1|Civil Procedure|Atty.

Jose Parungo|Case Digests|

SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana, a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu, was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student
regent of UP to serve a one-year term. Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI), to which one of the projects of the latter is the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to
the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The renovation
of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.

The succeeding student regent filed a complaint for Malversation of Public

Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for
lack of merit.
ISSUE Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter or over
the person of the petitioner.
HELD The petition cannot be granted. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. The court sees
no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer. Petitioner claims that she is

not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying
student. This is likewise bereft of merit. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly
vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board
of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
 2|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
FACTS Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director of the BIR with Salary Grade 26 as classified under R.A. No. 6758. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal
case against him for his failure to disclose in his SALN for the year 2002, his
financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and
Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and
the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT
LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets.

Petitioner alleged that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear
the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a
Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade
27. The Sandiganbayan denies the motion to dismiss of the petitioner. The
respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those
exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not
Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally
provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch
of the government occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials
who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g).
ISSUE Whether P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only
Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No.
6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD The Court finds merit in the petition. Republic Act No. 7975 divested the
Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at
Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades
were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important
positions in government regardless of salary grade. Yet, those that are classified as
Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e),
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27"
or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
 3|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA vs. HON. JUANITA GUERRERO
FACTS The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing wherein the petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman
and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice. In the
main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her. Further, alleging
evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ
prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and
Certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her.
The DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation and
recommended the filing of Information against petitioner.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority
to file the Information; the Information charges more than one offense; the allegations
and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is
based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged as state
witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay. The respondent judge
issued the presently assailed Order finding probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused.
ISSUE Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the
violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information.
HELD The RTC has jurisdiction.

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the
rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A
plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related
cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation
of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized
as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases. Notably, no other trial
court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-
related cases.

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government
officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law
and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,97 which amended
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the
Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of
PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a
catchall provision, does not operate to strip the R TCs of its exclusive original
jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. As pointed out by Justices Tijam and Martires, a
perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials were never considered excluded
from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes government officials found to
have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs, while Section 28 of the law
imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials and employees.
 4|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M.
TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.;
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS
MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES
FACT Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes
S against private respondents. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private
respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila
(RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized
to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed
was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were
constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest. private respondents
filed with the RTC the complaint. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the CA. the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic
Act No. 9282.
ISSUE Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing
an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD While it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions,
orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical
statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the
CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by
the RTC in local tax cases filed before it. On the strength of the above constitutional
provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the
CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in
these cases.
 5|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 196278 June 17, 2015

CE CASECNAN WATER and ENERGY COMPANY, INC.
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, THEOFFICEOFTHEPROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF NUEVA
ECIJA, and THEOFFICEOFTHEPROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NUEVA ECIJA, as
represented by HON. AURELIO UMALI, HON. FLORANTE FAJARDO and HON. EDILBERTO
PANCHO, respectively, or their lawful successors
FACT Petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into a build-operate-
S transfer (BOT) contract known as the Casecnan Contract relative to the construction and
development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and Power. Petitioner received a
Notice of Assessment of Real Property, which indicates that its RPT due was
248,676,349.60. Petitioner assailed the assessment with the Nueva Ecija LBAA which
dismissed it. Petitioner paid the assessed RPT under protest. Petitioner filed a complaint
with the RTC. The CTA denied due course the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE Whether CTA has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing
an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.

With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282.25 This
expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

On the strength of the constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power
of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
 6|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 192463 July 13, 2015

OMAIRA LOMONDOT and SARIPA LOMONDOT
vs.
HON. RASAD G BALINDONG, Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, 4th Shari'a Judicial
District, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur and AMBOG PANGANDAMUAN and SIMBANATAO
DIACA
FACT Petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC a complaint for recovery of
S possession and damages against respondents Ambog Pangandamun (Pangandamun)
and Simbanatao Diaca (Diaca). Petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan de Oro City a
petition for certiorari assailing the Orders issued by the SDC on November 9, 2009,
January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010. In a Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction. The CA held that the Shari'a Appellate Court has not yet been
organized until the present. It cannot take cognizance of the instant case because it
emanates from the Shari'a Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or tribunals
enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of [Batas] Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended
over which We can exercise appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the instant Petition should be
filed directly with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE Whether the CA does not have an appellate jurisdiction over cases appealed from the
SDC.
HELD The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts. It shall also
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas
corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The
decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice to
the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.

The Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding
Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall
have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the
SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of
the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.
 7|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017

THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE
vs.
HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court,
4th Judicial District, Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO ALOMPO,
represented by SULTAN DIMNANG B. ALOMPO
FACT The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with the
S Shari'a District Court against the petitioner for recovery of possession and ownership of
a parcel of land. The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious
affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of
land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate RTC.

The Shari'a Distric.t Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's motion to dismiss. It held
that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an
action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently with that
of regular/civil courts."
ISSUE Whether the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for
recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is
a Muslim.
HELD It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was
impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government
of Tangkal. When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-
and neither does he become-a real party in interest. The person represented is deemed
the real party in interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the action.30
That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with
the jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To
satisfy the requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who
must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility.
 8|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 181284 April 18, 2017

LO LOY UNDURAN, et al.
vs.
RAMON ABERASTURI, et al.
FACT Petitioners insist that claims and disputes within ICCs/IPs and/or between ICCs/IPs shall
S be resolved using customary laws, consistent with the State policy under the
Constitution and the IPRA to recognize, respect and protect the customs, traditions and
cultural integrity and institutions of the ICCs/IPs. They claim that cases of disputes
between IPs within the same ICC/IP group are always resolved completely and with
finality in accordance with their customary laws and practice, hence, the interpretation:
that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction in cases of disputes among IPs within the same
ICC/IP group is not only absurd but unconstitutional. They aver that even disputes
between different ICCs/IPs shall also (all within the jurisdiction of whatever their
customary laws and practice provide since Section 657 of the IPRA does not so
distinguish. They presume that after coexisting for centuries in adjacent ancestral
domains, some of the ICCs/IPs have developed their own indigenous means of settling
disputes between other ICCs/IPs.
ISSUE Whether it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), not the regular
courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral
domain of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (JCCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs)
regardless of the parties involved.
HELD The Court maintains that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is
limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to
the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties
who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have
jurisdiction. A court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide
cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a court of
limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction
expressly delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a
tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically
granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is
confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and
circumstances prescribed by the statute.

The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a
case either (1) belong to different ICCs/IP groups which are recognized to have their
own separate and distinct customary laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP
member who is neither bound by customary laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it
would .be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct customary laws and
Council of Elders/Leaders. In which case, the Court ruled that the regular courts shall
have jurisdiction, and that the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to
cases where the opposing parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.
 9|Civil Procedure|Atty. Jose Parungo|Case Digests|
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENIO DALAUTA
FACT Respondent Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land.
S The land was placed by the DAR under compulsory acquisition of the CARP. Petitioner
LBP offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such
valuation for being too low. Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just
compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC.

RTC (SAC): Rendered a decision on favor of Respondent Eugenio Dalauta.

CA: Affirmed SAC decision. SAC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation.
ISSUE Whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB decision
sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality.
HELD Primary Jurisdiction of the DARAB and Original Jurisdiction of the SAC.

The Court ruled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. A petition for determination
of just compensation before the SAC shall be proscribed and adjudged dismissible if not
filed within the 15-day period prescribed under the DARAB Rules.

There is nothing contradictory between the provision of granting the DAR primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," which
includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the provision of
granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction" over (1) all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal
offenses under R.A. No. 6657. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the
second refers to judicial proceedings.
 10 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Davao City, COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, DABAY ABAD,
HATAB ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI ABDULLAH, ROJEA AB ABDULLAH, ABDULLAH
ABEDIN, ALEX ABEDIN, et al.
FACT Abad, et al. filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title against petitioner DBP and
S Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise (GFSME) before the RTC. They
alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping pursuant to
the loan agreement they entered into with DBP. The same certificates of title were
turned over by DBP to GFSME because of its call on GFSME's guarantee on their loan,
which became due and demandable, and pursuant to the guarantee agreement between
DBP and GFSME. DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash
Writ of Seizure on the ground of improper venue.

