Lambino Vs.

Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the
support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition
changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by
adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of
government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion
on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it
is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Political Law Separation of Powers
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then,
upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused
the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed
local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18
Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having
been untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of
the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore
beyond the power of peoples initiative. The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is
pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
Delfin petition. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC.
The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely
entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. Being so, the Supreme Court can then
take cognizance of the petition for prohibition filed by Santiago notwithstanding Rocos petition.
COMELEC did not even act on Rocos petition. In the final analysis, when the system of
constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can
save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. It must be
recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and
the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days
their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing;
and by setting the case for hearing.

March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its
approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.)caused the
necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local
election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec
1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by
Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives
on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution
but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution
provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered
voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right
This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress.
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2,
Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC
ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute
resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already
given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and
adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis. See discussion here

Political Law Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its
approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.)caused the
necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local
election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec
1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in
power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of
peoples initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does
it constitute a revision.
HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a
political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although
the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which,
by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and
local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to
as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence,
to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

Gonzales vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967

Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and
PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On
March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions
(Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that
each province shall have at least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the
general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in
Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval
by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of
elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for
said election.

Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law.
PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD:

1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision
that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The
Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.

2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action
taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by
the Court.


Javellana vs. executive secretary 50 scra 33
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana,
a Filipino and aregistered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from
implementing the saidconstitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the
same was initiated by thepresident.He argued that thePresidentis w/o power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposedconstitution. Further, the election held to ratify
such constitution is not a freeelectionthere being intimidationand fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD:
The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar.Majorityof the SC justicesexpressedthe
view thatthey were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in
the exercise of hispolitical prerogatives. Further, there being nocompetentevidence to show such
fraud and intimidation during the election,it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of thevalidity of the 1973 Constitution is a political
question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity toanswer. Their ratification of the
same hadshownsuch acquiescence

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP
and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland
According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is
vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first
nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by
the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain andAncestral Lands of
the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its internal waters.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters
of public concern.
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be BINDING itself.
6. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato,
Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon,
Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro
Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutional
Held:
Issue 1:
The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and
academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the
exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact
that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Issue 2:
Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter
for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under
E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.
Issue 3:
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act ofguaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse
lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a
state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Issue 4:
Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An essential element of this right
is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to
information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived
such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the
MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Issue 5:
No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It
would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not
parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under
international law.
Issue 6:
Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North
Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the
future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any
form. These petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine
immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases.
Issue 7:
Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present
constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The
associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening
petitions.
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP
Province of North Cotabato vs.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)
G.R. No. 183591
Chico, Nazario, J.:
Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by
the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points
reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its
constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?
Held: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The
MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece
of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of
violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no
more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for
resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of
opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A
justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in
that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree
that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great
public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public
opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not
for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of
government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the
fundamental principles of constitutional law.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable
under the law of Karma.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh
Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation,
with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that
all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could
continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by
the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by
the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of
insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any
other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial
proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it
could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation
of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal
words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that
judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by
the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the
Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of
Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF
SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws
and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts
may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of
the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon
them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no.
3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even
during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and
control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the
rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon75 Phil 113Feria, J.FactsThe respondent judge of the
lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceeding of civil case No. 3012 of said
court which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established
during the Japanese military occupation of thePhilippines. He argued that the proclamation issued
by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effectof invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgements of the courts of the saidgovernments. He also argued that the said governments during
the Japanese occupation were notde facto governments.IssueWhether or not the governments
established in the Philippines under the names of PhilippinesExecutive Commission and Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupationor regime were de
facto governments.HeldThe Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission which was
organized byOrder No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government
established by themilitary forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second
kind. The sourceof its authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a government imposed by
the laws of war.The same is true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently established and
organized as asovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in
truth andreality, a government established by the Japanese forces of occupation.

