BPI v CA

First Union borrowed from BPI the sums of Five Million Pesos (PhP5,000,000.00) and One
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars and 32 cents (USD123,218.32), evidenced by separate
promissory notes. As partial security for the loan obligations of First Union, defendant Linda and
her spouse (Eddy Tien) executed a Real Estate Mortgage Agreement dated August 29, 1997, 7
covering two (2) condominium units. Linda executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement dated
April 14, 1997 8 where she agreed to be solidarily liable with First Union for its obligations to
BPI. Despite repeated demands to satisfy the loan obligations upon maturity, First Union failed to
pay BPI the amounts due.

Procedural History:

On April 1, 2002, First Union and Linda filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that BPI violated
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules); BPI failed to attach to the complaint the
necessary board resolution authorizing Asis and Ong to institute the collection action against First
Union and Linda.

On August 7, 2002, BPI filed an "Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss," arguing that the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping sufficiently established Asis' and Ong's
authority to file the complaint and proof of their authority could be presented during the trial.
Further, BPI alleged that a complaint "can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure if there was no certification against forum shopping." The provision,
according to BPI, "does not even require that the person certifying should show proof of his
authority to do so."

Instead of submitting a board resolution, BPI attached a "Special Power of Attorney" (SPA) dated
December 20, 2001 executed by Zosimo A. Kabigting (Zosimo), Vice-President of BPI. The SPA
authorized Asis and Ong or any lawyer from the Benedicto Versoza Gealogo and Burkley Law
Offices to initiate any legal action against First Union and Linda.

In their Comment to BPI's Opposition, First Union and Linda challenged BPI's reading of the law,
charging that it lacked jurisprudential support. First Union and Linda argued, invoking Public
Estates Authority v. Elpidio Uy, that "an initiatory pleading which does not contain a board
resolution authorizing the person to show proof of his authority is equally guilty (sic) of not
satisfying the requirements in the Certification against Non-Forum Shopping. It is as if though
(sic) no certification has been filed." Thus, according to First Union and Linda, BPI's failure to
attach a board resolution "shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the case without prejudice . . . ." First Union
and Linda likewise questioned the belated submission of the SPA, which in any case, "is not the
board resolution envisioned by the rules since the plaintiff herein is a juridical person."

BPI's Reply to the Comment argued that the cited Public Estates Authority case is not authoritative
since "what is proscribed is the absence of authority from the board of directors, not the failure to
attach the board resolution to the initiatory pleading." BPI contended that the "primary
consideration is whether Asis and Ong were authorized by BPI, not the failure to attach the proof
of authority to the complaint." BPI also begged the "kind indulgence of the Honorable Court as it
inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney the Corporate Secretary's
Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his substitutes."

On August 22, 2002, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting First Union's and Linda's Motion
to Dismiss. The trial court denied BPI's Motion for Reconsideration on November 13, 2002.
BPI, on February 5, 2003, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA. It alleged that that lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint despite the submission of the SPA and the
Corporate Secretary's Certificate.

In their Comment to the petition, First Union and Linda submitted that the petition is an improper
remedy since an order granting a motion to dismiss is not interlocutory. They contended that the
dismissal is final in nature; hence, an appeal, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, is the
proper recourse.

The CA disagreed with First Union and Linda's contention. The assailed order, according to the
CA, categorically stated that the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. As a dismissal
without prejudice, the order is interlocutory in nature and is not a final order.

The CA, however, found that BPI failed to comply with the procedural requirements on non-forum
shopping. Citing Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA ruled that the requirement that a
petition should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations since the
Rules of Court do not distinguish between natural and civil persons. Digital Microwave Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, et al. holds that "where a petitioner is corporation, the certification against forum
shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative."

While the CA did not question the authority of Asis and Ong as bank representatives, the Bank
however failed to show — through an appropriate board resolution — proof of their authority as
representatives. To the CA, this failure warranted the dismissal of the complaint.

The CA lastly refused to accord merit to BPI's argument that it substantially complied with the
requirements of verification and certification; BPI only submitted the SPA and the Board
Resolution after it had filed the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of non-forum
shopping are requirements that are basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural
orderliness.

Ruling:
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural
requirements it imposes. The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of non-
forum shopping are requirements that — as pointed out by the Court, time and again — are basic,
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
Thus, we cannot simply and in a general way apply — given the factual circumstances of this case
— the liberal jurisprudential exception in Shipside and its line of cases to excuse BPI's failure to
submit a board resolution. While we may have excused strict compliance in the past, we did so
only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the
effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. In other words, the rule for the
submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form and substance, remains to be a
strict and mandatory rule; any liberal application has to be justified by ample and sufficient reasons
that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from, the mandatory character of the rule.

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not
intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under
which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful
confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the
orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to
obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
decision dated November 2, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Hon. Romeo Barza, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 75350), and the subsequent resolution dated May 25,
2005 denying BPI's Motion for Reconsideration. The complaint filed against the respondents is
DISMISSED without prejudice. Costs against the petitioner.