48.

Testate Estate of the late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor, The

Parish Priest, G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979.

20JUL

[AQUINO, J.]

FACTS

The late Father Pascual Rigor, died on August 9, 1935 leaving a will
executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the CFI of Tarlac. It
named as devisees in the will his sisters: Florencia, belina and Nestora. He
also gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato. What was controversial about
the will was the part where he left to a nearest male relative who shall take
priesthood, 4 lots amounting to around 44 hectares of riceland — this was
to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines or his successors.

13 years later after the approval of the project of the partition, the parish
priest of Victoria filed a petition praying for the appointment of a new
administrator, who should deliver to the church the said ricelands and that
the possessors be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. This was
granted by the court. A new administrator was appointed. On January 31,
1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelands
to the church as trustee.

The intestate heirs of Fr. Rigor countered with a petition praying that the
bequest be made inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons
entitled to the said ricelands since no nearest male relative of Fr. Rigor has
ever studied for the priesthood.
RTC: this was granted. This was later reversed in view that the testator had
a grandnephew named Edgardo Cunanan (grandson of his first cousin)
who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in
QC. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish
priest of Victoria as trustee.

CA: Reversed. It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for
his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust
could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period
would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee
claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the
same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old
Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.

ISSUE

Whether the testator’s nearest male relative who took the priesthood after
the testator’s death falls within the intention of the testator in providing to
whom the bequest is to be given.

HELD

NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest
male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter. 

One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that the “testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration
the circumstances under which it was made’’ but excluding the testator’s oral
declarations as to his intention (Art. 789)

The bequest of Fr. Rigor and instructions as regards the trust of the
Riceland were clear in the will. However, what was not clear is the duration
or how long after the testator’s death would it be determined that he had a
nephew who would pursue priesthood. The Supreme Court therefore held
that the bequest refer to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any definite time thereafter. In order to be
capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the
moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper (Art. 1025). To construe them as referring to the nearest male
relative at anytime after the death would render the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of the estate.

Following this interpretation, the Court held that the bequest was
inoperative. As such, the Riceland shall be merged into the estate. It was
not no longer in trust with the Parish Priest considering that none of the
contingencies of the will were present at the time of the death.

49. Ramon Del Rosario V. Clemente Del Rosario

FACTS:  

Don Nicolas del Rosario d 6ied in 1897 leaving a last will, which provides:

8th Par. Don Nicolas’s P5000 brought into marriage shall be bequeathed to
his nephews Enrique and Ramon, natural children of his brother, Clemente:
9th Par. the 5K is to be divided; 3k for Enrique and 2K to Ramon which
delivery shall be effected by the testator’s wife, provided that the two shall
not cease to study until taking Bachelor of Arts, if their health will permit,
their support be paid out of the testamentary estate and they shall live in
the house of the widow;

11th Par. If they be still studying at the time the wife dies, they shall be
given support at the expense of the testamentary estate without deducting
such from their legacies, should they desire to continue the same studies;

18th Par. If in case her wife remarries, it shall be sufficient event for
Enrique and Ramonto separate from their aunt but still be supported by the
estate with P25 per month if they continue their studies or be in poor health
without reducing their legacies.

In a codicil, Don Nicolas’ will additionally provides. 

7th Par. The spouses agreed that the property will not be partitioned, and
the property will pass to the wife and will enjoy the revenue during her
lifetime without authority to convey and if she dies, the property will be
delivered to Don Nicolas’ brothers, Clemente and Rosendo and his sister,
Luisa, who shall also enjoy the property during their lifetime, which shall
also transmit to their male children whether born in wedlock or natural
children.

13th Par, If Luisa predeceases his wife, her share shall not pass to her
heirs except for P1000 and remainder will go to Enrique and Ramon, which
was later amended to include Clemente.
The wife, Dona Honorata also made a will stating similar conditions as to
her husband’s will 

As Don Nicolas died, he was followed by his sister, Luisa, then the death of
the testator's wife. 

Ramon then brought this action against the executor, Clemente, asking that
he be paid an allowance from the death of the widow for P75/month and
allow him to live in the house while the widow was still alive.

The court below ordered judgment in respect to this allowance, and the
right to live in the house as prayed for by the plaintiff.

Defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to nothing for the gift to him
was conditioned that he should be declared as his natural son.

ISSUE: WON Ramon is entitled to the testator’s property.

