Lost by Definition: Why Boredom Matters For Psychology and Society
Lost by Definition: Why Boredom Matters For Psychology and Society
Erin C. Westgate1
Brianna Steidle1
1
University of Florida, Department of Psychology,
945 Center Drive, Gainesville, FL 32603
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Final accepted version in press at Social and Personality Psychology Compass
Author Note
The research reported here was supported by a Foundation for Personality and Social Psychology
Heritage Dissertation Research Award and National Science Foundation Grant BCS 1423747.
We are grateful to Shige Oishi and Stephanie Wormington for their insight on portions of the
manuscript. Portions of this work appeared previously in the first author’s dissertation and
Abstract
Long overlooked, boredom has drawn increasing attention across multiple subfields of
animal cognition. In this paper, we review and integrate this work by providing a social
psychological perspective on boredom as an emotion, and its role in signaling the need for
change to restore successful attention in meaningful activity. In doing so, we discuss the
implications of that approach for understanding boredom cross-culturally and cross-species, and
identify opportunities for targeted interventions to reduce boredom and improve well-being.
What do air traffic controllers, security guards, and anesthesiologists share in common?
During a quiet overnight shift in 2011, the Cleveland airspace was jarred by audio from Samuel
L. Jackson’s Cleaner; the inadvertent transmission exposed the air traffic controller responsible,
caught watching a crime thriller instead of the sky (Lowy & Henry, 2011). Just last year, a
security guard had to call police to release him from handcuffs—after he handcuffed himself out
of boredom and lost the key (Darrah, 2019). And as a borrowed medical adage tells us, the
professionals in these careers work critical jobs requiring long periods of vigilance, technological
advances have made their day-to-day responsibilities safer and easier. But as an unintended side
effect, these same lifesaving technological improvements may be making workers profoundly
None of us like to be bored. In one study (Wilson et al., 2014), 67% of men and 25% of
women chose to give themselves an electric shock rather than be bored while sitting alone with
their thoughts. Indeed, boredom has been linked to a wide variety of “bad” behavior, from self-
harm and substance use (Havermans et al., 2015; Nederkoorn et al., 2016; Baldwin & Westgate,
2020; Weybright et al., 2015; Westgate & Fairbairn, 2020), to watching movies on the job
instead of monitoring the skies. Any first-year college student on their way to a dreaded 8am
class could articulate what we all intuitively know: surely we are better off without boredom.
But as happens so often in psychology, science does not support “common sense.”
Although boredom is unpleasant, it’s an important signal; like all emotions, boredom conveys
critical information about both our surrounding environments and internal psychological states
(Clore et al., 2001). This information empowers us to resolve impending problems, and acts as a
motivational force, steering our actions towards those that elicit positive feelings and curbing
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 4
those that elicit negative ones (Baumeiseter et al., 2007). Boredom, in short, is a powerful
indicator of whether our attention is successfully and meaningfully engaged, redirecting us when
While thousands of studies have examined other emotions, such as sadness and anger,
relatively few have examined the causes and consequences of state boredom. Why has boredom
been so understudied in the literature at large, and in the psychology of emotion in particular?
One straightforward possibility is that boredom, historically, has not always been defined as an
emotion.
Definitions can be boring, but they have consequences. And many definitions of emotion
put forward in the 1970s and 80s specifically excluded boredom and similar emotions such as
interest (Silvia, 2005, 2006, 2008), classifying them as cognitive states or “not-quite” emotions
(Ekman, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988;
Ortony & Turner, 1990). While there has been a great deal of debate about what constitutes an
emotion (see Barrett et al., 2019, for an overview), most approaches agreed that boredom failed
the central test: it wasn’t affective. If emotions are “situated affective states” (Clore & Ortony,
2013) – in other words, feelings about the goodness or badness of a specific thing – then
boredom, as a presumably “neutral” state, didn’t qualify. Instead, it was characterized variously
as a non-affective cognitive state (Ortony et al., 1987), mood state (i.e., long-lasting and not tied
to any particular object), or conceptualized as the absence of emotion altogether (Gasper, 2018).
However, a considerable body of empirical evidence, not available at the time, suggests this view
was premature.
