Rem2 Alpredo Notes - Reviewer
Rem2 Alpredo Notes - Reviewer
        NB: Preliminary Attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the
        attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal
        action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action
   2.   Ligon filed a collection suit with QC RTC with prayer for WPA against Sps. Baladjay, Marasigan,
        Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc., and its incorporators. WPA was granted. While the case was pending, a
        collection and cancellation of title with WPA to RTC Makati was filed by the Sps Vicente. Makati RTC
        rescinded the transfer of property to Polished Arrow and directed RD to issue clean title. Later, RTC
        QC ruled in favor of Ligon. WON RTC Makati to order issuance of clean title amounts to grave abuse of
        discretion?
       Yes. Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken
        into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for
        the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. It is a
        proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world.
        Lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until
        the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
        Prior registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has been
        duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property
        subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of
        constructive notice to all persons. Ligon vs RTC Makati Branch 56, 717 SCRA
   3.   Satsatin was authorized via SPA to sell lands of Petitioner. Solar bought the property to which it already
        paid but Satsatin did not remit such payment to Petitioners and that he had acquired a house and lot
        and a car (which he registered in the names of his children). An Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of
        WPA, respondent was about to depart the country and that they are willing to post a bond fixed by
        court. WOA was issued. WOA was served and sheriff levied their properties. Summons and copy of
        complaint was served later. Respondents filed a Motion to Discharge WOA: the bond was issued before
        the issuance of WOA, the WOA was issued before the summons was received. Moreover, counter-bond
        was posted. WON lifting of the WOA is proper?
       Yes. At the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
        persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should
        have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                      Page | 1
        of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon
        them and for the writ to have binding effect. Torres vs Satsatin, 605 SCRA
          Three stages involved in the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment; For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
          jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.— first, the court issues the order granting the application; second,
          the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. Once the
          implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.
          The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether
          by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case; Subsequent service of
          summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for
          retroactivity of a belated service. A belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect
          in the enforcement of the writ.
        Alias summons served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the
        enforcement of the writ. Estoppel cannot lie on this case because estoppel does not apply on questions
        of law. Mangila vs CA, 387 SCRA
   5.   Phil gov’t filed before the SB a sequestration of ill-gotten wealth with motion for issuance of WOA over
        the L/C in the name of Chuidian. Granted. Almost 4 years, Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment
        arguing the favorable decision made by a foreign court. WON lifting of WOA is proper on this ground?
       No. When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s
        cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section
        13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff’s application and
        affidavits on which the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been
        improperly or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution
        of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. Merits of the action would be
        ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial. Chudian vs Sandiganbayan, 349
        SCRA
   6.   WON a certificate of title of a real property can be used as a substitute to dismiss a WPA other than a
        bond
       No, the rule is strict as to disposal of WPA which requires either a deposit or a bond. The remedy is
        exclusive. An application for WA, being a harsh remedy is to be construed strictly in favor of the
        defendant. It is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of
        the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond.—
        petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing
        a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious.
        Luzon Development Bank vs Krishman, 755 SCRA 2015
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                   Page | 2
   7.   Northern Islands Co. filed a complaint with WPA due to unpaid appliances delivered to Sps Garcia.
        Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment was filed to oppose the WPA. RTC denied the motion hence
        case was elevated to CA which ordered appointment of a commissioner. WON RTC losses jurisdiction
        as to WPA when case is appealed
       Yes, WPA is an ancillary remedy. If the case is appealed, the jurisdiction over it by the court a quo is
        also lost. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal
        action because the attachment was only an incident of such action. — Where the main action is
        appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered
        appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be
        the subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only
        an incident of such action. Northern Luzon Island Co. vs Garcia 753 SCRAA 603
   8.   Win Multi Rich filed a complaint against Ying with prayer for issuance of WOA and posted bond issued
        by Visayan Surety. WPA was issued by RTC in favor of WIN. To prevent enforcement of WPA, Ying
        issued check drawn from Equitable PCI Bank. Later, Ying filed an Omnibus Motion to discharge
        attachment and questioned the jurisdiction of RTC due to the Arbitration Clause as stipulated in their
        contract. Another order was issued directing garnished amounts from Ying to be deposited to Clerk of
        Court. MultiRich prayed for the release of such cash deposit made by Ying in its favor and posted a
        Surety Bond (FESICO) which was granted. CA ordered return of the cash deposit (Equitable) to Ying
        and in case of refusal, held Win and FESICO and Visayan solidary liable. Is Visayan Surety liable?
       No. Section 20, Rule 57 specifically requires that the application for damages against the wrongful
        attachment, whether filed before the trial court or appellate court, must be with due notice
        (indispensable) to the attaching party and his surety or sureties.— Such damages may be awarded
        only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case. Under no
        circumstance, whatsoever, can the garnished funds or attached properties, under the custody of the
        sheriff or the clerk of court, be released to the attaching party before the promulgation of judgment.
        Cash deposits and counter-bonds posted by the defendant to lift the writ of attachment is a security
        for the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may obtain; they are thus, mere replacement
        of the property previously attached.
        In this case, there was an application for damages; but there was no notice given to Visayan Surety.
        Any application arising from the improper, irregular or excessive attachment shall be governed by
        Section 20, Rule 57. The application for this rule requires:
             1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;
             2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and
             3. After hearing with notice to the surety
        Visayan was not furnished any copies of the pleadings, motions, processes and judgments. To hold the
        surety liable, the notice and hearing is mandatory to the surety. In this case, the petitioner’s answer
        with compulsory counterclaim, which contained the application for damages was not served to
        Visayan Surety.
        However, FESICO’s bond is not covered by Section 20, Rule 57. It is Rule 57, Section 17 which is
        applicable. Unlike S20R57 which requires notice and hearing before the finality of the judgment in
        application for damages (unliquidated), S17R57 allows a party to claim damages on the surety bond
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 3
          after the judgment become executory (liquidated). It is FESICO who is liable and not Visayan Surety.
          Excellent Quality Apparel vs Visayan Surety 761 SCRA 464
         WPA should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy because it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.
         It must be granted only on concrete and specific grounds and not merely on general averments quoting the words of the rules. Since
         attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature, the rules on the application of a writ of attachment must be strictly
         construed in favor of the defendant.
         Ex-parte application – an affidavit of merit and an applicant’s bond must be filed with the court in which the action is pending. —
         Bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court and is subject to the conditions that the applicant will pay: (1)
         all costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party; and (2) all damages which such party may sustain by reason of the
         attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
    9.    Alfred Wolfe works with Watercraft as its shipyard manager. Wolf stored sailboat but never pay. When
          he was terminated, he pulled out his boat without paying storage fees. Watercraft filed a collection suit
          with WPA. As a result, 2 MV of Wolf were levied including his BPI bank account. Affidavit of Merit
          executed by Watercraft VP failed to show the alleged possibility of Wolfe’s flight from the country. Is
          non averment of such ground in the affidavit constitutes noncompliance to the rule and would not
          merit issuance of WPA?
         Yes. Watercraft failed to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by
          Sec 5, Rule 8. The failure to pay storage fees does not necessarily amount to fraud. Sec 3, Rule 57
          requires the AOM to (1) that a sufficient COA exist and (2) that the case is one of those mentioned in
          S1 , (3) that there is no other sufficient security for the claim brought to be enforced by the action and
          (4) that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is
          entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is grated above all legal counterclaims.
          Watercraft Venture Corp. vs Wolfe 770 SCRA 179
    10. A collection suit was filed by Phil-Air against RCJ Lines arising from non-payment of purchased AC for
        buses. RCJ refused to pay because of breach of warranty. RCJ posted CB and prayed for reimbursement
        for the premium and alleged unrealized profit. Can RCJ claim?
     No. Phil-Air is not directly liable for the CB premium and alleged unrealized profits. RCJ Lines availed
        of the first mode by posting a counter-bond.
          Under the first mode, the court will order the discharge of the attachment after (1) the movant makes
          a cash deposit or posts a counter bond and (2) the court hears the motion to discharge the attachment
          with due notice to the adverse party. The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond must be equal
          to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. The cash deposit or counter-
          bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action.
          Philippine Air-conditioning Center vs RCJ Lines 775 SCRA 265
    11. Idolor obtained a loan from Sps De Guzman secured by a REM. Upon default, extra-judicial foreclosure
        proceeding was made. Sps De Guzman won the bid and were issued a Certificate of Sale which was
        registered on June 23, 1997. On June 25, 1998, a complaint for annulment of the Certificate of Sale with
        prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a WPI was made. Is the issuance of WPI proper?
     NO. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before
        an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be
        aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be
        directed is a violation of such right. Petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the
        foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction for failure to exercise her right
        before its expiry. Idolor vs CA, 351 SCRA 402
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                     Page | 4
 Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the
 existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus probandi
 is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there
 must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
 writ to prevent a serious damage.
    12. A judge was filed with administrative case relative to an election protest. Romeo was a candidate for
        punong barangay with his opponent Libo-on an incumbent punong barangay and the ABC president.
        They were tie on the election and Romeo was proclaimed as the punong barangay. He filed a protest
        with preliminary prohibitory injunction, and damages. Judge ordered the issuance of summons to the
        parties and set the hearing but Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing. However, Romeo was
        not served with the Order. TRO was issued and annulled the proclamation of Romeo. Is the issuance of
        TRO proper?
     No. The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on
        the application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In the instant
        case, Judge admits that he issued the injunctive writ after receiving the applicant’s evidence ex parte.
         In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He
         had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said
         office. We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the second
         TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay. Gustilo
         vs Real 353 SCRA
    13. An employee was terminated after accidentally hitting his former girlfriend, who was his co-employee.
        A case for illegal dismissal was filed. The LA declared that the dismissal was illegal. LA issued a writ of
        execution. Employer moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for
        certiorari with the CA. TRO was issued and later a WPI. Employer moved to release the TRO cash bond
        and injunction cash bond in view of CA decision. Motion was denied as premature due to appeal to SC.
        Is the release of the cash bond proper?
     Yes. By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by granting Bristol-
        Myers petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the NLRC which dismissed
        the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash
        bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied.
         A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly
         exempted, files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party
         or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such
         party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
         order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Lagrosas vs Bristo
         – Myers, 565 SCRA 90
    14. There is an agreement between the parents of the Students and the University that instead of expulsing
        the students, they would just transfer to another school. This is signed by the parents and the
        University. Later, the parents sent a letter to the University President urging him not to implement the
        agreement because the Principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate
        transfer of students. Parents also seek the intervention of DepEd. Parents filed a complaint for
        injunction and damages with the RTC which was granted. Is the grant of injunction proper?
     NO. The Principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of students because of the
        agreement. Affixing their signatures to the minutes signified their conformity to transfer their children
        to another school. Jenosa vs Delariarte, 630 SCRA
    15. China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI). To secure the
        loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and REM
        over parcels of land in QC and Rizal. SBI defaulted and filed foreclosure of the REM. Is injunction a
        proper remedy to enjoin foreclosure of REM on the ground that the interest on the loan is
        unconscionable and usurious?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                   Page | 5
      NO. Foreclosure of REM as a remedy to collect a debt from the debtor cannot be enjoined through a
       WPI and TRO. The determination of the usurious character of the loan depends on the sound discretion
       of the court. However, court cannot issue a WPI to enjoin a debtor to foreclose a property securing a
       loan.
       Default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from availing of the
       equitable relief of an injunctive writ. It is a breach of contractual obligation. Since SBI is not entitled to
       the issuance of a WPI, so is MFII. The accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII
       as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in
       the event of SBI’s default. Solid Builders Inc. vs China Bank, 695 SCRA 4/3/13
   16. Vidal’s son and daughter-in-law, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, AF with Prayer for the
       Issuance of the WPI and/or TRO against Barbara’s successors (who was declared the owner of a parcel
       of agricultural land in another case which decision become F&E) and the Government of Butuan
       claiming that they acquired the land from Tuazon in 1997 who was the sole bidder and winner in a tax
       delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan. Decide.
    Deny. The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ; the
       present action has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the main action. A WPI is a
       provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination of the main action.
       It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Sps
       Silvestre vs Lustiva, 718 SCRA 3/5/14
   17. BSU-BOR issued Resolution No. 18, series of 2005 to implement the Order issued by Ombudsman
       dismissing an employee. EE filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a TRO or PI before
       the RTC against the BSU-BOR because of a pending appeal and, therefore, are not yet final and
       executory. Is injunction a proper remedy?
    NO. The requisites for the issuance of WPI was not satisfied. In the present case, the right of
       respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that
       the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is immediately
       executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in
       administrative disciplinary cases. Decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending
       appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. For a WPI
       to issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material
       and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an
       urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Office of the Ombudsman vs De
       Chavez, 700 SCRA (Compare with Ombudsman vs Sison, 612 SCRA)
   18. Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the
       Province of Samar guilty and ordered dismissal. Sison appealed, CA reversed the decision. Ombudsman
       filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached MR. CA did not allow the Office of the
       Ombudsman to intervene, because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal
       interest in the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was
       filed after the CA rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial
       body which rendered the impugned decision. Does the Office of the Ombudsman have the personality
       to invervene?
    No. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the
       sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court
       the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. To warrant intervention
       under Rule 19 of the ROC, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter
       in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
       rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
       separate proceeding.
       The Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must
       remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                             Page | 6
         advocate. It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their
         decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such a doctrine is the fact that
         judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend
         their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the judges active
         participation. When judges actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to
         be judicial and have become adversarial instead. Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R. No. 185954,
         February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 702, 712
    19. Tuazon and Nieto filed a complaint for forcible entry against Novecio et. al. Respondents contended
        that they have been in possession of the land for more than 2 years when complaint filed. MTC favored
        Tuazon. RTC reversed the MTC decision based on a certification issued by DENR. Prior to execution, an
        Extremely Urgent Application for WPI and TRO was filed before the CA by Novecio. CA issued TRO
        effective for 60 days. On resolution, CA denied issuance of the PI. Is CA correct?
     Yes, the resolution of CA contains no legal and factual basis for the denial of the application of WPI. The
        grant of PI would only be provisional and would not be conclusively determinative of the principal
        action. In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and
        complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
        for in his complaint.— A WPI is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence
        need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary
        injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action
        which has yet to be decided. Novecio vs Lim, 754 SCRA 111
    20. Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) was granted a Provisional Authority (PA) to install, operate
        and maintain a Multi-Point Multi-Channel Distribution System (MMDS) in Metro Manila, subject to the
        assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management Division of the NTC. PA is valid for 18 months.
        Atlocom failed and seek extension but was denied. Prior to the denial of extension, NTC re-allocated
        the bands for broadband wireless access for fixed, nomadic and mobile networks. Hence, Atlocom filed
        a Petition to enjoin the implementation of MC and reinstate the frequencies to it.
         Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), also a grantee allowed to intervene, joining NTC in
         opposing Atlocom's claims. Pursuant to MC, frequency bands were re-allocated and assigned to LBNI.
         Is Atlocom entitled to PI? Is LBNI entitled to file CB?
        No. Atlocom failed to demonstrate a clear and unmistakable legal right to the PI because the PA had
         already expired and its application for extension was denied. Findings of RTC as to issuance of PI
         cannot be disturbed absence of grave abuse of discretion.
        No, but the petition to file CB was already moot on this decision. In denying the motion to file a CB, CA
         relied on the Affidavit executed by Atlocom’s technical consultant to refute the affidavit submitted by
         LBNI. He said that the issuance of the injunction would result in reducing LBNI’s bandwidth which
         affects thousands of its subscribers. In contrast, Atlocom damage can be fully compensated considering
         that it has not constructed stations nor launched any network service. TRO issued was made
         permanent. Liberty Broadcasting Network vs Atlocom, 760 SCRA 625
 The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction.” A preliminary injunction
 does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted facts. Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent
 threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled. “It is usually granted when it
 is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the
 immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can
 be had on the merits of the case.”
 A final injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case
 of mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary mandatory injunction. It is issued when the court, after trial on the
 merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined. Otherwise stated, it is only
 after the court has come up with a definite pronouncement respecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative of such right, based on
 its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and permanent injunction, the right
 and the act violative thereof must be established by the applicant with absolute certainty.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                     Page | 7
    21. Rev. Cortez is a missionary who claimed that since 1962 he has been in possession of 50 hectares of
        and. Marcos reserved the land for military purposes. After 2 decades, Ramos declared the entire Island
        as marine reserve. Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with prayer for WPMI against the
        Commanding Officer of Navy. RTC granted WPMI but only as to 5 hectares and not 50 hectares. Is Rev.
        Cortez is entitled to final PMI?
           No, there is a distinction between WPMI and FPMI. In this case, rev. Cortez failed to present evidence
            to form a conclusion that he is entitled thereto. Motion of OSG was granted. Final injunction is
            dissolved. Republic vs Cortez, 769 SCRA 267
            Is the judicial act of placing the bank under receivership toll the running of prescriptive period to
            foreclose the REM?
           No. PVB was placed under receivership by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank pursuant to Section
            29 of the Central Bank Act on insolvency of banks. There was no legal prohibition imposed upon PVB
            to deter its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under the law. Larrobis Jr. vs
            Philippine Veterans Bank 440 SCRA
(In contrast to Provident Savings Bank v. CA, this is the General Rule)
Suspension viz-a-viz interruption. In suspension, past period is included in the computation.
Interruption is to start counting anew.
            Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in extreme situations.
            Receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and
             immediate loss or damage.
            Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would
             probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will
             imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for
             receivership.
            Section 2 of Rule 59, Rules of Court is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the
             applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented.―The filing of an applicant’s bond is
             required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule
             59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further
             security for such damages.
    23. A complaint of annulment of DOAS was instituted. During the pendency of the case, a Partial
        Settlement Agreement (PSA) was executed fixing the sharing of the properties, the appointment of
        administrator (Josephine) and the share as to the fruits of the property. Later, Dominalda (one who’s
        entitled to a share in the fruits) applied for receivership for not receiving her share resulting to
        appointment of new administrator. Case was filed alleging error to the court by failing to require
        Dominalda (the applicant) to post a bond prior to the issuance of the order appointing a new receiver,
        in violation of Section 2, Rule 59 of the Rules of court. Rule on the petition of Josephine.
     Granted. Dominalda’s Application for receivership has no leg to stand on. Financial reasons are not
        amongst those enumerated under Sec 1, Rule 59. Moreover, there is no clear showing that the disputed
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                      Page | 8
        properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and that the placing them under the
        receivership is the most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose them.
        Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall
        require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented.
        The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in
        this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required
        at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the
        court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the
        appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages. Tantano vs Espina-
        Caboverde, 702 SCRA 508
    24. Complaint was filed before RTC Makati for violation of corporation code with prayer for receivership
        and creation of a Management Committee. Answer was made raising lack of jurisdiction and dismissal
        of the case which was denied. Case was appealed to CA in which a 60-day TRO enjoining RTC Judge
        from hearing the case was issued. Later, CA issued WPI. Contended that RTC has no jurisdiction. This
        decision was assailed. Does RTC have jurisdiction to try the case?
     No, it is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case. The acts complained of pertain to the conduct of
        Banco Filipino's banking business. The law vests in the BSP the supervision over operations and
        activities of banks.
        New Central Bank Act grants the Monetary Board the power to impose administrative sanctions on the
        erring bank. It is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of
        the Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30
        of the New Central Bank Act.
        Section 30. - The Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the
        institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the PDIC as receiver of the banking
        institution. Actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall
        be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari
        on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as
        to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
        It is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of
        banks. Koruga vs Arcenas, 590 SCRA
    25. Fidela (land owner) contract with Evelina to supervise management and production of this land with
        50:50 sharing. Fidela claimed that Evelina remiss to give her share in the profits. Hence a complaint
        was file for recovery of possession, rent and damages with prayer for receivership. Evelina refuted
        jurisdiction according to her it was an agrarian dispute. RTC dismissed the case finding that tenancy
        exist. Fidela filed motion for receivership in CA who granted such. Did CA correctly grant the
        receivership?
     No, following Sec 1(b) of Rule 59. Deprivation of her share in the land produce is not equally necessary
        mean that the land would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Fidela’s claim that the
        land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation was not proven clearly.
        Receivership is not an action; It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve
        its purpose; It cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on
        the merits of the other cases. A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b), Rule 59 of the Rules of
        Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost,
        removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation; If the action does not
        require such protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership. Chavez vs CA, 610 SCRA
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                           Page | 9
         and CM as security. This PN and CM was assigned to FCP. Orosa failed to pay installment hence FCP
         demanded full payment. RTC dismissed complaint and ordered return of the MV or equivalent value.
         A supplemental decision was later on rendered ordering the surety – Stronghold Insurance to jointly
         and severally return the MV. Stronghold filed with CA a petition for certiorari to annul the order which
         was dismissed. Orosa also filed an appeal and was partially affirmed. CA affirmed RTC decision
         directing FCP to return the MV to Orosa and directed return of the 14 monthly installments. Is CA
         correct?
        Yes. The order to return the MV was deleted including the award for damages and FCP was made to
         return the installment payments made by Orosa. Replevin; It is error for a court to order a creditor to
         return the car earlier seized by virtue of a writ of replevin or to pay its equivalent, value when the
         debtor has not yet fully paid the purchase price.—To sustain the trial court’s decision would amount
         to unjust enrichment. The CA was correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return, not
         the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the 14 installments actually paid with interest. Orosa
         vs CA 329 SCRA
NB: Stronghold Insurance was for certiorari with injunction questioning the Supplemental decision. On the
other hand, Orosa filed under Rule 45 raising errors of law in the main decision. SC and CA did not pass on the
merits of the case but merely ruled on the issues of WON surety can be held jointly and solidarily liable and
WON the execution pending appeal is proper.
    27. Astorga is an original EE of Smart who was terminated due to reorganizational restructuring and
        outsourcing. A Complaint for ID, non-payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for damages
        was filed. On the other hand, SMART filed replevin with RTC to recover a car issued by the company as
        a benefit under car plan. It gave Astorga an option to return the car or pay the balance. Does RTC have
        jurisdiction over the replevin case or is it the NLRC who has jurisdiction?
     RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion. The demand to
        return the car or pay its FMV is not a labor case but a civil dispute. It involves debtor and creditor
        relationship rather than Er-Ee. Smart Communications vs Astorga, 542 SCRA
 Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for the execution of writs and other processes are: First, the sheriff must
 make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; Second, he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; Third, the
 approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and ex officio sheriff; Fourth, the Clerk of
 Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and Fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same
 period for rendering a return on the writ.
    28. Case was file against the Sheriff by one of the defendants in a replevin case. Judge issued an order of
        seizure against 22 MV owned by defendant who alleged that the seizure was oppressive – sheriff was
        accompanied by armed personnel’s during the seizure and that the MV were stored in the compound
        of the respondents (in the main case) Defendant filed a counter bond, hence an order to desist from
        implementation of the seizure order was made plus instruction to return the seized vehicles. However,
        8 of the MV were reported missing. Should Sheriff be made liable?
     Yes. As legal custodian, it is his duty to safe keep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, when he passed his
        duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to another, he committed a clear neglect of duty. Sheriffs, being
        ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care and
        diligence. Hence, his failure to return the motor vehicles at the time when its return was still feasible
        constitutes another instance of neglect of duty. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be
        immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at
        least five days to give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or
        sureties thereon or require the return of the property by filing a counter bond. Hao vs Andres, 555
        SCRA
    29. Karen T. Go filed for replevin and sum of money with damages against Navarro with prayer for writs
        of replevin. Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of
        action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (executed
        between her husband and respondent). RTC initially dismissed the case but later ordered the inclusion
        of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro refuted the claim for
        non-compliance of prior demand. CA denied. Is denial proper?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                 Page | 10
       No. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond pursuant
        to Sec 2, Rule 60. SC held in this case that Karen Go a real party in interest for being the registered
        owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises. She will directly benefit from or be injured by a
        judgment in this case. Navarro vs Escobido, 606 SCRA
    30. Sps. Agner executed PN with CM in favor of Citimotors, Inc. secured by a MV; interest of 6%/month for
        failure to pay each installment. Citimotors assigned them to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. which
        assigned them to BPI Family Savings Bank. Due to failure to pay, BPI filed on an action for Replevin and
        Damages in RTC of Manila which granted the application but vehicle was not seized. RTC (trial on
        merits) ordered Sps. to pay. Sps Agner argued that there was no prior demand before the filing of the
        case hence no COA against them. Decide.
     Demand is not necessary. In this case, assuming arguendo that demand is necessary, Sps had effectively
        waived their right to notice and demand when they executed the PN and CM because it is expressly
        stipulated that demand is no longer necessary. The Civil Code in Art. 1169 provides that one incurs in
        delay or is in default from the time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the
        obligee. However, the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary under certain
        circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand. Hence,
        since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the promissory notes, demand was unnecessary for
        them to be in default. Agner vs BPI Family Savings Bank, 697 SCRA June 3 2013
Elisco Case: The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars
the exercise of the others. At the same time, it prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin or the delivery to it
of the motor vehicle
Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent
despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that
petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued,
commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative
prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly,
there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.
        Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.—the right to receive support can neither be
        renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                          Page | 11
         owes the obligor. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. To allow
         renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to
         allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. An agreement for the
         dismissal of a complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
         counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. De Asis vs CA 303 SCRA
    32. Teresita Tibigar, 16 y/o was a stay-in waitress at Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan City. Teresita was raped
        by Manuel, brother-in-law of the owner, who was temporarily residing in the same canteen. She
        became pregnant. Rape case was filed. Teresita gave birth to Melanie Tibigar. Court found Manuel
        guilty and sentenced him to death. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim 50k as moral damages,
        pay the costs, and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. May CA order Manny to
        acknowledge the child born out of an offense?
     No. Compulsory acknowledgment of the child is not proper there being a legal impediment. As
        pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot
        be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether
        legitimate or illegitimate. However, he is obligated to support the child. People vs Manahan, 315 SCRA
    33. Grandparents, parents and their son Edward and his wife Cheryl and their 3 minor children all live in
        the same house. Edward’s earning in the family business of 6k shouldered the family expenses as
        Cheryl has no steady source of income. When Cheryl caught Edward with another girl, , she left the
        house together with the 3 minor children. Cheryl sued Edward and his parents for support. RTC
        ordered Edward to provide monthly support of 6k and the balance of 34 from his parents. WON
        Edwards parents have obligation to provide support?
     Yes limited to the amount of monthly support needed by the children. Edwards parents’ partial
        concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer
        to relatives, by blood of lower degree.
         “The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents
         but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to
         sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
         nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article
         199.” Lim vs Lim, 604 SCRA
 There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
 defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.―A prima facie case exists if a woman
 declares―supported by corroborative proof―that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts
 to the putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual
 relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time
 of conception.
 A parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
 dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.―Amount of support
 is variable, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
 and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities
 of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
    34. Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support against petitioner claiming
        that he is the putative father of her child, Gliffze. Divina is a casual employee while Gotardo is an
        accounting supervisor. They become sweethearts and eventually, Divina got pregnant. Plans for
        wedding were made but eventually, Gotardo backed out. When she gave birth, she eventually
        demanded recognition and support to the child. Gotardo denied paternity. During pendency of the
        case, RTC ordered 2k monthly support. Later, RTC dismissed the case for lack of evidence to prove
        child’s filiation, ordered return of the amount of support initially awarded and pay attorney’s fees. CA
        reversed the decision. Is CA correct?
     No, filiation proceedings are not just to prove paternal filiation but also to secure the child’s rights for
        future inheritance. In this case, Divina established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                 Page | 12
       father through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man. Rodulfo corroborated
       her testimony. Gotardo vs Buling, 678 SCRA
   35. Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer
       for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month. RTC
       granted. Danilo filed MR asserting that Susan is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
       does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to
       support the family for their sustenance and well- being in accordance with family’s social and
       financial standing. Moreover, he asserted that the order for support is unconscionable (1.75M one time
       award and 250k each monthly thereafter). CA reduced the monthly support to 115k for both of the
       children and permitted deduction due to the value of 2 cars of the children and the maintenance cost.
       CA ruled that these are considered as advances. Is CA correct?
    Yes. The support should be limited to the basic needs of the children and not including the mother.
       Any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for
       sustenance and household expenses. The amount of support may be reduced or increased
       proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
       resources or means of the person obliged to support. Lim-Lua vs Lua, 697 SCRA
   36. Daisy Yahon filed a complaint under RA 9262 against Sgt. Charles. Sheriff served the TPO. An order
       was also issued directing agencies thru their heads to withhold any retirement, pension and other
       benefits of Sgt. Charles pending the pre-trial. He appeared during the pre-trial conference without
       counsel. He requested for time to hire one but was never done. Hence, ex parte presentation of
       evidence was made. Order was made directing Sgt. Yahon to give 50% spousal support which will be
       automatically deducted from his pension. He never complied. RTC issued a Permanent Protection
       Order. A motion to lift protection order against AFP was filed contending that AFP is not a party to the
       suit and RTC has no jurisdiction there being no copy of complaint nor summons served but RTC
       dismissed the motion. Can AFP be ordered to automatically deduct claim of spousal support in
       compliance with a court order arising from violation of RA 9262?
    Yes in line with the legislative intent of RA 9262. To issue an injunction would defeat the very purpose
       of the law against VAWC. The argument of AFP vest from PD 1638, Sec 31, retirement benefits shall
       not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever . . . . RA 8291, GSIS
       law likewise provides a similar provision. SC held that RA 9262 as the exception to the non-execution
       of retirement benefits using the statutory construction rule that later enactment prevails when
       irreconcilable conflict between laws arise. Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, the provision of spousal
       and child support specifically address one form of violence committed against women — “Economic
       abuse” - refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but
       is not limited to the following: 1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging
       in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
       spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code; 2.
       Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
       conjugal, community or property owned in common; 3. Destroying household property; 4. Controlling the
       victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties. Republic vs
       Yahon, 726 SCRA 438
   37. Anabelle filed a complaint for support and damages against Narciso Salas for her son Christian Paulo.
       Anabelle was 24 when she met 56 yr old Narciso. She was made to believe that he is widower. Rented
       an apartment, and financed the delivery of the child. Later on, Narciso offered to take the child from
       Anabelle but she refused. Hence, Narciso abandoned the child and Anabelle. Anabelle offered the birth
       certificate and her testimony plus pictures of Narciso and the child as evidence of filiation. Narciso
       denied alleging that it was mere act of charity. Is paternal filiation established?