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged
that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known
as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed,
with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to
avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition
for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of
his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely,
the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987
constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake
of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test:
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public
trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his
alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent
of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time
during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
Jan Michael A. Rivera
02-16779 / 1-B

Case Digest of Estrada vs. Desierto (March 2, 2001)
Petitioner: Joseph E. Estrada
Respondents: Aniano Desierto (GR#146710-15) et al. and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GR#146738)
Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Republic of the
Philippines by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Ponente: Justice Puno
Facts:
The court looked at the events that occurred prior and immediately after the oath-taking of
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (to be referred to in the rest of the digest as GMA) as
president of the Republic of the Philippines (RP).
On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to as Erap) was
elected as President of RP with GMA as his vice-President. By the late 2000, word spread of Eraps
alleged involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses
popularity among different social groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting
from his agendas. And because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7
December 2000. Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of
the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with
P3.3billion in secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and
joined the rallying of people in the streets of Manila.
Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as candidate, to regain
stability in the country but such a move did little to quell the wave against him. Two rounds of
negotiations were held between Eraps camp and that of GMA in the early hours of 20 January 2001
and at 12nn of the same day, GMA took her oath as RP president. Both houses of Congress
acknowledged her presidency, as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left
Malacanang and is now faced with legal action against him by the Office of the Ombudsman among
other things.

Issues:
1) Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy
2) Whether petitioner Estrada resigned as President
3) If the petitions are justiciable, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an acting President
4) Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada
5) Whether petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity

Held:
1) Yes
2) Yes, impliedly
3) No
4) No
5) No

Ratio Decidendi:
1) While the 1987 EDSA People Power Movement is considered by the Court as a non-justiciable
event, EDSA 2, as it has come to be known, is very much different from the 1987 EDSA People
Power Movement (EDSA 1). EDSA 1 is extra-constitutional, hence, there would be no legal basis if
such an event was put to the courts. EDSA 2, on the other hand, is intra-constitutional as it is
based on the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and assembly. Even in GMAs
oath-taking ceremony, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution.
2) The Court used a Totality Test as an authoritative window to ascertain petitioner Estradas
state of mind on this issue. On reading the then Executive Secretary Angaras diary published in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly resigned because 1) he did not
want to be a candidate in the proposed snap elections, 2) he did not object to Senator Pimentels
dignified exit proposal, and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week left to stay in the
Palace. Also, from what the court eventually calls his resignation letter, Erap 1) acknowledged
GMAs oath-taking as President, 2) he did not mention any intent on re-assuming his position as
President, and 3) his gratitude in the letter is on a past opportunity he served as President.
On his defense, Erap cites sec. 12 of Republic Act 3019 which states that a public officer cannot
resign pending legal action, in this case the impeachment trial. A reading of history tells the Court
that the intention of Congress in passing such provision is merely to prevent public officials from
escaping liability to stop pending investigation. It does not apply to petitioner.
3) The law states that Congress has the sole authority to say whether a President is incapable of
performing the duties required of him of his office. Given the resolutions passed by Congress
immediately after GMAs oath-taking and the fact that both houses filed bills signed by GMA into
law, the Court recognizes that petitioners inability to perform was permanent and also, the Court
would have no jurisdiction to change the decision already done by Congress on his capacity as
President.
4) Regarding immunity from suit, history shows us that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did
not retain the 1973 Constitution provision on executive immunity. Also, the Impeachment court has
become functus officio. It is, then, untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
5) As for a prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the present case. Case law will tell us that a
right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since
our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that petitioner did
not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so
as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against petitioner
were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and
less with prosecutuion.
CO KIM CHAM vs. ESEBEUIO VALDEZ TAN KEH
75 phil. 113, September 27, 1945




FACTS:
Co Kim Cham had a pending case that was filed during the period of Japanese occupation.
He filed a petition of Mandamus, in which he is requesting for the judge of the lower court to
continue the proceedings in the Court of First Instance in Manila. But Judge Arsenio P. Dizon
refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings of the said case since the proclamation
issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur invalidating and nullifying the judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines, in the absence of an enabling law, the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts while the government is under the occupation of the Japanese.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid.
2. Whether or not the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur in which he declared that
all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines are null and void has
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.
RULLING:
1. YES. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The government, during
the Japanese occupation being de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion,
were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which
are not of a political complexion, are remain valid after reoccupation of a territory.

2. NO. The proclamation does not invalidate the judgement and judicial proceedings. And applying
the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, President McKinley, in
his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, said in part: "Though the powers of
the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private
rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as
continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to
be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the
administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to
administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the
American Commander in Chief.


REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671, November 28 1973, 54 SCRA 84

FACTS:
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor
of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award subject of Special Proceedings.