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 5
Rather than a neutral non-affective state, empirical data show that boredom is highly
negative. In classic work, Ortony, Clore, & Foss (1987) used linguistic conventions to determine
which states constitute emotions (e.g., anger) and which don’t (e.g., hunger). They used people’s
natural linguistic categories to classify which terms map onto (a) internal mental (b) affective (c)
states, the three prerequisites of an emotion. Critically, affective terms should seem equally
emotional when expressed as states of being (“being angry) as when expressed as states of
feeling (“feeling angry”; Clore, Ortony, & Foss, 1987). And like other affective-cognitive
emotions, people report that “being bored” is just as emotional as “feeling bored.”1 This clever
linguistic argument is mirrored in self-report data: participants asked to rate the valence of
boredom overwhelmingly report that boredom is predominantly negative (van Tilburg & Igou,
2016; Goetz et al., 2006, 2014). And, behaviorally, when given the choice many people choose
negative stimuli (e.g., electric shocks, visually disturbing images; Bench & Lench, 2019;
Haverman et al., 2015; Nederkoorn et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2014;) over feeling bored,
suggesting that boredom is itself aversive. In other words, linguistic, self-report, and behavioral
However, this historical definition had consequences for who studied boredom and how.
All research must balance the fundamental trade-off that internal validity often comes at the
expense of external validity, and vice versa (Aronson et al., 1998; Finkel et al., 2015; Wilson et
al., 2010). Disciplines vary in where they fall on this continuum, with some such as social
prioritizing descriptive observation and real-world context. Thus, the same construct dispersed
across different disciplines will come to be studied and conceptualized in different ways, not
1
Interestingly, this same work a priori predicted that boredom would be a strictly cognitive and non-affective state;
as such it has sometimes been used in support of the claim that boredom is not an emotion
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 6
unlike how a species, dispersed across isolated geographies, will diverge in adapting over time to
its new ecological niche (Darwin, 1859). As a “non-emotion,” boredom was rarely the focus of
experimental theoretical work on emotions in social psychology and affective science from the
1980s through the early 2010s (for a detailed overview, please see Westgate & Wilson, 2018).
education (e.g., Pekrun, 2006; Troutwine & O’Neal, 1981; Goetz et al., 2014) and the workplace
(e.g., Fisher, 1993, 1998; Kass et al., 2001). Due to the critical importance of understanding how
such outcomes unfold in real-world settings, boredom research in these areas generally
gravitated towards methods that maximize these qualities, focusing largely on correlational
designs, with an emphasis on individual differences. To a focus, in other words, on trait, rather
than state boredom. At the same time, work on state boredom was ongoing in clinical
psychology (Eastwood et al., 2012) and cognitive neuroscience (Danckert & Merrifield, 2016).
This work often didn’t consider boredom to be an emotion, but rather a cognitive state or
“feeling about thinking,” and focused, accordingly, on the cognitive mechanism of attention
(Danckert & Eastwood, 2020). Both these I/O and educational approaches, and the cognitively-
focused work on attention, made valuable and much-needed contributions to the study of
boredom. However, they intersected only infrequently with theoretical work in emotion, and its
psychology in the early 2000s, and a renewed interest in the application of psychological theories
of emotion to the study of boredom. New theoretical work argued that boredom’s purpose was
motivational, intended to regulate pursuit of goals (e.g., Bench & Lench, 2013), meaning (e.g.,
Barbalet, 1999), and well-being (e.g., Elpidorou, 2014, 2020). Meanwhile, new empirical work
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 7
found that boredom was often related to a lack of not only attention, but meaning (e.g., van
Tilburg & Igou, 2012, 2017; Schmeitzky & Freund, 2012). However, these approaches largely
investigated boredom’s cognitive (e.g., attention) and motivational (e.g., meaning) components
in isolation, and did not experimentally manipulate competing mechanisms (for an in-depth
comparative review, please see Westgate & Wilson, 2018). The Meaning and Attentional
Components (MAC) model integrated these existing models, which tended to focus on single
causal mechanisms (e.g., attention, meaning, goals), by bringing them together to specify when
and how meaning and attention combine to produce feelings of boredom (Westgate & Wilson,
2018). In doing so, it defined boredom not in terms of its experiential components (e.g., altered
time perception) or downstream consequences (e.g., risk-seeking), but in terms of its key causal
concept: “unsuccessful attentional engagement in valued goal-congruent activity” (p. 6). In other
words, the MAC model treated boredom as an emotion, governed by the same constructivist
But what theories should we apply? Older theories (e.g., “basic emotions” theory) posit the
their facial, physiological, behavioral, and neural signatures. However, such theories are not
consistent with a growing body of evidence that emotions cannot be distinguished by their
physiological signatures (Siegel et al., 2018), facial expressions (Gendron et al., 2014a, b; Barrett
et al., 2019), or neural activity (Lindquist et al., 2012). Indeed, variation within emotions (e.g.,
expressions of anger) is often as great as variation between emotions (e.g., expressions of anger
vs sadness; Barrett, 2009). Nor do emotions appear to be universal; work by Gendron et al.
