Week 15

              c.     With provisions of the Constitution

Defensor Santiago vs COMELEC, GR No. 127325, Mar 19, 1997

Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, (G)
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:
 December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend
the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
 Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman,
issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature
form, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general
circulation at his own expense and setting the case for hearing on 12 December
1996 at 10:00 a.m.
 December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.
 December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition
raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it
failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
 December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition and issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC
from proceeding with the Petition, and private respondents conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
 January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the
petition. They argue therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law
implementing the power of people initiative to propose amendments to the
constitution.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to
include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so,
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:
 No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation.
 First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section
2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought.
That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions."
 Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of
initiative, and that Section 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike
in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution.
 Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III),
no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735
to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in
the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
 d.     With provisions of Ordinances

Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, GR No. L-26702, Oct

18, 1979

FACTS:

Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged
with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a
truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and
prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent
from enforcing the said ordinance.

ISSUE:

W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,

Pangasinan is valid.

HELD:

No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of

Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No.
4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general
rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite
for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is
fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state.

  White Light Corp vs City of Manila, GR No. 122846, Jan 20, 2009
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate
Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of
Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC)
filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City
alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October
20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and
void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police

power

Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been

purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet
all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as
the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of
the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.  Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within
the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align
with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people. 
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons
of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is
subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this
is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power
whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

e.     Incompatibility of general and special laws

Duque vs Veloso, GR No. 196201, June 19, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent, then District Supervisor of Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee

Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City, was administratively charged
with three (3) counts of dishonesty in connection with his unauthorized
withdrawals of money deposited by Juanito Quino (complainant), a client of
Quedancor. The complainant applied for a restructuring of his loan with
Quedancor and deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Quedancors cashier for
his Manila account. In three (3) separate occasions, the respondent, without
notice and authority from the complainant and with the assistance of
Quedancor's cashier, managed to withdraw the P50,000.00 deposit. Upon the
discovery of the withdrawals, the complainant demanded the return of the
money and called the attention of the manager of Quedancor in Cagayan de
Oro City, who issued to the respondent a memorandum requiring him to
explain the withdrawals and to return the money.

From the established facts, the respondent was charged by Quedancor with
dishonesty, and was subsequently found guilty of the charges and dismissed
from the service. The CSC affirmed the findings and conclusions of Quedancor
on appeal.

Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor and the CSC, the
respondent elevated his case to the CA which adjudged him guilty of
dishonesty, but modified the penalty of dismissal to one (1) year suspension
from office without pay.

The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the applicable law and jurisprudence
which penalize the offense of dishonesty with dismissal from the service. The
CSC also argues that there are no mitigating circumstances to warrant a
reduction of the penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not dishonesty is the proper administrative penalty to be

imposed on the respondent?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: civil service; termination of employment

Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty imposed by Section 52(A)
(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a
first offense. The aforesaid rule underscores the constitutional principle that
public office is a public trust and only those who can live up to such exacting
standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. It is true that
Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules provides the application of mitigating,
aggravating or alternative circumstances in the imposition of administrative
penalties. Section 53, Rule IV applies only when clear proof is shown, using the
specific standards set by law and jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case
justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalty.

While in most cases, length of service is considered in favor of the respondent,

it is not considered where the offense committed is found to be serious or
grave; or when the length of service helped the offender commit the infraction.
The factors against mitigation are present in this case.

The circumstance that this is the respondent's first administrative offense

should not benefit him. By the express terms of Section 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules, the commission of an administrative offense classified as a
serious offense (like dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal from the service
even for the first time. In other words, the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV
does not consider a first-time offender as a mitigating circumstance. Likewise,
under statutory construction principles, a special provision prevails over a
general provision. Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, a general provision
relating to the appreciation of mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances, must thus yield to the provision of Section 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules which expressly provides for the penalty of dismissal even for
the first commission of the offense.

We reject as mitigating circumstances the respondent's admission of his

culpability and the restitution of the amount. As pointed out by the CSC, the
respondent made use of the complainants money in 2001 while the restitution
was made only in 2003, during the pendency of the administrative case against
him. Under the circumstances, the restitution was half-hearted and was
certainly neither purely voluntary nor made because of the exercise of good
conscience; it was triggered, more than anything else, by his fear of possible
administrative penalties. The admission of guilt and the restitution effected
were clearly mere afterthoughts made two (2) years after the commission of the
offense and after the administrative complaint against him was filed. With
these circumstances in mind, we do not find it justified to relieve the
respondent of the full consequences of his dishonest actions.

Thus, the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public
officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated
in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments.
They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service.

Manzano vs Valera, GR No. 122068, July 8, 1998

At issue in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with temporary

restraining order is the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court in a case for
criminal libel. It seeks to enjoin respondent Judge of the MTC in Bangued,
Abra from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 5728, for alleged lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner further prays for the nullification of the Order dated
August 2, 1995[1] issued by the respondent Judge and the subsequent Order
dated August 30, 1995[2] denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On June 2, 1994, a criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of
respondent Judge against Juanito Manzano (herein petitioner), who was then
Senior Police Officer 1. Complainant (now private respondent) Vilma Bobila,
who was then an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, charged that
with malicious intent to expose her to public ridicule, Manzano caused "to be
entered and written in the PNP, Bangued Police Station Blotter (a public record)
a (sic) false, malicious and highly defamatory statements against (Bobila) and
with no good intentions or justifiable motive for preparing and writing the
same."[3] The complaint in sum contained an account of the entry in the police
blotter, which was the alleged source of the libelous matter. Allegedly in the
blotter, Bobila was made to appear as having made grave threats against SPO1
Manzano when she visited the police station and when she uttered threatening
remarks against him, a portion of which we quote as follows:

