Case #66: DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS.

COURT OF APPEALS, 181 SCRA 450

Facts:
Gloria Cabral-Franco, applicant, sought to register a 104.9231-hectare parcel of land located in Sta.
Maria, Siocon, Zamboanga. According to the records, before 1921, two natives named Ulungkaya
Isla and Maud Calibugan had inherited a 45-hectare land (MOROLAND) in Sta. Maria, Siocon,
Zamboanga. In 1934, the Governor General of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 745 to
declare 1,064 hectares in Sirawai, Zamboanga as the Port Sta. Maria Teak Forest Reserve. Later on,
the two natives sold their land to Antonio Pichel who subsequently occupied a 59.9231 hectares land
east of MOROLAND and use it as Pasture Land. In 1948, Pichel sold MOROLAND to the applicant
and years later his heirs sold and assigned their rights over the Pasture Land. The applicant caused
the survey and subdivisionof the MOROLAND and Pasture Land. The Director of Lands opposed the
registration alleging that the subdivision plan of the applicant had overlapped lands under the Siocon
Public Land Subdivision, about 13 lots were found inside the applicant’s subdivision plan, three of
which were already patented and eight covered by subsisting public land applications.

The trial court find that the applicant has established an imperfect title to the subject land and ordered
its registration under the applicant’s name. The appellate court upheld the factual finding of the lower
court that the applicant has established her right of ownership over the Moroland and thus should be
entitled to have it registered in her name. The case was remanded to the lower court for the re-
surveying of the Moroland. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:
Whether the parcel of land subject to this Land Registration proceeding is private property.

Discussion:
Yes. Evidence is clear and convincing that the applicant is in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse,
notorious and public possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership from time
immemorial or at least more than 30 years as of the year 1934, the year a certain area was
proclaimed as forest reserve, by personally and her predecessors-in-interest, namely Ramon Pichel,
then the Calibugan brothers Ulangkaya and Maud, then to their grandfather. The testimony of
Faustino Cabral that in 1939, the oldest coconut trees found in the area were about 40 years old and
the mango trees about 50 years old which is corroborated by Juan Mendiola and Luis Demetillo.
These strong testimonial and documentary evidence to establish occupation and possession of the
land by the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have npt been discredited or destroyed. There
is no sufficient evidence on the part of the government has been presented to destroy or disprove the
presumption that the subject parcel of land is applicant’s private property by operation of law. So it
stands uncontroverted that the applicant has acquired a vested right over the land.

Held:
Wherefore, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Case #67: GOMEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 168 SCRA 503
Facts:
Jose Gomez filed an application to register several lots located in Bayambang, Pangasinan. The lots
were originally part of parcels of land that was adjudicated to Consolacion in another case,
Government of the Philippines Islands vs Abran. Jose and Luis are the heirs of Teodoro Gomez,
Consolacion’s son. Jose inherited the subject land after the death of Consolacion and Teodoro. Upon
the death of Teodoro, Luis Gomez, executed a quitclaim in his favor. The subject land was further
divided and such division duly approved by the Bureau of Lands.

After notice and publication and there being no opposition to the application, the RTC issued an order
of general default and granted the application. It promulgated judgment expressly ordering the
issuance of the decrees of registration. The judgment became final.

Later, respondent Perez, Chief of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
submitted a report to the RTC stating that some of the lots were already covered by homestead
patents. He recommended to set aside the RTC judgment. The RTC set aside its decision. Appellate
court dismissed its petition for certiorari and mandamus. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
Did the RTC err in settings aside its earlier order on account of Perez’ report?

Discussion:
No. Judgment in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final until after the
expiration of 1-year after the entry of final decree of registration. In several decisions held that as long
as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it. Here, the decree of registration hasn’t been even entered
yet.

Further, the duty of land registration officials to render reports isn’t limited to the period before the
court’s decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality until before the expiration of the
1-year period. Here, there’s nothing wrong with Perez submitting the report in the manner he did to
the RTC.