On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the
aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order,
the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the afore-mentioned
Alias Writ of Execution, the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment
with several Banks, specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of
deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution; the Philippine
Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the
Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance andoperations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Petitioner then alleged that respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of
jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and
void."

In the answer filed by respondents, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification
being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notices of garnishment are null and void.

HELD:
The Republic of the Philippines did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What
was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily
understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practicalground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends." Sociologicaljurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar.


This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised
charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." A
corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds
cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged


Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the
Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, respondents.

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:

Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan
and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon.
Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And
for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several
banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the
Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian
personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence
the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A
sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends.
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR
SCALZO, respondents

FACTS:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in
Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head
of the Iranian National Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No.
6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin
was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent
Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
damages on the trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

ISSUE:
WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic
immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

RULING:
The SC DENIED the petition.

Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the
representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with
the receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity
from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is
a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties
of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and
interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit
reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally
regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption
that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his
person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot
be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international
law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without
its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in
whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states
are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that
if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending
state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy
between the two sovereigns.
The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government
has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities
on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said
to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
Minucher v CA
Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of
summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer
with Counterclaim.

Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo,
then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo
(an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).

Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets.
Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding
the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling
card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy
caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.

Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets,
for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already
made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.

It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged
heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a
motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the
Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside
the Philippines.

TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the
erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is
a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo
is clothed with diplomatic immunity.

Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement
complained in a Diplomatic Note.

Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary
appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to
quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier
asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient
allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and
outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's
theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo
could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with
evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.
SEAFDEC VS. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580

FACTS:
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents againstthe
petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these
cases, the privaterespondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their
employment by the petitioner.

The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of
various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of
the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.

The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is
not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has,
however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

HELD:
The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is
an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held
in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National
Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992).
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department
(SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond thejurisdiction of public respondent
NLRC.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office
is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or
even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
CALLADO VS. IRRI
G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995, 244 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at theInternational Rice Research
Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to
the Ninoy AquinoInternational Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of
Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral andexemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private
respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that the Institute enjoys
immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that
it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the
instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity
considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. Theres no merit in
petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree
No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear.
Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that
the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.
ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)


ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:


Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner
figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the
IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was
charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the
vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him.

However, IRRI
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal
process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620,
5
and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed
by petitioner, not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an
Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent
IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a
legal obstacle in resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive
its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international
organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the
case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on
the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship?

Held: No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil
and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived
by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be
a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse
to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the
plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or
other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that
such waiver is discretionary on its part.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRMEG.R. No. L-52179 April 8,
1991Facts:
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of MacarioNieveras,
a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dumptruck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Dueto the impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including LaureanoBania Sr. died asa result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others
suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.On December 11, 1966, the private respondents
instituted a compliant for damagesagainst the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,
owner and driver,respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid
defendants filed a ThirdParty Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner.Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause
of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.Respondent Judge
Romeo N. Firme ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando,La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay,
jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeralexpenses.Private respondents stress that
petitioner has not considered that every court,including respondent court, has the inherent
power to amend and control its processand orders so as to make them conformable to law
and justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion whenit deferred and failed to
resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting tolack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
Non-suability of the state.

