AC No.

99-634            June 10, 2002 he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the
hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, 
vs. "That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent. Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify
the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by
PANGANIBAN, J.: Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999,
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and attached as Annex C;
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is
not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary "That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C.
consideration. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the
The Case certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent
the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is Annexes D and E;
accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
"x x x           x x x           x x x complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, conduct;"
sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law x x x           x x x           x x x.1
Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant
of contract; "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as
a kumpadre  of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former
demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this
inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former --
suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer,
which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to deliver the letter to the
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00); addressee.

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting,
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to
attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately; settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had 1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress; 2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. 4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office
to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait; All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the
asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter
personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had
the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal
at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was
almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint;
and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, hence, the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the
the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees
to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was and not for the filing fee.
told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should
give the filing fee later. We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
the defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to
filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession.5 Members
Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.6
agreement.
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre  of one
complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's of his partners.
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of
the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To
not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by complainant. constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he. promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
handle the case for which his service had been sought.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows: view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.7
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the
filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees.8 Hence,
by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that
misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre,  the
misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03
profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal
deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his matters entrusted to them.
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his
offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a
period of one (1) year."4 client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
The Court's Ruling zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their
We agree with the Commission's recommendation. utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client,
save by the rules of law legally applied.10
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office
to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to
the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon
for the filing fee. discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately
taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct
purpose of the payment. SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, 
vs.
The Practice of Law – a Profession, Not a Business ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession RESOLUTION
and not a business.11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and MELO, J.:
law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is
not a professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members
noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
without making much money.14 interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which complainant might obtain.
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the
receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional Criminal Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also
capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of
hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession. preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal
and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.16 It may be true
that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for
come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty.
such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte  was received against them
professional misconduct.17 In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution
interest within the bounds of law. was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was
levied upon.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases,
the public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and
filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao,
that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty. Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of and recommendations:
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED  from the practice of Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
a copy in respondent's file. Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta
SO ORDERED. and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas,
Puno, J.*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ.,  concur. that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy
 in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to RESOLUTION
stand on.  
CASTRO, C.J.:
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and
in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who
alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court. whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4, letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
Resolution) refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty thenceforth submitted for resolution.
to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court. At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant. The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section
SO ORDERED. 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur. order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
 SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
Roll of Attorneys. prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
of the Court Rule: sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual convenience of individual lawyers. 3
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
... Apropos  to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of
of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
void and of no legal force and effect. extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable
by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court
to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The
issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence,
granted for the exercise of the legal profession. the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ... individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court. (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
which reads: program — the lawyers.9
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of
xxx xxx xxx the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and State. 10
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
effectively. toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting
the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and 3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns. But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall. compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
them seriatim. name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8 necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars,
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the credited.10
power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby 21 September 201212and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur. negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
B.M. No. 2540               September 24, 2013 from the practice of law.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner. akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.: In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed
Medado (Medado). the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
Laws in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked
average of 82.7.2 by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied:
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention
Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung
the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right
Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6 thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
record.7 demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly be a member of the Philippine Bar.
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation
practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19
and was subsequently forgotten."9
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer,
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession. we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him
a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
years of inaction. unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the
30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
an honest error of judgment."22 WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR
We disagree. after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000
for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its this Court.
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance country.
before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an SO ORDERED.
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Chief Justice
Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When,
in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary [B.M. No. 1209. July 1, 2003]
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE BAR MATTER NO. 1209 LAWYER'S OATH
EN BANC
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an
attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect Gentlemen:
contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding,
however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 1 2003.
charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that RESOLUTION. B.M. No. 1209(In Re: Petition to Take the Bar Matter No. 1209 Lawyer's
petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized Oath, Caesar Z. Distrito, petitioner.)
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him. Before the court is a Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign in the Roll of Attorneys
dated April 22, 2002 filed by Caesar Z. Distrito, a successful 2001 Bar Examinee.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: The petitioner is a former Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay Singcang
Airport, BacolodCity.On September 18, 1999, an Information for Usurpation of Authority or
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of Official Function under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code[1]cralaw was filed against him
law. which read:
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is That on or about the 18th day of September, 1999, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being the President of
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar the Bacolod City Sangguniang Kabataan Federation, a government agency, did then and
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in there under pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, willfully,
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
unlawfully and feloniously preside over the special session of the said Federation, in
violation of the aforestated law.[2]cralaw May I inquire from your good office, whether a bar passer who has not taken his oath in
view of the pending criminal case filed against him can attached (sic) to his name the
The petitioner was conditionally allowed to take the 2001 Bar Examinations [3]cralaw and nomenclature atty.?Such is the case of Mr. Caesar Z. Distrito , SK Federation, Bacolod City
passed the same.He could not, however, take the Lawyer's Oath nor sign in the Roll of Vice-President whopassed the bar last May 2002, but has not taken his oath due to the
Attorneys pending the resolution of the above-mentioned case. pending criminal case lodged in MTCC branch 4, Bacolod City for Usurpation of Power
charge against him by the undersigned.
On August 2, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter [4]cralaw from a
certain Mr. Benjie Montinola informing the said office that there were other cases filed Ms. Espinosa attached a copy of an attendance sheet of a Sangguniang
against the petitioner which were not duly disclosed in the latter's petition to take the bar Panglungsod committee hearing dated June 21, 2002 where the petitioner's name
examinations, to wit: appeared to have been signed, along with the word "Atty."

