Cadastral Registration Proceedings

1.Sections 35 to 38

a.Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural,G.R. No.14167, 14August 1919

Facts:

• Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran, Province of Occidental

Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands, on June 16, 1916.
• Notice of the proceedings were published in the Official Gazette as provided by law. The trial
judge also issued general notice to all interested parties.
• Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an, answer asking for registration in his name of
lot No. 1608.
• The instant petitioners, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in this
municipality, and although said to have participated in other cadastral cases, did not enter any
opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had during September, 1916. On November 23 of the
same year, the court it declared final.
• Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the Land Registration
Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the latter as
guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez, came into the case for the first time.
• The petitioners, after setting forth their right of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was
included in their "Hacienda Santa Filomena," and after stating that they were in complete
ignorance of the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be annulled and that the
case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot.
• Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by countermotion, asking the court to dismiss the
motion presented on behalf of Vazquez and Gayares. The court denied the motion for a new
trial on the theory that there being a decree already rendered and no allegation of fraud having
been made, the court lacked jurisdiction.
• It may also be stated parenthetically that counsel for Vazquez and Gayares made an
unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme Court, through mandamus, to have the record completed
by the taking of evidence.

Issue:

When does the registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially
under the different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral System, become final, conclusive, and
indisputable?

Held:

• As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive and
indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of
 receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any
step having been taken to perfect an appeal.
• The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the
certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud.
• Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with able arguments relative to the
applicability of sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cadastral proceedings. The
view we take of the case would make unprofitable any discussion of this question.
• It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of September
21, 1916, has become final, and that no action was taken within the time provided by law for
the prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly
the appeal is dismissed

b.Abellera v. Farol, G.R. No.48480, 30 July 1943

Facts:

• Abellera sued Hermegildo Balanag and others who are either the same parties in this case or the
latter's predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of the land.
• But his complaint was dismissed by the Court of First Instance on two grounds: (1) prescription
in favor of defendants; and (2) the deed of donation of these lands to him had not been formally
accepted according to Article 633 of the Civil Code.
• Upon appeal to this Court, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the second ground
aforementioned (Abellera vs. Balanag G.R. No. 11970, promulgated March 22, 1918, and
reported in 37 Phil. 865).
• After the perfection of the appeal, Abellera executed a public document formally accepting the
donation of the land, and presented and deed of acceptance together with proofs of notification
of acceptance to the donor, as ground for new trial. The Court held that this was not newly-
discovered evidence, and that Abellera had not acquired title to the hacienda until the execution
of the deed of acceptance and the notification thereof to donor.
• So that whether rights he may have to institute and maintain a new action of ejectment in
reliance upon his claim that he has acquired title to the hacienda, since the date of the dismissal
of this action, it is clear that the present action was properly dismissed on the ground of failure
of proof of title in the plaintiff at the time when the action was instituted and later when
judgment of dismissal was entered by the trial court.
• In July of 1918, or four months after the above-mentioned decision of this Court, petitioner
herein brought another action for recovery of the land against the same defendants in the
previous case. The second suit was later dismissed by the Court of First Instance and transferred
to cadastral case No. 5 which included the hacienda in question that had in the meantime been
subdivided into lots. When the cadastral case came up before the Hon. Meynardo M. Farol at
Aringay, La Union, in July 1941, Fabian B.S. Abellera appeared as claimant while Narciso de
Guzman and others appeared as adverse claimant. The latter through counsel moved that
 Abellera's claim over the lots concerned be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and
prescription.

Issue:

Whether there is res judicata.

Held:

• A careful examination of the decision of this Court in the previous case convinces us that there is
no res judicata. We merely held that Abellera had not acquired title to the hacienda until the
execution of the deed of acceptance and the notification thereof, and we clearly refused to
prevent Abellera from instituting a new action based upon his assertion that he had acquired
title to the estate since the dismissal of his original action.
• The other ground for the motion for dismissal, prescription, is not involved in the present
proceedings.
• The next question is: Did the cadastral court, on the ground of res judicata, have any power to
entertain the motion to dismiss Abellera's claim and bar him from presenting evidence to prove
his ownership of these lots?
• Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient.
• The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when two conditions are present: (1)
analogy or need to supplement the cadastral law, and (2) practicability and convenience.
• If the nature and objective of the cadastral scheme are kept in view, a motion to dismiss in a
cadastral case on the ground of prior judgment would seem to be out of place.
• The Government initiates a cadastral case, compelling all claimants in a municipality to litigate
against one another regarding their respective claims of ownership. By this plan, all the private
lands in a town are registered in one single collective proceeding.
• Thus, the piece-meal and isolated registration of lands, so inadequate in more ways than one, is
avoided. The principal aim is to settle as much as possible all disputes over land and to remove
all clouds over land titles, as far a practicable, in a community.
• To attain this purpose, the cadastral court should allow all claimants ample freedom to ventilate
whatever right they may assert over real estate, permitting them, in keeping with the law of
evidence, to offer proofs in support of their allegations.
• To countenance the contrary opinion, by suppressing the presentation of evidence in support of
claims, would but serve to perpetuate conflicts over land, for such stifled affirmations of
ownership will fester like wounds unskillfully treated. No sufficient leeway having been give all
claimants to demonstrate the strength and consistently of their alleged rights, the stability of
decrees of title is jeopardized.
 • In Haw Pia vs. Roman A. Cruz (G.R. No. 48506), we declared that the Court of First Instance in a
cadastral proceeding cannot appoint a receiver because its jurisdiction is special and limited. We
declined in that case to apply the new Rules of Court by analogy.
• We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a cadastral case res judicata is available to a
claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment
can not set up in a motion to dismiss.
• The order appealed from is hereby reversed. Petitioner herein shall in the cadastral proceedings
be allowed to present evidence to prove his claim over the lots in question.

c.Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, G.R. No.14869, 27 October 1920

Facts:

• In 1913, cadastral proceedings begun to settle the title to a tract of land situated in the Province
of Rizal. Thirteen of the cadastral lots were claimed by the municipality of Cainta, Province of
Rizal, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and various private individuals.
• The judgment of the trial court adjudicated the parcels in question to the private claimants.
From this judgment both the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila and the municipality of
Cainta appealed, but subsequently the appeal of the latter was dismissed for failure to
prosecute.
• The contest has thus narrowed down to one between the Church as appellant and various
individuals as appellees.
• A ruling as to four of the lots can quickly be made. By stipulation during the trial, and by
admission of counsel for appellant, Policarpio Buenviaje is conceded to have title to lot 2187. As
to lot 2186, the only evidence before us, confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that
Mamerta Roxas went into possession of the same in 1895; and when counsel for the Church
made his offer to present rebuttal testimony, he failed to mention this lot.
• Likewise, as to lots 2213 and 2214, the only evidence before us, confirmed by the findings of
the trial court, is, that Antonio, Benito, and Gervasio de la Paz went into possession of the same
in -1896; the record states that "ambas partes dan por terminadas sus pruebas," while counsel
for the Church in making his offer of rebuttal testimony again failed to include these two lots.
• A more difficult situation has arisen with reference to the nine remaining cadastral lots. To
understand it, a brief narration of the course of the proceedings in the trial court will have to be
made.
• The trial as to the land now before us opened with a stipulation to the effect that the
composition title of the Church with the Spanish Government included this land. The Church
presented one witness and rested.
• The private oppositors then called their respective witnesses. Each endeavored to prove title by
possession.
• Counsel for the Church, thereupon, made an offer to present additional testimony with
reference to lots 2176, 2178, 2180,2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192.
Issue:

Whether the nature of Cadastral proceeding is in rem.

Held:

• A correct ruling can most appropriately be arrived at by a consideration of the nature of

cadastral proceedings, with reference to the usual rules of trial practice and evidence.
• The object of a cadastral petition, as all know, is, that the title to the various lots embraced in
the survey may be settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted
by the Director of Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a
judicial decree.
• In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the Government
is the plaintiff and all the- claimants are defendants. (Act No. 2259, sec. 10.) The trial is
conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration. (Sec. 11.) As to this court, now abolished, the Land Registration Act provides that it
"shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice in special proceedings in courts of first
instance." (Act No. 496, sec. 2.)
• The Code of Civil Procedure, which is thus brought into relation with the Cadastral Act,
prescribes the order in which the trial must proceed. (Secs. 56, 132.) The usual rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence govern registration proceedings.

d.Government v. Caballero, G.R. No.10751, 29 March 1916

Facts:

• Maria Caballero, one of the respondents, claimed that lot No. 5 on the cadastral plan did not
include all the land covered by her Torrens title issued in record No. 1894 on November 6, 1912.
• The court thereupon ordered the surveyor of the Bureau of Lands to investigate this claim and
to report the result.
• From the final order of the court, directing that in the new certificate of title lot No. 5-a be
excluded, Maria Caballero appealed.

Issue:

Whether the respondent can question about the validity or finality of the title.

Held:

• All admit that the appellant’s Torrens title covers lot No. 5-a, or in other words, lot No. 5-a is a
part of lot No. 5. The judgment of the Land Court, as a result of which the appellant’s Torrens
title issued, has long since become final, so there can be no question about the validity or
finality of the appellant’s title.
• But it is urged that the order of the lower court excluding parcel No. 5-a be sustained because
"it is based on sound principles and is essential to the proper handling of cadastral cases." With
 this proposition we cannot agree. We see no reason why a part of the appellant’s land, which is
covered by a Torrens title, should be taken from her and given to someone else.
• It may be true that in administering the Cadastral Law it will be necessary to issue new
certificates of title to these holding Torrens titles for lands within the cadastral survey, but if this
is done, the new certificate must cover all of the land contained in the old one. The appellant’s
theory of this case is so clear that a further discussion of the question is unnecessary.

Action for Reconveyance

i.Roque v. Aguado, G.R. No.193787, 7 April 2014

Facts:

• On July 21, 1977, spouses Roque and the original owners of the then unregistered Lot 18089 –
namely, Rivero, et al. executed the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale over a 1,231-sq. m. portion
for a consideration of P30,775.00. The parties agreed that Sps. Roque shall make an initial
payment of P15,387.50 upon signing, while the remaining balance of the purchase price shall be
payable upon the registration, as well as the segregation and the concomitant issuance of a
separate title over the subject portion in their names. After the deed’s execution, Sps. Roque
took possession and introduced improvements on the subject portion which they utilized as a
balut factory.
• On August 12, 1991, Sabug, Jr, applied for a free patent over the entire Lot and was eventually
issued OCT in his name on October 21, 1991. On June 24, 1993, Sabug, Jr. and Rivero, in her
personal capacity and in representation of Rivero, et al., executed the 1993 Joint Affidavit,
acknowledging that the subject portion belongs to Sps. Roque and expressed their willingness
to segregate the same from the entire area of Lot.
• On December 8, 1999, however, Sabug, Jr., through the 1999 Deed of Absolute Sale, sold Lot
18089 to Aguado for P2,500,000.00, who, in turn, caused the cancellation of OCT No. M-5955
and the issuance of TCT No. M-96692 dated December 17, 199911 in her name.
• Thereafter, Aguado obtained an P8,000,000.00 loan from the Land Bank secured by a mortgage
over Lot 18089. When she failed to pay her loan obligation, Land Bank commenced extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings and eventually tendered the highest bid in the auction sale.
Upon Aguado’s failure to redeem the subject property, Land Bank consolidated its ownership,
and TCT No. M-11589513 was issued in its name on July 21, 2003.
• On June 16, 2003, Sps. Roque filed a complaint for reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of
real estate mortgage, foreclosure, and certificate of sale, and damages before the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in not ordering the reconveyance of the subject portion in Sps. Roque’s favor.
Held:

• The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name to its rightful owner or to one
with a better right. Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal
claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
• The Court notes that Sps. Roque did not even take any active steps to protect their claim over
the disputed portion. This remains evident from the following circumstances appearing on
record: (a) the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale was never registered; (b) they did not seek the
actual/physical segregation of the disputed portion despite their knowledge of the fact that, as
early as 1993, the entire Lot 18089 was registered in Sabug, Jr.s name under OCT No. M-5955;
and (c) while they signified their willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price, Sps. Roque
neither compelled Rivero et al., and/or Sabug, Jr. to accept the same nor did they consign any
amount to the court, the proper application of which would have effectively fulfilled their
obligation to pay the purchase price. Instead, Sps. Roque waited 26 years, reckoned from the
execution of the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale, to institute an action for reconveyance (in
2003), and only after Lot 18089 was sold to Land Bank in the foreclosure sale and title thereto
was consolidated in its name. Thus, in view of the foregoing, Sabug, Jr. as the registered owner
of Lot 18089 borne by the grant of his free patent application could validly convey said property
in its entirety to Aguado who, in turn, mortgaged the same to Land Bank. Besides, as aptly
observed by the RTC, Sps. Roque failed to establish that the parties who sold the property to
them, i.e., Rivero, et al., were indeed its true and lawful owners. In fine, Sps. Roque failed to
establish any superior right over the subject portion as against the registered owner of Lot
18089, i.e., Land Bank, thereby warranting the dismissal of their reconveyance action, without
prejudice to their right to seek damages against the vendors, i.e., Rivero et al.

ii.Pacete v. Asotigue, G.R. No.188575, 10 December2012

Facts:

• Inocencio Asotigue filed a complaint for reconveyance against Gaudencio Pacete before the RTC.
The property in dispute is a parcel of agricultural land located in Barangay Dolis, Municipality of
Magpet, Province of Cotabato, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. V- 16654,
registered in the name of Pacete.
• Records show that the disputed lot was previously owned by Sambutuan Sumagad, a native. The
lot was mortgaged by Sumagad to Bienvenido Pasague , who later on bought it in 1958.
• Then, Pasague conveyed the same lot to Umpad. This transaction was done with Pacetes full
knowledge since he accompanied the parties when the sale took place.
• On March 22, 1979, Asotigue bought the lot from Umpad. Asotigue then entered the lot and
planted, among others, rubber trees, fruit trees and coconut trees. According to him, he failed
to apply for a title over the said lot due to financial constraint.
 • Pacete countered that sometime in 1979, Asotigue, by stealth, strategy and prior knowledge,
entered the disputed lot and started planting trees despite his demand to vacate the said lot.
• The RTC ruled in favor of Asotigue. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision.
Thus, Pacete elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
• Pacete contends that his original certificate of title is an unassailable evidence of his ownership
over the disputed lot having been issued pursuant to the Torrens System of Registration. He
argues that a Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein and that the mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a
registered Torrens title to real property.

Issue:

Whether an action for reconveyance proper in this case.

Held:

• Pacete cannot rely on his OCT No. V-16654 as an incontrovertible proof of his ownership over
the property in dispute because he was not in good faith when he obtained the said title as he
was fully aware of the conveyance of the said lot between Pasague and Umpad.
• Reconveyance is proper under the circumstances. Reconveyance is available not only to the
legal owner of a property but also to the person with a better right than the person under
whose name said property was erroneously registered.
• Although Asotigue is not the titled owner of the disputed lot, he apparently has a better right
than Pacete, the latter not being in good faith when he obtained his title to the said property. In
Munoz v. Yabut, Jr., the Court had the occasion to describe an action for reconveyance as
follows: An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name.
Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third
person for value.
• In the present case, when Pacete procured OCT No. V-16654 in 1961, the disputed lot, being a
portion covered by the said title, was already in possession of Asotigue. His predecessor-in-
interest, Sumagad, had been occupying it since 1958. After all, the Torrens system was not
designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and, thus,
holds title in bad faith.

iii.Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.62291, 6 March 1991

Facts:

• Valentin Ouano, a claimant-occupant of land situated at Davao del Norte, containing an area of
three (3) hectares, filed on February 27, 1959, a homestead application with the Bureau of
Lands. It was approved in March 3, 1959 by the District Land Officer and Authority. Three (3)
years later, or on September 5, 1962, a "Notice of Intention to Make Final Proof was made by
 Valentin Ouano to establish his claim to the lot applied for and to prove his residence and
cultivation before Land Inspector Lorenzo Sazon at the Bureau of Lands.
• On the said date, Valentin Ouano made his "Final Proof" before Land Inspector Lorenzo Sazon
pursuant to Section 14, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. An order for the issuance of
patent was issued by the Bureau of Lands the following year.
• An original certificate of title was then issued. But after 19 years of possession, Valentin Ouano
was interrupted in his peaceful occupation thereof when a certain Arcadio Ybanez and his sons,
forcibly and unlawfully entered the land armed with spears, canes and bolos. He was then
dispossessed.
• Hence he filed, complaint for recovery of possession, damages and attorney's fees before the
then Court of First Instance. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent,
ordering Ybanez and his sons to vacate the premises. IAC likewise affirmed the decision.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner’s contention is correct.

Held:

• Petitioner’s contention unmeritorious. The public land certificate of title issued to private
respondent attained the status of indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance of patent hence,
it is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud.
• Consequently, the filing of the protest before the Bureau of Lands against the Homestead
Application of private respondent on January 3, 1975, or 12 years after, can no longer re-open
or revise the public land certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud.
• No reasonable and plausible excuse has been shown for such an unusual delay. The law serves
those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.

iv.Balbin v. Medalla, G.R. No.L-46410, 30 October 1981

Facts:

• Private respondents on June 19, 1962, purchased from the heirs of Juan Ladao, a large parcel of
agricultural land situated at Sitios of Bacong, Tambunakan and Ibunan, Barrio Balansay
Mamburao, Occidental, Mindoro. They filed an application for registration of title of the said
parcel of land.
• They utilized as evidence of ownership, the Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of
the late Juan Ladao, the Informacion Posesoria issued in the name of Juan Ladao together with
the tax declaration and tax receipts for said land covering the period from May 26, 1904, to
January 27, 1962 the private respondents, after the sale, declared it for taxation purposes of
said LRC Case, and have continuously been paying the corresponding taxes up to the present.
• The application for registration of title was opposed by petitioners on the ground that they were
previously issued Original Certificates of title thru either Homestead or Free Patent grants.
 • It appears that before the filing of the present action for reconveyance and annulment of titles
on August 30, 1973, land registration proceedings had been instituted by private respondents
covering the same lands involved in the aforesaid action.
• Petitioners filed opposition to the application, but because of the reservation of private
respondents to file a separate action for the cancellation of the original certificates of title
issued to petitioners herein, the land registration court abstained from ruling on the petitioners'
opposition.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners' title to the land based on their respective homestead or free patents is
valid

Held:

• Examining closely the two cases invoked by petitioners, nowhere in said cases can be found the
aforecited passages quoted by the petitioners. These cases did not even speak of registration as
a requisite for the validity of possessory information title obtained for purposes of Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894 or the Maura Law. What was actually stated in the two cases are:
• A possessory information proceeding instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law in force on July 14, 1893 neither constitutes nor is clothed with the character of a
gratuitous title to property, referred to in Section 19 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
which provides that in order that an information may be valid for the purpose of the said Royal
Decree and produce the effects of a title of ownership, it is indispensable what it be instituted
within the unextended period of one year fixed in sections 19 and 20 of the said Royal Decree
(Aguinaldo de Romero vs. Director of Land 39 Phil. 814).
• The time within which advantage could be taken of the Maura Law expired on April 17, 1895.
Almeida obtained dominion over 526 hectares of lands on June 9, 1895. The possessory
information for 815 hectares was issued to Almeida on December 14, 1896 Almeida was thus
not in possession until after the expiration of the period specified by the Maura Law for the
issuance of possessory titles and his possessory information was of even a later date and made
to cover a large excess of land. Under these conditions, the possessory information could not
even furnish, as in other cases, prima facie evidence of the fact that at the time of the execution
the claimant was in possession, which it would be possible to convert into ownership by
uninterrupted possession for the statutory period. (Baltazar vs. Insular Government 40 Phil.
267).
• From the foregoing, it is made clear that what was required is merely the institution of a
possessory information proceeding within the one-year period as provided in the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894 or the Maura Law.
c.Action for Quieting of Title

i.Salvador v. Patria, Inc., G.R. No.195834, 9 November2016

Facts:

• Ciriano C. Mijares occupying a property, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the
plaintiffs from their respective improvements along Juan Luna Street, they applied for a
preliminary injunction in their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits.
• The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of
Manila. A Complaint-in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land
occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed
alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.
• A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.
• Based on the allegations of the parties involved, the main issue to be resolved is whether the
improvements of the plaintiffs stand on land that belongs to Patricia Inc., or the City of
Manila. Who owns the same? Is it covered by a Certificate of Title?
• All parties agreed and admitted in evidence by stipulation as to the authenticity of the following
documents: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247 in the name of the City of Manila;
(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35727 in the name of Patricia Inc.; (3) Approved Plan PSD-
38540; and (4) Approved Subdivision Plan PCS-3290 for Ricardo Manotok.
• The issue as to whether TCT 35727 should be cancelled as prayed for by the plaintiffs and
intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares is laid to rest by agreement of the parties that this particular
document is genuine and duly executed. Nonetheless, the cancellation of a Transfer Certificate of
Title should be in a separate action before another forum.
• Since the Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as
genuine, the question now is: Where are the boundaries based on the description in the
respective titles?
• To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and
respondent Patricia, Inc., the RTC appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three geodetic
engineers as commissioners, namely: Engr. Rosario Mercado, Engr. Ernesto Pamular and Engr.
Delfin Bumanlag. These commissioners ultimately submitted their reports.
• On May 30, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc.,
permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their
respective premises, and from collecting any rentals from them. The RTC deemed it more sound
to side with two of the commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City of Manila.
• On appeal, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735, reversed the RTC's judgment,7 and dismissed the
complaint.