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,Section 3
of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without itsconsent."Consent takes the form of
express or implied consent.Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities,
are agencies of the Statewhen they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy
thesovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in
theperformance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and
besued."Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicablelaw and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does notnecessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if itdoes not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that thestate has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity,it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable."Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for
the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
thedriver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions.Dual capacity of LGU.Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are twofold. In onethey exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the
performance of theduties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers
andagents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless publicfunctionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, andservants of the state. In
the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private,proprietary or corporate right, arising from
their existence as legal persons and not aspublic agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act inbehalf of the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for thestate or sovereign power."It has already been remarked
that municipal corporations are suable because theircharters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they aregenerally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmentalfunctions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they
were acting in aproprietary capacity.In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he wason his way to the Naguilianriver to get a load of sand and gravel
for the repair of SanFernando's municipal streets."In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to
Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump
truck was performing duties ortasks pertaining to his office.We already stressed in the case of
Palafox, et
.
al
.
vs
.
Province of IlocosNorte
, the DistrictEngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction
ormaintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of theaccident
are admittedly governmental activities."After a careful examination of existing laws and
jurisprudence, We arrive at theconclusion
that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions
.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE PHARMA WEALTH, INC., G.R. No. 182358,
February 20, 2013
Political Law; The State may be sued if it consents, either expressly or impliedly. The rule, in any
case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, the state may not
be sued without its consent; its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The
States consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. x x x Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.
In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so
provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state enters into a contract or it
itself commences litigation. However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract,
it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] xx
x no such waiver may be implied. Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in
strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al. v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC. 518 SCRA 240
(2007)
Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others neither
does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, althoughthe acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a
public position. Secretary ofHealth Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order
providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only
qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH).
Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion
of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic Penicillin G
Benzathine. Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units
vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealths
request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its
bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of
the non- accreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to
Cathay/YSS Laboratories (YSS). Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction,
mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial
courtnullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and
direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder
for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company and
adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff.
Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the
complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to
dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOHs petition for review which affirmed the order
issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper.
HELD:
The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within
his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official
functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH
sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since
judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by
the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as
defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of
immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for
the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a
court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in
causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts
that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where
the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity,
although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In
the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection
with their alleged act of illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff
Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and
with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is permissible, in
consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him
by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 92432 February 23, 1995
T/SGT ALDORA LARKINS, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. IRINEO BERNARDO, DANIEL
HERRERA, MARIETTA DE GUZMAN, JOSELITO CATACUTAN, JOSEPH GALANG, ROBERTO
HERRERA, DELPIN PECSON, CARLOS CORTEZ, JAIME CORTEZ, ARSENIO DIAZ, ROBERTO
SAGAD and MARCELO LOZANO, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the
Resolutions dated August 31, 1989 and February 5, 1990 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC Case No. RAB- III-08-0572-88.
We grant the petition.
I
Petitioner was a member of the United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the
dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base, Pampanga.
On August 10, 1988, 3 AGS terminated the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the
dormitories with the De Guzman Custodial Services. The employees thereof, including private
respondents, were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS. It was left to the new contractor, the
JAC Maintenance Services owned by Joselito Cunanan, to decide whether it would retain their
services.
Joselito Cunanan, however, chose to bring in his own workers. As a result, the workers of the De
Guzman Custodial Services were requested to surrender their base passes to Lt. Col. Frankhauser
or to petitioner.
On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch No.
III of the NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga, against petitioner, Lt. Col. Frankhauser, and Cunanan for
illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages (NLRC Case No. RAB-III-08-0572-88). On September
9, 1988, private respondents amended their complaint and added therein claims for emergency cost
of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay, service incentive leave pay and holiday premiums.
The Labor Arbiter, with the conformity of private respondents, ordered Cunanan dropped as party
respondent.
Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the hearings.
They, likewise, failed to submit their position paper, which the Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on
their part to do so. The case was therefore submitted for decision on the basis of private
respondents' position paper and supporting documents.
On November 21, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all the claims of private
respondents. He found both Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and
ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full back wages, or if that is no longer possible,
to pay private respondents' separation pay (Rollo, p. 78).
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over
her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and amended, were ever
served on her. In her "Supplemental Memorandum to Memorandum of Appeal," petitioner argued
that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions
of the R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947 (Rollo, pp. 35-37).
On August 31, 1989, NLRC issued a Resolution affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, but
declared that:
In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and considering our finding
that the real party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed
Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made subject to existing
international agreements diplomatic protocol (Rollo, p. 95).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which NLRC denied on February 5, 1990 (Rollo, p. 101).
Petitioner then elevated the matter to us.
On July 11, 1990, the Office of the solicitor General filed a Manifestation stating that it "cannot
legally support the decision of the Labor Arbiter" and therefore prayed that it be relieved from
the responsibility of filing the required Comment for the public respondents (Rollo, pp. 117-118). In
view of this Manifestation, on July 18, 1990, we resolved to require NLRC to file its own comment to
the petition, which NLRC did on November 29, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 120, 133-139).
II
It is petitioner's contention that the questioned resolutions are null and void because respondent
Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case. Petitioner alleges that
she never received nor was served, any summons or copies of the original and amended complaints,
and therefore the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over her person under Article XIV of the R.P.
U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
We agree.
The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed
the rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by Philippine and American nationals inside
the U.S. military bases in the country.
Article XIV thereof, governing the procedure for service of summons on persons inside U.S.
military bases, provides that:
. . . [N]o process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except with the
permission of the commanding officer of such base; but should the commanding
officer refuse to grant such permission he shall forthwith take the necessary steps
. . . . to serve such process, as the case may be, and to provide the attendance of the
server of such process before the appropriate court in the Philippines or procure
such server to make the necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service as
the case may require.
Summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United
States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only
with the permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead
designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the
appropriate court.
Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt.
Col. Frankhauser and not the Base Commander (Rollo, p. 11).
Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was ever issued and served on her.
They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
Notices of hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence in Civil
Procedure may be applied by analogy to NLRC proceedings (Revised Rules of the NLRC, Rule I, Sec.
3). It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
without the latter being served with summons (cf. Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA
244 [1992]; Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 149 SCRA 193 [1987]).
In the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment
rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void (cf. Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals,supra.)
Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before
the said body. This, however, does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary
submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her
pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to
and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. In effect, petitioner set forth only one issue
and that is the absence of jurisdiction over her person. If an appearance before the NLRC is
precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the defendant, then
this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons (De los Santos v. Montera, 221 SCRA 15
[1993]).
Be that as it may, on the assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons on her, still
the case could not prosper. There is no allegation from the pleadings filed that Lt. Col. Frankhauser
and petitioner were being sued in their personal capacities for tortious acts (United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). However, private respondents named 3 AGS as one of the
respondents in their complaint (Rollo, p. 10).
It is worth noting that NLRC admitted that:
At the outset, let it be made clear that We are aware as to who is the real party
respondent in this case; it is the Government of the United States of America which
is maintaining military facilities in the Philippines, one of which is located inside
Clark Air Base. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory
attendants is just one of the various units of the United States Armed Forces
(USAF) inside the said military base. While individual respondents, particularly Lt.
Col. William Frankhauser and T/Sgt. Aldora Larkins, are mere elements of the USAF
assigned to the 3 AGS. Thus, whatever awards, monetary or otherwise, the appellees
are entitled to by virtue of this case are the primary liabilities of their real
employer, the United States Government (Rollo, pp. 91-92).
Private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in
behalf of the U.S. Government. The employer of private respondents was not Lt. Col. Frankhauser
nor petitioner. The employer of private respondents, as found by NLRC, was the U.S. Government
which, by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for
members of the USAF (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]; United States
of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1985]).
Indeed, assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and the
monetary claims of private respondents proved, such awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. Col.
Frankhauser and petitioner in their personal capacities, but by the United States government
(Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
Under the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in
the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement
of May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between the United States Armed Forces and
Filipino employees should be settled under grievance or labor relations procedures established
therein (Art. II) or by the arbitration process provided in the Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum
of Agreement dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or if the grievance
procedure failed, the dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint Labor Committee
established in Article III of the Base Labor Agreement.
Unquestionably therefore, no jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter over the case and
the person of petitioner and the judgment rendered is null and void (Filmerco Commercial Co. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,supra.; Sy v. Navarro, 81 SCRA 458 [1978]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Shauf v. CA (consti1)