RTC: granted DBP's omnibus motion and dismissed the case for improper venue. It
pointed out that although there was indeed an order to return the 228 certificates of title
to DBP, it was not made as a result of a trial of the case, but as a consequence of the
order of dismissal based on improper venue.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE Whether the trial court has residual jurisdiction in the present case.
HELD The trial court did not reach the residual jurisdiction stage.

Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants;
to order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow
the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the
original record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been perfected or
despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for review under
Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition. The "residual jurisdiction" of the
trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

In this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to improper
venue and respondents could not have appealed the order of dismissal as the same
was a dismissal, without prejudice. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have
reached, the residual jurisdiction stage as the case was dismissed due to improper
venue, and such order of dismissal could not be the subject of an appeal. Without the
perfection of an appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of appeal, the RTC did
not acquire residual jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC may
rule on DBP's application for damages pursuant to its residual powers.
 11 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 198172 January 25, 2016

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. ANTONIO DELA CRUZ
FACT The petitioner is the owner of an apartment to which Antonio dela Cruz leased two units.
S The contract of lease for each of the two units similarly provides a lease period of one
(1) month, subject to automatic renewals, unless terminated by the petitioner upon
written notice. The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the
two subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner filed
a complaint for ejectment before the MTC. The MTC and RTC both ruled in favor of the
petitioner. However, the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the
ejectment case. The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds deposited by
the defendant-appellant as lessee. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and held
that the assailed RTC Orders were issued pursuant to its equity jurisdiction.
ISSUE Whether the RTC had equity jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
HELD The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and
occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on
the ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed
ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case
effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC
orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the
basis of its appellate jurisdiction.

Equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a
resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation.
 12 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE), et al.
FACT Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are
S the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Ramos and Eisma-Osorio as
their legal guardians and as friends who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait. DOE entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also
conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait.
ISSUE Whether the court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary
jurisdiction.
HELD The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which
allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts
for violations of our environmental laws. To further encourage the protection of the
environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases
as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing
environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on
the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the
doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.) Although this petition was
filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively
applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there is no vested rights in rules of procedure”.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing
has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in
their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file
this petition.
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SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 235935 February 6, 2018

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al.
vs.
SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, et al.
FACT President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law
S and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a
period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of
the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Three separate petitions were
subsequently filed before the Court, challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
said proclamation. The Court found sufficient factual bases for the Proclamation and
declared it constitutional. Petitioners assert that in relation to the Court's power to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or any extension
thereof, the military cannot withhold information from the Court on the basis of national
security especially since it is the military itself that classifies what is "secret" and what is
not. The Court's power to review in this case is a specific and extraordinary mandate of
the Constitution that cannot be defeated and limited by merely invoking that the
information sought is "classified." However, the respondents assert that the invocation of
this Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution is
misplaced. As held in Lagman, the "appropriate proceeding" in Section 18, Article VII
does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII, as it is
not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
extension.
ISSUE Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the
extension of Proclamation No. 216.
HELD Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court's judicial power to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The first part is to be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter
part, an innovation of the 1987 Constitution, became known as the court's expanded
jurisdiction. Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now delve into acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government traditionally considered as political if such
act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of
Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. We held that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will
emasculate the Court's constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was
precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse
and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
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SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002

GABRIEL L. DUERO vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL
FACT Private respondent Bernardo Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's land. When
S petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the
latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with
bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his
refusal to leave the land. Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise
agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment. The agreement
stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and
possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the
agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and
therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.

RTC: Rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.

CA: Reversed RTC decision. Private respondent is not estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction 'of the RTC.
ISSUE Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court
had jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it.
HELD In this case, the Court is in agreement with the CA that the respondent was not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. In the present case, private
respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC on legal grounds. Recall that it was
petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties
before the said court,16 believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But
by then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that
jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment.
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their
express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action
at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.
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SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR,
Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.,
represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as Manager
FACT Petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes,
S Inc. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 and was mortgaged to the SSS
as security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their
house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified
Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent informed
petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their
premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However,
petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot
No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’ certificate of title was cancelled and a
new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners
offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their
contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot
No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent
refused. This prompted petitioners to file an action for reformation of contract and
damages with the RTC. petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution,
alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by applying the principle of
estoppel.
HELD In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar
such party from attacking its jurisdiction. This Court affirmed the rule that a party’s active
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the
court’s authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later
challenging that same court’s jurisdiction. In the case at bar, it was petitioners
themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings
before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not
even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire
proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its
decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise
the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to
them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s jurisdiction
over the case they themselves filed.
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SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 139791 December 12, 2003

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI
FACT Respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance
S Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle
Verde Terraces. Petitioner, through its President, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of
the respondent. Petitioner informed respondent of the substantial completion of his
condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable forces, the final turnover was
reset. Upon receipt of petitioner’s notice of delivery, respondent again flew back to
Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
Respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still
unlivable. He was constrained to send petitioner a letter demanding payment for the
damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to
file with the RTC a complaint against the former for specific performance and damages.

RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of respondent.

CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE Whether the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case.
HELD It is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have consistently held
that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit
buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB. While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case,
petitioner’s active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of
it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. Here, petitioner failed
to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In
effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case.
Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction.
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SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO
FACT Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against the spouses Manuel and Lolita
S Toledo. The reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement
of the parties. Counsel for respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to
file a demurrer to evidence. Respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
citing the following as grounds: (1) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (2)
that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs.

RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

CA: Reversed decision of the RTC.
ISSUE Whether respondent is already estopped from questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction.
HELD The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s motion
to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as
respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE
FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This circumstance alone already warranted the
outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear contravention of the
express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this
provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before the filing of an
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.

Respondent’s act of filing multiple motions, such as the first and earlier motion to
dismiss and then the motion to dismiss at issue here, as well as several motions for
postponement, lends credibility to the position taken by petitioner, which is shared by the
trial court, that respondent is deliberately impeding the early disposition of this case. The
filing of the second motion to dismiss was, therefore, "not only improper but also
dilatory." Thus, the trial court, "far from deviating or straying off course from established
jurisprudence on the matter, x x x had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal
precedents in this case." The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred not only in entertaining
respondent’s petition for certiorari, it likewise erred in ruling that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.
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G.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003

DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., et. al.
FACT The DOTC engaged the services of ADP to conduct a comprehensive study of the NAIA
S and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to
the year 2010. DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) for the implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement
proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project. The consortium composed of
Paircargo, PAGS and Security Bank submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC.
PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was
incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. AEDC subsequently
protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as
regards the prequalification of PIATCO. The workers of the international airline service
providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of
the questioned agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the
enforcement of said agreements.
ISSUE Whether the Court is without jurisdiction to review the instant cases as factual issues are
involved which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve.
HELD After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues involved, this Court is of the
view that the crux of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions. The
facts necessary to resolve these legal questions are well established and, hence, need
not be determined by a trial court.

The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction
over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary
jurisdiction. It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar
that call for the relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these
cases are of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation
of the country's premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for
resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of key
provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court,
procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant
cases.
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SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL
vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF
MANILA,
FACT Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga) is the national organization of all the
S barangays in the Philippines. The Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-
laws to govern its internal organization. Respondent City Council of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8039, providing for the election of representatives of the District Chapters
in Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay
elections. The Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said
ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the
functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit
of the powers of the City Council. Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved
the assailed city ordinance.

On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts rule, the

OSG posits that technical rules of procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition.
While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction over cases of
this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the present petition,
however, calls for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that the Liga ng mga Barangay
determine the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians for the immediate
ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government
administration.
ISSUE Whether the petitioners disregarded the observance of hierarchy of courts.
HELD The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by
respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of
legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.