    No, other than the documentary evidence presented, the testimonial evidence is now accepted by
       jurisprudence to be a basis of filiation. However, in this case, the testimonial evidence presented was
       not sufficient to prove the paternal filiation. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
       father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                            Page | 13
         hand in the preparation of the certificate. While baptismal certificates may be considered public
         documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
         specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
         the child’s paternity. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
         inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent
         showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these are not sufficient to establish
         Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement
         of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. An illegitimate child is now also allowed to
         establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like
         his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
         reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of
         proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Salas vs Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560
    38. Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with
        a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
        Divorce Decree. Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. Ernst never gave support. Later,
        Ernst remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines. Norma filed a complaint for R.A. No.
        9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed
        the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
        the accused, he being an alien.
          Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
        YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
         the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged
         to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
         mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who
         wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In
         the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
         such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
         Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
         same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
         impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
         in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
         they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
         would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
         important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
         fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
         neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith,
         such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
         child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
         Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
         failure to support his minor child.
        YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
         Philippines and committed the offense here. Del Socorro vs Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA 516
Special Civil Actions (Rules 62 – Rule 71)
RULE 62 Interpleader
 Difference between interpleader under the Code of Civil Procedure and under the ROC.— under CivPRo the remedy of interpleader is
 available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas ROC an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-
 matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation.
    39. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club filed a complaint for interpleader against Won and Tan who both
        claim ownership over membership fee certificate. Won claims its ownership from a court decision. Tan
        claims ownership from the assignment made by the alleged true owner of the same certificate.
        According to Wack-Wack, it has no power to issue two separate certificates for the same membership
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                   Page | 14
       fee or issue another membership fee certificate without violating it AOI and CBL. Moreover, it alleged
       that the certificate issued by CFI Manila is null and void because it violated the CBL of Wack-Wack. The
       trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to state COA and res judicata by reason of
       the previous civil case that issued Won the right to the certificate. Is interpleader the proper remedy?
       If yes, was it timey filed?
      Yes, however the corporation had not timely filed the remedy. There is no question that the subject
       matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate, is proper for an interpleader
       suit.
       It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of
       intrepleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
       independently liable to any of the claimants. Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the
       adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on
       have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.
       In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. It was aware
       of the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before
       it filed the present interpleader suit. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the
       litigation and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and
       said judgment has already been executed. It is therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of
       interpleader In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already
       been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
       interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case. Wack-
       wack Golf and Country Club vs Won, 70 SCRA
   40. Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation (EGMPC) and North Philippine Union Mission
       Corporation (NPUMC) of the Seventh Day Adventists executed a Land Development Agreement
       whereby EGMPC would improve the land of NPUMC to be used for memorial of which 40% would go
       to EGMPC. The agreement is secured by REM. All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted ownership
       over the land. EGMPC filed an action for interpleader with NPUMC. Several other interpleaded
       asserting interest. NPUMC filed a motion for placing on judicial deposit to a bank approved by the court,
       this is granted by CA. Is the order to deposit proper?
    Yes. The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation
       on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is
       a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property
       or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be
       decided as entitled thereto."
       CA found that more than 20M involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be
       considerable, now accruing in favor of the ETERNAL. Finding that such is violative of the very essence
       of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the CA
       cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires
       correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by
       the Court. Eternal Gardens vs IAC, 165 SCRA
   41. Lessee refused to pay the rent because of the internal squabble as to the person authorized to receive
       payment and allege that they were prevented from using the units rented. Ejectment complaint was
       filed against the lessee. They eventually paid their monthly rent for December 1992 , and claimed that
       Lessor waived its right to collect the rents for the months of July to November 1992 since they were
       prevented from using some of the units. However, they again withheld payment starting January 1993
       because respondent refused to turn over certain property. Is the lessee justified to its non-payment?
    No, because they are not without remedy in law. Lessee should have had availed of consignation of
       payment and/or interpleader. Article 1256. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due
       at the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper
       case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases. R62S1 of the ROC—Whenever
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 15
       conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no
       interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
       claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
       litigate their several claims among themselves. Pasricha vs Don Luis Dizon Realty, 548 SCRA
   42. RCBC was a registered owner of CB worth 70M evidenced by Detached Assignment. RCBC sold these
       bills to BOC who in turn sold the bills to PDB; PDB to BOC. However, instead of delivering all the CB,
       PDB delivered only 7 CB with a note “substitution in lieu of 06-29-94 TB and retained possession of
       the Detached Assignment. BOC negotiated the CB further. PDB informed OIC of BSP’s Government
       Securities department (BSP-GSD) to record its claim and explained that the non-possession of the CBs
       were based on imperfect negotiations. Denied. In light of the refusal of BSP to adhere to its request a
       Mandamus case was filed with Prohibition and Injunction with PI and TRO against BSP and RCBC.
       BSP ask for an interpleader suit between and among the claimants to the CB bills. PDB agreed on a
       condition that the CB’s be placed in an escrow fund which would only be disposed upon order of RTC.
       Hence, BOC and PDB entered into 2 separate Escrow Agreements. They agreed to jointly collect from
       BSP the proceeds of the CB’s and deposit the amounts. RTC approved the agreement. BOC filed an
       answer and prayed declaration of ownership. PDB questioned jurisdiction and alleged that BSP has the
       jurisdiction as to the determination of who is the rightful owner of the CB’s. Is interpleader proper?
      Yes. However, RTC erred in dismissing the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction. When competing
       claims of ownership over the proceeds of the securities it has issued are brought before it, the law has
       not given the BSP the quasi-judicial power to resolve these competing claims as part of its power to
       engage in open market operations. Nothing in its charter provides such hence jurisdiction falls within
       the regular courts.
       Interpleader is a proper remedy. It is designed to protect a person against double vexation. It requires,
       as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
       against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no interest whatever in the
       subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. Through this
       remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine
       conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once
       on a single liability.
       Interpleader as a special civil action primarily governed by Rule 62 and secondary by the provisions
       applicable to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a
       complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly,
       Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the ROC does not include a complaint-in-
       interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put
       up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s “counter-
       complaint/cross-claim for interpleader” runs counter to general procedures.
       Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of a particular rules to govern the
       uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the ROC, governing ordinary
       civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted “in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-
       party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.” In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not
       required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-
       interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint)
       which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.
       In this case, BSP averred the interpleader thru an answer and not through an initiatory pleading. Court
       allowed such. Bank of Commerce vs Planters Development Bank, 681 SCRA
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 16
    43. Bathala Marketing, renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano Almeda. Under the contract, Almeda
        agreed to lease a portion of Almeda Compound for 4 years. In 1998, Almeda informed BM that its
        monthly rental be increased by 73% pursuant to the condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250.
        BM refused the demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant such
        application. BM refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by the Almeda but
        continually paid the stipulated amount. BM filed an action for declaratory relief for purposes of
        determining the correct interpretation of conditions Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent
        damage and prejudice. Almeda filed an ejectment suit. In response to the declaratory relief, Almeda
        moved to dismiss such on the ground that it is an improper remedy. WON declaratory relief is proper
        notwithstanding the fact that BM is already in breach when the petition for declaratory relief was filed
     Yes. In this case the requisites of declaratory relief is present except that petitioners were already in
        breach of the contract when it was filed. Based on the facts, there is no showing that there is breach.
        Hence, BM is not barred to seek the remedy of DR. A petition for declaratory relief may not be
        dismissed despite the filing of an action for rescission, ejectment and damages where the trial court
        had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief
        petition. In this case, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the
        pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on
        appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for
        declaratory relief. Almeda vs Bathala Marketing INd, 542 SCRA
          Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
          executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
          order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised
          in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the
          general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the
          circumstances.
          Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
               1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
                    executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
               2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
               3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
               4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests
                    are adverse;
               5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
               6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
NB:
Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, 395 SCRA 624 (2003) - DR should be dismissed in view of
the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer.
Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956) - DR was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out
in the unlawful detainer suit. There was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the DR petition.
    44. Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church
        of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and
        Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
        later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from
        his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
        thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
        26 of the Family Code. May Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
     Yes. The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
        Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
        celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
        foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
        remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Republic
        vs Orbecido, 472 SCRA
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                              Page | 17
   45. A case for Reinvindicacion Quieting of Title and Damages was filed. Petitioners alleged ownership from
       the estate of Anastacio who allowed Consuelo married to Boncad to occupy and build improvements
       over it. Later, Consuelo claims ownership. Hence this case. RTC ordered dismissal on the ground of lack
       of jurisdiction. MR was filed alleging that the COA is for quieting of title and the accion reinvindicacion
       is merely an accessory relief. Is the dismissal proper on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
    Yes. Rule 63 Section 1 first paragraph and second paragraph should be distinguished. First paragraph
       deals with a petition for declaratory relief in which RTC has exclusive jurisdiction. Paragraph 2 refers
       to quieting of title and is cognizable in accordance with the rules under BP 1980 as amended by BP
       129 on jurisdiction.
       Paragraph 2 specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under
       Articles 1359 to 1369 of the NCC, (2) an action to quite title authorized under Articles 476 to 481 NCC,
       (3) action to consolidate ownership under Article 1607, NCC in a sale with right of repurchase. There
       remedies are considered similar to DR because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights
       of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect. Note that ROC
       used the word “may” in contrast with BP 1980 which used the word “shall”. Hence, a case filed under
       paragraph 2 must comply with the jurisdictional amount imposed.
       Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of
       their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
       reinvindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. — An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of
       possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding
       of possession of the realty. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s recovery of
       possession over the real property as owner. Malana vs Tappa, 600 SCRA
   46. Section 8, A8, 1987 Constitution provides that a JBC will be created composed of CJ as ex officio
       Chairman, Sec of Justice, rep from Congress as ex officio Members, a Rep of IBP, professor of law, retired
       Member of SC, and Rep of private sector. (2) members will have 4 years term subject to consent of
       Commission on Appointments. . . . . x x x. The issue is the representation of Congress. HOR and Senate
       send alternate representatives to the JBC. Later, composition of JBC was changed allowing 1 Rep for
       each HOR and Senate with half vote each which was later on changed again to a full vote.
       Does Section 8, A8, 1987 Constitution allow more than 1 member of Congress to sit in the JBC?
      No. The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article
       VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the
       adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very
       declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
       jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate RTC. Notwithstanding the fact that only
       questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within
       the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
       However, in this case, SC took cognizance due to its serious implications. Hence, SC exercised its
       judicial power of review. SC declared that the composition of JBC to have 2 Rep from Congress – 1 from
       Senate and 1 from HOR is unconstitutional and regarded the matter to the legislative department for
       proper remedies. SC declared that Congress must only have 1 representative. Chavez vs JBC, 676 SCRA
   47. Alberto Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito Muertegui over an unregistered
       land in Leyte covered by a tax declaration. Juanito’s took possession of the land and made
       improvements thereon. Paid RPT from 1980 to 1998. On 1991, Alberto sold the lot to Juanitos family
       lawyer Atty. Sabitsana with a notarized DOAS which was also registered. In effect, TD was cancelled
       and a new TD was issued in his favor. When Domingo Sr. (father of Juanito) died, heirs applied for TCT
       under PLA. Atty. Sabitsana wrote to DENR CENRO/PENRO opposing the application by the Juanito’s
       claiming ownership. Juanitos filed for Quieting of title and preliminary injunction. RTC declared sale
       to Atty. Sabitsana as void and has no legal effects. Which court has jurisdiciton?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 18
       RTC has jurisdiction. Quieting of title may be instituted in the RTC regardless of the assessed value of
        the real property. Rule 63, ROC, an action to quiet title to RP or remove clouds therefrom may be
        brought to the appropriate RTC. In this case, the suit was prompted when a letter-opposition was sent
        to DENR CENRO upon application of Juanitos for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud form
        being cast upon his application, a case was filed to obtain a declaration of his rights. The law applicable
        in the sale of unregistered lands in Act 3344 and not A1544 of NCC. In this case, Juanito has a better
        right for being the first buyer. Sabitsana vs Muertegui, 703 SCRA August 5, 2013
Republic vs Roque, 706 SCRA September 24, 2013/ Relate to Southern Hemisphere case 632 SCRA
October 5, 2010
   48. A case for declaratory relief was filed before RTC assailing constitutionality of RA 9372: (a) Section 3
       for being void for vagueness; and (b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of communication and
       due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships; (c) Section 18 for violating due
       process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the UDHR, and the ICCPR as
       well as for contradicting Article 125 of the RPC; (d) Section 26 for violating the right to travel and (e)
       Section 27 for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A move to
       suspend the proceedings was made due to pending SC cases assailing constitutionality which was
       granted by RTC. Is DR proper? Should RTC moved to dismiss the case?
    The following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the
       controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
       regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful
       and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
       fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons
       whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth,
       adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
        In this case, elements 1-3 exists, elements 4-6 is wanting. As to the 4th requisite, there is serious doubt
        that an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one exist in this case. As to the 5th
        element, the controversy at hand remain highly speculative and merely theorized. A question is ripe
        when the act being challenge has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. RTC
        should have dismissed the case. Republic vs Roque, 706 SCRA September 24, 2013
This case assails the constitutionality of RA 9372 filed by several parties through a petition for certiorari. The
case was dismissed because of technicalities. SC held that certiorari is not the proper remedy. SC held that the
power of judicial review is not proper for noncompliance with the requirements set forth for its exercise.
Petitioners have no locus standing to the suit, they failed to present actual case or controversy, the facial
invalidation alleged is limited to invalidation of a statute on free speech cases.
    49. EO 140 was issued which created the CPRO in the DOF. It states that the CPRO "shall be responsible
        for reviewing the customs administration policies, rules and procedures, and thereafter providing
        sound recommendations for the improvement of the same." EO 140 shall take effect immediately upon
        publication in 2 newspapers of GC which was compiled thru Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star. On
        the same day of the publication, BOC Commissioner issued CPO 189-2013 detailing 27 BOC personnel
        holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI to CPRO.
        Ee detailed filed a case in RTC and EJ issued a WPI. Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with prayer for
        the issuance of a TRO or a WPMI to enjoin RTC’s WPI. Petitioners alleged that since the case involves
        personnel action affecting public officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. Also, CPO
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 19
        189-2013 is an internal personnel order and as such, it cannot be the subject of an action for
        declaratory relief. RTC denied the petition for WPMI. Is the denial proper and does RTC have
        jurisdiction?
       YES. When the petition was filed, it raised issues on constitutionality which is beyond the jurisdiction
        of the CSC.
        The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
        and agencies, including GOCC’s with original charters. It is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to
        the civil service. The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including
        "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
        reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
        CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents details which should be not more than a
        year. Moreover, they are not occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. SC sustained
        validity of EO 140, RTC has jurisdiction and the detail order not valid. “If adequate relief is available
        through another form of action or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for
        declaratory relief.” Department of Finance vs Dela Cruz Jr., 768 SCRA 73
    50. Umali filed a case as to the current practice of 6 months rotational representation of Congress in JBC.
        OSG wants SC to revisit Chavez case. OSG is on the position that House of Rep and Senate should have
        1 representation with 1 vote each in the JBC. JBC moved to dismiss alleging that the subject matter is
        not a proper for certiorari and even a mandamus because it does not involve an exercise of judicial and
        quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Is Certiorari and mandamus proper?
     Yes. Whenever the acts affects the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its
        members may validly bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and maintain strict sanctity
        thereof.
        Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy
        and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Bordomeo v. CA, however, this Court clarified
        that it is inadequacy that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari and not the mere absence
        of all other remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ. A remedy is considered plain,
        speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment,
        order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.
        Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the present ROC are the two special civil actions used for
        determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
        sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which necessarily includes
        the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The issuance of a writ
        of mandamus requires that the applicant has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
        the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It lies only to compel an officer to
        perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Umali vs JBC, 832 SCRA 194 July 2017
RULE 64: Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the COMELEC and COA
   51. Certiorari with prayer for TRO and Mandamus was filed to compel COMELEC to canvass the votes cast
       for ANAD in 2013 party-list elections. COMELEC cancelled the Registration and Accreditation of ANAD
       because it does not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, failure to comply with
       the procedural requirements and for failure to submit Statement of Contributions. Hence certiorarie
       was filed to question this cancellation. Is the remedy proper?
    No, the only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Sec 2, Rule 64 is WON
       COMELECC active with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Certiorari
       requires a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. In this case, SC
       dismissed the petition because ANAD’s votes were not meritorious of a seat in the House of Rep.
       Alliance for Nationalism and democracy vs COMELEC 705 SCRA 340, September 10, 2013
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 20
   52. Consolidated case was filed by Ampil, one under Rule 45 and one under Rule 65 challenging the
       decision of Ombudsman for dismissing the criminal complaint he filed against Espenesin et. al. alleging
       falsification of Public Documents and Graft. The issue arose from a Joint Project Development
       Agreement for construction of a condo building between ASB and Malayan Insurance. Accordingly,
       there exist a fraudulent changing of the name of owner that led to erroneous issuance of CCT. MICO
       was declared to be the true owner. Hence, Ampil filed this case. Is the remedy proper?
    Yes. Generally, certiorari is only used on pure questions of law. In this case however, SC checked the
       evidentiary facts because of grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. SC found that
       there exist a prima facie presumption as to the acts made by Espesin that leads to the existence of a
       probable cause to his guilt. Espesin (RD head) is held liable with gross negligence and ordered
       dismissal from service. Ombudsman was directed to file information as to his criminal liability due for
       trail. The SC is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari
       where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
       jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.— In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the
       Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and
       (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Ampil vs Ombudsman, 703 SCRA July 31, 2013
   53. A.L. Ang Network filed a case for small claims against Emma for unpaid water bills. A.L. claims that it
       is authorized to supply water and collect payment from homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision
       where Emma lives. As a defense, Emma alleged that she agreed on a flat rate of water bill which could
       only be adjusted upon prior notice. Moreover, she alleged that the 40 cu.m. per month consumption is
       impossible for a household with 3 members only. Meanwhile, the water service was disconnected by
       A.L. MTCC ruled in favor of Emma ratiocinating that since CPC issued by NWRD was only on August 7,
       2003, Emma could only be charged for the flat rate covering the periods in question. A.L. filed a case
       for certiorari under R65 to RTC but was dismissed because there is no appeal in small claims cases.
       Hence it directed its case to SC. Is the dismissal of the case by the RTC proper?
    No, The proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not
       an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under
       Rule 65 of the ROC.
       A petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of
       jurisdiction and not of judgment. In the facts given, certiorari is the proper remedy. Considering the
       final nature of small claims case, the remedy of appeal is not allowed and the prevailing party may
       immediately move for execution of judgment does not preclude a losing party to file a petition for
       certiorari under R65. In certiorari, it is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal
       remedies and the danger of failure without the writ that usually determines when it is proper. A
       petition for certiorari is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of
       judgmentA.L. And Network Inc vs Mondejar, 714 SCRA January 28, 2014
   54. One afternoon while on duty, Cecilia approached Maglalang and handed over an undetermined amount
       of cash. Following protocol, he laid down the bills in the spreading board but made an error of
       spreading it only on 4 clusters instead of 5. Cecilia asked him to rectify the error since she is aware that
       there should be 5 clusters. He recounted and apologized for the mistake but Cecilia accused him of
       trying to shortchange her. Memorandum was issued charging him of Discourtesy and imposed a 30-
       day suspension. He filed a case under R65 before CA. He explained that he did not appeal to CSC
       because the penalty is only 30 days suspension and is not within the jurisdiction of CSC. CA dismissed
       the case for being premature for failure to exhaust admin remedies. Is CA correct?
    No. As a general rule, the non-compliance with the doctrine of admin remedies will cause the dismissal
       of a case except for various reasons. This case falls under one of them, to wit – where no administrative
       review provided by law is available.
       What the law declares as “final” are decisions of heads and agencies involving suspension for not more
       than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceeding 3 days salary. Decisions of admin agencies which are
       declared final and unappeasable by law are subject to judicial review. A special civil action for
       certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 21
       the ordinary course of law.—It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this
       case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting
       to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal
       and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each
       other. Maglalang vs PAGCOR, 712 SCRA December 11, 2013
   55. Garcia is an owner of Plinth Ent who imported software CD’s and under declared the items cost leading
       to damage and prejudice of the Republic for taxes. Garcia pleaded not guilty, trial ensued and after
       prosecution presented evidence, a Demurrer was filed. CTA dismissed the case for failure to establish
       guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to lack of evidentiary documents. Later, RATS and RCMG received
       a copy of the order of entry of judgment hence a certiorari was filed. Should the Petition be granted?
      No. Petition was filed beyond the reglementary period under R65. Belated filing cannot be
       countenanced by the Court. Rule 65, S4 expressly provides the non-extendible 60 day period to file a
       petition either from notice of judgment or from the order denying a MR, otherwise it would be barred
       of any remedy. In this case, no convincing justification for belated filing was advance to warrant the
       relaxation of the rule.
       Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be
       instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
       assailed. — The 60-day period is in extendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
       constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While there are recognized
       exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
       liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
       rules. People vs Castaneda, 712 SCRA December 11, 2013
   56. Ramon Nadal applied for a scholarship program. A home investigation was made. Discrepancies as to
       his application were discovered. As a result, he was required to pay full tuition plus legal interest. The
       board decided to award him a penalty of expulsion and was required to reimburse the university. He
       filed a case for mandamus in RTC with prayer for PI and TRO which was temporarily granted pending
       continuation of hearing asserting denial of due process. WPI was issued in favor of Nadal. UP filed
       certiorari. May mandamus lie to compel UP to issue credentials to Nadal as a result of the WPI?
    No, Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of
       the petitioner being required. In this case, lower court find that the implementation of the disciplinary
       sanction of suspension on Nadal “would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in
       finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job.” Sadly, such a ruling
       considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own
       making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the
       overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition
       of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. UP Board of
       Regents vs Ligot- Teylan 227 SCRA
   57. Tuason’s (retired teachers) bought a land from Carmel Farms from their retirement benefits and
       savings. TCT was issued, took possession of the property for 8 years and after they just learned that
       they are no longer owners of the property because of president’s declaration that their land is open for
       disposition and sale to members of Malacañang Homeowners Association. A year after ML declaration,
       Marcos issued PD 293 invalidating the TCT of Carmel where the property of Tuason is part thereof as
       a result of the sale. Carmel bought the land under Act 1120 and CA 32. Under PD 293, Carmel was
       found out that she failed to completely pay the purchase price. Marcos invalidated the TCT and
       declared the land open for disposition and sale to the Homeowners. Tuason filed a case for certiorari.
       Decide.
    Grant. Extraordinary writ of certiorari is proper to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts. In a writ
       of prohibition, it is directed against acts of either judicial or ministerial.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 22
         Section 1, Rule 65 of the ROC deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to “any tribunal, board or
         officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of
         prohibition in relation to “proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person x x exercising
         functions judicial or ministerial.” But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality
         directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. In this case, Marcos exercised a judicial
         function. Hence, certiorari is proper. PD 293 - unconstitutional and void ab initio and directed what is
         necessary to restore TCT to Tuason. Tuason vs RD of Caloocan 157 SCRA
    58. Leyte issued franchise tax assessments to EDC which were protested separately. When Leyte denied
        the protest, EDC filed to RTC. While case is pending, another tax assessment was issued under the
        instruction of the governor. Hence, motion was filed for WPI praying Leyte to be enjoined from
        collection until case is resolved. EDC as a defense allege that it has no franchise hence it is not proper
        for Leyte to assess franchise tax. RTC issued WPI. Leyte filed certiorari to CA which dismissed the case
        on the ground of lack of proof of service against EDC. Is the dismissal proper?
     No because there was substantial compliance with the very purpose of requiring parties to furnish
        proof of service in this case. A certiorari by nature is an original and independent action and not
        considered part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.
        Hence, acquisition of jurisdiction by the appellate court is necessary.
         In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution indicating its initial action on the
         Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it. Rule 46 Section 3 provides the procedural
         requirements for filing original actions before CA. The rule requires proof of service to the other party.
         The purpose of this rule is to apprise such party of the pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such
         party had already been notified of the same and had even participated in the proceedings, such
         purpose would have already been served. Province of Leyte vs Energy Dev Corp 760 SCRA 149
    59. A certiorari case under Rue 65 was filed by Philippine Public Health Association, Inc., (PPHAI) assailing
        validity of Joint Circular 1 of DBM and DOH. Issued by virtue of resolution 4 of Congress authorizing
        PGMA to modify government employee’s compensation. Hence, DBM and CSC issued guidelines on
        grant of Step Increments due to meritorious performance. It provides that when granted with
        Longevity pay (5% of monthly salary for every 5 years of service), Ee will no longer be qualified for
        Step Increment pay. The Sec of DBM and DOH opposed arguing that it diminish the benefits granted
        under Magna Carta to PHWs. Hence certitorarie was filed on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
        Decide.
     Denied. Issuance of the Resolution is in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers which is not within the
        ambit of certiorari and prohibition for being an improper remedy. . A writ of certiorari lies against
        judicial or quasi-judicial acts, while a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to address judicial,
        quasi-judicial or ministerial acts. RA Petitions for certiorari seek solely to correct defects in jurisdiction
        and not to correct just any error committed by any court, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
        judicial functions unless such court, board or officer thereby acts without or in excess of jurisdiction
        or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Cawad vs Abad, 764 SC
 Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if:
 1. it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
 2. the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
      excess of jurisdiction; and
 3. There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                  Page | 23
 Prohibition or a “writ of prohibition” is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from
 usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally
 conferred. The proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
 provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
 Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the
 competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court.— As a rule, the
 Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where
 exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the
 extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial
 policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
    60. Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) corporate life expired which was extended and such led to
        the change of its name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI). MB conducted General
        examination from 2007 to 2009 which placed ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action. ECBI unjustly
        refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books and records. MB issued
        Resolution imposing penalty and referred it to the Office of the Special Investigation for filing of
        appropriate legal action. Moreover, MB issued a cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it
        from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership through
        OSI recommendation. Vivas filed petition for prohibition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB
        for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership. Decide.
     No. Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The resolution issued by MB placing the bank under
        receivership may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari pursuant to RA 7653
        Sec 30. The proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to
        be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. Settled is the rule that
        prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. *Fait accompli -a thing that
        has already happened or been decided before those affected hear about it, leaving them with no option
        but to accept. SC posits that the Petition should have been filed with CA (S4, R65) in accordance with
        the doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. Vivas vs Monetary Board of BSP, 703 SCRA August 7, 2013
    61. Corales is duly elected Mayor of Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. In his first term, he appointed Dr.
        Angeles as Municipal Administrator with approval of SB. He renewed the appointment on his 2 nd and
        3rd terms but this time without approval of SB due to nepotism. On an audit report submitted to
        Corales, it stated that Dr. Angeles is a de facto officer and is entitled only to actual services rendered
        which must be shouldered by Corales. Instead of commenting on the audit report, Corales and Angeles
        filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against Andal and SB with RTC. What is the proper
        remedy?
     Certiorari. CA decision is affirmed. Prohibition and mandamus is prematurely filed by Corales. For
        judicial determination to prosper, the requisites must all be met. In this case, petitioners failed to show
        the existence of an actual case or controversy that would necessitate judicial inquiry. In this case,
        Corales was merely asked to comment on an audit report which is not yet final nor executory. What
        Corales assails is Andal’s authority to request them to file the desired comment to the audit report,
        which is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition. Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek
        a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived
        to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
        remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Corales vs Republic, 703 SCRA August 27, 2013
    62. King charged Go et. al for violation of BP 22 and estafa. Later, a Supplemental Complaint Affidavit was
        filed to add 5 more checks. A second supplemental complaint-affidavit was filed for estafa to implead
        another Go and Tan et. al. King averred that Go borrowed money form him and in exchange, Go would
        issue PDC as payment plus interest. Their first few transactions were okay. Later, during a meeting,
        allegedly, Go attacked King with a box cutter and told him that all issued checks will be dishonored
        (this was subject to a separate criminal case). True indeed, all checks were dishonored thereafter.
        Despite demands, no payment was made. Prosecutor found probable cause. Arraignment was ensued
        and respondents pleaded not guilty followed by a petition for prohibition and injunction with PI and
        TRO before CA questioning the investigation of the prosecutor and alleging that there is no basis for
        his findings of probable cause which was dismissed. CA denied the petition. Decide.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                    Page | 24
       Denied. A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent the lawful and oppressive exercise
        of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is available only
        when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and
        when the proceedings are done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
        The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is
        not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
        petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.
        Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdiction. As long as the
        tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will
        amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a timely appeal. In
        determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse of discretion is not
        enough. There must be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised its power in an
        arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or
        gross as would amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in
        contemplation of law. Tan vs CA, 524 SCRA
        Limited to a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Mandamus is never available to direct the
        exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
        taken in the exercise of either. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of
        discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper
        remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of
        Judge Bay. Hipos, Sr vs Bay 581 SCRA March 17, 2009
    64. Sanchez, a constable in Philippine Constabulary, was discharged from service for losing his firearm.
        Meteoro was also discharged for being absent without leave. They appealed and was cleared. They
        applied for reinstatement but was not acted until integration of PNP. Resolution 98-037 was issued by
        NAPOLCOM absorbing PC employees. Director Galvante prepared a list which includes the petitioners.
        Later, NAPOLCOM Commissioner absorbed the 45 PC in the initial batch. Sanchez is in 45 of the list.
        However, no absorption order was issued, hence they seek assistance from DILG who in turn asked for
        feedback. Without waiting for this feedback, petitioners filed a case for mandamus in RTC. May PNP be
        compelled by mandamus to absorb the petitioners
     No because the act being mandated is not a ministerial duty. Remedy of mandamus is employed only
        to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a
        discretionary one. The issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
        and to perform a duty already imposed. Sanchez vs Lastimosa 534 SCRA September 25, 2007
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 25
   65. Social Justice Society (SJS) et. al. filed a mandamus to compel Mayor Atienza of Manila to implement
       Ordinance 8027. Reclassifying certain lands from Industrial II to Commercial I which in effect
       prohibited business operation for 6 months. However, in 2006, Manila and DOE entered into a MOU in
       which they agreed scaling down the Pandacan Terminals. Ateinza alleged that the MOU superseded
       the Ordinance. Is the remedy proper?