Also, Jose can’t use the Abran case to his advantage because the Abran case didn’t adjudicate to
Consolacion the lots covered by the homestead patent. The homestead patents were registered in
1928 while the Abran case was decided 1931. A homestead patent, once duly registered, becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title and may no longer be the subject of an
investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding.

Held:
Wherefore, the petition is denied. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs
against the petitioner-appellants.
Case #68: MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 84 SCRA 67
Facts:
Generoso Mendoza filed an application for the registration of two parcels of land, with a residential
house thereon, situated in Bulacan. During the pendency of the case, the same were sold to the
respondent spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, subject to the vendors' usufructuary
rights. The instrument embodying such sale was presented. The registration court rendered a
decision ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the vendees, subject to
the usufructuary rights of the vendors. Applicant-vendor, Generoso Mendoza, filed a motion for the
issuance of the decree. Thus, a decree was issued confirming the title to the land of vendees and
ordering the registration of the same in their names.

Later on, petitioner filed an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that the decision and the
decree be set aside and the Title be cancelled, on the ground that the vendees, the registered
owners, had failed to pay the purchase price of the lands.

The registration court set its decision. The registration court set aside its decision. It held that it did
not have jurisdiction to order registration in the names of respondents who were not parties to the
application for registration. The court then ordered registration in the name of petitioner.

Respondents went to the Court of Appeals which reversed the order of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether the registration court could not legally order the registration of the land in the names of the
vendees-respondents since they were neither the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration
case.

Held:
The Court disagreed.

Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the
registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the
person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time
between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.

The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer"
or the person to whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that
the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He may
thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1)
that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the
same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to
the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these
requirements have been complied with.

Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated requirements of the law, the Court of
Appeals did not, therefore err in holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to order the registration of
the lands in the names of vendees-respondents.

Held:
Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioner.
Case #69: RODRIGUEZ VS. TORENO, 79 SCRA 356
Facts:
Valentina Quinones owned a parcel of land in Davao City. On her death, Valentina was survived by
her children, namely, Maximina, Martiliano, Felix, Petra, Eugenia, Restituta and Ana, all surnamed
Bocase and all of whom are now deceased.
 Maximina died in 1940 and was survived by her children Sabina Toreno and Timoteo Toreno,
two of the herein respondents.
 Martiliano was survived by his children Eugenia Simplicia, Pedro, Bernardo and Gregoria, of
whom the latter four are some of the herein respondents.
 Felix was survived by his children Gliceria and the three minors Luciana Alejandro and
Lourdes who are likewise respondents.
 Petra died a widow and without any issue.
 Eugenia does not appear to have left any children.
 Restituta was survived by her 12 children who, like Ana's four children, are not parties to the
case at bar.

On July 9, 1958, the respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao, a complaint for
ejectment and damages against the petitioner, alleging basically that, together with their cousins, the
children of Restituta and Ana, they are pro-indiviso registered owners of the land covered by O.C.T.
No. 0-15; that in or about June 1953, the petitioner illegally, maliciously' and by means of force and
intimidation entered the land in question and occupied approximately 27,500 square meters thereof,
which portion, prior thereto, was in their possession as their share pursuant to a partition agreed upon
by the co-owners thereof. In his answer, the petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentine Quinones,
with the exception of Restituta and Ana Bocase had already sold their rights over the land covered by
O.C.T. No. 0-15 to him as early as 1941 and 1950 either through themselves or their successors in
interest, thus making him the rightful and legal owner of approximately 27,899 square meters thereof;
that he had been in the peaceful, continuous and public possession of the same; that there was no
then, encumbrance or adverse claim annotated on O.C.T. No 0-15 so that the series of sales made in
his favor, although not registered and annotated thereon, are valid and binding between the parties,
the said land not having passed to a third person; and that he had spent no less than P5,000.00 in
improving the land in question.

