Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

THIRTEENTH (13th) DIVISION

****
B.M.C.A.R.T. CA-G.R. SP No. 164797
INTERNATIONAL
RECRUITMENT AND Members:
PLACEMENT SERVICES,
INC., and MARICAR SORONGON, E.D.,
JAURIGUE, Chairperson,
Petitioners, ROBENIOL, G.T., and
*CALPATURA, C.B., JJ.

-versus-
Promulgated: 26 FEB 2021
NATIONAL LABOR ______________________
RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ARDY N. CARPIO, JOEY
LOPEZ, ARMEL MALINAO,
MALVIN AGUIRRE, NOEL
MALLARI, ROLANDO
BALAN, MARCELO
OBAÑA, RENATO
SUNGLAO and ROMAR JAN
TARCINO,
Respondents.
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DECISION
SORONGON, E.D., J. :
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism
can be told a million times over; each of their stories as real as any other.
Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of
families left behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days,
months, and years yearning to see their sons and daughters. We all know
of the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all grown up and,
being so, they remember what their work has cost them. Twitter accounts,
Facetime, and many other gadgets and online applications will never
substitute for their lost physical presence. 1 This case involves the money
claims of overseas Filipino workers who were repatriated from Saudi
Arabia.
* Designated Junior Member per Office Order No. 62-21-RSF dated February 22, 2021.
1 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164797
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This decides the instant Petition for Certiorari2 assailing the

September 30, 2019 Decision3 and January 29, 2020 Resolution4 of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC
No. OFW-L-05-000329-19/NLRC Case No. NCR (L) 01-01740-19 for being
allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow:

In their Position Paper,5 private respondents Renato Sunglao,

Rolando E. Balan, Jr., Noel Mallari, Joey G. Lopez, Marcelo R. Obaña,
Armel Malinao, Romar Jan Tarcino, Ardi N. Carpio and Malvin T. Aguirre
(private respondents) claimed that they applied for overseas employment
with petitioner BMCART International Recruitment and Placement
Services, Inc. (BMCART), an entity organized under Philippine laws
engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers, for its foreign
principal, AMZEEL Contracting Company (AMZEEL) in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA). Private respondents’ employment details are as
follows:

NAME POSITION MONTHLY DATE OF CONTRACT

SALARY DEPLOYMENT DURATION
(in SAR)
1. Joey G. Painter 1,500 plus 300 May 1, 2018 6 mos.
Lopez allowance
2. Armel Painter 1,500 plus 300 April 14, 2018 7 mos.
Malinao allowance
3. Mevin T. Painter 1,500 plus 300 April 14, 2018 7 mos.
Aguirre allowance
4. Noel Painter 1,500 plus 300 May 1, 2018 7 mos.
Mallari allowance
5. Rolando Painter 1,500 plus 300 April 14, 2018 7 mos.
E. Balan, Jr. allowance
6. Marcelo Tile Setter 1,500 plus 300 March 22, 2018 6 mos.
R. Obaña allowance
7. Renato Store 2,000 plus 300 January 31, 2017 1 yr. & 9
Sunglao Administrator allowance mos.
8. Romar Jan Mechanic 1,900 plus 300 April 14, 2018 6 mos.
Tarcino allowance
9. Ardi N. Tile Setter 1,500 plus 300 April 13, 2018 9 mos. 6
2 Rollo, pp. 3-24.
3 Id. at pp. 26-42; penned by Commissioner Cecilio Alejandrino C. Villanueva and concurred by
Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez.
4 Id. at pp. 92-94.
5 Id. at p. 207.
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Carpio allowance

In October 2018, AMZEEL’s project with Arabian American

Corporation (AAC) was shutdown amidst the various strikes initiated by its
employees. Consequently, the salaries of AMZEEL’s workers were delayed
for several months and the company’s assets were frozen by the KSA’s
Ministry of Labor. Soon, private respondents were repatriated with the
assistance of the Labor Attache of the Philippine Overseas Labor Office
(POLO) in KSA.7

Aggrieved, private respondents lodged complaints8 for (a) illegal

termination, (b) payment of the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts; (b) payment of their unpaid salaries and allowances; and (c)
award of damages and attorney’s fees, against BMCART and its
President/Manager, Maricar Jaurige (Jaurige).