    Yes. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
       of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and
       adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and
       certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
       respondent to do the act required to be done. Assuming that the MOU is inconsistent with the
       Ordinance questioned, it is already moot because the MOU is valid only for 6 months. Petition is
       granted and Atienza is directed to implement the ordinance. Social Justice Society vs Atienza 517 SCRA
       March 7 2007
   66. MECO was organized under BP 68 as a result of our relationship with Taiwan. It became a trusted
       entity of the government and was in fact authorized by the government to perform consular and other
       functions. Funa sent a letter to COA requesting FS under the belief that MECO is under operational
       supervision of DTI. Finding MECO that is not audited by COA, Funa filed a case as a taxpayer for
       mandamus. MECO filed MTD for being premature. It posits that for mandamus to compel the
       performance of a ministerial duty required by law only ripens once there has been a refusal by the
       tribunal, board, officer concerned to perform the duty. Moreover, MECO denied to be a GOCC. COA
       posits that the Mandamus must be dismissed on the ground of mootness and lack of locus standi.
       However, it ordered audit of MECO on the “verification fees “collected by it and maintains that it is not
       a GOCC. Decide.
    Mandamus is proper but on a limited capacity only to those funds it collect for performing
       governmental function. MECO is a non-governmental entity but “verification fees “collected in behalf
       of DO and those under Sec 2(6) of EO 15 S2001 are subject to COA jurisdiction.
   67. A case was filed by the father 6 days prior to PMA graduation for his son Jeff. A case for certiorari,
       prohibition and mandamus with application for TRO. Jeff, a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and
       belonging to “A” Coy, a Deputy Baron of his class was supposed to graduate as salutatorian. This did
       not happen because A Delinquency Report (DR) was issued against him by Prof Berong when he was
       2 minutes late. Graduation ensued. Cudia filed a mandamus to SC but this was not acted upon until
       graduation ceremony had eventually commenced. Is mandamus proper?
    No, it’s already moot and academic because the commencement exercised is over. Moreover, since it
       does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Substantive merits of the case was also
       discussed by SC in this case. In its final verdict, SC affirmed the dismissal of Cudia from PMA. For a writ
       of mandamus to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there
       should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
       Cudia vs Superintendent of PMA, 715 SVRA February 24 2015
   68. Judge Villanueva was appointed in 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the MTC Compostela Valley Province.
       After a year, he applied as RTC Judge. Later, he was informed that he was not included in the list of
       candidate nominees. He seek reconsideration on same day of his non-inclusion in the list. Accordingly,
       his exclusion is due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-
       level courts to judges who have served in their current position for at least 5 years. This requirement
       was not published. May JBC be compelled to include Judge V in its recommendation through
       mandamus?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 26
       No. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of in assailing JBC’s policy. In the issuance of the writ
        requires a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent
        to perform the act required. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant
        judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Likewise, the petition for declaratory relief is
        improper. An action for DR should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or
        other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation
        or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of
        the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
        thereunder.
        In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
        specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
        applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. The opportunity of
        appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be
        properly claimed by any person
        The consideration of experience does not constitute a violation of equal protection clause. JBC has the
        prerogative to impose certain criteria and qualification to its recommendation. However, SC assailed
        the criteria for the 5 year experience requirement because of failure to publish. Villanueva vs JBC, 755
        SCRA 182
        Prescription does not lie against the State. The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained
        in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster
        from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the
        right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive
        period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the
        instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the
        government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the
        qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary. Republic vs Sereno, GR 237428,
        May 11, 2008
    70. Mendoza became part of the BOC in 1972, and received promotions until he became Director III of
        the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service. In 1993, he was temporarily designated as Acting
        District Collector, while Allas was temporarily appointed to take his old position. In 1994, a letter was
        sent to petitioner, stating that he is terminated from the services of the BOC. He filed a petition for quo
        warranto against Allas, which the court granted. Allas appealed, but became moot and academic when
        Allas was promoted and was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of Customs Assessment and
        Operations. When Mendoza filed for motion for execution of its decision, it was denied because
        Godofredo Olores was appointed to take his old position and being not party to the quo warranto
        petition. Does a petition for quo warranto extends to the position claimed?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 27
      NO, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise of
       a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he
       has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the successor
       in office, even though the successor’s title comes from the same source. It is always directed to a
       person, in this case, Allas. Olores had never become part of the case; hence the decision
       cannot extend to him. Since Mendoza has reached the age of retirement, he cannot be reappointed.
       Neither can he claim from Allas his back wages, nor compel the BOC to pay said back wages.
       In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas.
       What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the
       contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. If the court finds for
       the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. x x x If
       it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully
       holding the same, the court may order: 1. The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office; 2. The
       recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator; 3. The determination of the respective rights in and to the
       office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. The rule
       that a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office is not
       applicable in quo warranto cases; The writ of quo warranto is never directed to an officer as such, but
       always against the person—to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to
       perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. Mendoza vs Allas, 302
       SCRA
   71. Panday file a case against Calleja for Quo Warranto with damages and prayer for MPI plus damages,
       and issuance of TRO. They allege that they have been members of BOD since 1985 of St. John Hospital
       which was incorporated in 2005. Accordingly, Calleja forcibly usurped the powers which supposedly
       belonged to Panday. RTC Br 58 referred the case to RTC Naga due to improper venue but the EJ refused
       to give the records of the case alleging that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
       warranto case to another admin jurisdiction. Hence, RTC 58 proceeded to issue summons. Respondent
       answered and alleged lack of jurisdiction, improper venue and wrong remedy. RTC Br 58 ordered that
       the jurisdiction is within SEC and /or within the respective territorial jurisdiction of the parties – RTC
       Naga. Later, AC 8-01 was issued by SC directing to transfer all cases from regular RTC to RTC specially
       designated to her cases in accordance to AM 00-11-03-SC. This made basis for Br 58 to remand case to
       RTC Naga. WON under the circumstances, Certiorari under R45 is proper
    The order is interlocutory hence certiorari under R45 is not the proper remedy. In this case, the basic
       issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by SEC and the propensity of
       parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond the technical lapses that R65 should
       have been used.
       Prior to RA 8799, R66 is limited to public officials, as to corporations, jurisdiction falls to SEC. When
       RA 8799 was passed, jurisdiction has been transferred to courts of general jurisdiction (RTC).
       However, R66 is still exclusive to public officials. For the private corporations, the Interim Rules of
       Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under RA 8799 governs. The jurisdiction is vested
       to the Special court where the principal address of business is located. In this case, Br 58 has no
       jurisdiction. A court not designated as Special Commercial Court is not vested with jurisdiction over
       cases previously cognizable by the SEC and does not have the requisite authority or power to order
       the transfer of cases erroneously filed with it to another branch of the RTC—the only action that it
       could take on the matter is to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction Calleja vs Panday 438 SCRA
   72. Certiorari and mandamus was filed by Lokin to question COMELEC resolution issuing IRR that provide
       a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in RA 7941. CIBAC manifested intent
       to participate in the 2007 national party list election. Its president submitted a list of 5 nominees from
       which its representatives would be chosen, a certificate of acceptance by the nominee, and the
       certificate of nomination. This list was published. However, prior to election, it’s President submitted
       a substitution of its nominees. Before closing of polls, its President submitted to COMELEC a signed
       petition confirming the withdrawal. Later, CIBAC filed to seek proclamation for Lokin as second
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 28
       nominee. This was opposed by its President. COMELEC failed to act on the matter prompting its
       president to seek confirmation. WON court has jurisdiction considering the contention of COMELEC
       that once a proclamation has been done, protest is under EJ of HRET
      Court has jurisdiction. An election protest proposes to outs a winning candidate form office. The
       controversy invoking Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, it concerns a
       specific and distinct situation. Lokin has correctly brought this certiorari against COMELEC to seek the
       review of the resolution it issued notwithstanding the proclamation of Gonzales. SC held that he is not
       guilty of forum shopping. The authority to make IRR is not a power exclusively legislative in character
       but an administrative in nature. The challenged Sec 13 of Resolution 7804 pursuant to BP 881 was
       published accordingly. However, COMELEC added another mode of allowing substitution which is
       beyond the ambit of the law which it seeks to implement. An election protest proposes to oust the
       winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates,
       based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has
       actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be
       filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding
       elections. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
       ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from
       the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly
       speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated
       even if the respondent may be unseated. Certiorari, not an election protest or quo warranto, is the
       proper recourse to review a COMELEC resolution approving the withdrawal the nomination of its
       original nominees and substituting them with others, even if the substitute nominees have already
       been proclaimed and have taken their oath of office. SC ordered proclamation of Lokin. Lokin Jr. vs
       COMELEC, 621 SCRA
   73. Lonzanida and Antipolo were candidates for Mayor in Zambales in 2010 election. Lonzanida filed COC
       on Dec 2009, this was petitioned by Rodolfo to be declared disqualified due to violation of 3 term limit
       rule. COMELEC cancelled the COC. MR was filed, pending the case, election ensued and she was
       declared Mayor. Her VP took oath of office as acting Mayor pending the resolution of the case. Later,
       MR was denied and COMELEC en banc confirmed the disqualification. Antipolo filed a motion to
       intervene seeking a right to be proclaimed as Mayor due to disqualification of Lonzanida. (Lonzanida
       is already disqualified prior to Election Day and that there is already an order to strike off his name in
       the ballots. COMELEC proclaimed Antipolo as Mayor. ) May Antipolo, the second place be declared the
       Mayor
    Yes, the DQ of Lonzanida exist prior to day of election and even before filing of COC. IN effect, she was
       never a candidate and can never be vote. Any votes cast on her favor is a stray vote. Second place is the
       winner. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
       seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible.
       Aratea vs COMELEC, 683 SCRA
   74. De Castro wanted to oust Carlos from Assistant General Manager for Operations (AGMO) post for
       MMDA. PGMA appointed him ass AGMO and was concurred by members of MMC in MMDA. Took his
       oath before Bayani Fernando. Meanwhile, Executive Secretary Ochoa issued OP Memo 2, S2010 re:
       non-CESO employees occupying CESO posts. Hence, MMDA issued order designating an OIC in AGMO
       and De Castro was reassigned to Legal office. Later, Carlos was designated as OIC of AGMO. De Castro
       seek clarification from CESB as to proper classification of the AGMO. In reply, AGMO was not yet
       classified as CES, he is not co-terminus and is not covered by OP Memo. May the Quo warranto prosper?
    No. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a
       franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-
       founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited. — Where the action is filed by a private
       person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise,
       respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. Career service is characterized by
       the existence of security of tenure, as contradistinguished from non-career service whose tenure is
       coterminous with that of the appointing authority; or subject to the latter’s pleasure; or limited to a
       period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the appointment
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                            Page | 29
        was made. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the
        office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or
        eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.—It is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly
        replaced by another non-CESO eligible.
        AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of tenure subject to civil service laws and regulations.
        CES positions must be a presidential appointee and those determined by CESB. AGMO is not a CES
        position. However, this was slater on reclassified as CES because AGMO performs functions that are
        managerial in character, exercises management over people, resource and/or policy; and assumes
        functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and overseeing the activities of
        MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry
        out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance, leadership and supervision. Since De
        Castro is not eligible, his appointment is coterminous. De Castro vs Caros, 696 SCRA April 16 2013
    75. Velasco filed mandamus against Speaker Belmonte alleging that he is the winner in 2013 elections in
        accordance with COMELEC resolution. Tan (voter) filed a case to cancel COC of Reyes (rival of Velasco
        for Congressman post due to misrepresentations. COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled the
        COC. Despite receipt of COMELEC EB resolution, on May 18, Reyes was proclaimed winner. Velasco
        filed an election protests on the 31st with HRET including a Q.W. Ad Cautelam. COMELEC later on
        declared finality of order after lapse of appeal period. Meanwhile, Speaker administered oath to Reyes.
        Velasco filed certiorari to COMELEC assailing proceedings of PBOC proclaiming Reyes as winner.
        Efforts were made by Velasco to execute the order but was futile that lead him to file the mandamus
        case. Is mandamus tenable?
     Yes. Based on the facts, this is a remedy for mandamus and not a quo warranto. What is prayed in this
        case is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. SC enforced the
        decision and declared Velasco as winner. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the
        right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment,
        if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. A petition for
        mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
        discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined,
        clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. Velasco vs Belmonte, 780 SCRA 81, January 12
        2016
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 30
    77. Antonio Pobre owns a land which was later on subdivided. Later, the Commission on Volcanology
        declared that thermal mineral water and steam were present in the land. NPC leased 11 of these lands
        for 1 year (1972). Later, (1977), NPC filed expropriation case against Pobre which was approved.
        During the pendency of the case, NC started its operations, in so doing, it dumped waste materials
        beyond the site agreed upon. Pobre complained but NPC did not bother. Later, another expropriation
        was filed. NPC deposited 10% of the FMV of the lot and entered the property upon RTC order of writ
        of possession. Pobre filed MTD and claimed compensation for all the lots affected by NPCs actions and
        for damages. RTC ordered payment of compensation and to transfer the ENTIRE property to NPC
        which NPC refuted. Should the decision be sustained?
     Yes. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent domain. In expropriation cases
        under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer. The power of eminent
        domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until
        expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for
        public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law. If the propriety of
        the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of
        the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the
        meantime. In the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made
        either in a separate or in the same action. If the government takes property without expropriation and
        devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just
        compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall
        not be taken for public use without just compensation. National Power Corp vs CA 436 SCRA
(It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 ROC that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well
as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule 67
specifically governed eminent domain cases.)
    78. Ismael Andaya is an owner of land with a perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation, ditches,
         etc. at no cost to the government except only the value of the improvements existing thereon that may
         be affected. The government negotiated to Andaya but failed. Hence, it instituted a suit to enforce the
         easement. RTC issued Writ of possession and constituted a BOC to determine just compensation. Later,
         an Order of Expropriation was made. The board reported a discrepancy as to the expropriation that
         led to reduction of the easement from 60 mtrs to 10 mtrs. Moreover, it recommended payment for
         consequential damages as a result of the easement. RTC ordered payment of 2.8M+ for severance
         damages. Andaya demanded for the value of the whole property. May Republic is required to pay (for
         the whole lot) just compensation in enforcing easement
     Yes. Sec 112 of PLA provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not
         exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches etc. free of charge expect only for
         the value of the improvements. However, when portion of the land become unusable and
         uninhabitable, payment of consequential damages is warranted. In this case, SC based the award on
         the definition of “taking”. Accordingly, the just compensation must be neither more nor less than the
         money equivalent of the land. However, the just compensation must be based ono the affected areas
         and not on the totality of the whole lot. Taking, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs
         not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property
         or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value
         of his property. Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor
         less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Republic vs Andaya, 524 SCRA
NB: Just Compensation is determined at the time of taking.
    79. The government is to expropriate a building property where such was constructed on land which it
        already owned. Republic filed an expropriation case with RTC with an application for special raffle. It
        seek to take immediate possession of NAIA 3 facilities. On its petition, Republic averred that it already
        made a deposit of 3B to LBP. On the same day of filing, an order of writ of possession was also issued.
        However, pursuant to RA 8974 amending Rule 67, it was ordered that Republic is required to make
        immediate payment to the property and not a mere initial deposit. It likewise prohibited the Republic
        to perform acts of ownership until full compliance of order. Is RTC correct?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 31
      Yes, because the law now mandates full payment. As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for
       certiorari may be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
       assailed. The filing by the AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months after its supposed right to the
       project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and negates any claim that the said petition for the
       extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy remedy available to AEDC. Asia’s Emerging
       Dragon vs DOTC, 552 SCRA
   80. RA 8794 should be applied in the instant expropriation case and not Rule 67.
    Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
       assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule
       67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the
       Court’s requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to
       PIATCO before the Government may take over the property. It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974
       to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases
       involving national government infrastructure projects. Republic vs Gingoyon 481 SCRA 457 [GR No.
       166429 December 19, 2005]
   81. Pending an unlawful detainer case between Filhomes Realty Development Corporation (FRDC) and
       Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) against Abad, Paranaque filed an expropriation case over the
       land. RTC issued a Writ of Possession and a certificate of turnover was given. Meanwhile, MeTC decided
       in favor of the FRDC and MRC. Ordered to vacate the property and payment of compensation starting
       2002 (when suit was filed). In this case, Abad, as a defense used the writ of possession. MeTC denied
       the defense because accordingly the beneficiaries of such expropriation has to be determined first. May
       an expropriation proceedings filed bars jurisdiction of a lower court to adjudicate claims of possession
       or ownership
    Yes. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands
       belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants
       occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the
       expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter
       case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the benefits of the
       suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit
       the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.
       In this case, Abad did not avail of the remedy provided. Mere issuance of writ of possession in
       expropriation proceedings does not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. An issuance of
       expropriation order does not automatically vest them the right to be a guaranteed beneficiary because
       certain requirements are still to be complied. A local government unit may, through its chief executive
       and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
       or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
       to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
       domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
       and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
       take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
       deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
       based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the
       amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
       fair market value of the property.
       In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public use
       upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use
       as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social justice. Abad vs Fil- Homes Realty, 636
       SCRA
   82. NPC seek to expropriate a land by YCLA to construct transmission lines. It filed for expropriation of
       land for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by the
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 32
        construction of transmission lines. MTD was filed by YCLA for failure to state the public purpose nature
        of the expropriation. RTC ordered constitution of a Board of Commissioners to determine just
        compensation. Meanwhile, RTC, issued a writ of possession in favor of NPC. Subsequently, BOC
        submitted its Report fixed the amount of just compensation at ₱500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected. Later,
        BOC fixed the JC to ₱1,000.00 per sq m. RTC adopted the report and ordered NPC to pay. WON RTC
        and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject
        properties.
       It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which
        usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. In this case, JC
        determination was relied heavily on the BOC report However, BOC report is based on FMV. In this
        report, FMV is based on 2003 rules while the expropriation was filed in 1997. The determination of JC
        is on the time the case is filed. Recommendation of BOC must always be based on evidence, otherwise
        it would be erroneous to adopt such recommendation. NPC vs YCLA Sugar Development Crp, 712 SCRA
        550
    83. Agricultural land were subjected to RA 6657. The owner filed a complaint for the fixing of just
        compensation in RTC and prayed that DARAB valuation be set aside and declared null and void. DARAB
        conducted a summary admin proceeding but affirmed the valuation. Later, it filed again a case with
        RTC impleading LBP and DAR through PARO to set aside the valuation of DARAB. In response, a MTD
        was filed alleging that the decision of DARAB is already final and executory prior to the certiorari. RTC
        granted the MTD. Pursuant to Section 60 of RA 6657, the decision became final because an appeal by
        petition for review was not taken from the decision of the RTC as the SAC within 15 days from notice
        of the decision considering further that there was no proof of service on the CA of a copy of the petition
        as required by Section 3, Rule 45 of the ROC and Circular No. 19-91, thereby warranting the outright
        dismissal of the petition. Is the action proper?
     No, petitioner should not be prevented from assailing the dismissal by petition for certiorari provided
        her resort complied with the requirements of the ROC for the bringing of the petition for certiorari.
        Certiorari was a proper remedy despite the availability of appeal. CA correctly dismissed the case
        because of the failure to appeal within the 15 days reglementary period. However, it was reversed by
        SC following LBP vs Sunday. SC harmonized the conflicting past decisions and followed PVB case
        alleging that while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the
        agrarian reform adjudicators’ decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15 day
        period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality.
        Limkaichong vs LBP, 799 SCRA 139 August 2, 1016
        Act No. 3135 only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the
        publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not
        necessary.— Section 3, Act No. 3135 reads: “Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale
        for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
        property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 33
       be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
       the municipality and city.” Ramirez vs Manila Banking Corporation, 712 SCRA December 2013
   85. Anita Marquez extended a loan to Gutierrez. As security, a REM was executed. Extrajudicial foreclose
       was made, sale was thereafter made and Anita won. Upon failure to redeem, title was consolidated in
       favor of Anita. However, this title bore an annotation of adverse claim by Sps Alindog. This claim was
       copied from an earlier annotation made only after the mortgage by Anita. Later, Alindog filed a case
       for annulment of REM and COS with damages against Anita and a certain Gonzales. RTC issued Writ of
       possession and a notice to vacate against Gutierrez. May an injunctive writ be granted for a claim based
       on a sale which was annotated on a title acquired as a result of consolidation from a foreclosure of REM
    Yes. Buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
       redeemed during the period of one year after registration of sale. He is entitled to the possession of the
       property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the
       issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. However, Sec 33, R39, ROC provides an exception
       where unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right i.e. when he who is
       actually holding the property adversely to a judgment obligor, a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.
       These holders are not merely successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner
       or the owner of the property. He is a possessor who has claim a right superior to that of the original
       mortgagor. In this case, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Anita is merely ministerial.
       Marquez vs Alindog, 714 SCRA January 2014
   86. LZK Holdings obtained a loan from PDB for 40M secured by REM. Later, extrajudicial foreclosure – sale
       – PDB won – COS was registered. LZK filed annulment of foreclosure and sale, with TRO and WPI to
       enjoin consolidation of title RTC Makati. PDB applied for writ of possession in RTC San Fernando. RTC
       Makati issued TRO for enjoining consolidation and later issued WPI. Later, RTC Makati declared the
       foreclosure and sale null and void which was affirmed by CA.
       Is the issuance of Writ of possession requires a hearing? May an injunction order bars the issuance of
       the writ of possession
    No, the issuance of a writ of possession is an ex parte and a summary in nature that benefits only the
       petitioner. RTC San Fernando should have acted on the ex parte petition. The injunction order is of no
       moment because it should be understood to have merely stayed the consolidation of title. Injunction
       is not allowed to prohibit the issuance of writ of possession. Neither does pending case for annulment
       of foreclosure sale, mortgage contract, PN and damages stay the issuance of the writ. No hearing is
       required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. LZK Holdings vs Planters Development Bank,
       714 SCRA January 2014
   87. Goldenway Merch. Corp. (GMC) executed a REM in favor of Equitable PCI bank over a property n
       Bulacan for 2M loan. Default – foreclosed REM – auction sale – COS – registered. Later, an offer to
       redeem was made tendering 3.5M (same as auction price) but became impossible because COS was
       already registered and title was already consolidated. Case for specific performance with damages
       was filed alleging that redemption under Act 3135 is 1 year and not RA 8791 (S47) because accordingly
       if this is applied, there would result impairment of obligation of contract. Moreover, it avers that bank
       failed to furnish copy of SOA nor filed one with COC of RTC. Is the action for specific performance
       tenable?
    No. RA 3135 applies in REM as amended by Act 4118. It provides a 1 year redemption period which is
       counted from the date of registration of the COS. In RA 8791 (GBL of 2000), Sec 47 amended Act 3135.
       It provides that redemption is within 1 year from date of sale and purchaser may seek possession of
       the property immediately after sale provided that a bond shall be constituted over the property.
       Paragraph 2 provides that notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons have right of redemption until
       registration which in no case shall be more than 3 months from foreclosure whichever is earlier. The
       allegation that the implementation of RA 8791 would result in impairment of contract is wanting of
       merit. Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. Sec 47 is constitutional. It
       did not remove right to redeem, it merely set a shorter period. The difference in the treatment of
       juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed―whether
       these are used as residence, for which the more liberal 1-year redemption period is retained, or used
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 34
       for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the
       period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of
       these acquired assets. Golden way Merchandising Corp vs Equitable PCI Bank 693 SCRA March 13,
       2013
   88. Mateo obtained a loan from bank – Rem + PN – default – foreclose REM extrajudicial – auction sale –
       bank won – COS issued and registered. Mateo signified exercise of right to redeem through his lawyer
       by sending faxed letters. ON last day of redemption, case was filed with TRO and PI with RTC.
       Meanwhile, consolidation was made and TCT was issued. During PTC, redemption offer was made but
       bank refused and instead wanted to proceed trial. RTC allowed redemption. Is mere tender and
       consignation of an insufficient amount may merit redemption
    No. In this case, SC sustained that redemption is not proper. Considering that the petitioner is a bank,
       the redemption price should have been governed by S78, RA 8791. In this case, parties agreed that
       redemption is supposed to be based on the foreclosed amount. Mateo offered a deficit amount before
       filing the complaint. The amount at which the foreclosed property is redeemable is the amount due
       under the mortgage deed, or the outstanding obligation of the mortgagor plus interest and expenses
       in accordance with Section 78 of the General Banking Act. In several cases decided by the Court where
       the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was an unequivocal tender of
       payment for the full amount of the repurchase price. Otherwise, the offer to redeem is ineffectual. Bona
       fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price,
       otherwise the rule on the redemption period fixed by law can easily be circumvented. Allied Bank vs
       Mateo, 588 SCRA
   89. Yapcinco – Rem – Marcelo. Marcelo transferred his rights to Cruz. Yapcinco defaulted – Cruz judicially
       foreclosed REM. MTC ordered to pay Cruz or foreclose after 90 days from date of decision if not paid.
       Cruz won – Certificate of absolute sale – took possession but did not register the COS, no judicial
       confirmation. Cruz donated land to grandchildren. However, one of the GC falsified a DOAS where he
       made it appear that the land was sold to him ALONE by Yapcinco. TCT was cancelled, new TCT was
       issued in favor of the GC and other co-vendees. Later, other GC donee’s filed a complaint for
       nullification of the DAS, cancellation of title and reconveyance against the GC and other co-vendees.
       Another case was filed later on by the heirs of Yapcinco claiming that although the property was
       mortgaged, no foreclosure was made and per Entry No. 32-2182 REM was released. Is registration of
       COS or court confirmation in judicial foreclosure is mandatory to vest title to the purchaser
    No because registration of COS is only required in extrajudicial foreclosure of REM to determine the
       reckoning date from which right of redemption may be exercised. Only the equity of redemption is
       granted to the mortgagor in a judicial foreclosure, except in mortgages with banking institutions. The
       failure of a purchaser to obtain judicial confirmation only prevents the title to the property from being
       transferred to him BUT does NOT redirect the property back to the mortgagor unless redeemed. RTC
       decision restored. The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
       mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the ninety (90)-day
       period after the judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the confirmation
       of the sale. Robles vs Yapcinco, 739 SCRA 75
   90. CPR Promotions – loan from MBTC covered by PN and REM over land – 1 land 6.5M other 3 land is
       2.5M. Note that 1 land is named under CPR, all the rest under Sps Reynoso (President and Treasurer
       of the CPR). Defaulted – extrajudicial foreclosure of REM – 2 actions were made – MBTC won. However,
       proceeds is insufficient. Hence collection suit was filed. RTC allowed collection. CA reversed the
       decision and ordered refund as to the excess of proceeds over principal. Is CA correct?
    Yes. A claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount due should be interposed
       as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against
       the debtor-mortgagor. However, respondents failed to timely raise the issue. A compulsory CC must
       be alleged in the Answer, otherwise it will now be barred. In this case, the CC was filed in the
       Appellant’s Brief filed before the CA. In ascertaining the deficit amount, Sec. 4, Rule 68 of the ROC is
       elucidating, to wit: Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.—The amount realized from the
       foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                     Page | 35
        person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the
        mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be
        ascertained by the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after
        payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it. In
        this case, the petition itself contained an admission that the 11M+ is already inclusive of interest. SC
        deleted refund and denied collection of deficit amount due to failure to substantiate claim. In
        extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, where the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt,
        the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
        Co. vs CPR Promotions and Marketing Inc. 760 SCRA 59
    92. Rufo mortgaged a land he own as security to a loan. – Foreclosed – sold to bank – COS was issued,
        registered no redemption was made – new TCT was issued. When Sebastiana died, her children
        executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dividing the property equally among them and in this
        EJS, a Recognition of the REM was manifested. 3 years after, they bought back the property from the
        bank. Sale was successful. May EJS recognizing co-ownership must still be recognized despite the lapse
        of the redemption period where the EJS was based on?
     No co-ownership. In this case, there was a complete transfer of ownership of the lot prior to the death
        of Sebastiana. The lot never become part of the estate of the deceased. When they executed the EJS, the
        lot is already completely transferred of ownership. Hence, reacquisition of the lot is a different
        transaction over the estate. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. Balus vs Balus,
        610 SCRA
    93. When Antonio Feliciano passed away, he left a land evidenced by a tax declaration. He has 5 children,
        2 were deceased. Amongst the remaining children, an EJS was executed. Later, the 4 children sold their
        share. Years later, the heirs of the 2 deceased children filed a case for nullity of title, recovery and
        damages alleging that the EJS was void because they were excluded claiming representation for the 2
        deceased children. RTC declared the EJS null and void including the sale and ordered partition. May
        prescription set in to annul the EJS?
     Yes. Nullification of Documents and Titles is imprescriptible. However, in an action for annulment of
        EJS on the ground of fraud, the PP is 4 years from date of discovery of fraud. SC sustained CA decision
        because this case was filed 16 years after registration. Feliciano vs Canosa, 629 SCRA
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 36
    94. Brobio died intestate leaving land and some bank deposits survived by wife, 4 LC and 3 IC. A EJS was
        executed with waiver from the 3 ICs that in exchange for the waiver, they will pay them for their share.
        Carmela, one of the IC’s agreed. Later on, Pacifico, one of the LC, asked Carmela to sign a copy of the
        Deed with waiver but Carmela refused because according to her, she was promised an additional
        amount but was never materialized. She demanded a 600k additional. Since Pacifico did not have
        money anymore, he executed a PN but this was not encashed. Carmela filed a case for specific
        performance. Decide.
     Denied. However the proper remedy is NOT partition but annulment of contract. Contracts are
        voidable where consent thereto is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
        fraud. An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common. Considering that the
        heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waived their shares in favor of
        respondent, the properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be
        partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person. Mangahas vs Brobio, 634 SCRA
         Registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. — However, the owner cannot simply
         wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession,
         he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to
         satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.” Jurisdictional Facts That Must Be Alleged
         and Sufficiently Established in a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer. When the complaint fails to aver
         facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
         effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
         accion reivindicatoria. Suarez vs Emboy Jr 718 SCRA 677 March 12, 2014
 Accion interdictal comprises 2 distinct COA, FE (detentacion) and UD (desahuico). FE and UD are distinct actions. FE is when one is
 deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat strategy, or stealth. In UD, one unlawfully
 withholds possession thereof after expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In
 FE, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In UD, the
 possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
 possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs COA is the termination of the
 defendant’s right to continue in possession.
 Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper RTC when
 dispossession has lasted for more than 1 year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
 independently of title.
 In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:
 a.    initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
 b. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
       possession;
 c.    thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
 d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
    96. As a result of a litigation where the lawyer’s client lost, a demolition order was issued. Appeal was
        made to RTC and pending appeal, a Writ of execution was issued by MTCC. According to the lawyer, he
        did not receive a copy of the decision denying his MR. Despite of such fact, the Sheriff went ahead to
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                               Page | 37
         execute the demolition. An altercation happened later between the Sheriff and the lawyer. Hence, this
         case. May the sheriff should be admonished for executing the order despite a pending TRO and appeal
         filed by the lawyer
        As to execution of order to demolish, No. But as to the failure of the Sheriff to observe the courtesy and
         diligence in the conduct of his duty, Yes.
         In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed via
         compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the ROC. Enforcement in ejectment cases requires the sheriff
         to give notice of such writ and to demand from defendant to vacate the property within 3 days; a sheriff
         who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry of the 3-day period is running
         afoul with the Rules. Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made
         immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor.
         The defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing
         a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for
         the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. Alconera vs Pallanan 714
         SCRA 204, January 2014
    97. Teodoro filed an ejectment suit against his co-heirs over an undivided lot inherited from their
        ancestors. His claim stemmed from a will that was executed by his ancestor. Despite such, he was
        deprived of possession when in the exercise of his right to ownership, other co-heirs put a barricade
        on the portion of the lot in dispute to deprive him of building a house thereon. May the act of
        barricading the property in effect arose a right to sue for unlawful dispassion through forcible entry
     Yes. In the absence of an approved partition among the heirs, remains a community property over
        which the legal heirs of Genaro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to exercise the right
        of dominion including the right of possession. Ownership issue in ejectment is inutile because in
        ejectment, the only issue to be resolved is a question of possession. Teodoro vs Espino 715 SCRA 435
        February 2014
 Ground Rules in Forcible Entry Cases.—The ground rules in forcible entry cases:
 a.  One employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of real property.
 b. Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof
     by the defendant (herein respondents). This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was
     unlawful from the beginning.
 c.  The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a
     claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can, at the outset, preclude the
     court from taking cognizance of the case.
 d. Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de
     facto and undue deprivation thereof.
    98. A case was file before the sala of the Judge Rabaca for ejectment. He decided in favor of YMCA and
        ordered the occupant, Cano to vacate the premises. However, pending expiration of the time to appeal,
        a notice of appeal was filed by Cano. Rabaca concluded that his perfected the appeal and vest the court’s
        jurisdiction to appellate court. Later, a motion for immediate execution of judgment was filed by YMCA.
        This was denied due to the perfected appeal. Decide on the motion.
     Grant. Order is Final and immediately executory unless a notice of appeal is filed plus a supersedeas
        bond which was duly approved by the court. Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for
        immediate execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond
        despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution became his
        ministerial duty upon the defendant’s failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule
        70, of the ROC clearly imposes such duty. The perfection of the appeal by the defendant in an ejectment
        case does not forbid a favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution—only the
        filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent
        due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution. Good faith,
        or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an
        as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. Ferrer vs Rabaca
        632 SCRA
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                           Page | 38
   99. CGR Corporation, Herman and Alberto, leased several hectares of public land, mostly consisting of
       fishponds, in Negros Occidental. Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr., with his men, forcibly entered the leased
       properties and barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along
       the road going to CRG Corporation‘s fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and
       fingerlings. CGR filed with the MTC in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry with TRO with
       Preliminary Injunction and Damages and reserved a separate civil action. The MTC found Treyes and
       his men guilty of forcible entry. CGR filed a separate complaint alleging therein that he
       suffered damages for the actions of Treyes during and after the forcible entry. A claim for
       additional damages which arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by Treyes of the
       premises was thereafter prayed for. The MTC awarded the claims of CGR. May additional damages can
       be awarded resulting from events that took place after Treyes left the property
    No. The only form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental
       value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property; other damages must
       be claimed in an ordinary action. In a forcible entry case, court has no jurisdiction over claims for
       damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees. Filing of an
       independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those
       caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not be considered as splitting
       of a cause of action. The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases refer to “rents” or
       “the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises” or “fair rental value of the
       property” and attorney’s fees and costs. CGR Corp vs Treyes 522 SCRA 765
   100.         Under Commonwealth Act No. 538, ejectment of tenant is suspended while expropriation
       proceedings is pending but tenant must pay the rent and be entitled to suspension.—When the
       Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any
       estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands
       shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings
       or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of
       suspension shall not exceed one year. Abad vs Filhomes, 636 SCRA
   101.         Zacarias filed a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/UD against Anacay. MCTC dismissed
       the complaint for failure to state the elements of UD as claimed. On appeal, Zacariass insisted that UD
       is the proper remedy considering that there was a mere toleration of the Anacay’s stay in the premises
       after demand to vacate was made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and she
       was only forced to take legal action when they reneged on their promise to vacate after lapse of certain
       period of time as agreed. RTC reversed and ordered to vacate. In the complaint, respondents failed to
       aver that there was no entry through stealth and strategy but UD is still proper because of the failure
       to accede on their promise to vacate the property in due time. RTC Decision became F&E. On the
       hearing of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, a manifestation was made that an Appeal to
       CA was initiated. CA held that MCTC had no jurisdiction. Zacarias availed of the wrong remedy to
       recover possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria with
       proper RTC. What is the proper remedy?
    Forcible entry. Complaint does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or
       tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner and which
       became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of such lawful possession.
       In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody statement of facts to bring the party clearly within
       the class of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough
       on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Such remedy is either forcible
       entry or unlawful detainer. While in forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of
       his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the
       defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto
       under any contract, express or implied. To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
       the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
       which is later sought to be recovered. Zacarias vs Anacay, 736 SCRA 508, 2014
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 39
 A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
 a.   initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
 b. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
      possession;
 c.   thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
 d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
   102.        Manalang et. al (petitioners) were co-owners for lot and caused a relocation and verification
       survey which showed that respondents had encroached on a portion of said lot. When the respondents
       refused to vacate despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer. On
       appeal RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of
       encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. RTC decided that there indeed exist an
       encroachment. CA reversed RTC decision. According to CA, RTC’s act to ordering reconveyance is
       tantamount to a reopening of trial, a complete disregard to S18 R70. Did RTC in the exercise of its
       appellate jurisdiction gravely abused its discretion?
    Yes because in R70, appeal of a case does not mean retrial or rehearing of the entire case. RTC shall
       decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
       memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. In this case, the
       proper remedy is either action reinvindicatoria or publiciana which is under RTC jurisdiction and
       cannot be summarily hear. Boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
       whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. Manalang vs
       Bacani 745 SCRA January 12, 2015
   103.          Sometime in 1992 during their regular semi-annual visit, they saw two (2) houses built on
       their lot without their knowledge and permission. Hence, an accion publiciana against Sps De Jesus,
       Macario was filed with MTC. As per tax dec, value is at 39+k. No settlement was made at Lupong
       Tagapamayapa. A criminal case was filed for violation of Anti-Squatting Law. RTC convicted
       defendants. Pending appeal, Congress enacted RA No. 8368, An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No.
       772 which paved way to the dismissal of the criminal case. Sps Supapo moved for the execution of the
       civil liability, praying issuance of an order to vacate. A writ of execution was issued to vacate the
       defendants. Aggrieved, they appealed to CA which granted the petition and held that with the repeal
       of the Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished. Sps Supapo filed the
       complaint for action publiciana to MeTC. Defendants argued that this case is barred by statute of
       limitations and by prior judgment. MeTC denied the arguments. Hence, defendants filed a petition for
       certiorari with the RTC. RTC granted the petition. Does MeTC have the jurisdiction to try the case for
       accion publiciana
    Yes. MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; The cause of action has not prescribed; and Complaint is not
       barred by res judicata.
         Sps Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements for MeTC based on the assessed value
         of the land. The cause of action has not prescribed. Cause of action is imprescriptible when property
         is registered and titled under the Torrens system. Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states: the lawful
         owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
         unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
         The action is not barred by prior judgment. Res judicata is not present in this case. Philippines filed the
         criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests... there is no identity of parties between
         the criminal complaint under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this
         reason alone, "collusiveness of judgment" does not apply.
         Accion publiciana refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one (1) year from the accrual
         of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.—It is an ordinary
         civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title.
         SC has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
         ownership. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now
         determined by its assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                        Page | 40
        by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. Supapo vs De Jesus, 756 SCRA 211 April 20,
        2015
    104.        Antonio and Remedios are registered owners of a lot. Respondent occupied this lot based on
        a MOA executed between him and one Don Mario. He claimed that the property was already sold by
        Antonio to Don Mario who in turn sold the lot to him. Antonio filed ejectment case with MTCC which
        dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. RTC affirmed alleging that the facts of the case is not really
        ejectment but an accion reivindicatoria. CA reversed the decision granting possession to Antonio and
        ordered respondent to vacate. May the action be dismissed considering that the complaint avers
        ejectment but the contents is really one for accion reinvindicatoria
Held:
Yes. SC reinstated MTCC decision dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the complaint seek
to eject and determine ownership of the alleged lot. Forcible Entry; The one (1)-year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except when
entry was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from the time the plaintiff learned
about it. Where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one (1)-year prescriptive period should be counted
from the time the person who was deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant desist from
dispossession when the former learned about it. Dela Cruz vs Hermano, 754 SCRA 231
    105.          Sps Dumlao owned a low where the San Mariano Academy was built. This lot was brought
        from an auction sale for EJForeclosure from Sps Erorita. Sps Dumlao agreed to allow continuance of
        the school to operate. Sps Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan as administrator. Accordingly, Sps
        Dumlao agreed to a monthly rental of 20k but Erorita failed to pay. Later, Sps Dumlao asked Eroritas
        to vacate. Eroritas wanted to comply but they cannot immediately do it without clearance from DECS.
        Sps Dumlao filed a case for recovery of possession to RTC which rendered decision on their favor.
        Erorita appealed to CA arguing that it has no jurisdiction because the case is for unlawful detainer.
        However, CA affirmed RTC decision. Does RTC has jurisdiction over UD case
     None, It is the MTC which has jurisdiction over RE and UD cases regardless of the assessed value of the
        lot. Allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.
        To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that:
            (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s
                tolerance;
            (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated;
            (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
            (d) The plaintiff filed a complaint within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
                the property.
        A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as
        an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted. Erorita vs Dumlao,
        718 SCRA 551 January 25 2016
    106.         A TRO was issued on the same day when upon request of certain stockholders of Interport
        Resources Corporation, Sec Chariman Yasay, direct Ricalde to submit a list of stockholders. However,
        despite the TRO, the meeting proceeded. Hence SEC declared respondents guilty of contempt. CA set
        aside the declaration. Respondent argued that the TRO is invalid in light of a TRO issued by CA
        restraining SEC to enforce its TRO. Is contempt criminal in character and that their exoneration from
        a charge of contempt amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie
     Yes. In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the dignity and
        power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie form the order of
        dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt. Yasay vs Recto 313 SCRA
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 41
         Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for
         the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. In general, civil
         contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has pecuniary interest
         in the right to be protected. If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given
         contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
         applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor.
   107.          Salvador Sison, MDA enforcer filed a complaint against the Judge and the sheriff with grave
       abuse of authority. This stemmed from an Order issued by the judge requiring him to explain a traffic
       incident involving his driver-son. The driver’s license was confiscated due to swerving. This happened
       while the son of the PJ is on official trip. He tried to negotiate but Sison proceeded to confiscate the
       license for violation of traffic rule. Later an order was issued by the Judge requiring Sison to explain
       within 24 hours why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. Sison failed to appear. Hence, Judge
       ordered arrest and commitment of Sison. Without a warrant, he was arrested and detained. Later on a
       hearing, he appeared and apologized under duress. Because of this, he was discharged. Note that the
       traffic violation happened in Mandaluyong city and Judge seats in Las Pinas city. May the judge be held
       administratibly liable?
    Yes. Judge exercised the power beyond his powers. Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt
       of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used
       as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein,
       and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious
       refusal to comply with court orders. Sison vs Caoibes Jr 429 SCRA 258
   108.         Sharcons bought from Evanswinda Morales a land in Dasmariñas. TCT was issued. However,
       when workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of
       Sps Mapua. The caretaker claimed that Sps Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the
       status of the title and found that it was indeed registered in the names of Sps Mapua. Sharcons filed
       with RTC a complaint for quieting of title, impleading as defendants were Sps Mapua, Morales, and the
       RD. Judge Español, issued an Order stating that Sharcons have used a spurious certificate of title and
       tax declaration when it filed quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of
       direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for 10 days. Is the verdict proper?
    NO. Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes indirect (not direct) contempt.
       Indirect or constructive contempt is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include
       misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
       transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of
       a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the
       process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending
       directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. Section 3, Rule 71, a
       contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been
       given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel. Espanol vs Formoso, 525 SCRA
   109.         P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a Criminal Case, where
       Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng La’O is one
       of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno is her counsel. The case
       involves an incident where the son of La’O and his company were shot and killed by police officers at
       Ortigas Center allegedly for carnapping. La’O, together with other petitioners filed that the resolution
       for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.
       While case is pending, A shooting incident occurred in Quezon, where Marantan was the ground
       commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the death of 13 men (Atimonan incident). The
       encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity, that respondents took advantage
       of the incident. After a few consecutive days, La’O, her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and Ernesto Manzano,
       organized and conducted a media press conference where they allegedly made malicious, intemperate
       and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, branding
       Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident. Whether the sub judice rule
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                       Page | 42
       restricting comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings infringe on freedom of
       speech.
      No. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
       order to avoid prejudicing the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
       IC is a form of contempt that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
       judicially. In the case, the comments are merely a reiteration of the respondents position in G.R. No.
       199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court
       detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their
       petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court. Marantan vs Diokno 716 SCRA
       164 February 2014
   110.         Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in
       Political Law Review. She averred that in 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her
       mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis) as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in
       Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as
       a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law. In one session, Judge even said that Francis, son of Judge was
       a court-noted addict. Is Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
    Yes. To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the
       performance of his official duties. In this case, the alleged misconduct happened in a class discussion
       and Judge is not in the exercise of his official duty. Hence he cannot be liable for misconduct not grave
       misconduct. Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings
       I order to avoid prejudicing the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
       Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
       investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In 2010, he still could not make
       comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting
       on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of
       the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of
       the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Tormis vs Paredes, 749 SCRA 505 February 4 2015
   111.         May filing of an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, despite knowledge of the
       pendency of a case, constituted forum shopping.
    No. Pascual et al. did not commit forum shopping. In this case, any action by the CA on Pascual et al.’s
       motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 is provisional in nature, such that it can in no way constitute as res
       judicata in CA-G.R. SP No. 61873. In CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 – it seeks the CA’s approval to execute the
       RTC Decision pending final disposition of Pulumbarit’s appeal. In CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 - an action to
       determine whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by RTC when it allowed execution
       pending appeal. The grant by the CA of a motion for execution pending appeal, being provisional in
       nature, could therefore not have rendered CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 moot and academic. Palumbarit vs CA
       772 SCRA 244
   112.         Is finding of fact in the application for receivership constituted res judicata as to the issue of
       the true agreement between the parties.
    No. There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered
       and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
       of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second
       action. Palumbarit vs CA 772 SCRA 244
   113.         Provincial Prosectutor downgraded the charges against Alandoni, Anwar and Balindong and
       dropped the charges against Amar and Ali. Zenaida, the widow of the victim filed a petition for review
       questioning the provincial prosecutor’s resolution before DOJ. Cuevas modified the resolution and
       instructed filing of 2 frustrated murder with attempted murder, 2 for frustrated murder and attempted
       murder. MR was filed – denied. 2nd MR was filed to new Secretary – Tuquero- denied. 3rd MR to Perez
       – granted. Zenaida filed MR – denied. Hence, appealed to CA thru certiorari. CA set aside Perez
       Resolution and affirmed previous resolutions issued by previous secretary.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 43
       RTC QC found PC. Accused filed a Motion to Re-Determine the existence or Non-Existence of PC which
       may even warrant dismissal – Even to the appropriate charges of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted
       Homicides. Judge failed to issue Alias Warrant hence, Zenaida moved for inhibition of the Judge. Lee
       granted the motion of the accused and voluntarily inhibited. After re-raffle, the new judge (Baclig)
       denied the MR filed by the accused and vacated the order made by Judge Lee and set the arraignment.
       Accused filed motion for inhibition of Judge Baclig but was denied.
       Because of this events, OSG filed a special civil action for certiorari to CA questioning the order of judge
       Lee granting the re-evaluation and the order of judge Baclig denying the re-evaluation. CA found Judge
       Lee and Balindong guilty of indirect contempt. Is there a merit to contempt Judge Balut when it
       deferred enforcement of arrest due to pending MR on the ground of judicial courtesy
      None. SC dismissed the contempt charge. A disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its
       authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts
       orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
       into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. The act of issuing the
       warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implied that the judge has
       determined the existence of probable cause for the offenses charged. Contempt of court is a defiance of
       the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
       administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their
       witnesses during litigation. Balindong vs CA 773 SCRA 27
   114.          With the death of 2 BOT, La Salle entered a MOA with SFS for supervision. La Salle appointed
       supervisors to sit in BOT without voting rights. Bro. Oca stepped in and was appointed as Chairman
       and President of SFS. Bro Magbanua was elected as Treasurer. Later, there was a disagreement as to
       the administrative structure. Bro Oca and Bro Magbanua wanted to expand the supervisory matters to
       include finances, admin, and operations which was opposed by Custodio. Custodio filed a case with
       RTC praying for TRO to enjoin Bro Oca from calling a special membership meeting to remove her as
       BOT. RTC appointed the cashier Ms. Reynante as authorized to collect and her as authorized to pay. An
       order was issued directing turnover of matriculation funds. In a comment filed by custodia, she averred
       that there are still funds not turned over. Hence, court issued another order directing turnover of the
       funds still in their possession. However, the parties failed to comply to turn over the funds with
       Custodio and Reynante. Hence, Custodio filed a contempt case. Defendants aver that they wanted
       clarification as to the use of the funds because it is reserved for the retirement of teachers. In their
       defense, the comment filed by Custodio should have been set for hearing but this did not materialize
       hence they were denied of due process. RTC found defendants guilty of contempt for failure to adhere
       to court orders. Is the verdict proper?
    Yes. This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect
       contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the RTC’s Orders. Oca vs
       Custodio, 832 SCRA 2017
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 44
 Direct contempt consists of “misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before it.”—
 Direct contempt consists of “misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before it.”
 It includes:
       1. disrespect to the court,
       2. offensive behavior against others,
       3. Refusal, despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition.
 It can be punished summarily without a hearing.
 Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71, Section 3 of the ROC:
      a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her] official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;
      b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after
            being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
            enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
            or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
      c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
            under Section 1 of this Rule;
      d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
      e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
      f)    Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
      g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a
            court held by him [or her].
    116.          A case for settlement of the estate of Felicisimo who died in Muntinlupa but an incumbent
        official of Laguna. Petition for LOA before the RTC of Makati City. Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children
        of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a MTD on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
        COA. Decide.
     Denied. Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the ROC, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
        should be filed in the RTC of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” For purpose of
        fixing venue under the ROC, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
        actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
        provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.—It is incorrect for petitioners to argue
        that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
        synonymous with “domicile.” San Luis vs San Luis
    117.         Joaquin Agtarap died intestate in Pasay without any known debts or obligations. During his
        lifetime, he contracted 2 marriages and left 2 lands in Pasay. Joseph, a grandson, put the lot to lease
        and improvements and had been appropriating for himself P26, 000.00 per month since April 1994.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                              Page | 45
       Eduardo asked to be appointed as administrator which was granted. Other heirs opposed and alleged
       that the lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia (1st marriage), and that, upon
       Lucia’s death, they became the pro indiviso owners of the properties. RTC ordered Partition which was
       appealed to CA questioning the RTC power and authority to determine questions of ownership. Decide.
      Granted. As held in several cases, a court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
       intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
       are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but
       by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. However, this general rule is subject to
       exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the court may provisionally pass upon in
       an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
       piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.
       Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
       advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the court and the rights of
       third parties are not impaired, then the court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
       jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate,
       such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
       conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. Agtarap vs Agtarap
   118.          Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate on 4 June 1990, survived by her spouse, Federico and
       5 GC: 3 LGC, including respondent Isabel; and 2 ILGC, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s
       and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I) who predeceased. In 1965, the marriage between
       Emilio I and Isabel Cojuancgo was declared null and void. The illegitimate children grew up with
       Grandparents Federico and Cristina. The legitimates were raised by their mother, Isabel Cojuangco.
       After Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his 2 ILGC. Isabel filed for an application for LOA. Federico
       opposed in that he is the nearest of kin and the application did not include the 2 ILGC as heirs. Upon
       his death, Emilio III was appointed as administrator. On appeal, the appointment was revoked and
       Isabel was appointed administrator. Later, both were appointed as co-administrator. Both filed MR.
       Who has better qualification?
    Partially Granted. Letter of Administration is issued solely to Isabel. In this case, Emilio III failed to
       provide for a complete inventory of the properties as required by the court. He likewise committed
       fraud in transferring the properties to different names. With this, the court sees that Isabel Emilio III
       is unfit to administer the estate. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
       over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.― Sec. 6, Rule 78
       takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the
       estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
       economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
       improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer
       the estate correctly. Suntay III vs Cojuangco-Suntay
   119.         Rafael and Jose Ortaez were appointed as joint special administrators of their father’s estate.
       They submitted an inventory which included shares of stock in Philinterlife. During its pendency, the
       decedent’s wife claiming that she owned some shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold
       said shares in favor of FLAG. Special Administrator Jose Ortaez acting in his personal capacity also sold
       the remaining shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate in favor of FLAG. After being
       appointed as Special Administratix, private respondent Enderes filed a motion to declare void ab initio
       the DOAS of Philinterlife shares of stock. Did the intestate court committed a grave abuse of discretion
       amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction in declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the
       Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void.
    NO. The jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or
       prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
       disposition of estate property can be annulled by the court, there being no need for a separate action
       to annul the unauthorized disposition. In a prevailing jurisprudence, an heir can only alienate such
       portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate
       court after final adjudication. LEE VS RTC OF QC
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 46
   120.         May the intestate court execute an order nullifying the invalid sale?
    YES. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized
       sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of
       estate property would be meaningless. Enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or courts
       power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property
       before final adjudication. LEE VS RTC OF QC
   121.         Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming his only son, Edmond, his adopted
       daughter, Maria, and his 3 GC, all children of Edmond. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial
       cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
       After his death, Edmond did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will. After 4
       years, Maria filed probate and approval of the will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
       Edmond. Court ordered deposit of the rentals from one of the properties to which he complied. Later,
       court admitted the will and ordered the issuance of LT to Edmond upon the filing of a bond. Edmond
       Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds - rent payments. Maria opposed and
       prayed for the release of the rent to 3GC and for the distribution of the testator's properties. Court
       ordered the release of the rent to the 3 GC and delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties.
       May the court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
       obligations, has the authority:
           (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
                grandchildren;
           (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and
           (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
      No authority. Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised ROC expressly states "children" of the deceased which
       excludes the latter's grandchildren. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law
       in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
       partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or
       gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. Grandchildren
       are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate.
      No authority. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
       made:
           1. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
              estate tax have been paid; or
           2. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
              sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as
              the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
       Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
       appraised.
      No. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust
       funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot
       unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
       submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a
       true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and
       estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
       justness. Heirs of Hilario Ruiz vs Edmond Ruiz
   122.        Efraim (deceased) loaned from First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) for the payment
       of Agricultural Tractors. Efraim died, leaving a holographic will which was probated. Edmund was
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 47
       appointed as the special administrator of the estate. In the meantime, FCCC assigned all its assets and
       liabilities to Union Bank. Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but he refused to pay.
       Thus, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim. Is the action proper?
      NO, it is the probate court that has jurisdiction. Well-settled is the rule that a court has the
       jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
       should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is
       primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. The filing of a
       money claim against the decedent’s estate in the court is mandatory. Union Bank vs Santibanez
   123.         Eliseo – father, Lourdes– common law wife, Elise – daughter. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise
       represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for LOA in RTC to preserve the estate of Eliseo and
       to prevent the dissipation of its value and prayed for appointment as Administratix. Amelia (legal wife),
       together with her 2 children opposed on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a
       resident of Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. Moreover, there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to
       be appointed Administratix of Eliseo’s estate. RTC issued LOA to Elise upon posting the necessary
       bond. CA affirmed. For purposes of fixing the venue the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. Is
       venue proper? Is Elise qualified?
       YES. Under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the ROC, the petition for LOA of the estate of a decedent should be filed
       in the RTC of the province where the decedent ACTUALLY resides at the time of his death. Elise, as a
       compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an
       interested party. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her
       legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
       estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within
       the purview of the law. Garcia-Quiazon vs Belen
   124.          Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. The heirs of
       Maximino filed a complaint against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of
       possession of real property alleging that Donata, as administratrix of the estate, through fraud and
       misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
       registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. The heirs of
       Donata as a defense alleged prescription. Accordingly, the heirs of Maximino knew his death and even
       attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from death
       before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for LOA. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino
       was already settled in a special proceeding, they waited another two years, before instituting a
       complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate of
       Maximino. Decide.
    Denied. Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents’
       conduct before this Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues,
       respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason
       or justification for such delay. It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and
       diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches,
       indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the
       courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
       It is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied trust as opposed to an express trust is subject to
       prescription and laches. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance of real property based on
       implied trust prescribes 10 years from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property. The rule
       on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at
       bar. —In this case Donata had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly
       or impliedly. An action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be brought within four years
       from the discovery of the fraud. PILAPIL VS HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES
   125.        A case for ejectment was filed. During this time, Sabidong is a COC II of the Court. During the
       pendency of the case, Sabidong goffered to buy the lot in case the parties to the case refused to buy it
       as they are preferred for being the first occupant. Later, the occupants refuse to buy the lot hence
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 48
         Sabidong purchased it with court approval. Years later, the new EJ received a complaint alleging that
         Sabidong is not qualified to buy the property because he is a court employee. He was awarded a
         forfeiture of salary for 6 months, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits. Is the award
         proper?
        NO.Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from
         acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rule is
         that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
         proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. ―Court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
         administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
         entitled to receive the same. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must
         take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired
         after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
         In this case, when Sabidong purchased the lot, the case has been long decided. Sabidong vs Solas
 The approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
 were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings. The final judgment rule embodied
 in the first paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 41, ROC, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final
 orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
 Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course.
 Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
 determined at various stages of the special proceedings.— Sec. 1, Rule 109 of the ROC enumerates the specific instances in which multiple
 appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz.: Sec. 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken.
 An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
 and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
 (a) Allows or disallows a will;
 (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
 (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the
      estate in offset to a claim against it;
 (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
 (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or
      guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
      the appointment of a special administrator; and
 (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order
      granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
    126.         Emigdio died intestate, survived by his 2nd wife - Teresita, and 5 children; and his 2 children
        by his 1st marriage: Franklin and Thelma. During his lifetime, he assigned his real properties in
        exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir
        Realty. Thelma filed a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator which was
        granted– LOA was issued. Teresita submitted an inventory. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other
        properties that were excluded, Thelma asked RTC to direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
        examined. Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita
        on the inventory. RTC issued order finding and holding that the inventory had excluded properties that
        should be included. Teresita, joined by other heirs, sought reconsideration on the ground that one of
        the real properties affected had already been sold to Mervir Realty. CA reversed the RTC decision
        insofar as the inclusion of land at Cebu and the various land in the revised inventory. Did RTC
        committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
        notwithstanding that such had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for shares by the decedent
        during his lifetime?
     No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
        erroneous. The court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of
        their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
        determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or
        the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
        by the court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
        incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
        the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
        property of the deceased spouse. Aranas vs Mercado
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                 Page | 49
    127.         Pedro died intestate. Heirs of his first wife allege that their co-heirs from the second marriage
        sold the properties to the Sps., Francisco and Maria without their knowledge and consent. Upon
        inquiry, RD of Nasugbu had no record of any sale. A notice of an extrajudicial settlement was published.
        Because of this, respondents caused the annotation of their adverse claims and filed their complaint
        praying for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and
        certificates of title issued to Sps. Francisco and Maria. They denied the allegation for lack of knowledge
        and for being a buyer in good faith. RTC nullified the transfer due to irregularities. Sps., Francisco and
        Maria filed MR raising RTC's lack of jurisdiction alleging that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition
        with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of estate.
        Hence, Court should have acted by appointing an administrator for the settlement of estate and not to
        rule on the action for partition. Decide.
     Deny. Sps Francisco and Maria is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action
        pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and
        extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete
        reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations
        therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title
        and recovery of possession. The general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
        name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to
        furnish the bond required by the ROC, then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially administered and the
        competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the
        ROC. —Except: Sec. 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from
        his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without
        submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator
        by the court. Butiong vs Plazo G.R. No. 187524. August 5, 2015.
    129.         Eusebio sold a land to Eliseo during the 5-year prohibitory period (violating Sec. 118 of the
        Public Land Act). Eusebio died. Norberta and her children filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and
        Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo and the RD. Is the sale of an agricultural land by a free patent
        during the 5-year prohibited period result to its automatic reversion as part of the public domain?
     The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during the five-year prohibitory period
        under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under
        Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act is not automatic. OSG must first file an action for reversion. The purpose
        of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed to private individuals or
        corporations to the mass of public domain. The five (5)-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained
        under homestead or free patent is provided under Sec. 118 of the Public Land Act (PLA).— Except in favor
        of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking
        corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
        encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of 5 years
        from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
        satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or
        crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
        Maltos vs Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 50
 Note:
 Sec. 29 of the Public Land Act is an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic (meaning, reversion can be automatic).
