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To The Material Facts of The Case Provided As Follows

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Monteroso v.

CA
NOTE: Kindly
 During his lifetime, Don Fabian married twice and sired 8 children, four from each union.
 In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Their children were SOLEDAD, Reygila, BENJAMIN and TIRSO. In 1927,
Soledad died.
 A little over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia Pendejito. Their children named Florenda,
Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.
 To avoid disputes, Don Fabian filed an intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife. Later, CFI approved
the Project of Partition.
 The partition covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half
of Parcel F-5, while the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4 and one half of Parcel
F-5. The intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was partitioned and distributed to her four children in equal shares.
 In 1948, Don Fabian also passed away.
 During his lifetime, 8 parcels of land were acquired during the first marriage (denominated as F1-F8) while 4 were acquired
during the second arriage (S1-S4)
 In 1969, children of late Benjamin Monteroso filed with RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with Damages against
their uncle, Tirso D. Monteroso.

Contention of Heirs of Benjamin:


 Tirso was entrusted with 1/4 portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share of estate of Soledad ALLOTED TO THEIR FATHER.
However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they demanded such delivery after reaching
majority age.

Contention of Tirso:
 The subject lot was never entrusted to him. it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang (NOT
the mother, the daughter), who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share
in said property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her. I think segue ni siya to bring us
to the material facts of the case provided as follows:
 Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with Receivership, involving 12 parcels of land (F1-F8 and S1-S4)
against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their representatives.
(1) the aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by
Don Fabian;
(2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for the reason that the
project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby
depriving Tirso of his one-fourth share or legitime over the said three parcels of land; and
(3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not paraphernal properties of Sofia
Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso

Answer of Heirs of Benjamin


 They contended that, AMONG OTHERS, that during his lifetime, Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang

Contention when the case reached SC


Sofia Pendejito Vda. De Monteroso, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, et. Al (PETITIONERS):
 Citing Article 494 of the Civil Code and Art. 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, petitioners aver that the right to ask partition is
proper only where co-ownership is recognized. They also suggest that no co-ownership obtains in this case considering
that no less than Tirso avers in his complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 that from the time of Don Fabian's death in 1948, the
lots in question have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public possession of the Cagampang spouses.
 Assayed against this perspective, petitioners submit that partition is not proper, ergo unavailing, but an action for
reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription.
 Corollary to the posture above taken, petitioners assert that there being no coownership over the properties sold by Don
Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso's cause of action, under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) in
relation to Art. 1116 of the Civil Code, had already prescribed, either in 1949, i.e., 10 years after the subject properties
were registered in Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang's name, or in 1958, i.e., 10 years after the cause of action accrued in
1948 (death of Don Fabian)
 Petitioners alleged that the exclusion of Tirso from the enjoyment of the fruits of the subject properties since after
the death of Don Fabian in 1948 is consistent with Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang's claim of exclusive ownership and
dominion.

Relevant Issues: 1) WON partition is proper 2) WON Tirso has already been barred by laches and acquisitive prescription

HELD:
Partition Proper, not Barred by Laches nor by Acquisitive Prescription
- SC cannot subscribe to petitioners' theory. The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were
excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against
the existence of a co-ownership. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand
from, and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily implies that he
was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through
the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the hereditary properties. By asserting his right as a
compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding
some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or
legitime thereon.
- Partition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from
the decedent. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.
- Also, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in
his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property.
- BEING A COMPULSORY HEIR OF DON FABIAN, TIRSO HAS THE RIGHT TO COMPEL PARTITION OF THE PROPERTIES
COMPRISING THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DON FABIAN AS A MEASURE TO GET HIS HEREDITARY SHARE. Before
partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory
heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian.
- Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is imprescriptible. As a matter of law,
acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro-indiviso share or
legitime is concerned, UNLESS said heirs repudiate their share.
- In the instant case, however, no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other compulsory
heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because effective repudiation had not timely been made against the former.
As aptly put by the appellate court, the repudiation which must be clear and open as to amount to an express
disavowal of the co-ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as
these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused
upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. However,
considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code applies; thus, Tirso has at the
very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court.
- Contrary to petitioners' stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this
regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime
from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned.

P.S. Guys, if you have time, kindly double check with the full-text of the case. It’s a 32-page case, I only picked out the facts that
I think are relevant. Caveat, basin naa ko’y na miss out. Plus, out of the 7 issues, only issues 4 and 5 are tackled here. Please
inform me if naa ko’y na miss para ma edit nako.    Nalipong btao ko sa case. HAHAHA.

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