Refuting private respondents’ claims, BMCART insisted that they

were not dismissed from their employment but they were repatriated upon
the order from the Philippine Government, particularly the Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). Besides, private respondents
were allegedly guilty of forum-shopping. Since they have already authorized
the POLO officials in KSA to receive all their money claims against
AMZEEL, they are now barred from filing the present action.9 They also
argued that this case should be dismissed in view of the compromise
agreement forged by the Philippine Government and AMZEEL.10 On the
part of Jaurige, BMCART stressed that she cannot be held personally and
solidarily liable for private respondents’ money claims sans proof of bad
faith, negligence and malice on her part.11

In a Decision12 dated March 29, 2019, Labor Arbiter Marie Josephine

C. Suarez (Labor Arbiter) ruled that private respondents were not
constructively dismissed but were repatriated by the Philippine Government
due to a force majeure that prevented AMZEEL from fulfilling its
contractual obligations. In particular, the Labor Arbiter cited the freezing of
AMZEEL’s assets by the Government of Saudi Arabia which resulted to the
“lock-out” of its employees.13 While the Labor Arbiter rejected private
6 Id. at pp. 252-253.
7 Id. at p. 209.
8 Id. at pp. 106-114.
9 Id. at p. 116.
10 Id. at pp. 122-126.
11 Id.
12 Id. at pp. 250-258.
13 Id. at p. 257.
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respondents’ claims for salaries for the unexpired portion of their

employment contract, she nonetheless sustained their claims for unpaid
salaries and allowances with the following computation:

NAME NO. OF SALARY ALLOWANCE TOTAL

MOS. (in SAR) (in SAR) (in SAR)
Joey Lopez 4 1,500.00 300.00 7,200.00
Armel Malinao 4 1,500.00 300.00 7,200.00
Malvin Aguirre 4 1,500.00 300.00 7,200.00
Noel Mallari 4 1,500.00 300.00 7,200.00
Rolando Balan 4 1,500.00 300.00 7,200.00
Macelo Obana 4 1,500.00 300.00 7,200.00
Renato 2 1,500.00 300.00 3,600.00
Sunglao
Romar Jan 2 1,500.00 300.00 3,600.00
Tarcino
Ardie Nicdao 4 1,500.00 300.00 7,200.00
Carpio

Aggrieved, BMCART and Jaurige filed a Memorandum of Partial

Appeal14 questioning the Labor Arbiter’s monetary award in favor of private
respondents. According to them, the Labor Arbiter seemed to have ignored
the evidence of the settlement agreement between the Philippine
Government and AMZEEL. They attached a copy of their Petition for
Mandamus filed against the DOLE and OWWA to compel these government
agencies to provide them a copy of the purported settlement agreement
between the said parties.

In the meantime, private respondents Renato Sunglao and Romar Jan

Tarcino likewise filed a partial appeal15 pointing out an error in the
computation of their unpaid salaries which should be increased to
SAR4,600.00 and SAR4,400, respectively.16

In the assailed September 30, 2019 Decision, the NLRC resolved to

dismiss BMCART’s partial appeal inasmuch as they failed to show that
private respondents’ monetary claims had already been settled. Corollary,
they failed to produce a single document to prove the purported “settlement
agreement” between the Philippine Government and AMZEEL. 17 In
contrast, the NLRC resolved to grant Sunglao and Tarcino’s partial appeal. It
explained that their employment contracts indicated that their basic salaries
14 See Memorandum of Partial Appeal, id. at pp. 43-53.
15 See Notice of Appeal with Memorandum of Partial Appeal, id. at pp. 260-265.
16 Id. at p. 264.
17 Id. at pp. 37-38.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164797
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were SAR2,000.00 and SAR 1,900.00, respectively. As such, they should be

awarded SAR4,600.00 and P4,400.00, respectively. The NLRC disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal filed by

Respondents is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Appeal filed by
Complainants is GRANTED. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Marie
Josephine C. Suarez is MODIFIED. The computation of Complainants
Sunglao and [Tarcino]’s unpaid salaries/benefits should be:

1. Sunglao (SR2,000.00 + SR300.00 x 2 months =

SR4,600.00
2. Tarcino (SR1,900.00 + SR300.00 x 2 months =
SR4,400.00

The rest of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, STANDS.