 Sec. 29 provides:
 After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey
 or encumber his rights to any person, corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act to purchase agricultural public lands,
 provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any right or interest of the Government in the land: And provided, further,
 That the transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due and payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the
 previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the
 acquisition and reverting the property and all rights to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the
 Government shall be forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire agricultural public lands
 under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the necessary qualifications.
    130.         Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment of the Free Patents, CTC and Damages against
        Narcise, et al., DENR and RD of Bataan alleging that he is the possessor of the subject lots in an actual,
        peaceful, adverse and peaceful possession. From 1977 until 1999, OCT, FP and TCT covering the lots
        in question were issued for petitioners. Is the instant case actually a reversion case?
     No, annulment of title is the proper remedy. An action for reversion, a remedy provided under
        Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the
        original certificate of title, including the transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest
        because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation.
         An action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks for the cancellation and
         nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert the
         property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity arises not from fraud or
         deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow
         title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
         The action is one of annulment of patents and titles. The allegations in the complaint show that
         respondent asserts its ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive
         prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by possessor through
         the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an
         owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. The possession contemplated as foundation for
         prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in prescription. Narcise vs Valbueci
         Inc 831 SCRA 319 July 2917
Note:
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in
possession of the property subject of the fraudulent acts. (Lausa vs. Quilaton, 767 SCRA 399 [2015]
The Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State in sales of real estate
to aliens incapable of holding title thereto. (Ang vs. Estate of Sy So, 799 SCRA 266 [2016])
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                              Page | 51
   132.              Carmen Cañiza, a retired pharmacist was declared incompetent and her niece, Amparo
       was appointed as her legal guardian. Sometime, her guardian commenced an ejectment suit against
       Sps.Pedro. MeTC favored the guardian. May a legal guardian bring action for ejectment in behalf of the
       ward? Can this representation be continued despite death of the ward?
    Amparo had authority. Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian
       of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen. By that appointment, it became Evangelista's
       duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal.
    Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza. While it is indeed well-established rule that the
       relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
       ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the
       latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon. Cañiza vs CA
   133.          Neri had 7 children: 2 from her 1st marriage with Gonzalo (Eutropia and Victoria) and 5 from
       her 2nd marriage with Enrique (Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa). Neri died intestate.
       Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas,
       together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
       DOAS, adjudicating themselves the properties, and conveyed them to the Sps. Hadji. The children of
       Gonzalo filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said properties against Sps. Hadji before the RTC,
       assailing validity for having been sold within the prohibited period. Is the extrajudicial settlement of
       the estate is valid?
    No. Execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of Sps.
       Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were
       admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein,
       the settlement was not valid and binding upon them. Neri vs Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy
   134.         Nilo Oropesa’s, petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, Cirilo Oropesa. A
       petition (guardianship) for Cirilo praying Nilo and Ms. Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the
       property of their father on grounds of old age and impaired memory. Nilo filed his Opposition and
       presented his evidence – his self, his sister, and a former nurse’s testimony but failed to file his written
       formal offer of evidence. May Nilo be considered incompetent and if he is, who should be appointed as
       his guardian?
    No.The only medical document on record is the Report of Neuropsychological Screening. Said report,
       was ambivalent at best, although had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of
       respondent, it also contained finding that supported the view that respondent on the average was
       indeed competent. Sec. 2, Rule 92 of the ROC tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by
       reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and
       their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
       guardianship. Sec. 2. “Incompetent.” includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who
       are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of
       unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by
       reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
       themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
       Oropesa vs Oropesa
   135.         Eduardo filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura with RTC
       and alleged that he is Maura's nephew. Leonardo opposed the Appointment alleging that he is also a
       nephew and that he was not notified of the pendency of the petition. Biason prayed that he be
       appointed since he was previously granted by the latter with a SPA. RTC appointed Biason. Pending
       the resolution of the instant petition to SC, Biason died. May guardianship still be awarde despite
       demise of Maura?
    No, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-
       established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of
       either the guardian or the ward. Abad vs Biason
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 52
RULE 98: Trustees
 Under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods
 covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in
 accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.—There are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is covered by the
 provision that refers to money under the obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The second is
 covered by the provision referring to merchandise received under the obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner.
 In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the alternative—the return of the proceeds of the sale or
 the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed.
 Elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Sec. 13 of the Trust Receipts Law.—In
 order that the respondents “may be validly prosecuted for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
 with Sec. 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the following elements must be established:
      a) they received the subject goods in trust or under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to [the
            trustor], or to return the goods if not sold;
      b) they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale;
      c) they performed such acts with abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank; and
      d) Demand was made on them by [the trustor] for the remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold goods.”
    136.          Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) executed in favor of Landbank trust
        receipts to secure the purchase of construction materials. When the trust receipts matured, ACDC
        failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction materials subject
        of the trust receipts. After several demands went unheeded, LBP filed a complaint for Estafa or
        violation of Art. 315, par 1(b) of the RPC, in relation to PD 115, against the respondent officers of ACDC.
        WON the disputed transaction is a trust receipt or a loan?
     TRUST RECEIPT. There are two (2) obligations in a trust receipt transaction:
             a) Covered by the provision that refers to money under the obligation to deliver it (entregarla)
                  to the owner of the merchandise sold.
             b) Covered by the provision referring to merchandise received under the obligation to return it
                  (devolvera) to the owner.
          The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction materials to a construction
          site of two government projects, as well as unspecified construction materials. As a government
          financial institution, LBP should have been aware that the materials were to be used for the
          construction of an immovable property, the ownership of whatever was constructed with those
          materials would presumably belong to the owner of the land, under Article 445 of the Civil Code. In
          contrast with the present situation, it is fundamental in a trust receipt transaction that the person who
          advanced payment for the merchandise becomes the absolute owner of said merchandise and
          continues as owner until he or she is paid in full, or if the goods had already been sold, the proceeds
          should be turned over to him or her. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Perez
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                     Page | 53
       adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her
       spouse. The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or
       older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552). Castro vs Gregorio
   138.         Herbert and his wife begot three children. Later, Anna learned of an alleged extra marital affair
       of her husband. Hence, Anna filed for a legal separation. Granted and ordered support. Herbert left for
       USA. He filed a divorce against Anna. US court awarded the custody of the children to Anna and ordered
       Herbert to send monthly support and remarried thereby acquiring US citizenship. Not long after, he
       divorced anew. Clavano, Anna’s brother and sister-in-law, filed for an adoption case in Cebu. Annexed
       an affidavit of consent of the eldest child, Keith (14 y/o), and of the mother Anna. Accordingly, the
       father had already abandoned the kids and since she will be leaving for US to work, the care and
       custody of the children will be best left to the Clavanos. Herbert opposed. Pending the adoption case,
       custody of the children were awarded to Herbert. Adoption was granted. CA affirmed. Should the
       consent of the father necessary in the adoption of the three children and if there is an abandonment
    Yes, consent is necessary. Written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
       requisite for its validity. This can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such
       parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. In this case, Herbert substantially proved that he did not
       abandon his children. Cang vs CA
   139.          Surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
       the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and
       the deceased. Legally-adopted son of Alfredo presented an Order granting the petition for adoption
       filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. May the decree of adoption be admitted to seek
       appointment?
    No. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This
       Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is
       a sham. Vda De Jacob vs CA
   140.         Sps. Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed a petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, 15 years
       old, who had been living with Jaime since he was 7 years old. OSG opposed the petition insofar as it
       sought the correction of the name of the child from Midael to Michael. He argued that although the
       correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the
       petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108
       of the ROC. May a petition for adoption include a correction of an entry?
    Yes BUT publication is mandatory. The local civil registrar must be impleaded as an indispensable
       party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. Republic vs CA
   141.         Eugenio owner of a land adjudicated by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs
       following the death of his parents. A case was filed to DARAB for annulment of contract by Leonida
       alleging that they are the legal heirs of Godofredo, who was the lawful and registered tenant of
       Eugenio. Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship exist. Godofredo’s occupation was based on the
       former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. PARAD favored Leonida. Moreover, the status of
       Leonida was collaterally attacked due to infirmities of her adoption. Can there be collateral attack in
       this case?
    No. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
       action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
       legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335). In Braza v. City Civil Registrar
       of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
       only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. Reyes vs
       Mauricio
   142.        Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor IC Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
       praying that the middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
       surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. The trial court denied the petitioner's request as
       there was no law that allowed an adopted child to use the surname of the child's biological mother as
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 54
       the child's middle name. The petitioner argued that adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
       adopted child, hence the child's right to bear a proper name should not be violated. In addition,
       permitting the child to use her mother's surname as her middle name avoids the stigma of her
       illegitimacy. May an IC use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
       adopted by her natural father.
      Yes. The Court held that there is no law expressly prohibiting the child to use the surname of her
       natural mother as her middle name and what is not prohibited by law, is allowed. It is customary for
       every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. While not set out
       in law this custom has been recognized during the lawmaking process. In fact, the Family Law
       Committees had agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
       surname of the father. In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga-Garcia
   143.         Monina Lim married Primo Lim. They were childless. Lucia Ayuban entrusted them 2 minor
       child whose parents were unknown. Lim registered the child to make it appear that they were the
       parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Upon
       death of Lim, Monina married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen. Monina decided to adopt the
       children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals
       who simulated the birth of a child. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was
       25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Should the
       adoption be joint?
    NO. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
       remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no
       other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. The law is
       clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
       adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. In Re: Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim
   144.         Nery engage in the services of Atty. Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her
       adoption by an alien adopter. This was granted. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an
       aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana in
       installment and did not ask for receipts. Later, Nery inquired about the status of the petition for
       adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. IBP found Sampana guilty
       of malpractice. May Nery can be legally adopted.
    NO. There was no proof that the adoption may be granted for under the Rules on Adoption A.M no. 2-
       06-02 SC under Sec 5 (Domestic Adoption) and Sec 29 (Inter-country Adoption), petitioner does not
       in any of those that are enumerated by the law. There was no valid proof or evidence to justify the
       adoption proceedings. The alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of
       consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to
       adopt is waived. —Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
       adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her
       Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived. Nery vs Sampana
   145.         John is a legally adopted child of Cornelio (Great Grandfather). Cornelio died when John was
       only Four (4) years of age. When John was already independent, he was employed as an electrician
       (Seaman) of Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
       Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel Maersk Danville
       while it was in Brazil. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried (Single). Thus,
       petitioner Bernardina, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
       for death benefits. SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as
       the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies
       as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Is the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority
       results to the AUTOMATIC restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter?
    Yes. It is automatic. Biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who
       was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do
       not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession
       at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 55
        right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of
        the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of
        parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
        Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
        benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent, given Cornelio’s untimely demise during
        John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
        Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining
        beneficiary. Bartolome vs SSS
    147.          Atty. Serapio was charged with plunder together with Former President Estrada and Jinggoy.
        He is a member of the BOT and legal counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received,
        on behalf of the said foundation, millions of pesos coming from illegal activities. Ombudsman
        recommended the filing of a case against him. Warrant was issued. Upon learning of the said warrant
        he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and filed an Urgent Motion for Bail but is opposed by the
        prosecution alleging that he should be arraigned first. The bail hearing was reset several times due to
        various pleadings filed by petitioner and the prosecution. Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for
        habeas corpus; the prosecution launched an endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to
        prevent the conduct of the bail hearings; and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of
        his guilt. Should the petition habeas corpus should be granted?
     No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. General rule applies. “Petition for
        habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be availed of
        where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter
        has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The
        proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and
        to allow hearings thereon to proceed.”
     The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A
        person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional
        liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right
        but is discretionary upon the court. Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for
        an application for bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Sec. 8. In exceptional
        circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained
        pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender; Writ issued where the deprivation of liberty while
        initially valid under the law had later become invalid.—As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will
        not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process
        issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. For this writ of liberty is recognized as “the
        fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 56
       action” due to “its ability to cut through the barriers of form and procedural mazes.” Serapio vs
       Sandiganbayan
   148.          Estrada was arrested by virtue of a warrant in connection with the criminal case for plunder.
       Several hundreds of policemen were deployed to effect his arrest. Supporters of Estrada hold camp
       outside his residence to prevent his arrest. Meanwhile, PGMA, was faced with "angry and violent mob
       armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting
       and attempting to break into Malacañang. PGMA declared that there was a state of rebellion.
       Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were effected.
       Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests several petitions were made. Can there be a valid legal arrest
       without warrant when there exist a declaration of "state of rebellion" by the President?
    Petitions were dismissed. PGMA upon lifting the order made the case moot and academic. In quelling
       or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
       suspected of rebellion, as provided under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the ROC, if the circumstances so warrant.
       The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of
       rebellion." Resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition not justified since an
       individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
       — Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the ROC, where he
       may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine
       WON he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Mandamus will not
       issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award. Lacson vs Perez
                 149.     Anisah filed petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of
       Lovely who was detained in the Cebu City Jail for violation of Sec. 5, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
       9165. PDEA planned an entrapment operation leading to the arrest of Adam. Inquest prosecutor
       recommended the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor. An information
       was filed against Adam. On review, DOJ Secretary found no probable cause due to absent of payment.
       Is the arrests valid?
      No, the arrest is not valid. In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order
       of the trial judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore, the petition has become moot. The singular function
       of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.— A writ of
       habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of
       his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its
       essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person
       from it if such restraint is illegal. Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu
   150.          Anita Mangila and 4 other were charged with syndicated estafa as well as violations of
       Republic Act 8042 for illegal recruitment. After PI, judge ordered the arrest without bail, and the
       records transmitted to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings. Averring that Judge had no
       authority to conduct PI, and the issuance of the warrant was without any justification or probable
       cause, Mangila filed a petition for habeas corpus. She argues that habeas corpus is available to her as
       she had no adequate remedy in law since the records of the case were already forwarded to the Office
       of the City Prosecutor who had no authority to recall the warrant of arrest. Decide.
    Dismiss the HC case. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when
       instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order
       that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus
       does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged
       to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and
       the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the
       custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner
       fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias. Sec. 4, Rule 102 of the ROC explicitly
       states that if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
       officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
       and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
       order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 57
       shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
       Mangila vs Pangilinan
   151.         Raquel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and demanded immediate issuance of the
       special writ, directing Ma. Hazelina to produce before the court her biological daughter, minor Criselda,
       and to return her the custody. This was issued. However, the sheriff was unsuccessful in personally
       serving the petitioner copies of the petition. Sheriff left copies at her Caloocan residence, as witnessed
       by her counsel and barangay officials. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear. Later, petitioner filed
       for guardianship over the child which was dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. A criminal case
       of kidnapping against the petitioner was filed. Petitioner moved quashal and prayed for the dismissal
       for lack of jurisdiction over her person for not personally served with summons. Rule on the MTD.
    Denied. RTC acquired jurisdiction. Service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it
       under Rule 102 of the ROC or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat
       comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires
       jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. Sec. 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the
       ROC requires that the HC must be filed with the Family Court and enforceable within its judicial region
       to which the Family Court belongs. Petition was filed before the family court of Caloocan City. Since
       Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-
       Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Tujan-Militante vs Cada Deapera
   152.          Datukan went to Saudi Arabia. He learned that police officers in Maguindanao suspected him
       to be Butukan, one of the accused of 57 counts of murder. He went to the police station to clear himself.
       He presented his passport, airline boarding passes and other documents to prove his absence from the
       country during the incident. Police destroyed his passport, arrested him and detained him. A petition
       for HC was filed. RTC released him. CA reversed the decision stating that the proper remedy is quashal
       of information. Decide.
    The return of the writ may be held by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the court
       issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
       proceed to decide the petition and determine the merits. The decision is appealable to the court that
       has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the lower court. If the accused avails himself or herself
       of a motion to quash, the accused “hypothetically admits the facts alleged in the information.” If the
       motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
       amendment, the court shall order the amendment of the complaint or information. If the motion to quash
       is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an offense,
       the trial court shall give the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. Datukan
       Malang Salibo vs The Warden
   153.         DU30 issued Proclamation 216 declaring martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas
       corpus in Mindanao on the ground of rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII,
       Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution. Is it mandatory for Congress to convene and vote jointly to approve
       and for the Proclamation to be valid?
    No. Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to
       revoke the President's declaration or suspension. Congress is only required to vote jointly to revoke
       the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
       corpus. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person arrested or detained shall be
       judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released. Padilla vs Congress of the Philippines
       832 SCRA (July 2017)
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 58
Republic Act No. 10172 – Amending RA 9048
Republic Act No. 10172 IRR - ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2012
    154.          Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition with RTC to correct some entries in the birth certificate
        of her son, Charles Christian – surname (Borbon to Eleosida), date of wedding to be blank. No
        opposition was made to this petition. RTC dismissed it on the basis that only clerical errors (CLERICAL
        ERRORS) of a harmless and innocuous nature like misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc. may
        be subject of judicial order authorizing changes or corrections and not as may affect the civil status,
        nationality or citizenship of the person (substantial/material change/error) involved. Is the dismissal
        proper?
     No, Rule 108 of the Revised ROC provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
        civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
        correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
        summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
        substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. (Note: CLERICAL -SUMMARY;
        SUBSTANTIAL- ADVERSARIAL) If all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 (Notice and
        publication) (Note: Adversarial) have been followed, it was therefore error for the trial court to dismiss
        the petition motu propio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition
        (and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same). Even substantial
        errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the
        parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.—Rule 108 of
        the Revised ROC provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
        Substantial changes are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with the ruling in Republic vs.
        Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. Eleosida vs Civil
        Registrar of QC
    155.         Carlito Kho and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth certificate.
        Carlito petitioned for 1) change of citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”; 2) delete
        “John” from his name; 3) delete the word “married” opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The
        last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael,
        Mercy, Nona and Heddy Moira. The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised
        on RA 9048, which allows first name and nickname in the birth certificates without judicial order. The
        Municipal officer approved the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground
        that the correction is not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The CA favored with
        Kho. Is CA correct?
     Denied. The petition is adversarial. It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to
        change the citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the “married”
        status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’ respective birth certificates, as well as change the date
        of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and
        innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments. For the
        change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and
        important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the
        parents, but also of the offspring. Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’
        parents were “married” alters their filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” with significant
        implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in
        an adversary proceeding. Republic vs Kho
 Grounds Held Valid for a Change of Name. — Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
 (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
 (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
 (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
 (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
 (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
 (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
 the change of name would prejudice public interest.
    156.       Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna, filed a petition for
        change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry to drop his middle name and have his
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                            Page | 59
       registered name changed to Julian Lin Wang as they plan to stay long in Singapore wherein middle
       names are not carried, they anticipate that he will be discriminated because of his current registered
       name. Julian and his sister might also be asked whether they are brother and sister since they have
       different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have
       the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." RTC – denied the petition. Are the grounds
       mentioned meritorious to grant the petition?
      No, State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification,
       and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
       change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
       reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
       should be denied. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
       or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
       name. The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
       Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lim Carulasan
   157.          Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Braza were and had 3 children. Pablo died in an accident. During
       the wake, Lucille introduced Ma. Cristina and Pablo’s alleged child, the minor Patrick Alvin Titular
       Braza. To confirm the truth, she obtained a copy of Patrick’s birth certificate and a copy of marriage
       contract of Lucille and Pablo. She found out that indeed there exist such document. Hence, Ma.Cristina
       and her 3 children filed a petition to the RTC to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the
       Local Register as Patrick could not have been legitimated due to the marriage between Lucille and
       Pablo. RTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It held that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
       the court is not acting as a Family Court; and thus, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
       marriage between Lucille and Pablo, impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, or order the DNA testing. Said
       controversies must be done in an ordinary adversarial action. Is the RTC correct?
    Yes. In Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
       jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Doctrinally, validity of marriages
       as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
       party, and not through collateral attack; An action seeking the declaration of marriage as void for being
       bigamous and one impugning a child’s legitimacy are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
       SC and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, and the petition should be filed in a Family Court. Braza
       vs Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
   158.          May a petition for change of name be granted as a result of body transformation due to
       sex reassignment?
    No, sex reassignment cannot be considered as ground for change of name and sex in the civil registry.
       A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change
       of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s
       first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
       public interest. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
       appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to
       sex in the civil registry for that reason. Republic vs Silverio
REPUBLIC vs CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.*
   159.          May a person suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) petition for change of
       name and gender? May filing a petition for change of name can be granted without impleading the local
       civil registrar?
    Yes. SC considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
       variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The SC made use of the available evidence
       presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the
       statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones
       (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.” Republic vs
       Cagandahan
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 60
   160.          A Petition for Correction of Entry was filed where it was only the Local Civil Registrar of
       Gingoog City was impleaded. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the IC of Sy Ton
       and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact
       she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her
       school records, Professional Regulation Commission Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport bear
       the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an IC considering that her parents were
       never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino
       citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. However,
       NSO records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC. Is the petition meritorious?
    Denied. The changes are substantial. Respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the
       Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected
       by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make. The fact that the notice of hearing was
       published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not
       change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sec. 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the ROC shows that
       the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named
       in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless
       may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
       purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and
       due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
       Republic vs Uy
   161.         Fujiki, a Japanese national married Marinay, a Filipina. However, Fujiki’s parents did not allow
       Marinay to go to Japan. Eventually, they lost contact. Marinay then met Maekara, Japanese, and married
       Marinay. However, Marinay suffered physical abuse from Maekara so she left him and reconnected
       with Fujiki. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
       marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a petition in the
       RTC for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). May a
       husband or wife of a prior marriage file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
       subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy? If so,
       may RTC take recognizance of such decision?
    Yes. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
       made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
       108 of the ROC. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
       judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
       judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. RTC can recognize the foreign judgment
       under Rule 108. Petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
       for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
       substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
       other related laws. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
       registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
       parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Fujiki vs Marinay
   162.         OLAYBAR, discovered that she was already married to Sune, a Korean, on June 24, 2002, at the
       MTCC. She denied having contracted the marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
       husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
       marriage certificate is not hers. OLAYBAR filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
       Contract. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar, as well as her alleged husband. During trial,
       OLAYBAR testified that: She was then in Makati working as a medrep. She denied having known the
       supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she
       had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. Her name was used
       by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in
       order for her to obtain a passport. Is Correction of Entries under R108 applicable in this case?
    NO. Rule 108 of the ROC provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
       registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. In this case, the entries made in the
       wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of OLAYBAR. A
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 61
       petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
       invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
       procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
       laws. People vs Olaybar
   163.         A petition for correction of entries in his BC filed in RTC with CR as sole respondent. He alleged
       that he is IC of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated
       that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and
       that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that: Date and place of marriage of his parents - December
       23, 1983/ Bicol to not married; First name of his mother - Tely to Matilde; and His first name - Franc
       Ler to Francler. RTC ruled that first name and his mother’s first name can be done in the civil registrar.
       The marriage status correction is a substantial issue requiring adversarial proceeding. Is the ruling
       proper?
    Yes. Sec. 1 of R.A. No.9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected
       and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial
       order. Substantial correction that will affect legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
       illegitimate one is adversarial. Onde vs Civil Registrar of Las Pinas
   164.           Petitioner used the surname Almojuela over the past 60 years. However, upon request of BC
       from BSO, he was surprised that he was registered as “Felipe Condeno,” instead of “Felipe Almojuela.”
       Thus, he filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in his NSO birth certificate before the RTC. He was born
       in Catanduanes and is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor,
       and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased who were not married. Said surname was used
       in all of his official and legal documents. OSG opposed due to defective publication and contending that
       the caption or title of a petition for change of name should state: (a) the alias or other name of
       petitioner; (b) the name he seeks to adopt; and (c) the cause for the change of name. CA reversed and
       set aside RTC Decision for failure to strictly comply with the requirements when he omitted to implead
       the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings, who stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for,
       as parties. Is CA correct?
    Yes for failure to strictly comply with notice and impleading indispensable parties RTC has no
       jurisdiction. A reading of Sec. 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential
       oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons who are
       not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties i.e. the local
       civil registrar. Change of family name in the birth certificate of Felipe C. Almojuela as appearing in the
       records of NSO
   165.         Emelita Basilio Gan was born out of wedlock to Pia and Basilio. Her registered name in NSO is
       Emelita Basilio. A petiton to change the full name indicated in her BC from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita
       Basilio Gan.” Claimed that she had been using the name in her records. RTC ordered petitioner to
       amend the petition in lie with Rule 108. OSG filed notice of appearance and authorized the Office of the
       Provincial Prosecutor to appear and assist in the proceedings. RTC granted the petition. OSG opposed
       for failed to adduce evidence that she was duly recognized by her father, which would have allowed
       her to use the surname of her father.CA reversed and set aside the RTC Order. May an IC may use his
       fathers name without proof of recognition or acknowledgement of filiation?
    No. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause must exist
       before a person may be authorized to change his name. Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not
       give to an illegitimate child or a natural child not acknowledged by the father the option to use the
       surname of the father. Republic vs Gan
Prerogative Writs
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 62
 Sec. 6 of the Rule of the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of
 a writ of habeas data.—Sec. 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
 petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data: “
             a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
             b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
                  aggrieved party;
             c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
             d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
                  control of the data or information, if known;
             e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
                  information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the
                  act complained of; and
             f)   Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.”
    166.          Sps. Sanson filed with MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
        issuance of a WPMI against the Daniel Masangkay Tapuz et. al. over a land at Aklan. That the threats to
        the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private
        respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police
        authorities owing to their financial and political clout. Is a petition of Habeas Corpus and Writ of
        Amparo proper?
     No for both petitions for writ of amparo and habeas data.
        Writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
        and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
        these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty
        or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
        Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminary satisfied
        with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail
        the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the aggrieved party was or is being
        committed. The writ of amparo should not issue when applied for as substitute for the appeal or certiorari
        process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes. When recourses in the ordinary
        course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures,
        neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo—extraordinary though they may be—will suffice to
        serve as a curative substitute. Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of
        separate actions, for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, and for the consolidation of petitions
        for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.
         Allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires rendering the petition fatally
         deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
         privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
         demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has
         already set forth as integral annexes. Tapuz vs Del Rosario
 As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the elements
 constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
      a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
      b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
      c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
            whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
      d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
    167.         Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant.
        Christina misled Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to
        complete the term of her pregnancy and intended to have the child adopted. Baby Julian was born. She
        voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian to DSWD where he was “matched” with Sps. Medina. Later,
        Christina changed her mind, wrote a letter to DSWD asking for suspension of adoption. DSWD, sent a
        Memorandum informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian to be legally available for
        adoption had attained finality which terminated her parental authority and made Baby Julian a ward
        of the State. Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to
        obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD. Rule.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                Page | 63
      No. There was no enforced disappearance in this case because DSWD officers never concealed Baby
       Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating
       that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Sps. when she filed her petition before the RTC.
       Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian
       before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the
       context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
       Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
       disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
       thereof.—Sec. 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows: SEC. 1. Petition.—The petition
       for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
       violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
       or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
       or threats thereof. In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 568
       SCRA 1 (2008), this Court held: “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of
       law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced
       disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
       person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
       indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
       the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
       outside the protection of law.
       Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise
       of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the
       State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.— To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is
       a remedy available to victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a
       similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official
       or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
       liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life. Caram vs Segui
   168.         Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC) uploaded on her Facebook
       profile several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing
       only their undergarments. The photos were taken while they were changing into their swimsuits for a
       beach party they were about to attend. Some of their classmates reported said photos to their
       computer teacher. Later, some seniors posted pictures online. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s
       students logged in to their personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified
       students drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar and some wearing that show
       virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. Escudero, through her students, viewed and
       downloaded the pictures. STC found Angela, Julia and Julienne, et. al. to have violated the student’s
       handbook and barred them from joining their graduation ceremonies. Despite a TRO granted by RTC,
       STC still barred the students to join the commencement exercises. Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares,
       mother of Julia, and the other parents of the minors filed a Petition for the issuance of the Writ of
       Habeas Data against STC. Invoking right of privacy because accordingly the FB is set to friends only.
       Prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
       subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to
       privacy. RTC denied. Is the petition proper?
    YES it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper. Petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of
       even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and writ of habeas data can be
       availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or
       storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
       party”. The writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information
       about a person. It can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
       specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
       include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files
       in possession or in control of respondents. STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy as the
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                           Page | 64
         subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large
         because its privacy settings is set to public. VIVARES et.al vs ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE et.al
    169.          Engineer Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
        Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Kunnong, an IDB scholar,
        arrived in Jolo by boat from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in. Tagitis asked
        Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day. When Kunnong returned, Tagitis
        was no longer around. This was reported to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, May Jean,
        filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo directed against Lt. Gen. Yano; Gen. Razon,; Gen. Doromal; Sr.
        Supt. Espina; Gen. Goltiao; and Gen. Rafael with the CA. On the same day, the CA immediately issued
        the Writ of Amparo and set hearing. MTD was filed alleging that the requirement that the pleader
        must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation
        of a victim’s rights, is indispensable in an amparo petition. Decide.
     No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
        presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security
        through State or private party action.
        May the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations sufficient for
        the court to grant the privilege of the writ.
     Yes
        May the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced
        disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.
     No.
The Writ of Amparo—a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life,
liberty and security—does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance; Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts; Accountability refers to
the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance
While, as in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause
of action, omitting the evidentiary details, in an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light
of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty—the petitioner may not
be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered
up by those who caused the disappearance. Where the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement
by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement
that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. Sec. 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition—
that otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action—as a means to
“fish” for evidence. The characteristics of the Amparo Rule of being summary and the use of substantial evidence
as the required level of proof reveal the clear intent of the framers to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted.
The Court believes and so holds that the government in general, through the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (PNP-CIDG), and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations
together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis—the Court
holds these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the
personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is
applied in addressing the enforced disappearnce of Tagitis. The Court holds Col. Kasim accountable for his failure
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                            Page | 65
to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance, and for the purpose of this
accountability, he is impleaded as a party to this case. Razon vs Tagitis
   170.         Melissa Roxas become a member of BAYAN- USA. After doing work in Tarlac, She and her
       companions rested in the house of Mr. Paolo and while resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes
       forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was
       informed that she is being detained for being a member of CPP -NPA. She was then separated from her
       companions and was brought to a separate room. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 days. She
       was informed by a person named ―RC that those who tortured her came from the ―Special Operations
       Group and that she was abducted because her name is included in the ―Order of Battle. Later, She was
       provisionally released and was given a phone. Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo
       and Habeas Data before the SC, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and PNP. SC issued the
       writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing. CA granted but absolved the respondents. Roxas filed
       an appeal.