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 8
(2014a, b) find that different cultures categorize the same emotional expressions in very different
ways.
components (e.g., neural signatures, facial expression), what are emotions and how do we define
them? Social psychology has long recognized that the key shared component that distinguishes
specific emotions are peoples’ subjective construals of the situation (e.g., two-factor theory of
emotion, Schachter & Singer, 1962). A racing heart can be interpreted as joy or anger, depending
on the context. For instance, when we believe a blame-worthy person has violated an important
boundary (Ortony et al., 1988), we experience anger – regardless of whether we yell, stomp out
the door, or seethe quietly. From this perspective, “situated affective appraisals” do not cause
Empirical evidence suggests this is true for boredom as well: that boredom, like other
attentional engagement in valued goal-congruent (i.e., meaningful) activity (Westgate & Wilson,
2018). Experimental manipulations find that people experience boredom when an activity is too
easy or too hard to pay attention (Berlyne, 1960; Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Danckert & Merrifield,
2016; Eastwood et al., 2012; Fisher, 1993, 1998; Hamilton, 1981; Leary et al., 1986; Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985; Westgate & Wilson, 2018; Westgate et al., 2017), or when it lacks meaning
altogether (Locke & Latham, 1990; Schmeitzky & Freund, 2013; Westgate & Wilson, 2018).
Moreover, attention and meaning deficits independently elicit boredom; each is a sufficient
Appraisal theories of emotion have long recognized these appraisals as the key defining
feature distinguishing specific emotions; modern constructivist theories take this insight further,
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 9
to posit that emotions are not “natural kinds” at all (Barrett, 2006; Coan, 2010; Cunningham et
al., 2007, 2013; . That is, just as the concept of “fruit” is contextually, rather than biologically,
determined (e.g., a tomato is a vegetable in a salad, but a fruit in a botany lab), so too are
emotions (Barrett, 2017). Like other constructed categories (e.g., sandwiches, birds), where and
how to draw definitional boundaries between emotions rests on our concepts, rather than any
inherent “natural” feature. Just as we picture robins to be prototypical birds and BLTs to be
prototypical sandwiches, emotion categories (e.g., anger) too have prototypes. But these
flamingoes, hot dogs, or – in the case of emotion – quiet anger, subdued joy, or restless boredom.
For instance, whether boredom is primarily low or high arousal has been hotly contested, with
some theories defining boredom as an inherently low arousal state (Posner et al., 2005; van
Tilburg & Igou, 2016). From a constructivist approach, the question is moot: arousal should
vary. And indeed, this is consistent with the empirical evidence: boredom is just as frequently
associated with high arousal as it is with low (e.g., Chin et al., 2017; Eastwood et al., 2012,
Goetz et al., 2006, 2014, see Westgate & Wilson, 2018 for overview).
In short, boredom “behaves” like an emotion (Clore & Ortony, 2013; Barrett, 2017). In
biology, species are classified not on the basis of their superficial similarity (e.g., phenotype) but
on the basis of their evolutionary origins and development (Müller, 2007). Different species do
things? Or do they share the same causal origins and mechanisms? The evidence above suggests
they do. If boredom behaves, in all respects, like an emotion, the most parsimonious approach is
to conclude it is one.
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 10
This approach likewise clarifies what we can and cannot learn about state boredom from
past research on trait boredom. For historical reasons, the majority of past work has focused
boredom with individual differences in outcome measures of interest (e.g., depression, anxiety).
However, there are theoretical and methodological barriers to drawing inferences about
emotional states from the study of traits. If trait boredom is thought to reflect how often or how
intensely people experience state boredom, then measures of trait boredom ought to predict
measures of state boredom during actual boring experiences. However, the two most common
scales – the Boredom Susceptibility Scale (10-item subscale of the sensation seeking scale;
Zuckerman et al., 1978) and the Boredom Proneness Scale (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) - suffer
from conceptual2 and psychometric issues3; they correlate only weakly with each other (r = .25;
Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), and even more weakly with measures of lab-induced
state boredom (Boredom Proneness Scale internal meta-analysis r = .17, revised Short Boredom
This is consistent with experience sampling data, which suggests that “trait” boredom
may largely reflect situational variance in activity (Chin et al., 2017), rather than trait-like
2 The creators of the Boredom Proneness Scale theorized that “boredom and depression can both be described as
‘depressions’ in mood,” differing largely in intensity (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). Accordingly, many of the items
on the Boredom Proneness Scale have significant overlap with clinical measures of depression and anxiety, and the
BPS correlates quite well with clinical measures of depression (r = .44-.54), hopelessness (r = .41), loneliness (r =
.53), and low subjective well-being (r =-.42). Indeed, it correlates more strongly with such clinical measures than it
does with lab-induced state boredom (r = .17).
