DANDY V.

QUIJANO, Petitioner,
VS.
GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC (LABOR ARBITER, NLRC-NCR SOUTH), AND ALBERTO
R. QUIMPO (COMMISSIONER, NLRC-FIRST DIVISION), Respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Dandy Quijano filed before this Court a verified complaint written in Pilipino
against herein respondents Atty. Geobel A. Bartolabac (Bartolabac), Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo
(Quimpo) of the same Commission for violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
According to complainant, respondents violated his constitutional right to due process in
failing to execute the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561
entitled Quijano v. Mercury Drug Corporation.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant was dismissed from service by the Mercury Drug Corporation
(corporation). He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Eventually, the
case was elevated to this Court, which promulgated its Decision in favor of herein
complainant ordering, among others, his reinstatement. The corporation’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Quijano avers that he filed with respondent Labor Arbiter Bartolabac a motion for
execution but despite the final resolution of his case, Bartolabac issued an order that in
effect changed the tenor of the final judgment. While the decision of the Court had
mandated complainant’s reinstatement, Bartolabac instead awarded back wages and
separation pay.
Pursuant to the Resolution of the Court, Bartolabac issued an alias writ of execution.
However, respondent Bartolabac allegedly again unilaterally issued another order
attendant of the corporation instead of his original position of warehouseman.
Subsequently, respondent Commissioner Quimpo overturned the above order of
Bartolabac and directed the payment of separation pay rather than reinstatement to a
substantially similar position as ordered by the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are liable for their acts in deviating from the final and
executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561.
HELD:
The Court is firm in its adjudication that complainant must be reinstated to his former
position as warehouseman or to a substantially equivalent position.
Clearly, the Court is unwilling to accept the corporation and respondent labor arbiter’s
reason that reinstatement is no longer feasible because the position of warehouseman
had already been abolished and there is no substantially equivalent position in the
corporation.
Both the labor arbiter and commissioner do not have any latitude to depart from the
Court’s ruling. The Decision in G.R. No. 126561 is final and executory and may no
longer be amended. It is incumbent upon respondents to order the execution of the
judgment and implement the same to the letter. Respondents have no discretion on this
matter, much less any authority to change the order of the Court. The acts of
respondent cannot be regarded as acceptable discretionary performance of their
functions as labor arbiter and commissioner of the NLRC, respectively, for they do not
have any discretion in executing a final decision. The implementation of the final and
executory decision is mandatory.
As held in Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Embang:
Once the case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to
rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party
is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it. The Court reiterates the
pronouncement in Salicdan v. Court of Appeals:
Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
Again, we are unceasing in emphasizing that the decision in the labor case has become
final and executory since 1999. There can be no justification for the overturning of the
Court’s reinstatement order by the NLRC First Division and full satisfaction of the
monetary award of only three (3) years after the finality of the judgment.
The Court is not used to compel the corporation to instantly restore the position of
warehouseman if it has been already abolished. Indeed, the Court granted that
complainant could be reinstated to a substantially equivalent or similar position as a
viable alternative for the corporation to carry out.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondents liable for violating
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents Labor
Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo are hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) months.
EURO-LINEA, PHILS., INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JIMMY O. PASTORAL,
respondents.
Facts:

On August 17, 1983, petitioner hired Pastoral as shipping expediter on a probationary

basis for a period of six months ending February 18, 1984. However, prior to hiring by
petitioner, Pastoral had been employed by Fitscher Manufacturing Corporation also as
shipping expediter for more than one and a half years. Pastoral was absorbed by
petitioner but under a probationary basis.

Pastoral received a memorandum terminating his probationary employment effective

also on February 4, 1984 in view of his failure to meet the performance standards set by
the company. To contest his dismissal, Pastoral filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal,

Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC but the appeal was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondent's dismissal was justifiable.

Ruling:

No.

Petitioner not only failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate the cause of
private respondent's dismissal, but likewise failed to cite particular acts or instances to
show the latter's poor performance.