RULING: YES. Ramon is entitled to the testator’s property as far as the

disposition of Dona Honorata’s will

The will left by Dona Honorata to Luisa, it was clear as it was distinctly
declared that Enrique and Ramon shall take certain parts in excess of
Luisa’s portion after the 1000 pesos have been deducted. They were
pointed out by name as legatees. As it is true that they are called the
natural son of Don Clemente, it is merely a further description as they are
already well identified, and if such be false, it can be rejected in accordance
with the provision of Article 773, by Article 789 is applicable to legatees.

The will plainly declares that, on the death of any one of the life tenants, the
male children of such tenant shall inherit, and in respect with Luisa, it is
expressly declared that this shall take place whether she dies before or
after the testatrix.

50. RABADILLA vs. CA

Topic: Article 789

FACTS:  In the subject Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of
testatrix Aleja Belleza, said Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under
obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena
Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should
they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The
Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property
and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants.

“…….in the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to
respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza……”

Private respondent Maria brought a complaint alleging that the subject lot
was mortgaged in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell,
lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix
and that Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
hundred (100) piculs of sugar from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of
the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for
compliance. Neither did the mortgagees give any sugar allotment to Maria
Marlena.

Among others contentions, petition  contend that the private respondent

has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from
the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

ISSUE : WON private respondent has the right to seize the property and
turn it over to the testatrix’s descendants?

HELD:YES

In the interpretation of Wills, the law provides that when an uncertainty

arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions,
the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will,
taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.

In this case,from the reading of the  codicil the intention can be

ascertained. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-
interest, hence the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and
his successors-in-interest.
**** Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or
property exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be
corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic
evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention;
and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations.

51.

Yambao vs Gonzales

FACTS:
On August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to
Gonzaleses all of her properties in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was
probated in 1948. Yambao filed an action against Gonzales and Pablo
praying that 1. he be appointed and empoyed as tenant during his tenant
during his lifetime on the parcels of land bequeathed to and inherited by
them to Gonzales 2. to deliver to him the value of the harvests belonging to
him as tenant of said parcels of land Provisions of the will invoked by
Yambao is as follows:

Dapat in naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila Maria

Pablo at Angelina Gonzales na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN OR
GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod:
xxxx
(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabajo ng bukid
habang panahon, at and nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala ng
Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin at may utang pa.

Gonzales aver that the provisions of the will relied upon by Yambao is not
mandatory. The determination of who should be the tenant of the land is
vested in a special court; and the present action is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:  WON the testator intended to impose a duty of hiring the appellant
as tenants in her will?

RULING:
Ruling: YES
Analyzing it carefully we will find that the same contains a clear directive to
employ appellant as may be seen from the words preceding the word
"pahihintulutan" which say: "Dapat din naman malaman, ng dalawa kong
taga-pagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay
may dapat TUNGKULIN O GAMPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod."
The words "dapat TUNGKULIN O GAMPANAN" means to do or to carry
out as a mandate or directive, and having reference to the word
"pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon
appellees. To follow the interpretations given by the trial court would be to
devoid the wish of the testatrix of its real and true meaning.
Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial court, is inapplicable.
That refers to an institution of an heir intended to be conditional by
providing that a statement to that effect cannot be considered as a
condition unless it appears clearly that such is the intention of the testator.
We are not faced here with any conditional institution of heirship. What we
have is a clear-cut mandate which the heirs cannot fail to carry out.

#52

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, 

vs.

ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA

DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:
·            Testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children and a legitimate
granddaughter who is the only legitimate child and heir of her pre-
deceased legitimate son.
·            In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all
her properties between the 7 compulsory heirs and 7 other legitimate
grandchildren
·            the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and
admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was
appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate.
·            The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her
death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the
legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to
P129,362.11
 ·            The executrix filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate
in accordance with the testatrix’s testamentary disposition, whereby
she devised and bequeathed specific real properties, the values of
which to be added or subtracted to the extent of their respective
legitimes of P129,254.96 while the adjudications in favor of the
grandchildren remain untouched
·            On the other hand, oppositors submitted their own counter-
project of partition wherein they proposed the distribution of the
estate wherein all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally
reduced to the value of ½ of the entire estate while the other half
would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-
appelleee and oppositors-appellants in 7 equal parts. As to the
grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the
properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by
Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor
should be proportionally reduced.
ISSUE: WON the proposed counter-project of partition of the oppositors
can be upheld
HELD: NO
·            The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially
result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article
791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to
favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be
doubted
 
ART 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give
to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of
the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is
to be preferred which will prevent intestacy
 
·            the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed
in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise
·            Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix'
testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate
by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that
upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last
illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and
for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid,
she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my
property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately
thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition. 
·            The right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the
right of compulsory heirs to their legitime.
·            Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and
assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs
cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole
context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole
 estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at
the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition
her whole estate through her will
·            Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs
and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore
on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is
expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately
following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this
wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I
named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do,
his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall
inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased.
·            The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions
in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the
free portion of the estate
·            the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be
respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.