Issue:

Whether the remedy to quiet title in this case is proper

Held:

• Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for quieting of title, the
petitioners failed to allege and prove their interest to maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of
this cause of action was warranted.
• An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil action governed by
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for
quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
put things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect
and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would
see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear
introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best.
• But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
• The first requisite is based on Article 477 of the Civil Code which requires that the plaintiff must
have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership, meaning a title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on recognized
equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred
to him.
• The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show their authority or
other legal basis on which they had anchored their alleged lawful occupation and superior
possession of the property. On the contrary, they only contended that their continued
possession of the property had been for more than 30 years; that they had built their houses in
good faith; and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under
Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended.
• Yet, none of such reasons validly clothed them with the necessary interest to maintain the
action for quieting of title. For one, the authenticity of the title of the City of Manila and Patricia,
Inc. was not disputed but was even admitted by them during trial. As such, they could not
expect to have any right in the property other than that of occupants whose possession was
only tolerated by the owners and rightful possessors.
• This was because land covered by a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or by
adverse possession. Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil
 Code as builders in good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's comments, which
they did not deny, they had been lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they
had no claim to possession in good faith, their occupation not being in the concept of owners.
• At this juncture, the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for priority
development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended, did not provide sufficient
interest to the petitioners. When an area is declared as an APD, the occupants would enjoy the
benefits provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban land Reform in the
Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof).
• The main requirement for the action to be brought is that there is a deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding casting cloud on the plaintiffs' title that is alleged and shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, the eliminates the
existence of the requirement. Their admission of the genuineness and authenticity of Patricia,
Inc.'s title negated the existence of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or proceeding that was
invalid, and thus the action must necessarily fail.

Action for Reversion

i.Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No.168661, 26 October 2007

Facts:

• In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title
over a parcel of land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964
located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal.
• The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the
Director of Lands, and by Mercedes Dizon, a private party. Both oppositions were stricken from
the records since the opposition of Dizon was filed after the expiration of the period given by
the court, and the opposition of the Director of Lands was filed after the entry of the order of
general default.
• After considering the evidence, the trial court rendered its April 26, 1974 Decision declaring
Fermina Castro the true and absolute owner of the land applied for.
• The land was then sold to Jesus S. Yujuico, and OCT No. 10215 was cancelled. On May 31,
1974, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 445863 was issued in Yujuico’s name, who
subdivided the land into two lots. TCT No. 446386 over Lot 1 was issued in his name, while TCT
No. S-29361 over Lot 2 was issued in the name of petitioner Augusto Y. Carpio.
• Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another,
mortgaged the lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank, N.A.
Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor of Private
Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and then
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) to secure various loans.
 • The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned,
Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the
road directly overlapped their property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the
PEA to the MBDC.
• On July 24, 1996, Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Parañaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
complaint for the Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-0317 against the PEA. On May 15, 1998 the parties entered into a compromise
agreement approved by the trial court in a Resolution dated May 18, 1998.
• The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was filed out of time and that
the allegation of mistake and excusable negligence lacked basis.
• The PEA fared no better in the Court of Appeals (CA), as the petition was dismissed for failure to
pay the required docket fees and for lack of merit.
• The matter was raised to the Supreme Court in Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico8 but PEA’s
petition was denied, upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for relief for having
been filed out of time. The allegation of fraud in the titling of the subject property in the name
of Fermina Castro was not taken up by the Court.
• On September 13, 2001, Yujuico and Carpio filed a Motion to Dismiss (With Cancellation of
Notice of Lis Pendens),10 on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action was barred by prior
judgment; (2) the claim had been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (3) a condition
precedent for the filing of the complaint was not complied with; and (4) the complaint was not
verified and the certification against forum shopping was not duly executed by the plaintiff or
principal party.
• On November 27, 2001, respondent Republic filed an Opposition11 to the motion to dismiss to
which defendants filed a Reply12 on January 14, 2002, reiterating the grounds for the motion to
dismiss.

Issue:

Whether a reversion suit proper in this case

Held:

• An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to
private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. This remedy is provided under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 (Public Land Act) which became effective on December 1,
1936. Said law recognized the power of the state to recover lands of public domain. Section 124
of CA No. 141 reads:
• SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed
in violation of any of the provisions of Sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and
twenty, one hundred and twenty one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred twenty-
three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the
effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized
 or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.
• From the foregoing, an action for reversion to cancel titles derived from homestead patents or
free patents based on transfers and conveyances in violation of CA No. 141 is filed by the OSG
pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code with the RTC. It is clear therefore that
reversion suits were originally utilized to annul titles or patents administratively issued by the
Director of the Land Management Bureau or the Secretary of the DENR.
• While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a land registration
court can be subject of a reversion suit, the government availed of such remedy by filing actions
with the RTC to cancel titles and decrees granted in land registration applications.
• The situation changed on August 14, 1981 upon effectivity of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129
which gave the Intermediate Appellate Court the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of RTCs.
• When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1, 1997, it incorporated Rule
47 on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of the RTCs. The two grounds for
annulment under Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic
fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery, and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel as provided by Section 3, Rule 47. Thus,
effective July 1, 1997, any action for reversion of public land instituted by the Government was
already covered by Rule 47.
• The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and
its derivative titles was filed on June 8, 2001 with the Parañaque City RTC. It is clear therefore
that the reversion suit was erroneously instituted in the Parañaque RTC and should have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The proper court is the CA which is the body mandated by BP
Blg. 129 and prescribed by Rule 47 to handle annulment of judgments of RTCs.

Cancellation of Title

i.Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No.L-33676, 30 June 1971

Facts:

• On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that they are owners pro-indiviso of the
parcel of land described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
1089 in the name of Diego Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan; that they had acquired the land as an inheritance from their late father Diego
Pajomayo; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept of owners for a period of more than 70
years until the early part of the year 1956 when the defendants dispossessed them of said
property, resulting in their having suffered annual damages amounting to around P1,100.00
representing the value of the crops of rice; mongo, corn and vegetables that they failed to
harvest; and that because they have to file the present suit they must spend P800.00 for
incidental expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.
 • The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the lawful owners pro-indiviso of the land in
question, and that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay them the damages
they have suffered.
• In their answer the defendants, after denying some of the allegations of the complaint, alleged
that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, the said land having been
adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings of the Malasique cadastre and that apparently
the plaintiffs are claiming the same parcel of land.
• The defendants claim they had acquired the land mentioned in their answer by inheritance from
their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, peaceful, and adverse possession of said land for more than 70 years, to the
reclusion of plaintiffs; and that as possessors in good faith they have introduced on the land
improvements worth P1,000.00. As affirmative defenses, the defendants allege that plaintiffs'
action is barred by res-judicata and/or prescription and that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.
• The defendants set up a counterclaim for damages in the sum of P500.00 representing
attorney's fees that they paid their counsel. The defendants prayed that they be declared the
owners of the parcel of land mentioned in their answer; that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay
them damages in the sum of P500.00; and, in the alternative should judgment be rendered
against them, that the plaintiffs ordered jointly and severally to pay them the sum of P1,000.00
representing the value of the improvements they have introduced on the land.
• The Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants.

Issue:

Which of the two original certificates of title should prevail?

Held:

• The ruling regarding the validity and force of a certificate of title issued in virtue of the
registration of a homestead patent is applicable to certificates of title issued in virtue of the
registration of other land patents under the Public land Law. In the case of Lahora, et al. vs.
Dayanghirang, et al., G.R. No. L-28565, January 30, 1971, 4 thus Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:
• The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding.
 • It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between
the original parties, and in case of successive registration where, more than one certificate is
issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the person who relies on the second certificate.
• In the case now before Us, it appearing that Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 upon which
the defendant appellants base their claim of ownership over the land in question was issued on
April 1, 1957, while Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 upon which plaintiffs-appellees base a
similar claim was issued on November 27, 1931, under the law and the authorities. We have
herein cited, the latter certificate of title should prevail, and the former should be cancelled.

Certificate of Title

a.Benin v. Tuazon, G.R. No.L-26127, 28 June 1974

Facts:

• The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of agricultural
lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma in the
municipality of Caloocan, that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin,
who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin.
• They and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly,
adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested
therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiffs' grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on
March 4, and 6, 1894
• That during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in barrio San Jose in 1933
Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs registered their claims of ownership over said parcels of land;
that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that
after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of plaintiffs,
constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
• The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural
land, described in Paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma = in the
municipality of Caloocan, parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father
Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs
Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two
brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in interest had
been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein palay and other
agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products.
• That on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that
during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933
Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over said
lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured
permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs
collected monthly rentals from them.
• Possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma municipality of
Caloocan, that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who
in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors in interest
owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial
• Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and cultivation of said land, that
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly,
adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural
products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime,
Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the
cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and
plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs
had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City,
Philippines.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners had acquired a valid title.

Held:

• It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land
which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors
in interest of the appellees — or any person, for that matter — had not filed a petition for the
review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8,
1914 when the decree of registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed
any proceeding for the review of said decree.
• As We have adverted to, that decree of registration had become incontrovertible. An action,
similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the present cases, which attack collaterally
the said decree of registration cannot be entertained. Neither may the action of the appellees
for reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action had already
prescribed, barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been
issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19,
1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years.
• Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land claimed by
the appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who
procured the original registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six
parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands parties who were innocent
purchase for value.
 • This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been
shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by
order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of
D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and
transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
• It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision.
Numerous persons and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued
transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that
an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less
against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are
claimed by the appellees.
• Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original registered owners that
procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
anything to do with the registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 — even supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently.

b.Del Prado v. Caballero, G.R. No.148225, 3 March 2010

Facts:

• On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner a lot on the basis of tax declaration located at
Guba Cebu City. Petitioner registered the same under PD 1529. Petitioner claimed that the sale
was for a lump sum containing an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less.
• However, when the land was registered on December 1990, the technical description states that
the lot measures 14,457 square meters, more or less.
• On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed in the same cadastral proceedings a "Petition for
Registration of Document Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529" in order that a certificate of
title be issued in her name, covering the whole Lot No. 11909.
• In the petition, petitioner alleged that the tenor of the instrument of sale indicated that the sale
was for a lump sum or cuerpo cierto, in which case, the vendor was bound to deliver all that was
included within said boundaries even when it exceeded the area specified in the contract.
• Respondents opposed, on the main ground that only 4,000 sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to
petitioner. They claimed that the sale was not for a cuerpo cierto. They moved for the outright
dismissal of the petition on grounds of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
• After trial on the merits, the court found that petitioner had established a clear and positive
right to Lot No. 11909. The intended sale between the parties was for a lump sum, since there
was no evidence presented that the property was sold for a price per unit.
• It was apparent that the subject matter of the sale was the parcel of land, known as Cadastral
Lot No. 11909, and not only a portion thereof.
 • The petition is granted and judgment is rendered in favor of herein petitioner.
• An appeal was duly filed. On September 26, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision,
reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Trial Court.

Held:

• The Supreme Court find no reversible error in the decision of the CA. Petitioner’s recourse, by
filing the petition for registration in the same cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Such
indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration.
• Inasmuch as the petition for registration of document did not interrupt the running of the
period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering that the prescribed one-year
period had long since expired, the decree of registration, as well as the certificate of title issued
in favor of respondents, had become incontrovertible.

c.Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.59731, 11 January 1990

Facts:

• In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a
parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga, Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque.
• In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco,
Regina, Perfecta, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente.
• By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng was deemed cancelled.
• On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America.
• His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed a petition for administration of the estate of deceased
Ching Leng.
• No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after...
presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's
estate on December 28, 1965
• The land covered by T. C. T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory submitted to
the court.
• Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December
27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and
cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession.
• Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face
of T. C. T. No. 91137.
 • Order dated May 29, 1980, An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against
Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact
that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the
defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes
only by publication.
• Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its
order dated February 7, 1979.
• The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor" declaring the
former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No.
91137 ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff sentencing
the defendant Ching Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137
• The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to
Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. petitioner Alfredo Ching filed a verified petition on November
10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on
May 29, 1980.
• On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered
and set aside the decision dated June 15, 1979 reinstated. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said latter order but the same was denied by the trial court.
• Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was
dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
• Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died during the pendency of the case.

Issue:

Whether private respondent is guilty of laches in instituting the action for reconveyance after the lapse
of 19 years from the time the decree of registration was issued.

Held:

• The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name—after one year from the date of the decree—is not to set aside
the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring
an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
• Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of
registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
 assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
• The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question
as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
• A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein
(Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and
that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or
title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).

d.Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Valdez, G.R. No.171531, 30 January 2009

Facts:

• The descendants of Pablo Pascua filed a complaint (in their complaint respondents alleged that
Pablo died intestate sometime in June 1945 and was survived by his four children, one of whom
was the deceased Cipriano) seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of 23.7229
hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales with Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404
in the name of Pablo. In the alternative, the heirs of Valdez prayed that damages be awarded in
their favor.
• OCT No. 404 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents’ complaint. It contained several
annotations in the memorandum of encumbrances which showed that the property had already
been sold by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto Morales.
• It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed a petition
before the RTC of Olongapo City for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 404.
However, the RTC denied the petition and held that petitioner was already the owner of the
land, noting that the failure to annotate the subsequent transfer of the property to it at the back
of OCT No. 404 did not affect its title to the property.
• Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by
the Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years having elapsed from the issuance of TCT No. T-
10863 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the complaint states no cause of action as it is
an innocent purchaser for value, it having relied on the clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
• The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
• The appellate court further held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value is contrary to the allegations in respondents’ complaint.

Issue:

Whether the RTC’s granting of the motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of the Court of
Appeals’ reversal of the RTC’s ruling.
Held:

• It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and
the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
• Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242 in the name of the spouses
Rodolfo, who were petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest, or any circumstance from which it
could reasonably be inferred that petitioner had any actual knowledge of facts that would impel
it to make further inquiry into the title of the spouses Rodolfo.

• Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales executed
by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other heirs of Pablo, is not binding on such other
heirs, nevertheless, it has operative effect under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree
(SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title).
• Lastly, respondents’ claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper. Section 101 of P.D.
No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any loss, damage or
deprivation of any right or interest in land which may have been caused by a breach of trust,
whether express, implied or constructive. Even assuming arguendo that they are entitled to
claim against the Assurance Fund, the respondents’ claim has already prescribed since any
action for compensation against the Assurance Fund must be brought within a period of six (6)
years from the time the right to bring such action first occurred, which in this case was in 1967.

e.Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.175049, 27 November 2008

Facts:

• Spouses Gregorio Nanaman and HilariaTabuclin) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land
situated in Tambo, Iligan City, upon which they likewise erected their residence. Living with
them on the subject property were Virgilio Nanaman, Gregorio’s son by another woman. When
Gregorio died, Hilaria administered the subject property with Virgilio. Hilaria and Virgilio
executed a Deed of Saleover the subject property in favor of Jose C. Deleste.
• Upon Hilarias death, Juan Nanaman , Gregorio’s brother, was appointed as special administrator
of the estate of the deceased spouses Gregorio and Hilaria. Edilberto Noel was appointed as the
regular administrator of the joint estate. The subject property was included in the list of assets
of the joint estate.
• However, Noel could not take possession of the subject property since it was already in Delestes
possession. Thus, Noel filed before the Court of First Instance ,an action against Deleste for the
reversion of title over the subject property to the Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 698.
Through the years, Civil Case No. 698 was heard, decided, and appealed all the way to the
Supreme Court in Noel v. Court of Appeals.
 • The Court rendered its Decision in Noel, affirming the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, such that
the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share therein to Deleste.
• Consequently, the intestate estate of Gregorio and Deleste were held to be the co-owners of the
subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in the same. Petition for Nullification of the
Emancipation Patents.
• Deleste passed away sometime in 1992.The Heirs of Deleste, filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board a petition seeking to nullify private respondents
Emancipation Patents . The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator rendered a Decision
declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership and the
subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land. On
appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its Decision.
• The DARAB held, that the EPs were valid, since it was the Heirs of Deleste who should have
informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698at the time the subject property was
placed under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer Program. The Heirs of Deleste filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision, but the Motion was denied by the
DARAB in its Resolution dated 8 July 2004.
• Petition for Prohibition A Petition for Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation Patents
Issued by DAR and the Corresponding [Original Certificates of Title] Issued by the [Land
Registration Authority], Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was filed
by petitioners with the Court of Appeals.
• Arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the
EPs to private respondents without notice to them, petitioners prayed that a TRO be forthwith
issued, prohibiting the DAR Secretary, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DARAB, the
Land Bank of the Philippines , as well as the RTC, from enforcing the EPs and OCTs in the names
of private respondents .
• Petitioners further prayed that judgment be subsequently rendered declaring the said EPs and
the OCTs null and void. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition.

Issue:

Whether Respondents Acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in overruling judicial decisions.