On October 31, 1960, after hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the
petitioner to vacate the land in question and to pay damages and costs. In due course, the petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 22, 1968, the Court of Appeal rendered its decision
finding the petitioner's claim "to the property in controversy untenable" and affirming, except for to
P550.00 the value of the coconut trees the petitioner had to reimburse the respondents, the appealed
judgment of the trial court.

Issues:
(1) Whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to an action filed after one year from the
issuance of the decree to compel reconveyance of the property in question;
(2) Whether the unrecorded deeds of sale between the parties are binding upon them and their
respective heirs.

Discussion:
(1) No. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was
wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens system from bringing an action, after one year
from the issuance of the decree for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action
does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who the registration of the questioned property is not the
real owner thereof.
(2) No. Even if the contracts executed by the respondents and their predecessor over the land
question in favor of the petitioner were genuine and bona fide purchase covenants, the same
however, lost for efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree of registration in
favor of the respondents. A cadastral court is a judicial proceeding in rem which, as such, binds the
whole world for the final judgment have settled the status of the subject land, and is barred from
further question under the principles of res judicata.

Held:
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 30053-R is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Case #70: VDA. DE BARROGA VS. ALBANO, 157 SCRA 131
Facts:
In a Cadastral Proceeding, the CFI rendered a decision adjudicating a parcel of land in Delfina’s
favor. One of the oppositors was Ruperta, declared in default. However, the decree of registration
didn’t issue until after 14 years and an OCT issued in Delfina’s name only after 24 years.

After the registration decree was issued but before the issuance of the OCT, Ruperta’s heirs,
petitioner Barroga, filed suit against Delfina’s heirs alleging possession of the land since 1941 and
they were the real owners thereof. Further, Delfina’s title encroached upon the land of Cesar Castro
and so the latter intervened in the case. The lower court dismissed Petitioner’s complaint and granted
Castro’s petition.

A motion for a writ of possession was submitted by the heirs of Delfina and was opposed by the

Delfina’s heirs motioned for a writ of possession that the Petitioner opposed. The lower court granted
the writ of possession. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:
Whether or not a writ of possession can still be enforced despite the considerable lapse of time.

Discussion:
Yes. The Court stated that the writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable
period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same
does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v.
loot.

The writ may correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-
interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the
declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of
possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least
as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest.

Held:
Wherefore, the appeal taken by appellants is dismissed and the orders of the Court a quo are
affirmed, as being in accord with the facts and the law. This decision is immediately executory, and
no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.
Case #71: BERNAS VS. NUEVO, 127 SCRA 399
Facts:
On February 17, 1981, the Heirs of Pascual Bellosillo and Francisca Besa, represented by Silvertre
Bellosillo, petitioners, filed a complaint against defendants Edilberto bernas, Baldonera Bulquirin and
Teofilo Berano for recovery of possession of a 33 1/3 hectare parcel of land known as Lot 3382 of the
Panay Cadastre and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restore the plaintiffs to the
possession of the land in dispute. The motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction was denied
but Judge Pelayo Nuevo granted the writ of possession. The motion for reconsideration was not
acted upon due to the retirement of Judge Nuevo. Judge Leviste, who assumed the position, acted on
the motion for reconsideration and issued an order declaring null and void the writ of possession
issued by former Judge Nuevo.

In G.R. No. 58438, the petitioners (Bernas) main contention is that the respondent Judge Nuevo
acted in excess of jurisdiction when he granted the writ of possession. On the other hand, the
petitioners (Bellosillo) in G.R. No. 60423 maintain that respondent Judge Leviste acted in excess of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion for questioning the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
possession.

Issues:
Whether or not the writ of possession granted to the Heirs of Pascual Bellosillo is proper.

