Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

THIRTEENTH (13th) DIVISION

****
JOSE UMAPAS DEJILLA, CA-G.R. SP No. 164011
Petitioner,
Members:
-versus-
SORONGON, E.D.,
NATIONAL LABOR Chairperson,
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROBENIOL, G.T., and
BLUE FLAME SECURITY *CALPATURA, C.B., JJ.
AGENCY, INC. and/or SUSAN
GERVACIO, Promulgated: 26 FEB 2021
Respondents. ______________________
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DECISION
SORONGON, E.D., J. :

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social

justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in
favor of labor. Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the
Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and
upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism,
however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in
every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.1

Brought to fore is a Petition for Certiorari2 instituted by petitioner

Jose Umapas Dejilla (Dejilla) to reverse and set aside the August 14, 2019
Decision3 and October 30, 2019 Resolution4 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 07-002726-19/NLRC Case No.
NCR-01-01024-19.

* Designated Junior Member per Office Order No. 62-21-RSF dated February 22, 2021.
1 Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 189255, June 17, 2015, citing Javier v. Fly Ace
Corporation, G.R. No. 192558, February 15, 2012 (citations omitted)
2 Rollo, pp. 3-15.
3 Id. at pp. 21-36; Penned by Commissioner Agnes Alexis A. Lucero-De Grano and concurred by
Commissioners Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra.
4 Id. at pp.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164011
DECISION
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The relevant facts and proceedings follow:

In January 2011, Dejilla was employed by private respondent Blue

Flame Security Agency, Inc. (Blue Flame), a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of providing security services. Private respondent Susan
Gervacio (Geravcio) is the company’s President.5

The controversy started when Blue Flame allegedly advised Dejilla to

take a leave of absence for three (3) months from January to March 2018. 6
At the end of his leave, he reported to the office but Blue Flame did not give
him a new work assignment. Instead, he was advised to renew his licenses
so he can be immediately deployed for work once a new post becomes
available.7 Unfortunately, he remained unemployed until June 2018.8 On
July 12, 2018, Dejilla was re-assigned to Picadilly Star Realty Corp., but
only as a reliever for three (3) days; thereafter, he was once again placed on
floating status.9 In September 2018, Blue Flame still failed to provide him
an assignment and placed him on a floating status for the next three (3)
months. On December 20, 2018, Blue Flame gave Dejilla a bonus in the
amount of P1,255.00 but on the same day, Gervacio allegedly declared him
absent without official leave (AWOL).10

Dejilla filed a Complaint for constructive dismissal against Blue

Flame and Gervacio asking for the payment of backwages and separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement. He also prayed that he be paid service incentive
leave, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Meanwhile, Blue Frame and Gervacio gave a different narrative.11

Blue Flame insisted that in January 2018, Dejilla was informed by

Officer-in-Charge Hannibal Gonzaga of his impending transfer to another
detachment in Makati City from his current post in Picadilly Star Realty
Corp.12 Unfortunately, this did not sit well with Dejlla who refused to be
transferred to another post. On January 5, 2018, he went to the main office
where he was informed that there was no available duty schedule for him
except for that post in Makati which he previously declined. As a result, he
filed a leave of absence and was eventually placed on a “floating status.” 13
5 See Position Paper, id.at pp. 46-47.
6 Id. at p. 47.
7 Id.
8 Id. at p. 22.
9 Id. at p. 47.
10 Id.
11 See Position Paper, id. at pp. 53-63.
12 Id. at p. 54.
13 Id.
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DECISION
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Blue Flame also advised Dejilla to renew his licenses during his leave so
that he can be immediately deployed once a new assignment becomes
available.14

After three (3) months, Blue Flame offered Dejilla a post in Biñan,
Laguna, but he again declined the offer as it was too far from his current
residence and he was yet to renew his licenses.15 Thus, Dejilla filed a second
(2nd) leave of absence from April 1 to May 1, 2018.16 On May 4, 2018, Blue
Frame sent Dejilla a Notice of Back to Work Order17 reminding him that his
85-day approved leave of absence had already ended and he must report to
the main office so that he can be given immediate deployment. At any rate,
Dejilla turned a deaf ear and instead filed a third (3 rd) application for leave
of absence citing that his licenses were still expired. 18 Then, for the fourth
(4th) time, he filed another application for leave of absence.19