3 The Boredom Susceptibility Scale loads appropriately only for male participants, and not for female participants
(Zuckerman et al., 1978). Likewise, the Boredom Proneness Scale has an unstable factor structure, with anywhere
from two to seven factors, said to indicate boredom due to internal versus external stimulation. However, these
factors appear to be artifacts of reverse-scored items and similarly worded items; when those items are rewritten, the
Boredom Proneness Scale forms only a single factor (Struk et al., 2017).
4
The Short Boredom Proneness Scale (SBPS) is a short revised form of the Boredom Proneness Scale that addresses
its unstable factor structure, but not the theoretical framing of boredom as a less intense state of depression (Struk et
al., 2017).
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 11
individual differences. Indeed, recent longitudinal work found only 28% of variance in the BPS
scale to be due to trait-like differences in boredom; the majority of variance (64%) was due to
Boredom-as-Information
Affect confers information about the goodness (or in boredom’s case, primarily the
badness) of its object. We infer that what feels good is good (Clore et al., 2001; Clore & Tamir,
2002). Likewise, emotions provide information about the situations that elicited them. Anger
alerts us to the possibility that someone has done something blame-worthy; sadness alerts us that
a loss has occurred. Boredom acts, in short, as a dashboard light, alerting us to deficits in
meaning or attention, and preventing us from persisting at activities that have little value (Chater,
et al., 2019; Elpidorou, 2018; Westgate, 2020; Westgate & Wilson, 2018). It does this in two
ways: first, by motivating us to engage in actions and thoughts which we believe will be
interesting and enjoyable, and to avoid those we believe (correctly or incorrectly) to be boring
(Yamamoto & Ishikawa, 2010). And, secondarily, by acting as a built-in reinforcement system,
rewarding ways of thinking and behaving that are meaningful and optimally challenging (with
pleasant feelings of interest and enjoyment, instead of boredom), and discouraging those that are
We can therefore reduce boredom by resolving the underlying deficits in meaning and
attention that produce it: 1) by regulating cognitive demands and resources (to restore
altogether to those offering a better attentional fit, more meaning, or (ideally) both. This last
option may be particularly appealing; boredom often draws people towards novel alternatives
(Bench & Lench, 2019; Kapoor et al., 2015) and sensitizes them to reward (Milyavaskaya et al.,
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 12
Figure 1
The Meaning and Attentional Components (MAC) model’s predictions for how attention and
meaning combine to cause discrete emotions (in bolded italics; adapted from Westgate &
Wilson, 2018)
Meaning Component
2019). Indeed, experimental evidence finds that boredom leads to an impressive array of both
good and “bad” behaviors, including willingness to donate to charity and behave prosocially
(Pfattheicher et al., 2020; van Tilburg & Igou, 2017), as well as willingness to harm one’s self
and others (Havermans et al., 2015; Nederkoorn et al., 2016; Pfattheicher et al., 2020). This
variability reflects the lack of a direct link between emotions and behavior; because emotions do
not directly cause behavior, downstream behaviors cannot be used to define them.
Rather emotions explain and motivate - and thus inspire action indirectly - by affectively
incentivizing behavior we believe will lead us to experience more of desired emotions (e.g.,
happiness), and less of emotions we wish to avoid (e.g., shame; Baumeister et al., 2007).
about how and why boredom (and its consequences) varies across time, space, and species. Does
everyone experience boredom, and (if so) do we all experience it in the same way? Constructivist
approaches to emotion would argue no (e.g., Barrett, 2009; Lindquist, 2017). Instead, meaning
and attention should interact with individual and socioecological variables (including time) to
create variation within and across people. Just as different environments produce different
boredom outcomes, we would expect individual differences in boredom to emerge to the extent
that individual, intergroup, and cultural differences affect its underlying components: attention
and meaning.
If deficits in meaning and attention produce boredom, then boredom should not be evenly
distributed across time and space: Presumably some ecological environments offer greater
opportunities for meaning-making and challenge than others, and people living in such
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 14
environments are less likely to be bored. Within the United States, some states (e.g., Ohio &
Utah) appear to experience boredom to a greater extent than others (e.g., Oregon & Virginia), as
indicated by patterns of internet search activity (Baldwin & Westgate, 2020). Intriguingly, low
boredom areas appear to have greater diversity and meaning-making potential. And these
deaths across all 50 U.S. states, even after accounting for baseline differences in regional well-
being. People living in boredom-prone areas might not only experience boredom more frequently
relieve boredom.