Shauf v. CA
Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi, respondents

Second Division
Doctrine: official v. personal capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: November 27, 1990
Ponente: Justice Regalado

Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air
Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air
Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a
180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill
the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill
a future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary
Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended thus,
Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended
indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against
Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in
accordance of with the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service
Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages +
20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be
collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they
are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the
Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction
of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA,
defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a
suit against the US government which would require consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule
allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only
in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

Held:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED,
jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are
not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he
does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or
abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that private respondents
committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Loida Q.
Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex,
color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo Tomas, Manila,
in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human
behavioral science. She has also completed all course work in human behavior and counselling
psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil service eligible. More important, she had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for approximately
four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi did not even
consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which
appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the
1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the
acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q.
Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they
should be held accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy
under the United States federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which
is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign
court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as a matter
of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance
and protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine
courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of
private respondents on that score.
S A T U R D A Y , D E C E MB E R 2 6 , 2 0 0 9
Shauf v. CA 191 SCRA 713
SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA

FACTS:

1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of
the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office
at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a qualified dependent locally
available.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex (female), color
(brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day
period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the
vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a
future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos
was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended thus, Shauf was
never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to
deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies
this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with
the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission,
Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of
such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected
from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune
from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental
functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines
does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US
District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are
immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit
against the US government w/c would require consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits
against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the
Philippines & is not part of international law.