On July 7, 2018, Blue Frame sent a second (2nd) Notice of Back to

Work Order20 to Dejilla but to no avail. Then, on August 20, 2018, the
company sent him a third (3rd) Notice of Back to Work Order21 hoping that
the latter will finally heed but its efforts proved futile. In September 2018,
Dejilla filed his fifth (5th) application for leave of absence.22 On October 29,
2018, it sent him the fourth (4th) Notice of Back to Work Order23 since he
failed to report to their main office despite previous demands.

In refuting Dejilla’s theory of constructive dismissal, Blue Flame and

Gervacio stressed that it was Dejilla who refused the two (2) available
employment schedules in Makati and Biñan, Laguna, respectively.24 They
also cited that his continuous failure to renew his government-mandated
licenses despite the ample time given to him coupled with his numerous
applications for leaves of absence, highlighted his disinterest to work for the
company.25 Finally, they averred that his money claims are baseless.

On June 13, 2019, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision26 dismissing

Dejilla’s Complaint, thus:
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See copy of Leave of Absence Form, id. at p. 64.
17 Id. at p. 65.
18 See copy of Leave of Absence Form, id. at p. 67.
19 See copy of Leave of Absence Form, id. at p. 68.
20 Id. at p. 69.
21 Id. at p. 71.
22 Id. at p. 73.
23 Id. at p. 74.
24 Id. at pp. 56-57.
25 Id. at p. 57.
26 Id. at pp. 37-42; Penned by Labor Arbiter Maki T. Datu-Ramos II.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164011
DECISION
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint of Jose

Umapas Dejilla against Blue Flame Security Agency, Inc. and Susan
Gervacio[,] Jerrick Manalad Barrientos is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.27 (Emphasis in the original)

In so ruling, the Labor Arbiter noted that Blue Flame offered Dejilla a
new deployment in Biñan, Laguna, but he declined because it was too far
from his residence in Parañaque City and he was yet to renew his licenses. 28
The Labor Arbiter likewise observed that Blue Frame sent a total of four (4)
return to work orders which he simply ignored. Instead, he filed five (5)
applications for leave of absence. These circumstances belied his allegation
that Blue Flame failed to give him new assignment for the past six (6)
months.29 Thus, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Dejilla was not
constructively dismissed and therefore his claim for backwages and
separation pay had no leg to stand on.30

The Labor Arbiter also dismissed Dejilla’s money claims.

Accordingly, it held that Blue Frame was able to show proof that he had
received his service incentive leaves as shown by the attached annexes with
his signature.31 In the same token, the Labor Arbiter denied his claims for
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees for lack of
substantiation.32 Finally, Gervacio was absolved from any personal liability
in the absence of proof of bad faith on her part.33

Aggrieved, Dejilla appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the findings

of the Labor Arbiter in toto. The dispositive portion of its assailed August
14, 2019 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, complainant’s Appeal is DENIED and the

Decision dated June 13, 2019 rendered by Labor Arbiter Maki T. Datu-
Ramos II is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.34 (Empahses in the original)

The NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Dejilla on

27 Id. at p. 42.
28 Id. at p. 40.
29 Id. at pp. 40-41.
30 Id. at p. 41.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at pp. 41-42.
34 Id. at p. 35.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164011
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October 30, 2019, for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition where Dejulla submits that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in concluding that he was not constructively
dismissed by Blue Frame.

It is well-established that a decision of the NLRC may be elevated to

the Court of Appeals only through a special civil action for certiorari.35 As
such, the nature of a special civil action for certiorari governs, prescribes
and limits the framework through which the Court can examine a decision of
the NLRC. Thus, the Court of Appeals’ review of NLRC decisions is limited
to determining whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 36 Stated differently,
this remedy is, by no means, intended to be an alternative to an appeal, and
thus not a means to review the entire decision of the NLRC for reversible
errors on questions of fact and law.37

The Supreme Court also emphasized in Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v.

