Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs.

Santos

FACTS:

De Koning obtained a loan from Metrobank in the principal amount of 2M+ evidenced by
promissory note. To secure the payment of the loan, De Koning executed a real estate mortgage in favor
of Metrobank over a condominium unit and all its improvements located in Cityland HV Dela Costa.

De Koning failed to pay his loan despite demand thus metro bank instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings against the REM. Metrobank was the highest bidder at the public auction of
the condo unit and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor. The bank duly registered the COS with
ROD for Makati City.

The redemption period lapsed without De Koning redeeming the property. Metrobank demanded
that he turn over possession of the property but de Koning refused.

So Metrobank filed with RTC Makati an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over the
foreclosed property pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended.

During the ex parte hearing, De Koning's counsel appeared and manifested that he filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that Metrobank's petition violated Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the ROC
(certification against forum shopping) which requires the attachment of a certification against
forum shopping to a complaint or other initiatory pleading.

CLAIM OF De Koning: Metrobank's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession involved the same
parties, the same issues and the same subject matter as the case he had filed on October 30, 1998 with
the RTC of Makati, to question Metrobank's right to foreclose the mortgage. De Koning also had a pending
petition for certiorari with the CA, which arose from the RTC case he filed. When Metrobank failed to
disclose the existence of these two pending cases in the certification attached to its petition, it failed to
comply with the mandatory requirements of the Rules so that its petition should be dismissed.

RTC RULING: RTC agreed with De Koning and dismissed Metrobank's petition. Denied Metrobank's MR
hence a petition for certiorari with CA.

CA RULING: CA affirmed the dismissal of Metrobank's petition. It explained that Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules is not limited to actions, but covers any "initiatory pleading" that asserts a claim for relief.

Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N Metrobank's petition for issuance of a writ of possession is failed to comply with Sec. 5 of
Rule 7.

METROBANK'S ARGUMENT: Metrobank claims that an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is not an initiatory pleading asserting a claim. Rather, it is a mere incident in the transfer of
title over the real property which was acquired by Metrobank through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Thus, the petition is not covered by Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules and a certification against forum shopping is not required.

RULING: No, the Petition is in compliance with Sec. 5, Rule 7.

The writ of possession under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended, In order to obtain a writ of
possession, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale must file a petition, in the form of an ex parte motion, in
the registration or cadastral proceedings of the registered property.

The reason why this pleading, although denominated as a petition, is actually considered
a motion is best explained in Sps. Arquiza v. CA:

The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other

initiatory pleading. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the
respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent denominated its
pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a
petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but
rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a
material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters
in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object
of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy. An
application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding. Hence,
although it was denominated as a "petition," it was in substance merely a motion.

Since a petition for a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, is
neither a complaint nor an initiatory pleading, a certificate against non-forum shopping is not
required. The certificate that Metrobank attached to its petition is thus a superfluity that the lower court
should have disregarded.

Petition is Granted.

PADLAN vs. DINGLASAN

FACTS:

Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land. One day while on board a jeepney, Elenitas
mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that
Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to
Maura. Maura subdivided the property into several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband
Felicisimo Dinglasan.

Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyer through falsified deed of sale bearing the forged
signature of Elenita and her husband.

Maura sold one of the lots to one Lorna Ong who in turn sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan.

After learning what happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of the lot but the
latter refused. Hence, a case was filed before the RTC of Balanga, bataan for the Cancellation of TCT.
Summon was served to petitioner through her Mother, Anita Padlan.

Respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed that they allowed to present evidence ex
parte.

Petitioner, through counsel, then filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default with Motion to
Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of Defendant. Petition claimed that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only by
means of substituted service through her mother because Petitioner is now residing in Japan after she
married a Japanese national.

RTC declared petitioner in default and when it rendered a Decision, it ruled that the petitioner to be a
buyer in good faith and consequently dismissed the complaint.

Respondent filed an appeal with the CA. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

Hence this case.

In filing this petition, petitioner maintained that the summons was not validly served upon her considering
that at the time the summon was served, she was residing in Japan. She contends that pursuant to Sec.
15 of Rule, when the defendant does not reside in the Philippines and the subject of the action is property
within the Philippines of the defendant, service may be effected out of the Philippines by personal service
or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, the summon was served only by
substituted service to her mother hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.

Also, petitioner posits that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, considering that from the
complaint, it can be inferred that the value of the property was only P4,000.00, which was the amount
alleged by respondents that the property was sold to petitioner by Lorna.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.

RULING:

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to
be consulted.