       Is Command responsibility applicable in Amparo cases
    No. Application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more
       aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
       proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective
       remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
       directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation
       of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is
       the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof
       had transpired, the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
       whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. The
       doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and by this
       account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition; The
       doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. However, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis
       of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 66
       party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed
       to do.
   171.         A resolution referring the case to CHR to continue investigation of Jonas for abduction was
       ordered by the court with an obligation to report its findings and recommendations. This was
       necessary as the investigation by the PNP–CIDG, AFP Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR
       investigation had been less than complete. In all of them, there were significant lapses in the handling
       of the investigation. CHR submitted its Investigation Report resulting in the violation of constitutional
       rights to life liberty and security by the Government. A member of the AFP was positively identified by
       a new witness. As a result a new petition for issuance of a WHC was referred to CA. Meanwhile, in an
       interview with Chairman of UMDJ, he revealed that the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the
       cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim, Jose,
       Ruben and Dennis otherwise known as ERAP FIVE. Unfortunately, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)
       turned down the request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so–called “Erap 5” on the
       ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition.
       May the Writ of Amparo may be issued anew by means of the newly discovered evidence
    NO, The beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served. The writ merely embodies the
       Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced
       disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It is
       curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and
       remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking
       of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo
       proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve.
       While the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address
       an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary
       remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather
       than expedite the investigations already ongoing. Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely
       to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or
       accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
       As to the documents from a Resolution from General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General,
       AFP, it may be accessed by CHR to allow them the opportunity to ascertain the true identities of the
       persons depicted in the cartographic sketches. The documents shall be examined and compared with
       the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas, without copying and without bringing the
       documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the SC. Burgos vs Esperon
   172.        Dolot filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and AF with the RTC. They protested
       the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
       Development Corporation and TR Ore in Matnog. Those mining operators did not have permit to
       operate; on which they’ve acquired their small scale mining permit from Sorsogon Governor and his
       predecessor Sally which they did not have authority to issue. DENR despite knowledge did not do
       anything. However, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed in
       Sorsogon and not in Matnog. May it be dismissed outright by RTC Sorsogon?
    No. Sec 21(1) of BP 129 vest RTC jurisdiction over CPM. Sec. 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, provides the rule of
       venue where the territory shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned. At most,
       the error committed by the petitioners is filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon which is improper
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                          Page | 67
       venue. The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of
       Manila Bay; Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the ROC for SCA for CPM, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
       of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) requires that the petition filed should be
       sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss
       the petition outright. It must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
       certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the
       government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Petition must contain substantive
       allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very
       least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ. It may be availed of “to compel the performance of
       an act specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other
       related law, rule or regulation or a right therein In essence is a command of continuing compliance with
       a final judgment as it “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
       successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision.” Failure to furnish a copy of
       the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect that merits dismissal. Dolot vs Paje
   173.         In 4 June 2008, a letter addressed to Lim (an admin. clerk in MERALCO) was posted at the door
       of the metering office of the Admin. Bldg. of MERALCO in Bulacan, as well as in the individual lockers
       of MERALCO Linesmen. The letter reads as follows:“Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG
       BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
       BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”; HR
       transferred Lim to Alabang Office; Lim sent a letter to HR VP asking for substantiation and an
       opportunity to confront the accusations and threats against her that led to her transfer, which she
       argues to be essentially “punitive” in character. Receiving no response, she filed a petition for the
       issuance of a writ of habeas data against MERALCO before RTC Bulacan. MERALCO countered by
       arguing that the dispute involved a labor issue and not a proper subject of the privilege of the writ of
       habeas data; RTC granted the TRO and the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data based on the
       principle that the privilege extends not only to political activists and extra-legal killings but also to
       ordinary citizens whose rights to life and security are jeopardized. Does RTC have jurisdiction?
    No. Privilege of the writ was meant to “protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
       information of an individual” and to “provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
       informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty
       and security against abuse in this age of information technology”. Limiting its scope to exclude private
       rights. The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
       concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful—
       employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.
       Meralco vs Lim
   174.           Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Dr. Lee,
       her former common law partner. According to Ilagan, Dr Lee has a digital camera owned by him
       containing a sexual video. When confronted, He denied the video and demanded the return of the
       camera, but Lee refused. They had an altercation where Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a
       wall and then walked away. This prompted Lee to file several cases against Ilagan, including a case for
       violation of Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom. Ilagan claimed that Lee’s
       acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same violated not only his right
       to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman. RTC granted the privilege of the
       Writ of Habeas Data in favor of Ilagan. RTC disregarded Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the
       collection, gathering and storage of data. Is the award proper?
    Petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy, and the right to
       life, liberty or security. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
       evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
       the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect
       purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
       therefor are vague and doubtful. In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
       privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
       threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 68
       suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in
       the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and
       any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Lee vs Ilagan
   175.         In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs
       which prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.
       Among those impleaded are US officials. Decide on the petition for writ of Kalikasan.
    Denied. The application and non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US
       personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
       and beyond the province of the petition for a writ of Kalikasan. Damages cannot be granted which have
       resulted from a violation of environmental laws, the rules allows the recovery of damages, collection
       of administrative fines in a separate civil suits or charging the same violation of an environmental law.
       Petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined (under rule 7)
       or restrained had already been accomplished. Respondents is entitled to the relief sought as far as the
       directives of the respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structures and marine habitat
       adversely affected by the grounding incidents, however the US and Philippine government both
       express readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by USS
       guardian, and the US government is closely coordinating to assessed the extent of damage and
       appropriate methods of rehabilitation, more so, exploring avenues for settlement of environmental
       cases is not proscribed by the rules. Arigo vs Swift
        Due to the extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
        administrative remedies. The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact — and,
        thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the ROC The power to approve or disapprove projects within the Subic Special
        Economic Zone (SSEZ) is one such power over which the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority’s (SBMA’s) authority prevails over
        the Local Government Unit’s (LGU’s) autonomy.
        In exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge defects in the Environmental Compliance Certificate
        (ECC). —In general, the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to follow the appeal process provided in DAO
        2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the proper administrative appeal process, recourse may be made
        to the courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In exceptional cases, it may be
        availed of to challenge defects in the ECC provided that
                   1. the defects are causally linked or reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the nature and
                         magnitude contemplated under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan, and
                   2. the case does not violate, or falls under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
                         remedies and/or primary jurisdiction. Paje vs Casino
                176.     SBMA, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a MOU to build a
       coal-fired power plant. SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate. TCC
       assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
       Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution 8, expressing objection to the coal-fired
       power plant. DENR issued ECC. RP Energy decided to include additional components in its proposed
       coal-fired power plant. Due to the changes RP Energy requested the DENR Environmental
       Management Bureau (DENR-EMB) to amend its EC which was granted. Hence, Hon. Casiño filed a
       Petition for Writ of Kalikasan. RTC issued the writ and directed the case to CA for reception of evidence.
       CA denied the writ for failure to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
       was. violated or threatened. Did CA erred in denying the writ?
      No, the petitioner failed to satisfy provisions under Sec. 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be
       present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the
       constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises
       from an... unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
       (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
       magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
      A party who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must
       not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least,
       a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual
       or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
       contemplated under the Rules.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                            Page | 69
      Approval of the concerned sanggunians over the subject project would not lead to or is not reasonably
       connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an affront to the local autonomy of LGUs.
       Violations could be the subject of appropriate remedies before the proper administrative bodies (like
       the NCIP) or a separate action to compel compliance before the courts, as the case may be. However,
       the writ of kalikasan would not be the appropriate remedy to address and resolve such issues. Paje vs
       Casino
   177.         The Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and exploitation of
       petroleum resources within Tañon Strait was entered by the Government with JAPEX (SC-46). EMB of
       DENR granted an ECC. A case was filed to nullify the Service contract and the ECC with the resident
       marine mammals as parties. Does petitioners have legal standing? (Procedural Issue)
    NO. The general rule is that only natural and juridical person can only be the real party-in interest in
       any case. However, Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
       Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit,"(Sec 5) and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our
       courts for violations of our environmental laws. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before
       the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that
       rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
       their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
       inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure." (NB: IN this case, SC did not really decide
       WON mammals have a standing but the case pursued because they are represented by the citizens and
       allowed the case using citizens suit) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait
       vs Angelo Reyes, et. Al
   178.          FPI C operates two pipelines 1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System and 2) the Black Oil
       Pipeline (BOPL) System. In May 2010, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
       residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A
       search made within the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its
       Basement 2. West Tower's management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City,
       which in turn called the city's BFP. What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-
       20 drum a day. A Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West
       Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City was
       filed. Petitioners prayed that FPIC and its BOD, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its BOD be directed
       to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence; (2) continue to check the
       structural integrity of the pipeline and to replace the same; (3) make periodic reports; (4) rehabilitate
       and restore the environment; and (5) to open a special trust fund to answer for similar and future
       contingencies. Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a TEPO.
       Does West Tower Corp. have the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether the
       other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-
       interest;
    Yes. Petitioners who are affected residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal are real parties-in-
       interest. In this case, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the
       condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower including nearby residents. While a
       condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4 726 it is empowered to pursue actions in
       behalf of its members. Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require
       that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical
       persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
       ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 70
        Should a special trust fund be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies; and
       No, Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for
        the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment. The present ruling on petitioners' prayer
        for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the
        judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from
        the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
        May FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the
        environmental protection order.38
       No court did not rule on this matter. Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners
        under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. However this can be
        properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them. West Tower Condominium
        vs First Philippine Industrial Corporation
    180.          Cecilia, the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin, entered the clinic of her husband, and in the presence
        of her mother, a driver and Dr. Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her
        husband’s clinic and took 157 documents belonging to private respondent, [i.e. Greeting cards,
        cancelled checks, diaries, passport, and photographs], of Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours. The
        documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
        disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. IS the
        documents admissible?
     NO. The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The privacy of communication and
        correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
        requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
        section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife
        do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
        them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
        his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
        available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
        by making it privileged. Zulueta vs CA
    181.        Judilyn, Kathylyn’s first cousin testified that she saw Yatar, wearing a white shirt with collar
        and black pants, descended from the 2nd floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel
        Dawang’s house, Judilyn didn’t find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30
        PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling her that he would be getting the lumber. Judilyn noticed that
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 71
       Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that his eyes were
       “reddish and sharp”. Yatar asked her husband, as he wants to talk with him but her husband is not
       around so Yatar left. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her
       house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked Kathylyn
       to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor, Isabel found that the door was tied with
       rope and upon opening with a knife, saw Kathylyn’s lifeless and naked body, with some intestines
       protruding out from it. Police came to the scene, they found Kathylyn’s clothes and undergarments
       beside her body, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from
       Isabel’s house, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyn’s cadaver. When subjected
       under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA is identical to Yatar’s genotype. There were no eye
       witness. May the testimony of Judilyn and the result of DNA lead to Joel’s conviction? Decide.
      Yes. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
       evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
       Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
       leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of
       the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must
       concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are
       proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
       reasonable doubt.
         DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
         exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
         courts should consider the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
         contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
         were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
   182.          Daniela sold a parcel of land to her granddaughter, Nena. DOAS was executed. She declared
       the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the taxes due for years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986
       and 1988. However, possession remained with Daniela. Later, a sworn statement claiming that Daniela
       had actually no intention of selling the property was executed; the true agreement between her and
       Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property to enable her to obtain a loan. Daniella later
       died and was represented by her heirs. Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered
       the sworn statement she executed and demanded the return. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the
       case amicably proved futile. Case for nullification of DOAS was filed. Nena denied any fraud or
       misrepresentation. RTC decided against the Nena. CA affirmed. Decide.
    Reverse the decision. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely
       simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated). The primary
       consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. Such intention
       is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and
       subsequent acts. The evidence presented to declare the DOAS void is the sworn statement of Daniela.
       There is no issue in the admissibility of the sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence
       should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance
       and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
       convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
       depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. Affidavits are
       classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who
       uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or
       misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to
       cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
       the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. Since Daniela is no longer
       available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, affidavit should have not given probative
       value for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and
       that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them. Tating vs Marcela
   183.          Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex past midnight; that after stabbing
       Bolanon, his assailant ran away; Bolanon managed to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo to seek
       help; his uncle rushed him to PGH by taxicab; on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it
       was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                        Page | 72
        he was declared dead. RTC convicted Salafranca for murder. CA affirmed. May the ante-mortem
        declaration of Bolanon meets the conditions of admissibility either as a dying declaration or as a part
        of the res gestae, or both
       Yes for both. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
        character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the
        declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that
        at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c)
        that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case
        for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
        A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
        exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res
        gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
        or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
        attending circumstances. The term res gestae has been defined as “those circumstances which are the
        undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such
        act.” It refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
        illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
        the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae
        is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
        principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
        whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. People vs
        Salafranca
    184.         SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (SIHI). To
        secure the payment, Danilo and Leopoldo executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
        themselves jointly and severally. SCC failed to pay. Demand letters were sent. SIHI filed collection suit
        with a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili. MTD was filed for lack of
        cause of action contending that the PN was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of
        consideration. SIHI presented one witness. The cross-examination of the witness was postponed
        several times. The case was calendared several times nut was always postponed. SCC was declared to
        have waived its right to cross-examine and the case was deemed submitted for decision. RTC favored
        SIHI. On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that it
        had a case against it. Competency of the witness was not established and had no personal knowledge
        of the transaction. CA denied. Decide.
     Sustain. Non-appearance in hearings constitutes waiver of right to cross examine witness. R130S36 of
        ROC mandates witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge
        reliance on it is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
        Except where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. Reason is the
        right of a litigant to cross-examine. Repeated failure of a party to cross-examine is an implied waiver
        of such right. R129S4 of ROC, a judicial admission requires no proof. Nor will petitioner’s reliance on
        the best evidence rule advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the
        documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the
        promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. SSS Chemical Corp vs CA
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                          Page | 73
         the Special Agrarian Courts. R129S3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a
         hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter. LBP vs Banal
    186.          Felix and several other public officers of Zamboanga City, was kidnapped for ransom. They
        were released after payment. 5 informations for kidnapping for ransom were filed before the RTC of
        Zambaonga. Another 3 informations for kidnapping were also filed which set forth identical
        allegations. 9 of 12 accused were apprehended and then the court found several of the accused
        including Kulais guilty of 5 counts of kidnapping for ransom and 1 count of kidnapping a woman and
        a public officer. Decision is based on the testimonies of victims and held that “no taint of evil or
        dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to prosecution witnesses.” Later, several of the accused
        filed their Joint notice of appeal. However, they withdrew it because of their application for amnesty,
        except for Kulais who still seeks MR of the SC. One of the issue raised by the accused was that due
        process was not observed in taking judicial notice of a material testimony GIVEN IN ANOTHER CASE
        by Lt. Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly captured
        the accused-appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-
        examine him. Should the appeal be granted?
     NO. The appeal of Kulais is bereft of merit. In this case, even if the court a quo did take judicial notice
        of the testimony of Lt Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against him. Hence,
        Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made
        by some of the kidnap victims who were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by his
        counsel. Trial court's mention of Lt Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither
        affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Kulais. Positive narration of prosecution
        witnesses is given greater weight than to the negative testimonies of the defense. Victims testified in a
        clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material points.
        Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims. Direct proof is not essential to prove
        conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may
        vary according to the purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there
        was a common design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense
        charged. People vs Kulais
    187.         Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines, after 4 years, SAL was hit by recession
        and so it had to lay off some employees including Laureano. Aggrieved, he filed a labor case for illegal
        dismissal. Later, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal
        termination of contract here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
        of lack of jurisdiction. Motion was denied. SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano is valid
        pursuant to Singaporean law. Court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue
        of lack of jurisdiction, non-applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The CA
        reversed the trial court. May the court take judicial notice on Singapore Laws on this case?
     NO. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court.
        As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed valid under
        Singaporean Law. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall
        apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all money
        claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within 3 years from the time the
        cause of action accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but he
        only filed the money claim in 1987. Hence claim is already barred by prescription. Laureano vs CA
 Maquiling vs COMELEC, 700 SCRA
 Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be
 "evidenced by an official publication thereof." Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
 deciding a case.
    188.         Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost it as a consequence of US naturalization. He
        applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
        Francisco and took the Oath of Allegiance to the RP which was granted. Later, Arnado again took his
        Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign citizenship and run for
        Mayor. Another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to DQ him and presented a record indicating
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                               Page | 74
       that he has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines. Pending the
       case, he won. Should he be DQ?
      Yes. Use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
       of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained
       by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
       position. Basis: Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Renunciation
       of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
       the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a
       full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
       citizenship. Maquiling vs COMELEC
   189.          RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route. Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while
       they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, 2 suspicious men rode.
       Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus
       was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. Witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be
       slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view
       as if he was tinkering with something. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala
       Avenue, the 2 men insisted on getting off the bus. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the 2
       passengers. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He
       ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw
       their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a
       statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident. Prosecution presented
       documents furnished by DOJ, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the
       Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio that the group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former PGMA.
       After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks. Several accussed were
       interviewed on television admitting participation. Bus conductor identified the accused and confirmed
       that they were the 2 men who had entered the RRCG bus. On their arraignment for the multiple murder
       charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On
       arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled
       guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. On plea
       bargaining, accused Baharan and Trinidad manifested their readiness for re-arraignment and
       eventually pleaded guilty. May a plea of guilt be admitted despite insufficiency of searching inquiry
       into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of plea
    Yes. All trial judges … must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while
       justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it
       that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an
       inevitable conviction." Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the procedure under R116S3,
       ROC. However, in this case, prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused made 2 confessions of
       guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews), and judicial admission
       (pretrial stipulation). Hence, it is now unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry".
       Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole
       basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration. Convictions based on a plea of guilt are set
       aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
       evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
       merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
       R130S30 statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made
       during the existence of the conspiracy. However, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
       extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
       conspirators. Extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against
       his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is
       admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-
       examine the former. R130S30, ROC applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
       testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
       declarant. People vs Baharan
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                          Page | 75
   190.         PCGG filed a case in relation to the allegation of illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
       shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
       (ETPI). This case docketed as Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them,
       Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by Victor Africa. IN this case, testimony of Mr. Bane (former
       director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by deposition upon oral examination (Bane
       deposition) before Consul General Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London. The purpose was for
       Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit so as to prove the ownership issue in
       favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s
       Class A stock. In Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner wanted to adopt the deposition of Mr. Bane. This was
       denied by SB because he was not available for cross-examination. Petitioners made its Formal Offer of
       Evidence. However, the Bane deposition was not included. To rectifying this, they filed a 2nd motion
       with for re-opening of the case and introduce additional evidence and requested the court to take
       judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. This was again denied. A third motion
       was filed by the petitioners seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which the SB denied again
       because the resolution has become final in view of the petitioner’s failure to file a MR or appeal. May
       SB refuse the motion to re-open the case? Should the Bane deposition be admitted?
    The decision that the finality of the resolution as basis for refusal to re-open the case was legally
       erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion due to the absence of a clear showing that
       its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. It
       was only an error of judgment. The resolution interlocutory decision, petition for certiorari is still
       premature since the rules of court provides that certiorari should be availed in a situation where
       neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available
       to the aggrieved party except if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved
       party of the injurious effects of the order complained of. At the time of the 1st motion, the presentation
       of evidence has not yet concluded. The remedy after the denial of the 1st motion should have been for
       the petitioner to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of
       the Bane deposition. But upon denial of the 2nd motion, petitioners should have already questioned it
       by way of certiorari since it effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration of the
       Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period,
       under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
       However, SB gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing
       and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from
       requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case provided
       that the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the
       burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the
       nature of NDE. At the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even
       presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the
       petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted “through oversight.”
      Admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply with the rules of court on the
       admissibility. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party
       or witness. Deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing
       otherwise, the adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay. Cross-examination will test the
       truthfulness of the statements of the witness; it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy and
       completeness of a testimony. Depositions from the former trial may be introduced as evidence
       provided that the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding.
       In the present case, the petitioner failed to establish the identity of interest or privity between the
       opponents of the two cases. Rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create
       confusion between the two cases. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia,
       of “the official acts of the judicial departments of the Philippines,” or gives the court the discretion to
       take judicial notice of matters “ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.”
      Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
       because these facts are already known to them. The rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as
       it would create confusion between the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 76
         properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing
         that same duty on the court. Republic vs Sandiganbayan, 662 SCRA 152
    191.         Anecita filed a complaint for theft against Ligtas alleging that as an owner of abaca plantation,
        one day, she asked Cabero, the plantation's administrator to harvest abaca however they were
        surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3)
        unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in
        harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita and the police. On the part of Ligtas, he
        said that he had been a tenant. Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the DARAB for Maintenance
        of Peaceful Possession. Subsequently, DARAB favored Ligtas. Is the conviction proper?
     No. Findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
        representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between
        the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. Where
        an accused's alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should
        be accorded the strictest scrutiny. Although the elements of theft was proved, the existence of the
        DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy negates the existence of the element that the taking
        was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate
        authority to harvest the abaca. Ligtas vs People
RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility
A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
    192.         Police raided the residence of Malinlin in Sorsogon City with a search warrant. The search was
        conducted in the presence of barangay Kagawad Delfin as well as Malinlin himself, his wife and his
        mother, 2 plastic sachets of shabu and 5 empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels were
        confiscated. He was charged under RA 9165 and pleaded not guilty. Forensic chemist who
        administered the examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness. He confirmed
        positive for shabu and further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by the
        arresting officer in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not
        she but rather a certain Mrs. Garcia who received the items from the arresting officer. Accused was
        convicted guilty. Is the compliance with the chain of custody rule
     None. Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
        possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
        the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
        offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. The presumption of regularity
        in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption
        of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
        guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by
        obliterating all doubts as to his culpability. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
        standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
        indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily
        identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
        to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to
        alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. People vs Malinlin
    193.         PO3 Almarez, posed as the buyer and when he handed the marked money to the Pagaduan, he
        immediately apprehended him. Captain de Vera took the marked money, and then arrested him. PO3
        Almarez, marked the sachet with his initials. Thereafter, Pagaduan was brought to Diadi Police Station.
        At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination. Pagaduan was
        transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. 2 days later, PO3 Almarez transmitted
        the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime
        Laboratory, which was received by PO2 Dulnuan. Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Quintero, the Forensic
        Chemist, conducted an examination and found it to be positive for shabu. Should he be convicted?
     No for non-compliance with chain of custody rule. It is important that the prosecution explain the
        reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                             Page | 77
         preserved. The justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume
         what these grounds are or that they even exist. Section 21 requires: In a prosecution for illegal sale of a
         prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
         (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
         the thing sold and the payment. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled
         with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that
         establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal
         transaction.
         The required procedure is in S21(1), AII of R.A. No. 9165 - (1) physically inventory and photograph …
         presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
         his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and DOJ, and any elected public
         official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy. This is
         implemented by S21(a), AII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165. Strict compliance with the prescribed
         procedure is required. In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to
         justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized
         drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an inventory and photograph of the seized evidence
         had not been made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required
         by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests). People vs Pagaduan
 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines "chain of custody" as
 follows:
 "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
 sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
 laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
 the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
 were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
    194.         Salas claimed that Matusalem is the father of her son Christian. Salas rented an apartment
        where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost
        of caesarean operation and hospital confinement. However, when she refused the offer of Matusalem
        to take the child from her, he abandoned her and the child and left them to the mercy of relatives and
        friends. Witness Grace testified. Matusalem was declared to have waived his right to present evidence.
        Murillo corroborated Salas’ testimony. Decision fvored Salas. Is her testimony enough to warrant the
        prayer of support?
     No. Under Article 175, FC illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same
        evidence as legitimate children. Certificate of Live Birth of the child in which the name of petitioner
        appears as his father but which is not signed by him is not competent evidence of paternity when there
        is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. If the father did
        not sign in the birth certificate. Testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to
        petitioner. An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other
        means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial
        admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
        pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
        R130,ROC Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish
        that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo. Salas vs Matusalem
           Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
           The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
                 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
                 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
                       parent concerned.
           In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
                 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
                 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
    195.        Police authorities received information that drugs were being distributed in Misamis Oriental.
        Buy-bust operation was conducted. Rosauro negotiated with the confidential agent and after the
        transaction, Rosauro was arrested. Agent handed the sachet to an officer, who taped it, marked it with
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                            Page | 78
       the marking “Exhibit A”, and placed it inside his pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs.
       In the police station, he prepared Inventory and a Request for Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs
       and Rosauro were turned over to the Crime laboratory. The Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime
       Laboratory found positive result for shabu; while Rosauro and the marked money tested positive for
       the presence of ultra-violet fluorescent powder. However, Rosauro claims he was merely a victim of
       instigation. He testified that police asset went to his house 4 times and convinced him to do an errand
       of buying a shabu. He refused because he did not know where to buy one. It was the confidential
       informant who told him to buy the prohibited drug from a certain “Kael” and to deliver it to the
       former’s house. It was also the informant who gave the money to Rosauro to buy the shabu. But
       Rosauro was not able to meet or buy directly from Kael because it was a young man who got and
       handed to him the shabu on the road. When Rosauro went to the house of the confidential informant
       as instructed, he was arrested. The sachet of shabu was not even recovered from him but from the
       confidential informant. Is there any irregularity in the chain of custody of the seized item?
      None. The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
       inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The IRR
       of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states: x x x Provided,
       further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
       integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
       officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. People vs
       Eric Rosauro
   196.        While PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez were on duty, a certain Edwin arrived at their office and
       asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. They responded and found 2 bricks of
       marijuana 997.9 grams in the vehicle. Turned it over to SPO3 Temena, police investigator at Bagong
       Barrio Police Station for investigation. He marked the items with his initials and forwarded to crim lab.
       Version of defendant: traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding
       almost collided with another car and had a heat up argument with the police office. As a result, they
       were arrested brought to police station. They were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and
       money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed them that they will be
       charged for drugs.
       May the seized items be admitted in evidence in accordance to plain view doctrine.
      Admissible. The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
       obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises
       under his immediate control. This is so because “objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the
       right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.”
       “The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
       but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the prior
       justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest,
       or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
       accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. ”The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in
       Calantiao’s situation because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police
       officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they
       deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
       Did the arresting officers’ complied with the requirements for the proper chain of custody of the seized
       dangerous drugs.
      Yes. People v. Ocfemia: Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR do not expressly specify the manner of
       “marking” of seized items in warrantless seizures. Unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill
       will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been
       preserved will remain. People vs Calantiao
   197.         At around 2:00 in the afternoon, P/Supt. Rodriguez, received a report from an informant that
       a certain Jojit was selling illegal drugs. P/Supt. Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 79
       composed of SPO Taguiam, SPO2 Tamang, SPO1 Blaquera, PO Hernandez, and PO3 Domingo. PO3
       Domingo was designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money, were dusted with fluorescent
       powder and serial numbers were recorded. Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team
       proceeded to Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City. PO3 Domingo positioned himself beside a street light
       while the rest of the team hid behind a nearby concrete fence. After waiting for about 45 minutes,
       Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo recognized Constantino as the Jojit described
       by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was Jojit. When Constantino
       replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked, "Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you have
       stuff?") Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how much he wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he
       wanted to buy P1, 000.00 worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money to
       Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic sachets to PO3 Domingo. PO3 Domingo turned his cap
       backwards, the pre-arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon seeing the signal, the other
       members of the buy-bust team approached the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom
       SPO2 Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money. Constantino was brought to the police station where
       the recovered drugs and money were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. The recovered
       drugs were then marked at the police station. The incident was recorded in the police blotter with an
       inventory of the recovered drugs and money. Later that evening, at around 10:00, P/Supt. Rodriguez
       and SPO2 Tamang submitted to PNP Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao
       City, a request for laboratory examination of two plastic sachets; as well as both hands of Constantino,
       and the money. Should he be convicted despite inconsistencies of the testimonies of the arresting
       officers?
      No. In this case, the arresting officer PO3 Domingo failed to properly mark the items seized. Instead,
       he let another member of the buy bust team to have it marked not at the place of arrest but at the police
       station in which at this early stage, the chain of custody is already destroyed. Moreover, the
       inconsistencies of the testimonies of the arresting officers made the evidence dubious to warrant
       integrity of the evidence. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
       custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
       equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
       safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized
       item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
       item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use
       in court as evidence, and the final disposition. People vs Constantino
   198.         At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening, PO3 Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and their
       civilian asset proceeded to Sitio Cogon. When the team went inside the interior portion, PO1 Reales
       together with the civilian asset approached the house of Dela Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1
       Bullido were strategically hidden more or less 10 meters away. The civilian asset called Dela Cruz and
       told her that they will buy shabu worth P200.00. Dela Cruz handed PO1 Reales a small plastic
       containing white crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to the former the P200.00 bills.
       Upon getting hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw the consummation of the
       transaction rushed to the scene. When PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for
       help and resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased her, however, her neighbor
       Ortega blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as policemen but Ortega did not listen, so
       PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning shot as the people likewise started to gather around them. Dela Cruz
       was able to evade arrest. The team arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice. There was no physical
       inventory made on the seized item nor was it photographed. May there be conviction?
    Yes. Substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item" is
       sufficient. To be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or
       testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused
       by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for
       determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the
       chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided
       for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
       People vs Mercury Dela Cruz
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 80
Object/Real Evidence
   199.          An informant reported to PCI Ojastro of PDEA that accused is selling marijuana. Based on the
       tip, PCI Ojastro directed the conduct of a buy-bust operation. IO1 Briguel (team leader) was designated
       as poseur-buyer. IO1 Jabano and IO1 Echavaria were assigned as arresting officers. They left at around
       1:00AM of March 29, 2009 and stayed for a while in Sabang. IO1 Briguel, however, testified that they
       arrived at Puerto Galera on March 30, 2009. Manny was arrested. IO1 Briguel frisked him and the
       marked money was recovered. Accused was boarded into PDEA vehicle and while onboard, IO1 Briguel
       marked the seized marijuana with his initials and the date of the arrest and testified that he placed the
       suspect dried marijuana leaves in his pocket. The team went back to Calapan City (54 km away from
       PG). IO1 Briguel conducted the Inventory witnessed by Barangay Chairperson Anacleto Vergara and a
       media representative. Photographs were taken during the marking and inventory. IOI Briguel turned
       over the item to PNP Crime Laboratory for forensic examination with a positive result. Accused appeal
       based on the inconsistencies of the arresting officer’s statements. Decide on the conviction.