53.

VILLAFLOR (OR VILLANUEVA) VS. JUICO. FEBRUARY 28, 1962;

Facts: 
On 9 October 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, penned a will in Spanish,
bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all
his properties, giving the other half to his brother. Don Nicolas died on 3
March 1922 childless. His wife was appointed as judicial administratrix in
the settlement proceedings instituted in CFI Zambales.

 In 24 November 1924, Fausta, by virtue of an approved project partition,

received the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of
estates, and the use and possession of all properties mentioned in Clause
7th of the will. In the 8th clause, the will provides that Fausta is bequeathed
the “use and possession of all properties mentioned in clause 7th while she
is still alive and does not remarry”, otherwise the properties will go to
Nicolas’ grandniece.

 On 1 May 1956, Doña Fausta died childless and still not remarried. On 8
February 1958, plaintiff instituted special proceeding in CFI Rizal against
defendant Juico, the appointed administrator of Fausta’s estate admitting to
be the Leonor mentioned in the will as ‘grandniece’. She contends that
upon Fausta’s death, plaintiff became vested with ownership of the
properties mentioned in clause 7th pursuant to the 8th clause. Defendant
argued that the title to the properties became vested in Fausta upon her
death on account of the fact that she never remarried. The CFI decided in
favor of defendant. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff cannot get the properties mentioned in
Clause 7th on the ground that Fausta did not remarry. Ruling:

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any
of the expression inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is
to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."cralaw virtua1aw library

"SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In

the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all."cralaw virtua1aw library

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions

contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the
clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are ever the
primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator
had intended to impose as sole condition the non remarriage of his widow,
the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary,
since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889),
expressly enjoins the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense
can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained.

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the
context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. 

 the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial,
relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words,
unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. 

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and

the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or
testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The
records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation,
accounting, and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs
against the administrator-appellee.

54. Enriquez vs Abadia

FACTS:
Fr. Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a holographic will in
1923. He died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan,
Cebu. On October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a
Petition for its probate. This was opposed by some of the cousins and
nephew who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will.

The court of first instance found and declared the Will as a holographic will.
The court admitted to probate the will of Fr Sancho although at the time of
its execution and at the time of testator’s death, holographic wills were still
not permitted by law, in light of the new Civil Code (which permitted
holographic wills) that was effective at the time of the hearing. It applied a
liberal interpretation of the law.

The oppositors appealed.

ISSUE: Is the will valid?

RULING: The will is denied probate. THE WILL IS VOID.

1. At th e time of the execution of the will in 1923 and at the time of death of
Fr. Sancho Abadia in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted.

2. Art. 795 of the CC provides: “The validity of a will as to its form depends
upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.” Thus a
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although
the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling
has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil.,
23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.

3. Although there is a view that the intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and
interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and
that new statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death
of the testator should be applied to validate wills defectively executed
according to thelaw in force at the time of the exection. We should not
forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the
title of the legatees and devisees under it become a vested right, protected
under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills
which would invalidate such a will.

4. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills. When
one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the
legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more
liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest
the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession.

Note:

When did the NCC take efect? August 30, 1950

The testator executed his will in 1923. It was admitted to probate in 1952.
That time the NCC had taken effect. Is that will valid? No, Art. 795 provides
that the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the
law in force at the time it is made.

Obviously, when the will was made, the law did not recognize holographic
wills. That will was void as of the date when it was made and it remains
void althroughout notwithstanding the amendment of the law. So if the will
is void at the time of its execution, it remains void even if at the time of
death of the testator, it was made valid or even when the probate was filed
in court, such will is recognized by law.

55. 55. Ibarle vs Po 92 Phil 721

Facts:

Leonard Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife,

the former died leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor
children.