Villamater, et al.38 that a petition for certiorari does not normally include an
inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. Errors of
judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the
province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is, thus, incumbent upon
petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously and
whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that
the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.

Clearly, the Court, in a Rule 65 petition involving labor cases must

determine the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion, and not on
the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct.39 Guided by these parameters, the Court finds that the NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.

At the outset, it bears stating that security guards, like other employees
in the private sector, are entitled to security of tenure. However, their
situation should be differentiated from that of other employees or workers.
35 St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC and Aricayos, G.R. No. 130866, 16 September 1998, 356 Phil. 811
36 Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194944, 18 September 2017, 818 Phil. 321.
37 Id.
38 G.R. No. 179169, 3 March 2010, 628 Phil. 81.
39 Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194944, September 18, 2017, 818 Phil. 321, citing
Career Phils. Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012, 700 Phil. 1.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164011
DECISION
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The employment of security guards generally depends on their employers’

contracts with clients who are third parties to the employment relationship,
and the requirements of the latter for security services and what will be
beneficial to them dictate the posting of the security guards. It is also
relevant to mention that their employers retain the management prerogative
to change their assignments and postings, and to decide to temporarily
relieve them of their assignments. In other words, their security of tenure,
though it shields them from demotions in rank or diminutions of salaries,
benefits and other privileges, does not vest them with the right to their
positions or assignments that will prevent their transfers or re-assignments
(unless the transfers or re-assignments are motivated by discrimination or
bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient
cause). Such peculiar conditions of their employment render inevitable that
some of them just have to undergo periods of reserved or off-detail status
that should not by any means equate to their dismissal. Only when the
period of their reserved or off-detail status exceeds the reasonable period of
six (6) months without re-assignment should the affected security guards be
regarded as dismissed.40

In the extant case, the records are bereft of any evidence that would
corroborate Dejilla’s claim that he was constructively dismissed from
employment. Our reason follows:

First, Blue Flame cannot be faulted for transferring Dejilla to another

work assignment. True, the right of security guards to security of tenure is
safeguarded by administrative issuances and jurisprudence, in parallel with
the mandate of the Labor Code and the Constitution to protect labor and the
working people. Nonetheless, while the Court has recognized the security
guards’ right to security of tenure under the “floating status” rule, the Court
has similarly acknowledged the management prerogative of security
agencies to transfer security guards when necessary in conducting its
business, provided it is done in good faith. 41 In the absence of proof of ill
motive on the part of Blue Flame, Dejilla’s transfer to another work
assignment is presumed to have been made in good faith.

Second, Dejilla’s assertion that Blue Flame failed to provide him a

new assignment after placing him on a floating status since beyond the six
(6)-month period allowed by law is a naked claim.
40 Spectrum Security Services, Inc. v. Grave, et al., G.R. No. 196650, June 7, 2017, citing Salvaloza v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 182086, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 184, 197-
198; Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, G.R. No. 160940, July 21, 2008, 559
SCRA 110, 116-117.
41 Exocet Security and Allied Services Corp., G.R. No. 198538, September 29, 2014.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164011
DECISION
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Temporary “off-detail” or “floating status” is the period of time when

security guards are in between assignments or when they are made to wait
after being relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new
one. It takes place when the security agency’s clients decide not to renew
their contracts with the agency, resulting in a situation where the available
posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its
roster. It also happens in instances where contracts for security services
stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the
guards assigned to it even for want of cause, such that the replaced security
guard may be placed on temporary “off-detail” if there are no available posts
under the agency’s existing contracts. During such time, the security guard
does not receive any salary or any financial assistance provided by law. It
does not constitute a dismissal, as the assignments primarily depend on the
contracts entered into by the security agencies with third parties, so long as
such status does not continue beyond a reasonable time. When such a
“floating status” lasts for more than six (6) months, the employee may be
considered to have been constructively dismissed.42