    Acquit for inconsistencies of dates on their testimony, failure to comply with the chain custody rule.
       Prosecution failed to sufficiently comply with the chain of custody rule. In this case, the crime was
       committed on March 29, 2009, then the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR shall apply.
       The physical inventory of the confiscated drug and the photographs of the same where only done in
       the presence of the accused-appellant, Brgy. Captain Vergara and media representative Nebrejo.
       Representative of the DOJ, as required by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, was not present during the
       inventory of the seized item. Apprehending team did not immediately conduct the physical inventory
       and the taking of the photographs at the time the suspected drug was confiscated or at the nearest
       police station. Instead, they travelled 54km from Puerto Galera, the place of the seizure, to Calapan City
       before they conducted the inventory of the seized drug. In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize
       its procedural lapses and give a justifiable ground for the non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No.
       9165. They were not able to explain the absence of a representative of the DOJ and the distant conduct
       of the inventory of the seized item. Moreover, the delivery of the confiscated item to the PNP Crime
       Laboratory in Camp also provides doubt as it was not clear who received the confiscated drug. People
       vs Manuel Dela Rosa
          Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was amended by R.A. No. 10640, which became effective on July 15, 2014, and essentially added
          the provisions contained in the IRR. Apprehending team is now required to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
          and photograph the same in
          (1) the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
          representative or counsel,
          (2) with an elected public official and
          (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
          inventory and be given a copy thereof.
          *(4) DOJ representative
B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
    200.         Sps. Silos obtained a revolving credit line from PNB, secured by a mortgage. The interest rate
        was initially agreed upon at 19.5% but a Supplement to the Credit Agreement provided that the Bank
        may modify the interest rate in the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the
        future, including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to the fixed
        interest rate system, or vice versa. The spouses were able to pay the interests on the loan up until their
        last PN which covered the principal amount. Because of this their properties were foreclosed and sold
        by auction to PNB. The spouses filed a petition to annul the foreclosure sale and for the accounting of
        PNB’s credit. Lydia testified and according to her the contract is one of adhesion and there was no
        proper relay of information to them because some were left blank when they signed it including the
        interest rate. PNB argued that her testimony is inadmissible because of BER. Decide.
     Documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence. However, in this case the PN were declared
        void not because of its contents but because of the circumstances as to the provisions it contain. The
        testimony that the Credit Agreement, the Amendment to Credit Agreement, REM and the Supplement
        were all prepared by PNB and were presented to her and her husband Eduardo only for signature. She
        was told that PNB would fill up the interest rate portion. She was not informed about the applicable
        spread that PNB would impose on her account; that the interest rate portion of all PN she and Eduardo
        issued were always left in blank when they executed them, with respondent’s mere assurance that it
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                        Page | 81
        would be the one to enter or indicate thereon the prevailing interest rate at the time of availment; and
        that they agreed to such arrangement. A contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment
        dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties, is void. Any
        modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the consent of the
        contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed modification, especially
        when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. The unilateral action of the PNB in increasing
        the interest rate on the private respondent’s loan violated the mutuality of contracts ordained in
        Article 1308 of the Civil Code.
    202.          Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners as
        janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT offices in Metro Manila area. Complaint for money claims was
        filed alleging that they were not paid minimum wages, OT, HoL, premium, SIL, and 13th month pay.
        They were made them sign blank payroll sheets. Later, amendment to complaints to include ID was
        made. LA partially ruled in favor of the petitioners but denied the petitioners’ claims for backwages,
        OT, HoL, and premium pay for failure to show that they rendered OT work and worked on HoL and RD
        without compensation. The respondents insisted that they were not personally served with summons
        and other processes. They also claimed payment and as proofs, they attached photocopied and
        computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal and maintained that the
        dismissal was proper. An unverified supplemental appeal was filed with attached photocopied and
        computerized copies of list of employees with ATM cards to the supplemental appeal with amounts of
        deposit shown. May this attachment be admitted in evidence?
     No because they were estopped for failure to present the evidence on the first opportunity. Generally,
        in labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. Time and again, we
        have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the NLRC in the interest of
        substantial justice. However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fair play.
        The liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately
        explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the
        allegations sought to be proven. The reason for these requirements is that the liberal application of the
        rules before quasi-judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just
        resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of
        procedure. Loon vs Power Master Inc. 712 SCRA
    203.          May a CTC of cadastral map be presented and admitted in evidence.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 82
       Yes. Generally, R130S3 (d), ROC only the original of the document is admissible in evidence. Except
        R130S7 when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
        office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof and
        R132S24 that the record of public documents be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the
        legal custody or the record. CTC of the cadastral map that was attested by 2 public officers having
        custody of such records is admissible in evidence. Moreover, as to the hearsay rule, R130S44, ROC
        provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule on BER. The rule provides that
        entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or
        by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
        therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
        official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
        The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
        duty. Dimaguila vs Monteiro, 714 SCRA
    204.        When may CA receive evidence in its exercise of its original and appellate jurisdiction?
     Under R6S3 of the Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in the following cases:
    a) In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as (1) certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, (2)
        annulment of judgment or final order, (3) quo warranto, (4) habeas corpus, (5) amparo, (6) habeas
        data, (7) anti-money laundering, and (8) application for judicial authorization under the Human
        Security Act of 2007;
    b) In appeals in civil cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
        pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court;
    c) In appeals in criminal cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
        evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 124 of the rules of Court; and
    d) In appeals involving claims for damages arising from provisional remedies. Republic vs Mupas, 769
        SCRA 384
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 83
       specific performance was filed. In the Answer, seller alleged several oral conditions. Buyer objection
       on ground of PER. May these conditions be admitted?
      No. Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome
       of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
       evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a
       uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in R130S9, ROC, when the terms of an agreement were
       reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence
       of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. An exception to PER is when the
       instrument does not show the true intent of the parties applies only Where the written contract is so
       ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from
       a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the
       contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding
       them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper
       interpretation of the instrument. In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity,
       mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof. Ortanez vs CA
   207.         Elias Tan, President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained loan from ABC bank covered by
       PN. Collection suit ensued. LFi contended that it is not liable because Tan borrowed money in her
       personal capacity and not as president of LFI and maintained that it never authorized Tan to borrow
       money in behalf of it. Tan admitted that he contracted the loans in his personal capacity. Averred that
       bank employee required him to affix two signatures on every PN, assuring him that the loan documents
       would be filled out in accordance with their agreement but it did not happen. Moreover, he denied
       receiving any demand. Should Tan and LFI be held solidarily liable?
    Yes and in effect the testimony of Tan be inadmissible because of PER. Application for credit
       accommodation, the signature cards of the two accounts in the name of petitioner Foundation, as well
       as New Current Account Record, all accompanying the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner
       Tan for and in the name of the petitioner Foundation establish that the loans were solidarily contracted
       by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan. PN is the law between the petitioners and the
       respondent Bank. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
       admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While PER is admissible to
       explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
       additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has
       been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case. Lapu-Lapu
       Foundation vs CA
   208.          Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were co-owners ¾ and ¼ pro-indiviso of a land. Sta.
       Maria sold her share to Benigna Llamas. Upon death, she willed her share equally to her sisters
       Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Later, Josefa sold her own one-half share (subject property) to
       the Leoveras and the Valdez, as evidenced by DOAS. An agreement was later executed in the nature of
       partition. Later, Valdez asked RD for requirements to transfer the property but he learned that
       Leoveras already obtained 2 TCT in his name including his portion. RD provided the following, copy of
       TCT, Benigna Deed, Subdivision Plan, and Affidavit of Confirmation of Subdivision. Valdez seek to
       nullify the Benigna Deed by presenting the death certificate of Maria and executing an Affidavit to
       explain the true intent of their previous agreement. Should the Affidavit be admitted as evidence to
       reflect the true intent of the agreement?
    NO. The parties’ Previous Agreement effectively partitioned the subject property. Valdez adequately
       proved his ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
       Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties’ Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties’
       Agreement, which cover the subject property. To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the
       ROC allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written
       agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to
       express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express
       the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident,
       which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                     Page | 84
       At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the
       parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed
       Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the
       petitioner’s staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the
       parties’ true intention. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the
       petitioner’s admission, coupled with the respondent’s denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit,
       placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner’s
       defense. Leoveras vs Valdez
   209.         Lucia Paras (concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit) and Kimwa (construction firm)
       entered into a contract denominated as "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates" where 40,000 cu. Mtrs.
       of aggregates were allotted by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa for P240.00/truckload. However, after
       hauling 10k cu mtrs., Kimwa stopped hauling and allegedly transferred to the concession area of a
       certain Mrs. Remedios. Sps Paras sent demand letters to Kimwa but was unheeded. A complaint for
       breach of contract with damages was filed. In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to
       obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates and argued that the 40k cu mtrs is only the maximum
       quantity that it could haul. It asserted that the expiration of the Special Permit of Lucia was never set
       as a deadline. Invoking PER, it insisted that Sps Paras were barred from introducing evidence which
       would show that the parties had agreed differently. Is there violation of PER? Is Kimwa liable?
    There is no violation of PER but Kimwa is liable for breach of contract. As exception to PER, a party
       may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in
       his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The
       failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c)
       The validity of the written agreement; (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
       successors in interest after the execution of the written agree. There are 2 things must be established
       for PER to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the 4 exceptions has been put in issue in a
       party's pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the PER sought to
       be presented serves to form as the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party. In this
       case, a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's failure to express the true
       intent of the parties is alleged in the pleading. Paras vs Kimwa Construction Inc
   210.         Ligaya sued PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages alleging of having a peso
       and $ time deposit accounts; both investment placements have matured; and when she sought to
       withdraw her deposit money with interests, PNB refused due to existing loan. Ligaya denied obtaining
       any loan. While conceding signing certain documents she professed not understanding what they
       really meant. She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or in an incomplete
       state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager, and Customer Relations Officer, led her
       to believe that what she was signing were related to new high-yielding PNB products. She also denied
       re-lending the loan proceeds to Paolo. She asserted that the branch manager went to her residence
       with a duly accomplished affidavit detailing the re-lending event and urged her to sign if she wished to
       recover her placements. RTC decided in favor of Ligaya. Ca affirmed. Court decided based on the
       testimony of Ligaya despite presentment of the notarized PN by PNB. Should her testimony be
       admitted?
    No. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing
       all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
       evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing. The facts in the case
       does not fall in any of the exeptions where evidence other than what is stated in the agreement may be
       admitted. Burden of proof lies with the party who asserts a right and the quantum of evidence required
       by law in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and
       value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
       "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence. PNB vs Pasimio
Electronic Evidence (AM 01-07- SC, Rules on Electronic Evidence and E- commerce Law RA 8792)
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 85
    211.         An ejectment suit was filed to order posseor by tolerance to vacate a land owned by petitioner.
        In their Answer, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and alleged that they entered and
        occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners.
        As evidence, they presented the Regional Director of the DENR which already upheld their possession
        over the land when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors and were, therefore,
        entitled to the issuance of a title. This certification was a facsimile. May it be admitted?
     No. It is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. A facsimile or
        fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic
        matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone
        of each area by a specified amount of electric current. Pleadings filed via fax machines are not
        considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there
        is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic. In this case, the facsimile is the
        signature of the RD of DENR. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative
        value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered
        at all, while probative value refer to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.
        Heirs of Sabanpan vs Comorposa
     Certain Doctrines or Rules of Admissibility
     1. Conditional admissibility -Where the evidence at the time of its offer appears to be immaterial or irrelevant unless it is
          connected with the other facts to be subsequently proved, such evidence may be received on condition that the other facts
          will be proved thereafter, otherwise the evidence given will be stricken out. This is subject to the qualification that there
          should be no bad faith on the part of the proponent.
     2. Multiple admissibility - Where the evidence is relevant and competent for two or more purposes, such evidence should be
          admitted for any or all the purposes for which it is offered provided it satisfies all the requirements of law for its admissibility
          therefore.
     3. Curative admissibility - This treats upon the right of the party to introduce incompetent evidence in his behalf where the
          court has admitted the same kind of evidence adduced by the adverse party
 Three theories on curative admissibility:
     1. American rule – the admission of such incompetent evidence, without objection by the opponent does not justify such
          opponent in rebutting it by similar incompetent evidence.
     2. English rule – if a party has presented inadmissible evidence, the adverse party may resort to similar inadmissible evidence.
     3. Massachusetts rule – the adverse party may be permitted to introduce similar incompetent evidence in order to avoid a plain
          and unfair prejudice caused by the admission of the other party’s evidence.
    212.         Torres received a letter of dismissal from the service. He filed with the CSC a Complaint against
        PAGCOR and its Chairman for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. Because
        of denials of actions in the lower courts, a petition for review under R43 was filed seeking to set aside
        the twin resolutions issued by the CSC. CA found insufficient to merit consideration because the MR
        filed was sent through a facsimile transmission. Assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was
        indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as electronic
        evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Rule.
     Sustain. The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic
        Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
        cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
        Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
        pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there
        is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
        originally signed by the party and his counsel. Not considered as an electronic evidence under the
        Electronic Commerce Act. Torres vs PAGCOR
    213.         Irish and Rustan were old sweethearts. Irish broke up with Rustan because he impregnated
        another girl and was aout to marry. She changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed
        to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Irish received MMS a picture of a naked woman with spread
        legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the
        message, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face
        from a shot he took when they were in Baguio. An entrapment was conducted to recover the cellphone
        containing the images and several sim cards and the operation was successful. Rustan was convicted
        under RA 9262. May the MMS sent be admitted as evidence?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                                 Page | 86
        Yes. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
         electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided
         under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC) is not tenable. Rustan is
         raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time on appeal
         is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it
         was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Rules
         on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
         proceedings. Ang vs Republic
    214.         Enojas et. al were charged for Murder. P02 Gregorio testified that he was with P02 Pangilinan
        when they saw a suspiciously parked taxi, of which the driver was Enojas, they invited the driver to
        the police station for further questioning; Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers. However,
        on their way, they stopped at a convenience store where an encounter ensued. Enojas fled. Suspecting
        that Enojas was involved, the police officers searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone
        belonging to Enojas, of which they used to monitor and to communicate with the accused. Entrapment
        was later conducted and was successful. They were convicted. The text messages was used as basis on
        the conviction. Appeal was made alleging that the text messages must be inadmissible for failure to
        authenticate as required by the rules. Decide.
     Sustain conviction. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to
        the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, exchanged text messages with the
        other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and
        to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
        competent to testify on them. The arrest without a valid warrant cannot be a ground for acquittal but
        may be a ground to reject any evidence that may have been taken. Text messages are to be proved by
        the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Illegal arrest
        cannot be a ground for acquitting (accused) them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence
        that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest.
        People vs Enojas
 NB: A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002. The latter case does
 not confront directly the obiter in Ang v. Court of Appeals, but the recognition of the 2002 resolution expanding the coverage of the
 rules on electronic evidence in People v. Enojas is clear. The Rules on Electronic Evidence apply to criminal cases.
                   215.    Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF)
         while Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She was hired and after 3 years tendered
         her resignation. She turned-over the papers under her custody to Lumapas. Sometime in 2006, Rivera
         called Lumapas and requested for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives.
         Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was
         still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold. Rivera sent text message to BANFF’s official CP
         held by Lumapas: I am expecting that. grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay
         ko. I don’t deserve this because I did my job when I was still there. God bless. Sana yung pagsimba niya,
         alam niya real meaning. Another text, Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including
         incentive up to the last datena nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor. Labor case was filed. Pending
         the LC, Syhunliong filed a complaint for libel and used the text messages as evidence. As a defense,
         Rivera said her text message falls squarely within the parameters of "Privileged Communication" or
         the elements of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are not fully established by the Prosecution’s
         evidence. Thereafter, the lower court issued an Order on June 18, 2009 denying Rivera’s motion for
         reconsideration of the foregoing. Should Rivera be convicted? Are the text messages a PC?
        No. The text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
         communication. The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good
         faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
         duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty. Rivera's text message falls within
         the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she was speaking in response to duty, to
         protect her own interest, and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there
         was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned. Note
         that this case was dismissed because of prescription. Syhunliong vsRivera
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                          Page | 87
 In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the
 following requisites must concur:
      (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
            interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
      (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who
            has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
      (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice
    216.         Ella M. Bartolome filed against Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III, RTC for extortion,
        graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. Ella alleged that
        Rosalie asked money from her for P200k, which was reduced to P160K for the filing of her case for
        annulment of marriage. Moreover, Rosalie undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the
        need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case. During the entrapment operation
        Rosalie was apprehended inside the premises of the RTC in the act of receiving the money. Ella
        attached to her affidavit-complaint the transcribed electronic communications (text messages)
        between her and the respondent; a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History form given to her by the
        Rosalie for her to accomplish in filing the petition for annulment of marriage; a copy of the Imus Police
        Station Blotter and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing the video taken during the entrapment
        operation. Decide.
     Affirm dismissal. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to
        certain conditions. “Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text
        messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
        communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony
        of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. In the present
        case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering
        the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages has personal knowledge
        of these text messages. R11S1 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of
        events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to
        the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or
        by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof. Bartolome vs Maranan
    217.          May an unauthenticated text messages be admitted as evidence in a complaint for support and
        violation of Ra9262?
     Yes. In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 469 SCRA 439 (2005), it is stated that any question
        as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising
        such issue admits authorship of the subject messages. Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly
        prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Violence is not a
        subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that
        the victim is somehow at fault. x x x. AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23, directs the referral to mediation of all
        issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property
        relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
        Principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his
        previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own
        misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s
        son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those
        of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support.
    218.        Astorga and Repol Law Offices charged Alexander (Sheriff Villanueva) with “willful neglect of
        duty and serious misconduct in office due to graft and corruption or extortion with a prayer of
        dismissal. It arose upon a case it handled where ARL won. Special Sheriff to which Villanueva was
        assigned met with Atty. Lugares and demanded P8,000.00 to execute the Decision. He allegedly stated:
        “Sayang lang ang pagod ko dito, kung wala naman tayong makokolekta” and “E wala pang 50% ang
        magagarnish natin diyan eh.” Atty. Lugares tried to bargain and lower the amount to P5,000.00. They
        agreed. Sheriff Villanueva sent a text message at 4:27 p.m. to Atty. Lugares. “Cge po sir magCALL na
        kau ngayon.” Atty. Lugares called Sheriff Villanueva on his cellular phone to confirm their appointment.
        In the morning of November 26, 2008, Atty. Lugares sent a text message to Sheriff Villanueva to remind
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                         Page | 88
        him of their appointment. At 7:23 a.m., he replied, “Dala mo ba mga colors?” Atty. Lugares asked Sheriff
        Villanueva what he meant by “colors.” At 7:29 a.m., he replied, “Hauz pa po, nagcoffee breakfast lng, un
        legal fees kako kung dala mo?” Atty. Lugares told Sheriff Villanueva to proceed with the meeting. At
        7:44 a.m., he replied, “Bka puede bukas nlng sir, nag insist ang mga tga ChinaTrust mamya.” Atty.
        Lugares insisted that they proceed with the garnishment since it was Sheriff Villanueva who set the
        appointment. At 8:45 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva replied: “Patawagin mo nga c atty. astorga dto sa mobil
        phone ko para magconfirm tau sa legal fees.” At 8:51 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva allegedly sent this text
        message to Atty. Lugares: “Padala mo nlng khit lunch time un legal fees, khit kmi na bhala magpaserve
        nina shf. Flora.” Atty. Lugares then assumed that since Sheriff Villanueva was not given the amount of
        P5,000.00 he demanded, the issuance of the Notices of Garnishment did not take place. In the hearings,
        Atty. Lugares failed to present the text messages that he sent to Sheriff Villanueva from his phone.
        These outgoing text messages were automatically deleted since his phone could only store a hundred
        messages at a time. EJ Pozon concluded that Sheriff Villanueva did not commit gross neglect of duty.
        Should the sheriff be sanctioned?
        Yes. GR: findings of fact of an investigating justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar
        with the weight. Except: If there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the
        lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
        considered, would alter the result of the case. A review of the facts is called for when the finding of a
        lack of administrative liability is premised on the supposed absence of evidence, but an examination
        of the record shows that there is evidence to support the allegations. Administrative proceedings are
        governed by the substantial evidence rule. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence
        that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Text messages is admissible
        as evidence and given probative value by this court. Court considers the content of the text messages
        and the identification of the person sending them as substantial evidence to prove the commission of
        administrative offenses. Astorga and Repol Law office vs Villanueva
C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. Qualification of Witnesses
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
    219.         An Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated a lot
        to Andres, Jr. was presented as evidence. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through
        Assistant Fiscal Andres, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting
        expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard
        signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person. After the pre-trial, a moved to
        disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness was made. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the
        handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will
        violate their constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before the
        examination was conducted. Decide on the admissibility of the testimony of PO2 Alvarez.
     Admissible. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
        provided in the ROC. R130S20 in relation to S21 to S24, Rule 130 provides the rules on qualification of
        witness, Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. S22
        disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. S23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity
        of the adverse party. S24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication. S19 disqualifies
        those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them
        incapable of being witnesses. S20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on
        relationship. S21 provides for disqualification based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule
        132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be
        impeached by the party against whom he was called. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez
        can surely perceive and make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified
        as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications
        specified under the Rules. R130S49 is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in
        evidence. Marcos vs Heirs of Andress Alvarez
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 89
    220.         Evelyn is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo, left for Singapore to work, Evelyn
        was entrusted to sister Jovita and her husband Salvador. Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a
        certain Rosing leaving Evelyn with Salvador who took advantage of the situation and raped Evelyn.
        Evelyn told Jovita about what happened but she didn’t believe her. Later, it was discovered that she
        was pregnant. A criminal complaint was filed by Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, against Salvador. May a
        mental retard’s testimony be admitted in evidence?
     Yes. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
        mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual
        weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long
        as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. A mental
        retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her
        testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. To be sure, modern rules on evidence have
        downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness and has become a modern trend of
        evidence. People vs Golimlim
Marital Disqualification
   221.          Maximo Alvarez, an estranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez was filed with arson. Esperanza
        was the 1st witness. Maximo objected on MDR. Pending resolution of the objection, the trial court
        directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. RTC DQ Esperanza.
        Prosecution filed a MR but was denied hence this case. May Esperanza’s testimony admissible in
        evidence?
    Yes. R130S22 is not applicable. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is
        no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
        upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such case, identity of interests disappears and the
        consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, the security and
        confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through
        their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Alvarez vs Ramirez
    222.         Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The
        complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria. Benjamin falsified DOAS for the sale of house and lot belonging
        to the conjugal partnership to Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent.
        Is Victoria barred to testify?
     No. The wife can testify against the husband in a case for falsification of the wife’s signature in public
        documents to sell share of wife in conjugal property because it is a crime committed by the husband
        against the wife. The case is an exception to MDR. WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR
        DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to
        the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
        committed (by) one against the other. People vs Castaneda
Death or Insanity
Razon vs CA 207 SCRA
   223.         Chuidian as an administrator demanded Razon to deliver certificates of stocks representing
       the shareholdings of the deceased Juan in the E. Razon, Inc. Razon assails the decision on its alleged
       misapplication of the dead man's statute rule. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not
       applicable for failure of the petitioner to object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement
       between him and the deceased. May the testimony of Razon be admitted in evidence?
    Yes. R130S20(a), ROC PAP vs EAR not allowed. If persons having a claim against the estate were
       allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be
       tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons. It is to "guard against the temptation to
       give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party." In this
       case, the testimony excluded by the court is that of the defendant to the affect that the late Juan, and
       the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually
       owned by Razon unless the Juan opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by
       the administrator of the estate of the late Juan to recover shares. Hence, testimony of the petitioner is
       not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate,
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                           Page | 90
        nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Respondent never objected to the testimony of the
        Chuidian as regards the true nature of his transaction with Juan. The petitioner's testimony was subject
        to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's
        testimony is within the prohibition, respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. Juan is declared
        owner.
    224.         CA and RTC decided that a partnership existed between Chua and Sunga until Sunga’s death.
        In the absence of any written document to show such partnership exists, courts were proscribed from
        hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership 3
        years after Jacinto’s death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the “Dead Man’s Statute” or
        “Survivorship Rule” under R130S23, ROC. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
        party.– PAP, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against EAR of a deceased person, or
        against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person,
        or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
        death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.” Is the argument
        correct?
     NO . The “DMS” provides that if one party to the transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
        insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
        giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule can be
        successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
             1. The witness is a PAP.
             2. The action is against an EAR of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
             3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
                 person or against person of unsound mind;
             4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
                 person or before such person became of unsound mind.
        In this case, DMS is not applicable because, Petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim and with the
        filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the
        “Dead Man’s Statute”. When it is the EAR of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, may
        testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the Scounterclaim. The testimony of
        Josephine is not covered by the “DMS”, she is not “PAP”. “”Assignor” of a party means “assignor of a
        COA which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any COA has arisen.” Sunga-Chan
        vs Chua
    225.         A land is indispute. This land was adjudicated the the heirs of Sps Jayme where a house was
        currently built and is occupied by Nicanor Jayme. Elena(heir) alleged that the lot was originally owned
        by her paretns and that 1/3 was adjudicated to her thru partition. Portion of it is occupied by Nicanor
        with her permission. Nicanor opposed stating that the land also covers the land adjudicated to him.
        Elena successfully acaquired FP and OCT over the lot. This was disputed. RTC finding fraud cancelled
        the FP and OCT. Hence this case, Elena contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for Nicanor
        which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted
        by the trial court, as the same violated the dead mans statute. Rule.
     It is admissible. DMS does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming
        to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
        communication made by the deceased to the witness. Since the claim and the testimony of their
        witnesses is based on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on
        dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted
        by the trial court. Bordalba vs CA
Privilege Communication
    226.        Annullment case was filed on ground of failure to care and support and that a psychiatrist
        diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
        During the PTC, wife pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that husband attached to his answer as
        proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
        physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Wife
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                     Page | 91
       filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City,
       covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a
       motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Husband
       opposed based on physician-patient privilege. Decide.
      Granted. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
       evidence, would be at the time they are offered. R132S36. Since the offer of evidence is made at the
       PTC, Wife request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before
       making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. It is when those records are produced
       for examination at the trial, that husband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but
       more so to their disclosure. Request may be appreciated as MOD under R27S1. But the right to compel
       the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged.”
       Disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician
       ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to
       allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. R132S17 is misplaced
       because trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that husband had already
       presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify wife
       into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Chan vs Chan
   227.         The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful
       detainer against Barrientos. MTC favored Veneracion. Appeal to RTC ensued and case was raffled to
       Judge Lacurom who reversed the decision. MR was filed with Motion for inhibition. Judge Lacurom
       ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear and explain why she should not be held in contempt. Records show
       that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case. Nevertheless, Velasco-
       Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for whatever mistake may have committed. Velasco-Jacoba
       was sentenced guilty of contempt and penalized with imprisonment for 5 days. MR filed and Velasco-
       Jacoba alleged that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Jacoba stopped her and
       asked her to sign the motion. Atty Jacoba questioned the answer being priviledge as part of MDR. Rule.
    Admissible. Marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
       object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
       waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion. Larucom vs
       Jacoba
   228.           Atty. Valencia filed a case in the RTC for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while
       being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia,
       Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. May an attorney be
       precluded from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client upon the
       termination of the attorney-client relationship
    YES for being violate of the Cannon laws, except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
       disclosure of the facts. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
       relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
       client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. The stern
       rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good
       taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain
       inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an
       attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. Termination of the relation of
       attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
       conflict with that of the former client. Samala vs Valencia
   229.         Ombudsman issued order for subpoena duces tecum requiring Rogado and Rivera, as chief
       accountant and record custodian to produce all documents relating to Personal Services Funds and all
       evidence. An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employee, was sent to the
       Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices, including the Office of the
       Ombudsman for allegations as to the misuse of funds. Ombudsman’s investigated. Is the order proper?
    YES. Governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
       military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                      Page | 92
        importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as
        a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. In this case, there is no claim that
        military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
        personnel of the EIIB. Almonte vs Vasquez
    232.         DOTC entered a contract with ZTE for NBN Project financed by China. Jose de Venecia III
        testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
        approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
        the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing and admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to
        bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
        informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
        bribe. When probed further, Neri invoked executive priviledge. He was cited in contempt and ordered
        his arrest and detention. Did he properly invoke executive priviledge?
     Yes. The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464, does not in any
        way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
        underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
        inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
        military and foreign relations. Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
        on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
        correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
        decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
        diplomatic as well as economic relations with China.” Neri vs Senate Committe
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                       Page | 93
      Elements of presidential communications privilege:
      1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
      2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself.
          The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
      3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate
          need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
          elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority
2. Testimonial Privilege
3. Admissions and Confessions
    233.          A case arise from a dispute of properties inherited by the grandchildren from their ascendants.
        On dispute is the validity of an Extra Judicial Settelement and waiver. On Pre-trial conference, parties
        entered into stipulations and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Trial on
        the merits ensued. RTC rendered a Decision finding that the parties are in pari delicto, whereby the
        law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. Parties who are equally guilty
        cannot complain against each other. May stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference
        be made as proper basis on which the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto?
     Yes. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in
        civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under R18S7, ROC, which
        mandates that the contents of the PTO shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby,
        defining and limiting the issues to be tried. Constantino vs Heirs of Constantino
    234.        Rolando was convicted for raping a minor, Remelyn. Gaudia’s father offered money to
        Remelyn’s mother to settle what his son has committed. This offer of compromise was used by Amalia,
        the mother of the victim, against the Rolando to convict him. May the offer of compromise made by the
        parents be taken against the accussed?