There is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important
reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner
or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. The Court held
that this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. The
Court reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
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appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s
docket.

G.R. No. 176508 January 12, 2015

SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC.
vs.
HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON CITY
FACT This case is a direct resort to the Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus. The
S petitioner applied for the judicial reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
1609 and for the issuance of a new OCT in place thereof, but respondent Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the RTC in Quezon City dismissed the petition for
reconstitution through the assailed order. The petitioner alleges that the respondent
Judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion and unlawful neglect of performance
of an act specifically enjoined upon him. The OSG and the UP argued that by directly
coming to the Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus, the petitioner had availed
itself of the wrong remedies to substitute for its lost appeal; that the correct recourse for
the petitioner was an appeal considering that the two assailed orders already finally
disposed of the case.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner did not properly observed the hierarchy of courts.
HELD The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there
are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court
enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the
more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
There being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated
the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for
certiorari.
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SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 196795

INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION
vs.
OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
FACT Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it
S administered to Offshore Construction. Offshore Construction occupied and introduced
improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros and the DoT halted the
projects due to Offshore Construction's non-conformity with P.D. No. 1616, which
required 16th to 19th centuries' Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area. During the
lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite
several demand letters. Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the MeTC.
Repondents claimed that Intramuros failed to inform the MeTC that there were two (2)
pending cases with the RTC. It also argued that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case since the relationship between the parties was not one of lessor-lessee
but governed by a concession agreement.

MeTC: Ruled in favor of the respondent.

RTC: Affirmed MeTC decision.
ISSUE Whether or not direct resort to this Court is proper.
HELD At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court to assail the Regional Trial Court's ruling upholding the Metropolitan Trial
Court October 19, 2010 Order instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 with this Court. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable,
and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions
is the exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the parties
has been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when the initial dispute-
an ejectment case-is, by nature and design, a summary procedure and should have
been resolved with expediency. Thus, petitioner's resort to this Court is proper and
warranted under the circumstances.
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GR No. 220832 Feb 28, 2018

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS
FACT The ASEAN member-countries, including the Philippines, signed the Protocol to
S Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window (ASW Protocol), under which the
member-countries agreed to develop and implement their National Single Windows.
Petitioner DBM-PS, a Request for Expression of Interest (RFEI), inviting prospective
bidders (consultants) in the eligibility screening and to be shortlisted for the competitive
bidding of the PNSW 2 project with a total approved budget for the contract of P650
Million. Commissioner Lina wrote a Letter addressed to Director Syquia. Commissioner
Lina requested for the discontinuance of the procurement process of the PNSW 2
project, in line with the Government Procurement Reform Act. This provision grants to
the head of the procuring agency the right to reject bids for justifiable and reasonable
grounds where the award of the contract will not redound to the benefit of the
government. Private respondent, through a Letter, moved for a reconsideration of the
Notice of Cancellation, but the same was denied in petitioner BOC's Resolution.
ISSUE Whether Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos (respondent Judge) gravely abused in his discretion
when he issued the omnibus order and the injunctive writ.
HELD The direct filing of this petition in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, CA and the RTC to
issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
Stated differently, although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the
RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special,
extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the
observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous
and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and
more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. Absent any showing of any
special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition will cause
the dismissal of the recourse, as in this case. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this
petition is procedurally infirm, and thus, dismissible.
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G.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004

GEORGE KATON
vs.
MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO
FACT Petitioner George Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry
S in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known
as Sombrero Island. The Bureau ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the
land subject of the petitioner’s request for eventual conversion or re-classification from
forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead
patent. The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably
endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for
appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus
Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the
petitioner. "Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original
certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of
respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays
for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr.
claims that he himself requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute and that
on or about the time of such request, Respondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango
already occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements. In
addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for the
island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey
of the island.
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an
issue not raised in the Petition.
HELD Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts
over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis
pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription is evident from the pleadings or the
evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss
the claim or action.

The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or
upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original
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records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-
called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal
of the appeal.

G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013

ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACT A 14-year old second year high school student tiled an affidavit-complaint against Pat-
S og, a third-year high school teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service
Commission. Bang-on filed a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious
Physical Injury with the RTC. Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-
CAR directed Pat-og to file his counter-affidavit. While the proceedings of the
administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case
and found Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical injury. Pat-og filed a motion for
reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He
contended that administrative charges against a public-school teacher should have been
initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers. the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration. It ruled that Pat-og
was estopped from challenging its jurisdiction considering that he actively participated in
the administrative proceedings against him, raising the issue of jurisdiction only after his
appeal was dismissed by the CSC.
ISSUE Whether or not respondent CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the civil service commission to
hear and decide the administrative case against him.
HELD Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon
a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it
is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several
tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction
over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to
proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of
Professional Teachers.

At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed
estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question
may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case,
estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction,
the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the
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CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of
jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This
Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

G.R. No. 202836 June 19, 2018

First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Philippine Bank of Communications
FACT First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a P40,000,000.00 loan, which was secured by a
S real estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land. PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. It claimed in its Petition that it sent First Sarmiento
several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to pay the principal amount and
accrued interest on the loan. This prompted PBCOM to resort to extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgaged properties. First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment
of real estate mortgage with the RTC. The RTC of City of Malolos, Bulacan, granted
First Sarmiento's Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the
Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation, and ruled that First Sarmiento's
action for annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to this Court with its Petition for Review under
Rule 45. It insists that its Complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. In its Comment, respondent contends that petitioner's
action to annul the real estate mortgage and enjoin the foreclosure proceedings did not
hide the true objective of the action, which is to restore petitioner's ownership of the
foreclosed properties.
ISSUE Whether the complaint of First Sarmiento for annulment of real estate mortgage is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
HELD This Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance.

In numerous decisions where this Court proclaimed that the test to determine whether
an action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is to ascertain the nature of the
principal action or relief sought. Thus, if the principal relief sought is the recovery of a
sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of pecuniary estimation.
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However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of money or real property
and the money claim is only a consequence of the principal relief, then the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. A careful reading of petitioner's Complaint convinces
this Court that petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed
during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them.
Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it
entered into with respondent
because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan
agreement.

G.R. No. 138822 January 23, 2001

EVANGELINE ALDAY vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION
FACT Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati
S alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing
unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurred
by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent for respondent. Petitioner
filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for the payment of
P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and contingent
bonuses earned, and for accumulated premium reserves. Respondent filed a "Motion to
Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default"
because petitioner's answer was allegedly filed out of time. However, the trial court
denied the motion and similarly rejected respondent's motion for reconsideration. A few
weeks later, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim, contending
that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-
payment of docket fees by petitioner. In response, petitioner asked the trial court to
declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory
and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer such
counterclaim.
ISSUE Whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature.
HELD Tested against the standards, petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and
accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove
petitioner's claims differs from that needed to establish respondent's demands for the
recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of
premiums. The recovery of respondent's claims is not contingent or dependent upon
establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result
in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. One
would search the records in vain for a logical connection between the parties' claims.
This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own admissions since she declared
in her answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the
Special Agent's Contract. However, petitioner's claims for damages, allegedly suffered
as a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.

There is no need for need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory
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counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is
nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the
proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent
filed its motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket
fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her
counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in
addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer her
counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim. Pursuant to
this Court's ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given petitioner a
reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.