How people experience boredom likely depends on culturally endorsed views of emotion,
in general, and of boredom, in particular (Barrett, 2006a,b, 2009; Gendron et al., 2014a,b). There
is considerable variation even within Westernized cultures; for instance, the German word for
boredom, Langeweile, loosely translated as a “long while” or “long period of time,” emphasizes
its temporal component, while the French ennui conveys a sense of existential angst, stemming
from the Late Latin inodaire, or “to make loathsome.” Indeed, many languages differentially
emphasize boredom’s attentional and existential components. Japanese, for instance, uses several
terms to describe boredom; 退屈, the most common translation, has a meaning similar to that in
English, but its Chinese characters originally meant to “withdraw” and “bend”, implying the
physical posture of being bored. 倦怠, in contrast, carries a connotation of fatigue or physical
exhuastion, while 飽きた,used to express the feeling of being bored, implies that one has had
enough, or is satiated. Such differences are intriguing, especially in light of evidence that
boredom induced by attentional deficits feels (and is experienced differently) than boredom
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 15
induced by meaning deficits, with the latter characterized by higher arousal and greater desire for
disengagement (van Hooft & van Hooft, 2018; Westgate & Wilson, 2018).
or causal components of boredom? It’s possible: emotions, constructivist approaches argue, stem
from the contextual categorization of sensations in the body and their perceived causes, as
belonging to recognized emotion categories (Barret, 2006b). Such categories are thought to be
culturally acquired, and both reflected in and learned via language (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2006,
2009, 2017); indeed, language is sometimes argued to be a prerequisite for higher-order emotion,
with children exhibiting more emotional specificity and complexity with developing language
acquisition (e.g., Nook et al., 2019, 2020). It follows then that some emotion constructs may be
society.
Using linguistics to parse emotional states has a long and well-established history in
social psychology and affective science (e.g., Clore et al., 1987; Ortony et al., 1987; Oishi et al.,
2013), however, it’s unclear the extent to which boredom varies cross-culturally. Past research
has been conducted predominantly (though not exclusively) in American, British, Canadian, and
German samples. One study found that Lebanese and Hong Kongese students reported greater
boredom proneness than American or Australian students, but scale items did not load equally
onto factors across cultures (Sundberg et al., 1991). This is not surprising; as reviewed earlier,
the trait boredom measure in question (Boredom Proneness Scale; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986)
has psychometric issues (Struk et al., 2017) which make direct comparison difficult.
More recently, researchers calibrated the Multidimensional State Boredom Scale across
Chinese and Canadian samples, finding state boredom to be higher among Canadians (Ng et al.,
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 16
2015). Other studies of state boredom in Chinese and South African samples (e.g., Liu et al.,
2013; Tze et al., 2013; Weybright et al., 2015; Zhou & Long, 2012 ) have found effects generally
consistent with those from “WEIRD” societies (i.e., Westernized, educated, industrialized, rich
democracies; Henrich et al., 2010), but more information is needed on how, whether and why
boredom differs across cultural settings. For instance, data on boredom during the Covid-19
pandemic suggests that boredom rates were much higher in some countries (e.g., Turkey, South
Korea) than others (e.g., France), but it’s unclear to what extent those differences reflect
underlying cultural differences versus variation in public health response strategies and pathogen
Differences in boredom are not confined to geography. Boredom may vary not only
across space, but across time; indeed, boredom is often colloquially considered to be a problem
of modernity. Even the term “boredom” is quite recent, entering the English dictionary in the
mid-19th century (1853; Oxford English Dictionary), in the midst of the industrial revolution.
However, its use as is preceded by the word bore, somewhat earlier, taken to mean the act [1768]
of being “tiresome or dull” (or to be a bore [1778], as in the authors responsible for boring their
readers). Interestingly, people could be “in a bore” as early as the 1760s, an English expression
Were people, then, less bored in the past? It’s difficult to say; evidence suggests that
teenagers at least, may be becoming more bored over time (Weybright et al., 2019). In an annual
survey of American teenagers, boredom remained relatively stable from 2008 to 2010, before
showing a slight but statistically significant increase from 2010 through 2017. These changes
on a 5-point scale endorsing the item “I am often bored” (1 = Disagree, 5 = Agree). If boredom
prevalence is increasing, it may be due to technological advances that divorce individuals from
traditional sources of meaning, including social relationships, meaningful work, and stable
The best available estimates suggest that stable individual differences account for only
about a fifth of the variance in people’s day-to-day boredom, with almost 80% due to situational
factors (Chin et al., 2017). College students are bored in college classes, kids are bored at school
(Pekrun et al., 2010; Pekrun et al., 2010), and adults are bored at work; boredom in highly
constrained environments is common across the lifespan (Chin et al., 2017). Indeed, constraint
might be one reason children and teenagers, so readily complain of boredom – they have
relatively little control over their daily activities, or daily schedules. And while control is not a
direct cause of boredom, it is a significant moderator (Troutwine & O’Neal, 1981) that may
Such constraint limits people’s ability to modulate tasks at work and school in ways that
are optimally challenging and meaningful, and are exacerbated by management decisions that
optimize efficiency over well-being. Fisher (1993; 1998) found that both too much and too little
challenge at work was associated with boredom, and many people struggle to find work
meaningful; in a recent survey, 37% of British workers thought their jobs were meaningless
(Dahlgreen, 2015). David Graeber coined the term “bullshit jobs” to describe these jobs that
contribute little of value to society, but are necessitated by the need to provide 9-5 employment
Conventional wisdom holds that boredom is particularly common among children and
teenagers, but there is surprisingly little work on boredom in these age groups (Plummer, 2019).