1.Two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22 filed sometime in 1999, On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the
docketed as B.C.I.S. 99-6735 and 99-6736, before the City Prosecutor's Office of Bacolod; Roll of Attorneys alleging that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod, rendered a decision acquitting him in Criminal Case No. 99609. [5]cralaw Attached
2.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on July 26, 2001, before the MTCC, thereto was a certified true copy of the decision in the said criminal case and a certificate of
Bacolod, in which an adverse decision dated April 1, 2002 was rendered; finality of judgment.[6]cralaw The OBC informed the petitioner of the above-mentioned
charges and required him to comment on the same.
3.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on March 15, 2002, before MTCC,
Bacolod. In his Comment dated May 12, 2003, the petitioner avers that when he filed his petition to
take the 2001 bar exams, the criminal case for usurpation of authority or official function
Mr. Montinola also alleged in his letter that the petitioner took his oath as an Integrated Bar was the only pending case against him at the time.He did not mention I.S.B.C. Case Nos.
of the Philippines (IBP) member, knowing fully well that he had not yet taken his oath as a 99-6735 and 6736 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in his petition because he was of the honest
lawyer before the Supreme Court nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys Mr. Montinola further belief that it was no longer necessary for him to do so, considering that the cases had long
averred: been settled and dismissed without even reaching the arraignment stage. [7]cralaw The said
criminal cases apparently stemmed from the debts of some 50 fish vendors
The fact that CAESAR Z. DISTRITO have (sic)not disclosed the above-mentioned criminal at Magsungay Village.The petitioner's father, as the punong barangay, had guaranteed the
and civil case filed against him in his application form despite his personal knowledge of the same in order to help the fishermen.But as the drawer of the two checks, the complainant
same when he applied for the Bar Exams sometime in 2001, is tantamount to PERJURY filed the action against the petitioner when the debts remained unpaid.
and that should be acted upon by your respectable office to protect the integrity of our
present lawyers who will be our future Prosecutors, Judges, Justices or even High Ranking As regards the civil cases, the petitioner avers that the same stemmed from salary loans
Cabinet or Government Officials or even President of our country. that he, along with other barangay officials and employees, obtained from Fil-Global Credit
and Asset Management Inc. and SWIP Lending Corporation on January 13,
The unethical act of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO when he took his oath as a lawyer/member 2000 and August 22, 2000, respectively, when he was Barangay SK
before a testimonial dinner tendered by the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter and witnessed Chairman.The barangay treasurer regularly deducted from his salary the payment for the
not only by it's Officials, present members and honored guests but by thousands of said loans until such time when he completed the payment to Fil-Global on January 31,
Television viewers not only in Bacolod City but the whole of Western Visayas if not the 2001 and for SWIUP Lending on April 30, 2001.The barangay treasurer thereafter issued a
whole country, despite also of his personal knowledge that he is not qualified to do so for certification of complete payment.[8]cralaw When the petitioner came back to Bacolod after
the same reason above-stated, is tantamount to IMPERSONATION that should be properly the bar exams, he was surprised to learn that their barangay officials and employees were
acted upon by the said body who will be furnished a copy of this information and to also facing cases for sum of money filed by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending because apparently,
protect their integrity and to avoid similar incident that may happen in the future for lack of their payments were not duly remitted.He received summons only on October 22,
proper screening. 2001 and April 4, 2002 from the MTCC, Bacolod City.The finance officer and the treasurer
promised to settle everything, but they failed to do so until their term expired on August 15,
Mr. Montinola attached to his letter copies of the complaint as well as a copy of the decision 2002.After the decision was rendered by the MTCC, the petitioner paid the plaintiffs in the
in Civil Case No. 26837. said cases, as evidenced by official receipt nos. 8169 [9]cralaw and 9019[10]cralaw issued by
Fil-Global and SWIP Lending respectively datedMay 7, 2003.Thereafter, an order of
On August 15, 2002, the OBC received another letter from a certain Ms. Christine Angelie satisfaction of judgment[11]cralaw was correspondingly issued by the court in civil cases
M. Espinosa, then SK Federation President of Bacolod City, which read: 26837[12]cralaw and 27447.[13]cralaw

Your Honor:
Anent the IBP incident, the petitioner stated that an invitation [14]cralaw was sent to him by
the IBP Negros Occidental Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the annual judicial Third.The petitioner's admitted use of the appellation "Atty." When he had no authority to do
excellence awarding ceremonies, but that there was no mention of any induction so as yet.
ceremony.Considering the he in fact successfully passed the bar examinations and was The Court sees fit to discuss each one, to serve as reminder to law students and
being recognized therefore he was inspired to attend the occasion.He admitted that during prospective applicants to the bar.
the occasion, all those who just passed the bar exams were called for the induction of new
members, and that he was left with no choice but to join the others onstage when his name The petitioner's non-disclosure of a
was called.However, the petitioner did not intend to deceive or to keep the IBP in the dark, Criminal case for violation of B.P.
as he in fact informed them of his status.To prove the absence of malice on his part, he did Blg. 22 and two other civil cases filed
not sign any document that night. against him, albeit already dismissed
at the time of the filing of his petition
The petitioner also stated that after some verification as to the identity of the complainant in to take the 2001 bar examinations.
the Letter-complaint dated August 22, 2002, he found out that Benjie Montinola awas a non-
existing person who cannot claim to be a "guardian of proper civi[c] responsibility" The petitioner insists that he had not read any requirement in the petition to include cases
considering that he is not even a registered voter of Bacolod City and that he could not be that had already been dismissed.[19]cralaw This, the Court cannot quite fathom.As stated by
located in the address given, as indicated in a Certification issued by the Commission on Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Ma. Cristina B. Layusa:[20]cralaw
Elections, Bacolod City[15]cralaw and the Office of the Barangay Council of Barangay
Singcang Airport.[16]cralaw The petitioner's contention is quite hard to accept.In the ready-made petition form to take
the Bar Examination, the following is written clearly:
Regarding the use of the appellation "Atty.", The petitioner admitted writing the same in the
attendance sheet in a committee hearing of the Sangguniang "Note: Indicate any pending or dismissed civil, criminal or administrative case against you
Panglungsod of Bacolod City.He reasoned that he was of the notion that a bar passer can and attach pertinent documents:____________________________."
be called "Attorney," and that what is only prohibited is to practice law, such as appearing in
court and notarizing docunments without the requisite oath-taking before the Supreme Court If petitioner had not read the notation, as what he claimed, why did he disclose his pending
and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. case for Usurpation of authority or Official Function.Moreover, the said instruction is written
in the middle of the form, so if petitioner had not really read the same, he was not mindful of
The petitioner averred that the complainant in this case, Ms. Matus Espinosa, had in fact what he was doing which should not be the case of a Bar applicant.
executed an affidavit of desistance[17]cralaw to attest that there was indeed no Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the requirements for all
misrepresentation on his part. applicants for admission to the bar, to wit:

The petitioner manifested his sincere apology to the Court for any mistake he may have Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
committed. least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines;
and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
On May 22, 2003, the OBC made the following recommendation: and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines.
Considering that there is no more pending civil, criminal or administrative cases against
herein petitioner, he may now be admitted as a member of the Bar. Whether or not the petitioner shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in
the sound discretion of the Court.An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of
Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that Mr. CAESAR Z. DISTRITO be good moral character, fit and proper to practice law.[21]cralaw The practice of law is not a
now allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.Rather, it
required fees.[18]cralaw is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.[22]cralaw
There are thus three important matters raised before this Court, the determination of which
would materially affect the fate of the present petition: It has been held that moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held
First.The petitioner's non-disclosure of a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and of two by the public in the place where he is known.Moral character is not a subjective term but
other civil cases filed against him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the filing of his one which corresponds to objective reality.The standard of personal and professional
petition to take the 2001 bar examinations. integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
Second.The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for new of criminal law.Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[23]cralaw
lawyers, when he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys.
Admittedly, the petitioner was less than honest when he failed to disclose the two other In behalf of the Officers and members of the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter, I am
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and the civil cases involving sums of money which were inviting you to attend said after being one of the new members of the Bar.Please
filed against him, in his petition to take the bar examinations.He should have known that the come in formal attire.
said petitionis not to be taken lightly as it is made under oath.The petitioner, in so doing, Your presence on this occasion will be highly appreciated.
violated Rule 7.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[24]cralaw which requires of
every applicant candor and truthfulness.Every applicant is duty bound to lay before the The Court can only conclude that the petitioner did not take his petition to take the Lawyer's
Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable Oath and to sign in the Roll of Attorneys seriously.He would have us believe that he
the Court to fully ascertain or determine the applicant's moral character. [25]cralaw The attended an affair, believing in good faith that it was meant for those who recently passed
petitioner should have realized the implication of any omission on his part, even if the bar, when the invitation he himself attached to his petition states otherwise.The
inadvertently made. petitioner's forthrightness and candor with the Court leave much to be desired.

