (jus fruendi), the right to abuse or consume (jus abutendi), the right to dispose or
alienate (jus disponendi), and the right to recover (jus vindicandi). Under the law, respondent
PSALM exercises all attributes of ownership over respondent NAPOCOR’s generation assets,
including the right to operate these assets if the operation prevents its dissipation. PSALM was
given a lifespan of 25 years, during which it would have ownership over all of NAPOCOR’s
generation assets. PSALM, thus, has right over all the fruits produced by the assets including its
revenues. Since PSALM is mandated to administer these generation assets, it has the correlative
obligation to answer for the expenses of its operations. Whatever remains from the revenues
would be NAPOCOR’s net profits, over which PSALM has explicit ownership under the law. Power
Generation Employees Association-NPC vs. National Power Corporation, 835 SCRA 645, G.R.
No. 187420 August 9, 2017

The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a public corporation or government instrumentality;
hence, the money to be paid to complainant is public money and subject to audit by the
Commission on Audit (COA).

We find nothing improper in the actions and statements of respondent. What respondent did
was a mere honest effort to protect the interest of his client, the Chair of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines-Mayon Albay Council. The Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a public corporation or
government instrumentality; hence, the money to be paid to complainant is public money and
subject to audit by the Commission on Audit. Hence, if the Memorandum of Agreement causes

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any undue injury to any party, including the government, the parties to the Agreement can be
brought to court on administrative and/or criminal charges. Canlapan vs. Balayo, 784 SCRA 135,
A.C. No. 10605 February 17, 2016

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was created for the purpose of providing
social security and insurance benefits as well as promoting efficiency and the welfare of
government employees.

To this end, the state has adopted a policy of maintaining and preserving the actuarial solvency
of GSIS funds at all times. The fund comes from both member and employer contributions.
Hence, non-remittance of the contributions threatens the actuarial solvency of the fund.
Matalam vs. People, 788 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 221849-50 April 4, 2016

The Pag-IBIG Fund was established pursuant to “constitutional mandates on the promotion of
public welfare through ample social services, as well as its humanist commitment to the
interest of the working groups, in relation particularly to their need for decent shelter.”

This continued commitment to social justice and national development through the
establishment, development, promotion, and integration of a sound and viable tax-exempt
mutual provident savings system for the working peoples’ housing needs, with the mandatory
contributory support of the employers, is seen in the subsequent amendments to the law. Failure
of the employer to remit its share of the contributions jeopardizes the peoples’ needs and rights
to decent shelter or housing. Matalam vs. People, 788 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 221849-50 April 4,
2016

The 1987 Constitution mandates the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the
limits prescribed by Congress.

The 1987 Constitution mandates the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the limits
prescribed by Congress. Under Article II, Section 21 of the Constitution, “[t]he State shall promote
comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.” Article XIII, Section 4 provides that an
agrarian reform program shall be carried out in the country: Section 4. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the rights of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall

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encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land sharing. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal,
822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) covers the following lands: (1) all
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture; (2)
all lands of the public domain exceeding the total area of five [5] hectares and below to be
retained by the landowner; (3) all government-owned lands that are devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and (4) all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture, regardless of the
agricultural products raised or can be raised on these lands.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers all public and private agricultural lands, as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced.
However, a maximum of five (5) hectares of the landowner’s compact or contiguous landholdings
may not be distributed to qualified beneficiaries, as it is within the landowner’s rights to retain
this area. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

The law defines agricultural land as “land devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.”

The law defines agricultural land as “land devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.” For agricultural land to be considered
devoted to an agricultural activity, there must be “cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.” Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs.
Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

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Section 65 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, as reiterated by Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-90,
states that reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands into nonagricultural lands is
subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

The law has given the Department of Agrarian Reform the power to “approve or disapprove
applications for conversion . . . of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses[,]” such as
“residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses. . .” Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs.
Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

In Natalia Realty Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 225 SCRA 278 (1993), lands not
devoted to agricultural activity, including lands previously converted to nonagricultural use
prior to the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 by government agencies other than the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), were declared outside the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

In light of Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued
Administrative Order No. 06-94 to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. It affirms the rule that a local government reclassification before
June 15, 1988 does not need the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Heirs of
Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

As a general rule, agricultural lands that were reclassified as commercial, residential, or

industrial by the local government, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), before June 15, 1988 are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).

A farmlot is not included in any of these categories. Respondents correctly argue that the 17 lots
are still classified and devoted to agricultural uses. The definition of a “farmlot subdivision” under
the HLURB Rules and Regulations Implementing Farmlot Subdivision Plan (HLURB Regulations)
leaves no doubt that it is an “agricultural land” as defined under Republic Act No. 3844. Heirs of
Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

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Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, sought “to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant
and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.”