The decedent left a parcel of land and the latter was mentioned
as a conjugal property. Surviving spouse sold the entire estate to
spouses Canoy alleging that she needed money for the support of
her children.
After her appointment as guardian to her children, surviving
spouse sold ½ to Esperanza M. Po which portion belongs to the
children of the above-mentioned spouses.

Issue:

Whether the sale of the property made by the surviving spouse is

valid.

Held:

No.

The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs

acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be
pure or contingent.

It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses

between the death of the predecessor and the entry into
possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is
always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death.

 
The above provision and comment make it clear that when
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the
Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's
children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to
confirm the children's  title, it follows that the first sale was null
and void in so far as it included the children's share.

56. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA

CAPONONG-NOBLE, Petitioner, v. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL
ABELLAR, Respondents.

FACTS:

Abada died in 1940, his widow, Paula Toray ("Toray"), died in 1943, both
died without legitimate children.

Alipio C. Abaja filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament
of Abada, which allegedly named his natural children, as testamentary
heirs Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of
Eulogio.

Nicanor Caponong opposed the petition for Abada did not left any will and
that if such will does exist, it was not executed and attested as required by
law
Alipio filed another petition for the probate of the last will and testament of
Toray, but was still opposed by Capunong and other oppositors, composed
of Abada and Torays nieces and nephews.

In an Order, RTC admitted to probate the will of Toray. The same court
designated Belinda Caponong-Noble.

Sometime in 1993, Presiding Judge Layumas discovered that former

Presiding Judge Catilo had already submitted the case for decision. Thus,
the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution admitting the Last Will and
Testament of Abada for probate.

Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal. The CA affirmed the Resolution

of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the will is valid.

RULING: YES, the will is valid

Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are
the Civil Code of 1889 or Old Civil Code, and the Code of Civil Procedure.

Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will
are the following:

(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the
testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written
by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction;

(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other;

(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of the will
on the left margin;

(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each sheet;

(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page of the will, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

Article 685 of the Old Civil Code provides:

Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will
must be acquainted with the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall
be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are known
to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses
shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their
judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.

However, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil
Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not
necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore, Abada's will does not
require acknowledgment before a notary public. The legislature cannot
invalidate a valid will.

---Additional Notes---

** (1) As to the ground of Spanish language** 

There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator
knew the language or dialect used in the will. However, Alipio testified that
Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.

** (6) The Attestation Clause of Abada's Will**

-A phrase found in the will is translated, which means "in the left margin of
each and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that
the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with
the letters "ONE" and "TWO"

-The translated phrase "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio

Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having
also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of
the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada
signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.

-As to the number of witnesses, though the attestation clause does not
indicate the number of witnesses. The Court agrees with the appellate
court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining the
number of witnesses. A close inspection of the will shows that three
witnesses signed it.

-As to the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will
and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
attestation clause states that "in its witness, every one of us also signed in
our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each
witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of the testator.

57. In Re: Will of Jose Riosa

Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance
of the law in force at the time it is made

Art. 795 in this case refers to extrinsic validity from the viewpoint of time

FACTS

Jose Riosa made a will in January 1908, disposing of his entire estate. The
will was executed according to the law in force at that time, complying with
all the requisites then required in section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. He died April 17, 1917. However, between the execution of the
will and his death, the law on formalities on execution of wills was amended
by Act No. 2645 in force (July 1, 1916) , prescribing certain additional
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills. The new law, therefore,
went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the
testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements.

ISSUE

Whether the law which was existing on the date of the execution of a will,
or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls

HELD

1.  The law existing on the date of the execution of a will controls. The will
is extrinsically valid.

The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that The validity of the
execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its
execution and statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect.

 This is now article 795 of the NCC.

In this case the court considered 3 differing views in addressing the issue:

1. the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and that a will
not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its
execution was sufficient at the time it was made. (reason:  will a mere
inchoate act  until death).This view  that would make riosas will invalid was
rejected by the SC. “The act of bequeathing or devising is something more
than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when
the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not
take effect on the property until a future time.”

2. Validity of wills must be tested by statutes in force at time of execution.

This view is the one adopted by SC

3.  statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the
necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity
of a will already made and, when they lessen the formalities required,
should be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to the
law in force at the time of their making. The court did not directly address
this view

It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has

said, that "all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against
the retrospective effect.

The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect.

Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary
succession.
The SC clearly stated that they are adopting the (2nd rule) that Validity of
wills must be tested by statutes in force at time of execution.. This 2nd rule
is now espoused in Art 795 of the Civil code.