G.R. No. 169576 October 17, 2008

LEONIDES MERCADO, represented by his heirs: Racquel D. Mercado, Jimmy D. Mercado,
Henry D. Mercado, Louricar D. Mercado and Virgilio D. Mercado
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
FACT Leonides Mercado had been distributing respondent San Miguel Corporation’s (SMC’s)
S beer products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. SMC extended to him a ₱7.5 million credit
line allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado
assigned three CBC certificates of deposit amounting to ₱5 million1 to SMC and
executed a continuing hold-out agreement. SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay
for the items he withdrew on credit. Consequently, citing the continuing hold-out
agreement, it asked CBC to release the proceeds of the assigned certificates of deposit.
CBC approved SMB’s request and informed Mercado. Mercado argued that he had
already settled his recent purchases on credit but SMC erroneously applied the said
payments to his old accounts not covered by the continuing hold-out agreement.
ISSUE Whether SMC’s counterclaim was permissive in nature.
HELD A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party) may be
compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily
connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.

When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of
assignment (which he executed as security for his credit purchases), he in effect sought
to be freed from them. While he admitted having outstanding obligations, he
nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts.
For its part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore
sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased on credit.
Thus, Mercado’s complaint and SMC’s counterclaim both touched the issues of whether
the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether
Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would essentially
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support or refute Mercado’s claim and SMC’s counterclaim.

Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the efforts of the RTC
and the parties would have had to be duplicated. Clearly, SMC’s counterclaim, being
logically related to Mercado’s claim, was compulsory in nature.19 Consequently, the
payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

G.R. No. 151242 June 15, 2005

PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, AUTOMOTIVE PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE
CORPORATION and AUTOCORP
vs.
BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS
FACT Petitioner Proton availed of the credit facilities of respondent BNP. To guarantee the
S payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive, Asea and Autocorp executed a
corporate guarantee to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently
entered into three trust receipt agreements. Under the terms of the trust receipt
agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in
trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it
would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. In
case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together with all the
accompanying documents of title. Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the
sale and return the unsold motor vehicles. To the complaint, the defendants-herein
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct
docket fees to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. As
additional ground, petitioners raised prematurity of the complaint, BNP not having priorly
sent any demand letter.
ISSUE Whether the failure of BNP to pay the correct docket fees prevented the trial court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
HELD Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement,
even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by
the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule
does not apply. In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by
the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of
court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the
prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.
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Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial
court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time within
the expiration of applicable prescription or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to
comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction
or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between
appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a
lien or (sic) any award he may obtain in his favor.

G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN
FACT Ruby Shelter, herein petitioner, obtained a loan amounting to P95,700,620.00 from
S respondents Romeo Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo) secured by real
estate mortgages consisting of five (5) parcels of land in the name of the petitioner. After
several negotiations and despite the extension granted by Tan and Obiedo, petitioner
still wasn't able to pay. Tan and Obiedo, by virtue of real estate mortgages, executed
Deeds of Absolute Sale in their favor consisting the five parcels of land. It is provided for
in the Memorandum Agreement that if petitioner fails to pay the loaned amount, five
Deeds of Absolute Sale would be executed in favor of Tan and Obiedo. Petitioner filed a
Complaint before the RTC for declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale and damages
believing that respondents' action was one which was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Upon filing its complaint, petitioner paid docket fees amounting to P13,644.25 as
assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. It was stated that it only wanted to annul
the deeds of absolute sale, so therefor, no issue of title or recovery of possession is
present to classify it as a real action.

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, there was a provision which states that if
Ruby Shelter brought suit against respondents, it would be amounting to
P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages inclusive of costs and attorney's fees. Tan and
Obiedo moved to dismiss the complaint contending that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the case involved recovery of real
property making it a real action which requires payment of docket fees equivalent to a
percentage of the fair market value of the land amounting to P720,392.60.

RTC and Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of Tan and Obiedo ordering Ruby Shelter
to pay additional docket fees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether or not Ruby Shelter should pay additional docket fees to acquire jurisdiction.
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HELD Payment of Docket fees is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. In Manchester Devt.
Corp. vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562, the court explicitly pronounced that, the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. "Hence,
the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. A real action is
an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. No matter how
fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its
complaint appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by
petitioner of its title and possession of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and
Obiedo. A real action is one which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as
indicated in what is now section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of court, a real action is an action
affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.

The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value
of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the
acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the
courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the
fair market value of the real properties ( as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal
Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence
thereof, the stated value of the same.

G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC. vs. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS
FACT Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the petitioner’s
S College of Human Sciences. She is an active member of the UFESLU. The 2001-2006
and 2006-2011 CBAs between SLU and UFESLU contain the common provision on
forced leave. SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first semester of School
Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the evaluation for SY 2002-2003, SY 2005-2006,
and SY 2006-2007, with the rating of 85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below the
required rating of 87 points. To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought
recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery. Despite the conferences held, the parties
still failed to settle their dispute, prompting Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced
leave or illegal suspension with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment. When circulation and mediation again failed, the
parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary
Arbitrator (VA) Daniel T. Fariñas. Cobarrubias filed her motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the ground cited is technical. She maintained that the ends of justice and
fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits. The CA reinstated the
petition. It found that Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by paying the
appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion for reconsideration.
SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for Cobarrubias’ failure to
pay the docket fees on time. SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the
appeal since Cobarrubias failed to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period, and
rendered the VA decision final and executory.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the
appeal fee within the reglementary period, and in reversing the VA decision. To state the
obvious, the appeal fee is a threshold issue that renders all other issues unnecessary if
SLU’s position on this issue is correct.
HELD In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007,
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her
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docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money orders for
₱4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the full
docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period. In
Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting that
the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits,
Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she
filed her petition for review. To us, Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause. We, thus,
find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition for review despite the
nonpayment of the requisite docket fees within the reglementary period. The VA
decision had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid; hence, the CA had no
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal except to order its dismissal.

G.R. No.177425 June 18, 2014

ALONZO GIPA, IMELDA MARO LLANO, JUANITO LUDOVICE, VIRGILIO GOJIT, DEMAR BIT
ANGCOR, FELIPE MONTALBAN AND DAISY M. PLACER
vs.
SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE as represented by its Vice-President For Operations and
Corporate Secretary, RUBEN G. ASUNCION
FACT Respondent SLI, an educational institution, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership
S and Possession with Damages against petitioners. During trial, defendant Rosita
executed an SPA in favor of her sister Daisy M. Placer (Placer) authorizing the latter to
represent her in the case and to sign any and all papers in relation thereto. Finding SLI
to have proven its ownership of the property by preponderance of evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision in its favor. Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Notice of
Appeal which was granted by the RTC in its Order. The CA, however, dismissed the
appeal in its Resolution since it was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and
other lawful fees were paid. Petitioners and their co-defendants promptly filed a Motion
for Reconsideration to which they attached a Certification from the RTC that they paid
the appeal fee in the amount of ₱3,000.00 under OR No. 18091130. In view of this, the
CA granted the said motion and consequently reinstated the appeal through a
Resolution.

The CA dismissed the appeal. Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration invoking the principle of liberality in the application of technical rules
considering that they have paid the substantial amount of ₱3,000.00 for docket and
other legal fees and fell short only by the meager amount of ₱30.00. As compliance,
they attached to the said motion a postal money order in the sum of ₱30.00 payable to
the Clerk of Court of the CA. The CA, however, was not swayed, hence, the denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution
ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal for the nonpayment of the ₱30.00
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and should have applied liberal construction in favor of the petitioner.

HELD No. Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory
and jurisdictional; Relaxation of the rule on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this
case.

Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with
the original record or the record on appeal.

The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the CA at
the outset. It may be recalled that while petitioners paid a substantial part of the docket
fees, they still failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment was short of
₱30.00. Based on the premise that the questioned Decision of the RTC has already
become final and executory due to non-perfection, the CA could have dismissed the
appeal outright. But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of ₱30.00 was
lacking and considering that the CA may opt not to proceed with the case until the
docket fees are paid, it still required petitioners, even if it was already beyond the
reglementary period, to complete their payment of the appeal fee within 10 days from
notice.