In the case of People v. Tuanda,[26]cralaw the Court held that "violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a The petitioner's admitted use of the
serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order," and Appellation "Atty." When he had no
considered the same an offense involving moral turpitude.The erring lawyer was Authority to do so as yet.
consequently suspended from the practice of law.
The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations may allow
In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did not even himself to be called an attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has passed the
reach the arraignment stage is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to disclose the required examination or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar,
same as it was a material fact which could affect his application for admission to the bar. shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
[31]
cralaw The Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the
It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its
statement in his application is not of good moral character. [27]cralaw The concealment or records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which
withholding from the court of the fact that an applicant has been charged with or indicated certificates shall be his authority to practice.[32]cralaw The clerk of the Supreme Court shall
for an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification of the applicant to take the bar keep a Roll of Attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person
examination, or for revocation of the license to practice, if he has already been admitted to admitted when he receives his certificate..[33]cralaw
the bar.If what the applicant concealed is a crime which does not involve moral turpitude, it
is the fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime itself that makes him morally The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the signing in
unfit to become a lawyer.It should be noted that the application was made under oath, which the Roll is the last act that finally signifies membership in the bar, giving the applicant the
he lightly took when he made the concealment.[28]cralaw right to call himself "attorney".Continued membership in the IBP and regular payment of
membership dues and other lawful assessments that it may levy are conditions sine qua
The petitioner's attendance and non to the privilege to practice law and to the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys.
[34]
participation in an IBP testimonial cralaw
dinner for new lawyers, when he had
not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect
signed in the Roll of Attorneys. contempt of court.[35]cralawThe Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the Lawyer's
Oath for grave misconduct, such as calling himself and "attorney" and appearing as counsel
As to the IBP incident, the petitioner claims that he though the occasion was just a plain and for clients in courts even before being admitted to the bar.[36]cralaw Although the evidence in
simple testimonial dinner for successful bar examinees that included an awarding ceremony this case does not include that the petitioner actually engaged in the practice of law, the fact
for judges.It was only later when he discovered that the program was actually a testimonial is that he signed in an attendance sheet as "Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself
for new lawyers.[29]cralaw However, a perusal of the invitation[30]cralaw sent by the IBP to the "attorney" knowing fully well that he was not yet admitted to the bar.[37]cralaw
petitioner reveals that there was an express mention that the affair was for new lawyers, to
wit: Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to
become a member of the bar.The petitioner must show this Court that he has satisfied the
Dear Atty. Distrito: moral requirements before he can be admitted to the practice of law.
The IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter will hold its Chapter's Judicial Award of
Excellence to Outstanding Judges and Proscutors and Testimonial Dinner for new ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath as
lawyers on June 28, 2002, 7:00 P.M., at the Ballroom-A, Business Inn, Lacson member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138
Street, Bacolod City. of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DENIED.
Very truly yours,
 (Sgd.)LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO evidence consisting of Exhibits "1" to "19" were also presented and formally offered, which
Clerk of Court were not opposed by the complainants.

Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted its report and
[B.M. No. 887.August 21, 2001] findings, as follows:

Sometime in 1996, Laurentino C. Rada and Hildegarda C. Rada-Onia (plaintiffs), uncle and
IN THE MATTER OF ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW et al.
mother, respectively, of herein respondent, filed a complaint for ejectment against herein
complainants, spouses Agripino and Francisca De Vera, with the Municipal Trial Court of
EN BANC
Alaminos, Pangasinan. Representing the plaintiffs in the said case was the Casino Creencia
and Baldovino Law Offices, through Atty. Manuel Pagdanganan Casino, with office address
Gentlemen:
at 910 San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila. During the pre-trial conference of the case,
however, it was respondent who appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs. Herein
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 21 2001.
complainants, through their counsel, objected to the said appearance of respondent, as he
had not yet passed the Bar examination, let alone admitted tq the Philippine Bar. The trial
B.M. No. 887(In the matter of Admission to Practice Law of Henry R. Onia, 1998 Bar
court required respondent to submit a legal justification for his appearance as counsel.
Examinations passer, spouses Agripino and Francisa de Vera vs. Henry R. Onia.)
Respondent cited Sec. 34, Rule l38 of the Rules of Court in support of his claim that he was
eligible to appear as counsel before the trial court. In its Order of October 11, 1996, the trial
Respondent Henry Rada Onia took and passed the 1998 Bar examinations. After the
court found the legal justification of respondent to be insufficient. It thereby denied the
release of the results of the said examinations, or on April 16, 1999, a complaint was filed
motion of respondent to appear as counsel. With the said order, respondent ceased to
by the Spouses Agripino and Francisca de Vera against the respondent averring that the
appear as counsel for the plaintiffs. It was, however, the contention of complainants that
latter does not possess the moral qualification expected from a member of the Bar. They,
respondent continued to handle the case for the plaintiffs by resorting to falsification. The
thus, prayed that respondent be forever barred from becoming a lawyer. Considering that at
falsification allegedly consisted of forging the signature of Atty. Casino. The said forgery
that time, respondent was already issued a clearance to take the oath as lawyer together
allegedly became more manifest when the IBP number used in the pleadings submitted in
with the other successful examinees, the Court in a Resolution dated May 3, 1999 allowed
connection with the said case did not match the IBP number actually issued to Atty. Casino
respondent to proceed with his oathtaking but ordered the deferment of his signing of the
by the IBP, Tarlac Chapter, of which Atty. Casino is a member.
Roll until the resolution of the instant complaint.
The complaint must be dismissed.
In the complaint dated April 15, 1999, the Spouses de Vera charged respondent with
usurpation of authority and falsification relative to the ejectment case filed against them by
Respondent cannot be held liable for usurpation of authority or misrepresentation by
Hildergarda Rada-Onia and Laurenlino Rada, respondent's mother and uncle, respectively,
appearing as counsel for the plaintiffs in the Civil Case No. 1674. Nothing in the evidence,
with the Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The plaintiffs were represented by
both documentary and testimonial, which complainants presented show that respondent
the law firm, Casino, Creencia and Baldovino Law Offices through Atty. Manuel
held himself out as a lawyer. The most that they could show to substantiate their accusation
Pagdanganan Casino, with office address at 910 San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
of usurpation of authority or misrepresentation against respondent was the latter's
During the pre-trial conference of the case, respondent appeared as counsel of the plaintiffs
appearance during the pre-trial conference of the said case, where he declared himself to
when he has not yet passed the bar examinations at that time; and categorically stated that
be the counsel for the plaintiffs. Such appearance, however, was not completed, as
he is a member of the law firm which was allegedly fictitious and non-existent. Upon
complainants, through their lawyer, questioned the same considering that respondent has
verification of the address given, complainants' found out that the same was the address of
not yet been admitted to the Philippine Bar at the time. Respondent explained that he made
respondent's boarding house in Manila. Complainants further alleged that in some of the
the said appearance in the honest belief that he could do so pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 138
pleadings filed in court in the civil case, Atty. Manuel P. Casino used IBP No. 658724, when
of the Rules of Court. The OBC is inclined to give respondent the benefit of the doubt.
the IBP number issued to him for that year was IBP No. 417185. Complainants concluded
Respondent is no stranger to the plaintiffs in the case, they being his mother and uncle.
that the falsehood and falsification were done with the help and control of respondent.
Hence, as a law student, he took it upon himself to assist them in the litigation. The same is
not devoid of any basis, though, as the said provision under the Rules of Court allows a
In the Resolution dated May 18, 1999, the Court En Banc referred the case to the Office of
more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation, report and recommendation. Accordingly,
before municipal courts in relatively simple litigation. Besides, there was no evidence
hearings were conducted on June 14, July 17 and 18, September 6 and 7, 2000. The
presented by complainants showing that respondent further appeared as counsel for the
complainants presented four (4) witnesses: Angelina Mendoza, Jose Luis, Agripino de Vera
plaintiffs before the trial court or any other courts after the trial court issued an order
and Julius De Vera. Exhibits "A" to "H" were presented as documentary evidence but were,
disallowing his appearance as counsel.
however, not formally offered. The respondent, on the other hand, testified on his own
behalf and presented his mother, Hildegarda Rada-Onia, as his other witness. Documentary
On the alleged falsification being imputed to respondent, complainants again failed to 1996, who not being a member of the bar, was required to submit legal justification for his
present any convincing evidence that respondent ever perpetrated the said offense. True, appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs.
complainants were able to show that the IBP number appearing in the pleadings purportedly
filed by Atty. Casino does not match the actual IBP number issued to him in the year the Said counsel again filed a Manifestation and Motion dated September 26, 1996 praying that
said pleadings were filed. Complainants, however, did not present any evidence, which he may be allowed by this court to submit some proceedings in connection with this case
would clearly show that respondent was responsible for the forgery. At best, their allegation before his qualification to appear as counsel is finally resolved by this court.
that it was respondent who did the falsification was speculative. Neither can the similar
address of the Casino Creencia and Baldovino Law Offices and that of respondent be used The justification relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiffs is the provision of Section 34,
as a basis to hold the latter liable for falsification. In the course of the investigation, Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 138A of the Rules of Court.
complainants and respondent stipulated that the said law firm used as its office the
residence of respondent at 910 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila. This belies their claim Under Section 34, Rule 138, said law provides that a party may conduct litigation in person,
that the said law office is non-existent and fictitious. with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid of an
In fine, complainant failed to prove that respondent is morally unfit to be admitted to the attorney.
Philippine Bar. Even assuming, however, that the appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 1674 during the pre-trial conference may be considered as unethical or Section 1, Rule 138A provides for a law student who has successfully completed his third
inappropriate, the period (almost two years now) that he has been deprived to practice law year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
is enough punishment therefor. school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil criminal and administrative case before any trial court,
As the sixty-day period within which those who took the lawyer's oath on May 4, 1999, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
including respondent, must sign the Roll of Attorneys had already elapsed, it is necessary school.
that respondent must take the lawyer's oath anew before he signs the Roll of Attorneys.
Finding that the said counsel for the plaintiffs does not qualify to appear as counsel
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that Henry R. Onia be now pursuant to the above-mentioned provisions of law, this Court finds his legal justification to
allowed to take the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. be insufficient.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. Accordingly, the Manifestation and Motion dated September 26, 1996 should also be denied
as a consequence of his failure to qualify as counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such WHEREFORE, premises considered, the counsel for the plaintiffs is hereby denied by this
privilege. 1 Bongalonta v. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310 (1995).And one of these requirements Court to appear as counsel in the aforementioned case and his Manifestation and Motion
which is given importance, far greater than the acquisition of knowledge and proficiency in dated September 26, 1996 is hereby also ordered denied.
law is the possession of good moral character. It is said that all aspects of moral character
and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. 2 In Re: SO ORDERED. 3 Exhibit "3."
Al C. Argosino, 246 SCRA 14 (1995).The charges hailed against the respondent, if really
true, certainly undermine his qualification for admission and is a ground for refusal to admit While we may not fully agree with the trial court's ruling on the matter and despite
him to the bar. However, the circumstances of the case readily show that there is no respondent's honest belief that there was no prohibition for him to appear as such pursuant
sufficient basis for the Court to deprive the respondent this privilege to practice the to Rule 138, Section 34, suffice it to say, that respondent showed his adherence to the
profession which he had worked hard for. orders of the trial court and thereby, ceased to appear as counsel for his relatives. Such
The alleged deception of the respondent is belied by the records which clearly disclose that alleged infraction may even be mitigated by the fact that the parties which respondent
he never concealed the fact that lie was not yet a lawyer when he appeared during the pre- represented in the ejectment case are no strangers to him, as they are his mother and
trial conference in the ejectment case. His appearance as a non-lawyer representative or uncle. It is quite understandable that after being sent to law school and finally, passed the
agent of his mother and uncle in said case was, in fact, questioned and put to issue before bar examinations, respondent was expected to assist his family members in litigation. His
the municipal trial court. In the Order dated October 11, 1996, the municipal judge found the appearance is not without basis as the rule explicitly provides that:
legal justification for his appearance as counsel of the parties insufficient and thus, denied
respondent's manifestation and motion to appear as counsel. The order reads as follows: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conduction. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
ORDER conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
Pending before this court for resolution is the legal justification filed by counsel for the personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
plaintiffs on September 16, 1996 in compliance with the Order of this court dated August 29, authorized member of the bar.
We also note that the instant complaint is the only instance where respondent's appearance law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an
in court was questioned. There is no evidence to show that respondent engaged in an election year, reads in full as follows:
unauthorized practice of law by holding himself out as a lawyer when he is not yet a
member of the bar 4 See Tan vs. Sabandal, 126 SCRA 60 (1983).or continued to appear as REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
counsel in the ejectment case. AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
With respect to the other charges of falsification, we agree that the evidence presented is FIFTY-FIVE.
not sufficient to substantiate the charges leveled against the respondent.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the complaint; respondent Henry R. Onia assembled:
is allowed to take the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one
Very truly yours, hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
LUZMINDA D. PUNO average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
Clerk of Court forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
Resolution March 18, 1954 nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
1946 to 1953;  as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners. next whole number.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent. SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
DIOKNO, J.: any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the examinations that he may take.
Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to
the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of
strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
cent was raised to 75 per cent. ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether
this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason
Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by
in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the
to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President law, the following statistical data are set forth:
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371,
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court (1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
 overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
xxx xxx xxx preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And
have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094),
motions for reconsideration. because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of
preparation."
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of
said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession,
grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972. demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor
1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to
unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
grades mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the
expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case
Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States,
Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial
from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can
Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against
Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re  Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which
finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law
member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or respects.
partiality.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated: To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State,
denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary
statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the
state of New York. The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided: that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as
the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this
practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93). extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows: present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously xxx     xxx     xxx
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this question. (p.93)
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme (1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of (2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission. decree the admission of any lawyer.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.) (3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different
on the matter of admission of the practice of law.
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided
that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
country. been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most
solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law: practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and
professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by the attempted to be revoked or modified.
act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted
had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs: regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent,
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
legislative power. (p. 444) the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444) independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444) unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard
of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected,
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which
and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is
and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
567. (p. 445) Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely
true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445) Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D.
43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445) practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to
confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445) the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus: consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the
is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish
and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to legislative departments of the government.
the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent
power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it
those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters
this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines
good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he
ought to be removed." (p.727) The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice
the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part: If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted
they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the
counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of
as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in
and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good question.
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement
admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no
of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
VIII, sec. 13.
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have 1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of
the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact
supervise the practice of the legal profession. to the satisfaction of said court.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and
the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the
legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal and ability."
profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and
at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in
are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the
justice. fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to
and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of power exercised.
law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged
the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States,
previous examinations. The court said: articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a
to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would
under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their
citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was
or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held: under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled
"An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists
of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment. college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes
in said rules". — In re  Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of . . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar. every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied. two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso,
since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
prescribed by general rule. — (In re  Guariña, pp. 48-49.) is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
the license. persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville
suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It
rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he
making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact
dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an
course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge
years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act."
the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses
31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331,
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest 227 N.W. 179.
upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur.
persons. (pp. 647-648.) 151-153 as follows:

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded
to its aspect of being a class legislation: and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences,
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate
upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are
all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946
as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in
prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum
under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If
there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective. Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following
does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an reasons, to wit:
equal consideration.
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the
does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to
75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be 2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not
consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient 3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as
that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend
law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to
was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done existing rules.
was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has
granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power 4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided. makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws
and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it 5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in law is void.
the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in 6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations
permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the in those years, shall continue in force.
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable
from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law. RESOLUTION
 xxx xxx xxx
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations
of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision xxx xxx xxx
not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution.
of the same: Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
without force and effect. As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950,
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the
valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
Constitution. amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the
admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us.
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the The proposed amendment is as follows:
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered. shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur. Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political
Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics
xxx xxx xxx and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in
they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration into account in determining their general average in any subsequent
without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows: examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70
per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
xxx xxx xxx subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows: Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
xxx xxx xxx
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all-- to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in
presented motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in
Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows: with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President
requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was
signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or
part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said: more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this
question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the
if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or
of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only
one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be
those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We
believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
the practice of law. Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

xxx     xxx     xxx Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of
provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of 1950 bar examinations.
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any
examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme
their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
not only prospective but retroactive in its effects. the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year.
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those other professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public
who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the accountancy.
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows: President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
AND INCLUDING 1953 admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
assembled: established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted,
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable
after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court,
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect,
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, resolutions.
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number. If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification"
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval. class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.
With the following explanatory note: (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution
Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will
it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U.
73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of
below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the
last world war. Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The
President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the Españo retorted that in the previous hearing, the prosecution already moved for trial in
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking absentia  and the court ruled that trial should proceed on said date [November 4], as
the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, scheduled. Petitioner answered back "Wala kaming hearing rig criminal
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant cases ngayon  dahil  Thursday." Atty. Espano responded "Kayo ang  nag-set nito."  Petitioner
Executive Secretary. quipped back "Abogado ka, eh hindi mo pala alam ang ginagawa mo, eh ikaw ang
abogado at hindi mo  pala alam dng ginagawa mo eh ako, clerk ako  dito, ikaw, abogado,
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without hindi mo pala alam ang ginagawa mo"  Irked by petitioner's reply, Atty. Espano
vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, shouted "Masyadong matalas and dila mo ha, ang tinatanong ko bakit hindi  naka-set for
Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974). trial at bakit hindi ako inabiso at huwag mong sasabihin na di ko alam ang ginagawa
ko!" Atty. Españo started walking. Out of the courtroom, while his client, still inside the
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President courtroom, heard Annie Grace A. Arreola, the Clerk of Court of the MTC,
and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the say: "Masyadong  high blood ang  lawyer mo, ang  lalakas n'yo magpa-aresto eh hindi pala
polls. ninyo  a/am ang,ginagawa n'yo."2

[BM No. 1099. January 21, 2003] On November 15, 1999, Atty. Españo filed, with the Office of the Court Administrator, an
administrative complaint against Judge Leonardo P. Reyes, Annie Grace A. Arreola and
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF petitioner for unilaterally canceling a previously scheduled trial date for Criminal Cases Nos.
ATTORNEYS 322928-322948 and for disrespectful remarks. The complaint was docketed as OCA-IPI-No.
99-820-MTJ.
Gentleman:
In the interim, petitioner took the Bar Examinations on September 2, 9, 16 and 23, 2001.
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Bane Petitioner was one of the successful examinees therein. However, due to the pendency of
dated JAN 21 2003. the aforementioned administrative complaint filed against him, he was not allowed to take
Bar Matter No. 1099. (IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
THE. ROLL OF ATTORNEYS (RANDY P. BARENG, Petitioner).)
On March 6, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a report with the following
Before us is the Petition of Randy P. Bareng, Clerk III in Branch 4 of the Metropolitan Trial recommendation:
Court of Manila (MTC), to take his oath as a member of the . Philippine Bar and to sign the
Roll of Attorneys. "4.That respondent Randy P. Bareng, Clerk III, same court, be likewise found GUILTY of
Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties -and that he be REPRIMANDED therefor with a
The antecedent facts of this case are: warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely."3
Among the cases raffled to the MTC were People of the Philippines vs. Nympha
Isaac,  Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-322948 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Upon the Court Administrator's recommendation, the administrative case was docketed as
Court set the trial on October 25, November 4, and 22, 1999, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. em>Arnold F. Españo vs. Annie Grace A. Arreola, et  a/., A.M. No. P-00-1385. Thereafter, a
During the October 25, 1999 hearing, Nympha Isaac, the accused in said case, failed to formal investigation ensued.
appear without any justifiable reason, prompting the public prosecutor "to move: (a) for the
cancellation of the bail bond of the accused; (b) for the arrest of the accused; and (c) for the On April 04, 2002 the Office of the Bar Confidant received a Letter-Petition from petitioner
MTC to proceed with the trial in absentia.  The MTC. granted the motion over .the objection requesting that he be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
of the private prosecutor.1 On April 23, 2002, this Court issued a Resolution holding in abeyance the oath taking of
petitioner pending the resolution of the administrative charge against him.
On November 4, 1999, the next scheduled date of hearing in the. aforementioned criminal
-cases, Atty. Arnold F. Españo, the private prosecutor, and the private complainant arrived On October 21, 2002, a Resolution was issued in A.M. No. P-00-1385 reprimanding Annie
at the MTC to attend said hearing. The lawyer checked the court's calendar for the day and Grace A. Arreola and petitioner for inefficiency and conduct unbecoming, of a court
was surprised to learn that Criminal Cases Nos. 322928-322948 were not included. The personnel with a stern warning that the commission of similar acts shall be dealt with more
accused was in the courtroom. Atty. Españo then inquired from petitioner why Criminal severely.4
Cases Nos. 322928-322948 were not calendared for the day when the same were
previously scheduled for the said day. He also asked if the hearing for the day was On November 11, 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation and/or Compliance renewing his
.cancelled and if so, why was he not notified of such cancellation. Petitioner request that he be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
replied "May warrant of arrest, di ba pina-aaresto mo kaya hindi sine-set for trial yan." Atty.
Petitioner averred that he has "already ingrained in his heart the mandate of the Lawyer's
Oath and the Canon of Professional Ethics as well." B.M. No. 890.April 2, 2002]
On November 19, 2002, the Court issued a Resolution referring the matter to the Office of RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH, GINGOYON
the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation.
On December 10, 2002, the Bar Confidant submitted a Report recommending that petitioner EN BANC
be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the
required fees. Gentlemen:

The Court finds merit in the petition. Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 2 2002.
B.M. No. 890(Re: Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon.)
In her Report where she recommended that the petition be granted, the Bar Confidant
stated that: On August 4, 1998, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon filed with the Office of the Bar
"As found by the Court, petitioner is guilty of inefficiency and conduct unbecoming of a Confidant his petition to take the 1998 Bar Examinations.In said petition, he stated that "he
court, personnel. As such, the Court resolved to reprimand petitioner with a stern .warning has been charged with the crime of Grave Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) now already
that the commission of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. submitted for decision" in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City, Branch
3.Apparently, when petitioner filed a similar petition with the Office of the Bar Confidant in
This petition to take the Lawyer's Oath requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing 1994, he had already submitted all pertinent documents relevant to the criminal case so he
petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. The 'inefficiency' of petitioner and his was no longer required to submit the same in 1998, relying mainly on his allegation that the
disrespectful utterances towards a lawyer while in court are conduct unbecoming of a case was still pending.
would-be lawyer. However, petitioner should be given a chance considering that the Court On September 1, 1998, the Court allowed Victor Rey T. Gingoyon to take the bar
had already reprimanded and warned him. Moreover, the almost one year deprivation of the examinations subject to the condition that should he pass the examinations, he shall not be
privilege to practice law would be considered-enough penalty for petitioner's misconduct."5 allowed to take the lawyer's oath until he is cleared of the charge against him.Victor Rey T.
Gingoyon passed the bar.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the Bar Confidant. However, it must be On April 21, 1999, he filed a petition with the Court praying that he be allowed to take the
stressed that the practice of law is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed Layer's Oath scheduled on May 4, 1999 at the PICC together with the other successful
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess examinees.Attached to his petition were duly authenticated copies of the Decision dated
good moral character.6 In "In Re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.,  285 SCRA 5.9 [1998]" the Court April 8, 1998 of the Municipal Trial Court, Mandaue City, Branch 3, convicting the petitioner
held that insofar as the general; public and the proper administration of justice are of the crime of Grave Threats.The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
concerned, the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance than
the possession .of legal learning; thus all aspects of moral character and behavior may be WHEREFORE, Decision is hereby rendered finding accused, Victor Rey Gingoyon, Guilty
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the bar. Even as petitioner is allowed Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Grave Threats, and the Court sentences said
to take his oath as a lawyer, he must take heed of and pay obeisance to the caveat that: accused the penalty of arresto mayor medium which is an imprisonment of Two (2) months
and One (1) day and to pay a fine of Pesos: Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and the civil
"x x x a lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal liability of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as reimbursement for attorney's fees and
profession. As a would be member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand litigation expenses.Failure on his part to pay said fine, he shall be subjected to a subsidiary
as a shield in the defense of what is right, exacted from him are such positive qualities of imprisonment equivalent to P8.00 per day.
decency, truthfulness and responsibility. To achieve such end, he needs to strive at all times
to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession. He shall conduct himself with courtesy, SO ORDERED.
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues. He shall not use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."7 Mandaue City, Philippines, April 8, 1998.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Randy P. Likewise, petitioner submitted to the Court the Order of the trial court dated December 2,
Bareng is allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign, the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be 1998, granting his application for probation; and several certifications of Good Moral
set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached Character issued by responsible members of his community.
to the Petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
On May 6, 1999, the Office of the Bar Confidant received a sworn letter-complaint from the
Very truly yours, Spouses Andres and Avelina Taran, the private complainants in Criminal Case No.
LUZVlMINDA D. PUNO 9693.They alleged that they were the next door neighbors of petitioner and his family at
Clerk of Court Cabancalan, Mandaue.The complainants, with their ailing mother and children have
become constant victims of petitioner's threats, harassment and stoning.Because of E.Moreover, assuming for the seek (sic) of argument that petitioner was already aware of
petitioner's oppressive acts, they were eventually forced to sell their land, leave the the scheduled promulgation at the time he mailed his petition, he was telling the truth under
neighborhood and live far away from the petitioner in order to avoid his regular shooting, the "Doctrine of Colorable Truthfor the word "pending case" is all encompassing and, he
stoning and harassment.They pray that petitioner be prevented from taking his oath as did not know then of the decision.For it is a matter of fact and law that parties in a criminal
member of the Philippine Bar considering that he does not possess the good moral case would only be aware of its outcome DURING PROMULGATION and not before.
character required from a member of the Bar, owing to his criminal conviction for grave
threats. The foregoing allegations especially the fact that it was petitioner's sister who received the
notice of promulgation of judgment and not the petitioner himself was confirmed upon an
In a Third Motion for Early Resolution filed with the Court on December 28, 1999, petitioner inquiry made from Executive Judge Galicano C. Arriesgado, Regional Trial Court, Branch
reiterated his prayer that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath on the basis of the Order of 18, Cebu City.
the trial judge dated December 9, 1999 terminating Criminal Case No. 9693 after having
satisfactorily fulfilled all the terms and conditions of his probation. Given these facts, it is safe to assume that petitioner did not yet have actual knowledge of
the judgment against him, which was promulgated on August 10, 1998 when he filed his
The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation.In a petition to take the bar examinations on August 4, 1998.But the more important question is
Report dated June 23, 2000, the OBC recommended the denial of the petition.The OBC whether or not petitioner possesses the good moral character required for admission to the
significantly observed that the decision of the MTC was dated April 8, 1998 which was bar considering his criminal conviction for grave threats.Undoubtedly, the crime is one
clearly four (4) months before he filed his petition to take the bar in August, 1998.If the involving moral turpitude.
criminal case was indeed promulgated on said date, petitioner committed perjury in falsely
stating in his petition that the criminal case filed against him was allegedly still With the termination of the criminal case against him, petitioner wishes to
pending.Moreover, petitioner's criminal conviction involves moral turpitude, unfit for impress upon the Court that he now possesses the good moral character required for those
admission to the Bar. seeking admission to the bar.To attest to his righteous and religious character, petitioner
submitted several certifications from responsible members of his community, to wit:
In a Resolution dated July 25, 2000, the Court required the petitioner to present proof of
promulgation of the judgment against him.Pursuant to the resolution, petitioner filed a xxx xxx xxx
Certification issued and signed by Clerk of Court Salvacion Acabodillo of the MTC,
Mandaue City, Branch 3 stating that Criminal Case No. 9693 for Grave Threats against He also submitted the order of discharge from his probation officer which states
Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was promulgated on August 10, 1998 at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. that he has complied with all the terms and conditions of his probation without any
infractions.In a span of two (2) years, petitioner has filed eight (8) motions for early
As to whether or not petitioner had actual notice of his conviction for grave threats prior to resolution asking the Court to accept him to this noble profession.
his filing of the petition to take the bar examinations, his Eighth Motion for Early Resolution
contained the following explanation: It must be understood that the practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be given to everyone who demands it.It is a personal privilege granted
A.The "Notice of Promulgation" of said case was Personally received by Eva Gingoyon- to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
Abarca (sister of petitioner) on 06 July 1998 and not by herein petitioner.Copy of her and certified.All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
affidavit is attached as Annex "A". those seeking admission to the Bar. [1]cralaw Thus, the letter-complaint of the Spouses
Taran objecting to petitioner's oath-taking is validly noted considering that petitioner's violent
B.Petitioner was made aware of the then scheduled promulgation sometime in the first week temper for which he was consequently convicted is certainly unbecoming of a would-be
of August 1998 only when he returned home in Cabancalan, Mandaue City from his lawyer.
boarding house in Cebu City (pls. See Annex A).
However, after a careful evaluation of the case, we are prepared to give
C.Further, petitioner is attaching herewith the last page of the decision of the above- petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he is morally fit for admission to the bar.In a personal
mentioned case where his signature appeared (Annex "B").It can be clearly determined that letter of appeal to the Court dated May 3, 2000, petitioner appears to be sorry and
it obviously differs with that signature appearing in the notice of promulgation (attached to remorseful for his reckless actuation which resulted to his criminal conviction.He prays to be
Annex A). a full-fledged member of the bar in order to be of help to his septuagenarian parents.He
promises "to be a productive member of society, true to the tenets of the legal profession, of
D.If petitioner's memory is right (facts are on file at the Office of the Bar Confidant), he service to the country and God-fearing." It had been two (2) years past since he first filed
stated in his petition to take the 1998 Bar Examinations mailed in the third or last week of the petition to take the lawyer's oath.Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived the
July 1998, the following entries, among others appeared, "pending case for Grave Threats privilege had been long enough for him to do some introspection.
at Branch 3, MTCC, Mandaue City."
 Finally, it is important to stress to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a
mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the Sometime after the judicial declaration that his first wife was presumptively dead, Ladrera
presence of selected witnesses.Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach married his third wife, Socorro Santos by whom he has five children. After Ladrera married a
at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional third time, his first wife showed up and filed a bigamy case against him with the Court of
Responsibility.[2]cralaw First Instance of Davao. According to the immorality complaint filed by Lucila, the second
wife, this bigamy case was later dismissed as a result of alleged monetary concessions
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to allow Victor Rey T. Gingoyon to take which Ladrera made in favor of Orticio. Incidentally, the latest information about Florencia
the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date set by the Court, subject to the Orticio is that she is quite well off, having inherited properties from her parents and that she
payment of appropriate fees.Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records teaches Spanish at the University of Eastern Philippines in Catarman, Samar.
in the Office of the Bar Confidant.(Puno and Vitug, JJ.,are abroad on official business)
On the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Ladrera, this Court suspended his
Very truly yours, oath taking and directed him to file an answer to the complaint. In his Answer, Ladrera
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA alleged that:
Acting Clerk of Court
... [W]hen he married complainant, he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio,
was already dead; that complainant in fact knew that respondent was previously married
B.M. No. 135 January 29, 1987 because respondent's child with Florencia Orticio lived with respondent and complainant
after the latter's marriage and until its annulment; that respondent has paid all the monthly
PETITION OF SOCORRO LADRERA, 1954 SUCCESSFUL BAR EXAMINEE TO TAKE pensions to complainant's three minor children; that respondent later discovered that
THE LAWYER'S OATH. complainant's motive in suing for annulment of her marriage to respondent was to get a
share of the properties acquired by respondent, and as a matter of fact, complainant has
RESOLUTION squandered and sold the properties adjudicated to her in Civil Case No. 470, and the money
  realized from the sales was not used for the benefit of their children; that the value of the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: properties adjudicated to the complainant in the case for liquidation of conjugal properties
was approximately P37,000.00; that respondent married Socorro Santos and still lives with
Socorro Ke. Ladrera passed the 1954 bar examinations. Before he could participate in the her in view of the decision in Civil Case No. 501, dated November 24, 1951, declaring
scheduled oath taking of successful bar examinees, an administrative complaint for respondent's first wife, Florencia Orticio presumptively dead; that respondent's admission in
immorality was filed against him by Lucila C. Casas. Civil Case No. 399 for annulment of complainant's marriage, that Florencia Orticio was alive
and residing in Manila was made in good faith, he having then received information from his
Lucila stated that she and Ladrera were married on May 23, 1944 and that when she brother, Fr. Emerardo Ladrera, that Florencia Orticio was in Manila; that subsequent search
married him he represented himself to be single. Sometime in 1948, Lucila learned that her and inquiries, however, led the respondent to believe that Florencia Orticio was not alive
husband had been previously married on March 23, 1936 to Florencia Orticio by whom he and this resulted in the filing by respondent of the petition in Civil Case No. 501, praying that
had a child called Monserrat. Lucila filed a case for annulment of her marriage to Ladrera on Florencia Orticio be declared presumptively dead; that Criminal Case No. 1863, against the
October 5, 1949. A decision was rendered on February 13, 1950 annulling the marriage and respondent for bigamy, was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Davao upon motion
ordering Ladrera to give P40.00 a month for the support of his three minor children with of the City Attorney of Davao; that the mere filing of civil cases against respondent does not
Lucila. necessarily reflect immorality on his part, not to mention the circumstances that said cases
were settled or otherwise dismissed; that complainant's charges were motivated by hatred
In 1951, Socorro Ladrera filed a civil case to declare his first wife, Florencia Orticio as and revenge, intended as a ruse to compel respondent to give to complainant another ten
presumptively dead, In a November 24, 1951 decision, the Court of First Instance of Davao hectares of first class agricultural land located in Monteverde, Calinan, Davao City, plus
stated that Ladrera and Orticio were married on March 23, 1936 in the Roman Catholic complainant's desire to put respondent down politically.
church of Capul, Samar. The couple had a daughter, Monserrat Ladrera, who lived with the
petitioner from birth up to the date of the decision. It appears that, while the couple were The then Supreme Court Clerk of Court, Jose S. de la Cruz, was ordered to investigate the
living in Cebu, Florencia Orticio eloped with a certain Ramon E steban and left the conjugal administrative charge and to submit his report.
home without the petitioner's knowledge. Inspite of allegedly determined searches by the
petitioner in Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and Manila, Florencia could not be located or her On August 31, 1955, de la Cruz submitted his Report, the salient portion of which reads:
whereabouts ascertained. The court therefore ruled "that the petition to declare Florencia
Orticio presumptively dead for all intents and purposes of law has satisfactorily been It is noteworthy that the complainant had chosen not to testify in the investigation, and that
established." by merely presenting documentary evidence consisting of copies of the complaint for
annulment of marriage in Civil Case No. 399; the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Petitioner Ladrera had three children with his second wife, Lucila C. Casas. Davao in said case annulling the marriage between complainant and respondent; the
decision in Special Case No. 501 wherein the Court of First Instance of Davao declared least to the date of this investigation in March, 1955. The claim that respondent is immoral
respondent's first wife, Florencia Orticio, presumptively dead; the order of the Court of First because of the filing against him of several civil cases, deserves no serious consideration
Instance of Davao in Criminal Case No. 1863 against respondent for bigamy, dismissing since, according to respondent's evidence, said cases, aside from having been dismissed or
said case, the complainant is basing her charges of immorality against respondent upon the otherwise settled, do not necessarily imply moral perversity.
latter's bad faith arising from the fact that, while in the annulment proceedings respondent
and his attorney admitted that Florencia Orticio was alive, in Special Case No. 501 filed in WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera be allowed to take
1951 by respondent, the latter claimed that said Florencia Orticio could not be located and the lawyer's oath.
was unheard from for several years, and from the fact that he married for the third time
Socorro Santos while respondent's first wife was alive, and who, as a matter of fact, filed a The favorable recommendation, notwithstanding, this Court, on September 7, 1955 issued a
case for bigamy against respondent. resolution disqualifying Ladrera from taking the lawyer's oath, to wit:

Upon the other hand, the respondent testified during the investigation and declared that he Acting upon the complaint for immorality filed by Lucila Casas against Socorro Ke. Ladrera,
acted in good faith, first, in marrying complainant; secondly, in instituting Special Case No. 1954 successful bar candidate; the answer filed by the latter; the evidence taken during the
501; and, thirdly, in marrying Socorro Santos. He explained that when he married investigation; the report of the investigator; as well as all the circumstances surrounding the
complainant in 1944, he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was already case, the Court RESOLVED to disqualify respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera from taking the
dead; that he had to admit in the annulment proceedings, Civil Case No. 399, that Florencia lawyer's oath
was alive because of a letter he received from his brother, Fr. Ladrera; that he filed the A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution was denied in another
subsequent Special Case No. 501 after suspecting that complainant's purpose in annulling resolution issued on October 11, 1955.
her marriage to respondent was merely to obtain her snare in the conjugal properties, and in
order also to establish definitely his civil status; and that he married his third wife, Socorro Up to now or more than thirty-one years after he passed the bar examinations, Ladrera has
Santos, after the decision in Special Case No. 501, declaring his first wife Florencia not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath. All his motions to allow him to take the oath filed
presumptively dead, had become final. every year without fail beginning on May 23, 1956 up to September 7, 1982 have been
denied. Before us, now is Ladrera's April 15, 1985 urgent motion, to wit:
While the complainant's charges are based upon inferences or assumptions, the testimony
of respondent is unrefuted that he acted in good faith In the first place, the fact that no NOW COMES your petitioner, by and for himself and unto tills Honorable Supreme Tribunal
annulment proceeding was instituted by complainant until after three children were born to most respectfully stated:
her marriage with respondent, at least shows that Florencia Orticio was not generally known
to be alive. In the second place, the admission by respondent and his counsel in the That your petitioner has been deprived from taking his Lawyer's Oath as member of the
annulment proceeding that Florencia was alive, is explained by respondent's receipt of a Philippine Bar since January 20, 1955, because of a petition of Lucila C. Casas who has
letter from his brother, Fr. Ladrera, to the effect that she might still be living, which at any long ago withdrawn her complaint and has in fact attested to the good reputation and
rate was the very fact alleged in the complaint for annulment. In the third place, respondent character of the herein respondent;
was constrained to file Special Case No. 501 because he subsequently realized that That considering the time that has elapsed which is already more than thirty (30) years is
complainant annulled her marriage to respondent mainly to get her share of their conjugal more than sufficient punishment, your respondent now prays this Honorable Tribunal to
properties, and because he also wanted to respondent settle his own civil status after failing grant him the privilege to take the Lawyer's Oath together with the new successful
to locate the whereabouts of his first wife, Florencia Orticio; and the respondent candidates scheduled to take their oath on April 25, 1985 at the Philippine Convention
undoubtedly had the right to look for Florencia after his marriage to complainant was Center, Manila.
judicially set aside on the ground that Florencia was alive. It is very significant that no
opposition whatsoever was interposed in Special Case No. 501 either by complainant or by On October 4, 1986, he wrote another letter, this time to the Court Administrator asking for
Florencia inspite of due publication of the proceedings; and the final decision therein can be the approval of his petition of nearly 32 years.
said to have legally paved the way for respondent's third marriage to Socorro Santos. As a
matter of fact, in the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing the bigamy An applicant for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. (Rule 138, Sec. 2).
case against respondent, it was in effect held that respondent married Socorro Santos What constitutes good moral character within the meaning of the rule has been elucidated in
without fraudulent intent, and said order had become final. precedent cases.