Discussion:
No. It is a settled rule that when parties against whom a writ of possession is sought have been in
possession of the land for at least 10 years, and they entered into possession after the issuance of
the final decree, and none of them had been a party in the registration proceedings, the writ of
possession will not issue. A person who took possession of the land after final adjudication of the
same in the registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession
regardless of any title or lack of title of persons to hold possession of the land in question, they cannot
be ousted without giving them their day in court in proper independent proceedings. In the case at
bar, Bernas had been in possession of the lot since 1960 under an alleged lease contract and were
not a party to the original registration case in 1930, notwithstanding the writ of possession was issued
after pre-trial and hearing and not after final adjudication of the rights of the parties over the lot in
controversy. Therefore, it was a patent error on the part of Judge Nuevo to issue the writ. The remedy
should be is to resort to the court of justice and institute a separate action for unlawful entry or
detainer or for reinvidicatory action. Only after judgment has been rendered can the prevailing party
secure a writ of possession to enforce his right over the disputed lot.

Held:
Wherefore, the order of Judge Pelayo Nuevo I reversed and set aside. The orders of Judge Oscar
Leviste are also reversed and set aside. As a matter of right, the petitioner-defendants should remain
in possession of Lot No. 3382 pending final adjudication of the respective rights of both petitioners.
No costs.
Case #72: RAMOS VS. RODRIGUEZ, 244 SCRA 395
Facts:
Feliciano Ramos, applied for registration of a parcel of land in San Jose, Rizal, identified as Lot 125-
B.

July 28, 1988  RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, rendered a decision adjudicating the said
lot to Ramos.

Sep. 12, 1988

- The same court, issued an “Order of Issuance of Decree” stating its July 28, 1988 decision has
become final and executory.
- The same court directed the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA), to prepare the decree pursuant to Sec. 39 of PD No. 1529 and prepare the
certificate of registration.

Instead of issuing the said certificate, NLTDRA through its administrator Teodoro Bonifacio:
- Submitted a report dated Sep. 26, 1988, recommending that the decision made on July 28,
1988 be set aside since Lot 125-B was already covered by an existing TCT (TCT #8816),
issued on October 29, 1984, in the name of Payatas Estate Improvement Company.

The Ramos claimed that the said TCT was fraudulent but they failed to present any evidence in
support of such allegation.

The RTC, on the other hand, contend that it cannot set aside its decision on July 28, 1988 since it
already became final and executory. It added that the proper remedy of the government was an
action for annulment of judgment.

Teodoro Bonifacio, through the chief legal officer of the LRA, filed a motion for reconsideration.

Mar. 29, 1990

- “The court quo” [wala ko kahibaw unsa nang court quo, whether CA bah or lain na RTC]
issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration. It also denied Ramos’ application for
registration and sets aside the decision made on July 28, 1988.
- The court noted that the subject lot was covered by an existing TCT and that no final decree
has yet been issued by the LRA

Issues:
Whether or not a final and executory decision, after a lapse of more than 15 days, of a Trial Court
acting as the Land Registration Court, can be validly set aside?

Discussion:
The Supreme Court held that unlike any ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral
or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until the
expiration of 1 year after the entry of the final decree of registration.

As long as the final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now
NLTDRA) and the period of 1 year has not yet elapsed from the date of such entry of the decree, the
title is not yet finally adjudicated and the decision of the registration proceeding continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

Petitioner Ramos Contends:

- The issuance of the decree of registration and the certificate of title by the LRA is a ministerial
duty which follows of course the order of the court directing it to issue said decree.

The SC held:
Citing the case of Gomez --- The role of the LRA is ministerial in the sense that they act under the
orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court.

However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree,
it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect as officials of the court and not
as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically upon to extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.

In the case at bar:

Adminstrator Teodoro Bonifacio filed his report to the court precisely to inform the court that NLTDRA
cannot comply with its order since the subject lot was already registered and titled in the name of the
Payatas Estate. Under this circumstances, the LRA is not legally obliged to follow the court’s order.