Furthermore, what makes the dismissal highly suspicious is the fact that while petitioner
claims that respondent was inefficient, it retained his services until the last remaining
two weeks of the six months probationary employment.

No less important is the fact that private respondent had been a shipping expediter for
more than one and a half years before he was absorbed by petitioner. It therefore
appears that the dismissal in question is without sufficient justification.

It must be emphasized that the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay- off an

employee must be done without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only
petitioner's position but also his means of livelihood. (Remerco Garments Manufacturing
vs. Minister of Labor, 135 SCRA 137 [1985]). The right of an employer to freely select or
discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise
of its paramount police power (PAL, Inc. vs. PALEA, 57 SCRA 489 [1974]). This is so
because the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more
vital than the preservation of corporate profits (Phil. Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC,
106 SCRA 444 [1981]; Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, supra).

Finally, it is significant to note that in the interpretation of the protection to labor and
social justice provisions of the constitution and the labor laws and rules and regulations
implementing the constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has always adopted the
liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights. (Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v.
CIR, 127 SCRA 268 [1984]).
METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RAMON M. GARCIA,
respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent Ramon M. Garcia started working with petitioner Metro Transit
Organization (METRO) as a station teller in 1984. On 22 April 1992 he called up the
office of METRO and asked his immediate supervisor Carlos Limuaco if he could go on
leave of absence as he was proceeding to Cebu to look for his wife and children who
suddenly left home without his knowledge. After a few weeks of fruitless search he
returned to Manila.

When he reported to the office on 15 May 1992 Garcia was not allowed to resume work
but was directed by his section head to proceed to the legal department of METRO
where he would undergo investigation. There he was asked by one Noel Pili about his
absence from work. After he explained to Pili his predicament, Pili cut short the inquiry
and informed him right away that it would be better for him to resign rather than be
terminated for his absences. Still in a state of extreme agitation and weighed down by a
serious family problem, Garcia at once prepared a resignation letter. Then he left again
for the province to look for his family. But like his first attempt his effort came to naught.
Soon after, the Personnel Committee of METRO approved his resignation.

Meanwhile, Garcia sought advice from the president of his labor union and asked that
the union intervene in his case by bringing the matter of his forced resignation before
their grievance machinery for arbitration. METRO paid no heed to the problem and
rejected Garcia's plea that he be not considered resigned from his employment. Thus
Garcia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

At the hearings, petitioner maintained that private respondent absented himself on 22

April 1992 without official leave and then later on freely and willingly relinquished his
employment because he was establishing his own business. This position was rebuffed
by the Labor Arbiter who found for private respondent and ordered petitioner to
"immediately reinstate complainant Ramon M. Garcia to his former position as station
teller without loss of seniority rights and to pay him back wages plus attorney's fees .

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and thereafter denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC is right in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
thereafter denied petitioner's motions.

Ruling:
Yes.

The Court was not persuaded that Garcia had already made up his mind to resign, as
petitioner would have us believe, even before he was told by an immediate superior to
report to the legal department for investigation. If this was so, he would have already
prepared a formal letter of resignation to hand over to management as soon as he
reported for work. Notably, it was only after Garcia met with Investigating Officer Noel
Pili to explain the reason for his absence that he wrote a resignation letter as prompted
by pill. The resignation was clearly an offshoot of that fateful meeting.

An examination of the circumstances surrounding the submission of the letter indicates

that the resignation was made without proper discernment so that it could not have
been intelligently and voluntarily done. During his encounter with Pili, respondent Garcia
asked, " . . . ano ba ang gagawin ko kasi aalis uli ako, kailangan kong ayusin ang
problema ko . . . sabi n'ya mag-resign ka na lang para hindi ka na ma-terminate.” Verily,
what Pili did as petitioner's representative was to advise Garcia, who at that time was
thoroughly confused and bothered no end by a serious family problem, that he had
better resign or face the prospect of an unceremonious termination from service for
abandonment of work. At that precise moment, the employee could not be said to have
fully understood what he was doing, i.e., writing his resignation letter, nor could have
foreseen the consequences thereof, for it is established that as soon as he came out of
the investigation office he prepared his resignation letter right then and there at a table
nearby with no time for reflection. It is noteworthy that shortly thereafter he consulted his
union president for help regarding his forced resignation. This does not indicate by any
means a resignation that was knowingly and voluntarily done. On the contrary, it shows
that his writing and handing in the resignation letter to petitioner were a knee-jerk
reaction triggered by that singular moment when he was left with no alternative but to
accede, having been literally forced into it by being presented with the more unpleasant
fate of being terminated.