In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the respondents in their complaint can be
granted, the issue of who between the two contending parties has the valid title to the subject lot must
first be determined before a determination of who between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title
covering the property in question.

From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the cancellation of a
particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The determination of such issue merely
follows after a court of competent jurisdiction shall have first resolved the matter of who
between the conflicting parties is the lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately
entitled to its possession and enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of
these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction over which is determined by the
assessed value of such lot

In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint
that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even
presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings,
respondents' counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the
next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor's Office. However, they
did not present such copy.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it
should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property
subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot
is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all
proceedings in

the RTC are null and void.

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK vs. ONGPIN

FACTS:

Philippine Apparel, Inc. entered into a credit agreement with petitioner UCCPB for a case-to-case credit
line in the amount of US500k. Ongpin, then controlling stockholder of PAI, signed as surety,
binding himself jointly and severally liable with PAI for the same amount. PAI availed of the credit
line by drawing on short-term loans and opening letters of credit for the importation of goods.

PAI failed to pay its obligations hence petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Ongpin
with the RTC Makati to enforce his obligation as surety of PAI. Petitioner sought the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment on the following grounds: (1) respondent, in fraud of creditors, had
transferred residence to Hongkong; (2) his obligation was not covered by any collateral; and (3) PAI and
its officers, including respondent, with intent to defraud, did not disclose the fact that the Bureau of
Customs had claims against PAI for unpaid customs duties and taxes in the amount of P284,010,387.00,
which fact could have affected petitioner's decision whether to grant the loan to PAI.

the trial court issued an order granting petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. Then a writ of attachment and notice of garnishment
were issued.

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint and to quash the writs issued by
the trial court on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent since the summon was unserved as of nov. 17, 1995. The
motion was denied.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the orders of the
trial court. During the pendency of the petition, the petitioner filed with the trial court a
Motion for Leave to serve summons through publication which was granted.
The publication was held in abeyance but the Petitioner only received the trial
court’s order at the close of office hours on October 3, 1996. The publication was
attempted to be prevented but was not successful. Today magazine the published the
summons on Oct. 4.

CA promulgated its Decision on Feb. 27, 1997 validating the issuance of Writ of
Attachment but the implementation is prohibited until after the Court shall
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner either through
voluntary appearance or service of summons.

The MR of respondent was denied by CA.

Again, during the pendency of the case, petitioner filed with the trial court on
August 15, 1997 another Motion to Serve Summons through Publication with
Leave of Court. In the meantime, on August 27, 1997, this Court issued a resolution
dismissing petitioner's petition for review on certiorari for failure of petitioner to comply
with procedural requirements.
Service of Summon was made by the court’s sheriff at the PILTEL where
Ongpin is expected to attend a board meeting. The summon was received by a
person named Morallo. But when it tried to forward to Ongpin, the lawyer refused to
received this.

The sheriff then implemented the writ of attachment by serving notices of

garnishment.

Respondent filed with the trial court an Urgent Omnibus Motion to dismiss and prohibit
the implementation of writs. This was denied by the trial court.

A Petition for certiorari was filed with CA. The Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision on December 27, 2000, annulling and setting aside the orders of the trial court,
dated April 19, 1999 and October 13, 1999, on the ground that PILTEL was not the
regular place of business of respondent and that, even if it was, Morallo could not be
considered a competent person in charge of respondent's office, as she was the
executive secretary of the president of PILTEL and not of respondent. Hence, this petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure

Hence this case.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent Ongpin's continuous "special appearances"

before the court for five years may be deemed voluntary appearance as
contemplated by the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure on acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of defendant; and (2) whether or not the substituted
service of summons on Anne V. Morallo, executive secretary of the president of PILTEL,
was valid.

RULING:

This contention has no merit. A party who makes a special appearance in court
challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground, e.g., invalidity
of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. In fact, in La Naval Drug Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
this Court ruled that even the assertion of affirmative defenses aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant cannot be considered a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.

In the present case, although respondent had indeed filed numerous pleadings,
these pleadings were precisely for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of respondent on the ground that there was no valid
service of summons on him. It would be absurd to hold that respondent, by
making such appearance, thereby submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court.

Further, the Court ruled that substituted service of summons made on the
executive secretary of the president of PILTEL, of which Ongpin was the chairman
of the Board but not holding regular office therein, was not valid, as the said
secretary is not authorized to receive service of process on behalf of
Ongpin. On the alleged unknown whereabouts of Ongpin, service may be effected
by publication as provided by law.