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)18

Dissatisfied, BMCART and Jaurige moved for a reconsideration 19 and

contended that courts should take judicial cognizance of the mutual
agreement between the Philippine Government and AMZEEL which was
duly published in the official website of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).20 They also asserted that Jaurige cannot be held
personally liable in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith
on her part which contributed to the plight of the private respondents.21

In a Resolution dated January 29, 2020, the NRLC denied BMCART

and Jaurige’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition of BMCART and Jaurige based on these issues:

I. WHETHER THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN IGNORING THE CATEGORICAL
DECLARATION OF THE DOLE AND OWWA THAT THERE
IS ALREADY AN EXISTING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
WITH AMZEEL FOR THE CLAIMS OF ITS FILIPINO
WORKERS INCLUDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS;

II. WHETHER THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
18 Id. at p. 41.
19 See Motion for Reconsideration, id. at pp. 95-104.
20 Id. at p. 96.
21 Id. at p. 102.
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COMPLAINT DESPITE THE FACT THAT RES JUDICATA

HAD ALREADY SET IN RESULTING IN FORUM-
SHOPPING ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS; and

III. WHETHER THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING JAURIGUE SOLIDARILY
LIABLE WITH BMCART FOR THE JUDGMENT AWARD IN
FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.22

BMCART and Jaurige argue that the Court should take judicial notice
of the compromise agreement between the Philippine Government and
AMZEEL.23 They opine that the said agreement operates as a res judicata
that should effectively bar the instant case. 24 They also reiterate that private
respondents are guilty of forum-shopping as they have already authorized
the POLO in KSA to be their attorney-in-fact to receive their unpaid money
claims.25 And, there is no legal justification to hold Jaurige personally liable
for private respondents’ money claims.26

In their Comment,27 private respondents counter that the Labor Arbiter

and the NLRC did not err in refusing to take cognizance of the purported
compromise agreement entered into by the Philippine Government and
AMZEEL. They point out that BMCART has failed to attach a copy thereof
in any of its pleadings.28 Consequently, there is neither forum-shopping nor
res judicata in the case at bar.29 They maintain that Jaurige should be held
personally liable for their money claims regardless of whether she acted with
good faith or malice in dealing with them.30

A. Judicial notice not warranted in the case at bar

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it. When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence
contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been extinguished
by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim
of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the
burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general
22 Id. at pp. 9-10.
23 Id. at pp. 13-15.
24 Id. at pp. 15-17.
25 Id. at p. 18.
26 Id. at pp. 18-23.
27 Id. at pp. 294-311.
28 Id. at pp. 298-300
29 Id. at pp. 301-302.
30 Id. at p. 305.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164797
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burden of proof - shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of

producing some evidence to show non-payment.31

BMCART consistently denies private respondents’ claim for unpaid

salaries and allowances by invoking the compromise agreement forged
between the Philippine Government and AMZEEL. Notably, however,
BMCART wants the Court to dispense with the proof of the existence of the
aforesaid compromise agreement and suggests instead that the Court take
judicial notice of the said document.

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and

convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to
achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. 32 Generally speaking,
matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that
it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. At this juncture,
it bears discussing that things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take
judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in
the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man
ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.33

The subject compromise agreement patently lacks a requisite for it to

be of judicial notice to the court because such document is not well and
31 G&M Phils, Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 140495, April 15, 2005.
32 Lee v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170422, March 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 52, 58.
33 Juan v. Juan, G.R. No. 221732, August 23, 2017.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164797
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authoritatively settled and is doubtful or uncertain. As aptly ruled by the

NLRC, the Petition for Mandamus they attached does not prove the
existence thereof. It merely showed their attempt to secure a copy of the
alleged compromise agreement the contents of which is still unknown to the
parties and to this Court.34 Furthermore, it is improper to take judicial notice
of newspaper articles on the said document without first verifying both its
existence and the contents.

