CONSTIREV 2020 Syllabus Case Doctrines

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Reynaldo Lopez – 2020 Syllabus

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 4. Cabanas v. Pilapil
Judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects
INTRODUCTION one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest.
THE STATE 5. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid.
1. Magalona v. Ermita
Regarding the constitutionality of R.A. 9522, the court ruled that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by
or loss of territory. It is simply a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, the sea-use rights over maritime zones change of sovereignty. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution,
and the continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. The maritime zones are as follows: (territorial waters [12 the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change.
nautical miles from the baseline], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baseline], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baseline]). UNCLOS III was the culmination of the decades-long negotiations among THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
UN members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing
coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts. 6. Santiago v. COMELEC
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the constitution under section 2 of article
Baseline laws, therefore, are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III state-parties to delimit with precision xvii of the constitution is not self-executory.
the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. This, in turn, gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which state-parties exercise treaty-based 7. Lambino v. COMELEC
rights, namely: the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters, the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone, and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire
UNCLOS III and its baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement, or the diminution of territory. Under proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two (2) essential elements must be present. First, the people
traditional international law typology, States acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession and must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
prescription, and not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. An amendment is "directly proposed by the
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the FULL TEXT of the
are outside UNCLOS III and are governed by the rules of general international law. proposed amendments.
2. Capitol Wireless v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas 8. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