This case involves a land that was reclassified as a “farmlot subdivision,” intended for “intensive
agricultural activities.” Likewise, located away from the city center, the farmlot subdivision has
not been developed into an urban zone. When Salas’ agricultural land was reclassified as a
farmlot subdivision, the applicable law was Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. Republic Act No.
3844, sought “to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens,
and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.” Thus, Republic Act No. 3844
established the Land Authority to initiate proceedings for the acquisition of private agricultural
lands, and the subdivision of these lands into economic family-size farm units for resale to bona
fide tenants, occupants, and qualified farmers. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal, 822
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

Section 166(1) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 defined an agricultural land as “land devoted to
any growth, including but not limited to crop lands[.]” The law neither made reference to a
“farmlot subdivision,” nor did it exclude a farmlot from the definition of an agricultural land.

Not being excluded, Salas’ landholdings were thus contemplated in the definition of an
agricultural land under Republic Act No. 3844. Likewise, Republic Act No. 6657 does not exclude
a farmlot subdivision from the definition of an agricultural land. Section 3(c) of Republic Act No.
6657 states that agricultural lands refer to “land devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.” Section 76 expressly
provides that any other definition inconsistent with Republic Act No. 6657 has been repealed by
this law. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

It bears stressing that neither Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 nor RA No. 6657 excludes a farmlot
subdivision, which is primarily agricultural in nature, from the definition of an agricultural land.

An executive regulation cannot go beyond the law. Republic Act No. 3844 (1963) broadly defined
an agricultural land as “land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands.”
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, also broadly defines agricultural land as land devoted to
agricultural activity. In contrast, the HLURB Regulations restrict the definition of agricultural lands
to those lands “exclusively or predominantly used for cultivation,” not being a farmlot
subdivision. In limiting the definition of an agricultural land to one “without the intended qualities
of a farmlot subdivision,” the HLURB Regulations are overriding, supplanting, and modifying a
statutory definition. This is prohibited. A mere executive issuance cannot alter, expand, or restrict

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the provisions of the law it seeks to enforce. It bears stressing that neither Republic Act No. 3844
nor Republic Act No. 6657 excludes a farmlot subdivision, which is primarily agricultural in nature,
from the definition of an agricultural land. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1,
G.R. No. 191545 March 29, 2017

Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in (Republic Act [RA]
No.) 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial, or industrial use.

We parse this definition into its three elements. Agricultural lands consist of lands: (1) Devoted
to agricultural activity, as defined in Republic Act No. 6657; (2) Not classified as mineral or forest
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources; and (3) Prior to June 15, 1988, not
classified for residential, commercial, or industrial use under a local government town plan and
zoning ordinance, as approved by the HLURB (or its predecessors, the National Coordinating
Council and the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission). Salas’ farmlot subdivision fulfills
these elements. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. vs. Cabungcal, 822 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 191545 March
29, 2017

Any application for a homestead settlement recognizes that the land belongs to the public
domain. Prior to its disposition, the public land has to be classified first as alienable and
disposable through a positive act of the government. This act must be direct and express, not
merely inferred from an instrument such as the homestead patent. The State has the right to
institute an action for the reversion of an inalienable land of the public domain erroneously
awarded by its officials and agents.

A homestead patent is a gratuitous grant from the government "designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation." Being a
gratuitous grant, a homestead patent applicant must strictly comply with the requirements laid
down by the law.

Under the Public Land Act, the Governor-General (now the President), upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and
Natural Resources), shall have the power to classify lands of the public domain into: (1) alienable
or disposable; (2) timber; and (3) mineral lands.

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Lands of public domain which have been classified as alienable or disposable may further be
classified into: (1) agricultural; (2) commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (3)
educational, charitable and other similar purposes; and (4) reservations for town sites, and for
public and quasi-public uses.

Once lands of public domain have been classified as public agricultural lands, they may be
disposed through any of the following means: (1) homestead settlement; (2) sale; (3) lease; or
(4) confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Republic vs. Heirs of Daquer, G.R. No. 193657
September 4, 2018

Electricity is “a basic necessity whose generation and distribution is imbued with public interest,
and its provider is a public utility subject to strict regulation by the State in the exercise of police
power.”