Petitioner Ramos Contends:

- Petitioner contends that a decision by the court cannot be set aside upon the mere motion for
reconsideration filed by the LRA, the motion must be properly brought before the court by the
Solicitor General.

The SC held:
Under the Administrative Code of 1987 – the Solicitor General is bound to represent the Government
in all land registration and related proceedings. However, PD 1529, section 6, specifically enumerates
the function of the Commission of the Land Registration, the same law did not in any way, took away
LRA’s power to make the representation the same as that of the Solicitor General in land registration
proceedings.

Even granting that there are procedural lapses that have been committed in the proceedings. These
may be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice.

Furthermore, the SC held that this controversy could have been avoided hand the proper procedure
in the land registration proceeding was observed. The court should have rendered its decision only
after considering the evidence and the reports of the Commissioner of the Land Registration and the
Director of Lands.

If a faster disposition of the proceedings were really desired, the court could have wielded its power in
the office of the LRA to speed up its investigation, report and recommendation.
Case #73: MELGAR VS. PAGAYON, 21 SCRA 841
Facts:
Issues:
Discussion:
Held:

Case #74: YLARDE VS. LICHAUCO, 42 SCRA 641

Facts:
Crisanto Lichauco and the Nable Jose sisters filed in the Court of Land Registration an application for
registration of lands in hacienda El Porvenir in Pangasinan. Oppositions were filed by 150 individuals.
The SC granted the registration. The Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Lichauco and Noble
Jose sisters. Both the decree of registration and the original certificate of title (OCT) were based on a
plan prepared by Aurelio Rocafull. The Director of Lands found it impossible to properly locate the
properties covered by the OCT. The descriptions and surveys were of doubtful accuracy. The owners
were required to point out to the surveyor on the ground the actual boundaries of their lands. A new
survey of the land was made by an authorized private surveyor Garcia. The court approved the new
plan but later on set aside the approval for lack of publication and notice. Government and oppositors:
The Garcia plan included lands of public domain covered by free patent application. The court
rejected the opposition and approved the Garcia plan. The records of the case were destroyed as a
result of the battles for liberation. The lower court ordered the Director of Lands to resurvey in
accordance with the Rocafull plan. The survey was executed by surveyor Llobera of the Bureau of
Lands whose plan was approved. The petitioners did not appeal. Petitioners filed a motion to proceed
with the hearing of the registration case on the merits on the ground that the approval of the Llobera
relocation survey plan did not necessarily adjudicate or vest upon the applicants the title to the land or
bring to an end the litigation. The lower court denied the motion.

Issues:
WON the lower court erred in issuing the orders which denied the motion of petitioners to proceed
with the hearing on the merits that would require the applicants to prove their title to the land subject
of the registration proceedings and the petitioners to present evidence of their claims to certain
portions of the land.

Discussion:
No. First, the Hacienda “El Porvenir” is covered by the Decree of Registration which binds the land,
quiets title, is conclusive upon all persons, and cannot be reopened or reviewed after the lapse of 1
year after entry of the decree. Second, petitioners are the heirs of the original private oppositors
whose claims and rights had been foreclosed by the decree of registration. It follows that the present
oppositors’ pretended rights have also been barred. The motion of herein petitioners for hearing on
the merits is based on their erroneous conception of the nature of the Llobrera survey and the
proceedings in the lower court. The Llobrera survey was not really a new survey but only a relocation
survey that should follow the old corners used in the former survey in order to approach the same
area and configuration. The Llobera Plan was more or less a reproduction of the Rocafull plan.