Held:

• Prohibition is a legal remedy, provided by the common law, extraordinary in the sense that it is
ordinarily available only when the usual and ordinary proceedings at law or in equity are
inadequate to afford redress, prerogative in character to the extent that it is not always
demandable of right, to prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons, from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law.
• The writ of prohibition, is one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to do
something which, by suggestion of the relator, the court is informed he is about to do. The only
 effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action and to prevent any further proceeding in
the prohibited direction.
• In this case, the Petition for Prohibition filed by the petitioners reveal that the same is
essentially more of an action for the nullification of the allegedly invalid EPs and OCTs issued in
the names of private respondents. The writ of prohibition is only sought by petitioners to
prevent the implementation of the EPs and OCTs. Such EPs and OCTs had become indefeasible
and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted their Petition for Prohibition, and may no
longer be judicially reviewed. Private respondents EPs were issued in their favor and their OCTs
were correspondingly issued and subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City.
• Petitioners directly went to the Court of Appeals, instead to the Regional Trial Court almost four
(4) years after the issuance and registration thereof.
• Petitioners failed to vindicate their rights within the one-year period from issuance of the
certificates of title as the law requires. After the expiration of the one-year period, a person
whose property has been wrongly or erroneously registered in another’s name may bring an
ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree gives petitioners only one
other remedy, i.e., to file an action for damages against those responsible for the fraudulent
registration.

f.PNB v. Tan Ong Zse, G.R. No.27991, 24 December1927

Facts:

• Sometime in July 1994, respondent Teresita Tan Dee bought from respondent Prime East
Properties Inc. on an installment basis a residential lot located in Binangonan, Rizal.
Subsequently, PEPI assigned its rights over a 213,093-sq m property on August 1996 to
respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefits System, Inc.,
which included the property purchased by Dee. Thereafter, or on September 10, 1996, PEPI
obtained aP205,000,000.00 loan from petitioner Philippine National Bank , secured by a
mortgage over several properties, including Dee’s property.
• After Dees full payment of the purchase price, a deed of sale was executed by respondents PEPI
and AFP-RSBS on July 1998 in Dees favor. Consequently, Dee sought from the petitioner the
delivery of the owners duplicate title but latter refused. As a result, Dee filed with Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a case for specific performance to compel the delivery of
the title by the petitioner, PEPI and AFP- RSBS. HLURB ruled in favor of Dee and directed the
petitioner to cancel/ release the mortgage over the lot and ordered that PEPI and AFP- RSBS to
deliver the title to of the lot in the name of Dee, free from all liens and encumbrances.
• The HLURB decision was affirmed by its Board of Commissioners and by the OP, hence the
petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA which also affirmed the OP decision.
• Petitioner maintains that it cannot be compelled to cancel the mortgage until the mortgagor
(PEPI and AFP RSBS) has settled its obligation.
Issue:

Whether petitioner may be compelled to cancel/ release the mortgage

Held:

• The appellant contends that said memorandum is sufficient the fact that Tan Ong Zse Vda. de
Tan Toco authorized Mariano Tan Bunco, to administer her property, obtain loans, and
mortgage said property to secure said loans. It cites, in support of its claim, section 47 of Act No.
496, which reads as follows:
• SEC. 47. The original certificate in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under
the signature of the clerk, or of the deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and
the seal of the court, and also the owner's duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in
all the courts of the Philippines Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained
therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act.
• From a careful examination of the section just quoted, it will be seen that it is the original
certificate in the registration book, a copy thereof certified under the signature of the clerk of
court or of the registrar of deeds of the province or city in which the land is situated, the
duplicate of the same for the owner, and the seal of the court that must be received evidence of
all the matters contained therein.
• Section 41 of the same Act defines a "certificate of title" as follows: SEC. 41. Immediately upon
the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof, under the
seal of the court, to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces, or city in which the land
lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration
Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title.
The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate
of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court.
• According to this legal definition, the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of
registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry. And, according to section 40 of the
same Act, the decree of registration must contain the following data: SEC. 40. Every decree of
registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by
the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of
the husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the disability,
and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined
by the court, and shall set forth the estate of the owner, and also, in such manner as to show
their relative priority, all particular estates, mortgages, easements liens, attachments, and other
incumbrances, including rights or husband or wife, if any, to which the land or owner's estate is
subject, and may contain any other matter properly to be determined in pursuance of this Act.
The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title
hereinafter mentioned.
• If, according to the above cited section 47, only the original certificate in the registry of deeds, a
certified copy of the same, or the seal of the court, will be admitted as conclusive proof of its
 contents and if, according to section 41, also above quoted, the original certificate of title is no
other than the transcript of the decree of registration made in the registration book, then the
notations, or memoranda on the back of the certificate of title are not admissible as proof of the
contents of the documents to which they refer, inasmuch as they do not form a part of the
contents of the decree of registration. The said notations or memoranda are at most, proof of
the existence of the transactions and judicial orders noted, which affect the registered land, of
its presentation to the registrar of its entry in the registry, and a notice to the whole world of
such facts, as provided for in section 51 of said Act No. 496, which reads as follows:
• SEC. 51. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, decree, instrument, or
entry effecting registered land which would under existing laws, if recorded, filed, or entered in
the office of the register of deeds, affect the real estate to which it relates shall, if registered,
filed, or entered in the office of the register of deeds in the province or city where the real
estate to which such instrument relates, lies, be notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing, or entering.
• It could not have been the Legislature's intention to make the original certificate of title, or a
certified copy thereof, or a duplicate of the same for the owner, conclusive proof not only of its
contends but also of the contents of the documents and judicial orders noted since, unlike the
original certificates or certified copies thereof, said notation do not contain the full text of the
documents or judicial orders noted, but only a memorandum, or extract of the same, consisting
of the designation of the kind of the document, the name of the person to whom it was issued,
the date of its execution and the date and hour of its registration. It would be extremely
hazardous to accept such notations or memoranda as conclusive proof of the contents of the
documents or judicial orders noted, because then the document itself which is an
unquestionable and indubitable evidence of its contents would be supplanted by an extract of
its contents made by the registrar, which extract of the conditions stipulated therein. And even
if such an extract as exact as could be desired, still, it cannot be a guarantee of the authenticity
and due execution of the document from which the extract is made. Moreover, it would be
contrary to the fundamental rule that the document itself is the best proof of its contents and
that only in case of destruction or loss can secondary or suppletory proof of the same be
admitted. (Sec. 321, Act No. 190.)

g.Cureg v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.73465, 7 September 1989

Facts:

• Private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the heirs of Domingo Gerardo, the owner of
the subject land (2.5 ha). Since July 26, 1894, Domingo’s father, Francisco, and predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the land, under a
bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants. Such land called “motherland”
was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Francisco Gerardo.
 • The respondents then sold the land to Domingo Apostol and executed an extra-judicial partition
on September 10, 1982. During the time such was executed, there were already signs of
accretion of 3 ha. on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River.
• The accretion and the motherland was declared by Domingo for taxation purposes under his
name on September 15, 1982. On the other hand, petitioners contend that their predecessor,
Antonio Carniyan, was the owner of the accretion of the subject land. Antonio Carniyan
acquired the land from his father-in-law on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed
of Sale. Antonio declared the land for taxation purposes and even had an OCT (issued November
24, 1968) pursuant to Free Patent dated May 21, 1968.
• This title includes the accretion portion and “the motherland” (total of 5.5 ha) being claimed by
the Gerardos and Apostol.

Issue:

Whether Apostol and the Gerardos have better title over the accretion than Cureg.

Held:

• No. The private respondents presented four tax declarations as evidence of their ownership
over the land. These declarations are not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. On the other
hand, petitioners have an OCT under the name of Antonio Carniyan to show.
• Tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership and should not prevail over a decree
of registration. A decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have
existed prior the decree. The issuance of the decree quiets the land.

h.Cusi v. Domingo, G.R. No.195825, 27 February 2013

Facts:

• Lilia Domingo owned a certain real property which was vacant and unfenced. After some time,
construction activities were being undertaken on her property without her knowledge and
more so, without her consent.
• She soon was able to discover a series of anomalous transactions involving her property. It
turned out that Radella Sy was able to execute a falsified deed of sale and thereafter, acquired
a valid title to the property.
• Sy then divided the property into two and sold each half to spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi,
and both buyers were able to have valid titles to the property on their names. All of the said
transactions took place without the knowledge of the real owner Lilia Domingo.
• Upon learning of the circumstances, Domingo filed a case at the RTC seeking annulment or
cancellation of the titles issued. The RTC rendered a decision, affirmed by the CA in favor of Lilia
Domingo.
Issue:

Whether the petitioners are buyers in Good Faith

Held:

• The Court concurs with the finding by the CA that the Cusis and De Vera were not purchasers for
value and in good faith. The records simply do not support their common contention in that
respect.
• Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is required to maintain a register of
landholdings that guarantees indefeasible title to those included in the register. The State issues
an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what
the law warrants or reserves. One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the
curtain principle, in that one does not need to go behind the certificate of title because it
contains all the information about the title of its holder.
• This principle dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long complicated documents
kept by the registered owner, which may be necessary under a private conveyancing system,
and assures that all the necessary information regarding ownership is on the certificate of title.
Consequently, the avowed objective of the Torrens system is to obviate possible conflicts of title
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and, as a rule, to
dispense with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system
gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has
not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.
• The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of the property. It
was not enough for them to show that the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it
would be too easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its possession,
through illegal occupation. In view of the foregoing, the court affirmed the decision of the lower
courts and restores to Domingo her rights of dominion over the property.

i.Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental v. Anglo, G.R. No.171804, 5 August 2015

Facts:

• On June 29, 1960, Alfredo V. de Ocampo filed an application before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental to register two parcels of prime sugar land, Lot No. 2509 of the cadastral
survey of Escalante and Lot No. 817 of the cadastral survey of Sagay.
• The registration was contested by the Republic of the Philippines Bureau of Education (the
Republic). According to the Republic, the lots de Ocampo sought to register were bequeathed to
the Bureau of Education by the late Esteban Jalandoni on September 21, 1926. Due to the
donation, the Bureau of Education owned the lots as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 6014.
 • While registration proceedings were pending, de Ocampo entered into an agreement with Oscar
Anglo, Sr. on June 15, 1962. Their agreement, denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale,
included an undertaking that de Ocampo would cede, transfer, and convey Lot No. 2509 and
part of Lot No. 817 under certain conditions.
• In the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the registration of Lot
No. 2509 and Lot No. 817 in favor of de Ocampo. On October 1, 1965, Original Certificate of Title
No. 576-N covering both lots was issued in the name of de Ocampo.
• On December 28, 1965, the Republic filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary
Injunction Pending Proceeding before the Court of First Instance in San Carlos City assailing the
Decision dated August 3, 1965.
• On January 6, 1966, de Ocampo sold Lot No. 2509 and a portion of Lot No. 817, Lot No. 817-D,
to Anglo, Sr. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered and annotated at the back of OCT No.
576-N. The Register of Deeds cancelled OCT No. 576-N and subsequently issued TCT No. T-
42217, covering Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D, in favor of Anglo, Sr.
• On March 3, 1966 and August 24, 1966, the Republic caused the annotations of notices of Lis
Pendens in Anglo, Sr.'s transfer certificate of title.
• On August 20, 1967, the Court of First Instance in San Carlos City dismissed the Republic's
Petition for Relief from Judgment.
• The Republic's appeal before the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in the Resolution
dated August 21, 1969.
Issue:

Whether Respondent is a buyer in good faith.

Held:

• Whatever good faith that had attached during respondent Anglo, Sr.'s transaction with de
Ocampo no longer existed by the time he took the undertaking with respondent Anglo
Agricultural Corporation.
• On June 7, 1976, the adverse claim of the Republic was already known to the world because of
the notices of Lis Pendens on respondent Anglo, Sr.'s transfer certificate of title. When
respondent Anglo, Sr. transferred the lots to respondent Anglo Agricultural Corporation, he
already knew of the conflicting claims of ownership over the lots.
• Respondent Anglo Agricultural Corporation is presumed to have taken cognizance of the notices
of Lis Pendens as well. Its act of entering into a Deed of Conveyance with respondent Anglo, Sr.
is an act of negligence on the part of respondent Anglo Agricultural Corporation; hence, this act
fails to comply with the second requirement under Section 95 of Presidential Decree a No. 1529.
• Respondent Anglo Agricultural Corporation also does not meet the first requisite of a loss
because it no longer suffered a loss due to respondent Anglo, Sr.'s undertaking to assume all
liability in the agreement dated June 7, 1976.
• Respondent Anglo Agricultural Corporation is not precluded by law from bringing an action
against respondent Anglo, Sr. for the loss it sustained. On the other hand, respondent Anglo, Sr.
 is barred from recovering the land because its current owner, the Bureau of Education, holds a
valid certificate of title over the lots. Respondent Anglo, Sr. meets the last requisite for a claim
from the Assurance Fund. However, due to non-compliance with all the requirements under
Section 95, respondent Anglo, Sr. is barred from his claim.
• Respondent Anglo, Sr. would have met the requirements for claims from the Assurance Fund
had he not conveyed the properties to respondent Anglo Agricultural Corporation. The purpose
of the Assurance Fund would be fulfilled because respondent Anglo, Sr. purchased the
properties in good faith, not knowing that there was another titleholder over the same
properties.
• Eventually, respondent Anglo, Sr. would realize that the business transaction involved properties
whose title had severe defects. However, instead of going after his rights under the Assurance
Fund, respondent Anglo, Sr. made the conscious choice of recovering the value of the properties
he purchased by selling the properties to another buyer. This bars respondent Anglo, Sr. from
making a subsequent claim from the Assurance Fund because that will be tantamount to unjust
enrichment.
• On the other hand, respondent Anglo Agricultural Corporation was aware of the properties'
defects when respondent Anglo, Sr. conveyed the properties to the corporation. The Deed of
Conveyance even recognized the notices of Lis Pendens in the title. The law does not protect
parties who knowingly enter into risky business transactions. It is part of the freedom to
contract, and the state is not mandated to ensure parties who enter into risky business
transactions.
j.Magay v. Estiandan, G.R. No.L-28975, 27 February 1976

Facts:

• Venancia B. Magay bought the land. in question. from her mother-in-law, Soledad de los Reyes.
The land was formerly titled in the name of Soledad de los Reyes under Original Certificate of
Title No. E-2020 which was subsequently cancelled and transferred in the name of the herein
plaintiff under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004.
• The area bought by the plaintiff from Soledad de los Reyes was resurveyed,which is the land in
question: The defendant has constructed two houses in the land in questionwhich is an old
house and Exhibit which is a new house.
• Before this property was sold by Soledad de los Reyes to the plaintiff, the former sent two
letters, to the defendant telling him to vacate the premises. After the plaintiff has acquired the
property in question, she sent other letters to the defendant advising him to vacate the
premises,The plaintiff has declared the property in question for purposes of taxation, Exhibit 'G'
and has paid the real estate taxes. Due to the refusal of the defendant to vacate the premises in
question, the plaintiff was obliged to hire the services of a lawyer and spent P600.00 for
attorney's fees.
• On the other hand, the defendant testified that he has filed a miscellaneous sales application,
over the land in question said application, according to him, is now pending in the Bureau of
Lands and it has neither-been rejected nor approved.
 • The defendant bases his application on the decision rendered by Judge Bartolome Revilla in the
case of El Gobierno de las Islas Filipinos contra Antonio Aborot y otros adjudicating the land in
question in favor of the Government of the Philippines. Moreover, the defendant questions the
validity of the title issued to Soledad de los Reyes, alleging that the issuance and reconstitution
thereof was done under anomalous circumstances.

Issue:

Whether appellant can question in this proceeding the validity of Original Certificate No. E-2020 issued
to Soledad de los Reyes

Held:

• It is well-settled that a torrens title cannot be co attacked. The issue on the validity of the title
can only in action expressly instituted for that purpose. Even assuming that the land in question
is still part of the public domain, then the appellant is not the proper party to institute the
reversion of the land but it must be the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
• Finally, We also find no merit in appellant's contention that the lower Court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the case. As clearly emphasized by Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (now Chief Justice of
this Court) in Serrano v. Munoz Hi Motors, Inc.," jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein-a matter that can be resolved
only after and as a result of the trial.
• Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of
jurisdiction could depend almost entirely upon the defendant." The lower court did not commit
any am in declaring that plaintiff-appellee's complaint is actually an accion publiciana rather
than one for unlawful detainer, within the intendment of Section 1, Rule 70 of the procedural
law.

I.Subsequent Registration

1.Voluntary Dealings

a.Sections 51 to 68

b.Distinguish: Contract of Sale and Contract to Sell

c.Pactum Commissorium

d.Foreclosure

e.Writ of Possession
i.Abuyo v. De Suazo, G.R. No.L-21202, 29 October 1966

Facts:

• The Original owner of the entire land of almost 10 hectares, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 814 2 was Ambrosio Abuyo, plaintiffs’ father. On May 8, 1939, Ambrosio Abuyo (who
later died on May 28, 1946) sold the disputed 3-hectare portion of that land to Gregorio Suazo,
husband of defendant Concepcion B. de Suazo.
• Promptly, defendant and her husband, now deceased, took possession of the 3-hectare piece.
They fenced the same to segregate it from the rest, paid the taxes thereon. Defendant’s
possession continues up to the present. She enjoys the fruits thereof.
• The plaintiff filed a Suit to recover a 3-hectare portion of an almost 10-hectare land in Lanote,
Isabela, Basilan City.

Issue:
Whether the deed of sale of May 8, 1939 is indubitable evidence that Ambrosio Abuyo sold the 3-
hectare portion to Gregorio Suazo.

Held:

• The core of plaintiffs’ case is that the unrecorded deed of sale of May 8, 1939 covering the 3-
hectare disputed piece of land is not binding upon them. Reliance, they place on Section 50,
Land Registration Act, which provides that a deed shall not "take effect as a conveyance or bind
the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority
to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration." By that same legal precept," The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land."
• Interpreting Section 50 aforesaid, this Court has ruled that an unrecorded deed of sale
between the vendor and the vendee, is binding between them. Because actual notice is
equivalent to registration. As binding is that contract to the vendor’s privies. Reason therefor is
that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third persons. And, privies are not third
persons. The vendor’s heirs are his privies. Against them, failure to register will not vitiate or
annul the vendee’s right of ownership conferred by such unregistered deed of sale.
• Plaintiffs therefore are bound by the deed executed by their father, Ambrosio Abuyo. They are
no longer owners of the disputed portion of land. They cannot recover ownership and
possession thereof from defendant.

ii.Joaquin v. Madrid, G.R. No.L-13551, 30 January 1960

Facts:

• The spouses Abundio Madrid and Rosalinda Yu are the owners of a residential lot at 148
Provincial Road, corner Sto. Sacramento, Makati, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
 No. 31379. Planning to build a house thereon, the said spouses sought a loan from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, in November, 1953.
• One Carmencita de Jesus, godmother of Rosalinda, offered to work for the shortening of the
usually long process before a loan could be granted and the spouses, accepting the preferred
assistance, delivered to her the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the lot in January, 1954, to
be surrendered to the RFC.
• Later, the spouses were able to secure a loan of P4,000.00 from their parents for the
construction of their house and they decided to withdraw the application for a loan they had
filed with the RFC. They so informed Carmencita de Jesus and asked her to retrieve the Transfer
Certificate of Title and return it to them.
• Shortly thereafter, Carmencita told them, however, that the RFC employee in charge of keeping
the Transfer Certificate of Title was out on leave. In August, 1954, one Florentino Calayag
showed up in the house of the spouses and asked for Abundio Madrid and Rosalinda Yu.
Rosalinda answered that she was Rosalinda Yu and Abundio, that he was Abundio Madrid.
• Calayag would not believe them. He said that he was looking for Abundio Madrid and Rosalinda
Yu who had executed a deed of mortgage on the lot where the house they were in then stood,
and that the term of the mortgage had already expired, he added.
• Abundio and Rosalinda then retorted that they had not mortgaged their land to anyone. The
spouses immediately went to consult with a lawyer who accompanied them to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. They found out then that the land had been mortgaged to Constancio
Joaquin on January 21, 1954.
• The appellant admits that Abundio Madrid and Rosalinda Yu, the registered owners of the
mortgaged property, were not those persons who had signed the deed of mortgage. His version
of the case is as follows: In the month of January, 1954 Carmencita de Jesus saw Florentino
Calayag and asked the latter to find a money-lender who could grant a loan on a security or real
property, showing, at the same time, a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the spouses
Abundio Madrid and Rosalinda Yu.
• Calayag approached Constancio Joaquin who having funds to spare for the purpose, visited the
land and, finding it well situated, told Calayag to show to him the prospective borrowers. On the
following day, Calayag brought two women to the law office of Atty. M. S. Calayag and
presented them to Constancio Joaquin as Rosalinda Yu and Carmencita de Jesus.
• The alleged Rosalinda Yu claimed to be the owner of the lot with her husband Abundio Madrid
who authorized her to secure a loan on their property, she assured him, and that Abundio would
come when the contract therefor was ready to sign it with her.
• Thus, the deed of mortgage Exhibit I was signed by the persons who posed themselves as
Abundio Madrid and Rosalinda Yu on the following day. The whole amount of the loan was
delivered to the supposed Rosalinda Yu immediately after the registration of the document of
mortgage in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, according to Florentino Calayag.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners are negligent.