Complainant's allegation that respondent has failed to comply with his obligation to pay the In Carmen E. Bacarro v. Ruben M. Pinataca (127 SCRA 218), this Court cited various
monthly support of his three children with complainant as ordered in the decision of the precedent cases and ruled:
Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No. 399, is neither touched nor pressed in
complainant's memorandum. At any rate, complainant may avail herself of any appropriate One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant
civil remedy for the collection or enforcement (or even increase) of said support; and must be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high
respondent has presented evidence to show that he had complied with his obligation at moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest and to possess good moral character. (Martin, Ruperto G., "Legal & In the 32 years since Ladrera passed the bar examinations, he has supported and sent
Judicial Ethics," 5th ed., p. 15, citing In Re Parazo, 82 Phil 230) As a man of law, (a lawyer) through college all his children by the three women he married — a daughter by Florencia
is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. (Planza v. Orticio, three children by Lucila Casas, and five children by Socorro Santos. Some of the
Archangel 21 SCRA 1, 4). He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect children have joined their father in his many petitions asking for the privilege of taking his
for the law, but also for his clean living. (Martin, supra,  p. 36) Thus, becoming a lawyer is lawyer's oath.
more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations. One who has
the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, Ladrera was a guerrilla officer during World War II in Bohol and Mindanao. After the war, he
which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral was elected head of the Davao War Veterans Association and led the veterans' movement
character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and to acquire some of the lands left by Japanese-owners. He became a successful
Ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation. businessman in Davao, acquiring a gasoline station, three corn and rice mills, and a
transportation line called "Ladrera Overland Transit".
The Court, in the past, consistently denied the annual petitions of Ladrera that he be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath. He claimed that when he married his second wife, he There was moral deliquency in Mr. Ladrera's younger days but he has made up for it by
sincerely believed that his first wife was already dead. He married his third wife only after observing a respectable, useful, and religious life since then. Thirty-two years of rejecting
the first wife had been declared presumptively dead and after his second marriage-e had his petitions are enough for chastisement and retribution. Considering that the respondent
been annulled. There may have been compliance with a strict or narrow interpretation of the has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and demonstrated a sincere willingness to
letter of the law but the Court was of the view that Ladrera had failed to live up to the high make up for that moral lapse, the Court has decided to admit him to membership in the
moral standards required for membership in the Bar. Philippine bar.

All of that, however, is in the past. Ladrera now states that if he has committed an act which WHEREFORE, the PETITION of Mr. Socorro Ke. Ladrera to be allowed to take the lawyer's
justified the suspension from taking the lawyer's oath, the time that has elapsed is more oath is hereby GRANTED.
than sufficient punishment. He submits that "he humbly believes with all candor and SO ORDERED.
sincerity that he has more than atoned for it by living a very moral and exemplary life since
then."

Apart from his marital misadventures, there is nothing in the records to warrant a permanent
denial of Ladreras petition, He worked as a janitor-messenger in Cebu City while pursuing
his college education at night. He has also served in fairly important positions in the
government such as Technical Assistant to President Ramon Magsaysay, Special Assistant
to President Carlos P. Garcia, and member and later Chairman of the Board of People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation. He has served as Treasurer of the Escolta Walking
Corporation and Director of the Foreign Affairs Association of the Philippines.

As early as 1960, then Senator Quintin Paredes endorsed Ladrera's petition stating that the
latter was "honest, dependable, and trustworthy" and followed this up with another
endorsement in 1966.

In July 13, 1966, Lucila Casas filed a motion for the withdrawal or dismissal of her
complaint. Casas stated as her "considered opinion" that Ladrera has been sufficiently
punished by the then 12-year suspension of his oathtaking as a lawyer. Casas stated that
her children by Ladrera — Teresita, graduating with AB and BSC degrees; Belen,
preparatory medicine student; and Socorro, Jr. an engineering student — were suffering
from the stigma of the punishment which arose from her complaint. Casas observed that
Ladrera was "behaving well and leading an exemplary life."

The records show various indorsements of good character from lawyers, a law professor in
Davao City, a congressman, and others. A priest, Fr. Emiliano Sabandal attested that
Ladrera "is a man of high moral character, humble and possessed with an innate religious
quality; as a consequence thereof he is a daily communicant of the blessed sacrament."