Ako lang ni:

The reason why the Sc took this view is seen from the provisions of section
634 of the Code of Civil Procedure , incorporating act 2645 which, in
negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five
cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." 
While Riosa’s will was not executed in conformity to this act, this provision
supports the view that  a will that has been executed with the formalities
required at the time is now a completed act at the time of the execution and
attestation, so far as the act of the testator is concerned. ( see view 1). I
think  ang difficulty sa third kay the need to construe to aid the will that is
lacking,so mura ug ginahatagan ug exception, addtl  interpretation ba 
when really ang retrospective aspect ra ang dapat iconsider, na complete
and valid  na ang act of making a will as regards the formalities at that time
of execution.

58.

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG

JOHNSON, applicant-appellant.

#59

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of

Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA
CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.

FACTS:

·            Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, then petitioner,

Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondents Nenita C.
Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving
heirs. 
·            As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto
himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased.
·            Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, which was allegedly executed in
the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased.In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix
was an American citizen at the time of her death, that the testatrix
died in Manila while temporarily residing w/ her sister. 
·            The last will and testament was executed on July 10, 1975
according to the laws of USA. That the same was presented,
probated, allowed and registered w/ the Registry of Wills in USA
·            An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed, on the
grounds of forgery and that the intrinsic provisions are null and void
as it would work injustice and injury to the Hermogenes.
 ·            Hermogenes died and was substituted by Polly Cayetano, as the
executrix of the former’s last will and testament
 
ISSUE: WON the Probate court should pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will even before it is probated 
HELD: YES
·            As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to
the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Normally, the intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand otherwise, the court should meet the issue.
·            It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the
Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. 
 
ISSUE: WON Hermogenes was divested of his legitime by allowing the
reprobate of Adoracion’s will
HELD: NO
·            Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its
probate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established
that Adoracion Campos was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.
Therefore, the law governing Adoracion Campos’ will is the law of
Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. Under
 the Pennsylvania law, no legitimes are provided for, and all the estate
ay be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.
60.

LLORENTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW

LLORENTE VS. CA                                                                  G.R. No.

124371 , November 23, 2000

FACTS:

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In
1937, he and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943,
Lorenzo became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered

that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente, a brother of
Lorenzo and the two even have a son. 

Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her
monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in
writing that Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the she will agree to
waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the
US.

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California.

Paula was represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted
and in 1952, the divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia

Fortuno. They had three children.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his
estate to Alicia and their children and left nothing for Paula. In
1983, Lorenzo went to the court for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as
the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding
can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate.

RTC ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce

decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on
January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.
The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE: what law shall govern the will

Held: 

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia;
(3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily

governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals
did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called
to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the
law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary
theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national
law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has
its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent
was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to
one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the
will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

-
#64 CHRISTENSEN, AZNAR VS GARCIA

Art 795: from the  viewpoint of place and country

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the

Philippines, died leaving a will and admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Davao. The court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia
(hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the
deceased. In the will, testator  gave the bulk of the estate to his daughter
Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and only a legacy of P3600 to Helen
Garcia.  Being a California citizen, the law on succession of California was
applied.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen

Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child. It was also alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal
law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the
case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,
which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the
California law?
Held: The Sc applied the Philippine law on will and successions, applying
the RENVOI doctrine (the return or referring back to our laws.)  in accepting
back the jurisdiction of this case to our courts.

The Renvoi Doctrine is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with a
conflict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private
international law rules. This can apply when considering foreign issues arising in
succession planning and in administering estates.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined
in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.

Therefore, as provided by our civil code, since the  deceased was a citizen
of California, California law on succession would apply.

However  provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, read as

follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is

situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
the law of his domicile.
In California there are two sets of rules regarding succession, Article 946 of
the California Civil Code being a conflict of laws rule and an internal Law
which should apply to California citizens with domiciles in California.

In this case, following the doctrine of Renvoi, the SC  therefore find that as
the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..