Held:

• In the first assignment of error it is argued that since par. 2 of Sec. 55 of the Land Registration
Act expressly provides that "in all cases of registration by fraud the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to the fraud, without prejudice to the rights of
any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title", the second proviso in the same section
"that a registration procured by the presentation of a forged deed shall be null and void" should
be overlooked. There is no merit in this argument, which would have the effect of deleting the
last proviso.
• This last proviso is a limitation of the first part of par. 2 in the sense that in order that the holder
of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be
considered a holder in good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged.
When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the
assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.
• In the second assignment of error it is further argued that as the petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value, he should be protected as against the registered owner because the latter
can secure reparation from the assurance fund. The fact is, however, that petitioner herein is
not the innocent purchaser for value protected by law. The innocent purchaser for value
protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the
registered owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law expressly states. Such is not the
situation of the petitioner, who has been the victim of impostors pretending to be the registered
owners but who are not said owners.
• The next assignment of errors is predicated on the assumption that both the petitioner and the
respondents are guilty of negligence. The giving of the certificate of title to Carmencita de Jesus
is in itself no act of negligence on the part of respondents; it was perfectly a legitimate act.
Delay in demanding the certificate of title is no act of neglect either, as respondents have not
executed any deed or document authorizing Carmencita de Jesus to execute deeds for and on
their behalf.
• It was petitioner who was negligent, as he did not take enough care to see to it that the persons
who executed the deed of mortgage are the real registered owners of the property. The
argument raised by petitioner’s counsel that in case of negligence on the part of both the one
who committed a breach of faith is responsible, is not applicable. Petitioner alone is guilty of
neglect, so he must suffer from it.

iii.Muñoz v. Yabut, G.R. No.142676, 6 June 2011

Facts:

• The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St., Diliman, Quezon City,
formerly owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching),
Munoz's sister. Munoz' lived at the subject property with the spouses Ching. As consideration
 for the valuable services rendered by Munoz' to the spouses Ching's family, Yee L. Ching agreed
to have the subject property transferred to Munoz.
• By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Munoz, the
latter acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale Munoz'
purportedly sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching. As a result, TCT No. 186306
was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia M. Ching's name. Emilia M. Ching, in a
Deed of Absolute Sale sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses
Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go's
names.
• Munoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses
Go. Munoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale and the
cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Go's names, and the restoration and revival of
TCT No. 186306 in Munoz's name. Munoz caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go.
• The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank When the spouses
Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family
executed in favor of the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Consequently, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) in the name of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No.
53297 was issued in the spouses Chan's names on January 28, 1991.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the decision of the RTC.

Held:

• There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto.
• In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the
municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of
the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of
the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is
determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property.
• Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership
and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
• Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who had prior
physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior
possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so
that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.
 • Even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may accord to Muñoz in the
event that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
into the subject property (i.e., that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muñoz the possession of
the subject property on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on February 2, 1994 by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, and stealth).
• Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No. 146718 – that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
28580 does not extend to the spouses Chan, who were not impleaded as parties to the said case
– the MeTC is precluded from granting to Muñoz relief, whether preliminary or final, that will
give her possession of the subject property. Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful
execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Based on the same reason, Muñoz
can no longer insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 granting a
preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in possession of the subject property during the
course of the trial. Muñoz though may recover damages if she is able to prove wrongful
deprivation of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until the finality of this
decision in G.R. No. 146718.

iv.Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.L-64159, 10 September1985

Facts:

• Duran owned parcels of land which she had purchased. When she left the country, a deed of
sale over the two lots was made in favor of her mother, who mortgaged the same to Tiangco.
When Duran found out, she notified the Register of Deeds.
• She did not get any answer however, prompting her to return to the Philippines. Her mother
failed to redeem the mortgaged properties, which were foreclosed and sold in an auction in
favor of respondent Tiangco. She alleged that the sale made by her mother is invalid.

Issues:

Whether respondent Tiangco is a buyer in good faith even without Duran’s consent.

Held:

• Yes. Tiangco is a buyer in good faith. Good faith requires a well-founded belief that the person
from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it. In
the case at bar, private respondents, in good faith relied on the certificate of title in the name of
Duran’s mother.
• A fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate of
title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or
the name indicated by the forger.
 • An innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued is protected. A mortgagee has
the right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title and, in the absence of anything to
excite suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate.

v.Adriano v. Pangilinan, G.R. No.137471, 16 January 2002

Facts:

• Guillermo Adriano is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of three hundred four
(304) square meters, more or less, situated at Col. S. Cruz, Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 337942.
• Sometime on November 23, 1990, petitioner entrusted the original owner’s copy of the
aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title to Angelina Salvador, a distant relative, for the purpose of
securing a mortgage loan.
• Without the knowledge and consent ofpetitioner, Angelina Salvador mortgaged the subject
property to Romulo Pangilinan. After a time, verified the status of his title with the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, and was surprised to discover that upon the said TCT No.
337942 was already annotated or inscribed a first Real Estate Mortgage purportedly executed
by one Guillermo Adriano over the aforesaid parcel of land, together with the improvements
thereon, in favor of Romulo Pangilinan, in consideration of the sum of Sixty Thousand Pesos
(60,000.00). Petitioner denied that he ever executed the deed of mortgage, and denounced his
signature thereon as a forgery; he also denied having received the consideration of P60,000.00
stated therein.
• Petitioner thereafter repeatedly demanded that respondent return or reconvey to him his title
to the said property and when these demands were ignored or disregarded, he instituted the
present suit.
• Petitioner likewise filed a criminal case for estafa thru falsification of public document against
[Respondent] Romulo Pangilinan, as well as against Angelina Salvador, Romy de Castro and
Marilen Macanaya, in connection with the execution of the allegedly falsified deed of real estate
mortgage.
• Respondent in his defense testified that he was a businessman engaged in the buying and selling
as well as in the mortgage of real estate properties; that sometime in the first week of
December, 1990 Angelina Salvador, together with Marilou Macanaya and a person who
introduced himself as Guillermo Adriano, came to his house inquiring on how they could secure
a loan over a parcel of land; that he asked them to submit the necessary documents, such as the
owner’s duplicate of the transfer certificate of title to the property, the real estate tax
declaration, its vicinity location plan, a photograph of the property to be mortgaged, and the
owner’s residence certificate; that when he conducted an ocular inspection of the property to
be mortgaged, he was there met by a person who had earlier introduced himself as Guillermo
Adriano, and the latter gave him all the original copies of the required documents to be
submitted; that after he (defendant) had verified from the Registry of Deeds of Marikina that
the title to the property to be mortgaged was indeed genuine, he and that person Guillermo
 Adriano executed the subject real estate mortgage, and then had it notarized and registered
with the Registry of Deeds. After that, the alleged owner, Guillermo Adriano, together with
Marilou Macanaya and another person signed the promissory note in the amount of Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) representing the appraised value of the mortgaged property. This
done, he (defendant) gave them the aforesaid amount in cash.
• Respondent claimed that petitioner voluntarily entrusted his title to the subject property to
Angelina Salvador for the purpose of securing a loan, thereby creating a principal-agent
relationship between the plaintiff and Angelina Salvador for the aforesaid purpose. Thus,
according to respondent, the execution of the real estate mortgage was within the scope of the
authority granted to Angelina Salvador; that in any event TCT No. 337942 and the other relevant
documents came into his possession in the regular course of business; and that since the said
transfer certificate of title has remained with petitioner, the latter has no cause of action for
reconveyance against him.

Issue:

Whether or not consent is an issue in determining who must bear the loss if a mortgage contract is
sought to be declared a nullity.

Held:

• As between petitioner and respondent, we hold that the failure of the latter to verify essential
facts was the immediate cause of his predicament. If he were an ordinary individual without any
expertise or experience in mortgages and real estate dealings, we would probably understand
his failure to verify essential facts.
• However, he has been in the mortgage business for seven years. Thus, assuming that both
parties were negligent, the Court opines that respondent should bear the loss. His superior
knowledge of the matter should have made him more cautious before releasing the loan and
accepting the identity of the mortgagor.
• Given the particular circumstances of this case, we believe that the negligence of petitioner is
not enough to offset the fault of respondent himself in granting the loan. The former should not
be made to suffer for respondent’s failure to verify the identity of the mortgagor and the actual
status of the subject property before agreeing to the real estate mortgage. While we
commiserate with respondent — who in the end appears to have been the victim of scoundrels
— his own negligence was the primary, immediate and overriding reason that put him in his
present predicament.
• To summarize, we hold that both law and equity favor petitioner. First, the relevant legal
provision, Article 2085 of the Civil Code, requires that the "mortgagor be the absolute owner of
the thing . . . mortgaged." Here, the mortgagor was an impostor who executed the contract
without the knowledge and consent of the owner.
• Second, equity dictates that a loss brought about by the concurrent negligence of two persons
shall be borne by one who was in the immediate, primary and overriding position to prevent it.
Herein respondent — who, we repeat, is engaged in the business of lending money secured by
 real estate mortgages — could have easily avoided the loss by simply exercising due diligence in
ascertaining the identity of the impostor who claimed to be the owner of the property being
mortgaged. Finally, equity merely supplements, not supplants, the law. The former cannot
contravene or take the place of the latter.
• In any event, respondent is not precluded from availing himself of proper remedies against
Angelina Salvador and her cohorts.

vi.Cabuhat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.122425, 28 September 2001

Facts:

• Mary Ann Arede was barely three days old when appellant Mercedes Arede informally adopted
her as the latter's own daughter. In December, 1972, appellant purchased a parcel of land
situated in Bagbag, Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite comprising an area of 1,313 square meters.
• The said land was registered by appellant in Mary Ann Arede's name and the corresponding title
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on December 9, 1972 as Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-56225. According to appellant, the said title was always in her possession which she
kept in a locked drawer in her residence.
• Upon reaching the age of majority and unknown to appellant, Mary Ann Arede obtained a
reconstituted owner's duplicate of TCT No. T -56225 thru the use of a falsified court order
supposedly issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 17, on December 16, 1988,
whereby the court purportedly directed the Register of Deeds of Cavite to issue another owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-56225, which Mary Ann Arede claimed to have lost.
• Using this reconstituted title, Mary Ann Arede mortgaged the land to the Rural Bank, of
Noveleta, Cavite on February 28, 1989. Upon release of the mortgage, the land was again
mortgaged by Mary Ann Arede on May 16, 1990, this time to appellee Flordeliza Cabuhat for the
amount of P300,000.00, which mortgage was registered by appellee on the following day at the
Register of Deeds of Cavite.
• It appeared however that prior to the second mortgage on May 16, 1990, the subject lot was
sold by Mary Ann Arede to appellant Mercedes Arede in consideration of the sum of
P100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated January 17, 1990. Unfortunately, this sale was
not registered by appellant.
• Hence, upon knowledge of the mortgage to appellee Cabuhat, appellant was prompted to
commence the instant suit for annulment of title.
Issue:

Whether the petitioner was an innocent mortgagee for value.

Held:

• On the basis of these statutory provisions, this Court has uniformly held that when a mortgagee
relies upon what appears on the face of a Torrens title and loans money in all good faith on the
basis of the title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that the latter's title was
 defective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or lien upon the land
mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained her title thereto
through fraud.
• In the case at bar, there is no doubt that petitioner was an innocent mortgagee for value. When
Mary Ann mortgaged the subject property, she presented to petitioner Flordeliza an owner's
duplicate certificate of title that had been issued by the Register of Deeds. The title was neither
forged nor fake. Petitioner had every right to rely on the said title which showed on its face that
Mary Ann was the registered owner.
• There was no reason to suspect that Mary Ann's ownership was defective. Besides, even if there
had been a cloud of doubt, Flordeliza would have found upon verification with the Register of
Deeds that Mary Ann was the titled owner and that the original title on file with the said office
was free from any lien or encumbrance, and that no adverse claim of ownership was annotated
thereon.
• Petitioner's reliance on the clean title of Mary Ann was reinforced by the fact that the latter had
previously mortgaged the same property to a bank which accepted the property as collateral on
the strength of the same owner's duplicate copy of the title presented by Mary Ann. Certainly,
petitioner Flordeliza cannot be expected or obliged to inquire whether the said owner's
duplicate copy presented to her was regularly or irregularly issued, when by its very appearance
there was no reason to doubt its validity .Where there is nothing in the certificate of title that
would indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon,
the mortgagee is not required to explore further than what the certificate of title on its face
indicates in search of any hidden defect or inchoate right that may thereafter defeat her right
thereto.
• In fact, respondent never questioned petitioner Flordeliza's good faith in accepting the subject
property as security for the loan and in having the mortgage registered and annotated on the
title. Neither was there an allegation that the petitioner was a party or even privy to Mary Ann's
alleged fraudulent acts to secure another owner's duplicate copy. There is, therefore, no reason
to doubt petitioner's good faith in entering into the mortgage transaction with Mary Ann.
• The record shows that petitioner loaned the amount of P300,000.00 to Mary Ann, proving that
not only was she an innocent mortgagee for value, but also one who in good faith relied on the
clean title of Mary Ann. In accepting such a mortgage, petitioner was not required to make
further investigation of the title presented to her to bind the property being given as security for
the loan.
• In fine, the prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the
certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as security and in the absence of any
sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence,
even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the
mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is nonetheless entitled to protection.
• We are not unmindful of the fact that both petitioner and respondent are innocent parties who
have been forced to litigate due to the duplicitous acts of Mary Ann, who has not even bothered
to make an appearance or participate throughout the litigation of this case. Nevertheless, there
 is an equitable maxim that between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the
wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. It cannot be denied that
Mercedes, in her failure or neglect to register the sale in her favor made it possible for Mary Ann
to mortgage the subject property to the petitioner. Having failed to properly safeguard her own
rights, she cannot ask the courts to come to her rescue, when to do so would be at the expense
of an innocent mortgagee in good faith. The law and jurisprudence dictate that petitioner's right
as a registered mortgagee in good faith and for value is better deserving of protection.

vii.PNB v. Acero, G.R. No.69255, 27 February1987

Facts:

• Isabela Wood Construction & Dvpt Corp has a savings account with PNB in the amount of P2
Million. Said account is the subject of two conflicting claims. One claim is asserted by the Aceros,
and the other is by PNB.
• Aceros’ claim to the bank deposit was founded upon the garnishment thereof by the sheriff,
effected in execution of the partial judgment (in the amount of P1.5 M) rendered by the CFI in
their favor. Notice of garnishment was served on PNB, followed by a CFI order (Feb. 15, 1980)
directing the latter to hand over the P1.5M to the sheriff for delivery to the ACEROs. A second
judgment was rendered ordering ISABELLA to pay compensatory damages and atty.’s fees all
amounting to almost P600k.
• On the other hand, PNB's claim is based on a Credit Agreement between it and ISABELA in virtue
of which: (1) the deposit was made by ISABELA as "collateral" in connection with its
indebtedness to PNB as to which it (ISABELA) had assumed certain contractual undertakings
(such as to deliver a property as mortgage, obtain the consent of Metrobank to secure a second
mortgage in favor of PNB); and (2) in the event of ISABELA's failure to fulfill those undertakings,
PNB was empowered to apply the deposit to the payment of that indebtedness.
• It was upon this version of the facts, and its theory thereon based on a mutual set-off, or
compensation, between it and ISABELA — in accordance with Articles 1278 et al. of the Civil
Code — that PNB intervened in the action between the ACEROS and ISABELA on or about
February 28, 1980 and moved for reconsideration of the Order of February 15, 1980 (requiring it
to turn over to the sheriff the sum of P1,532,000. The CFI denied the motion. PNB again filed an
MR, this time of another Order, and also pleaded for suspension in the meantime of the
enforcement of the Orders of February 15, and May 14, 1980. Its persistence seemingly paid off.
• The RTC set aside the Orders, and set for hearing PNB’s first MR. Subsequently, the RTC reversed
its decision, ruling that there had been a valid assignment by ISABELA to PNB of the amount
deposited. The ACEROS appealed to the IAC which ruled in their favor. PNB appealed to the SC.
• PNB's main thesis is that when it opened a savings account for ISABELA on March 9, 1979 in the
amount of P 2M, it (PNB) became indebted to ISABELA in that amount. So that when ISABELA
itself subsequently came to be indebted to PNB on account of ISABELA's breach of the terms of
the Credit Agreement, ISABELA and PNB became at the same time creditors and debtors of each
 other, compensation automatically took place between them, in accordance with Article 1278 of
the Civil Code.
• PNB’s alternative theory: which is that the P2M deposit had been assigned to it by ISABELA as
"collateral," although not by way of pledge; that ISABELA had explicitly authorized it to apply the
P2M deposit in payment of its indebtedness; and that PNB had in fact applied the deposit to the
payment of ISABELA's debt on February 26, 1980, in concept of voluntary compensation.