The country's territorial sea (to the extent of 12 nautical miles outward from the nearest baseline, under Part II, Sections Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
1 and 2) over which the country has sovereignty, including the seabed and subsoil, it follows that indeed a portion of contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
the submarine cable system lies within Philippine territory and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the said local taxing private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
authorities. And even if such portion does not lie in the 12-nautical-mile vicinity of the territorial sea but further paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
inward, this Court held that whether referred to as Philippine 'internal waters' under Article I of the Constitution or as
'archipelagic waters' under UNCLOS Part III, Article 49(1, 2, 4), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
of water lying landward of (its) baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
STATE IMMUNITY
3. Government v. Monte de Piedad
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has 9. UP v. Dizon
the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been The UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral
entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended damages (including attorney’s fees) was not validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover
for the people. the liability. It was, therefore, legally unwarranted for the CA to agree with the RTC’s holding in the order issued on
April 1, 2003 that no appropriation by Congress to allocate and set aside the payment of the judgment awards was
1 ABUEVA | ATIENZA | BARNACHEA | BARON | BUNAL | CABALANG | CALIUAG | CASTILLO | DE LA PEÑA | DIZON | EDNALAGA | ESPINOSA | ISHIHARA | KUA | LUBANGCO | MANGAYA | MERCADER | MOLINO | MUNGCAL | PADERAYON | PERLEZ | ROMANO |
SAGMON | SANTOS | TIONGSON | TOLENTINO
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necessary because "there (were) already an appropriations (sic) earmarked for the said project."82 The CA and the be, in effect, suing the state itself. The doctrine of par in parem, non habet imperium applies - that all states are
RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of the Government and its agencies sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts were created or for which the
funds were received except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in control 15. Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon
of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii.A sovereign State does not
merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its
Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises,
actual damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials.
covered by the "appropriations earmarked for the said project." The Constitution strictly mandated that "(n)o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 16. ATCI v. Echin
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic
10. Republic of the Philippines represented by the PCGG v. Sandiganbayan Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively what is due them. The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its
suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before petitioner can be
counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
11. Ildefonso Santiaga v. Republic of the Philippines
The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The 17. NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association v. NAPOCOR
government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment
Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that
to equity which the government so advances. judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate
his duties to another. However, a delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to assist him in his
12. DOTC v. Spouses Abecina functions provided that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
The State may not be sued without its consent. This fundamental doctrine stems from the principle that there can be
no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. But as the principle itself implies, 18. Sema v. COMELEC
the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be made For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time
expressly or by implication. the power to create a legislative district.
It became necessary to distinguish between the State's sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, 19. US v. Salaveria
commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure For the suppression of such an evil, coordinate and harmonious action must concur between the three departments of
imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity. Government. A law or ordinance enacted by the legislative body must exist. Vigorous executive enforcement must
take place to make the law or ordinance a reality. And finally the Judiciary, having full respect for the legislative
13. Arigo v. Swift action of the municipal council and for the prosecution by the executive officials, must, by judicial construction,
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without equally as progressive and constructive, give effect to the action of the other two powers.
the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental
acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State 20. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may not, under the guise
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic appearance of the community.
economic affairs.
21. Pelaez v. Auditor General
14. Minucher v. CA Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. Suing a representative of a state is believed to
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory departments and its power of confirmation; and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. e. The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not
mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided
SEPARATION OF POWERS / CHECKS AND BALANCES for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
22. Belgica v. Ochoa f. A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item
a. The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the of the 1987 Constitution
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." To the legislative branch of g. For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of
the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters appropriation as follows: An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an
b. There is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches appropriation bill. On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money"
may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.Further, it is significant to
performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning
one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." In other words, there is a violation an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-
of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another item; Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related
department‘s functions. purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE
c. In Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently
proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power; Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the
specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed.
law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and
from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the *For more doctrines not related to separation of powers and checks and balances, please read the entire digest
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern itself with details for implementation
by the Executive." STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
d. In Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the PRINCIPLES
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." It must be clarified, however,
that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," 23. Mendoza v. People
Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere payment
Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any of unpaid contributions does not suffice.
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions. Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.
In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on
24. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
Association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. The concept of association Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive
is not recognized under the present Constitution. The concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state but the Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less As the sole organ of our foreign relations, and the constitutionally-assigned chief executive and architect of our foreign
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country’s interface with other
states and governments. Being the principal representative, he has the power to, among others, enter into international
25. Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR agreements.
Tax treaties are entered into to minimize, if not eliminate the harshness of international juridical double taxation,
which is why they are also known as double tax treaty or double tax agreements. A state that has contracted valid 28. Mitsubishi Corp. v. BIR
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract.
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."20 Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one
treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering
negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.
Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to
avoid the process of legislative approval.
26. Republic v. Manalo
None of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and It is stated that "treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding,
State will be violated. In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with modus vivendi and exchange of notes" all refer to "international instruments binding at international law."
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress.
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.
29. Central Azucarera de Bais v. Heirs of Apostol
POLICIES The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the
27. Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
The MDT is not yet obsolete, as the court continued to recognize its validity even in 2009. The constitutional restriction privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to
enunciated under Art. XVIII, Sec. 25, was interpreted by the court with the use of statutory construction. It refers the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives
solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the
acts are subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to Sec. 25, protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor
or the requirement of validity through a treaty. with the blemishes of their own character.
Considering such circumstances, the VFA until the EDCA would be valid and binding upon the Philippines even if it 30. Garcia v. Drilon
does not have Senate concurrence. Furthermore, the President may generally enter into executive agreements subject a. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate. to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
b. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process. It is a constitutional
Executive agreements do not need to be concurred with by the Senate and they are still binding. Executive agreements commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
are different from treaties, and do not require the concurrence mandated by Art. XVIII. They merely involve protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats
arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded: to their personal safety and security.
a. to adjust the details of a treaty; c. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
b. pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
c. in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
The raison d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations. administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."
On right to Health:
31. Racho v. Tanaka The Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public.
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
pleaded and proved as a fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
remarry once our courts find that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his or distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be practitioner.
absolute.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and
32. Hubilla v. HSY Marketing Ltd. materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
When the evidence in labor cases is in equipoise, doubt is resolved in favor of the employee. “safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective”.
33. Oposa v. Factoran 36. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies The ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision making in matters which may
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights affect their rights, lives and destinies. The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in IPRA, which entails, among other things, the observance
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs. The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now compromise. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA,
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOAAD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority.
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first 37. Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
sustaining life. against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status. The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
environment.The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted. 38. Limbona v. Mangelin
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
34. Republic v. Albios administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed. that local affairs are administered according to law."
35. Imbong v. Ochoa Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial
On right to life: to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being CITIZENSHIP
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should 39. So v. RP
be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization:
a. administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139;
b. judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and
c. legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is concerned, should
alien.45 be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a
person's qualifications to vote is... determined.
A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not
constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified
applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the voter. One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote.
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the
certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision Court definitively characterized registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage:
of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court. "Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice,
photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features."
40. Republic v. Go Pei Hung
Strict compliance with all statutory requirements is necessary before an applicant may acquire Philippine citizenship THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
by naturalization. The absence of even a single requirement is fatal to an application for naturalization.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
41. Maquiling v. COMELEC
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation
46. Aquino III v. COMELEC
as to one's nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts
Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is
that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district.
42. David v. Agbay
Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the
47. Alaba v. COMELEC
provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
On the OSG’s contention that Congress’ choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation
citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they
with constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of
shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance
such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there
under the new law.
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
43. Republic v. Sagun
The exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming weight of authority is that district
citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere
apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts." Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of
exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
legislative districts is important because the "aim of legislative apportionment is ‘to equalize population and voting
Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship.
power among districts.”
44. David v. Poe-Llamanzares
48. Naval v. COMELEC
Foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted
a. R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second District, but it merely renamed the other four. The Court notes that
nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly
after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the current Third District, which brought Naval
burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.
to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second District, which elected
him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicates the intent of the lawmakers to
45. Kabataan Party List v. COMELEC
create a single new Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First District with Gainza and
A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such as fitness or capacity) inherently
Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the word "rename." Although
or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or to perform a public duty or function."
the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d)
and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second, while
merely renaming the rest. It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
Second District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. Therefore, Naval had already served for 3 women, and the youth.
consecutive terms in the same government post. e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
b. Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly,
to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
person. that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
49. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC advocacy for their respective sectors.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or
body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power organizations.
among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
50. Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of 53. Coalition of Assoc. of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members from the moment they are The twin requirements of notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the
considered as a Member of the House or of the Senate. Thus, until such time, it is the COMELEC who has the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. The appropriate due process standards
jurisdiction of all contest relating to election, returns and qualifications of an applicant. that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in Ang Tibay v. CIR,
outlining administrative due process requirements.
51. BANAT v. COMELEC
The Court rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent 54. Lico v. COMELEC
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 The 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the of Representatives. The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is
52. Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of
The COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters: the proclaimed winner.
a. Three different groups may participate in the partylist system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 55. Abang Lingkod v. COMELEC
b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent
lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only
c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral 56. Abayon v. HRET
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives.
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure
57. David v. Poe-Llamanzares for enactment of laws and presentment.
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously exclude all foundlings from public service.
62. Balag v. Senate Committee on Public Order
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence The period of detention under the Senate's inherent power of contempt is not indefinite.
is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one
or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. 63. Imbong v. Ochoa
The “one title-one subject” rule sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
58. Liban v. Gordon general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,
The PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the executive branch since his appointment does not fall under scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
section 16, article vii of the constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the judiciary
or legislature. 64. Belgica v. Ochoa
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
59. Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. This is rooted in the principle
Equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 (Parliamentary Immunity) of the Constitution that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in
is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides for the one of the powers of the SC to promulgate rules them.Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any
admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. The Court, besides other appropriation law.
being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific
authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, 65. Araullo v. Aquino III
among other things: In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount
a. Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for
that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the
independence; President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
b. Enforce rigid ethical standards Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in
the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain
60. Makalintal v. COMELEC language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now dispose of
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no as untenable.
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the
Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised following requisites, namely:
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate a. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
to decide." Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions
to transfer funds within their respective offices;
61. Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima b. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not c. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to offices.
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
66. Macalintal v. PET
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution The 1987 Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the
with either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single,
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, 72. Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances
between the PET and the Supreme Court. require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive
departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved
67. Pormento v. Estrada by the latter.
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of
the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person's second (whether immediate or not) election as President, 73. Kulayan v. Tan
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In
issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
68. Funa v. Ermita called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In Code.
other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the 74. Ampatuan v. Puno
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. a. Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A did violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act. First, the claim
69. Funa v. Agra of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the President, Vice-President, the Members of the is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region. But, in the first place,
otherwise provided in the Constitution. Complementing the prohibition is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents
the 1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive official from holding any other office or employment in the took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009
corporations or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position. pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor
Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting
70. De Castro v. JBC ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of
The prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next the ARMM.
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of b. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places.
the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the
deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment
71. Velicaria-Garafil v. O.P. is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
and effective) appointment: Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
a. Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
b. Transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. The
c. A vacant position at the time of appointment; and President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
d. Receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise
The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether the same.
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and
operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. And, unlike the dissent's 75. Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo
proposal, there is no need to further distinguish between an effective and an ineffective appointment when an It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
appointment is valid. proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President
does not have. Executive agreements do not need to be concurred with by the Senate and they are still binding. Executive agreements
are different from treaties, and do not require the concurrence mandated by Art. XVIII. They merely involve
76. Lagman v. Medialdea arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded:
Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. a. to adjust the details of a treaty;
Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power b. pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or
to review. c. in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution.
The scope of the power of review of the Court under 1987 Constitution refers only to the determination of the The raison d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. In
the sufficiency of factual basis test the Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive
rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases. Court's review is agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent
events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. As the sole organ of our foreign relations, and the constitutionally-assigned chief executive and architect of our foreign
policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country’s interface with other
77. Monsato v. Factoran, Jr. states and governments. Being the principal representative, he has the power to, among others, enter into international
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the agreements.
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence
of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of 80. BAYAN v. Executive Secretary Zamora
the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. Both Article VII, Section 21 and Article XVIII, Section 25 constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other,
actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus,
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause "No treaty x x x,"
party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the and Section 25 contains the phrase "shall not be allowed." Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the
finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of 81. Araullo v. Aquino III
the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount
contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for
78. Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain
coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now dispose of
to delimit the pardoning power of the President. as untenable.
79. Saguisag v. Ochoa 82. Neri v. Senate Committee On Audit of Public Officers and Investigations
The MDT is not yet obsolete, as the court continued to recognize its validity even in 2009. The constitutional restriction Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect
enunciated under Art. XVIII, Sec. 25, was interpreted by the court with the use of statutory construction. It refers public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will
solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the
acts are subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to Sec. 25, President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise
or the requirement of validity through a treaty. of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as
Considering such circumstances, the VFA until the EDCA would be valid and binding upon the Philippines even if it the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained
does not have Senate concurrence. Furthermore, the President may generally enter into executive agreements subject separation of governmental powers.
to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary
83. Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
In accordance to the environmental law, every Filipino is entitle to act as a steward of nature and that consequently, Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of respondents as officials performing or discharging their official duties as
the plaintiff had the standing to sue. The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated from their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar.
by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers.
laws.
88. Ocampo v. Enriquez
84. Oposa v. Factoran Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. As they are
85. Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr. concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure,
On Judicial Review political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of has been limited by Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power to
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
justice or expediency of legislation.
89. People v. Teng Moner y Adam
On Legal Standing If the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the
The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the governmental consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the
act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. They must show that they have a weight of evidence presented for each particular case. Herein, the trial court judge convicted Moner on the strength of
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning the corpus delicti.
some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act. However, when those
who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may The chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure. It is therefore the SC who has the last say
exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to regarding the appreciation of evidence.
show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
90. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council
86. Domingo v. Revilla The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
Moreover, the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions. Every attorney is a vanguard of our statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured. He
must then conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
all times. Any violation of the high moral standards of the Legal Profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. Verily, the respondent's deceitful conduct as an attorney decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may
rendered him directly answerable to the Court on ethical, professional and legal grounds despite the fact that he and not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
the complainant had amicably settled any differences they had that might have compelled the complainant to bring
the complaint against him. 91. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
87. Trovela v. Robles definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be
The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of official duties as stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
Arellano exclusively pertained to their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will
authority to discipline pertained to the President. not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all 95. Re: Request for Guidance / Clarification on Section 7, Rule 111, RA 10154 Requiring Government
other statutes. Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency / Non – Pendency of Cases from CSC
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution exclusively vests in the Court administrative supervision
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so over all courts and court personnel. Retiring government employees from the Judiciary do not need to secure a prior
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC. To deem it otherwise
the first essential of due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel.
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."14 96. Re: Save the SC Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its independence. Courts, therefore, must also be
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting accountable with their own budget.
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech. 97. Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
92. Araullo v. Aquino III practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of
The Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the
DAP proceeds is to achieve equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
could not be ignored or could no longer be undone. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without
recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well 98. Chavez v. JBC
as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public
clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial
93. Fortich v. Corona independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three
The word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the rule of branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3),
but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice
speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and member of the
94. COA Opinion in the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased for the Retired Chief / Associate JBC put it, "negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Justices of the SC Constitution.
Decisional independence "refers to a judge s ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based
solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand, institutional independence "describes the 99. Aguinaldo v. Aquino III
separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of recommending appointees to the
independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body. Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the
process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the
Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a It is apparent from CONCOM deliberations that nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the
court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, Judiciary, but this only means that the President cannot appoint an individual who is not nominated by the JBC.
the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial It should be stressed that the power of the JBC to recommend cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power
functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in
unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy amounts the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of appointment is valid.
adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel
the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate
separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of the prospective
provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. appointees. The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is composed of a Presiding Justice and 20 Associate Justices
divided into seven divisions, with three members each. The numerical order of the seniority or order of preference of
the 20 Associate Justices is determined pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or appointment by
the President. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES / AGENCIES
Justices cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the President. 103. Laya v. CA
This point is important because the Constitution provides in its Article IX-B, Section 2(1) that "the Civil Service
100. Jardeleza v. Sereno embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
a. In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, or controlled corporations with original charters." As the Bank is not owned or controlled by the Government although
that qualifications such as "competence, integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as it does have an original charter in the form of R.A. No. 3518, it clearly does not fall under the Civil Service and should
they are developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or advisable to lay down be regarded as an ordinary commercial corporation. Section 28 of the said law so provides. The consequence is that
iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or the relations of the Bank with its employees should be governed by the labor laws, under which in fact they have
Deputy Ombudsman." Given this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and uniformity in already been paid some of their claims.
JBC’s guiding precepts and principles."
b. For the sake of transparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of 104. Funa v. Villar
JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set in the determination of competence," "probity and a. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
independence," "soundness of physical and mental condition, and "integrity." As disclosed by the guidelines uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years;
and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term
may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-governmental as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among
others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public b. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment)
on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked. shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less
As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2),
character." Art. IX(D).
c. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven
101. Villanueva v. JBC years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission.
Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five (5)-year experience and those with less than Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition
five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and against reappointment.
relevant to its legitimate purpose. d. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
itself. seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec.
102. Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or
Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of a public officer. Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or
Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal." A quo warranto office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal
proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust the holder sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment. e. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the
use or exercise of the office. Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to 105. Funa v. Duque III
determine whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of the It has been provided under Article IX-A that the Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. It does not ascertain CSC, COMELEC and the CoA. Sec. 2 states that no member of any constitutional commission shall, during his tenure,
the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official from office.
management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries. PHILIPPINE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Although their functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president of the KINDS AND HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS
Philippines in the discharge of such functions; Sec. 1 states that all the constitutional commissions shall be
‘independent’ which shall include its independence from all three branches of the government. Each of the
commissions conduct its own proceedings under the applicable laws and promulgates its own rules in the exercise of 1. Republic v. Cagandahan
its own discretion. Its decisions, rulings and orders are subject only to review on certiorari by the court. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent
The GOCCs in question are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there
purposes for which they were created. While the powers and functions associated with the GOCCs bear similarities is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
with the duties of the CSC, they are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions which are not
personnel-related. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the boards of the GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC and Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle
HDMF, he may exercise additional powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to Congenital
Chairman. This is not the essence of an ex oficio designation. Adrenal Hyperplasia. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
106. De la Llana v. Chairman In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
Decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari. However, these refer to respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
decisions and orders which were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity. Circular No. 89-299 was Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
promulgated by the COA under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence, Circular No. 89-299 is not
reviewable by certiorari. Neither is a petition for prohibition appropriate in this case. A petition for prohibition is filed DUE PROCESS
against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person — whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial ARTICLE III, SECTION 1
functions — who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the petitioner
prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
specified in the petition. However, prohibition only lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. 2. PBM Employees Org. v. PBM
A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave
107. Capablanca v. CSC and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It
The Civil Service Commission (“CSC”), as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees,
a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently
integrity in the civil service. their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to
intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
Under Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with civil service examinations. Thus, private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
it has jurisdiction over alleged anomalies in the career service professional examinations of PNP personnel. Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.
108. Caoibes v. Ombudsman 3. Ermita – Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v. City Mayor
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to oppression. Due Process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty “to those
judicial independence. striving for justice” and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch “in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect democratic traditions of legal and political thought”, decision based on such a
clause requiring a “close and preceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society”. Questions of due process
are not to be treated narrowly or pendantically in slavery to form or phrases.
is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
4. Cruz v. Paras governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to enact
ordinances and make regulations.— The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, In judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard of determining the quality and the
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms, and is used today to test
by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other fundamental rights as
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and expansion to equal protection.
for the protection of property therein." It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found
in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, The court recognizes that the effect of the ordinance not only extends to the petitioners/owners, but also to the patrons
and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, who would be barred from availing the short-time rates. The liberty of both shall unnecessarily be burdened by such
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there an ordinance.
was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous
of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
therein employed. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the recently-
enacted Local Government Code. The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is 7. Tanada v. Tuvera
set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. Municipal The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
their business. immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in
every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
5. City of Manila v. Judge Laguio extended.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to
due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with 8. GMA v. MTRCB
the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. While MTRCB had jurisdiction to review the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of
the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof,
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A 9. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” It
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual without due process, whether
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the construction of a building
in one's own property, would violate substantive due process.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights-a violation of the due process clause. 10. Evasco v. Montanez
The power to regulate billboards within its territorial jurisdiction has been delegated by Congress to the city
6. White Light v. City of Manila government via the Davao City Charter. This direct and specific grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in
Two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or another law of general application, in this case the National Building Code. Stated differently, the city government
restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. A third standard, does not need to refer to the procedures laid down in the National Building Code to exercise this power.
which is the heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted for evaluating classifications based on gender and
legitimacy. 11. Mayor Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
The court has often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Two tests have been used by the
basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under court ( the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test.
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures
Pertinent parts of these documents annexed to the 1991 Petition, along with the other pleadings filed before the
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and Sandiganbayan relative to the present petitions, have also been extensively quoted and reproduced verbatim in this
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: resolution. The purpose is not only to provide a clearer statement of the factual antecedents, but also to confirm the
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; veracity of the reference to these documents and to equally dispel any doubt regarding them
2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory; 16. Lagon v. Velasco
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade; The Judicial Affidavit Rule was particularly created to solve the ills brought about by protracted litigations. The fact
5. must be general and consistent with public policy; and that the defendant is mandated to submit his judicial affidavit prior to the trial and before the plaintiff has rested his
6. must not be unreasonable. case is not a cumbersome requirement or a circumvention of due process. On the contrary, this is necessary for the
orderly administration of the proceeding before the courts. The Court has always emphasized that "procedural rules
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites: should be treated with utmost respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
1. the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice." It cannot
and be overemphasized that when the rules are clear, magistrates are mandated to apply them.
2. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. 17. Republic v. Sereno
A mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
12. Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown. Verily, for bias and prejudice
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action. to be considered sufficient justification for the inhibition of a Member of this Court, mere suspicion is not enough.
This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically
enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public 18. Borlongan v. BDO
purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the thing in litigation must be notified
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge. and given an opportunity to defend that interest. Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
19. Allowance for the Family Foundation Phil., Inc. v. Garin
13. Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Puedan Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as
The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in a person to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps,
the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the
applied. part of those who are called upon to administer it. The FDA certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs
and devices, without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, that is, without notice and without public
14. Turks Shawarma Company v. Pajaton hearing. It appeared that, other than the notice inviting stakeholders to apply for certification/recertification of their
The Court has time and again held that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. reproductive health products, there was no showing that the respondents considered the opposition of the petitioners.
It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so the 20. Gov’t of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia
right to appeal is lost. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international
15. Estate of F.E. Marcos v. Republic law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
They allege that they were denied due process by not being given any opportunity to prove their lawful acquisition of dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World
the Malacañang Collection. This allegation cannot be given credence for being utterly baseless. War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws
of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders
The complete records of Civil Case No. 0141 - a total of 35 volumes along with 2 envelopes containing exhibits and have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
1 envelope containing the transcripts of stenographic notes - have been forwarded to this Court by the Sandiganbayan. significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the The State through the labor Secretary exercises the police power which is a power coextensive with self- protection,
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. and it is not inaptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
23. People v. Hernandez
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts.
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each
offense.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. In his Separate 24. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan
Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which Those adversely affected by a law may under such circumstance invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted
by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. Equal protection and
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked
upon in term of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
21. Agabon v. NLRC restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and
authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. 25. Abubakar v. People
Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, The prosecution of offenses is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the fiscal. A claim of "selective
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order prosecution" may only prosper if there is extrinsic evidence of "clear showing of intentional discrimination." The
Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process prosecution of one person to the exclusion of others who may be just as guilty does not automatically entail a violation
should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process. of the equal protection clause. Petitioners failed to establish discriminatory intent on the part of the Ombudsman in
choosing not to indict other alleged participants to the anomalous transactions. Their contention that several other
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, public officials were not criminally charged, by itself, does not amount to a violation of petitioners Abubakar and
civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules Baraguir's right to equal protection of laws. The evidence against the others may have been insufficient to establish
protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. probable cause. There may have been no evidence at all. At this point, all this Court could do is speculate. In the
absence of extrinsic evidence establishing discriminatory intent, a claim of selective prosecution cannot prosper.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. Failure to abide by the two-notice rule does not automatically render the 26. Gallardo v. People
dismissal invalid. However, the employer should indemnify the employee (in damages) for the violation of his The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that
statutory right. all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial
EQUAL PROTECTION differences, one class may be treated differently from another. Simply because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 some cases allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a
clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The Ombudsman dismissed those
cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand,
22. PASE v. Drilon
he recommended the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold
The Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which
them for trial. He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of
their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not
his office. Stated otherwise, the circumstances obtaining in the numerous cases previously dismissed by the
thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled that equality before the law under the
Ombudsman are entirely divergent from those here existing.
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women.
27. Tiu v. CA Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and the print media. In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on the grantees or
regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply licensees. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and
to all those belonging to the same class. Explaining the nature of the equal protection guarantee, the Court in Ichong regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the radio and
v. Hernandez said: television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as gets. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and
either [by] the object to which it is directed or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does not regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified 30. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable. grounds exist for making a distinction To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of
28. ISAE v. Quisumbing classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions
policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.
"give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a
"in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of this duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be
observe honesty and good faith." rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
sympathy of this Court. suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
29. TELEBAP and GMA v. COMELEC
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have 31. Garcia v. Drilon
to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision conferred and responsibilities imposed.
that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when
the common good so requires." In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in other
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In the granting of the of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the state spends constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it cannot even require the should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
licensees to render public service by giving free air time. the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media (radio and television stations on one hand, and foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
newspapers and magazines on the other) however, which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal 35. Manila Memorial Park v. DSWD
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its Police power versus eminent domain.
protection. Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property for public
welfare. The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.
POLICE POWER
Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
32. Southern Luzon Drug Corp. v. DSWD to fulfill the objectives of the government."
The issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant cse as it had been clear in Carlos Superdrug that the
power being exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen discount was its police power. Unlike in the Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property for public
exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely use provided there is payment of just compensation.
because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.
Traditional distinctions:
33. SJS v. Atienza In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely
Local Government Code imposes upon City Mayors, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence,
the city." As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been payment of just compensation is not required.
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. These
officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty In the exercise of police power, although the regulation affects the right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights
because it might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.
to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially
been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose
are bound to obey it. which necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of the property
are transferred to the expropriating authority. However, the acquisition of title or total destruction of the property is
34. Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD not essential for "taking" under the power of eminent domain to be present. In these cases, although the private
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare property owner is not divested of ownership or possession, payment of just compensation is warranted because of the
for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to burden placed on the property for the use or benefit of the public.
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.
"the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs."For The evolving meaning and scope of public use and just compensation in eminent domain evinces that these are not
this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy static concepts. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the challenged governmental
of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Here, The act and decide, on the basis thereof, whether the act is the exercise of police power or eminent domain. The 20%
Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed,
grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may
of our society. not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive
years of their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation. As to its nature and effects, the 20%
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products and services relative to a
exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential concern.
rights in the process. Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by
petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the This affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens.
active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and However, it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the
directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter, but merely
implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private
a legislative act. establishments may derive from, senior citizens. The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with
substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded
as police power measures.
The subject regulation differs from price control or rate of return on investment control laws in that (1) the discount measure. It is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
does not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications ─ which has
does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.
degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category
of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, 39. Assoc. of Medical Clinic for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Center Assoc.
the subject regulation is a police power measure To be considered reasonable, the government's exercise of police power must satisfy the "valid object and valid means"
method of analysis: first, the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires
36. Drugstore Assoc. of the Phil. v. National Council on Disability Affairs interference; and second, the means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the objective sought and not unduly
The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose as oppressive upon individuals.
aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional
notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably present in Section 16 of RA No. 10022. The prohibition against
convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a the referral decking system is consistent with the State's exercise of the police power to prescribe regulations to
benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The means employed in invoking the active promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people. Public interest demands State interference on health
participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly matters, since the welfare of migrant workers is a legitimate public concern.
related. Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are reasonably related to its
accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that as a form of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs 40. St. Luke’s Medical Center Employees Assoc. v. NLRC
in the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments as allowable tax deductions pursuant to Section 32 While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably
of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009. Otherwise stated, the regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and
discount reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability of the establishments is computed. the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
37. MERALCO v. Spouses Ramos careers.
The distribution of electricity is a basic necessity that is imbued with public interest. Its provider is considered as a
public utility subject to the strict regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. Failure to comply with EMINENT DOMAIN POWER
these regulations gives rise to the presumption of bad faith or abuse of right. ARTICLE III, SECTION 9
Nevertheless, the State also recognizes that electricity is the property of the service provider. R.A. 7832 was enacted
WHAT CONSTITUTES TAKING
by Congress to afford electric service providers multiple remedies to. protect themselves from electricity pilferage.
These remedies include the immediate disconnection of the electric service of an erring customer, criminal
prosecution, and the imposition of surcharges. However, the service provider must avail of any or all of these remedies 41. Republic v. Vda. de Castelvi
within legal bounds, in strict compliance with the requirements and/or conditions set forth by law. ELEMENTS OF A TAKING
Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property for more
38. MMDA v. Viron than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
MMDA’s move did not satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between Requisites of "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain:
the purposes and the means. As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
and not merely a private, concern. The Court held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting
Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads. but a moment; of but a moment's duration" "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas, this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure recurring at every moment" The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should
designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures be construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or permanent.
calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. The MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’ Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected.
terminals not only because no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power beneficial enjoyment of the property.
to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local government
42. City of Manila v. Laguio should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road."
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road lots covered by TCT No. 179165
and violative of the private property rights of individuals. have actually been donated to the government or that their transfer has otherwise been consummated by respondents.
It only theorizes that they have been automatically transferred. Neither has expropriation ever been fully effected.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves 45. Bartolata v. Republic
no reasonable economically viable use of the property. Only public lands acquired by qualified applicants without public auction and for residential purposes are free from
any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation. The provision is inapplicable to petitioner's property which was
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no awarded to petitioner not in accordance with RA No. 730, but through public auction. Also, the Republic was under
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When no obligation to pay just compensation in enforcing its right of way. Be that as it may the Court did not foreclose the
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common possibility of the property owner being entitled to just compensation if the enforcement of the right of way resulted in
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. the "taking" of the portions NOT subject to the legal easement.
The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances In this case, petitioner was erroneously paid when respondents appropriated the amount in his favor. However, because
such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever of respondents' representation that the amount was a mere downpayment for just compensation, petitioner never
other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, objected to the taking of his land and peacefully parted with his property, expecting to be paid in full for the value of
are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could the taken property thereafter. As the events unfolded, respondents did not make good their guarantee. Instead, they
be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb would claim for the recovery of the wrongful payment after almost 12 years, as a counterclaim in their Supplemental
the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.” Answer. Indubitably, respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering from petitioner the amount initially paid.
43. NAPOCOR v. Heirs of Borbon 46. NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez

The moment it appears in whatever stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for
should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation. The retirement determining just compensation. The above prices refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market
of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue value thereof. No matter how laudable NPC’s purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable
with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in that they may be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity,
the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.
use.
47. PPI v. COMELEC
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property for
no need to pay "just compensation" to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
actual or other compensatory damages. This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. The taking of private property for
lost. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings occurred during the appeal, the SC treats the public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation” (Article III,
dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an action for damages. Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission.
DEPRIVATION OF USE
*In Print spaces (newspapers, magazines etc.), they are owned by private person, while in television or radio
44. Republic v. Sps. Llamas networks the airwaves are owned by the Government or the State, meaning the State can provide regulations with
A "positive act"must first be made by the "owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over respect to the use of airwaves. While in print space the Comelec-Space would amount of taking private property.
the subdivision roads." As there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an
actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated
PRIVATE PROPERTY 51. Mactan – Cebu International Airport v. CA
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two
48. City of Baguio v. NAWASA mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
This court has already expressed the view that the waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city that has property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable
established it. Being owned by the municipal corporation in a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be taken away the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
without observing the safeguards set by our Constitution for the protection of private property. And unless appellee is
given its due compensation, appellee cannot be deprived of its property even if appellant desires to take over its With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose
administration in line with the spirit of the law. We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the law, insofar as it stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an effective payment of just compensation, violates our it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to
Constitution. reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose
49. Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law,
The capacity in which the governmental property is held is dependent on the use to which it is intended and and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
devoted. There are two laws which may determine the nature in which the property is held. The first comes from The
New Civil Code of the Philippines, and the second from the Law of Municipal Corporations. In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations than that of The New Civil public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
Code. The court rejects the view that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
ordinary private property. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power
acquired through adverse possession. The classification of properties under Art. 424 is without prejudice to the of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
provisions of special laws. For the purpose of the aforesaid article, the principles obtaining under the Law on
Municipal Corporations can be considered as special laws. Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted 52. Mactan – Cebu International Airport v. Lozada
for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
Under The Law on Municipal Corporations, all 50 of the aforesaid properties which are devoted to public service property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable
are deemed public and the rest remain patrimonial. To be considered public, it is enough that the property be held the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. Following
this classification, R.A. 3039 would be valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose
grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites—a total of 24 lots—as these were held stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity, and are therefore subject to the absolute control of it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to
the Congress. reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose
FOR PUBLIC USE for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law,
and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
50. Manosca v. CA
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo
to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The
practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well 53. Republic v. Macabagdal
be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but to compensate him for the
a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss
of public use resulted. Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's property;
it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due consideration to the circumstances availing
at the time the property was taken.
The owner's loss is not only his property, but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
compensation of its value must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
income lost. The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due,
and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been 57. City of Cebu v. Sps. Dedamo
completed. This shall comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and constitutes In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section
due compliance with the constitutional mandate of just compensation in eminent domain. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not
Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the complaint but from the categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We
date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008, since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value
of property can be established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest should begin from this date. of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed
Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid balance of the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
the just compensation for the subject lot, which shall be computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the proceedings."
date of the taking on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due respondent shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a. 58. Assoc. of Small Landowners v. DAR
The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may
54. NAPOCOR v. Sps. Chiong own in excess of the maximum area allowed hence there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights
but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
received therefor." The aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is
expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to 59. MERALCO v. Pineda
the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as
remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in
consequential benefits. expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute
its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied
55. EPZA v. Dulay illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence,
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32
tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. Phil. 286). Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be
but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from
amount. the record. The rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by petitioner for the entire area
of aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation
or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill
of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or 60. NAPOCOR v. Henson
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any
be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under
operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
56. Esteban v. De Onorio
The value should be taken from the time of the taking. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the However, the land has been reclassified as residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is
condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or "that the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct 61. Sec. of DPWH and Engr. Contreras v. Sps. Tecson
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. The FMV of the property at the time of taking is controlling for purposes of computing just compensation.. The
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss
thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of a. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use
the taking, when the loss resulted. we recognize that the owner's loss is not only his property but also its income- and benefit of his property, in this case, when emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer
generating potential.Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve beneficiaries in 1989. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the RTC for the valuation
a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. of the subject land must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.
b. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as
Thus, adding the interest computed to the market value of the property at the time of taking signifies the real, amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that while it should take into
substantial, full and ample value of the property. Verily, the same constitutes due compliance with the constitutional account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation for the subject land,
mandate on eminent domain and serves as a basic measure of fairness. Additional compensation shall be awarded to it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. In any event, should
respondents-movants by way of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in view of the government's taking without the RTC find the said guidelines to be inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating
the benefit of expropriation proceedings. therefrom, and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the
acquired property.
62. Republic v. Lim c. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases
recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an
within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be pegged at the
have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking in 1989 when Emancipation Patents were issued, until June 30,
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners
of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral
owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799,51 Series of 2013.
be considered "just."
66. Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v. Municipality of Pasig
63. NAPOCOR v. Heirs of Sangkay An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a
It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offeror's promise into a contractual
or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended
occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, a
interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.
manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his
property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements
hands. and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court
action. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a
GENUINE NECESSITY OF TAKING reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will
suffice. In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite
64. Filstream International v. CA and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent
RA 7279 ( Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) Sec. 9 provides for the limitations with respect to the order to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly
of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
Private lands rank last in orde of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with TAXATION POWER
these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of
private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use. 67. CIR v. Algue
The burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed deduction. In the present case, however, we find
65. Heirs of Feliciano, Jr. v. Land Bank that the onus has been discharged satisfactorily. The private respondent has proved that the payment of the fees was
For the purpose of determining the just compensation of expropriated property, the following guidelines should be necessary and reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent
followed: businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of
pesos.
LICENSE FEES v. TAX
68. City of Pasig & Crispina Salumbre v. MERALCO
The LGC further provides that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge or to generate revenue shall be exercised by 71. Physical Therapy Org. v. Municipal Board
the Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance. This simply means that the The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered in determining whether it is a tax or an exercise of the police
local government unit cannot solely rely on the statutory provision (LGC) granting specific taxing powers, such as the power. The amount may be so large as to itself show that the purpose was to raise revenue and not to regulate, but in
authority to levy franchise tax. The enactment of an ordinance is indispensable for it is the legal basis of the imposition regard to this matter there is a marked distinction between license fees imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations
and collection of taxes upon covered taxpayers. Without the ordinance, there is nothing to enforce by way of which the sovereign wishes to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical and dangerous to the public,
assessment and collection. However, an ordinance must pass muster the test of constitutionality and the test of health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee maybe very large without necessarily being a tax.
consistency with the prevailing laws. Otherwise, it shall be void.
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
TAX EXEMPTIONS (RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE)
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2
69. CIR v. DLSU
A plain reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and TO WHOM DIRECTED
income must have also been sourced from educational activities or activities related to the purpose of an educational
institution. The phrase all revenues is unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues. Thus, so long as the 72. People v. Andre Marti
revenues and income are actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes, then said revenues and income Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
shall be exempt from taxes and duties. as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
DOUBLE TAXATION The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
70. City of Manila v. Cosmos Bottling Company Corp. the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
There is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance
No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter — the privilege of doing business in the City If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of Manila; (2) for the same purpose — to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
city revenues; '(3) by the same taxing authority — petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
— within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods per calendar year; and (6) against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
of the same kind or character — a local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the business. is involved.
The Court revisits Section 143 of the LGC, the very source of the power of municipalities and cities to impose a local WHO MAY INVOKE THE RIGHT
business tax, and to which any local business tax imposed by petitioner City of Manila must conform. It is apparent
from a perusal thereof that when a municipality or city has already imposed a business tax on manufacturers, etc. of 73. Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz
liquors, distilled spirits, wines, and any other article of commerce, pursuant to Section 143(a) of the LGC, said The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal
municipality or city may no longer subject the same manufacturers, etc. to a business tax under Section 143(h) of the of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary. In the case at bar, no
same Code. Section 143(h) may be imposed only on businesses that are subject to excise tax, VAT, or percentage tax personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent de Leon) and his
under the NIRC, and that are "not otherwise specified in preceding paragraphs." In the same way, businesses such as witness (respondent Logronio). This cannot be considered as a personal examination. If there was an examination at
respondent's, already subject to a local business tax under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 [which is based on all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as already stated,
Section 143(a) of the LGC], can no longer be made liable for local business tax under Section 21 of the same Tax the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge.
Ordinance.
74. Stonehill v. Diokno
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Two points must be stressed in connection
with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
seized.
79. Pita v. CA
PROBABLE CAUSE "The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to pronounce what "obscene" means or
what makes for an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test,
75. Burgos v. Chief of Staff in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense other article charged as being obscene may fall." "Another test," so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks
are in the place sought to be searched. the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. " Kottinger hastened to say, however, that "[w]hether a
picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to
76. AAA v. Carbonell be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities?
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the In People v Go Pin, the court held that the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those
pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and
77. People and Pastrana v. Abad who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because
safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall thus be pictures
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights In Gonzales v Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of
of the citizens; for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
of government.
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of
The search warrant must be issued for one specific offense. the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases
are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on probable undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to
cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
warrant. In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusetts, and
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. established "basic guidelines," to wit: "
a. whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole,
ISSUED PERSONALLY BY A JUDGE appeals to the prurient interest . . .;
b. whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and
78. Soliven v. Judge Makasiar c. whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem. Apparently, the courts have assumed
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate In issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory
of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon,
or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the burden to show this lies with the authorities. PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF PERSONS, THINGS AND PLACES
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present 82. Del Castillo v. People
danger." The presentation as evidence, of fruits of an invalid warrantless search is a violation of an individual’s constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the
speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected
not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. The police officers,
as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus,
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
80. Pasion Vda. De Gracia v. Locsin 83. People v. Salanguit