"ADDANTO PANAGPATINGGAYO NGA KASTA NGATATTAO, and at the same

time she allegedly raise (sic) her palm and made a sign across her neck which
according to said reported (sic) it was a clear sign she wants somebody among
the BPP personnel be (sic) killed."[4]
On October 24, 1994, the respondent Judge initially recognized that the
Regional Trial court (RTC) had jurisdiction and forwarded the records to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. However, upon receipt of the records,
Prosecutor Edgardo Flores invoking the amendment in Paragraph 2, Section 32
of B.P. 129 which is now also Section 2 of Republic Act 7691,[5] opined that
the MTC should take cognizance of the case. A month later, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Ricarte Valera requested that the records of the case be
returned to the MTC. Upon the MTC's acceptance of the case, petitioner filed a
motion to Dismiss, invoking no jurisdiction over the offense charged.[6] A twist
took place when the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor was required to file a
comment on the aforesaid Motion to Dismiss. Instead of arguing to retain the
case in the MTC, he changed the stand of the prosecution. In his Comment, he
supported petitioner's arguments and asked that the entire records of the case
be elevated to the RTC. He cited libel as one of the offenses outside the scope
and jurisdiction of inferior courts, following Jalandoni vs. Endaya (55 SCRA
261) wherein this court ruled that the Court of First Instance (now RTC) has
the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases.[7] In spite of this, respondent
Judge denied[8] the Motion to Dismiss and thereafter also denied[9] the Motion
for Reconsideration. Petitioner went for a final attempt by filing his Last
Appeal[10] which was likewise denied.[11]

In holding that the MTC had jurisdiction, respondent Judge made reference to
RA 7691 which according to him, amended Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code.[12] Furthermore, he opined that although Section 6 RA 7691[13] does
not specifically state what laws fall within the scope of the amendment, the
provision on jurisdiction over libel being inconsistent with the new enactment,
the code should now be considered amended.

Hence this petition.

In a Resolution of this Court dated October 23, 1995, respondents were

required to file a comment on the petition; and in the same resolution,
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order was
granted. On November 8, 1995, respondent Judge filed his comment simply
reiterating his opinion as stated in his questioned Order. On March 12, 1996,
the Office of the Solicitor general as counsel to public respondent, also filed its
comment. By way of reply, petitioner submitted a copy of the provincial
prosecutor's comment on the motion to dismiss; petitioner adopted the
prosecution's position as his own.

The sole issue here concerns jurisdiction over a complaint for libel. Specifically,
is it the RTC or the MTC which has exclusive original jurisdiction?

Public respondent contended that the applicable law is RA 7691 which

amended certain provisions of BP 129, specifically Section 32, expanding
jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does
not exceed six (6) years. He further argued that RA 7691 should control as it is
the later enactment. Worth noting, the Office of the Solicitor General capped its
Comment in this wise:

"While, indeed, R.A. 7691 excludes from the MTC's expanded jurisdiction those
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and the
Sandiganbayan, there is nothing in B.P. 129 nor in any other subsisting law
that expressly confers exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases on the
latter courts. As such, libel cases are not excluded from the expanded
jurisdiction of the municipal courts."[14]

Public respondent also wished to impress upon this Court that since the
penalty for libel as found in Article 355 of the RPC is prision correcional in its
minimum and medium periods and that prision correcional has a range from
six months and one day to six years,[15] then it is the penalty that is to be
followed in determining the proper jurisdiction over libel cases. Moreover,
considering the fact that there is nothing in the amendment which properly
excludes crimes such as libel from the application of the new law, he argued
that libel falls within the scope of the aforementioned provision of RA 7691.

We find merit in the petition at bar. Respondent's position is not legally

tenable.
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,[16] which
categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the
Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No.
123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red[17]
wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that case, the
MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due
to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent
judge's orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court's Orders dated

August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null
and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is
enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition."[18]

Another case[19] involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter:

"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by

public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional
Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is
punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two
months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged
within the Municipal Trial Court's jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32
[2]), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly
cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts
have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel
cases."[20]
Conformably with this rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed
an error in ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of
Bangued.

For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the
Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said
law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter
the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws vesting
jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and
should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts
(such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law."[21] A later
enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law,
because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of
the dates of their enactment.[22] Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the
RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC.[23]

Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest

intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent,
then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because implied
repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.[24] Furthermore, for
an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict
should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and
old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible.[25] In the law
which broadened the jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute
prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain
cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive
jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained
in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129.[26] The inconsistency
referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691,[27] therefore, does not apply to cases of
criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court
delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with
finality:

"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY,

CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN
LIBEL CASES.

XXX XXX XXX

"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING

JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." (Underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED; the respondent court's orders

dated August 2 and august 30, 1995 are declared NULL and VOID for having
been issued without jurisdiction; and said court is permanently enjoined from
further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 5728, as it
is now commanded to FORWARD the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial court of Abra for proper disposition.

(Manzano vs. Valera G.R. No. 122068 July 08, 1998)

This decision, and more, can be found at

https://www.digest.ph/decisions/manzano-vs-valera