Issue:

Whether PNB’s contentions are correct, and that compensation automatically took place between the
parties thus preventing the Aceros’ garnishment thereof

Held:

• No. Article 1278 of the Civil Code does indeed provide that "Compensation shall take place
when two persons, in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each other. " Also true is that
compensation may transpire by operation of law, as when all the requisites therefor, set out in
Article 1279, are present. Nonetheless, these legal provisions cannot apply to PNB’s advantage
under the circumstances of the case at bar. The insuperable obstacle to the success of PNB's
cause is the factual finding of the IAC, that it has not proven by competent evidence that it is a
creditor of ISABELA. All that the documents presented by PNB prove is that a letter of credit
might have been opened for ISABELA by PNB, but not that the credit was ever availed of (by
ISABELA's foreign correspondent MAN, or that the goods thereby covered were in fact shipped,
and received by ISABELA. It bears stressing that PNB did not at all lack want for opportunity to
produce these documents, if it does indeed have them.
• PNB’s alternative theory, is as untenable as the first. First, there being no indebtedness to PNB
on ISABELA's part, there is in consequence no occasion to speak of any mutual set-off, or
compensation, whether it be legal, i.e., which automatically occurs by operation of law, or
voluntary, i.e., which can only take place by agreement of the parties. In the second place, the
documents indicated by PNB as constitutive of the claimed assignment do not in truth make out
any such transaction. While the Credit Agreement declares it to be ISABELA's intention to
"assign to the BANK the proceeds of its contract with the Department of Public Works” it does
not appear that that intention was adhered to, much less carried out.
• Even if it be assumed that such an assignment had indeed been made, and PNB had been really
authorized to apply the P2M deposit to the satisfaction of ISABELA's indebtedness to it,
nevertheless, since the record reveals that the application was attempted to be made by PNB
only on February 26, 1980, that essayed application was ineffectual and futile because at that
time, the deposit was already in custodia legis, notice of garnishment thereof having been
served on PNB on January 9, 1980 (pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the CFI for the
enforcement of the partial judgment in the ACEROS' favor).
• One final factor precludes according validity to PNB's arguments. On the assumption that the P
2M deposit was in truth assigned as some sort of "collateral" to PNB — although as PNB insists,
it was not in the form of a pledge — the agreement postulated by PNB that it had been
 authorized to assume ownership of the fund upon the coming into being of ISABELA s
indebtedness is void ab initio, it being in the nature of a pactum commisoruim proscribed as
contrary to public policy.

viii.Benedicto v. Yulo, G.R. No.8106, 26 November 1913

Facts:

• According to the claim of Gregorio Yulo as attorney for Juan Tuason, sometime prior to the
beginning of this action a mortgage held by Juan Tuason against the real estate of one Ceferino
Domingo Lim was foreclosed by the former and the property described therein sold at public
sale to said Juan Tuason under the bid of Gregorio Yulo, his attorney.
• The sale, so far as the record in concerned, was duly and properly made and affirmed by the
court. Later the purchaser at the sale, Juan Tuason, asked the sheriff for a deed of the property
in pursuance thereof at the public sale, and the sheriff was about to execute the conveyance to
the purchaser when one Ruperto Montinola presented himself to the sheriff alleging that he had
purchased from the mortgagor and defendant in the action to foreclose the mortgage, Ceferino
Domingo Lim, his right to redeem the mortgaged premises and tendered to the sheriff the
amount for which the mortgaged property was sold, with the costs and expenses, at the same
time demanding that the sheriff execute a deed of said property to him.
• The sheriff finding himself called upon by two different persons, with interests apparently
opposing, to perform an official act, began this action to determine to whom the conveyance of
the property should be issued.
• The facts as claimed by Montinola are the same as those stated by Gregorio Yulo as attorney for
Juan Tuason, except that Montinola claims that the sale of the real estate in question was under
an execution issued upon a judgment and not under a decree in foreclosure.

Issue:

Whether the conveyance of the property should be issued to the respondent.

Held:

• This is the general doctrine prevailing in the absence of statute. It may be modified, and is
modified, either materially or casually by the legislative authority of the state. Here the
mortgagor is given until the term of court next succeeding the one in which the decree of
foreclosure is made to pay the mortgage debt, interest, cost, and charges; and in the event of
such payment the land remains his own.
• The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which deal with the foreclosure of mortgages are
silent on the equity of redemption. Having arrived at the point where the sale is to take place,
reference is then made to the provision relating sales under execution, and the provisions in
relating to sales under execution, and the provisions in relation to such sales are made
applicable to sales in foreclosure.
 • While the provisions relating the sale of property under execution, to which the provisions of
the code relative to the foreclosure of mortgages make reference, provide that, where the sale
of property is made by virtue of an execution, the debtor whose property is sold shall have one
year within which to pay the judgment, interest, costs, and charges and to retake the property
thus sold, we are, nevertheless, of the opinion that it was not the intention of the Legislature to
include those provision in the reference contained in the sections relating to mortgage
foreclosures.
• The substantive rights of the parties to a mortgage are determined by the law, and in the
present instance, it is undoubted, under the Code of Civil Procedure as well as under the general
law, that the right of redemption is property and is subject to the same protection which other
property receives at the hands of the law.
• The owner of that equity is entitled to the same consideration which the owner of other
property must receive and he can be deprived of it only under the same circumstance and
conditions and with the same formalities. It is equally true, on the other hand, that the equity of
redemption, if there be one, being when granted property of the mortgagor and in derogation
of the rights of the mortgagee, will not be held to be conferred upon the mortgagor in the
absence of clear statutory provisions to that effect. The contract between the parties is that to
which we must first look to determine their rights; and that contract, as interpreted and
construed under the law of the state, in the only source from which the rights of the parties
under the contract spring. The contract is this case grants no such right; and it being the general
rule that the rights which pertain to the mortgagor are completely terminated and cut off by the
decree of foreclosure and the sale thereunder, the latter being duly confirmed, it follows of
necessity that his rights cannot be continued beyond that point except by clear provisions of
statute, for the reason that, in the absence of such provisions, the rights of the mortgagee under
the contract would become absolute on the happening of that event.
• We are of the opinion, therefore, that when, in the law relating to the foreclosure of
mortgages, reference was made to the provisions of the code relative to the sale of property
under execution, it was intended, there being no express words to the contrary, to include in
such reference only such provisions as refer to the mere management and conduct of the sale
— the mere ministerial acts which must be performed in order that the sale be legal — and do
not those provisions which relate to the substantive rights of the parties before or after the sale
has been consummated.

ix.China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.94182, 28 March 1994

Facts:

• On March 1, 1984, petitioner CBC filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint against George
U. Lim, Julia L. Wang and private respondent, as officers of Pacific Mills, Inc., for violation of P.D.
No. 115. The complaint arose from two trust receipts: one, dated November 18, 1977 which was
signed by George U. Lim and private respondent, and the other dated March 19, 1981 (also
 referred to in the records and in the petition as being dated July 10, 1981) which was signed by
George U. Lim and Julia L. Wang.
• Private respondent could not be subpoenaed at the address furnished by petitioners.
• When private respondent found out that Criminal Case No. 85-34190 arose from the March 19,
1981 trust receipt, he filed a counter-affidavit with the Fiscal’s office alleging that he was not a
signatory to said trust receipt.
• Petitioner CBC forthwith filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and/or Amendment of Information,
alleging that "through inadvertence and oversight in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit,"
the names of Claro Ben Lim and Julia L. Wang were interchanged, and as a consequence, private
respondent was charged in the affidavit-complaint in connection with the Trust Receipt
Agreement dated March 19, 1981 (Annex "B-3"), while Julia L. Wang was charged in the
complaint-affidavit in connection with the Trust Receipt Agreement dated November 18, 1977
when it should have been the other way around.
• Petitioner Ong filed a supplemental reply-affidavit with the City Fiscal, reiterating the allegations
in the Motion for Reinvestigation and/or Amendment of Information of his co-petitioner.
• Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 85-34190, which was granted in
an order dated November 27, 1988 insofar as he was concerned.
• Subsequently, private respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He alleged that petitioner Ong
committed perjury when he implicated private respondent as having executed with George U.
Lim, the trust receipt dated March 19, 1981, when he had already severed his relations with
Pacific three years before the execution of said trust receipt.
• In support of his claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees,
private respondent alleged that "petitioners’ wanton, malevolent, reckless, fraudulent, ruthless
and oppressive manner" caused him to suffer "mental torture, shock, humiliation, mental
anguish and sleepless night" not only because his stature in the business community declined
and his business suffered, but also because his wife suffered a nervous breakdown and his
children who were also engaged in business were affected. He asserted that he was well-known
both in the local and international business circles and was actively engaged in various socio-
civic, religious and charitable associations.
• The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent

Issue:

Whether there is malicious prosecution.

Held:

• The act complained of must be intentional. The act must be tainted with bad faith. However,
bad faith cannot be attributed to petitioners in filing the criminal complaint against private
respondent. In doing so, they were merely exercising their right under the law. Based on the
trust receipt bearing the signature of private respondent (Annex "A-3") there was a prima
facie case against him for estafa. The interchange in the names of private respondent and Julia
 L. Wang was merely due to oversight and was not done deliberately. This fact was proven when
petitioners immediately asked for a reinvestigation of the case upon discovering their mistake.
• Since the facts show that petitioners did not act with bad faith, it clearly follows that an award
for damages based on malicious prosecution will not prosper. Malicious prosecution, both in
criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence
of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that
the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602
[1980]).
• Hence, mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he
be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate
(Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]; Rubio v.
Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral
damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good
faith, or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433
[1988];

x.Rural Bank of Oroquieta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.53466,10 November1980

Facts:

• The Spouses Serrano owe the Rural Bank of Oroquieta, Inc. a sum of money, due to number of
demands unheard the Bank filed a case in the Court of First Instance. The CFI rendered a
decision, ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff bank within a period of "not less than ninety
(90) days nor more than one hundred (100) days from" the receipt of the decision the loan of
P1,500 with twelve percent interest per annum from January 16, 1972 plus ten percent of the
principal as attorney's fees.
• In case of nonpayment within that period, the trial court, in order to satisfy that obligation,
ordered the sheriff to sell at public auction the mortgaged lot, a parcel of coconut land with an
area of 2.8 hectares, covered by TCT, located at Sitio Petugo Barrio Bato, Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental. The Serrano spouses did not pay their mortgage debt.
• A writ of execution was issued. On January 13, 1975, the sheriff levied upon the mortgaged lot
and advertised its sale at public auction to satisfy the mortgage obligation which, together with
the sheriff's fees and costs, amounted to P2,223.60 on January 28, 1975. At the auction sale
held on March 3, 1975, the mortgaged lot was sold to the bank as the only bidder. The sheriff
issued a certificate of sale dated March 4, 1975.
• There being no redemption within the one-year period, the sheriff issued a final certificate of
sale dated April 19, 1976 which was registered on the following day.
• On September 20, 1976, the bank sold the lot to Eufemia Mejos. TCT was issued to her.
 • On September 8, 1977, Judge Genato issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of
possession to the bank. The mortgagors or judgment debtors filed a motion for the
reconsideration of that order on the grounds that, because there was no judicial confirmation of
the action sale, they still have an equity of redemption and could still pay the mortgage debt
(alleged to be usurious) and that the auction sale was fraudulent and irregular. They averred
that the bank rejected their offer to redeem the mortgaged lot and that the issuance of the writ
of possession was premature.
• Judge Genato granted the motion for reconsideration.
• On December 23, 1977, the bank filed a manifestation and motion wherein it revealed that the
land had already been sold to Eufemia Mejos and, therefore, its acceptance of the redemption
price amounting to P2,820.60 would not produce any legal effect.
• The bank further disclosed that there is pending in the trial court a case for the annulment of
the foreclosure sale of the said lot and the release of the mortgage, which was instituted by the
Serrano spouses, as mortgagors, against the bank and the Mejos spouses. The bank prayed that
it should not be compelled to accept the proffered redemption price.
• The trial court denied the motion. The bank filed a notice of appeal, deposited the appeal bond
of P120 and submitted a record on appeal. It specified in its notice of appeal that it was
appealing to the Court of Appeals from the trial court's order of October 12, 1977, allowing the
redemption.
• The Serrano spouses filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that they had already
deposited with the clerk of court the redemption price of P2,830.
• The trial court in its order of February 27, 1978 dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
order sought to be appealed is interlocutory or not appealable. The bank assailed that order in
the Court of Appeals by means of certiorari which was really a mandamus action to compel the
trial court to give due course to its appeal.
• The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Issue:

Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not giving due course to the bank's appeal.

Held:

• We hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals acted correctly in refusing to give due
course to the bank's appeal not only because the order sought to be appealed is in interlocutory
but also because in the present posture of the case it is imperative that the trial court
should consolidate the foreclosure case, Civil Case No. 2988, with the other case, Civil Case No.
3265 filed by the Serrano spouses for the annulment of the foreclosure sale and the subsequent
sale of the mortgaged lot to the Mejos spouses. Note that the latter case is also pending in the
sala of respondent Judge.
• The trial court erred in unreservedly allowing the Serrano spouses to redeem the mortgaged
lot without taking into ac count the supervening fact that the lot is now registered in the name
 of Eufemia Mejos who is not a party in the foreclosure proceeding and who is entitled to be
heard. That complication cannot be summarily ignored.
• At this stage, a decision cannot be rendered outright on the conflicting rights of the Serrano
spouses, the bank and the Mejos spouses with respect to the mortgaged lot. The trial court
should first try and resolve the issues arising out of the lack of judicial confirmation of the
foreclosure sale and the subsequent sale of the mortgaged lot to a third person after the
expiration of the one-year period for exercising the right of redemption. We can only state some
guidelines in resolving those issues.
• After the execution of a real estate mortgage, the mortgagor has an equity of redemption
exercisable within the period stipulated in the mortgage deed. In case of judicial foreclosure,
that equity of redemption subsists after the sale and before it is confirmed by the court
(Raymundo vs. Sunico, 25 Phil. 365; Benedicto vs. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160; Grimalt vs. Velasquez and
Sy Quio 36 Phil. 936; Sun Life Assurance Co. vs. Gonzales Diez, 52 Phil. 271; La Urbana vs.
Belando 54 Phil. 930; Villar vs. Javier de Paderanga 97 Phil. 604; Piano vs. Cayanong 117 Phil.
415).
• However, in case of a judicial foreclosure of a mortgage in favor of a banking institution, section
78 of the General Banking Law grants the mortgagor a right of redemption which may be
exercised within one year from the sale.
• In the instant case, where the foreclosure sale has not yet been confirmed but the statutory
one-year period for redemption expired and the mortgaged lot was sold by the mortgagee (as
the only bidder at the auction sale) to a third person, the trial court should give the purchaser a
chance to be heard before requiring the mortgagee-bank to accept the redemption price
tendered by the mortgagors.

xi.Dayot v. Shell Chemical Co., G.R. No.156542, 26 June 2007

Facts:

• Panay Railways, Inc. executed a real estate mortgage contract over six parcels of land located in
Lapuz District, Iloilo City in favor of Traders Royal Bank for purposes of securing its loan
obligations to TRB.
• PRI failed to pay its loan. As a consequence, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and
sold at public auction to TRB as the highest bidder. PRI failed to redeem the foreclosed
properties. Hence, TRB consolidated its ownership over the subject parcels of land and,
thereafter, certificates of title were issued in its name.
• Thereafter, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession with the RTC. In its Order dated October
22, 1990, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of TRB. However, the writ was not fully implemented.
 • On November 20, 1990, TRB sold to spouses Edmundo and Candelaria Dayot, by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, five parcels of land which are portions of Lots 3834, 1-A and 6153.
• Subsequently, on February 5, 1991, Candelaria Dayot filed a Supplemental Pleading before the
RTC of Iloilo City, praying that she, being the transferee of all the rights and interests of TRB
over the parcels of land subject of the Petition for Writ of Possession filed by the latter, be
substituted as the new petitioner, and that an alias writ of possession be issued in her favor.
The trial court granted petitioner's prayer in its Order dated March 12, 1991. On April 1, 1991,
the RTC issued an Alias Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner.
• On August 24, 1994, the spouses Dayot filed with the RTC, a complaint for Recovery of
Ownership and Possession, Annulment of Documents, Cancellation of Titles, Reconveyance and
Damages against TRB, Petron Corporation and Shell Chemical Company, Inc., praying that Shell
be directed to vacate the portion of Lot No. 6153 which it actually possesses and for both
Petron and Shell to surrender ownership and possession of portions of parcels of lands covered
separately by TCT.
• On August 21, 1997, while Civil Case was pending resolution, herein petitioner filed in LRC CAD.
REC. NOS. 1 and 9616 an Amended Supplemental Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession,
praying that Shell be ejected from the portion of Lot 6153 which it actually possesses.
• Shell lodged an Opposition to petitioner's Amended Supplemental Motion arguing, among
others, that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping as it seeks the same relief being sought in
Civil Case and that the parcels of land sold to petitioner do not include the portion of Lot 6153
being possessed by Shell.
• On May 7, 1999, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Possession, insofar as Shell is concerned.
• Despite the issuance of the above-mentioned Order, petitioner filed two successive motions
praying for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Shell opposed these motions.
• RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered Shell to vacate the property.
• Shell then filed a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition with the CA which is granted by the CA.

Issue:

Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct.

Held:

• Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property at the time of levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or
last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.
• Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that the obligation of a court to
issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of a
mortgaged property ceases to be ministerial once it is shown that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor and that
 such third party is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of
possession was applied for.
• It bears emphasis that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious
proceeding authorized in an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as
amended. It is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by
any person adversely interested.
• Furthermore, unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court where an action for foreclosure is brought before the RTC where the mortgaged property
or any part thereof is situated, any property brought within the ambit of Act 3135 is foreclosed
by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made. As such, a third person in possession of an extra-judicially
foreclosed property, who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor, is thus given
no opportunity to be heard in his claim. It stands to reason, therefore, that such third person
may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex-parte possessory writ, since to do so
would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process.
• Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited above, requires nothing less than
ejectment or reivindicatory action to be brought even by the true owner. After all, the actual
possessor of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just title in his favor, which must be
overcome by the party claiming otherwise.
• In the case at bar, it is not disputed that herein respondent had been in possession of the
subject lots since 1975 and that it has in its premises bulk plant and fuel storage facilities for the
purpose of conducting its business. In this respect, the Court agrees with the findings of the CA
that petitioner had knowledge of respondent's prior possession of the disputed properties. Yet,
instead of pursuing Civil Action No. 21957 where respondent will be given a chance to
substantiate its claim of ownership, petitioner still insists on obtaining a writ of possession
pursuant to its alleged right as purchaser of the properties which had been extra-judicially
foreclosed. The Court cannot sanction this procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against
herein respondent, an unwitting third-party possessor who took no part in the foreclosure
proceedings, would be tantamount to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper
judicial intervention.
• Hence, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No. 3135 to issue a writ of
possession for the ouster of respondent from the lot subject of this instant case, particularly in
light of the latter's opposition and claim of ownership and rightful possession of the disputed
properties.
• Moreover, the trial court was without authority to grant the ex-parte writ, since petitioner's
right of possession under said Act could be rightfully enforced only against PRI as the original
mortgagor and its successors-in-interest, but not against respondent which possesses the
property subject of execution under a claim of ownership, having bought the same from the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
xii.Top Rate International Services, Inc. v.Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.L-67496, 7 July 1986

Facts:

• On August 12, 1981, petitioner (Rodrigo Tan, doing business under the name Astro Automotive
Supply') filed a complaint against Consolidated Mines Inc. and Jose Marino Olondriz, the
president of said corporation, for the payment of the purchase price of certain heavy
equipment, parts and accessories sold to Consolidated Mines, Inc. with a total cost of
P271,372.20.
• In said complaint, plaintiff asked that a writ of preliminary attachment be issued against
defendants on the ground that said defendants were guilty of fraud in securing said equipment.
• On August 17, 1981, respondent Court granted plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment upon plaintiff's posting of a bond in the amount of P 271,372.20.
Pursuant to said order, a writ of attachment was issued on August 26, 1981.
• The sheriff served notices of garnishment on the tenants of the building owned by defendant
Consolidated Mines, Inc. garnishing the rentals due from said tenants, but since there were
earlier notices of garnishment served upon said tenants issued in two (2) other cases, the sheriff
was not able to garnish any amount from said tenants.
• The sheriff levied on the properties of defendant Consolidated Mines, Inc. and the notice of levy
was duly annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-68501 (143900) and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. S-68500 (14329). The notice of levy was not annotated on the transfer certificate of
title of a third property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 79776, although notice of
said levy was duly entered in the primary book of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
• Annotated as prior encumbrances on the first two properties on December 20, 1978 was a
mortgage in favor of twelve (12) consortium banks and a notice of levy issued in Civil Case No.
136406 entitled 'Warmco Trading Company versus Consolidated Mines, Inc. and Jose Marino
Olondriz' on May 15, 1981.
• After hearing on the merits, the trial court in Civil Case No. 142598 ordered the lifting and
setting aside of the levy on attachment on the two properties involved while in Civil Case No.
142443, the trial court issued the same order maintaining, however, the levy on attachment on
the property covered by TCT No. 79776 in favor of plaintiff Rodrigo Tan.
• On January 6, 1984, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
142443, and ordered the levy on the two properties maintained.