Held:
In view of the foregoing, the instant petition is dismissed, and the writs prayed for are denied, with
costs against the petitioners.
Case #75: AVILA VS. TAPUCAR, 201 SCRA 148
Facts:
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a parcel of land situated at
Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. In 1965, said property was inherited by private
respondents Julito Bahan, Cristina Bahan-Panis, Lucita Carters, Boy Cartera and Candelaria Bahan-
Mendoza as successors-in-interest. On October 11, 1960, petitioner Magdalena Avila (then Mrs.
Magdalena R. Vda. de Leon) bought a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan
del Norte, containing an area of 4,371 square meters more or less from Luis Cabalan and his wife
under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and under Tax Declaration No. 3055. On
November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan filed Free Patent
Application. The Deputy Public Land Inspector Francisco stated that the heirs of Pedro Bahan
have cultivated only 2.2500 hectares of land applied for and consequently, he did not
recommend the issuance of the patent. Said report was erroneously forwarded to the Bureau
of Lands by then Acting Assistant District Land Officer of Butuan City dated December 23,
1971, recommending the issuance of patent therefor. In May 1973, private respondent Julito
Bahan together with ten persons gathered coconuts from the land purchased by petitioner Magdalena
Avila but was intercepted by the Chief of Police. Private respondents Bahans filed an action for
quieting of title and damages with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. He
alleged that he discovered that the northwestern portion of said land containing an area of about 1/3
of a hectare was already in the possession of the Avilas; and the latter were harvesting the fruits of
about 40 coconut trees found therein. Petitioners Avila argued that Magdalena Avila purchased a
parcel of land situated from Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same. Subsequently, private respondents Bahans took
advantage of the Avilas' absence in the premises and was able to gather 354 fruits of the coconut
trees on the disputed land which produce costs about P300.00 more or less.

Thus, Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary writ of injunction. In the meantime, private respondents
Bahans' application for free patent was approved. Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. granted Avilas'
motion for writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and ordering the Bahans to refrain and desist from
gathering or continue harvesting the fruits. On March 13, 1974, O.C.T. No. P-8424 issued to the
Bahans was transcribed in the registration book for the Province of Agusan del Norte. Avilas then
filed an administrative protest against the Bahans before the Bureau of Lands for having erroneously
included their land under the issued free patent and Original Certificate of Title, which protest was
filed 11 months after the issuance of the patent and 7 months and 3 days after the registration
of the Certificate of Title. Bureau of Lands issued an Order in favor of Avilas and that the lot
rightfully belong to the Avilas. Due to this favorable judgment, Avilas filed an opposition to the motion
for dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction. However, Judge Lauro L. Tapucar issued an Order
Dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction. The MR filed by Avilas was subsequently denied by the
court.

Issues:
Whether or not the Order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent judge is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction?

Discussion:
Admittedly, the Bahans are the successors-in-interest of a parcel of coconut land containing an area
of about 1,8340 square meters situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. On the other
hand, the Avilas are the purchasers for value of a 4,371 square meters lot situated in the same place
and are in possession of aforesaid property since 1960. The Order of January 14, 1974 granting a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued for the purpose of enjoining the Bahans to cease and desist
from harvesting the fruits on the land possessed by the Avilas until the final determination of the suit
for quieting of title between the parties. The subsequent erroneous approval of the application for free
patent for 6.9027 hectares in favor of the Bahans (the land which rightfully pertains to the Avilas being
embraced and included therein), the issuance of Free Patent No. 552571 and Original Certificate of
Title No. P-8424 in favor of the Bahans during the pendency of the case for quieting of title does not
call for dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction since the property in the possession of the
Avilas would be placed in the hands of the Bahans, pending final outcome of the action between
them. Such transfer of property in litigation from the possession of one party having
possession asserting ownership thereto would be pre-determinative of the main case.
Dissolution of the writ due to mere presentation by the Bahans of an Original Certificate of Title in
their names while the case is on going is erroneous. The sole object of a preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard. The argument that the Bahans' title to the property has become indefeasible and
incontestable is a prejudgment and uncalled for inasmuch as the parties have not as yet
finally rested their cases and the trial is still in progress. While land registration is a proceeding
in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens
Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. If a
person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which
can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included"

Held:
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Orders of respondent judge are annulled and set
aside and the writ of Preliminary Injunction is reinstated and to remain effective until the final
determination of the case.