National Income Inequality and Ineffective Health Insurance in 35 Low-And Middle-Income Countries
National Income Inequality and Ineffective Health Insurance in 35 Low-And Middle-Income Countries
National Income Inequality and Ineffective Health Insurance in 35 Low-And Middle-Income Countries
Abstract
Global health policy efforts to improve health and reduce financial burden of disease in low- and
middle-income countries (LMIC) has fuelled interest in expanding access to health insurance cover-
age to all, a movement known as Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Ineffective insurance is a meas-
ure of failure to achieve the intended outcomes of health insurance among those who nominally
have insurance. This study aimed to evaluate the relation between national-level income inequality
and the prevalence of ineffective insurance. We used Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (SWIID) Gini coefficients for 35 LMICs and World Health Survey (WHS) data about insur-
ance from 2002 to 2004 to fit multivariable regression models of the prevalence of ineffective insur-
ance on national Gini coefficients, adjusting for GDP per capita. Greater inequality predicted higher
prevalence of ineffective insurance. When stratifying by individual-level covariates, higher inequal-
ity was associated with greater ineffective insurance among sub-groups traditionally considered
more privileged: youth, men, higher education, urban residence and the wealthiest quintile.
Stratifying by World Bank country income classification, higher inequality was associated with inef-
fective insurance among upper-middle income countries but not low- or lower-middle income
countries. We hypothesize that these associations may be due to the imprint of underlying social
inequalities as countries approach decreasing marginal returns on improved health insurance by
income. Our findings suggest that beyond national income, income inequality may predict differ-
ences in the quality of insurance, with implications for efforts to achieve UHC.
Keywords: Health insurance, income inequality, ineffective insurance, LMIC, universal health coverage
Key Messages
• Greater income inequality predicted higher prevalence of ineffective health insurance when adjusting for GDP per capita.
• The association between income inequality and ineffective health insurance is stronger among sub-groups traditionally
considered more privileged: youth, men, higher education, urban residence, wealthiest quintile.
• Stratifying by country income, higher income inequality is associated with higher ineffective health insurance among
upper-middle income countries but not low- or lower-middle income countries.
• We hypothesize that these associations may be due to the imprint of underlying social inequalities as developing coun-
tries approach decreasing marginal returns on improved health insurance by income.
C The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
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2 Health Policy and Planning, 2016, Vol. 0, No. 0
Introduction Penn World Tables (PWT). Income inequality was assessed utilizing
Gini coefficients for the 35 countries in the WHS datasets obtained
Global health policy efforts to improve health and reduce financial
from the SWIID version 5.0 (Solt 2014). As our exposure variable,
burden of disease in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) has
Gini coefficients of net inequality for each country were averaged
fuelled interest in expanding access to health insurance coverage to
between 1999 and 2001, the three years before which we had out-
all, a movement for Universal Health Coverage (UHC). The World
come variable data (ineffective insurance as assessed between 2002
Health Report 2010 defines UHC as a health system where all peo-
and 2004). Averages of three years were utilized to reflect the time
ple in need of health services (promotion, prevention, treatment, re-
period of the outcome variable and minimize yearly variation.
habilitation and palliation) receive them without undue financial
National GDP data were obtained from the PWT version 8.1 to
hardship (WHO 2010). Subsequent research, including case studies
control for national wealth (Feenstra et al. 2015). The GDP per cap-
in 13 countries, has underwritten efforts to establish UHC as an out-
ita variable was generated utilizing real GDP at constant 2005 na-
come for the post-2015 development goals (Boerma et al. 2014, UN
tional prices (mil. 2005US$) divided by population (in millions) for
General Assembly 2015).
each country in each year as provided by the PWT. GDP per capita
There is substantial interest in the capacity for UHC to reflect its
was then averaged between 1999 and 2001 for the 35 countries of
goals, particularly with respect to improving health equity (Giedion
interest to match the exposure variable.
et al. 2013). For example, one study of Mexico’s new public insur-
The WHS is a cross-sectional study conducted by the World
ance program found heterogeneity in financial protection for rural
Health Organization (WHO) between 2002 and 2004 in 70 countries
Country World Bank income Nominal insurance Ineffective insurance Total under-insurance Unweighted
classification prevalence prevalence prevalence (uninsured þ n*
(2003) (weighted %) (weighted %) ineffectively insured) (weighted %)
*Unweighted n: Number of households by country from which health insurance data was extracted from World Health Survey.