G.R. No. 221062 October 05, 2016

ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS, Petitioner, vs. THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. AND
ROLANDO OGSOS, JR.
FACT Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico (Fermina), represented by their Attorney-in-
S Fact, Catalino V. Noel, entered into a Contract of Lease covering five (5) parcels of
agricultural land owned by the latter. The term of the lease contract was extended for
three (3) years, due to Ogsos, Sr.'s introduction of improvements on the leased
premises. Thereafter, the said contract was amended, modifying the lease rental.
Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed that the lease
rentals were not paid. They filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
against respondents, before the RTC to recover the unpaid lease rentals. Pertinently,
they did not include in their claim the lease rental for crop year 1999-2000 because
respondents had already abandoned the leased premises since the said crop year.

Respondent Ogsos, Jr. only filed a motion to admit answer and answer to the complaint
after more than two (2) years. Thus, petitioner and Kathryn filed an opposition and
moved to declare respondents in default, which the RTC granted. The CA ordered the
RTC to admit respondents' answer so as to give them the opportunity to be heard and to
present their side on the merits of the case.
ISSUE Whether respondents' counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not permissive in
nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required.
HELD Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the
counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is
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that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to
compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the
same action.

On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.

The Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in nature. This is
because: (a) the issue in the main case, i.e., whether or not respondents are liable to
pay lease rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether or
not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for taking over the possession of the
leased premises and harvesting and appropriating respondents' crops planted therein;
(b) since petitioner and respondents' respective causes of action arose from completely
different occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata had they opted to
litigate its counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove
petitioner's claim that respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise different from
the evidence required to prove respondents' counterclaim that petitioner and Kathryn are
liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith; and (d) the recovery of petitioner's
claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents' counterclaim, such that
conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and
effort of the court and the parties.

G.R. No. 223290 November 07, 2016

WOODROW B. CAMASO, Petitioner, vs. TSM SHIPPING (PHILS), INC., UTKILEN, AND/OR
JONES TULOD
FACT Camaso alleged that he signed a contract of employment with respondents TSM
S Shipping (Phils), Inc., Utkilen, artd Jones Tulod (respondents) to work as a Second Mate
on-board the vessel "M/V Golfstraum," for a period of six (6) months and with basic
monthly salary of US$1,178.00. He joined his vessel of assignment. Prior to said
contract, Camaso claimed to have been working for respondents for almost five (5)
years and boarded eight (8) of their vessels. Camaso complained of a noticeable
obstruction in his throat which he described as akin to a "fishbone coupled [with]
coughing." His situation worsened as he developed lymph nodules on his jawline,
prompting him to request for a medical check-up while in Amsterdam. Upon repatriation
to the Philippines, he reported at respondents' office and was referred to a certain Dr.
Nolasco of St. Luke's Medical Center for testing. After a series of tests, it was confirmed
that Camaso was indeed suffering from tonsillar cancer. Consequently, he underwent
chemotherapy sessions and radiation therapy for 35 cycles which were all paid for by
respondents. He likewise received sickwage allowances from the latter. Thereafter,
respondents refused to shoulder Camaso's medical expenses, thus, forcing the latter to
pay for his treatment. Believing that his sickness was work-related and that respondents
remained silent on their obligation, Camaso filed the instant complaint for disability
benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses, and
other consequential damages before the NLRC.
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LA: Ruled in Camaso's favor.

NLRC: Reversed the LA ruling.
CA: Dismissed Camaso's petition for non-payment of the required docketing fees.
ISSUE Whether the CA correctly dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari before it for non-
payment of docket fees.
HELD Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to
the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at
the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal
provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no
intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and
via mail, a Metrobank check dated July 6, 2015 under the account name of Pedro L.
Linsangan was attached thereto to serve as payment of docket fees. Although this was
not an authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the
attachment of such personal check shows that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay
the required docket fees. Clearly, this exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to
defraud the government. In this relation, the assertion of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA
Receiving Section that there was no check attached to Camaso's certiorari petition is
clearly belied by the fact that when it was examined at the Office of the Division Clerk of
Court, the check was found to be still stapled thereto.

In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the
technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice and, hence, remands
the instant case to the CA for the resolution of its substantial merits. Upon remand, the
CA is directed to order Camaso to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable
period of thirty (30) days from notice of such order.

G.R. No. 174202 April 07, 2015

DYNAMIC BUILDERS & CONSTRUCTION CO. (PHIL.), INC. vs. HON. RICARDO P.
PRESBITERO, JR.
FACT Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its BAC, published an invitation to
S bid for the construction of a rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline.
Municipality of Valladolid received its "NO OBJECTION" letter from World Bank through
the LOGOFIND project director, advising the BAC to proceed with the issuance of the
notice of award, letter of acceptance, signing of contract, and notice to proceed. BAC
issued Resolution No. 7 affirming the award of contract to HLJ Construction and
Enterprise for the construction of the 1,050-lineal-meter Construction Shoreline
Protection Project. Dynamic Builders was informed that its bid proposal had been found
to be 'not substantially responsive’. Dynamic Builders alleged that it submitted the letter
containing a request for the BAC to furnish it with all submitted bid documents and
relevant BAC resolutions, but this was denied by the letter invoking confidentiality under
Section 2.46 of the LOGOFIND guidelines. Mayor Presbitero dismissed the protest in
the Decision. Dynamic Builders filed this Petition for prohibition with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before this court.
ISSUE Whether petitioner violated the rules against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity
of suits, and forum shopping.
HELD Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to
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avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. Also,
this law covers only national government infrastructure projects. This case involves a
local government infrastructure project.

Section 58 of R.A. 9184 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this court by
one that had already filed an action before the Regional Trial Court without violating the
basic rules on proscription against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits,
and forum shopping.

Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “a party may not institute more than
one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a
single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as
a ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of action "violate[s] the
policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening
the dockets of the courts."

G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002

IMELDA RELUCIO vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ
FACT Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE
S ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE,
ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez in the RTC of Makati. In the petition, private-
respondent alleged that defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private
respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties,
spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the
private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his
family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner. A Motion to
Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent
has no cause of action against her. An Order was issued by herein respondent Judge
denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered
in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
ISSUE Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of
action against petitioner.
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HELD In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. The complaint is by an
aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief
is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all against her
husband. he administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to
the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her
husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no
right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause
of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists. To sustain a
cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an action
for interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.

A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit." In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
Proceedings M-3630. If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30
is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J.
Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by
him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against
Alberto J. Lopez.

G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002

IMELDA RELUCIO vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ
FACT Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE
S ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE,
ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez in the RTC of Makati. In the petition, private-
respondent alleged that defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private
respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties,
spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the
private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his
family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner. A Motion to
Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent
has no cause of action against her. An Order was issued by herein respondent Judge
denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered
in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
ISSUE Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of
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action against petitioner.

HELD In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. The complaint is by an
aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief
is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all against her
husband. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to
the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her
husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no
right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause
of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists. To sustain a
cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an action
for interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.

A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit." In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
Proceedings M-3630. If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30
is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J.
Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by
him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against
Alberto J. Lopez.

G.R. No. 115838 July 18, 2002

CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE CASTRO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO ARTIGO
FACT Private respondent Artigo sued petitioners Constante and Corazon to collect the unpaid
S balance of his broker's commission from the De Castro’s. Appellants were co-owners of
four (4) lots. In a letter, appellee was authorized by appellants to act as real estate
broker in the sale of these properties for the amount of P23,000,000.00, five percent
(5%) of which will be given to the agent as commission. It was appellee who first found
Times Transit Corporation, represented by its president Mr. Rondaris, as prospective
buyer which desired to buy two (2) lots only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually,
sometime in May of 1985, the sale of lots 14 and 15 was consummated. Appellee
received from appellants P48,893.76 as commission. It was then that the rift between
the contending parties soon emerged. Appellee apparently felt short changed because
according to him, his total commission should be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%)
of the agreed price of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to appellants for
the two (2) lots, and that it was he who introduced the buyer to appellants and
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unceasingly facilitated the negotiation which ultimately led to the consummation of the
sale. Hence, he sued below to collect the balance of P303,606.24 after having received
P48,893.76 in advance.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in not ordering the dismissal of the complaint for failure to implead
indispensable parties-in-interest.
HELD The De Castros' contentions are devoid of legal basis. An indispensable party is one
whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no
final determination of the case can be had. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence. Whenever it appears to
the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined,
it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party. However,
the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant
case. There is no dispute that Constante appointed Artigo in a handwritten note dated
January 24, 1984 to sell the properties of the De Castro’s for P23 million at a 5 percent
commission. The authority was on a first come, first serve basis.

Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other co-owners.
Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and
Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante's individual or
representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case
for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties. The De Castros
admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of agency

G.R. No. 141463 August 6, 2002

VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACT Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of a parcel of land which was adjacent
S to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of
Herminigilda Pedro. Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then
registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided
them into smaller lots. Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons
including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. The other portions
were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third
persons. Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against
Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During
the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura
Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in
favor of said corporation. Trial continued for three decades.
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RTC: Adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching
on plaintiff’s land.
CA: It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were
considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be
reached by the execution order.
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the decision can also be enforced
against the petitioners even if they were not impleaded as parties.
HELD The Court must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel
of land under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the
registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the
title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on
the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola,
are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the
petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.

Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in
Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original
action was commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners
acquired the lot before the commencement of the civil case. Second, the right over the
disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based on a
title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by
the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the
right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully
recognized Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in
their own names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her
predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land.

G.R. No. 135796 October 3, 2002

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. MERCEDES M. OLIVER
FACT Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M. Oliver opened a joint account in Chinabank.
S Lim introduced Oliver to the bank’s branch manager as his partner in the rice and palay
trading business. Thereafter, Lim and Oliver applied for a P17 million loan, offering as
collateral a lot in the name of Oliver. The bank approved the application. Lim and Oliver
executed in favor of Chinabank a promissory note for P16,650,000, as well as a Real
Estate Mortgage on the property. The mortgage was duly registered and annotated on
the original title under the custody of the Registry of Deeds and on the owner’s duplicate
copy in the bank’s possession. The mortgage document showed Mercedes Oliver’s
address to be No. 95 Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. For brevity, she is hereafter
referred to as "Oliver One."

Respondent claiming that she is Mercedes M. Oliver with postal office address at No. 40
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J.P. Rizal St., San Pedro, Laguna, filed an action for annulment of mortgage and
cancellation of title with damages against Chinabank, Register of Deeds Atty. Mila G.
Flores, and Deputy Register of Deeds Atty. Ferdinand P. Ignacio. Respondent, whom
we shall call as "Oliver Two," claimed that she was the registered and lawful owner of
the land subject of the real estate mortgage; that the owner’s duplicate copy of the title
had always been in her possession; and that she did not apply for a loan or surrender
her title to Chinabank.

RTC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss of Chinabank.

CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE 1. Whether the mortgagor who goes by the name of Mercedes M. Oliver, herein
called Oliver One, an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 96219.
2. Should Section 7 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply in this case?
HELD Petitioner’s contention is far from tenable. An indispensable party is a party in interest,
without whom no final determination can be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor
Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the case. She
stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title
is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver One’s absence from the case does not
hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and
petitioner. A perusal of Oliver Two’s allegations in the complaint below shows that it was
for annulment of mortgage due to petitioner’s negligence in not determining the actual
ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgage’s annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in
the Registry of Deeds’ custody. To support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two had
to prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that
she is not the same person using that name who entered into a deed of mortgage with
the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint without necessarily
impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an indispensable party
in the case filed by Oliver Two.

As to the second issue, since mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable party,
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires compulsory
joinder of indispensable parties in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule
3, that applies.11 Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of
the parties.12 Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it found no abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court for denying Chinabank’s motion to dismiss and,
instead, suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor Oliver
One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either
on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.
G.R. No. 176973 February 25, 2015
DAVID M. DAVID vs. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS, JR.
FACT David, Paragas and Lobrin agreed to venture into a business in Hong Kong. They
S created Olympia International, Ltd. (Olympia) under HK laws. Olympia started with
"selling, through catalogs, consumer products such as appliances, furniture and
electronic equipment to the OFWs in Hong Kong, to be delivered to their addresses in
the Philippines. They coined the name Kayang-Kaya for the venture. Olympia became
the exclusive general agent in HK of PPI’s pre-need plans through the General Agency
Agreement. Olympia launched the Pares-Pares program by which plan holders would
earn points with cash equivalents for successfully enlisting new subscribers. The cash
equivalents, in turn, would be used for the payment of monthly premiums of the plan
holders. PPI authorized Olympia to accept the premium payments, including the cash
equivalent of the bonus points, and to remit the same, net of commissions, to PPI in the
Philippines. The money from HK was to be remitted through Olympia’s account in
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RCBC. In turn, Olympia was to pay the plan holders’ bonuses as well as the share of
profits for the directors.7 David was tasked to personally remit said amounts to PPI as
he was the only signatory authorized to transact on behalf of Olympia regarding the
RCBC accounts. As Paragas alleged, the amount remitted by Olympia to RCBC
reached ₱82,978,543.00, representing the total net earnings from the pre-need plans,
30% of which comprised the bonus points earned by the subscribers under the Pares-
Pares program. The rest was to be distributed among the four partners.
ISSUE Whether Olympia is not a party to the case below, hence, the dismissal of the complaint
and compulsory counterclaims are personal in nature to the parties and is within the
purview of Section 2 of Rule 17.
HELD The Court reiterated that an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Considering that
David was asking for judicial determination of his rights in Olympia, it is without a doubt,
an indispensable party as it stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the main
proceeding. It has such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect its rights. Not having been impleaded, Olympia cannot be prejudiced
by any judgment where its interests and properties are adjudicated in favor of another
even if the latter is a beneficial owner. It cannot be said either to have consented to the
judicial approval of the compromise, much less waived substantial rights, because it was
never a party in the proceedings.

Moreover, Olympia’s absence did not confer upon the RTC the jurisdiction or authority to
hear and resolve the whole controversy.1âwphi1 This lack of authority on the part of the
RTC which flows from the absence of Olympia, being an indispensable party,
necessarily negates any binding effect of the subject judicially-approved compromise
agreement. Time and again, the Court has held that the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The failure to implead
an indispensable party is not a mere procedural matter. Rather, it brings to fore the right
of a disregarded party to its constitutional rights to due process. Having Olympia's
interest being subjected to a judicially-approved agreement, absent any participation in
the proceeding leading to the same, is procedurally flawed. It is unfair for being violative
of its right to due process. In fine, a holding that is based on a compromise agreement
that springs from a void proceeding for want of jurisdiction over the person of an
indispensable party can never become binding, final nor executory and it may be
"ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."
G.R. No. 135796 October 3, 2002
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. MERCEDES M. OLIVER
FACT Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M. Oliver opened a joint account in Chinabank.
S Lim introduced Oliver to the bank’s branch manager as his partner in the rice and palay
trading business. Thereafter, Lim and Oliver applied for a P17 million loan, offering as
collateral a lot in the name of Oliver. The bank approved the application. Lim and Oliver
executed in favor of Chinabank a promissory note for P16,650,000, as well as a Real
Estate Mortgage on the property. The mortgage was duly registered and annotated on
the original title under the custody of the Registry of Deeds and on the owner’s duplicate
copy in the bank’s possession. The mortgage document showed Mercedes Oliver’s
address to be No. 95 Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. For brevity, she is hereafter
referred to as "Oliver One."

Respondent claiming that she is Mercedes M. Oliver with postal office address at No. 40
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J.P. Rizal St., San Pedro, Laguna, filed an action for annulment of mortgage and
cancellation of title with damages against Chinabank, Register of Deeds Atty. Mila G.
Flores, and Deputy Register of Deeds Atty. Ferdinand P. Ignacio. Respondent, whom
we shall call as "Oliver Two," claimed that she was the registered and lawful owner of
the land subject of the real estate mortgage; that the owner’s duplicate copy of the title
had always been in her possession; and that she did not apply for a loan or surrender
her title to Chinabank.