The important question presented is whether upon the facts and under the circumstances of the present case, there has Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific
been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures. While the offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies
Solicitor-General admits that, in the light of decisions of this court, the search warrant was illegally issued, he the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and
maintains "(1) that the petitioner had waived her constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search and seizure, the persons or things to be seized.
and (2) that the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made after an unreasonable length of
time after the date of seizure." Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed
personal right which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied. No express waiver has been made into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
in the case before us. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said
right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
84. Dimal and Castillo v. People
Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation that points
her behalf. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. As the constitutional guaranty is not satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. To the Court's view, the abovequoted search warrant
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting sufficiently describes the place to be searched with manifest intention that the search be confined strictly to the place
an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to described. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when the description therein
a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact -
of the law. not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to
be described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued. The
81. Mata v. Bayona purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end
in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written that no unreasonable searches and seizures will be committed.
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In warrantless arrests made
pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
85. People v. Sucro On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created committed it. In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. essential.
86. People v. Go The scenario under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplates that the officer
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest having been issued prior himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, the officer knows for a fact that a crime has just been
thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest committed.” Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test, showing
may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested that "the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that she was in possession
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been of illegal drugs at the time she was apprehended." Absent any overt act showing the commission of a crime, the
committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has warrantless arrest is rendered invalid, as in a case where a person was apprehended for merely carrying a bag and
committed it. traveling aboard a jeepney without acting suspiciously.
In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellant's waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. 88. Umil v. Ramos
No search was conducted as none was necessary. Appellant could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the The arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified. It can be said that, within the contemplation
time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a
warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership is penalized, and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.
As a consequence of appellant's valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 89. Luz v. People
126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest.10 The subsequent discovery in his car of drug First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal search. As such,
the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained in violation of the Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
right against warrantless arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any proceeding.11 Hence, not being fruits of the offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
a consented search is admissible in evidence. parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary.
87. Reyes v. People
One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
lawful arrest. violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter.
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning
reversed. A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a general rule – be complied with. The that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of
provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, conducted.
there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an
arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where 90. Villamor v. People
he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before arraignment.
a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest especially when the accused
A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend actively participated during trial as in this case. However, we have clarified that such waiver is only confined to the
a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest
may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect,
questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is HOT PURSUIT
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators
the answers they seek. See id., at 451. 91. People v. Gerente
The arrest made without warrant was lawul because the arresting officer has personal knowledge that the accused
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the committed the crime -- 1) saw the dead body of the victim; 2) inspected the scene of the crime and found the
mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that instruments of the crime; 3) arrest was made only some three (3) hours after the commission of the crime.
the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most 92. People v. Cubcubin
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x Rule 113, 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop,", than to a formal arrest. arrest a person:
x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary attempting to commit an offense;
traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
purposes of Miranda. that the person to be arrested has committed it;
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional while being transferred from one confinement to another.
equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his
traffic citation was being made. Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid:
1. the offender has just committed an offense and
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the 2. the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed be arrested has committed it.
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was probable cause for the
traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. The two did
with. not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of
the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely
The Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter on what they had been told by others. At the time accused-appellant was arrested, he was not doing anything overtly
of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came after his arrest. Moreover, as will presently be explained, the objects
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against allegedly seized from accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
NB: In this case, the penalty for the traffic violation was only a fine
TIME OF ARREST of law enforcers, regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions.” With the illegal seizure of the marijuana
plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
93. People v. Rodrigueza
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante 96. People v. Aminnudin
delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught Vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
red handed in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer. vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. However, in the
instant case, the PC officers had at least 2 days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
While the rights of a person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only against the accused. His name was known, the vehicle was identified, and the date of its arrival was certain. From the
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to
conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right Also, the accused was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do
against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the vessel and there was no
violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other disembarking from the vessel. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon the accused and immediately arrest him.
search warrant.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
94. Go v. CA
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not CONSENT OR WAIVER
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time the petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact 97. People v. Omaweng
just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such
the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out
to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 98. Veroy v. Layague
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant
Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, the petitioner was not arrested at all. is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search
of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view.
LACK OF URGENCY
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject
95. People v. Pasudag thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may
The prosecution’s evidence clearly established that the police conducted a search of accused’s backyard garden not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having
without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant; they failed to secure one. There was no showing been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
of urgency or necessity for the warrantless search, or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants. protected by the exclusionary principle.
The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of 99. People v. Damaso
dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous While the court encourages and supports law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in the
disregard of the Bill of Rights.”We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is society, the court must stress that the latter’s efforts to this end must be done within the parameters of the law. In
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.” “The mantle of the case at bar, not only did the court find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high handedness
obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence presented against him is weak to justify contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which
conviction. these persons are associated.
The constitutional immunity from searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 103. Picardal v. People
the person whose rights are invaded, or one who is expressly authorized to do so on her behalf. In the case at bar, The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for a violation of the said section is only a fine of
the records show that the appellant was not in his house at the time the two women allowed the authorities to enter it. PhP500.00 or community service of 1 day. The said regulation did not provide that the violator may be imprisoned
There is no evidence as well that would establish that Morados is his helper, and that the appellant had given her for violating the same, precisely because it is merely a regulation issued by the MMDA. Stated differently, the MMDA
authority to open the house in his absence. Tanciangco also had no such authority. Without this evidence, the Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere regulation, and not a law or an ordinance.
authorities’ intrusion into the appellant’s dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place, the police officers involved in
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, it must still be exercised and the law enforced this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens. As a consequence, the search conducted by the a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of. Thus,
authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the circumstances demanded urgency which could have as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be used in any prosecution against him .
prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant, however, the records are silent on this point. The fact that
they came to Damaso’s house at nighttime does not grant them the license to go inside his house. There was absolutely MOVING VEHICLE
no reason why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and insist on arbitrarily forcing
their way into Damaso’s house with the menace of a military invasion. 104. People v. Mago
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control,
even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with
100. People v. Kalubiran seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The officer in-charge could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope
The arrest in flagrante delicto as a result of entrapment is valid. The warrantless arrest of any person actually or other containers wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles
committing a crime is also valid. A search made as an incident of a lawful arrest is also lawful under Section 12 of introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. An abundance of jurisprudence justifies warrantless searches and seizures under the reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid.
conditions established in this case.
105. Asuncion v. CA
101. Espano v. CA Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued
The arrest in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by Police Officers on the basis of by a competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the land ordains it.
information received regarding illegal trade of drugs within the area, is valid. The arrest was lawful, and the two However, the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving
cellophane bags of Marijuana seized are admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
An exception to the general rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
106. People v. Degracia
102. People v. Tangliben The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest
squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript bailable. The arrest or capture is impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society
of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection,
a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of continues cannot be less justified.
109. People v. Pasudag
INCIDENTS WHICH MAY LEAD TO WARRANTLESS SEARCH As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize
the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
PLAIN VIEW secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible.
107. People v. Musa "Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce." The Court is not unmindful of the
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights." We need not
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific
instances are searches allowed without warrants." "The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praise
the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the worthiness of their intentions."
object. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. 110. People v. Valdez
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an
money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic
bag. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants
to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the
opened it and found the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to
apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
108. Padilla v. CA Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that
Seizure of evidence in "plain view", has the following elements: upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.38 Patently,
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana
pursuit of their official duties; plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; to apply.
c. the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
d. "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 111. People v. Compacion
Authorities forcing their way in without the valid and proper consent of the owner and/or the lawful occupant does
It appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any not amount to a valid search. The presence of force and intimidation which eventually made the owner and/or the
active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The lawful occupant to consent to the search is not a lawful search.
seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view"
of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket
CHECKPOINT
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation
of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero
and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. 112. Caballes v. CA
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the
object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without
a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency,
or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe late.
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. It is clear from the records of this case that
the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. The articles 116. Manalili v. CA
were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a
underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles
without further search. . . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
113. People v. Libnao presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced
warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This
was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached
STOP AND FRISK petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended
period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred
114. Terry v. Ohio with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to
Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or investigate this behavior further.
that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed
and dangerous regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
that the individual is armed. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of
Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously x x x
be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required. in upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only after
they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In
A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the identity or to
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized
as something less than a full search, even though it remains a serious intrusion. 117. People v. Solayao
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardy tenable. He and his
115. Posadas v. CA companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons
it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and
it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding
something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
and seizure in the Posadas case brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made. by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
118. People v. Comprado Port security measures are consistent with the country's aim to develop transportation and trade in conjunction with
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the national and economic growth. In 1974, the Philippine Ports Authority was created for the reorganization of port
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a administration and operation functions. The Philippine Ports Authority's Charter was later revised through Presidential
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search Decree No. 857. The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority through Executive Order No.
can be made - the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search 513.
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering that port
violence. personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article III of the
Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch function.
will not validate a "stop and frisk," A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 121. People v. Breis
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an authority. Further, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable proceeding. However, the rule against warrantless searches and seizures admits of exceptions, such as the search of
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps moving vehicles.
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. In People v. Libnao, the Court held:
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
REASONABLE SEARCHES securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine
119. People v. Johnson checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane an automobile or other vehicle contains a[n] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft destruction.
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to
x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to 122. Saluday v. People
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Other factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline of a particular activity may diminish this expectation. The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation
to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedure visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the
airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggages. Considering
120. Libo – on Dela Cruz v. People the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test the necessity for a warrant.
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
DRUG, ALCOHOL AND BLOOD TESTS
A buy bust operation is a form of entrapment used to apprehend drug peddlers. It is considered valid as long as it
123. SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board passes the "objective test," which demands that 'the details of the purported transaction during the buybust operation
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the illegal drug subject of the sale.
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. There is a valid buy bust operation if the prosecution is able to establish details of the transaction from the initial
contact of the poseur-buyer and the appellant up to the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the Drugs. The
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public identities of the poseur-buyer and the appellant as the seller of the drugs, and the details of the procedure employed
and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out by the police operatives in conducting; the buy-bust were clearly established by the prosecution. The fact that the
illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful poseur-buyer, through the CI, solicited morphine from appellant is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy
effects of dangerous drugs." bust operation invalid as, under prevailing jurisprudence.
The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. 127. People v. Garry dela Cruz
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with Non-compliance with the chain of custody is tantamount to failure in establishing the identity of the corpus delicti,
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an
reasonable, and equitable requirements. element of these offenses, non-compliance will therefore engender the acquittal of the accused.
124. Lucas v. Lucas The purpose of the chain of custody is to lessen the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit,
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and more so when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdiction have differed whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police until it was tested in the
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdiction have almost universally found that a laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible.
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood The prosecution’s sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties will suffice.
in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause Whatever presumption there is as to the regularity of the manner by which officers took and maintained custody of
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie the seized items is negated.
case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
As cited in People v. Nandi, there are four links that should be established in the chain of custody in the established
125. Jaime Dela Cruz v. People item, sequentially:
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful 1. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. officer,
2. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 3. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination and
4. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
126. People v. Dumagoy
A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a 'decoy 128. People v. Gayoso
solicitation,' is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy-bust operation invalid. Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
There is instigation when "the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him." seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."
On the other hand, there is entrapment when law officers employ schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal
while in the actual commission of the crime. Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; 132. People v. Que
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Summary of the Requirements of Section 21 of RA No. 9165, as amended:
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory 1. As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, the Act requires the performance of two actions:
examination; and physical inventory and photographing.
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the 2. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation."
court. 3. As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant.
• If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items after place that the search warrant is served.
they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the seized items be marked immediately • In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest
since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as reference. The chain of custody rule also requires that office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."
the marking of the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately 4. At least 3 persons are required to be present during the physical inventory and photographing.
upon confiscation."
• First, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; Alternative, his or her representative;
and second, his or her counsel.
In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with their initials in the presence
of appellant and immediately upon confiscation • Second, an elected public official; and
• Third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service; Alternative, a representative of the media
129. People v. Villanueva may be present in his or her place.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the Note: Representative from the media and a representative from the National Prosecution Service are now alternatives
substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of to each other.
the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances
or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this Requisites of Non-compliance under “Justifiable Grounds”
requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner. 1. Prosecution must specifically allege, identify, and prove the “justifiable grounds”;
2. It must establish that despite non-compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs and/or
130. Dabon v. People drug paraphernalia were properly preserved. Satisfying the second requisite demands a showing of positive
It must be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of the RevisedRules of Criminal steps taken to ensure such preservation. Broad justifications and sweeping guarantees will not suffice.
Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in implementing the same as the same Rules provide
parameters in the proper conduct of a search. One of those parameters set by law is Section 8 of Rule 126, to wit: 133. People v. Sipin
Links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:
Section 8.Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — Nosearch of 1. Seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug from the accused by the apprehending officer;
a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof 2. Turn-over of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer;
or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion 3. Turn-over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
residing in the same locality.The law is mandatory to ensure the regularity in the execution of the search 4. Turn-over and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.
warrant. This requirement is intended to guarantee that the implementing officers will not act arbitrarily
whichmay tantamount to desecration of the right enshrined in our Constitution Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid
or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the
131. People v. Crispo evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. The Prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for
Under the CDDA a representative from the media and the DOJ and any elected public official is required. However, non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA No. 9165, as amended. Strict adherence to Section
it may not always be possible, non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds - will not render void 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting,
and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized tampering or alteration of evidence.
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves
that: 134. People v. Teng Moner y Adam
1. There is justifiable ground for non-compliance;; and To reiterate, noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is excusable as long as there exist justifiable grounds which
2. The integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved prevented those tasked to follow the same from strictly conforming to the said directive. The preceding discussion
clearly show that the apprehending officers in this case did not totally disregard prescribed procedure but, instead, secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
demonstrated substantial compliance with what was required. It was likewise explained that the divergence in known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
procedure was not arbitrary or whimsical but because the buy-bust team decided that they could not linger at the crime otherwise described. . . .
scene as it would unduly expose them to security risks since they were outside their area of responsibility.
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of
This is not the first time that this Court has been confronted with the question of whether or not to uphold the conviction the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in
of a person arrested for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs who had been positively identified by credible witnesses violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
as the perpetrator of said crime but the manner by which the evidence of illegal drugs was handled did not strictly judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
comply with the chain of custody rule. To reiterate past pronouncements, while ideally the procedure on the chain of
custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in
chain.24 Unfortunately; rigid obedience to procedure creates a scenario wherein the safeguards that we set to shield admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
the innocent are likewise exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment. Realizing the inconvenient truth that conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act
no perfect chain of custody can ever be achieved, this Court has consistently held that the most important factor in the No. 4200.
chain of custody rule is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act.
DATA PRIVACY ACT
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
138. Katz v. US
135. Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC If a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation, that conversation is protected by the Fourth
There is no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens Amendment and cannot be recorded by the Government without a warrant.
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico
claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an 139. Pollo v. Constantino – David
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual(subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-
issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
136. Zulueta v. CA which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband Neither did he allege that he used passwordsor adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people,whom he even allowed to use his
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite computer which to him seemed a trivial request.
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
of fidelity that each owes to the other. Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances,
that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the
INTRUSION; WHEN ALLOWED presence of policy regulating the use of office computers,. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human
ANTI – WIRETAPPING LAW
means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only
for such legitimate business purposes.
137. Salcedo – Ortanez v. CA
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy 140. Republic v. Bolante
of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The As regards the purported violation of the right to privacy, the Court ruled that the source of the right to privacy
relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows: governing bank deposits is statutory, not constitutional. The legislature may validly carve out exceptions to the rule
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private on the secrecy of bank deposits, and one such legislation is Section 11 of R.A. 9160.
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
The case of Subido emphasized that the holder of a bank account that is the subject of a bank inquiry order issued ex violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the
parte has the opportunity to question the issuance of such an order after a freeze order has been issued against the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
account. The account holder can then question not only the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the freeze support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
order, but also the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the bank inquiry order.
144. Ople v. Torres
CYBERCRIME LAW Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as
an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be
141. Disini v. Secretary of Justice let alone." A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with
To know if the state has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
unreasonable government intrusion. persons seeking basic services. The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is
the burden of the government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given narrowly drawn. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. Unsolicited 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression and the State cannot rob him of this right without violating the will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." The potential
Restricting or blocking access to computer data void and unconstitutional, because It not only precludes any judicial for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
intervention but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of
speech. basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it
be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan
The Court finds nothing in Sec 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable information base through
of another without right. It is a universally condemnable act. the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Also, it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." This
142. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government
case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through through his PRN.
the utilization of the OSN's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in
cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Even if the Court grants that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic personal
information about the individual such hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity
143. Lee v. Ilagan for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a are essential to safeguard the privacy and guarantee the integrity of the information. Well to note, the computer linkage
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder,
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the stored within the system.
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there
exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other .19
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard ARTICLE III, SECTION 4
of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down
his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right CONCEPT, PURPOSE AND SCOPE
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
146. Babst v. NIB
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
An invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can
Rights seeks to prevent.
easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and
Moreover, the Court rejects the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable
when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated
expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on
interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports
quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by
to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case,
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that
the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this
society recognizes as reasonable.
Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman
saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.
The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. The measure of
147. Disini v. Secretary of Justice
protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted.
Petitioners claim that Sec 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seek to discourage data interference, it
The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the
intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed
advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard
freedoms. —-Sec 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is
The rules and regulations to be made by the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC). The rules and regulations
no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a
to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or
proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually unfettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected speech.
ID System
Spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the same level of protection as other
145. KMU v. Director – General, NEDA
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, but it is nonetheless entitled to protection. It ruled that the prohibition
Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed
on transmitting unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Accordingly, the court declared sections 4 (c) (3) as
executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter
unconstitutional. Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant to collect or record
required legislation. EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards
traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system. Traffic
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power
data under this section includes the origin, destination, route, size, data, and duration of the communication, but not
that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres
its content nor the identity of users. As to whether section 12 violated the right of privacy, the court first recognized
sought to establish a "National Computerized Identification Reference System," a national ID system that did not exist
that the right at stake concerned informational privacy. In determining whether a communication is entitled to the right
prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a
of privacy, the court applied a 2- part test: (1) whether the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of
new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.
privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable
in the society. The court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their
communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively reasonable because the
traffic data sent through internet does not disclose the actual names and addresses of the sender and redisclose, only
their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Accordingly, the court struck down section 12 for lack of specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy. Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or
block access to a computer data found to be in violation of the act. The court first recognized that computer data
constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the
Philippines’ constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
property or to block a form of expression. Because section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the court finds it an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
unconstitutional. purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
REGULATIONS: CONTENT BASED v. CONTENT NEUTRAL
152. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
148. U.S. v. O’Brien A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations
imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased;
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;if the or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities.
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.We find that the 1965 The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
Amendment to § 12 (b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
consequently that O'Brien can be constitutionally convicted for violating it. the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
149. Osmena v. COMELEC freedoms.”
§11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or
information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more effect" upon protected speech.
than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.
STATE REGULATIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEDIA
150. Roque v. Chief of Staff
Respondents should not be faulted for releasing a subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they 153. Disini v. Secretary of Justice
filed against petitioner. The statements were official statements made in the performance of respondents' official The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for the purpose of regulating access
functions to address a matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious to and use of cyberspace. Several sections of the law define relevant cyber crimes and enable the government to track
breach of security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for responding down and penalize violators.
publicly to such public actions.
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both nuisance and trespass because
"Dangerous tendency" rule: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain without
then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or prior permission.
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the same level of
the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It
body seeks to prevent. ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications “would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as
FACIAL CHALLENGES: VOID – FOR – VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH DOCTRINES unconstitutional. Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record
traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.”
151. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti – Terrorism Council Traffic data under this Section includes the origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication,
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common but not its content nor the identity of users.
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their communications lawful election propaganda. Petitioners, meanwhile, argue that the present size regulation is content-based, as it
transmitted online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through applies only to political speech and not other forms of speech such as commercial speech. “Assuming arguendo that
internet “does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only the size restriction sought to be applied [...] is a mere time, place, and manner regulation, it’s still unconstitutional for
their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.” lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective.”
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable The court also defined content-based and content-neutral regulations. Content-based regulation or restraint or
expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient, censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” It bears a heavy presumption
against which the Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless, of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The content-based regulation will pass
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication constitutionally only if it is justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad
they want.” Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect nor vague. The regulation involved here is content-based as the tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size
for the right to privacy. of its medium.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in violation The court ruled that the twin tarpaulins consist of satire of the political parties. Satire is a literary form that employs
of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right to freedom of expression, as well as the devices such as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies and this may target any individual or
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court first recognized that computer data group in society, private and government alike. Surely Team Patay is not a list of dead people. The tarpaulin caricatures
constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the political parties and parodies the intention of those in the list. The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the
Philippines’ Constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal usual messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are more declarative and
property or to block a form of expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found descriptive and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. The COMELEC is out of bounds if
it unconstitutional. it attempts to restrict private speech made by private persons in their private property.
KINDS OF SPEECHES 155. Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Duque III
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such
CORE SPEECHES rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris).
Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the
member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents
154. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
The court here distinguished between political and commercial speech.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national health policy. Respondents
issue,” “fostering informed and civic-minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech is defined as submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014.. However,
speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of
breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. The national policy of protection, promotion and support of
The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is definitely political speech. In Justice Brion’s dissent, he breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.
noted that “the content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it subject to the regulations in R.A.
9006 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. While indeed, the RH issue, by itself, is not an electoral matter, the slant
PROTECTED SPEECHES
that the petitioners gave the issue converted the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and
Team Patay and the plea to support one and oppose the other.” While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure
of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean that it is election propaganda. The 156. JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party or party-list group. By way of a summary: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
It is clear from the definition under COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that personal opinions are not included, while owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
sponsored messages are covered. enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
An additional contention by the COMELEC is that the order of removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
regulation. The order was simply made because petitioners failed to comply with the maximum size limitation for grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In
to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, "the
burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on the. . .
157. David v. Macapagal – Arroyo authorit[ies]."
Settles is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statues invalid although they may be abused and misused.
And may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present
determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular danger." "It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or censorship that the ... authority does not rely solely
case. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require."
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger
158. Bayan v. Ermita test."
BP No. 880 is NOT an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable
"lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they and subject to challenge.
would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing"
in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide:
government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. — A person charged with an offense may be
Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
in the rally. The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, offense.
public convenience, public morals or public health, a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on
account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party,
UNPROTECTED SPEECHES under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
159. Pita v. CA A. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity
In the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut rap is in order;
simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging B. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear
influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties C. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on
yet their works are considered important literature today. Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned from public a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
exhibition but now adorns the world's most prestigious museums. D. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for;
E. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the F. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized are
divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it. indeed "obscene".
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been, an easy one to answer, These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of
as it is far from being a settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the discouraging trend in American official power under the Civil Code" for the Revised Penal Code .
decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in sight.
160. Soriano v. Laguardia
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a "perfect" definition of RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: There is nothing in the petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any
"obscenity", if that is possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with the problem, which, after particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his
all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition. statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious
discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech.
AVERAGE CHILD TEST: SC found that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of
average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
We hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for general total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.While adults may have governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be expected to have the same expression.
discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television
broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. 163. GMA Network v. COMELEC
The "aggregate-based” airtime limits on political ads is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. The
petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium COMELEC has no power to enforce such a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and
easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech. political parties would be able to campaign through the air.
PRIOR RESTRAINT: Statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional 164. 1 – UTAK v. COMELEC
breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial controls the time, place or manner, and under well-de;ned standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts
effects of unprotected speech. The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulations within the
television shows, even religious programs constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third,
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the
suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and It is not disputed that the COMELEC has the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
obscene remarks he uttered franchises or permits for the operation of transportation utilities during an election period. The franchise or permit to
operate transportation utilities is a privilege granted to certain persons to engage in the business of transporting people
161. Celdran v. People or goods; it does not refer to the ownership of the vehicle per se. Ownership is a relation in private law by virtue of
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will is everything not prohibited by public law
must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible or the concurrence with the rights of another. Thus, the owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the without other limitations than those established by law.
feelings of those professing another faith
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
162. SWS v. COMELEC ARTICLE III, SECTION 5
Test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4 held in United States v. O 'Brien:
[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
1. if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
165. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the
4. if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and
following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.8
their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to
of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
have "become canonical in the review of such laws."9 is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with
Court in at least two cases.10
the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is
union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in
labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its. secular goals. In pursuing these goals,
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, however, government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious
they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by the Free
not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the
compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of integral purpose of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of accommodation where an exemption
association. is sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise. Although our constitutional
history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to
Anent the issue that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will not look with
the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when
condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither it can within flexible constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free
does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection
or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation granting exemption from a
Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop law of general applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the religion clauses justify it.
agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act - to exercise the right to join or
to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious 168. Imbong v. Ochoa
religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union - he is The Establishment Clause and Contraceptives
exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
166. Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Cebu doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies
morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation
line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave things that are God's.
and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious
beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7,
167. Escritor v. Estrada 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately
Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. The Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
voluntarism, although the Establishment Clause also assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the advancement
of religious groups on their intrinsic merits and not on the support of the state. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education is instructive on the matter, compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
viz:The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.One may believe in most anything, however from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest
strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the. scales of in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
stretch of road to travel. The difficulty in interpretation sets in when belief is externalized into speech and action.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened.
As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience NON – ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious
beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes. 169. Aglipay v. Ruiz
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course,
of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were
not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event
if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation. considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" It is significant to note that
the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law seeks to propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are
provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
religion. appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and 170. Engel v. Vitale
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is The state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not required and the prayer is not tied to a
of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded particular religion. The majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. Clause of the First Amendment. Specifically, the policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church
If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle and state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing religion meant that the government
of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. had no business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its population.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and The Court stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from this activity did not make the law
Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors constitutional because the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent government interference with religion. The
under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff Court held that the mere promotion of a religion is sufficient to establish a violation, even if that promotion is not
on their labor ward who were involved in abortions. The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined coercive. The Court was not persuaded that the general wording of the prayer and the fact that the prayer was voluntary
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity were enough to insulate it from the First Amendment. The Court observed that not every religion recognizes a God,
and uncertainty." so some are necessarily excluded even with this wording. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced not appropriate for the government to endorse any particular belief system.
to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
171. Abington Schools District v. Schempp
We cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with
the consent of the majority of those affected, collides with the majority's right to free exercise of religion. While the
Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never ALLOWABLE v. NON – ALLOWABLE GOVERNMENT AID; REQUISITES
meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.
175. Lemon v. Kurtzman
172. Stone v. Graham A statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a
This Court has announced a three-part test for determining whether a challenged state statute is permissible under the secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; it must not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.”
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must
not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
This is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like. Posting 176. Fonacier v. CA
of religious texts on the wall serves no such educational function. If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed the.right to inquire into the jurisdiction of religious tribunals
to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their decisions to the test of fairness or to the test
the Commandments. However desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state furnished by the constitution and laws of the church. Thus, it has been held that the expulsion of a member without
objective under the Establishment Clause. notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a property right is involved.
173. Wallace v. Jaffree Amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and abandonment of faith or abjuration, having to
One of the well-established criteria for determining the constitutionality of a statute under the Establishment Clause do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference
is that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 -613. The First to the power of excluding- from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.
The record here not only establishes that 16-1-20.1's purpose was to endorse religion, it also reveals that the enactment 177. Republic v. Manalo
of the statute was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose. In particular, the statements of 16-1-20.1's sponsor in The establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
the legislative record and in his [472 U.S. 38, 39] testimony before the District Court indicate that the legislation was cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
solely an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. Moreover, such unrebutted evidence of legislative they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
intent is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship between 16-1-20.1 and two other Alabama statutes - one of particular religion and, thus establish a state religion. The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
which, enacted in 1982 as a sequel to 16-1-20.1, authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a prescribed prayer, convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is
and the other of which, enacted in 1978 as 16-1-20.1's predecessor, authorized a period of silence "for meditation" sincerely believes that they are good for country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal
only. The State's endorsement, by enactment of 16-1-20.1, of prayer activities at the beginning of each schoolday is consequences which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that
not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
religion.
178. Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindon
174. Letter of Atty. Valenciano The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective administration and
portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. In the same breath enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts
that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari'a
or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and
can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters
a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion. ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party
is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.
Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other hand, is passive. In the
former, the State becomes involved through the use of government resources with the primary intention of setting up When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein the parties involved are Muslims,"
a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines
freely exercise their religion. real parties in interest as those who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the
avails of the suit.
180. Manotoc v. CA
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the oneness of God and the If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the
Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam. Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish between sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite
natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, which is a fundamental personal right. the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding
The ability to testify to the "oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad" and to profess Islam is, by its nature, his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to
restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with "no consciences, no beliefs, no leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.
feelings, no thoughts, no desires. They are considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of
Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner
that exercises powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the
inhabitants of its territory. accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the
government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the
The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of sureties or affect their remedies against him. The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an
Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian. Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to absolute right.
the municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the Shari'a District Court. It is an elementary principle that a
municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other officers 181. Genuino v. De Lima
composing it. And under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations-as the The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art.3 of the 1987 Constitution provides three
Shari'a District Court has done-without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church and State enshrined considerations that may permit a restrictionon the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As
in the Constitution. Shari’a Courts have no jurisdiction under the law if not all parties in the action are Muslims. a furtherrequirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the
impairment.
LIBERTY OF ABODE / RIGHT TO TRAVEL
ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise
of the right to travel. To be clear, DOJ Circular No.41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent
179. Silverio v. CA the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere administrative
Article III, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution states: issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enablinglaw which the former DOJ Secretary believed
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.It is, however, important
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in to stress that before there can even be a valid administrativeissuance, there must first be a showing that the delegation
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. of legislative power is itselfvalid. It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth thereinthe
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes astandard the limits of which are
The same should not be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without a court sufficiently determinate and determinable to whichthe delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. The phrasing in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the 182. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Macarine
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution.1âwphi1 However, the exercise of such right is not absolute.
application of an interested party. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such restriction
is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should
The provision should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts.
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. The nature and function of a bail OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges
bond remained unchanged in all the previously promulgated Constitutions until now. and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from
doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.
Petitioner has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the court when he was
required to do so. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. These orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No.
an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of absence
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court
must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with Management Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his Certificate of Service for the month
law. immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within
three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
186. IDEALS v. PSALM
183. SPARK v. QC The people’s constitutional right to information (Section 7, Article III) is intertwined with the government’s
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Section 28, Article II).
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State’s duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling state interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative The foregoing provisions seek to promote transparency in policy-making, in the operations of the government and to
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. They are also essential to
is presumed unconstitutional.. Thus, the government has the burden of proving the classification (i) is necessary to hold public officials accountable to the people. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper
achieve a compelling state interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen functioning of any democracy. Consistent with this policy, the EPIRA was enacted to provide for "an orderly and
is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. transparent privatization" of NPC’s assets and liabilities. Specifically, said law mandated that "all assets of NPC shall
be sold in an open and transparent manner through public bidding."
RIGHT OF INFORMATION
ARTICLE III, SECTION 7 The SC distinguished the duty to disclose information from the duty to permit access to information on matters of
public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory
184. Baldoza v. Dimaano under the Constitution, the other aspect of the people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public access to documents and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions
concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only
or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic the government agency. Such relief must be granted to the party requesting access to official records, documents and
perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied papers relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to a government contract.
access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection 187. Bantay Republic Act No. 7941 b. COMELEC
for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. However, The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise.
restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern
insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Without a
control inadequate to maintain order. government’s acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without
an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights
185. Valmonte v. Belmonte becomes a sophistry. Since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed,
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the state. objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.
Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Yet, like all
constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. People’s right to information is limited to “matters Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official
of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public
concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too,
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and
Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977 provide for annual diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security. The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded
appropriations for to pay for contributions, premiums , interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether
compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is
these funds are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question
employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis
tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were above board. of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice.
The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the
Comelec.
However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens title
RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power.
The Court reiterates the Court's pronouncements in the Sangalang case which are quite clear: It is not that we are
188. Rotary International v. Rotary Club saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the
In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection, Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject
consideration must be given to factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate
aspects of the relationship. exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law between the
contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs,
189. In Re: Edillon public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights,
whenever necessary.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national ACCESS TO COURTS
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. ARTICLE III, SECTION 11
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of 193. In Re: Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in 1987 Constitution, thus:
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. denied to any person by reason of poverty.
190. Arizala v. CA The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance
Supervisors who were already members of a rank-and-file labor organization at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. cannot be denied.
6715, are authorized to remain therein and that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor
organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership, is not only not a crime, The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate
but is explicitly allowed, under present law. and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
NON – IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and
ARTICLE III, SECTION 10 filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
191. Clemens v. Nolting Extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may
The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; it may declare new crimes and establish rules of conduct for be prone to abuse;even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements, particularly by corporations and
all its citizens in future cases; it may command what is right and forbid what is wrong, but it cannot change innocence entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the
into guilt and punish innocence as a crime, or violate the rights of an antecedent lawful private contract or the right of documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
private property. (Calder vs. Bul, 3 Dallas, 388.) The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that
the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred, and that includes contractual rights. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
(Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters, 657.) ARTICLE III, SECTION 12
192. Presley v. Bel – Air Village Association MIRANDA DOCTRINE