Here, apart from Dejilla's bare self-serving allegation, nothing in the

records even hints of him being severed from employment or being
prevented by Blue Flame to continue with his employment. In fact, as will
be explained later, the company sent him various return-to-work orders
which he lamentably ignored. Verily, bare allegations of constructive
dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, as in this case,
cannot be given credence.43 This Court cannot sustain his claim of illegal
dismissal as the same would be self-serving, conjectural and of no probative
value.44

In stark contrast, the evidence for Blue Flame show that it repeatedly
summoned Dejilla to report for work but he also repeatedly refused; instead,
he filed a total of five (5) applications for leave of absence. Records disclose
that in January 2018, he filed his first (1 st) application for leave of absence
for three (3) months from January to March 2018. Then, he was offered a
new assignment in Biñan, Laguna which he turned down because it was
allegedly too far from his Parañaque residence and he was yet to renew his
government-mandated licenses. Then, Dejilla filed a second (2nd) leave of
absence from April 1 to May 1, 2018. Notably, on May 4, 2018, Blue Frame
sent Dejilla a Notice of Back to Work Order but he merely ignored the same.
42 Pido v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 169812, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 609,
615-616; Phil. Industrial Security Agency Corp. v. Dapiton, 377 Phil. 951, 962 (1999); Sentinel Security
Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 434, 443, 446 (1998).
43 Vicente v. Court of Appeals (Former 17th Div.), 557 Phil. 777, 787 (2007).
44 MZR Industries, et. al. v. Colambot, 716 Phil. 617, 626 (2013); citing Machica v. Roosevelt Services
Center, Inc., and/or Dizon, 523 Phil. 199 (2006).
CA-G.R. SP No. 164011
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Instead, he successively filed his third (3rd) and fourth (4th) applications for
leave of absence. After the end of his leave, Blue Frame sent him a second
(2nd) Notice of Back to Work Order to Dejilla in June 2018 but to no avail.
Still willing to accommodate Dejilla, Blue Frame sent him a third (3 rd)
Notice of Back to Work Order on August 20, 2018 but its efforts proved
futile. In September 2018, Dejilla filed his fifth (5 th) application for leave of
absence. On October 29, 2018, it sent him the fourth (4 th) Notice of Back to
Work Order and again Dejilla refused to take heed. Set against these
circumstances, the Court finds that the NLRC did not err in denying
Dejilla’s complaint for constructive dismissal. There is no dismissal to speak
of, let alone an illegal one. Instead, it was Dejilla who clearly demonstrated
his lack of interest in resuming his employment with Blue Flame.

It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to hold Blue Frame liable for

constructive dismissal due to the mere lapse of the six (6)-month period of
floating status without looking into the peculiar circumstances that resulted
in Dejilla’s failure to assume another post. This is especially true in the
present case where the security guard’s own refusal to accept another detail
and continued absence from work for a long period of time were the reasons
that he was not given an assignment within the six (6)-month period. The
security agency, Blue Flame, should not then be held liable.

As a final note, the Court reiterates that it stands to promote the

welfare of employees and continue to apply the mantle of protectionism in
their favor. Thus, employees, like security guards, should not be laid-off for
an indefinite period of time. However, We hold that a similar protection
should be given to employers who, in good faith, have exerted efforts to
comply with the requirements of the law by offering reasonable work and
appropriate assignments during the six-month period. This was precisely
done by Blue Frame who offered Dejilla new work assignments twice.
Verily, the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not
intended to oppress or destroy management, and the commitment of this
Court to the cause of labor does not prevent Us from sustaining the
employer when it is in the right, as in this case.45

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

The August 14, 2019 Decision and October 30, 2019 Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 07-002726-
19/NLRC Case No. NCR-01-01024-19 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
45 Id.
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(SGD.)
EDWIN D. SORONGON
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(SGD.)
GABRIEL T. ROBENIOL
Associate Justice

(SGD.)
CARLITO B. CALPATURA
Associate Justice

C E R T I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

(SGD.)
EDWIN D. SORONGON
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Thirteenth (13th) Division