Issue:

Whether the Sheriff should levy only on the right of redemption and not on the property itself.

Held:

• Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after his
default in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the sale of the property
or the confirmation of the sale, whereas the right of redemption means the right of the
 mortgagor to repurchase the property even after confirmation of the sale, in cases of
foreclosure by banks, within one year from the registration of the sale. (Cf. Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 283-284, 1980 Edition; Quimson vs. Philippine National Bank,
36 SCRA 26).
• When herein private respondents prayed for the attachment of the properties to secure their
respective claims against Consolidated Mines, Inc., the properties had already been mortgaged
to the consortium of twelve banks to secure an obligation of US$62,062,720.66. Thus, like
subsequent mortgagees, the respondents' liens on such properties became inferior to that of
the banks, which claims in the event of foreclosure proceedings, must first be satisfied. The
appellate court, therefore, was correct in holding that in reality, what was attached by the
respondents was merely Consolidated Mines' right or equity of redemption. Thus, in the case
of Alpha Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Reyes (106 SCRA 274, 278), we ruled:
• Deciding the legal question before Us, even ff the DBP were just an ordinary first mortgage
without any preferential liens under Republic Act No. 85 or Commonwealth Act 459, the
statutes mentioned in the Associated Insurance case relied upon by the trial court, it would be
unquestionable that nothing may be done to favor plaintiff-appellant, a mere second mortgage,
until after the obligations of the debtors-appellees with the first mortgagee have been fully
satisfied and settled. In law, strictly speaking, what was mortgaged by the Reyeses to Alpha was
no more than their equity of redemption.
• We, therefore, hold that the appellate court did not commit any error in ruling that there was
no over-levy on the disputed properties. What was actually attached by respondents was
Consolidated Mines' right or equity of redemption, an incorporeal and intangible right, the value
of which can neither be quantified nor equated with the actual value of the properties upon
which it may be exercised.

Involuntary Dealings

a.Sections 69 to 77

b.Attachment

c.Adverse Claim

d.Lis Pendense.

Cases:

i.Caviles v. Bautista, G.R. No.102648, 24 November 1999

Facts:

• On September 22, 1982, petitioners-appellees, the spouses Alendry and Flora Caviles, Jr. filed a
case against Renato C. Plata for recovery of a sum of money. The complaint contained an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. On September 24, 1982, the CFI
issued the writ prayed for and on October 4, 1982 Deputy Sheriff Jaime L. de Leon issued a
 Notice of Attachment over a piece of real estate owned by Plata covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title.
• The Notice of Attachment was entered in the Primary Entry Book on October 6, 1982, but was
not annotated on TCT by the Register of Deeds, nor did the deputy sheriff or petitioners-
appellees, take any step to annotate the attachment on the TCT.
• On October 18, 1982, Plata sold the property to the spouses Evelyn and Ramon Bautista, free, of
course, from the attachment or any encumbrance, and on the same date Platas TCT was
cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of respondents-appellants. From then on,
respondents-appellants appear to have taken over and resided in the property.
• No action was taken by petitioners-appellees to annotate the attachment as indeed they
remained ignorant that the property had been sold and a new title issued until very much later
when, after obtaining a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 82-12668 on September 30, 1983,
they attempted execution. Thus, even as petitioners-appellees were able to obtain a writ of
execution on February 3, 1984, the levy effected on February 21, 1984, was in (sic) still in regard
to the by-then-cancelled TCT No. S-3364. The Notice of Levy was entered in the Day Book on
February 22, 1984.
• On March 30, 1987, close to 4 years after the property was bought by respondents-appellants,
and 3 years after levy on execution was effected, the property was sold on execution to
petitioners-appellees.
• The Certificate of Sale was entered in the Day Book on April 2, 1987, but when its inscription
was sought to be made - the first time such idea entered petitioners-appellees mind, apparently
- it was found out that Platas certificate had been cancelled and a new one issued to
respondents-appellants. The entry was made nonetheless on the title of respondents-appellants
which annotation the Register of Deeds, however, refused to sign. Upon the matter being
elevated on consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, the
Administrator thereof, the Honorable Teodoro G. Bonifacio, opined on February 23, 1988, that
the certificate of sale may be annotated on respondents-appellants TCT.
• Due to the refusal of respondents-appellants to surrender their owners copy of TCT, the
proceedings below were initiated on January 30, 1989, with petitioners-appellees invoking
Section 107 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which insofar as herein pertinent speaks of an
action to compel surrender of the owners duplicate of title for annotation of a voluntary
instrument.
• In any event, on June 2, 1990, a decision was handed down by the Regional Trial Court
ordering, inter alia, respondents-appellants to surrender their owners duplicate copy of TCT for
inscription or annotation of the certificate of sale, and for the subsequent cancellation of said
certificate of title and the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of petitioners-appellees.
• On September 20, 1991, the Court of Appeals, promulgated a decision reversing the June 2,
1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition before the
trial court and upheld the transfer certificate of title of respondent-appellants Evelyn T. Bautista
and Ramon T. Bautista.
Issue:

Whether the petitioner’s interest will prevail

Held:

• In the case at bar, the notice of attachment covering the subject property was annotated in the
entry book of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City on October 6, 1982, while the new transfer
certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses was issued on October 18, 1982, the date
when Plata sold the property to said respondents. Petitioners levy on preliminary attachment
was put into effect when the property was sold on execution to petitioners, after the latter
obtained a writ of execution by virtue of a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 82-12668.
• This Court has repeatedly held that in involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy on
execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day book or entry book is a sufficient
notice to all persons of such adverse claim. Petitioners’ lien of attachment was properly
recorded when it was entered in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds on October 6,
1982.
• We have also consistently ruled that an auction or execution sale retroacts to the date of levy of
the lien of attachment. When the subject property was sold on execution to the petitioners, this
sale retroacted to the date of inscription of petitioners notice of attachment on October 6, 1982.
The earlier registration of the petitioner’s levy on preliminary attachment gave them superiority
and preference in rights over the attached property as against Respondents.
• Accordingly, we rule that the execution sale in favor of the petitioner Caviles spouses was
anterior and superior to the sale of the same property to the respondent Bautista spouses on
October 18, 1982. The right of petitioners to the surrender of the owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. 57006 covering the subject property for inscription of the certificate of sale, and for the
cancellation of said certificate of title and the issuance of a new title in favor of petitioners
cannot be gainsaid.
• Anent the matter of the existence of another case involving the same issue as raised in Part IX of
the petition, suffice it to state that our present disposition of this case is not inconsistent with
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 16359, promulgated on September 28,
1990. This ruling was elevated to this Court as G.R. No. 98343 by way of a petition for certiorari,
but it was denied for failure to comply with the Rules governing the filing of petitions with this
Court.

ii.Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.121298, 31 July 2001

Facts:

• Genaro Ruiz, Sr., already in his late seventies was a very sickly man. In order to defray the cost of
his continuous medication and hospitalization, he was constrained to obtain loans from his
neighbor, Honorato Hong. He used the subject land which was his exclusive property as
 collateral. On April 23, 1986, Genaro Ruiz,Sr. finally decided to convey the land to Honorato
Hong for a consideration of P350,000.00.
• Hong issued a check in the amount of P100,000.00 in favor of Genaro Ruiz, Sr. representing part
of the balance of the purchase price, in addition to the sums of money earlier obtained from
him. The deed of sale was duly notarized. It was agreed that the transfer of title to Hong’s name
would be undertaken by the vendor.
• The relationship between Genaro Ruiz, Sr. and his wife, Amor Ruiz was estranged but Honorato
Hong was a good friend to both of them. Apparently, Amor Ruiz was also borrowing money from
Honorato Hong in her personal capacity. She used the subject land as security so that sometime
in November, 1985, Honorato Hong and Amor Ruiz executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby Hong took possession of the TCT of said land for safekeeping.
• In July 1986, Amor Ruiz demanded the return of the TCT from Honorato Hong alleging that she
would undertake registration of the sale and transfer of title to Honorato Hong. The transfer of
title however never materialized.
• Upon learning about what his wife did Genaro Ruiz Sr. executed another deed of sale with the
same contents and was also duly notarized. Meanwhile in August 1986 Amor Ruiz and her
children, Genaro Ruiz Jr. Angelo Ruiz and Maria Ruiz filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu a
complaint for support against her husband with a prayer for a writ of attachment over Lot 8485-
B. Honorato Hong filed a third-party claim declaring that the subject lot was his exclusive
property.
• In the support case, the Regional Trial Court approved of a compromise agreement whereby
Genaro Ruiz Sr. acknowledged his obligation for support in arrears in the amount of PHP
363,000 and PHP 20,000 in attorney’s fees. Upon the failure of Genaro Ruiz to comply with his
obligation the trial judge issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to enforce the same.
• In January 26, 1989 Honorato Hong filed a case for Specific Performance case with damages for
the delivery of the title of the subject land and a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against Genaro Ruiz, Sr. and/or Amor Ruiz, et al from conducting the auction sale. The trial court
however did not act on the latter so the auction sale proceeded with Amor Ruiz as lone bidder.
• Genaro Ruiz, Sr. died on July 27, 1989.
• Michael Paul Sauza The Trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Honorato
Hong enjoining the sheriff from issuing the certificate of sale to the Ruizes.
• This order was assailed by the Ruizes and filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Apeals.
While the petition of the Ruizes assailing the writ of preliminary injunction was still pending with
the Court of Appeals, the trial court in the Specific Performance case rendered a decision in
favor of Honorato Hong ordering Amor Ruiz to deliver the TCT and vacate the premises and
declaring the writ of attachment, levy and execution sale null and void. On March 23, 1992, The
Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated August 27,
1990 which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sheriff of Cebu from issuing
the certificate of sale in favor of Amor Ruiz.
• On the strength of the decision Amor Ruiz and her children were placed in the possession of and
control of certain portions of Lot 8485-B. Hong filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that a
 writ of possession not be issued in favor of Amor Ruiz since he was in actual physical possession
of the subject lot pursuant to rule 39, section 35.
• On June 1, 1994, Petitioners moved for the full implementation of the writ of possession in their
favor which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners went to the court of appeals raising the
pivotal issue as to whether the respondent court can be compelled to order the respondent
sheriff to deliver possession of Lot 8485-B to herein petitioners.
• The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Honorato Hong declaring that respondent Hong is already
adjudged the owner of Lot 8485-B, the respondent court had no power to enforce authority
over such property since it belongs to a person other than the judgement debtor and
consequently petitioners are not entitled to its possession.
• The petitioners dissatisfied, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the respondent court affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto.

Issue:

Who between the parties has a preferred right over the subject land?

Held:

• The Supreme Court declared private respondent Hong as the rightful owner of the subject land.
Where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the
effect of registration as to him. K
• nowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. Moreover, the sale of the
property was evidenced by duly notarized deeds of sale executed on April 23, 1986 and again on
July 22, 1986. Documents acknowledged before notaries public are public documents and public
documents are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their
authenticity and due execution. They have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.
• The Court also considered the statement of Genaro when he submitted his Answer in the case
filed by his wife and children for Support where he respectfully prayed to the court to issue an
order to lift the order of attachment on the real property, more particularly on Lot 8485-B which
he sold on April 23, 1986 for the reason that since that date he no longer owned it. Said
statement was a declaration made by the owner himself, which could be considered as a
declaration against interest.
• Genaro Ruiz, Sr., the registered owner, categorically stated that he had already sold the land to
Hong on April 23, 1986 so that his wife had no basis to attach the subject land. Genaro Ruiz, Sr.
would not have made the allegation if it were not true. Such statement must be given weight
and credence as against the party who declares otherwise and has no proof to rebut the same.
iii.Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No.172204, 2 July 2014

Facts:

• Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative recognized under Republic Act No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It allegedly entered into a joint venture
agreement with farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in
Silang, Cavite. While respondent was negotiating with the farmer-beneficiaries, petitioner
Cathay Metal Corporation entered into Irrevocable Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with
the same farmer-beneficiaries.
• In 1996, respondent caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the farmer-beneficiaries’
certificates of title. Petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of sale of the
properties. Transfer certificates of title were also issued in the name of petitioner in the same
year. The annotations in the original titles were copied to petitioner’s titles. Respondent’s Vice-
President, Orlando dela Peña, sent two letters to petitioner, informing it of respondent’s claim
to the properties. Petitioner did not respond. On September 15, 2000, petitioner filed a
consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on its transfer certificates of title with
the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City.
• It served a copy of the petition by registered mail to respondent’s alleged official address at
“Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.” The petition was returned to sender because respondent
could not be found at that address. The postman issued a certification stating that the reason
for the return was that the “cooperative [was] not existing.” Petitioner allegedly attempted to
serve the petition upon respondent personally. However, this service failed for the same reason.
Petitioner was later allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
• Upon learning that a case involving its adverse claim was pending, respondent, through Mr.
Orlando dela Peña, filed a manifestation and motion, alleging that respondent never received a
copy of the summons and the petition. It moved for the service of the summons and for a copy
of the petition to be sent to No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba, Laguna.
• Since no one received the summons, petitioner insisted that the trial court issue an order to
effect substituted service. Petitioner argued that summons could only be validly served to
respondent’s official address as indicated in its registration with the Cooperative Development
Authority. This is because respondent as a registered cooperative is governed by Republic Act
No. 6938, a substantive law that requires summons to be served to respondent’s official
address.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons to the respondent

Held:

• No. there was no valid service of summons to the respondent.

 • The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as
administered by the Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are not procedural
rules that will govern court processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to
have an official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the
place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding. This is
not to say that the notices cannot be sent to cooperatives in accordance with the Cooperative
Code. Notices may be sent to a cooperative’s official address.
• However, service of notices sent to the official address in accordance with the Cooperative
Code may not be used as a defense for violations of procedures, specially when such violation
affects another party’s rights. Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on
service of summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served upon a
juridical entity only through its officers.
• Thus, Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
• We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service
of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even
substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. This provision of the rule does not
limit service to the officers’ places of residence or offices.
• If summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices,
summons may be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found. In this case,
petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by personal
service at the office address indicated in respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was
not served upon respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules of
Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to present evidence, and petitioner
was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an order cancelling respondent’s annotations
of adverse claims.

iv.Ching v. Enrile, G.R. No.156076, 17 September2008

Facts:

• Petitioners purchased the subject property thru a deed of absolute sale. The owner’s duplicate
certificate of title was delivered and they took physical possession of the property. However, the
conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds. Instead, they executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim which was recorded and annotated at the back of TCT No. 83618 reflected in the
Memorandum of Encumbrances. In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously
possessed the subject property.
 • Three years after they purchased the disputed property, petitioners received a Notice of Levy on
Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of
respondents.
• The petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property asserting
ownership of the disputed property. On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners upholding the latter’s superior right over the disputed property in view of the
registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of
respondents.
• The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
• The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.

Issue:

Whether a notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided by
Section 70 of PD 1529.

Held:

• Yes, a notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided
by Section 70 of PD 1529. Section 70 provides:
• Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right
or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
• The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence,
and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for
a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the
party in interest. Provided, however that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on
the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
• As long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains
subsisting.
• If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the
lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to
clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in
interest to do a useless act.
• In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing
will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim.
v.Lozano v. Ballesteros, G.R. No.L-49470, 8 April 1991

Facts:

• Maria Nieves Nuñez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the original registered
exclusive owner of the land in question comprising Lots Q, B and O as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. 46076. However only Lot Q is the subject of this present action. On March
6, 1958, by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the land in question to Marciana de
Dios.
• On June 2, 1958, Augusto, Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano,
together with Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidation-subdivision plan and for the annotation of
several documents at the back of the Original Certificate of Title No. 46076. Acting on the
verified petition, the court approved the consolidation-subdivision plan and directed the
inscription, among others, of said deed of sale at the back of the title.
• Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26537 was issued in the name of Marciana de Dios who later
mortgaged the land to Kaluyagan Rural Bank in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
• On January 22, 1963, plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the
title of the said lot.
• Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusto Lozano was filed by the
plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. On November 18, 1965, plaintiffs through
the administrator filed an inventory which included said lot Q.
• On August 25, 1966, De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 63171 was later transferred in his name.
• On September 21, 1966, plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios in Civil Case
No. D-1953, alleging that the estate of Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B.
On June 8, 1967, the court rendered a default decision in favor of the plaintiffs. However, the
judgment was not satisfied on the ground that De Dios was insolvent and did not have any
registered property.
• Having failed to effect the recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed several
complaints in Civil Cases Nos. D-2107, D-2109 and D-2115 before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan for reconveyance and recovery of possession.
• The Trial Court dismissed the complaint hence, plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in deciding the cases in favor of appellees

Held:

• The applicable law in the case at bar is still Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act despite the modification introduced by Section 70 of Presidential Decree
 No. 1529. The said section particularly deals with adverse claim, to wit:
"Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,
and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
• "The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence,
and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in
interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and
shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall
find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble costs in its discretion."
• Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the above quoted provision, as
amended, the following are the formal requisites of an adverse claim:.
1. the adverse claimant must state the following in writing:
a. his alleged right or interest;
b. how and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired;
c. the description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed, and
d. the certificate of title number
2. the statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other officer authorized
to administer oath; and
3. the claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices may be served upon
him.
• The lower court quoted in part the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs, to wit:
"That this adverse claim is being filed prior to the filing of a court action because all the
properties above-described formerly belong to my husband, the late Augusto Lozano
• However, the lower court noted that "the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the
title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did not meet the
requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is setting forth fully how or under
whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the property."
We adhere to the lower court’s findings and find appellee’s position meritorious. A cursory
reading of the aforequoted adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs shows that the same has failed
to comply with the formal requisites of Section 110 of Act 496, more specifically the appellants’
failure to state how and under whom their alleged right or interest is acquired. Thus, the effect
of such non-compliance renders the adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective.
• In a case where the adverse claim filed for registration did not fully comply with the formal
requisites of Section 110 of Act No. 496, or more specifically, there being no description of the
 land in which right or interest is claimed nor the place to which all notices may be served upon
the adverse claimant given, such adverse claim could not be registered.
• Despite the appellee’s alleged knowledge of the appellants’ claims against De Dios, We still find
the allegation of bad faith on the part of the appellee devoid of merit. It should be stressed that
bad faith is inconsequential because of the ineffectiveness of the adverse claim.
• Anent the appellant’s contention that appellee is bound by the decision in the former
reconveyance case against De Dios, the lower court stressed that it is convinced that the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. D-1953 is a nullity, because an indispensable party like the
defendant herein was not brought as party therein. The failure of the plaintiffs to implead the
present defendant in that case, constituted a legal obstacle to the exercise of judicial power in
said case, and rendered any judgment therein an absolute nullity.

vi.Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.102377, 5 July 1996

Facts:

• The Sajonas couple bought a parcel of land from Ernesto Uychocde, the couple had the deed of
sale annotated as an adverse claim in the TCT. Meanwhile, the Ernesto Uychocde owed some
money and had the same lot subjected to a mortgaged to the private respondent Domingo
Pilares, when Ernesto was not able to pay the loan.
• Domingo moved to the execution of the mortgaged but the title was already transferred to the
Sajonas couple, Domingo caused an annotation of the mortgaged in the new title. The Sajonas
couple demanded the cancellation of the annotation but Domingo Pilares refused.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in holding that the rule on the 30-day period for adverse claim is
absolute.