As found by the Court of Appeals, Meralco failed to comply with the 48-hour disconnection notice
rule. Meralco claims that the statements in its demand letters, that failure to pay would result in
disconnection, were sufficient notice. However, pursuant to Section 97 of Revised General Order
No. 1, the governing rule when the disconnection occurred, disconnection due to nonpayment
of bills requires that a 48-hour written notice be given to the customer. It must be emphasized
that electricity is “a basic necessity whose generation and distribution is imbued with public
interest, and its provider is a public utility subject to strict regulation by the State in the exercise
of police power.” The serious consequences on a consumer, whose electric supply has been cut
off, behoove a distribution utility to strictly comply with the legal requisites before disconnection
may be done. This is all the more true considering Meralco’s dominant position in the market
compared to its customers’ weak bargaining position. Manila Electric Company vs. Nordec
Philippines, 861 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 196020 April 18, 2018

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of
tenure.

“One’s employment, profession, trade or calling is a ‘property right,’” of which a worker may be
deprived only upon compliance with due process requirements: It is the policy of the state to
assure the right of workers to “security of tenure” (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New Constitution,
Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a
person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood.

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Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. Article 280 of the
Labor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that “the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by” the code. Dismissal
is not justified for being arbitrary where the workers were denied due process and a clear denial
of due process, or constitutional right must be safeguarded against at all times. Rivera vs. Genesis
Transport Service, Inc., 764 SCRA 653, G.R. No. 215568 August 3, 2015

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is an independent office created under the Constitution
with power to investigate “all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights.”

It is divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate
human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction. Each regional office is headed by the Regional
Director who is given the position of Attorney VI. Lingan vs. Calubaquib, 727 SCRA 341, A.C. No.
5377 June 30, 2014

Powers and Functions of the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).

Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance, the Regional Director has the
following powers and functions: a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to
“[Commission on Human Rights] matters”; b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional
offices; c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints
in the absence of the legal officer or investigator; d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary
conferences among parties and discuss “immediate courses of action and protection remedies
and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution”; e. To issue
Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or
subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; and f. To review and approve
draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer. These powers and functions
are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by
members of the judiciary and notaries public — officers who are necessarily members of the bar.
Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission’s legal officer.
Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving
draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive
legal knowledge. Lingan vs. Calubaquib, 727 SCRA 341, A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014

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EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

The courts must stay true to its mandate of protecting the welfare of children. In Araneta v.
People, this Court emphasized: Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable
members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate
under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children
to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."

This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed
against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child
and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence
against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their
commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.
Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child
abuse under existing laws but includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development.” Fernandez vs. People, G.R. No.
217542 November 21, 2018

The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was never
intended and will not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses.
Individuals belonging to indigenous cultural communities who are charged with criminal
offenses cannot invoke Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to
evade prosecution and liability under courts of law.

The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking
cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and
duties in support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.

A crime is "an offense against society." It "is a breach of the security and peace of the people at
large[.]" The basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions make it improper for the State
to yield "disputes" involving criminal offenses to indigenous peoples' customary laws and
practices.

To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the
objects of criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of
reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable the

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consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately then, yielding
prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of justice.

It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice.
Its view of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances.
Preservation is pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the
national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes designed to
address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty. Ha Datu Tawahig vs. Cebu City Prosecutor
Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139 March 20, 2019

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Under treaty law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary status, since under
treaty law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, petitioners went too far in their
interpretation, ignoring completely the nature of the obligation contemplated by the provision
in an attempt to justify their failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule aimed to protect
a human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the adverse party. On March 29, 2004, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 31, which pertained to the
nature of the general legal obligations imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights on State Parties. Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde, 775 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 217456
November 24, 2015

Human rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these
rights.

The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish a system
of accessible and effective remedies through judicial and administrative mechanisms. The
present trial of Pemberton, to which petitioner, Marilou S. Laude, is included as a private
complainant, indicates that there is a legal system of redress for violated rights. That petitioners
chose to act on their own, in total disregard of the mechanism for criminal proceedings
established by this court, should not be tolerated under the guise of a claim to justice. This is
especially in light of petitioners’ decision to furnish the accused in the case a copy of her Motion
only during the hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be

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eschewed to rectify an important procedural deficiency that was not difficult to comply with.
Human rights are not a monopoly of petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these
rights. Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde, 775 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015

Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental international law principle that requires agreeing parties
to comply with their treaty obligations in good faith.

Observance of any treaty obligation binding upon the government of the Philippines is anchored
on the constitutional provision that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land[.]” Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental
international law principle that requires agreeing parties to comply with their treaty obligations
in good faith. Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 778 SCRA 131, G.R. No. 169507
January 11, 2016

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