     NO – it is merely considered as a hearsay evidence. No probative value. Guilty of only simple rape. A
        witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer
        of compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of
        testimony of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,
        the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said
        conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the
        mother of the victim. Peoplevs Gaudia
    235.         Case for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol. Instead of pursuing
        request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. However, he reneged on his promise
        leading to this case. In his defense. Doldol averred that the funds which the State Auditors found
        missing were, in fact, cash advances availed of by the municipal employees. He insisted that not a
        single centavo was used for his personal benefit. He averred that the charges lodged against him were
        premature because the same were based on an incomplete audit. He was convicted. Is there
        misappropriation of public funds?
     Yes. Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove
        that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner
        could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts of
        the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, letter addressed to the Provincial Auditor for an offer
        to refund is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. This is a case of admission
        by silence. Doldol vs People
    236.         A case for illegal pillaging of public funds from PDAF of Sen. Revilla was filed. Accordingly, Sen.
        Revilla, authorized the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his PDAF through his
        endorsement of fraudulent NGO created and controlled by Napoles’ in relation to “ghost” PDAF-funded
        projects, and for receiving “commissions” or “kickbacks”; Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla made
        the processing and had personally received his own “commission” or “kickback”. Napoles, as the
        mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal acts. Lim and De Asis, as staff employees
        of Napoles, for assisting. Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the
        DBM, for participating. Is there a probable cause against all petitioners that merits full blown trial?
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                          Page | 94
      Yes, there exist an evidence as to find PC in this case that merits full blown trial. Only facts sufficient to
       support a prima facie case against the accused are required, not absolute certainty.” Probable cause
       can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,
       and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is
       improper.
       R130S28 does not apply in PI because “such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
       adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.” “Under the doctrine of independently relevant
       statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
       relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. R112S3, ROC
       expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to
       examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
       propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
       present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.”
       Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the
       accused. It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule on such issue. All that the Office
       of the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of
       the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and
       that the accused are probably guilty thereof.” Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of
       discretion in determining probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. Cambe vs Office of the
       Ombudsman
Confessions
   237.          Antonio was charged with Parricide for stabbing his wife Norma who was found lifeless with
       several puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son. During police investigation,
       Antonio informed police that 100K cash and jewelry were missing. He concluded that Miller (lover of
       Norma) may have cause the crime. Later, Antonio confessed to the crime before the media. During trial,
       Antonio interposed the twin defenses of alibi and denial, claiming coercion and intimidation on the
       part of the police officers involved in the investigation of the crime. Accused denied having killed his
       wife, alleging that she was alive the morning he left for work. May the EJC convict Antonio?
    Yes. A confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police
       authorities, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused. The fact that the
       extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a detention cell does not by itself render such
       confession inadmissible. It is well-settled that where the accused fails to present evidence of compulsion;
       where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators for
       maltreatment; and where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as
       factors indicating voluntariness. People vs Dacanay
   238.          Accused is a PNP member who had an altercation with Francisco that resulted to his
       instantaneous death. He admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. SB
       convicted him. In his Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that
       caused the victims death was used as evidence against him. However, it found no evidence of treachery;
       thus, it convicted him of homicide only. Is there an admission or confession?
    It is only an admission. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is
       merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent
       to commit the offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused
       admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal
       intent is an admission, not a confession. In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their
       untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that
       formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in
       ignorance of the true state of facts. Ladiana vs People
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                          Page | 95
   239.          Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62 found appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty
       beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape. In the same decision, the appellant was
       convicted of two counts of acts of lasciviousness. Counsel objected to the admissibility of Lucelle’s
       sworn statement on the ground that she was incompetent to give the same because of her mental
       illness. The trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in evidence as part of her testimony. Is
       the ground to strike the testimony proper?
    NO it is admissible. Mere identification of signatures in the statement qualifies the document as
       admissible. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely
       from the credence to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and
       competence of some persons from whom the witness has received the information. It signifies all
       evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited,
       and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-examination. Although Lucelle did not testify on the
       contents of her sworn statement the same were admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.
       As to the change of plea, as a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
       offenses because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the
       condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty,
       evidence to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree of
       his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not
       contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate conviction. People vs Ulit
   240.         Sayaboc was convicted for murder. During custodial investigation, an EJC was made but was
       refutted because the PAO lawyer who was his counsel, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and
       effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was
       not independent, as he was formerly a judge in NPC holding court inside the PNP Command. Should
       the EJC be admitted?
    No. Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this case for being violative of
       Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear
       that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating
       environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear
       to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators
       for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation
       renders the confession valueless and inadmissible. EJC are presumed to be voluntary, however, is that
       the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights
       during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial
       confession has been denounced.People vs Sabayoc
   241.          In a case for Estafa, Valentino, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank,
       testified that he conducted and interviewed the accussed; that in said interview, accussed admitted
       having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that
       the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the accussed although it should be the
       client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the accussed were contained
       in a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him. May the document
       be admitted as evidence against him?
    Yes. Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence. The constitutional proscription against
       the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of
       the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial
       interrogation. Confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
       confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary; Right to counsel for a statement applies only to
       admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation
       In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
       regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
       questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager
       of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                        Page | 96
       manner during the questioning. Right to counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal
       investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation." Tanenggee vs People
   242.         Cebuana’s internal auditors conducted a surprise audit where it revealed that 156 pieces of
       jewelry were missing, cash shortage of was likewise discovered.Case for Qualified theft was filed. RTC
       convicted accussed based on an extrajudicial written confession. Decide.
    Convict. The petitioner wrote and signed the confession letter spontaneously. The language of the
       confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious circumstances tending
       to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be known to the
       petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome
       than risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus implausible for
       one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job.
   243. A case for robbery with homicide was filed against the accussed. Accussed was arrested and upon
       interrogation, he verbally confessed that he and his companions, "had just killed and robbed an old
       couple." During cross-examination, PO2 Paule affirmed that accussed was not aided by a lawyer, nor
       was his confession reduced into writing. Should convictin be sustained?
    Yes. Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid waiver of
       the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. It is
       undisputed that Dela Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into
       writing. Further, when the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter did not
       say anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to
       have a competent and independent counsel. Any confession obtained (without Miranda doctrine) is
       flawed and cannot be used as evidence not only against the declarant but also against his co-accused.
       However, when several accused are tried together, the confession made by 1 of them during the trial
       implicating the others is evidence against the latter. An accused is always a competent witness for or
       against his co-accused, and the fact that he had been discharged from the information does not affect
       the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the relevancy, as well as the weight that should be
       accorded his declarations are to be determined by the Rules on Evidence. People vs Opiano
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                          Page | 97
        evidence. Exclusion of the Guerrero affidavit would not result in any change in the result reached by
        the trial court. For that result is essentially and adequately based upon the positive identification of
        accused as one of the gunmen. People vs Santos
    245.         May conviction be based on a testimony of a witness who is the victim but is proven as an
        incorrigible liar?
     Yes. While lying may constitute a habit, the court believes that the falsehoods committed by the victim
        assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as
        charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. Rule 130,
        Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
        one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another
        time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
        habit, custom or usage, and the like." Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as
        they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of
        prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
        substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. People vs Nardo
    246.          An annulment of irregularly issued FP was initiated. Investigator Isagani recommended filing
        of civil case. OSG instituted the action. The alleged owner died pending investigation. Isagani’s
        testimony was stricken down by curt for being a hearsay. In his testimony, Land Inspector Efren did
        not conduct an investigation on the FP application of the alleged owner. Is the testimony of Isagani
        considered hearsay?
     No. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
        witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were
        actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it
        (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. A witness
        may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad
        faith -- and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating
        the hearsay rule. Portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
        conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may
        be considered as independently relevant. Rp ve Heirs of Alejaga
5. Testimonial Knowledge
Hearsay Evidence Rule
    247.         Complaint for estafa was filed from non-remittance of sales collection. At pre-trial, no
        stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Branch manager
        and auditor of the company was presented by prosecution ass witness. Based on the audit, a written
        report denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in
        Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997" was submitted to the branch manager; finding
        that there exist indeed a misappropriation. Defense did not present any evidence. She was convicted.
        May auditor’s testimony as to the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
        inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion be admitted?
     It may be admitted but will not pose weight for being hearsay. Auditor conceded having no personal
        knowledge of the amounts actually received by the accused from the customers or remitted by the
        manager. Persons other than auditor prepared the Exhibits B to YY Accordingly, her being the only
        witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to
        validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation
        or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. Patula vs People
6. Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                         Page | 98
 For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur:
      (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
      (a) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death;
      (b) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
      (b) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.
 In order for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur:
      (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
      (b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
      (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances
    248.         Calinawan was charged with murder for killing Janice. Marigor (7 years old) daughter testified
        that she saw thee accused stabbed her mother by mere identification of him being amputated but she
        did not saw his face. The victim confessed to his brother that it was Calinawan who stabbed her. She
        was hospitalized. Her husband also asked her in the hospital if who stabbed her and she said
        Calinawan. After 3 days, she died. Decide.
     Convict. Denial and Alibi fails in light of Positive Identification. In criminal prosecution, the identity of
        the accused must be established with moral certainty, but this did not necessarily require that the
        witness must have seen the face of the accused. The test to determine the moral certainty of an
        identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such
        distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or
        characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body,
        fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
        Moreover, the identification of the victim of the accused was considered as dying declaration. People
        vs Calinawan
Dying Declaration
    249.         One night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing
        their routine duty when they met 2 men, later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast
        speed. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and they continued patrolling the
        area. There they saw Januario lying on the street. As he was severely injured, the policemen
        immediately loaded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside
        the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was “Jay-R and his uncle”
        who stabbed him. Subsequently, Januario died due to the fatal wounds he has sustained. Decide on
        admissibility of the testimony.
     Not a dying declaration but a part of res gestae. In the case not all the requisites of a dying declaration
        are present. From the records, it does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of
        his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying
        declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the
        declarant. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death
        as certain impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying
        declaration. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declaration that grow out of the main
        fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
        fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. When Januario gave the identity of the
        assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by
        accused and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring
        him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance
        about assailant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza,
        was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is
        relevant because it identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario
        perpetrated by accused, is adequately proven by the prosecution. People vs Gatarin
Alpredonotes/rem2/obra-brondial                                                                                            Page | 99
         4 successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borre’s house and
         saw 2 men armed standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to
         SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told
         Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" who shot him. This statement was
         repeated to his wife before he died. Decide.
        Convict. SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the cause
         and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds,
         it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was
         already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to
         utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false
         accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
         death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
         considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an
         obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court. People vs Palanas
Family Reputation
   253.         Monina presented a total of 11 witnesses as to her relationship with Francisco whom she
       allegedly called “Daddy” since she was a child. She also presented certifications issued by the Local
       Civil Registrar and her baptismal certificate all to prove her allegation that Francisco impregnated her
       mother (deceased) Esperanza. However, Francisco refuted all the allegations of Monina. Are the
       evidence presented is enough to establish filiation.
    Yes. Reliance to the certifications issued by the Local Civil registrar. A certificate of live birth
       purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when
       there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the
       Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
       information of a third person. Certificate of live birth and the school records presented is being
       competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.
       However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be
       admitted as part of MONINA’s testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her
       education. The common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is
       a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Matters of pedigree may be proved by
       reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree
       in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. Jison vs CA
   254.           7 members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch when they were attacked by several
       masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
       hospitalization. One of them, died from his injuries. An information for murder was filed against
       several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and separate informations were also filed against them
       for the attempted and frustrated murder.
    Convict. Information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against him to enable
       him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates
       their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them is
       untenable. The Court found no merit on the appellants’ arguments that the prosecution should not
       have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since they
       were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks
       fell off. Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this
       case. People vs Feliciano
   255.         Accused interposed their alibis and claimed that the prosecution witnesses did not actually
       see who shot the gun. Hence, they argued that their identification as killers was not positively made.
       For proper identification to be positive, should there have to be made a witness who actually saw the
       assailants?
    No. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
       exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes
       as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
       premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to
       be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness;
       otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy
       circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally
       presumed innocence of the accused.
   256.         SPO2 MAMANSAL was shot and was killed. At the hospital, victim confessed that “Juany and
       Tony Palmones” were the killers. Alice Villamor pointed to a passing motorcycle and told him that it
       was the motorcycle the assailants were riding. He chased them and while on chase PO3 Aniceta called
       him on the radio and told him that the assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones. Should conviction be
       upheld?
    No. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence. Except when given under
       the circumstances specified in Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. As such, the requirements
       for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the crime and the
       surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was
       under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
       declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the decedent was
       the victim.
       In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be proven that that the
       declaration was made “under a consciousness of impending death” which means simply that the
       declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently,
       or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there must be “a settled hopeless
       expectation.” While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his
       perception that he has given up the hope of life, the circumstances surrounding his declaration must
       justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending death.
       Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
       spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of a crime,
       when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
       utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant
       to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. In order to admit statements as evidence part of the
       res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical.
    259.        A DQ case was filed for material misrepresentations and failure to comply with 1 year
        residency requirement. Petitioner’s evidence are as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns and
        corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification from the barangay
        captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette; and (4) Affidavits from a
        previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation from the barangay parish and
        Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. COMELEC awarded DQ. Pending
        MR, he was proclaimed winner. COMELEC en banc denied the MR. May a Certification issued by
        Barangay Captain not sworn to before a notary public be admitted?
     YES. Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Certification would not only be admissible
        in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration sanctioned ass Entries in Official Records.
        Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to keep an updated record of all
        inhabitants of the barangay. It is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his
        own barangay. The Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires
        him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.Sabili vs COMELEC
    260.         A copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church
        was presented to prove parental filiation and alleged that it is a public document because it is required
        by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the NSO. Possession a duplicate original of the
        Contrato Matrimonial should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a
        private document, they maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which
        is excluded from the requirement of authentication. May the marriage contract be sufficient to prove
        the fact of marriage between Vicente and Benita.
     No because it is a private document. Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made
        subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer
        public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and
        their authenticity must be proved. Before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
        authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was
        acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
        recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously
        confessed execution thereof. An unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is
        not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the
        copy." Ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in
    263.         A criminal complaint was filed. Plaintiff cannot seek attendance in the Philippines due to
        health issues. A motion to seek deposition abroad was made. May this be allowed despite objection of
        the accused for violation of his right to confront the plaintiff?
     NO. Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under
        Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.
        This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
        public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
        satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
        through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the
        Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
        testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal
        cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the
    265.          Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his
        younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He
        saw accused, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he
        (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs.
        After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the accused. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s
        lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the accused, a
        neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he
        related that the accused took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see
        very well the perpetrator tor because there was no light. Should conviction be upheld solely based on
        the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old child witness
     Yes. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events
        witnessed. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial
        proceedings. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000),
        every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies
        on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability
        of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty
        to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency
        examination of a child. People vs Esugon
7. Opinion Rule
Opinion Rule: Expert Witness
    266.          In a murder case, prosecutions presented a ballistics expert, and defense argued that (1) He is
        ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure
        barrel. (2) He is not conversant with the required references concerning ballistics, particularly books
        on the subject by foreign authorities. (3) He could not scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet. IN
        effect, he lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, defense claim that his opinion that the
        test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime was
        not reliable. Moreover, accused also assail ballistics expert failure to take the necessary photographs
        to support his findings. Should his testimony be admitted in evidence?
     Yes. The witness qualifies as a ballistics expert. An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession
        or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on
        questions on which he proposes to express an opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the
        degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that
        the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the
        facts of the case; and (3) Presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The
        question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the
        discretion of the trial court. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and
   267.          In a land dispute case, of land disputes, expert witnesses were presented who claimed that the
       signature of Seller on the alleged DOAS and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were
       not his. On rebuttal, a witness who saw the acct that thee seller signed the DOAS was presented. RTC
       disregarded the testimony of the expert witness. Is the testimonies of expert witnesses conclusive to
       be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed and notarized Deed of Absolute Sale?
    No. Under R132S22, ROC, genuineness of handwriting may be proved: (1) by any witness who has seen
       the person write; or he has seen writing; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court. A duly
       notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the
       full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. Forgery cannot be presumed and must be
       proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging
       forgery. In the case, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and
       fraud. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although
       such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity
       of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. The
       authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g.,
       quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature.
       Bautista vs CA
   268.         In a murder case, defense used the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang
       and Cañada and as to the inconsistencies between their statements and the findings of the medico-
       legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman. Will it warrant conviction despite
       inconsistencies?
    YES. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise,
       and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make
       the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial. Jurisprudence further provides
       that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the probative value of the testimony of a
       witness regarding the very act of the accused. The allegations of petitioner cannot exculpate him from
       criminal liability. Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. This was
       corroborated by the testimony of Cañada, an eye witness. Defense that Manalangsang’s testimony
       contradicts with the medical findings, and should then be disregarded. Petitioner claims that
       Manalangsang’s statements that Hispano was shot in a downward direction conflict with the findings
       of the medico-legal that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction. SOCO PSI Cabamongan
       report as regards the position of the gunman when the assailant shot Hispano was not given merit.
       Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot,
       which is opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony. However, records reveal that Cabamongan was
       presented as an ordinary witness. Slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness
       hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not
       discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused. As
       long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor
       inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Avelino vs People
Ordinary Witness
   269.        In a rape case, prosecution presented 3 witnesses, complainant AAA, complainants mother
       BBB, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame. Accused filed a demurrer to the evidence,
       but the trial court denied it. The defense thereafter presented its witnesses, accused, accused
       roommates, and his wife. He was convicted. Accused questioned the victim’s mental age was not
8. Character Evidence
    270.         Dominga Pikit-pikit was on her way home from work when suddenly a man appeared from
        behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. The man
        dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields. Dominga got a good look at the
        man, who turned out to be Rafael Diopita, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her
        belongings. Rape happened. In a police line-up, Dominga readily pointed to Diopita which was further
        bolstered by the fact that when the police had him try the slipper, it easily fitted him. Among the
        arguments is that he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of “Ministerial
        Servant” in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a
        responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God. May testimonies of the
        accused of his good moral character is sufficient to acquit him of his charges.
     No. Religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
        succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of
        his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. Alibi cannot prevail over the clear and
        positive identification of the accused as the very person who committed the crime. People vs Deopita
        Preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the
        evidence offered in opposition to it. It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of
        the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Exclusive possession of the card alone did not
        suffice to preponderantly establish that he had himself made the withdrawals, or that he had caused the
        withdrawals to be made. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because
        mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must
        prove. FEBTC vs CHAN
Presumptions: Conclusive Presumptions
   273.         Complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages, against Sps Alcaraz over a residential building
       without including the lot which such building stood. The lessor is the late Virginia who was the spouse
       of Pedro while the lessee was petitioner. The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of
       said building exclusive of the lot because said lot was owned by NHA. Lease is for 5 years but lessor
       reneged. Hence, lessor sought to repossess the premises. However, lessee alleged that, they stopped
       paying rents to original lessor but instead to the new owners who were Virgilio and Angelita. When
       there is change of ownership, does a lease contract automatically terminates?
    No. Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including
       the land. R131S2, ROC provides as a conclusive presumption that: (a) Whenever a party has, by his
       own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
       thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act
       or omission, be permitted to falsify it; After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for 2 years,
       the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the
       ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot. Sps
       Reynaldo Alcaraz vs Pedro Tangga-an et. al
   274.         Torres chaired 2 thrift banks. He acted as FISLAI's President, while his wife, Dolores, acted as
       DSLAI's President and FISLAI's Treasurer. Upon Torres' request, BSP issued standby emergency credit
       Later, University of Mindanao's VP for Finance, executed a deed of real estate mortgage over UM's
       property in CDO in favor of BSP. "The mortgage served as security for FISLAI's PI.9 Million loan" It was
       allegedly executed on UM's behalf accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate stating authority of the
       chairman to appoint him in representation of the UM to transact, transfer, convey, lease, mortgage, or
       otherwise hypothecate the subject properties. He executed another deed of real estate mortgage,
       allegedly on behalf of University of Mindanao, over its two properties in Iligan City. This mortgage
       served as additional security for FISLAI's loans. FISLAI and DSLAI eventually merged with DSLAI as
       the surviving corporation in an effort to rehabilitate the thrift banks due to the heavy withdrawals of
       depositors. DSLAI later became known as Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (MSLAI). MSLAI
       failed to recover from its losses. BSP foreclosed the mortgaged properties. UM filed Complaints for
       nullification and cancellation of mortgage. UM alleged that it did not obtain any loan from BSP and that
       certification was anomalous. RTC ruled in favor of UM. Is UM bound to the REM?
    No. Acts of an officer that are not authorized by the board of directors/trustees do not bind the
       corporation unless the corporation ratifies the acts or holds the officer out as a person with authority
       to transact on its behalf.
       No board resolution was passed. Being a juridical person, petitioner cannot conduct its business, make
       decisions, or act in any manner without action from its BOT who must act as a body in order to exercise
       corporate powers. Individual trustees are not clothed with corporate powers just by being a trustee.
       Contracts entered into by persons without authority from the corporation shall generally be
       considered ultra vires and unenforceable against the corporation. Conclusive presumptions are
       presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is. They are made
Disputable Presumptions
   275.          A double sale of land was made thru 2 SPA’s. First one effectively transferred the property to
       the buyer. Another SPA was made that transferred the land to another buyer. In the first sale, transfer
       of title was not made, nor was any annotation effected. RTC held that when Luis executed the second
       deed of sale in favor of Meridian, he was no longer the owner as he had already sold them to his
       children by his first marriage. Luis lost his right to dispose of the properties to Meridian from the time
       he executed the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners. CA reversed. It ruled that the first deed of sale
       in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration.
       It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband. Second sale was valid
       because the documents were notarized and, as such, they enjoyed the presumption of regularity.
    RTC is correct not CAA. The first sale is a valid sale. A public document executed with all the legal
       formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained. In order to overthrow a
       certificate of a notary public to the effect that a grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged
       the fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Disputable
       presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the
       necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the
       contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the
       presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in
       support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. Bare
       allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court. Rather, the
       evidence must (be) so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity
       of the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. A notarial document
       is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. (Ramirez vs. Ner, 21 SCRA 207). As such it …
       must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it shall not have presented strong,
       complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided
       against by law. Rosaroso vs Soria
HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CANADA
   276.          It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due
       execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption
       is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
       preponderant. Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear and convincing evidence that is
       enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.
Uy vs Lacsamana, 767 SCRA 657
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
    277.           Presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to
         plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally
         married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were
         legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. A man and woman deporting themselves as
         husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."Semper praesumitur pro
         matrimonio — Always presume marriage. Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
         evidence. Testimonial and Documentary evidence may be shown to prove marriage.
Diaz vs People, 776 SCRA
G.R. No. 208113, December 2, 2015
    278.The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the
         acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight of the
        No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of
         evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that “evidence willfully
         suppressed would be adverse if produced” does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both
         parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the
         suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena
Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the
witness stand. Rowena was certified to be suffering from “Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition” and thus
“cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.”
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. CA and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000
    280.Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the
         evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails
         to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded.
         The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge
         it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a
         disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party. METROBANK's failure to
         bring before CA the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans”.
         when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in
         his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him
         if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the
         evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. x x x" "No
         rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if
         proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not
         exist."
Official Duty
    281.          The presumption of regularity can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two
        (2) things, namely: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired
        by any improper motive. The prosecution must account for each link in the chain of custody of the
        dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure from the accused until it was presented in court as proof of
        the corpus delicti. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
        drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
        from the time or seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation
        in court for destruction. Anything short of observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what
        the law required meant that the former did not regularly perform their duties. When there is failure to
        comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in the confiscation of contraband in a drug
        buy-bust operation, the State has the obligation to credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the
        proof of the corpus delicti is doubtful, and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt
        beyond reasonable doubt.
NO. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule
that was violated.
Court finds that the petitioners have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing
auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly
monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy,
despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there
been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the
hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the
said PDAF. Petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT
Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money. Liable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
    283.          In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the
         narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
         presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
         In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the
         crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the
         accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to
         particularly search the accused especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of
         the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident.
         The subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing
         their usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the
         fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other.
         Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the
         accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated
         on circumstances surrounding the apprehension.
Yuk Ling Ong vs CO 752 SCRA
G.R. No. 206653. February 25, 2015.*
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there
is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs
actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides
only two grounds for annulment of judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of
judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a
judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being
bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.
Cohabitation
    285.MEDICAL EXAMINATION, NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE. — The Court has
        repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape. A
        person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is
        credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.
        MINOR INCONSISTENCIES; BADGES THAT THE WITNESSES WERE UNREHEARSED AND HONEST. — The
        alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertain to minor matters and are
        even badges that the witnesses were unrehearsed and honest.
Moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has
ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape. In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that
the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent
and responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was
raped. Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical examination was
conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts.
RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence
    287.there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Even without a police line-
        up, there could still be a proper identification as long as the police did not suggest such identification to
        the witnesses
As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a
child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion.
Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court
was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the
recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.
Impeachment
PEOPLE vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. et al
G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003
    288.In a case where self-defense is invoked by the accused, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove,
         with clear and convincing evidence, the following essential requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part
         of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of
         sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no complete or incomplete
         self-defense unless the accused proves unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The inconsistencies
         adverted to by the appellants pertained only to minor and collateral matters and not to the elements
         of the crime charged; hence, they do not dilute the probative weight of the testimony. It bears
         stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not
         necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in
         their entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages Before the credibility of a witness
         and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements
         which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or
         the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-
         examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency
         between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and
her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present
testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did
not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of
impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted
by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.
Reference to Memorandum - Present Memory Revived
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PLASENCIA
G.R. No. 90198 November 7, 1995
     289.The initial assessment on the testimony of a witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve
         due regard notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one who
         personally may have heard the testimony. The reliance on the transcript of stenographic notes
         should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject to challenge. The continuity of the
         court and the efficacy of its decision are not affected by the cessation from the service of the judge
         presiding it or by the fact that its writer merely took over from a colleague who presided at the trial.
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132,
of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the
time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record
must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now Chartis Phil Insurance, Inc.)
G.R. No. 181163  July 24, 2013
    292.         Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
        authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By
        evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Another private document need
        only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The requirement of authentication of a private
        document is excused only in four instances specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within
        the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the
        actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the
        genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being
        offered as genuine. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents
        may be presented as evidence in court.
    294.The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
        evidence is offered must be specified. (Rule 132, sec. 34, rules of court). The offer of evidence is necessary
        because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the
        evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
        purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative
        weight.
all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary
value for the sole reason that these documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To
consider them now would deny the other parties the right to examine and rebut them.
TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
Fortune Tobacco Corp. vs. Com of Int. Rev. 761 SCRA 173
G.R. No. 192024, July 01, 2015
    296.The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require
        direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no
        eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and
        overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA
G.R. No. 190178        February 12, 2014
    297.The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of the
         private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy, and it is
         usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing rule is that when
         an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
         has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature
         and the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the private complainant's testimony, it
         must be received with utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in
         ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency
         to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have been sexually abused and demanding punishment
         for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes
         through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
         justice according to law.
Prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the
charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation. The
testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for
the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape,
especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and who’s
conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations.
While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks
justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. The
numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable doubt in Our mind.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld
considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.
Test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge,
observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human
knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.
Clear and Convincing Evidence
Supreme Court vs. Delgado 658 SCRA
G.R. No. 79672 February 15, 1990
    298.The testimony of Rogelio Zamoras is not as patently absurd as contended by the appellant. It was natural
         for Santos Zamoras, after he had stabbed Clemente, to realize the gravity of his act, sit on the concrete
    299.An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
        can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
        preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
        evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
        to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.
A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. In this case, there is no showing
that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence."
EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal and
criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus characterized as the right of the a foreign power,
created by treaty to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. The
extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time in the detention should be reasonable.
    300.It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal
        injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
        the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author
        of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to
        the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by
        sufficient and satisfactory proof
Preponderance of Evidence
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA
G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011
    305.The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed
        in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or
        quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
        amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its imputation of
negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the
affirmative of an issue. In this case, BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate
information in credit applications and determine credit worthiness of prospective loan applicants rests with
the Dealer Network Marketing Department, which is the department under the supervision of Ramos. Quite the
contrary, records show that these responsibilities lie with the bank’s Credit Services Department, namely its
Credit Evaluation Section and Loans Review and Documentation Section, of which Ramos was not part of.
Second, as similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing company practice when he issued
the PO and ATD without prior approval from the bank’s Credit Services Department. The report further noted
that the practice has been adopted due in part to the stiff competition with other banks and lending institutions.
Resultantly, in 2005 alone, approximately 111 car loan applications were released ahead of the approval of the
credit evaluation section.
Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramos’s action of issuing the PO and ATD ahead of the
approval of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company practice which BPI Family itself
sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent on his duties. To this end, it is well to note
that in loan transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their client wholly comply with all the
documentary requirements in relation to the approval and release of loan applications. As BPI Family
"uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry
competition, it is but reasonable that solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings.
Prima Facie Evidence
Probable Cause
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 193250  April 25, 2012
    307.A manager’s check is one drawn by a bank’s manager upon the bank itself. It stands on the same footing
        as a certified check, which is deemed to have been accepted by the bank that certified it, as it is an order
        of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources, integrity and honor behind
        its issuance. By its peculiar character and general use in commerce, a manager’s check is regarded
        substantially to be as good as the money it represents. Indeed, as the bank’s own check, a manager’s check
        becomes the primary obligation of the bank and is accepted in advance by the act of its issuance. Probable
        cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
        founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the
        existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
        facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
        he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
        than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead
to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. In the case at bar,
although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that
the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him
to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
As pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor of private
complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their houses and
ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one was inside complainant's house as all of
them were at the wake of private complainant's recently demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the items
discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment of the accused's motorcycle which
he was riding on when accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant
as her stolen property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and
claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the
accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.