Boredom during free time increased modestly from the ages of 10 to 14 in a longitudinal sample
of German adolescents (Spaeth et al., 2015), and about 20% of American teenagers report high
rates of boredom, a number on the rise in recent years (f et al., 2018). However, overall rates of
boredom even among teenagers remain relatively low; the average American teenager in 2010
reported that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement “I am often bored” (Weybright
et al., 2019). One of the few studies that has compared age groups directly found little difference
between preschool-aged children and college students in how much they enjoy “thinking for
pleasure” – both children and young adults found it equally boring (Taggart & Lillard, 2017).
Complicating the issue is that children’s conceptions of emotions (including boredom) shift over
time. Childhood emotions increase in complexity from simple “good-bad” evaluations to more
means to a 3-year-old may fundamentally differ from what it means to adults (Nook et al., 2018).
bored”) drop steadily from 18 through middle age, before largely plateauing around age 60; the
limited longitudinal data available support this trend (Giambra et al., 1992). Older Americans are
slightly less likely to be bored on a day-to-day basis, compared to younger ones (Chin et al.,
2017), and the same is true for directed activities in the lab, such as thinking for pleasure (Wilson
et al., 2019). To the extent that older adults experience less boredom, it’s likely due to age-
related changes in their ability to pay attention and find meaning. Although for the most part
older adults enjoy thinking about the same as younger adults, to the extent they differ, older
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 19
adults find it slightly less boring – they’re better at paying attention to their thoughts, and more
motivated to enjoy them. This is consistent with evidence that older adults prioritize activities
with personal meaning over extrinsic benefits and thereby experience greater meaning in life
(Carstensen, 1995; Steger, et al., 2009). Older adults may also have more financial and social
resources available to select activities that are meaningful and optimally challenging. The ability
to self-select into certain environments and activities is an underrated distal cause of boredom;
experience-sampling estimates suggest that type of activity not only accounts for up to a third of
the variance in boredom during everyday life, but may partially account for boredom differences
Do our dogs get bored? What about elephants in the zoo? Before turning to examine
boredom in non-human animals, we should pause to consider a more basic question: do non-
human animals experience emotion at all? Non-human animals share many of the same
psychological and physiological building blocks – core affect, attention, predictive coding - that
combine to produce emotion in humans (Bliss-Moreau, 2017; Bliss-Moreau et al., 2018). While
some have argued that language is a prerequisite for emotion (e.g., Lindquist, 2017), it is perhaps
more useful to focus on the mechanism by which language is thought to facilitate emotional
experience, namely via the development of emotion concepts: the grouping of particular
situations into one overarching affective category (e.g., jealousy). While such concepts are
clearly aided and shaped by language (largely unique to humans), they are also shaped by
historical and cultural context and by lived experiences (not unique to humans) that allow for
predictive coding. Thus, to the extent animals experience emotion beyond core affect, it is likely
constrained by such predictive concepts. For instance, while there is some evidence that dogs
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 20
may have a “concept” of jealousy (and behavioral reactions to it) that are similar to those in
humans (Abdai et al., 2018; Harris & Prouvost, 2014; Cook et al., 2018, cf Prato-Previde et al.,
2018a,b), dogs do not appear to have a “concept” for guilt or the situations that would elicit guilt
in humans (Horowitz, 2009). And, conversely, animals may experience discrete emotions for
which humans lack concepts, such as the emotion of “sensing the vibrations of a dying family
member’s voice hundreds of miles away (as might be the case for cetaceans and elephants), or an
emotion that results from the physiological consequences of a 250 m deep dive that has turned up
a favorite food (as may be the case for California sea lions)” (Bliss-Moreau, 2017, p. 187).