Held:

• Annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest over a piece of real
property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the
Land Registration Act of Act 496 and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property
that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered
owner thereof.
• Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now PD 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree) and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner
thereof.
• Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province
where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other
 datas pertinent thereto. The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under
Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.

vii.Cloma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.100153, 2 August 1994

Facts:

• Oppositors spouses Tomas Cloma and Victoria Galvez Cloma were the owners of two parcels of
land located at Buendia Extension, San Jose, Pasay City, Metro Manila registered in their names
under TCT Nos. 17138 and 17139 of the Register of Deeds, Pasay City and were declared for
taxation purposes also in their names. Several liens and encumbrances have been annotated on
both said TCT.
• Realty taxes on the subject lots for the years 1983 to 1985 were not paid. On June 6, 1985, the
City Treasurer of Pasay City sent notice to the Clomas concerning their tax delinquency. The
Clomas were also furnished under date of June 6, 1985 with a Statement of Account of the total
realty tax arrears then due on their subject properties
• On July 24, 1985, the City Treasurer sent the Clomas a Second Call and Final Notice.
• Despite said notices, the Clomas appeared unperturbed and the realty tax arrears remained
unpaid. Finally, on October 21, 1985, the City Treasurer informed the spouses Cloma in a letter
that the subject properties belonging to them have been included in the list of delinquent
properties scheduled to be sold by public auction.
• On November 28, 1985, the City Treasurer informed the Clomas in a letter of that date with
copy of the certificate of sale as enclosure to the effect that a certificate of sale over the subject
properties has been issued to Nocom as the highest bidder in the auction sale conducted by his
office and that they have until November 26, 1986 within which to redeem said lots.
• The spouses Cloma failed to redeem the properties within the prescribed period. Urban Bank of
the Philippines made an offer to redeem the subject lots but the offer was cancelled by the City
Treasurer in a deed entitled citing as ground for cancellation that the redemption was
erroneously made and is "null and void". The City Treasurer with prior notice to the City Auditor
by letter dated July 24, 1989 signed by the City Legal Officer of Pasay then had refunded to
Urban Bank the payment it made.
• On July 27, 1989, the City Treasurer executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of the petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner Nocom had paid the realty taxes on the properties which became due for
the years 1986 to 1989.
• On October 5, 1989, petitioner Nocom filed the instant petition in the lower court seeking the
cancellation of TCT in the names of spouses Cloma and all the liens and encumbrances
annotated thereon and the issuance of new titles in his name invoking Section 75 of PD 1529
and Section 80 of PD No. 464, the Real Property Tax Code.
• Spouses Tomas and Victoria Cloma and PMI Colleges filed a common Answer making admissions
and denials of allegations of the petition and putting up special and affirmative defenses, i.e.,
the auction sale was attended by irregularities rendering the entire proceedings null and void;
the action is inappropriate and Section 71 of PD 1539 rather is applicable; the City Treasurer has
 no authority to conduct the sale but the City Assessor who is by law empowered to sell tax
delinquent properties at public auction; redemption was made by Urban Bank; the purchase
price of P52,856.74 for the two properties is grossly inadequate and made a tender to refund or
reimburse the petitioner's expenses of a cashier's check in the amount of P150,000.00. They
prayed for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
• Concerning the oppositors Cloma and PMI Colleges, Inc., a stipulation in lieu of evidence was
submitted by them to the effect that the nature and scope of their testimony would be that no
notices of the public auction sale had reached them and that they have not heard of the
existence of the newspaper by the title of Metropolitan Mail. Except for said offer of testimony
no other evidence was presented in support of said oppositor's claims.
• The lower court rendered its Decision in favor of the petitioner Mariano Nocom.
• The appellate court affirmed the Decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
"findings" of the Land Registration Court that the tax sale was regularly held and had complied with the
Real Property Tax Code.

Held:

• We consider the contention of petitioners that they were not notified of the public auction sale
of the subject lots and that other irregularities attended the sale in favor of the private
respondent. The contention is factual in nature and is hardly appropriate to be considered in a
petition for review on certiorari.
• The evidence bearing on the issue has been painstakingly analyzed both by the trial court and
the appellate court and their findings coincide to the effect that the claim of irregularities
charged by petitioners has not been proved.
• We agree that considering the mass of evidence presented by private respondent, petitioners'
simple denial that they did not receive any notice of sale cannot carry the day for them. No less
than the Treasurer of Pasay City, a public official, testified and presented documentary evidence
to prove that every requirement of the law on notice was complied with before the lots of
petitioner were sold for non-payment of taxes for three (3) years. The Statement of Account,
dated June 6, 1985 was sent to petitioners in their address. This was followed by another Letter
of Demand sent on June 6, 1985.
• Then on July 24, 1985, a Second Call and Final Notice was once more sent to petitioners. As all
the demands proved futile, a Notice of Inclusion in the List of Delinquent Real Properties dated
on October 21, 1985, was also sent to petitioners.
• Then the Notice of Sale of Delinquent Properties written in English, Spanish and Tagalog was
posted in three (3) conspicuous public places in Pasay City. The notice was also published in the
Metropolitan Mail for three (3) times in three (3) consecutive weeks. The sale was then made to
private respondent on November 25, 1985.
 • The next day, November 26, 1985, the City Treasurer formally notified petitioners about the
sale, enclosed therewith the Certificate of Sale and advised them that the period of redemption
would expire one (1) year thereafter.
• On the face of these overwhelming evidence, petitioners did not even take the witness stand
but instead stipulated that if they would testify, they would allege they did not receive any
notice of sale and that they were not aware that Metropolitan Mail is a newspaper of general
circulation.
• Given the cumulative impact of the testimonial and documentary evidence of the private
respondent and buttressed by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
on the part of the City Treasurer of Pasay, the denial of petitioners that they received notice of
the sale is not entitled to credence. Petitioners' claim is too easy to make and its approbation
finds no sanction in our rules of evidence.

viii.Cunanan v. Jumping Jap Trading Corporation, G.R. No.173834, 24 April 2009

Facts:

• Carmencita Fradejas Nemoto is the registered owner of a 618 square meter-lot, with the house
and improvements thereon, located at No. 167 Pili Drive, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. She acquired the property by virtue of a deed of sale
executed in her favor by Metropolitan Land Corporation .
• On 22 March 2001, respondent Jumping Jap Trading Corporation, filed Civil Case with the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City seeking the annulment of both the deed of sale and TCT,
as well as the reconveyance of the property. Respondent anchored the complaint on its alleged
superior right over the property by virtue of the execution of a previous deed of conditional sale
by MLC in its favor and its having paid P18,300,000.00 by itself using corporate funds
and P5,000,000.00 by Protacio, or a total of P23,300,000.00 which was more than
the P12,600,000.00 that the spouses Nemoto had paid on the purchase price of P35,900,000.00.
• It was allegedly agreed that Nobuyasu Nemoto, who is one of respondent's stockholders and
also a friend of Protacio, would pay the remaining installment of P12,600,000.00 and reimburse
the amount already paid by respondent and Protacio while the title, to be placed in the name of
the minor daughter of spouses Nemoto, Sakura Nemoto, would be in respondent's possession.
• However, MLC did not deliver the title to the property to respondent despite repeated oral
demands. Respondent later discovered that a deed of absolute sale was executed between MLC
and Carmencita with a stated consideration of P12,500,000.00 and that TCT was issued in the
name of Carmencita.
• Despite several demands and assurances in a span of more than three years, the spouses
Nemoto still failed to pay the purchase price advanced by respondent and Protacio amounting
to P23,400,000.00.
• On 19 April 2001, respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens involving Civil
Case No. 01-098 on TCT. Despite the notice of lis pendens, Carmencita executed a deed of real
estate mortgage dated 20 July 2001 over the property in favor of petitioners Isabelita and
 Carolyn Cunanan as security for the payment of a P10 million loan plus interest, as well as all
subsequent loans and obligations. She also executed a promissory note dated 22 July 2001,
undertaking to pay on or before 22 December 2001 the P10 million loan with interest of 3% per
month.
• In an Order dated 18 July 2001, the RTC dismissed the case and ordered the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens. Subsequently, on 23 July 2001, the RTC issued an amended
order specifically ordering the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to immediately cancel the
notice of lis pendens on TCT. Within thesame day, the Register of Deeds cancelled the notice
of lis pendens and, immediately thereafter, annotated the deed of real estate mortgage.
• The RTC subsequently granted respondent's motion for reconsideration of the amended order
of dismissal in its order dated 24 October 2001. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa
City re-annotated the notice of lis pendens on 12 December 2001.
• Ultimately, the RTC decided Civil Case in favor of respondent
• In the meantime, the Cunanans effected the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the
property on 17 July 2002. This prompted respondent to file on 12 August 2002 before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City seeking the nullification of mortgage deed and the extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings, as well as the cancellation of the mortgage deed annotation on TCT.
• In the complaint in that case, from which the present case stemmed, respondent as plaintiff,
averred that the mortgage deed was executed fraudulently and deceitfully to deprive
respondent of its right over the property and that the Cunanans are mortgagees in bad faith
since Civil Case No. 01-098 was still pending when the deed of real estate mortgage was
executed in their favor.
• On 16 April 2004, the RTC rendered its decision18 in favor of respondent.
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court per its decision

Issue:

Whether the Cunanans are bound by the notice of lis pendens which was ordered cancelled by the RTC.

Held:

• A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is
in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at
his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property.
• The filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the particular litigation
referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is
subject to the eventuality of the suit. Such announcement is founded upon public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the
court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.
• Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529,26 a notice of lis pendens shall be
deemed cancelled only upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the
action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof if there was a final
 judgment in favor of the defendant or the action was disposed of terminating finally all rights of
the plaintiff over the property in litigation.
• Given the antecedent facts in the present case, the Court should deny the petition.
• There is no question that the Register of Deeds cancelled the notice of lis pendens annotated on
TCT No. 213246 only on 23 July 2001 while the Cunanans and Carmencita executed the deed of
real estate mortgage three days before, or on 20 July 2001. The Cunanans are bound by the
notice of lis pendens because on the date they executed the mortgage deed with Carmencita
the annotation was still subsisting and had not yet been cancelled. The Order dated 18 July 2001
dismissing the complaint and directing the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens did not
improve the situations of the Cunanans simply because said Order was not registered at all and
therefore did not preclude the notice of lis pendens from continuing in effect.
• Neither did the issuance and registration of the amended Order dated 23 July 2001, although it
even commanded the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens apart from
containing the same directives as those in the 18 July 2001 Order. The simple reason this time is
the fact that the last order was issued after the execution of the mortgage deed. As the
mortgage had already been executed and therefore deemed valid and effective between the
parties as of the date of its execution, the Cunanans had taken a gamble on the result of the
litigation referred to in the notice of lis pendens when they accepted the properties as security.

ix.Blas v. Palma, G.R. No.L-15689, 29 April 1960

Facts:

• Petitioners filed a case against Rosalina Santos in her capacity as executrix of the estate of
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas to recover one-half of all the properties included in the inventory
submitted by the latter in the testate proceedings of said deceased. Pursuant to the provisions
of the Rules of Court, Petitioners, caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on all the
certificates of title covering the properties of the estate.

• After trial, judgment was rendered in said Case dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs reasonably
appealed from the adverse decision to the Supreme Court which was orally argued and
submitted for decision on May 8, 1959.
• While the case, was pending appeal in the Court, the executrix filed a motion to cancel the
notice of lis pendens on the lands on the ground that she had sold the said, to pay certain estate
and inheritance taxes due on the estate of Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.
• Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that respondent judge had no more jurisdiction
over the cases, except to deny the motion. Petitioners also contend that the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens, far from preserving the rights of the parties, would destroy and extinguish
the rights; that its cancellation would remove the lands from the jurisdiction of the trial court
and would render ineffective any judgment that may be rendered in their favor by the appellate
court, and that the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes was premature, because
petitioners’ claim, if sustained would considerably reduce said taxes.
 • Over petitioners’ opposition, respondent judge issued an order on July 14, 1955 directing the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens prayed for by the executrix upon the filing of a bond in
favor of petitioners in the amount of P142,000,00 subject to the approval of the Court.

Issue:

Whether the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens would destroy and extinguish the rights and would
remove the lands from the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Held:

• In holding that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on the petition for cancellation of lis
pendens on the two lots in question in spite of the appeal taken by petitioners to the Supreme
Court because its purpose is to protect and preserve the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal, the trial court made the following observation:
• "It is a settled rule that in the absence of a statutory prohibition, the Court has an inherent
power to cancel a notice of lis pendens even if the action is still pending and undetermined
when there are exceptional circumstances which justify such cancellation. (Mun. Council of
Parañaque, Rizal v. the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Et Al., 70 Phil., 363; Moran’s Vol. 1, p.
134, 1957 ed.)
• The situation as given above present exceptional circumstances and this Tribunal believes that
there will be no abuse of its discretion were it to grant the herein petition. This Court having
jurisdiction over the present Civil Action is duly bound to take judicial notice of the proceedings
held in Sp. Proc. 2524, and to assist the Probate Court in giving full force and effect to its Orders.
From the records it appears that the two fishponds in question were sold to pay principally the
estate and inheritance taxes due to the government which totalled P252,954.61.
• Non-payment of said taxes rendered the estate liable for surcharge, monthly interest, and other
penalties. As a matter of fact, the estate had actually to pay in addition to the assessed estate
tax of P159,774.64 the sum of P7,988.48 representing 5% surcharge plus P17,574.66
representing the 1% monthly interest. With respect to the inheritance tax of P93,179.97, the
estate has to pay in addition the sum of P4,659.00 as penalty plus another sum of P7,454.40
representing 1% interest per month from the date of the assessment to the date of payment.
• These facts clearly show that continued non-payment of said obligations to the Government
would have caused great prejudice to the estate. Considering, therefore, that the sale of the two
fishponds was absolutely necessary for the best interest of the estate, it is incumbent upon this
Court to aid there herein defendant in the fulfillment of her commitment that a clear and clean
title will be given to the purchasers, especially if we take into account that her account redounds
in the long run to the benefit of all those who have claims on said estate including the plaintiffs
herein."
• It is, therefore, not quite correct to say that the immediate sale of the two fishponds as
proposed by the executrix with the sanction of the court would promote the best interest of the
 estate for, as already stated, it may still result upon the final determination of the appeal that
the estate may have to pay much less in taxes which may in effect redound to the benefit of the
estate. In this sense, it is our opinion that the action taken by the trial court cannot be said to
come within the exemption of Section 9, Rule 41 and as such it cannot be legally justified.
• Moreover, as petitioners’ claim is over one-half pro-indiviso of all the properties involved in the
special proceedings, they may have some good sentimental reasons for opposing the disposition
of the two fishponds for which reason they want to maintain pending the annotation of lis
pendens on the titles covering them. At any rate, the main purpose of the rule is to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is over and since
the litigation is not yet terminated petitioners are entitled to have their right respected against
third persons. The reasons advanced by the trial court are, in our opinion, not sufficient in law to
nullify this protection to which petitioners are entitled.

x.Vicente v. Vera, G.R. No.169970, 20 January 2009

Facts:

• Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of the property in dispute. On October 1, 1987,
Rebuquiao executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners, spouses Protacio Vicente
and Dominga Vicente, over the property in dispute. Respondent Delia Soledad Avera alleges that
on October 9, 1987, Jose Rebuquiao, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney granted to him by
Jovencio Rebuquiao, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of
Roberto Domingo, Avera’s spouse at the time, and herself.
• On May 29, 1991, Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC. In
this case, Avera asserted exclusive ownership over the property in dispute. On January 23, 1992,
a notice of lis pendens was inscribed on TCT, pertaining to the JDRC case pending at the time.
• Since 1997, petitioners possessed the property in dispute. On July 22, 1998, TCT was cancelled, ,
the Registry of Deeds issued petitioners a new TCT, on the basis of the deed of sale executed on
October 1, 1987. The notice of lis pendens was carried over.
• On November 28, 1994, the RTC, rendered a Decision in the JDRC case, declaring the marriage of
Avera and Domingo void and ordering the property acquired during their cohabitation to be put
in the custody of Avera, including the property in dispute. After the decision in the JDRC case
became final and executory, the RTC, issued a Writ of Execution. On June 13, 2001, the same
trial court issued an Alias Writ of Execution.
• Pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution, respondent Ronberto Valino, in his capacity as Sheriff IV
of the RTC, served a Notice to Vacate dated August 15, 2001, on petitioners. On August 17,
2001, petitioners filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim before the RTC.
• On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order before the RTC, to enjoin Sheriff Valino from implementing the alias writ of
execution. On September 4, 2001, the trial court issued a TRO and, on May 29, 2002, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, enjoining respondents from enforcing the notice to vacate.
 • Defendants’ counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
• On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether injunction lies in favor of the petitioners to prevent the respondents from interfering in the
exercise of their rights over the property in dispute.