ISSUE:

WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces


HELD:

Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K as moral damages,
P20K for attys fees.


RATIO:

No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the
acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner
Shauf.

While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only
contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law &
injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates
the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit will
not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen) The
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private &
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was
previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an interview.
The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position
despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateos
services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for
the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff Judge Advocate
of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur whereas
respondents merely denied allegations.

The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi & Detwiler violated
Shaufs constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to life. Thus, they should
be accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be paid for the supposedly
unearned income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. She never acquired rights over that
amount because she was never appointed.

Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants discriminatory acts. The
Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to file a
civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the initial
appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been decided up
to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise prohibited,
which will best advance & protect her interests.
Vicarious Liability (Torts and Damages Case Digest)
JAYME vs APOSTOL
G.R. No. 163609 November 27, 2008
SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners, vs. RODRIGO APOSTOL,
FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY
OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO,
represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q.
MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
respondents.
FACTS:
Fidel Loano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, borrowed the pick-up truck owned by
Rodrigo Apostol from its current possessor Ernesto Simbulan to ferry Mayor Miguel of Koronadal
to Buayan Airport. The pick-up accidentally hit a minor, Marvin C. Jayme, who was crossing the
National Highway. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin 50 meters away from point of impact, a
clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Despite
medical treatment, Marvin died six days after the accident.
Marvins parents filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against the driver, the mayor, the
owner of the pick-up, Simbulan and the Municipality of Koronadal (now City), pointing out that the
proximate cause was Lozanos negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. And that applying the
doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability, Mayor Miguel should be liable for his employees
negligent acts. On the other hand, Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up
without their consent. Mayor Miguel and Lozano pointed that Marvins sudden sprint across the
highway made it impossible to avoid the accident.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Marvins parents, absolving Simbulan and the Municipality
of Koronadal from liability. Fidel, Rodrigo and Mayor Miguel are ordered jointly and severally liable
to pay Marvins parents damages. In his appeal, Mayor Miguel claims that the real employer of
Lozano was the Municipality of Koronadal and not him. The CA granted his appeal and dismissed the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the
driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian.
RULING: NO. PETITION DENIED.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual
acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees,
the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which
the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was
on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be
established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was
performing his functions.
Indeed, it was the Municipality of Koronadal who is the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of
accident. Though Mayor Miguel, also an employee of the municipality, loaned Lozano to drive him to
the airport, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer.
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have
the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an employer-employee
relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a
fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the
occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the
doctrine of vicarious liability.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or
interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958,
Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the
said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in
the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the
Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recoveryof any
amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that
plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.


Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.


Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without
its consent. Inthe case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back
of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of
the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to
recover possession of the land anytime, becausepossession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other
purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of
the lot at the time of the taking.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, VS. NICOLAS CUENCA,
as Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE PHIL.
43 SCRA 360

FACTS: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of
the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the
government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th
Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca (Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of ownership and
possession of her lot. The defendants denied the plaintiffs allegations stating: (1) that the action
was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2)
that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit
against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis
since the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and(4) that inasmuch as it was the
province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue,
plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its
decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's claim
for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; and that it had long
prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its
consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether of not the appellant may properly sue the government.

HOLDING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her
lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she
could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said
portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for
the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by
the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which
should be fixed by the trial court after hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation,
including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated.

NOTE: THE GOVERNMENT, WHEN IT TAKES AWAY A PROPERTY FROM A PRIVATE LAND
OWNER FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE LEGAL PROCESS OF
EXPROPRIATION OR NEGOTIATED SALE, THE AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY PROPERLY MAINTAIN
A SUIT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT VIOLATING THE DOCTRINE OF
GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. THIS DOCTRINE CANNOT BE USED IN
PERPETRATING INJUSTICE TO A CITIZEN.

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)

US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and
ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First
Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the
requests based on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint
is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages.
The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants,
the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents
of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this
suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to
reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be
able to invoke state immunity

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside
and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order;
they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a
State but the legal nature of the act
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military
bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding
conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to
another group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to
be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of
indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and
proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental
acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A
state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part
of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of
the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.

CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA,
petitioners,v.
HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A.CASTILLO,
Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZSANTIAGO and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB),
respondents.
G.R. No. 107271; September 10, 2003

CORONA,
J.
:
FACTS
:

I
n 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator
and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed thelegality of the
abolition. The CF
I
in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all thedismissed employees and
the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Governmentappealed the decision
but such was dismissed.
I
n 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partialpayment of her back-wages. The others were
paid in full.
I
n 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the
City refused to release the money to Santiago.The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not
entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of
the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The amount was given to Santiago. The
City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle;properties of the municipality were
exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directedthe sheriff to levy and
schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed
Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago asback-wages,
plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check butthe City
Treasurer cant do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde
ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of
Caloocancorresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB
but the CityTreasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it
would hold PNB liablefor any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.
ISSUE
:

Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from
execution), to satisfy Santiagos claim.
HELD
:

Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to
subjectto his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by
such third personor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all
government funds deposited inthe PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine
Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may not besubject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a
corresponding appropriation as required by law. Eventhough the rule as to immunity of a state from
suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability
of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is atliberty to determine for itself whether
to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such
statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgmentsrecovered, and only
convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final andmake provision
for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-
definedexception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
I
n such a case, themonetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City
Council of Caloocanalready approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the
amount of P439,377.14for Santiagos back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within
the exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990


Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati
determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents
amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner
which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for
reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The
RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said
dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy
upon execution.

Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net
amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of
P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-
settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the
municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public
funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However,
this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court
will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within
the bounds of fair play and justice.
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990; Cortes, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. in 1986, In lieu of an expropriation
proceeding filed in court, petitioner Municipality of Makati opened a bank account with the PNB
Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, pursuant to the
provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. RTC Makati determined the cost of the said land to be
P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of
execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in
PNB. After this decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued and a Notice of
Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch.
However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of
petitioner. Private respondent then filed a motion praying for the court to order the bank to deliver
to the sheriff the unpaid balance, while petitioner also filed a motion to lift the garnishment.

While these motions are pending, however, a Manifestation was filed, informing the court
that private respondent was no longer the owner of the subject property and that ownership to this
has been transferred to Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. A compromise agreement was made between
private respondent and Philippine Savings Bank, Inc., which was then approved by the court.

The court further ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of
P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property,
from the garnished account of petitioner but the bank failed to comply as it was still waiting for
proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling it to make a disbursement for the amount
so ordered.

As the case was in the Supreme Court, petitioner raised for the first time that it had two
accounts with PNB Buendia Branch: one was made exclusively for the expropriation of the subject
property, and the other is for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government

Issue:
WON the balance of the appraised value of the subject property may be levied upon the
second account of petitioner municipality?


Held:
It is well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute.
More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are
necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money
judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues are derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities
and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision
dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-
3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner
deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.

The court hereby orders petitioner Municipality of Makati to immediately pay Philippine Savings
Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount of P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to
submit to this Court a report of its compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible
period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of receipt of this resolution.