There are serious ethical implications for understanding boredom in non-human animals,
given the prevalence of animals in captivity (including agriculture, zoos, aquariums, and pet
ownership) and questions of wildlife conservation (Burn, 2017). For instance, debate over free-
range chickens has focused on how much space a chicken really wants or needs; such answers
are not obvious (Dawkins et al., 2003). Debates over wildlife conservation—with serious fiscal
consequences—often revolve around the protected species’ needs, not only in terms of physical
or nutritional requirements (e.g., sufficient prey or grazing land) but also psychological well-
being. How much space does a wolf need to not only survive but flourish? While we know much
about the former, we lack rigorous theoretical frameworks to predict the latter, often relying
instead on descriptive norms, where they exist. The MAC model of boredom provides such a
framework for predicting boredom in humans (Westgate & Wilson, 2018); can it predict the
understimulation. Fur-farmed mink housed in standard cages approach new stimuli (both
pleasant and aversive) more readily than mink housed in environmentally enriched cages, as do
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 21
mice (Meagher & Mason, 2012). Rats likewise desire normally unwanted stimuli (e.g., flashes of
bright light, non-preferred food items) after periods of monotony (Berlyne, 1960; Galef &
Whiskin, 2003). Boredom has also been used as a rationale for providing enriched environments
to captive octopuses (Anderson & Wood, 2001; Mather, 2001). Many of these findings, however,
On first glance, it may seem odd to discuss meaning in the context of non-human
animals. However, meaning as defined here – the extent to which an activity is congruent with a
valued and salient goal – presumes only that animals have goals (e.g., reproduction, nutrition,
etc.) and are motivated to achieve them. This assumption is a critical component of operant
conditioning, which is effective in both human and non-human animals. Offering a charity
donation for completing an otherwise meaningless task uses the logic of operant conditioning
(i.e., offering a contingent reward for performing otherwise meaningless behaviors) to reliably
increase subjective meaning and reduce boredom in humans (Schmeitzky & Freund, 2013;
Westgate & Wilson, 2018). Incentives for human study participants vary, but often take the form
of food or social rewards, which are motivating for many non-human animals, as well. Thus, in
theory, adding a food payoff at the end of an otherwise boring task should reduce boredom in
animals, in much the same way a charity donation reduces boredom in humans – by making it
more meaningful. Indeed, recent work suggests that many of the primary sources of meaning for
humans (e.g., kin care) may be rooted in social motives we share in common with other non-
While chronic boredom in captivity is clearly a concern, smaller “doses” of boredom may
have similar adaptive functions in human and non-human animals. Boredom, it has been argued,
may be a central motivator for play in non-human animals (Burghardt, 1984). Play behavior
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 22
emerges when animals have sufficient resources to indulge in it; it’s more common in
domesticated than in wild strains of rats (Himmler et al., 2013), for instance, and less common in
animals experiencing food deprivation or other adverse conditions (Baldwin & Baldwin, 1976;
creativity in thought and behavior (Burghardt, 2015; Gasper & Middlewood, 2014; Smith, 1982).
Interestingly, boredom, under the right circumstances, is sometimes associated with increased
creativity in humans (Baird et al., 2012; Gomez-Ramirez & Kosta, 2017; Harris, 2000; Schubert,
1977, 1978; cf. Haager et al., 2018); and people who engage in creative expression, such as the
arts and humanities, report greater happiness and subjective well-being (and presumably less
boredom; Tay et al., 2018; see Westgate & Oishi, 2020 for a review). Whether boredom in
moderate amounts actually motivates play across species—including nudging humans towards
novels, dance, music-making, and similar forms of “play” —is an open question.
As research psychologists, we should care about boredom, if for no other reason than that
many of the tasks we ask of our participants often bore them. If boredom does affect behavior,
shifting people’s preferences and inclinations, then it should do so as surely in our studies as it
does in the lecture hall or boardroom. Implicitly we acknowledge this. Conventional wisdom for
online studies is to keep them short—under five minutes, ten at maximum. The implication, of
course, is that long studies increase attrition; left unspoken is why: our participants, like all
We know that boredom is bad for our research. Inattention is both a cause and common
symptom of boredom (Eastwood et al., 2012), and participants routinely fail attention checks,
resulting in lower-quality data and attrition (Abbey & Meloy, 2017). Indeed, interventions to
boost online engagement often rely implicitly on screening out inattentive participants (e.g.,
Oppenheimer et al., 2009; Thomas & Clifford, 2017), invoking intrinsic sources of meaning
(e.g., reducing anonymity, emphasizing research value, explaining study purpose; Zhou &
Fishbach, 2016), and providing extrinsic incentives to make the experience more meaningful
(e.g., cash payments, giftcards, but see Göritz, 2010 for potential backfire effects).