The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions annotated
in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual 194. Miranda v. Arizona
obligations freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after' a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's way. This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 to include "the practice of issuing an
privilege against, self-incrimination. "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed."
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION In case at bar, during the cross examination of SP04 Geronimo, he narrated that upon finding the name of the owner
of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle
195. People v. Lugod was summoned, and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. A further perusal of the
There is no question that at the time of his apprehension, accused-appellant was already placed under arrest and was transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because
suspected of having something to do with the disappearance of Nairube. In fact, the lower court declared that accused- allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape.
appellants warrantless arrest was valid based on Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. However, at the time
of his arrest, the apprehending officers did not inform the accused-appellant and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time
disregard of his constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, which provides: he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the baranggay captain, he was already under effective custodial
A. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same
B. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
C. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him. 197. People v. Uy
D. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to The "investigation" in Section 12, Article III, par. 1 refers to a "custodial" investigation where a suspect has already
and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. been taken into police custody and the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and
confessions or admissions from the suspect. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to
be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of confessing to SPO2 whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements. Such a
Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having situation is more precisely described where after a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
transgressed accused-appellants rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellants headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary
act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right to to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he
remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods
tree. Thus, in People vs. De La Cruz, we ruled that: and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee.
Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating
Equally inadmissible, for being integral parts of the uncouselled admission or fruits of the poisonous tree are the and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence....Clearly,
photographs of subsequent acts which the accused was made to do in order to obtain proof to support such admission therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not available
or confession, such as (a) his digging in the place where Virginia Trangia was allegedly buried, (b) his retrieving of before government investigators enter the picture.
the bones discovered therein (c) his posing before a photographer while executing such acts.
198. People v. Judge Ayson
196. People v. Del Rosario RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived,
that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
enforces after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprive of his freedom of action in any significant
RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result 201. People v. Ordon
of interrogation can be used against him. The failure of the prosecution toshow that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated in the presence of representatives from the media and the DOJ pursuant to
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting said guidelines does not automatically render appellant’s arrest illegal or the item seized from him inadmissible. A
in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." proviso was added in the implementing rules that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."
persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any Pertinently, it is the preservation ofthe integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which must be proven to
significant way." establish the corpus delicti.
CONFESSION TO NEWSMEN 202. People v. Guillermo

