Ramirez v. Ramirez Aranas v.
Aranas
GR No. L-27962, February 15, 1982 GR No. L- 56249, May 29, 1987
FACTS: FACTS:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to declare the
partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez orders of respondent Judge as an exercise of a gross
among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, by
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews ruling that the properties under Group C of the testate
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas are subject to
de Wrobleski. remunerative legacies.
The administratrix submitted a project of partition as Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into Church, died and had executed his Last Will and
two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno Testament which was admitted to probate. In said Last
dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or Will and Testament, the questioned provision are the
"free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en properties under Group C, which states that:
nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the
free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the C. The special administration of the remainder of the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and
Wanda. serviceable nephew and designating him also as
recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after
ISSUE: deducting the expenses for the administration and the
other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic
Is the partition according to the will valid? Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. Said
pertinent provision 1 reads as follows:
RULING:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from
No. other persons should be converged and placed under a
"special administrator." The special administrator of
As to the usufruct granted to Marcelle, the court ruled these lands, for his office, should receive one half of all
that to give Marcelle more than her legitime will run the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses
counter to the testator’s intention for for the administration, and the other half of the produce
his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and
favor Wanda. should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas
(Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable
As to the usufruct in favour of Wanda, the Court upheld nephew, should be the first special administrator of said
its validity. SEC. 5 of the 1935 Constitution: Save in properties, without bond, until his death or until he
cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone
land shall be transferred or assigned except to of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to said office of special administrator, and none other than
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the they. Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be
Philippines. (Art. XIII.). The Constitutional provision the one to decide who among them shall hold the said
which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not office, but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo
extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the Aranas, his said sons will have power to select the one
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. among them ourselves. The special administration is
Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the usufruct perpetual.
in favour of Wanda because a usufruct does not vest title
to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title ISSUE:
to aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Can a juridical person be an heir?
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect,
the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for RULING:
the reason that the substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the Yes.
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such Vicente Aranas as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result
heir originally instituted." From this, it follows that the from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's
fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of property, with the obligation to return, at the designated
the first heir. Furthermore, there was no absolute duty time, either the same thing, or in special cases its
imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as
Code. there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
Likewise his designation as administrator of these
(Additional notes from UP Succession: However, properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and
fideicommissary subsitutions are also limited to one therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil
transmission. Upon the lapse of time for the first heir, he Code relied upon by the petitioners.
transmits the property to the second heir. There cannot
be any more fideicommissary substitution coming from The SC also upheld the right of the Roman Catholic
the same testator. In other words, there can only be one Church as the other usufructuary legatee of the testator,
fidiecommissary substitution such that after the first, a priest of the Roman Catholic church, for the duration of
there can be no second fideicommissary subsitutiton.) the statutory lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years
from the date of the effectivity of said legacy.
The court distributed the estate by: ½ to his widow and
½ to the grandsons but the usufruct of the second half
shall go to Wanda with a simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
Morente v. De La Santa Broce vs Marcellana
GR No. L- 3891, December 19, 1907 CA L-10896-R, June 21, 1954
FACTS: FACTS:
The will of Consuelo includes the following clauses:
Wife provided in her last will and testament: “I want and I
(1) I hereby order that all real estate which may belong direct my husband that I am dead, and he should want to
to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo; remarry, he should choose a relative of mine within the
6th degree, and if he disregards this wish of mine, my
(2) That my said husband shall not leave my brothers brothers and sisters will have the right to claim or
after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; recover my properties as if they were only the heirs.”
should my said husband have children by anyone, he
shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, Husband however, one month prior to his death, married
except the 1/3 part thereof and the two remaining thirds another woman who was not within the 6th degree of the
shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his
deceased spouse, notwithstanding the fact that there
children should he have any;
were 3 of them available.
(3) After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the
camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of ISSUE:
the properties belonging to me.
Is the condition imposed in the will for the husband to
Gumersindo, married again within four months from the marry one of the relatives of his late wife within the 6th
death of Consuelo. Elena, a sister of the deceased, filed degree valid?
a petition to annul the legacy made to him on the basis
of his second marriage. RULING:
ISSUE: Yes.
Whether or not Gumersindo forfeits the legacy to him by
reason of his second marriage. Article 793 (now Article 874) of the old Civil Code which
was in force that time provides: “An absolute condition of
RULING: not contracting a first or subsequent marriage shall be
disregarded unless such condition has been imposed on
No. the widower or widow by the deceased spouse, or by the
ascendants or descendants of the latter”.
To no one of these orders is attached the condition that
if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy
Thus, the condition is valid. Undoubtedly, the purpose of
given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere
the lawmakers was to preserve the property of the
expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters,
testator in favor of her nearest of kin in case of non-
or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in
compliance with the condition. In the instant case, the
the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first
heirs of the husband are not entitled to any of the
clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he
properties which he inherited from his late wife because
marries again he shall incur such a loss.
her heirs are entitled to recover all the properties which
the husband received because of his failure to marry any
But it is expressly provided that if one event does
of her relatives within the 6th degree.
happen the disposition of the property contained in the
first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if
he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property
shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.
There being no express condition attached to that legacy
in reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that
any condition can be implied from the context of the will.