RTC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss of Chinabank.

CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE 1. Whether the mortgagor who goes by the name of Mercedes M. Oliver, herein
called Oliver One, an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 96219.
2. Should Section 7 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply in this case?
HELD Petitioner’s contention is far from tenable. An indispensable party is a party in interest,
without whom no final determination can be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor
Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the case. She
stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title
is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver One’s absence from the case does not
hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and
petitioner. A perusal of Oliver Two’s allegations in the complaint below shows that it was
for annulment of mortgage due to petitioner’s negligence in not determining the actual
ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgage’s annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in
the Registry of Deeds’ custody. To support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two had
to prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that
she is not the same person using that name who entered into a deed of mortgage with
the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint without necessarily
impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an indispensable party
in the case filed by Oliver Two.

As to the second issue, since mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable party,
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires compulsory
joinder of indispensable parties in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule
3, that applies.11 Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of
the parties.12 Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it found no abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court for denying Chinabank’s motion to dismiss and,
instead, suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor Oliver
One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either
on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.
G.R. No. 176973 February 25, 2015
DAVID M. DAVID vs. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS, JR.
FACT Municipality of Agoo entered into 2 loans with LBP in order to finance a Redevelopment
S Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality authorized
the Mayor Eriguel to enter into a P4M loan with LBP for the Public Plaza and again for
the amount of P28M to construct a commercial center. The Municipality used as
collateral a 2,323.75 sqm lot at the south-eastern portion of the Plaza. Cacayuran and
other residents opposed the redevelopment of the Plaza as well as the means of the
funding. They claim that these are highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental
to public interest resulting in the desecration of the public plaza. Cacayuran’s request for
the documents relating to the plaza’s redevelopment was not granted. Cacayuran
invokes his taxpayer right and files a complaint against LBP and officers of the
municipality but does not include the municipality itself as party-defendant. He
questioned the validity of the loan agreements and prays that the redevelopment is
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enjoined. LBP asserted that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action because he
was not privy to the loan agreements.

RTC: Held the Subject loans are null and void. Resolutions approving the loanwere
passed irregularly and are thus ultra vires. Plaza lot is property for public use and not
valid as collateral.
CA: affirmed RTC with modification. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and the
issue is of transcendental importance to public interest.
ISSUE Whether the Municipality of Agoo should be deemed an indispensable party to the case.
HELD YES, it is an indispensable party under Sec 7, Rule 3 which mandates that all
indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it is the party whose interest will be
affected by the court’s action and without whom no final determination of the case can
be had. His legal presence is an absolute necessity. Absence of the indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act.

Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint. The proper remedy is to implead them. In this case, Cacayuran failed to
implead the Municipality, a real party in interest and an indispensable party that stands
to be directly affected by any judicial resolution. It is the contracting party and the owner
of the public plaza. It stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the case.

The decision of the RTC, CA, and SC is not binding upon the Municipality as it was not
impleaded as defendant in the case. Case is REMANDED to the RTC and Cacayuran is
DIRECTED to implead all indispensable parties.

G.R. No. 166302. July 28, 2005

LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC. vs. ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, et. al.
FACT Petitioner Lotte Phils., Inc. is a domestic corporation. Respondents are among those
S who were hired and assigned to the confectionery facility operated by private
respondent. 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services entered into a contract with private
respondent to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial and other
services to the latter. However, private respondent dispensed with their services
allegedly due to the expiration/termination of the service contract by respondent with 7J.
They were either told "huwag muna kayong pumasok at tatawagan na lang kung may
gawa"; or were asked to wait "pag magrereport sila sa trabaho." Unfortunately,
petitioners were never called back to work again. petitioners lodged a labor complaint
against both private respondent Lotte and 7J, for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter
Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr., rendered judgment declaring 7J as employer of respondents.
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The arbiter also found 7J guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered to reinstate respondents.
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying
that Lotte be declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only
contractor. The Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the real employer of respondents
and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte.
Respondents who performed activities directly related to Lotte’s business were its
regular employees under Art. 280 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE Whether 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondents’
petition in the Court of Appeals.
HELD In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be
affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be
solely liable as the employer of respondents. The Court of Appeals however rendered
Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was not impleaded by holding that the
former is the real employer of respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J. An
indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary
to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause,
the right to act in a case". Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit
or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011

DOMINGO CARABEO vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO
FACT Domingo Carabeo entered into a contract denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng
S Karapatan sa Lupa" with Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco whereby petitioner
agreed to sell his rights over a parcel of unregistered to respondents for ₱38,000.
Respondents tendered their initial payment of ₱10,000 upon signing of the contract, the
remaining balance to be paid on September 1990. Respondents were later to claim that
when they were about to hand in the balance of the purchase price, petitioner requested
them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going "squabble" over the land. By
respondents’ claim, despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted on
petitioner’s acceptance of the remaining balance of ₱18,900 but petitioner remained firm
in his refusal, proffering as reason therefor that he would register the land first.
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Respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that
petitioner had caused its registration in his name. They offered to pay the balance but
petitioner declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan
Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, however, hence, respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan. Petitioner
countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object
certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land. In any
event, petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld, respondents’
failure to comply with their reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price
would render the action premature.
ISSUE Whether the death of herein petitioner causes the dismissal of the action filed by
respondents; respondents’ cause of action being an action in personam.
HELD In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the
kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his
proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void,
there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and
since the action involves property rights, it survives. It bears noting that trial on the
merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not
informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment
without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner’s
legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property
subject of the action is concerned.

In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus,
in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on
behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted
as a party after his death. The trial court’s decision had thereby become final and
executory, no appeal having been perfected.

G.R. No. 162788 July 28, 2005

Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN
FACT The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the
S cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the RTC
of Nueva Ecija. Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in the
amount of ₱9,000, payable after five (5) years. To secure the payment of the obligation,
he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was for a
parcel of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. The parties also executed
another document entitled "Kasunduan." Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan
showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz
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contended that this document was merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of
the property, a right that he failed to exercise. The RTC issued a Decision in his favor.
The trial court declared that the parties had entered into a sale with a right of
repurchase. It further held that respondent had made a valid tender of payment on two
separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase. Accordingly, petitioners were
required to reconvey the property upon his payment.
ISSUE Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin.
HELD When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of
Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by
Section 16 of Rule 3. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no
adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental
right to a day in court is denied. This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution
by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the
case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim
that the right to due process was violated.

Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right
of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated
formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of
due process. Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated
in the case. We stress that the appellate court had ordered his legal representatives to
appear and substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered
correctly. In all proceedings, the legal representatives must appear to protect the
interests of the deceased. After the rendition of judgment, further proceedings may be
held, such as a motion for reconsideration or a new trial, an appeal, or an execution.

Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to
have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin.
There being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a
ground to nullify the trial court’s Decision.

G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO
FACT Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of
S money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the
RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s
possession. In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the
two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease
Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) — the
actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case
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but set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Go’s (husband) leasing
business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the
inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a complaint
which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of
action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. CA denied petition.
ISSUE Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
HELD YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as the
registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention,
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint
does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.

Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties
registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit
for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other
co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit
is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to
recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-
forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules. Even assuming that
Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015

MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO
C. DIVINAGRACIA
vs.
CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA,
MAUDE NOBLEZA
FACT Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land. He had 2 children with his 1st wife and 7 children
S with his 2nd wife. He also begot 3 illegitimate children. Both Mateo, Sr. (7 children) and
Cebeleo, Sr. (2) pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. Santiago, who bought the shares of
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majority of the heirs of a property left by Conrado, Sr. He filed a complaint for partition
but did not implead Mateo, Sr.’s children.

RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the
subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However,
Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering
that Felcon (son of Mateo Sr.) admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with
regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share. CA dismissed Santiago’s complaint for partition. It held the
Mateo, Sr.’s children are indispensable parties to the judicial partition and thus, their
non-inclusion as defendants would necessarily result in its dismissal.
ISSUE Whether the action for partition proper without impleading Mateo, Sr.’s children.
HELD No because the co-heirs are indispensable parties. They have rights over the subject
land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for
partition. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.