The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
199. People v. Andan investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is
Confessions to the media in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any investigating officer, are conveyed. Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that the person
inadmissible. Appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by the section 12 (1) and (3). the has been truly "informed" of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles
prohibitions therein are similarly addressed to the state and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that the
government has the duty to protect. OTHER CONFESSIONS
200. People v. Endino 203. People v. Malingan

As the trial court stated in its Decision - Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following
had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview requirements:
of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein. (1) it must be voluntary;
(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and (3) it must be express; and
the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases,14 it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution (4) it must be in writing
must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond 204. People v. Gomez
the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to It is immaterial that the sworn statement was executed in a foreign land. Appellant, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy
the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.1âwphi1.nêt these constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in 205. People v. Lugid
the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and Even if we were to assume that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights
conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in at the time he was brought to the police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized
determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession
was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when
Lugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly 100 of
the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards confession was concerned, although he was not assisted by counsel when he initially signed his confession at the
Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and taken to the police station police headquarters because at the time the extrajudicial confession and waiver were first executed, there was no rule
up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was highly intimidating and of doctrine prescribing that waiver of the right to counsel may be validly made only with the assistance of
was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was counsel.
beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged
confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod
cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact that 207. People v. Alicano
several persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian
wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and VillaAnastacia respectively as well exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16 celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to
September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit ") derived from it is also inadmissible.
circumstantial in nature. The combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the
logical conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed
of the other prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
the scene of the crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted. illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
RE - ENACTMENT
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a
206. People v. Luvendino confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show
As gleaned from the records of the RTC, the decision was based on the following facts: on the night that the search that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be
party was conducted, a police officer, Sgt. Birxo, told Panfilo that they had arrested Ernesto Luvendino. The accused discharged by clear and convincing evidence. In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed
was then demonstrating how they brought the girl to the vacant lot. As the re-enactment was going on, Panfilo said to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection
that he heard the accused saying that he and his companion boxed her in the stomach, dragged her to the vacant lot to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden
and raped her there. The accused allegedly admitted that he and Cesar Borca strangled Rowena, and he likewise of proof that rested on the prosecution.
admitted that he abused her. Panfilo stressed that in the course of the demonstration, Luvendino said, “Inaamin ko po
na kasama ko si Cesar Borca sa pangre-rape kay Rowena.” He also demonstrated how she was boxed, dragged and 208. Ho Wai Pang v. People
abused. He even pointed to the place where they left her remains. The evidence for the prosecution in this regard was Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render
not rebutted nor denied by the accused. inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. "The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected
The re-enactment was apparently staged promptly upon the apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
investigation at the police station. The RTC decision found that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights
before he was investigated in the police headquarters, and cited the Salaysay of Luvendino. The decision itself, RIGHT TO BAIL
however, states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. It is therefore not ARTICLE III, SECTION 13
clear from the record that before the re-enactment was done, Luvendino was informed of his constitutional rights,
including, specifically, his right to counsel, and that he had waived such right before proceeding with such a 209. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
demonstration. Under these circumstances, the court declines to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
that re-enactment. person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon
a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was generally a judge- that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
made one, and was first announced in the case of Morales v. Enrile and thereafter reiterated in People v. Galit. The
same eventually became part of the 1987 Constitution, however, such a doctrine affords no comfort to Luvendino for Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the requirements and restrictions in those cases have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to April the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
26, 1983. The court then finds that Luvendino had validly waived his right to counsel so far as his extrajudicial
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the
preventive incarceration during the trial. speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and
diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance therewith at all times in their respective
210. Napoles v. Sandiganbayan jurisdictions.
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe, this Court held that in a petition for bail hearing, the court is to
conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence 212. Extra Excel International Philippines v. Cajigal
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of It is axiomatic that a bail hearing is a must, despite the prosecution's lack of objection to the same. In Balanay v. Judge
evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to White, we said:
be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further It is basic, however, that bail hearing is necessary even if the prosecution does not interpose any objection
evidence may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial or leaves the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, in Villanueva v. Judge Buaya,
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to therein respondent judge was held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting
a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the an ex parte motion for bail without conducting a hearing. Stressing the necessity of bail hearing, this
hearing. Court pronounced that:
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication of time and effort of The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail. Where bail
both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence
are charged of having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially the same on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of petitioner with matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to properly exercise
the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation this discretion, [the judge] must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
of the former president in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely different strong. This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the
dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused.
proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. x x x
In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required in
With the joinder of the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the former President, the latter will have order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in
the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to the petition fixing the amount of bail. This Court has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the prosecution fails
for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require the
concluded its evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The joinder prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the strength of the State's evidence, but
of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty
and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court. Hence, it is altogether of no consequence that the Order granting bail "was made in the presence of the public
prosecutor, and the latter made no objection or comment to the oral manifestation of the defense counsel.
211. Altobano – Ruiz v. Pichay
Judges who approve applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES
ignorance of the law. In Lim v. Judge Dumlao, the Court held that: ARTICLE III, SECTION 14
The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant bail.
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of
tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know
213. Coronel v. People
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is not sufficient to show that they
were aware of the nature of the suspected drug den before visiting it, absent any other circumstantial evidence. Section
Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected
7 (b) of RA 9165 penalizes the act of knowingly visiting a drug den. But before a person may be convicted under such
to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve [the accused's]
provision, it must be shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited the place despite
bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error.
this knowledge.
True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs some time before their arrest. However, NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before their arrest, there was no showing how long
petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or how long the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no 216. Corpuz v. People
basis to assume that petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest, and thus, at the location of the The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement
arrest. to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been
established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
214. People v. Macapundag chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must funds or property to personal use.
follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section,
the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced,
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has
breached. His conviction must be affirmed
It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of 217. Quimvel v. People
illegal drug suspects. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in
the Information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged
215. People v. Amarela to have been violated, being conclusions of law.
More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape cases are solely
decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the 218. People v. Amoc
impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless It is settled in this jurisdiction that as long as the testimony of the witness is coherent and intrinsically believable as
that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. However, this misconception, particularly in this a whole, discrepancies of minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity, or detract from the essential
day and age, not only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice. credibility of the witnesses' declarations.
The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case of People v. Tana, 12 the Also, in prosecuting a crime of rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim
Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person. It is a well-known fact that that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things
women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened.
This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended party would have PROMULGATION IN ABSENTIA
positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.13
This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would have been 219. Javier v. Gonzales
appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the promulgation of judgment in
stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition of the situation in the past when the judicial process
mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed could be subverted by the accused by jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. The only essential
into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights. elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof
was served upon the accused or counsel.
In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on 220. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan
the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are
with human nature and the normal course of things.14 Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction
believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim. to seek relief.
Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on
filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or
a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.
Indeed, there is nothing in P.D. 1606 which prevents the Supreme Court from regulating the procedure for
promulgation of decisions in criminal cases done in absentia. In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for
remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law
judgment. unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman. (Bold underscoring is supplied
for emphasis)
It is incumbent upon the accused to show justifiable cause for their absence at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction. RIGHT AGAIST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
ARTICLE III, SECTION 16 223. Melo v. People
The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated.
221. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the accused's in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.
The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural
rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense,
to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same
suffered by the accused as a result of the delay. offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the
same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity between
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but through the the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction
examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the for the other. This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the
point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form.
of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such
delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the
constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis. first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may
RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES, CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information
ARTICLE III, SECTION 19 constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the
ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter. In other words, on who has been
222. Maturan v. COMELEC charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or
We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights extends only to situations of greater than the former.
extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. The proscription is aimed
more at the form or character of the punishment rather than at its severity, as the Court has elucidated in Lim v. People, This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
to wit: prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution,
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries
the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being in jeopardy. Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at
the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicated for 226. People v. Domingo
the new offense. To the mind of the Court, an accused cannot be made to needlessly and baselessly suffer incarceration or any anxiety
arising from criminal prosecution, no matter the duration. Any day in jail or in fear of criminal prosecution has a grave
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for the impact on the accused. When the prosecution is needlessly and baselessly prolonged, causing him prejudice, the Court
purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the pendency is constrained, as in this case, to arrive at a finding that accused-appellant's right to a speedy trial was violated.
of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no jeopardy could attach therefor
during the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. In instances where the State has been given every opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to do so, it cannot
By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot claim to have been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its evidence. Such failure and the resulting dismissal of
be construed to recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist. the case is deemed an acquittal of the accused even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case.
224. Ivler v. Modesto – San Pedro 227. Javier v. Gonzales