That bored participants don’t pay attention is problematic, but more troubling is that
boredom may alter thoughts, feelings, and behavior. For instance, boredom increases risk-taking
(Bench & Lench, 2019; Gasper & Middlewood, 2014; Kapoor et al., 2015), all of which may
actively interfere with researchers’ intended targets of study. It’s not uncommon in the emotion
literature, for instance, for researchers to treat boredom as equivalent to an affect-free state, and
(Gasper, 2018). However, such an approach is not consistent with what we now know about
boredom, which has been consistently found to be a negative affective state, with a wide range of
distinct behavioral consequences, including those above. Early work in fMRI, for instance,
assumed that participants in control conditions were in a neutral resting state (Raichle, 2015;
Shulman et al., 1997). Very quickly, however, researchers realized that participants in such
conditions, left to their own devices, were in fact engaging in mental activity of their own –
thinking, daydreaming, and mindwandering. Today, the “default mode network” is recognized as
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 24
ongoing high activity in brain regions supporting referential mental activity, emotional
processing, and memory for past experiences (Greicius et al., 2003; Raichle, 2015).
be inert – can lead to inadvertent confounds. Research in the hotly debated field of ego depletion
has historically used manipulations that may induce not only effortful self-control, but boredom.
Circling numerals on a page, or turning pegs on a pegboard, are well-known boredom inductions;
their use to this end dates back to classic work on obedience to authority (Orne, 1962) and
cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Recent work suggests that boredom may
partially explain declines in performance during tedious tasks (Inzlicht & Friese, 2019; Lin et al.,
2020). That is, while people may be capable of exerting self-control, they may choose not to do
so if they feel bored or otherwise unmotivated (e.g., Gieseler et al., 2020; Inzlicht & Schmeichel,
2012). If so, people should show declines in performance as boredom increases (and attention
decreases) over the duration of a task, but those effects should vanish when the task ends, or
when switching to a new task. Michael Inzlicht and colleagues theorize and find evidence
consistent with such an account; for instance, participants exhibit small but significant depletion-
like effects – namely decreases in performance and attention (but also increases in fatigue and
boredom) - within a task, that then return to baseline when participants shift to a new task
(Francis et al., 2020; Lin et al., 2020). Boredom and fatigue may have more in common than
previously realized: notably, participants find boring tasks (e.g., passively observing number
strings) even more fatiguing than cognitively effortful versions of the same task (e.g., mentally
adding three to each digit of a four-digit number; Milyavaskaya et al., 2019). Other researchers
have also noted this, advancing theories explicitly linking boredom to ego depletion (Wolff &
Martarelli, 2020).
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 25
improve our capacity to draw causal inferences. The use of online data has already necessitated
steps in this direction, due to attrition in boring studies. Longitudinal designs, where item
repetition may lead to boredom, use different item versions (calibrated to adjust for known
differences, or equated via IRT) to limit this possibility (Salthouse et al., 2006). Cognitive
psychology has also explored ways to make paradigms more interesting; for instance, Rosedahl
& Ashby (2018) tested the use of cartoon fish (in lieu of traditional Gabor patches) as stimuli.
They found the cartoon fish to have a simple and well-understood perceptual presentation that
could be easily varied on a number of orthogonal dimensions, and which (anecdotally) increased
participant interest and reduced task fatigue. Reducing boredom in our research may not only
lead to an improved experience for our participants, but better data quality, while eliminating
potential confounds due to the accidental (and unwanted) intrusion of emotion into our measures
and manipulations.
Future Directions
It may be surprising that an air traffic controller or a nuclear plant operator could feel
bored when people’s lives are at stake. Certainly none of us want to think our anesthesiologist is
bored while we’re lying on the operating table. But while boredom may not be pleasant, it is an
effective signal. When boredom strikes, we can infer that we aren’t able to pay attention or find
meaning in the moment (Westgate & Wilson, 2018). And it can occur even during critically
important moments if people (including air traffic controllers and anesthesiologists) aren’t
emotion, examining its occurrence over the range of human (and, in some cases, non-human)
WHY BOREDOM MATTERS 26
experience. Consistently, we find evidence that boredom not only behaves like an emotion, but
that treating it as one provides a useful framework for understanding its causes and
consequences. Such boredom, in moderation, is adaptive – in the best case, serving as creative
fuel for enriching global culture (with literature, visual art, and music) and solving our most
pressing contemporary problems (e.g., artificial intelligence, wealth and resource inequality,
climate change). In this light, boredom represents not just a meaningful avenue for future
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