Held:

• A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It serves
to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending
resolution. While the notice of lis pendens remains on a certificate of title, the registrant could
rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation.
• Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the
land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. For this reason, the
Court has pronounced that a "purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact
that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of his vendor and
his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation."
• In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners’ title to the property in
dispute. A notice of lis pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where
the transferee who acquires land with a notice of lis pendens annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which case the transferee’s title
is subject to the results of the pending litigation.
• The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his
title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis pendens pertains to
the JDRC case, an action for nullity of the marriage between Avera and Domingo. Since
Rebuquiao’s title to the property in dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case,
petitioners’ title to the same property is also not subject to the results of the JDRC case.
• To determine whether the second requisite for granting a writ of injunction exists, that the act
against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of the complainant’s right, we must
examine the implications regarding the implementation of the writ of execution over TCT No.
14216. Pursuant to this writ of execution, Sheriff Valino served petitioners with a notice to
vacate.
• If allowed to be carried out, the act against which the injunction is directed, the implementation
of the writ of execution, would violate petitioners’ rights as the registered owners and actual
possessors of the property in dispute. The registered owner has the right to possess and enjoy
his property, without any limitations other than those imposed by law. The implementation of
the writ of execution would unduly deprive petitioners, as the registered owners, of their right
to possess the subject property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.
• We must stress that until petitioners’ title is annulled in a proper proceeding, Avera has no
enforceable right over the property in dispute. At this point, petitioners’ possession of the
subject property must be respected. Since Avera failed to prove her indubitable right over the
 subject property, we rule that petitioners possess a clear and unmistakable right over the
property in dispute that requires the issuance of a writ of injunction to prevent any damage to
their interests as registered owners.

xi.Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.142406, 16 May 2005

Facts:

• On April 23, 1996, petitioner Ma. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-contract to
sell with private respondent Saturnino Orden. In said contract, private respondent proposed to
purchase from Romero and her siblings a property located at Denver cor. New York Sts., Cubao,
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. The contract stipulated that private
respondent shall pay petitioner the amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute
sale, the balance of P10M not later than December 19, 1996 and that private respondent shall
shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property.
• When private respondent failed to pay the down payment, petitioner Corona told him that she
was rescinding the contract to sell. Private respondent then filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court alleging that he
has complied with his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to
demand from petitioners the performance of their obligation under the contract.
• Simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, private respondent caused the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens on TCT.
• On August 11, 1997, Manuel Y. Limsico, Jr. and Aloysius R. Santos, subsequent buyers of the
subject property sold by petitioner Corona and her siblings, filed a motion for leave to intervene
with the RTC and were admitted as defendants-intervenors. They filed a motion for the
cancellation of lis pendens which the RTC granted in its Resolution dated November 26, 1997.
• On November 16, 1998, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking
the nullification of the resolutions of the RTC and asked for the re-annotation of the notice of lis
pendens on the TCT. The CA granted the petition in its Decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation of the lis
pendens.

Held:

• No. Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control
which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action,
 and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to
keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated,
and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
• The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the
defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or
not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.
• While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power,
meanwhile, is exercised under express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if
the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the
annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
• Whether or not the claim of private respondent has merit is of no moment and should not affect
the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the subject property. There is nothing in the rules
which requires a party seeking annotation of lis pendens to show that the land belongs to him.
• There is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation must prove his right or
interest over the property sought to be annotated. Thus, we have held that even on the basis of
an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title.
• Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title based
on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect
similar to a lien. The rules merely require that an affirmative relief be claimed since a notation
of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It only protects the
applicant’s rights which will be determined during trial.

Petitions and Actions After OriginalRegistration

A.Sections 107 to 110

B.Reconstitution

1.RA No. 6732

2.RA No. 26

3.Distinguish: Judicial and Administrative

4.Cases:
a.Rivera v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No.107903, 22 May 1995

Facts:

• The reconstituted title involves a parcel of land with an area of sixty (60) square meters at
Pagsanjan, Laguna. This land was originally registered in the name of deceased souses Claudio
Gabalones and Benita Roldan.
• Allegedly, the Gabalones spouses sold the land to Generoso Reyes in 1947. The deed of sale was
not presented to prove the sale. Tax Declaration No. 4304 in the name of the Gabalones spouses
appears to have been cancelled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Generoso
Reyes for the year 1948.
• On April 22, 1969, the land was sold by Reyes to spouses Rogelio Taiño and Corazon Leron. The
transaction was covered by a deed of sale, duly registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna.
• On February 21, 1977, spouses Taiño sold the land to petitioner. The deed of sale executed by
the parties was also registered on September 11, 1981.
• On August 20, 1989, petitioner discovered that Paz Gabalones, one of the heirs of spouses
Gabalones (the original owners of the land), filed a petition for reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original title covering the subject land. Notwithstanding, petitioner failed to file an
opposition to the petition for reconstitution. The petition was granted and a reconstituted title
was issued.
• Petitioner then filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds which
was annotated on the title of the land. She also filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna for quieting of title and delivery of the reconstituted title.
• After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision 2 declaring petitioner as the
absolute owner of the subject land.
• Aggrieved by the ruling of the trial court, private respondent heirs appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
• On August 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court

Issue:

Whether the lot ceased to be registered when it was lost

Held:

• The fact that the title to the lot was lost does not mean that the lot ceased to be a registered
land before the reconstitution of its title. Reconstitution is simply the restoration of the
instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Indeed, the
order granting reconstitution of title confirms the fact that the subject land has been previously
registered and covered by a torrens title. As the subject land did not cease to be titled, it cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription. 6 To hold otherwise is to wreak havoc on the stability of
our torrens system.
 • Finally, the respondent court rightly rejected petitioner's invocation of the equitable principle of
laches. Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
• Laches thus amounts to an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an
acquiescence in them. 8 There is nothing in the records proving that private respondents,
despite discovery or knowledge of the successive transfer of their parents' land, omitted to
assert their claim over it for an unreasonable length of time. In the absence of this proof, laches
cannot be applied against private respondents.

b.Republic v. Mateo, G.R. No.148025, 13 August 2004

Facts:

• On April 30, 1997, spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga, Bataan a petition for "RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL COPY AS WELL AS THE
OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-38769" issued on July 16,
1971 by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan in the name of one Jose Tan.
• From the Mateos’ petition for reconstitution, it is gathered that Transfer Certificate of Title
covers two parcels of land forming part of Lot No. 979 of Bagac, Bataan Cadastre situated in
barrio Cabog-Cabog, Bagac, Bataan
• That they acquired from Jose Tan the above-described parcels of land by purchase on
September 3, 1978 by Deed of Sale dated September 3, 1978; that the original copy of TCT No.
T-38769 on file at the Registry of Deeds of Bataan is missing and could not be located despite
efforts to do so, hence, deemed lost; that while Lorenzo Mateo was in possession of the owner’s
duplicate copy of the title, "due to his frequent reassignment as a former military officer to
different places from 1978 up to his retirement on September 3, 1990, he misplaced said title
among his files, although he has a xerox copy "; and that despite efforts to locate the owner’s
duplicate copy of the title, the same proved futile and is now deemed lost.
• The Mateos’ Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s decision having been denied
• The CA accordingly rendered judgment in favor of the Mateos

Issue:

Whether Mateos’ petition for reconstitution fails

Held:

• The order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The
order may, however, be changed if necessary, in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of
the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the
judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.
• In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is
no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos’ petition for reconstitution fails.
 • In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or is no longer available, not
only is the photocopy of the alleged owner’s duplicate copy partly illegible. When, where and
under what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where it was kept to spare it from
being also "lost" were not even shown. These, not to mention the conduct by the Department of
Justice and NBI of an investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT caution and lead this
Court to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos’ evidence and propriety of a grant of their
petition for reconstitution.

c.Republic v. Lorenzo, G.R. No.172338, 10 December 2012

Facts:

• Concepcion Lorenzo and Orlando, Samuel, Juliet, Elizabeth, Rosela, Renato, Evelyn, all surnamed
Fontanilla, filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3980 before
the RTC covering a parcel of land in Echague, Isabela.
• They claimed that during his lifetime, Pedro Fontanilla and his spouse Concepcion Lorenzo
bought a parcel of land from Antonia Pascua and that a deed of sale was executed for the said
transaction. Hence, an Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 3980 was delivered unto the spouses
Pedro Fontanilla and Concepcion Lorenzo.
• They also averred that the owner's copy of the said title was eaten by termites while the original
copy of the title filed before the Register of Deeds of Isabela was burned when the latter was
razed by fire.
• The RTC granted the petition.
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed the RTC's Order of reconstitution of OCT No. 3980

Held:

• The relevant law that governs the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title
is Republic Act No. 26. Section 2 of said statute enumerates the following as valid sources for
judicial reconstitution of title: Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant
to which the original certificate of title was issued;
 (e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which the property, the description of which
is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
• As correctly pointed out by Republic, we had emphasized in Republic v. Holazo that the term any
other document in paragraph (f) refers to reliable documents of the kind described in the
preceding enumerations and that the documents referred to in Section 2(f) may be resorted to
only in the absence of the preceding documents in the list. Therefore, the party praying for the
reconstitution of a title must show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such documents and
failed to find them before presentation of other documents as evidence in substitution is
allowed.
• Furthermore, in a more recent case, this Court enumerated what should be shown before an
order for reconstitution can validly issue, namely: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered
owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same and those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of
title.
• In the case at bar, Lorenzo, et al. were unable to discharge the burden of proof prescribed by
law and jurisprudence for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title.
• Likewise, the deed of sale purportedly between Antonia Pascua, as seller, and Pedro Fontanilla,
as buyer, which involves OCT No. 3980 cannot be relied upon as basis for reconstitution of
Torrens certificate of title. An examination of the deed of sale would reveal that the number of
the OCT allegedly covering the subject parcel of land is clearly indicated, however, the date
when said OCT was issued does not appear in the document. This circumstance is fatal to
Lorenzo etal.s cause as we have reiterated in Republic v. El Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas that
the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of
title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of a
petition for reconstitution.

d.Republic v. Kiram, G.R. No.68303, 15 January 1988

Facts:

• The properties in dispute number three undivided lots [Lot No. 465-A; Bsd-864, CAD-159, Lot
No. 2408-A, Psd-864 (Lot 2457-Cad. 99), and Lot No. 2410-B, Psd-864 (Lot 2461 Cad 99)]
altogether consisting of a total of 1,024 hectares of ricelands.
• They are all located in Tiptipon, Panamao, Sulu. The title thereto stood allegedly in the name of
Sultan Jamalul Kiram, who died in 1936.
 • The private respondent, a niece of the late Sultan, now claims that the original certificate of title
(No. P-133) thereto was destroyed as a consequence of a fire that gutted the office of the
Register of Deeds of Sulu sometime in February, 1974. She likewise alleges that the owner's
copy thereof was lost on account of the same misfortune.
• On October 18,1979, she went to the then Court of First Instance of Sulu, Branch I, at Jolo, now
Regional Trial Court, the Honorable Jainal D. Rasul, District Judge, presiding, for reconstitution.
• The then Court of First Instance ruled for the private respondent, a ruling affirmed on appeal.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed the RTC's Order of reconstitution

Held:

• It shall be noted that a judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding.
Thus, notice of the proceedings must be done in the manner set forth by the letter of the law.
• It is futile for the private respondent, in connection with the charge that she failed to post the
notice at the main entrance of the municipal building, to invoke the fiction of "performance of
duty."
• The question that remains unanswered is whether or not she had in fact complied with the
requirement. The Court notes that all she presented was a certificate of service prepared by the
sheriff, embodying an order addressed to the Station Commander of Panamao, Sulu, to post the
proper notices and a certificate of publication in the Official Gazette. The order, however, of
posting forwarded by the sheriff to the local Station Commander is not proof that the Station
Commander had in fact complied with such an order. The presumption of "performance of
duty" cannot therefore apply. Republic Act No. 26 itself specifically calls upon the applicant to
submit proof of that posting. He cannot rely on the presumption. In this case, fiction must yield
to fact.
• The Republic cannot be faulted for nursing doubts about the private respondent's assertions. In
the first place, the private respondent claims that two deeds have been lost, the original and the
duplicate certificates of title. She furthermore relies on quite doubtful sources as bases for the
reconstitution sought, i.e., certain statutes making references to the properties. In such a case,
the courts are admonished to take utmost caution that the petition and the evidence presented
to support it can stand judicial scrutiny.
• This Court agrees with the Republic that the private respondent, based on the evidence, has not
sufficiently shown her right to a reconstitution. Neither Act No. 3430 nor Proclamation No. 1530
confers title to any party over the properties mentioned therein. On the other hand, Republic
Act No. 26 entitled, "An Act Providing A Special Procedure for The Reconstitution of Torrens
Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed," enumerates the sources on which the reconstituted
certificate of title may be based. It should be noted that both Sections 2 and 3 thereof list
sources that evidence title or transactions affecting title to property.
• When Republic Act No. 26 [Sec. 2(f)] therefore speaks of "[a]ny other document," it must refer
to similar documents previously enumerated therein. The statutes relied upon by the private
 respondent, so we hold, are not ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to.
Furthermore, they do not contain the specifics required by Section 12(a) and (b) of the title
reconstitution law.
• We, therefore, hold that for reconstitution purposes, the two pieces of legislation earlier
adverted to, Act No. 3430 and Proclamation No. 1530, are not enough to support the petition
for reconstitution. The private respondent must have sufficient proof that her predecessor-in-
interest had in fact availed himself of the benefits of the land grant the twin statutes confer.

e.TahananDevelopment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.55771, 15 November 1982

Facts:

• The heirs of Manuela Aquial filed a petition for reconstitution of title, original and owner’s
duplicate copy’ over lots 2 and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 docketed as 504-P. They alleged that
the copies of the said title were salvaged after the World War.
• The petition was given due course and it was set for hearing. Accordingly, publication of the
petition in the Official Gazette was made and notices of hearing were sent to the adjoining
owners except Tahanan who is not only an adjoining owner but also an owner and an actual
occupant as the 9 hectares portion of Tahanan’s land overlapped the land of the Pascuals
registered in the name of their predecessor Manuela Aquial.
• A decision was rendered granting the said petition.
• Tahanan filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied, hence, it filed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted.

Held:

• From the evidence submitted by the Director of Lands, it is officially and clearly shown that Plan
II-4374 was not among those salvaged after the last World War and subsequently microfilmed
during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy; that Plan II-4374 bearing Accession No.
385637 is not authentic and does not and has never represented any parcel of land property
surveyed and approved by the Director of Lands; that on July 17, 1972, Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the
then Chief of the Survey Records Division, certified that his division has no copy of Plan II-4374
and that on May 15, 1970, Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of
Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, the alleged source of data being Accession No. 195551 which,
however, turned out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land pertaining
thereto is the property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
 • Subsequent certifications issued by Anselmo Almazan, Chief, Survey Reconstruction Section,
Bureau of Lands dated November 24,1971 marked Exhibits "M" and "N" indicating the technical
descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 with Accession No. 385637 cannot be relied upon
because said plan was not among those salvaged after the last World War. Our ruling in
the Bernal case, 102 SCRA 370, 447 that "the technical descriptions cannot have two accession
numbers as sources thereof " stands.
• Incidentally, We must point out that the above official report (marked Exhibit "8") was
submitted to the Supreme Court in the Bernal case as Annex "A" to the Final Report of Amante
R. Dumag, Officer-In-Charge, NCR, Bureau of Lands, pp. 425-428, in compliance with Our
Resolution of September 25, 1979, which was accepted and approved by Us and admitted as
evidence of this Court. In the case at bar, it is part of the evidence of the oppositor Director of
Lands, admitted by the trial court and hence, reviewable on appeal in the petition at bar, he
being a respondent herein.
• The Torrens titles of petitioner Tahanan and the numerous transfers therefrom to innocent
purchasers for value must be respected and protected in order to achieve the "real purpose of
the Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land x x x and once a title is registered, the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in
the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land." (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65,
84; Legarda And Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102
SCRA 370, 451).

f.Angat v. Republic, G.R. No.175788, 30 June 2009

Facts:

• Federico and Enriquita filed before the RTC a verified Petition for the reconstitution of the
original copy of TCT No. T-4399 covering a 3,033,846-square meter parcel of land located in
Sapang, Ternate, Cavite, presenting the owners’ duplicate copy of said TCT in their possession.
Federico and Enriquita claimed that since 6 October 1955, the subject property has been
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite in their names, as the true and absolute owners
thereof, under TCT No. T-4399, covered by a certain plan PSU-91002.
• On 7 June 1959, the old Provincial Capitol Building housing the former office of the Register of
Deeds of Cavite was burned to ashes, totally destroying all the titles and documents kept inside
the office, including the original copy of TCT No. T-4399.
• According to Federico and Enriquita, the owners’ duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 was intact
and has been in their possession since the time of its issuance and up to the present. The
owners’ duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 has not been delivered to any other person or entity
to secure payment or performance of any obligation nor was any transaction or agreement
relative to said TCT presented or pending before the Registry of Deeds of Cavite when its former
office was burned. No other lien or encumbrance affecting TCT No. T-4399 exists, except the
right of Federico and Enriquita.
 • Federico and Enriquita attached to their Petition for Reconstitution a photocopy of their owners’
duplicate certificate of TCT No. T-4399.
• There being no oppositor nor written opposition, the RTC declared a general default against the
public.
• Finding the petition to be well-taken, hereby grants the same and orders the Register of Deeds
of Cavite Province to reconstitute the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399 as
shown on plan Psu-91002 in the name of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat.
• The Republic appealed the RTC Order dated 27 November 2000 to the Court of Appeals.
• The Court of Appeals found that Federico and Enriquita failed to prove that at the time the
original copy of TCT No. T-4399 was lost, they were the only lawful owners of the subject
property.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for reconstitution.

Held:

• One of the reasons why the Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the Petition for
Reconstitution of Federico and Enriquita was the lack of notice to the adjoining property
owners, which supposedly deprived the RTC of jurisdiction over the said Petition.
• Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732, allows the reconstitution of lost or destroyed
original Torrens title, to wit: SEC. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens
title. – Original copies of certificates of titles lost or destroyed in the offices of Register of Deeds
as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall be
reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26
insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in
case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as
determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority: Provided, That the number
of certificates of titles lost or damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number
in the possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, that in no case shall
the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five hundred (500).
• Based on the foregoing, reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title may be done
judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in Republic Act No. 26; or
administratively, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 6732. By filing the
Petition for Reconstitution with the RTC, docketed as LRC Case No. 1331, Federico and Enriquita
sought judicial reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, governed by Republic Act No. 26.
• The nature of the action for reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26,
entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of
Title Lost or Destroyed," denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have
been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purpose of such an action is
 merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it
was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same Republic Act No. 26 specifies the
requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of
a certificate of title. As we held in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, failure to comply
with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the
proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one,
Republic Act No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger
that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an
easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.

Consulta

A.Section117

B.Alfonso v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 150091, 2 April 2007

Facts:

• Petitioner Yolanda O. Alfonso (Alfonso), then the register of deeds of Caloocan City, was found
administratively liable for allegedly acquiescing to the change of the date of the registration of
OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that there were two
OCT Nos. 994. Consequently, she was dismissed from government service for grave misconduct
and dishonesty.
• Alfonso was investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon the request of Phil-Ville
Development Corporation (Phil-Ville) who purchased some parts of the land. Phil-Ville‘s letter-
complaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement which found that Alfonso acted
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith hence it recommended the filing of administrative
cases against her and her conspirators. On the other hand, LRA finds her guilty of Grave
Misconduct and recommended her dismissal.
• Upon review by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of the LRA decision, it recommended to the
Office of the President (OP) that Alfonso, a presidential appointee, be found guilty of Grave
Misconduct and Dishonesty and be dismissed from the service.
• Consequently, OP issued an Administrative Order ordering the dismissal of Alfonso. Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the Administrative Order. Alfonso came to Supreme Court to seek a
reversal of the CA‘s Decision and its Resolution affirming her dismissal ordered by OP.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding decision of the Office of the President because
Alfonso‘s right to due process was violated

Held:
• Alfonso was given every opportunity to explain her side and to present evidence in her defense
during the administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently show that in
compliance with the “show-cause” letter of the LRA Administrator, she submitted her written
explanation, and that during the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary evidence.
• Likewise, the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is only substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
• The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person indicted was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct. In the case at
bar, petitioner stood charged not for changing the date of registration of OCT No. 994 but
rather, she was indicted for acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting “certifications”
on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994; and (2) for making it appear that there were two OCT
Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she had no hand in the alteration are unavailing.