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to Grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same attaching.
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional In People v. Hernandez, this Court explained that "an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really 'acquit' and therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double
People v. Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru jeopardy based on a void indictment."
reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: Considering that Judge Soluren's order of acquittal was void from the very beginning, it necessarily follows that the
CA ruling dismissing the Petition for Certiorari must likewise be reversed and set aside.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW / BILL OF ATTAINDER
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if ARTICLE III, SECTION 22
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not 228. Salvador v. Mapa
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
different crimes and prosecutions. than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
225. David v. Marquez different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
We also uphold the CA's finding that double jeopardy does not exist in this case. Inasmuch as the dismissal of the This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only
charges by the RTC was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a
acquittal or dismissal of the case at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Also, it is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused is
charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and (4) he/she is convicted or acquitted, or the Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
case is dismissed without his/her consent. Thus, as found by the CA, double jeopardy does not attach in this case as those that define crimes, treats of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and
the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioner. To be sure, no fundamental right of the petitioner was violated memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition.
in the filing of the petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent, as well as the grant thereof by the CA.In
fine, the dismissal of the cases below was patently erroneous and as such, invalid for lack of fundamental requisite 229. Valeroso v. People
that is, due process. For this reason, this Court finds the recourse of the respondent to the CA proper despite it being THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive,
brought on her own and not through the OSG. effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.
These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.
Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong batas
ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto
law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief
Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the
State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."
230. People v. Mejares

Republic Act No. 10951 has since come into effect during the pendency of this case. It likewise specifically stipulates
that its provisions shall have retroactive effect. Section 100 adds that this retroactivity applies not only to persons
accused of crimes but have yet to be meted their final sentence, but also to those already "serving sentence by final
judgment." This retroactivity is in keeping with the principle already contained in Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony." Given
these circumstances, it is proper for this Court to adjust the penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant.
Since the penalty in cases of theft is dependent on the value of stolen personal properties, it is critical to ensure that
the penalty is based on the value proven during trial, and not merely on the Information or uncorroborated testimonies
presented by the prosecution.
231. Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group
without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals,
the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a
judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee
and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights
of the concerned employee are amply protected.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Reynaldo Lopez – 2020 Syllabus

THE STATE 5. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

2. Capitol Wireless v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas 8. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

43. NAPOCOR v. Heirs of Borbon 46. NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez

80. Pasion Vda. De Gracia v. Locsin 83. People v. Salanguit

192. Presley v. Bel – Air Village Association MIRANDA DOCTRINE

CONFESSION TO NEWSMEN 202. People v. Guillermo

200. People v. Endino 203. People v. Malingan

224. Ivler v. Modesto – San Pedro 227. Javier v. Gonzales

230. People v. Mejares

231. Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves

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