In validating the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that private respondent was indeed illegally
dismissed, the NLRC similarly saw beyond the resignation letter and considered it for
what it was.

Petitioner could have fairly settled the problem of its employee and avoided litigation
had it listened judiciously to the former's explanation for his absences. An employer may
have to bend a little backwards if only to accommodate an employee who is heavily
burdened with a grave family crisis. For it is worth remembering that the objectives of
social justice can be realized only if employers in appropriate situations extend their
hand to their employees in dire need of help. Certainly, a termination without just cause
entitles a worker to reinstatement.
CANDIDO ALFARO, Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STAR

PAPER CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS:

Alfaro, helper/janitor of Star Paper took his sick leave. When he returned, he was
surprised that another worker was recruited in his place. He was transferred to wrapping
section where he was required to render overtime and he was given new assignment
which was more difficult. When he complained because he just recovered from sick, he
was treated rude until he was told to look for another job because he was dismissed.
Then, he just asked for his 13th month pay and 15 days sick leave but he was advised
to just return next year.

When Alfaro returned for his claims, a check amounting to P3, 000.00 was dangled to
him which will be given only if he would sign the documents. Desperate, Alfaro signed
the said document, Resignation and Release and Quit claim.

Alfaro filed a case against the Star Paper for non-payment of separation pay which was
later amended by claiming illegal dismissal and damages in lieu of separation pay, with
a prayer for reinstatement with backwages and attorney’s fees.

Labor Arbiter’s report to the National Labor Relations Commission shows that petitioner
‘resigned voluntarily’. The same report likewise mentioned the "Quitclaim and Release"
which further strengthened the fact that petitioner resigned due to his ailment. CA
affirmed the NLRC. Hence, this recourse.

Issues: Whether or not Alfaro was illegally dismissed

Ruling: NO.

Generally, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to

separation pay. In the present case, however, upon the request of Star Paper, Alfaro
agreed to a scheme whereby the former would receive separation pay despite having
resigned voluntarily. Thus, the terms and conditions they both agreed upon constituted
a contract freely entered, which should be performed in good faith, as it constituted the
law between the parties.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned, simply because of a change of mind.
The position taken by the Star is more credible than that of complainant. This is evident
from the fact that the complaint filed by Alfaro more than two (2) years from his alleged
dismissal was only payment of separation pay. It was only later when complainant
abandoned his claim for separation pay and instead filed an amended complaint
claiming that he was, illegally dismissed.

The foregoing coupled with the fact that there is practically no evidence on record which
shows that complainant was pressured and made to sign a resignation letter and
Release and Quitclaim against his will and better judgment only shows that his claim of
illegal dismissal is unsubstantiated and is a mere afterthought.

Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an employee, who finds himself in a

situation in which he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from
his employment. Termination of the employment relations of Alfaro with STAR was
ultimately, if not outrightly inevitable. Resignation with separation pay was the best
option for him under the circumstances.

Clearly then, the claim of petitioner that he was illegally dismissed cannot be sustained,
considering that his voluntary resignation has been indubitably established as a fact by
the three tribunals below. Indeed, illegal dismissal and voluntary resignation are
adversely opposed modes of terminating employment relations, in that the presence of
one precludes that of the other.

Although the Supreme Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the
workers and has upheld their cause in their conflicts with the employers, such inclination
has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine. An
employee who resigns and executes a quitclaim in favor of the employer is generally
estopped from filing any further money claims against the employer arising from the
employment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.