B. No proof of forum-shopping and res judicata

In view of the doubt as to the existence and contents of the

compromise agreement, the Court is also not prepared to declare the private
respondents to have violated the rule on forum-shopping which is essentially
committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts,
either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on
the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable
decision or action.35 Sans concrete proof of its existence and contents, the
compromise agreement cannot hardly private respondents’ money claims.

Equally, there can be no res judicata in the case at bar. In simple

terms, res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in
the former suit.36 It is true that a compromise agreement once approved by
final order of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and
should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, a
decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory and it has the
force of law and is conclusive between the parties. 37 At any rate, with a
doubtful existence and content of the compromise agreement between the
Philippine Government and AMZEEL, this Court has no choice but to reject
BMCART’s plea of res judicata.

C. The piercing of the veil of corporate

fiction is not justified

As stated above, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC held Jaurige
34 Rollo, p. 38.
35 Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation, 457 Phil. 740
(2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
36 Guttierez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82475 January 28, 1991, citing Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1470
(Rev. 4th ed., 1968).
37 Sonley v. Anchor Savings Bank, G.R. No. 205623, August 10, 2016.
CA-G.R. SP No. 164797
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personally and solidarily liable with BMCART for private respondents’

money claims. This is erroneous.

Basic is the rule in corporation law that a corporation is a juridical

entity which is vested with a legal personality separate and distinct from
those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising
it. Following this principle, obligations incurred by the corporation, acting
through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. A
director, officer or employee of a corporation is generally not held
personally liable for obligations incurred by the corporation. 38 Nevertheless,
this legal fiction may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetrate
fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues. 39
This is consistent with the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, which states:

Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. – Directors or trustees

who wilfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by
the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.

Prescinding from the above-cited provision, solidary liability will then

attach to the directors, officers or employees of the corporation in certain
circumstances, such as: (1) when directors and trustees or, in appropriate
cases, the officers of a corporation: (a) vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation; (b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence
in directing the corporate affairs; and (c) are guilty of conflict of interest to
the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other
persons; (2) when a director or officer has consented to the issuance of
watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file
with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) when a
director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold
himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) when a
director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally
liable for his corporate action.40

Jurisprudence also instructs us that before a director or officer of a

38 Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540
SCRA 456, 473-474.
39 Aratea v. Suico, G.R. No. 170284, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 501, 507 citing Prudential Bank v.
Alviar, 502 Phil. 595 (2005).
40 Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 242, 252 (1997).
CA-G.R. SP No. 164797
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corporation can be held personally liable for corporate obligations, however,

the following requisites must concur: (1) the complainant must allege in the
complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith; and (2) the complainant must clearly and convincingly prove such
unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.41

In the present case, private respondents failed to prove that Jaurige

committed an act as an officer of BMCART that would permit the piercing
of the corporate veil. There is no evidence that she committed bad faith or
gross negligence in the performance of her duties such that the lifting of the
corporate mask would be merited. Besides, it had already been ruled that
private respondents had not been illegally dismissed from their employment.

It behooves this Court to emphasize that the piercing of the veil of

corporate fiction is frowned upon and can only be done if it has been clearly
established that the separate and distinct personality of the corporation is
used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate a deception. 42 Hence,
any application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should be done
with caution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The September 30, 2019 Decision and January 29, 2020
Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in
NLRC LAC No. OFW-L-05-000329-19/NLRC Case No. NCR (L) 01-01740-
19 are MODIFIED in that petitioner Maricar Jaurigue is absolved from
being held personally and solidarily liable for the money claims of the
private respondents. The rest of the disposition in the assailed issuances
stands.

SO ORDERED.

(SGD.)
EDWIN D. SORONGON
Associate Justice

41 Francisco v. Mallen, Jr., G.R. No. 173169, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 118, 123.
42 Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, G.R. No. 182729, September 29, 2010, 631SCRA 596, 628.
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WE CONCUR:

(SGD.)
GABRIEL T. ROBENIOL
Associate Justice

(SGD.)
CARLITO B. CALPATURA
Associate Justice

C E R T I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

(SGD.)
EDWIN D. SORONGON
Chairperson
Thirteenth (13th) Division