Torio vs. Fontanilla, L-29993 (October 23, 1978)
Posted on October 3, 2012
G.R. No. L-29993; 85 SCRA 399
October 23, 1978
____________________
Facts:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 to manage the 1959
Malasiqui town fiesta celebration The 1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee was
created, which, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage.
A zarzuela troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their performance on
January 22. During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was pinned underneath. He was
immediately hospitalized, but died the following day.
Fontanillas heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its
Municipal Council and all the Councils individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its
agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipalitys agents in carrying out the
municipal ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not
one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the
municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding that the Executive Committee had
exercised due diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the construction of the stage,
and the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of the committee. Consequently, the
defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial courts decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual
damages:P1200.00 its attorneys fees; and the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.
Held:
Yes.
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity
with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and
be contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character: public, governmental or political on the one
hand; and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised
by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare.
These include the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal powers, on the other hand, are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community. These include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate.
This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality for the acts
of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty, no
recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor
from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did
not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held
liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to suit upon contracts
and its tort.
Torio v Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-29993, 23 Oct 1978)
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed a resolution which
created the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. This committee handled everything for
their annual town fiesta, which would be held on January 21, 22, and 23 the following year. The
Municipal Council appropriated P100 for the construction of two stages, one to be used especially
for a zarzuela entitled Midas Extravaganza. The committee, under chairman Jose Macaraeg,
supervised the construction of a stage.
At the night of the first show, even before the zarzuela itself started, many people were already
climbing up the stage to listen or catch a glimpse of the performers. Midway through the zarzuela,
the stage collapsed, and Vicente Fontanilla, who was at the rear of the stage, was pinned
underneath. He was taken to the hospital and died the following afternoon.
The heirs of Fontanilla then filed a complaint for damages with the Manila CFI, naming the
Municipality of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal Council as defendants.
CFI ruled that the Town Fiesta Executive Committee did exercise due diligence and care of a good
father of a family in constructing the stage for such purpose, and its collapse was due to forces
beyond the Committees control. The heirs of Fontanilla appealed, and the Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling, and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of Fontanilla.
The issue is whether a town fiesta is an exercise of a municipalitys governmental/public function
(from which it incurs no liability), or is it of a private/proprietary character (from which it incurs
liability).
HELD: A town fiesta is considered a private/proprietary function. But the Supreme Court concedes
that there is no hard and fast rule in determining the nature of a municipalitys undertaking.
Whether it is a governmental/public or private/proprietary function will depend heavily on the
context. McQuillins rule is: A municipal corporation proper has...a public character as regards the
state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so-called) insofar as it is to
promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. Thus, a town fiesta clearly falls
under private/proprietary function.
The Municipality of Malasiqui argues that they exercised due diligence in the construction of the
stage. But the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the collapse was due to great number of
onlookers who mounted the stage; this the municipality could have prevented by asking the people
to step away from the stage, but they did not.
The individual members of the Municipal Council, however, cannot be held liable under Art. 27 of
the Civil Code, because Art. 27 covers cases of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer
of his or her official duty, not to cases of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.
The records do not show that the members of the Municipal Council directly participated in the
defective construction of the stage, or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform. The municipal councilors are absolved from liability, but the Municipality of Malasiqui is
still liable.

TORIO VS. FONTANILLA (October 23, 1978)
Muoz-Palma, J.

Facts:
- The municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions. The first was for management
of the town fiesta celebration, and the second was for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee.
- The Subcommittee on entertainment and stage was formed, with Macaraeg as Chairperson.
- 2 stages were constructed one for the zarzuela and another for cancionan. Macaraeg supervised
the construction of the stages.
- While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath
and died in the afternoon of the following day.
- Vicentes heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the
municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members.
- CFI held that the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct
the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the CFI and held all defendants solidarily
liable for damages.


Issue: Whether or not the municipality can be held liable for the collapse of the stage which
caused the death of Fontanilla.

Held:
- Powers exercised by municipal corporations: 1) public, governmental or political -> administering
powers of the state; 2) corporate, private, proprietary -> for special benefit and advantage of a
community.
- If injury is caused in the course of performance of a governmental function, there could be no
recovery unless allowed by statute. Likewise, there can be no recovery from officers if acts were
done in good faith.
- Palafox case -> province is not liable. Maintenance and construction of roads was performance of
a governmental function.
- The Revised Administrative Code gives authority to the municipality to celebrate the yearly
fiesta. Observance thereof is not imposed as a duty. It is considered as a special benefit of the
community and not done to promote general welfare.
- Doctrine of repondeat superior -> municipality is liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla if
due to negligence of its own officers, employees or agents.
- The stage was not strong enough to support the onlookers who mounted it. The municipality
should have taken steps to maintain the safety of the stage. It should have prevented participants
from mounting the stage.
- Participants had the right to expect that the municipality, through the committee, would build a
stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of performance and take
necessary measures to insure the safety of the participants.
- Sanders v City of Long Beach Know your City Week was a proprietary activity. The city was
expected to exercise ordinary care, and not to expose people to danger.
- The municipality is liable for acts of its servants. It was acting through the municipal council
which appointed Macaraeg as chairperson of subcommittee in charge of the construction of the
stage.
- It appointed Macaraeg. It can control the discharge of duties and hold Macaraeg responsible for
the manner in which duties are discharged.
- Municipal councilors are not liable. The municipality has a personality separate from those of
officers, directors and the persons composing it. The councilors had no direct participation in the
incident.

Affirmed.