Additional re “national law” and US succession law:

 There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary

provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So
it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

#66. BELLIS VS BELLIS

FACTS:
·            Amos Belliswas a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States. By his first wife, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children; and finally he had three illegitimate
children
 ·            Amos executed two wills, one for his Texas property and the
other, for his properties in the Philippines. The latter directed that
after all taxes, obligations and expenses of administration are paid
for, his distributable estate should be divided as follows:
                        a. 240,000 to his first wife
                        b. 120,000 or 40,000 each to his 3 illegitimate children; and
that after the above 2 are satisfied, the                                              
remainder shall go to his 7 surviving children in equal shares.
·            Amos died on July 8, 1958. His will was subsequently
admitted to probate.
·            The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein in the form of shares of stock
which it released from time to time. On Jan. 8, 1964, the executor
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of the first wife as
well as that of the 3 illegitimate children and pursuant to the will,
the project partition shall divide the residuary estate into seven
equal portions.
·            Two of the 3 illegitimate children filed their respective
oppositions to the project partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
as compulsory heirs of the deceased (if we apply the Philippine
law)
ISSUE: WON the illegitimate children are entitled to their legitimes in the
present case
HELD: NO
 ·            The illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes
because under the Texas law (the National law of the deceased),
there are no legitimes
·            RENVOI DOCTRINE – takes place when the conflicts rule of
the forum makes a reference to a foreign law but the foreign law is
found to contain a conflict rule that returns or refers back to the law
of the forum
·            This doctrine of renvoi is not applicable in this case, it is only
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and a
domicillary of another. In the present case, the decedent was both
a national and a domicillary of Texas at the time of his death.
·            Assuming that Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the PH law
to properties situated herein, the doctrine of renvoi shall arise.
·            However, in the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule,
it should NOT be presumed different than ours.
 
ISSUE 2: WON the national law of the deceased should be disregarded
because Art. 17, para 3 provides that our prohibitive laws should not be
rendered nugatory by foreign laws
HELD: NO
·            Art. 17, para 3 is merely a GENERAL PROVISION and because
Congress deleted the phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article” when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old
civil code as Art. 17 of the NCC while reproducing w/o substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old civil code as Art.
 16 in the new. The intention was to make Art. 16 a SPECIFIC
PROVISION w/c must be applied to testate and intestate successions
·            Moreover, Art. 1039 was also added by Congress which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent. Therefore, Congress has not intended to extend the
prohibitive laws to the succession of foreign nationals.
 
ISSUE: WON because of the intention of the testator to apply the Philippine
law for his properties in the Philippines, said will can be validated and
enforced
HELD: NO
·            The intention of the decedent would not alter the law, a
provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not his national law,
illegal and void for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Art. 16 of the NCC states said national law should
govern.
·            In this case, the decedent was a citizen of Texas, USA and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy
of Amos Bellis

62. MICIANO vs. BRIMO

G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927

Facts:

Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of

the estate.

Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a

scheme of partition.

However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,

opposed it.

Brimo‘s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in

question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo‘s will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of
Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to

govern his testamentary disposition.

Held:

Yes.

Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will

that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate;
however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator‘s national law must govern in accordance
with Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly
said that ―it be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine Island‖, this condition, described as
impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide. 

Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law

or good morals.  

Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary

dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the

judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo,
as one of the legatees

 
67.

Malang v. Moson

G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000

FACTS:
Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3 sons with her. Abdula
then married for a second time with Jubaida and no child was born out
of that marriage. Abdula divorced Aida. Abdula then married Nayo and
they also had no child. Thereafter, he contracted another marriage with
Mabay and had a daughter with her. Not long after, Abdula married 3
other Muslim women but eventually divorced them. Abdula then married
his 4th wife Neng, excluding the wives he divorced. They were childless.
Abdula died without leaving a will.

ISSUE:

What law governs?

RULING:

The Civil Code since the Muslim Code has not yet taken effect. Abdula
died intestate on December 1993. It is the Muslim Code which should
determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate
succession and the respective shares of the heirs.

The Muslim Code took effect on February 4, 1977. If a Muslim died

before the effectivity of the Muslim Code, the order of succession shall
be governed by the Civil Code. The status and capacity to succeed on
the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every
marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the
performance of the marriage rite.
If the Muslim marriage took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and before the effectivity of the Muslim Code, he cannot marry again
because under the Civil Code, only one marriage is valid. But when the
marriage took place when the Muslim Code has taken effect,
subsequent marriages are allowed and valid.

The right of the spouses to inherit will depend on whether or not they
have been validly married. If they are not validly married, then they do
not have successional rights over their partner. The status and capacity
to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time
of conception or birth of the child. As to property relations, it is the Civil
Code that determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration
of the marriages in question, the Civil Code was the only on marriage
relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim
or non-Muslim.