Table 2 Survey-weighted multivariable linear regression models of ineffective health insurance and its sub-categories on national income
inequality
Ineffective insurance 1.759 [0.844, 2.673] ** 1.274 [0.429, 2.119] ** 0.437 [0.696, 0.178] **
Sold/borrowed 2.573 [1.270, 3.877] *** 1.984 [0.720, 3.248] ** 0.531 [0.919, 0.143] **
Untreated chronic condition 0.901 [0.080, 1.882] 0.736 [0.310, 1.782] 0.148 [0.469, 0.173]
Non-facility delivery 3.260 [0.692, 5.828] * 1.491 [0.559, 3.540] 1.595 [2.224, 0.967] ***
*P 0.05;
**P 0.01;
***P 0.001.
Age 13–34 years 3.196 [1.629, 4.764] *** 2.731 [1.110, 4.353] ** 0.419 [0.916, 0.078]
35–65 years 1.471 [0.561, 2.382] ** 1.011 [0.156, 1.866] * 0.415 [0.678, 0.153] **
>65 years 1.306 [1.945, 4.557] 2.245 [1.126, 5.616] 0.847 [0.187, 1.881]
Sex Female 1.122 [0.091, 2.152] * 0.555 [0.384, 1.493] 0.511 [0.799, 0.223] ***
Male 2.473 [1.005, 3.942] ** 2.239 [0.671, 3.807] ** 0.212 [0.692, 0.269]
Marital Status Unmarried 1.872 [0.988, 2.757] *** 1.495 [0.624, 2.366] *** 0.339 [0.609, 0.069] *
Married/Cohabitating 1.648 [0.670, 2.626] ** 1.109 [0.216, 2.003] * 0.484 [0.761, 0.207] ***
Education No secondary education 1.957 [0.406, 3.507] * 1.538 [0.083, 3.160] 0.375 [0.878, 0.127]
Any secondary education 1.891 [0.346, 3.436] * 1.856 [0.181, 3.530] * 0.032 [0.551, 0.488]
Residence Rural 2.391 [1.331, 3.450] *** 1.795 [0.838, 2.751] *** 0.537 [0.830, 0.244] ***
Urban 1.940 [0.463, 3.417] * 1.707 [0.129, 3.285] * 0.210 [0.694, 0.274]
Wealth Poorest 20% 0.192 [3.176, 2.791] 0.151 [3.376, 3.074] 0.037 [0.952, 1.026]
Second poorest 20% 2.137 [0.090, 4.184]* 2.519 [0.342, 4.695]* 0.344 [0.323, 1.012]
Middle 20% 2.309 [0.269, 4.349]* 2.635 [0.457, 4.814]* 0.294 [0.374, 0.962]
Second wealthiest 20% 1.892 [0.285, 3.499]* 1.354 [0.287, 2.995] 0.485 [0.988, 0.018]
Wealthiest 20% 3.428 [1.693, 5.162] *** 3.182 [1.326, 5.039]*** 0.221 [0.790, 0.348]
*P 0.05;
**P 0.01;
***P 0.001.
coefficient showed a significant association (P 0.001) with a coef- associated with prevalence of ineffective insurance among all demo-
ficient of 1.759 (95% CI: 0.844–2.673). After adjusting for GDP graphic subgroups except those >65 years old and the poorest
per capita the association remained significant (P 0.01) with a co- wealth quintile. After adjusting for GDP per capita, associations
efficient of 1.274 (95% CI: 0.429–2.119). continued to be significant among 13–34 year-olds and 35–65 year-
Linear regression models were also fit for each sub-category of olds, males, those of both married and unmarried status, those with
ineffective insurance (sold/borrowed assets or money, untreated for any secondary education, both urban and rural residence, as well as
chronic condition and child delivery outside health facility). In the the second-poorest, middle and wealthiest quintile.
simple regression model national Gini coefficients were significantly Table 4 shows simple and multivariable regression models of the
associated with selling or borrowing assets or money to pay for prevalence of ineffective insurance on Gini coefficients stratified by
healthcare expenditures (P 0.001) and delivering a child outside a World Bank country income classifications in 2003. Gini coeffi-
health facility (P 0.05). Upon adjusting for GDP per capita, the as- cients were significantly associated with ineffective insurance only
sociation with selling or borrowing assets or money to pay for among upper-middle income countries (P 0.05). As expected,
healthcare expenditures remained significant (P 0.01) with a coef- GDP per capita was not significantly associated with ineffective in-
ficient of 1.984 (95% CI: 0.720–3.248). surance when stratifying by country income classification.
Table 3 shows simple and multivariable regression models of
prevalence of income inequality on Gini coefficients stratified by
demographic covariates known to affect health and healthcare util- Discussion
ization (age, sex, marital status, education, residence, wealth quin- This study considered the influence of income inequality on the
tile). In a simple regression model, Gini coefficients were directly quality of health insurance in LMICs. We found that income
Health Policy and Planning, 2016, Vol. 0, No. 0 5
Table 4 Survey-weighted multivariable linear regression models of ineffective health insurance on national income inequality stratified by
World Bank country income status
Low income 0.770 [3.085, 4.625] 0.740 [3.500, 4.980] 0.090 [1.209, 1.388]
Lower-middle income 0.880 [0.427, 2.188] 0.899 [0.489, 2.286] 0.067 [0.966, 0.831]
Upper-middle income 1.287 [0.343, 2.231]* 1.715 [0.338, 3.092]* 0.912 [1.177, 3.001]
*P 0.05;
**P 0.01;
***P 0.001.
inequality was directly associated with ineffective insurance after ad- This is supported by our finding that upon stratifying the associ-
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