The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the
dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus,
the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present. (Domingo v. Scheer). The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable.

G.R. No. 225309 March 06, 2018

ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO v. ANTONIO T. VILAR
FACT Spouses Zulueta, registered owners of several parcels of land, obtained various loans
S secured by the mother titles from the GSIS. From the records, the lot covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26105 was divided into 199 lots. Under the first
mortgage contract, 78 of these lots were excluded from the mortgage. When Spouses
Zulueta defaulted in their payment, GSIS extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgages
wherein the latter emerged as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was then issued.
GSIS, however, consolidated its title on all of the three mother titles, including the 78 lots
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which were expressly excluded from the mortgage contract. Later, GSIS sold the
foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation. The same, however, was
disapproved by the Office of the President. Accordingly, the TCTs issued in favor of
YDC were canceled. Spouses Zulueta were succeeded by Antonio Zulueta (Antonio),
who transferred all his rights and interests in the excluded lots to Eduardo Santiago
(Eduardo). Claiming his rights and interests over the excluded lots, Eduardo, through his
counsel, sent a letter to GSIS for the return of the same. Antonio, as represented by
Eduardo, filed an Action for Reconveyance of the excluded lots against the GSIS.
Subsequently, Antonio was substituted by Eduardo. Upon Eduardo's demise, however,
he was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Rosario.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in impleading Vilar as party-plaintiff in substitution of Rosario.
HELD Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the
widow of the original party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination of the propriety of the
action of the trial court in merely noting and not granting his motion would necessarily
affect her interest in the subject matter of litigation as the party-plaintiff. Accordingly, the
Court differs with the CA in ruling that the petition for certiorari filed before it merely
delves into the issue of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court. Guilty of
repetition, the final determination of the case would pry into the right of Rosario as party-
plaintiff before the lower court who is entitled to the proceeds of the judgment award. As
it is, the CA did not actually rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion alone as its
corollary ruling inquired into the right of Rosario. In ruling for Vilar's substitution, the right
of Rosario as to the proceeds of the judgment award was thwarted as the CA effectively
ordered that the proceeds pertaining to Rosario be awarded instead to Vilar.

Likewise, the Court finds merit in Rosario's contention that her failure to participate in the
proceedings before the CA constitutes a denial of her constitutional right to due process.
Moreover, even the basis for the substitution of Vilar as pronounced by the CA was
unfounded. In ruling so, the CA merely relied on the purported Deeds of Assignment of
Rights executed between Eduardo and Vilar in considering that the latter is a transferee
pendente lite, who can rightfully and legally substitute Rosario as party-plaintiff in the
implementation of a writ of execution.

G.R. No. 166920 February 19, 2007

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER HENRICHSEN
vs.
KLAUS K. SCHONFELD
FACT Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New Westminster, British
S Columbia, Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering
and water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly
established and incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary
purpose of PPI was to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical
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services both in and out of the Philippines. PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy
services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. Respondent was employed by PCIJ,
through Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI. However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI
sector manager in the Philippines. His salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.
Respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment had
been terminated for the reason that PCIJ and PPI had not been successful in the water
and sanitation sector in the Philippines. However, Henrichsen requested respondent to
stay put in his job until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and
discuss all the opportunities he had developed. Respondent continued his work with PPI
until the end of business hours. Respondent filed with PPI several money claims,
including unpaid salary, leave pay, air fare from Manila to Canada, and cost of shipment
of goods to Canada. PPI partially settled some of his claims, but refused to pay the rest.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioners PPI and
Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE Whether the proper venue for the present complaint is the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC and not the Court of Arbitration in London.
HELD We agree with the conclusion of the CA that there was an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner PPI and respondent using the four-fold test. In the case
at bar, the power to control and supervise petitioner’s work performance devolved upon
the respondent company. Likewise, the power to terminate the employment relationship
was exercised by the President of the respondent company. It is not the letterhead used
by the company in the termination letter which controls, but the person who exercised
the power to terminate the employee. It is also inconsequential if the second letter of
employment executed in the Philippines was not signed by the petitioner. An employer-
employee relationship may indeed exist even in the absence of a written contract, so
long as the four elements mentioned in the Mafinco case are all present.

Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the
intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language
clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them
be litigated only at the place named by them.

G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007

MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK
FACT Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in
S the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained
several loans from the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the said loans,
Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land
which the real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When
Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank
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through counsel sent him a written demand, however, proved futile. Respondent bank
filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa
Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco
through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a
writ of execution was served on the spouses. Petitioner sought the annulment of the
Regional Trial Court decision contending, among others, that the trial court failed to
acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without
any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC
decision invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.
ISSUE Whether the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner.
HELD No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi
in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB

undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure
proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is
not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this
case, must be personally served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO
FACT The City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five
S parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent
Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land were previously mortgaged to City trust
Banking Corporation, the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate
Mortgage Contract. The Manila RTC rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of
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land expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory and was
entered in the book of entries of judgment. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to
Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant's Request to Release, but
the RTC denied the motion for having been "filed out of time." The petitioner sued the
respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint. The respondents then filed their reply, in which they raised for the
first time their objection on the ground of improper venue. They contended that the
action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a supplementary action of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought in
the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the properties were located. The
Makati RTC denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit; and
held on the issue of improper venue that it would be improper for this Court to dismiss
the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue is
indeed improperly laid, since the said ground was not raised in the defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.
ISSUE Whether an action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
property mortgage is a personal action or a real action.
HELD It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal
action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have
been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is
also referred to as a local action.

In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. such
actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery
of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a
personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which
reason the action is considered a transitory one. Based on the distinctions between real
and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title
to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.

G.R. No. 228617 September 20, 2017

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. SPOUSES VICTORIANO AND MELANIE RAMOS
FACT Spouses Ramos applied for several credit lines with petitioner PDB for the construction
S of a warehouse in Barangay Santo Tomas, Nueva Ecija. The said application was
approved for P40,000,000.00, secured by Real Estate Mortgage. Spouses Ramos
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requested for additional loan. Despite the assurance of the bank, only P25,000,000.00 in
additional loan was approved and released by PDB, which was secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over four (4) real properties. Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their
obligations as they fell due. They appealed to PDB for the deferment of debt servicing
and requested for a restructuring scheme but the parties failed to reach an agreement.
Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgages. Instead of
filing an Answer, PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the venue of the
action was improperly laid considering that the real estate mortgages signed by the
parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall be filed in Makati City
only. It further noted that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and must
therefore be dismissed.

RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Ramos.

CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in affirming the order of the RTC, which denied the motion to
dismiss despite the improper venue of the case.
HELD The petition is meritorious. The RTC should have granted the Urgent Motion to Dismiss
filed by PDB on the ground that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint being one
for annulment of real estate mortgages and promissory notes is in the nature of a
personal action, the venue of which may be fixed by the parties to the contract. In this
case, it was agreed that any suit or action that may arise from the mortgage contracts or
the promissory notes must be filed and tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or
public policy, the stipulation on venue, which PDB and Spouses Ramos freely and
willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and thus, should be complied
with in good faith.

In the present case, Spouses Ramos had validly waived their right to choose the venue
for any suit or action arising from the mortgages or promissory notes when they agreed
to the limit the same to Makati City only and nowhere else. True enough, the stipulation
on the venue was couched in a language showing the intention of the parties to restrict
the filing of any suit or action to the designated place only. It is crystal clear that the
intention was not just to make the said place an additional forum or venue but the only
jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to the mortgage contracts may be filed.
There being no showing that such waiver was invalid or that the stipulation on venue
was against public policy, the agreement of the parties should be upheld. It is therefore
a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to deny the motion to dismiss filed by
PDB on the ground of improper venue, especially when the said issue had been raised
at the most opportune time, that is, within the time for but before the filing of an answer.
The CA should have given this matter a more serious consideration and not simply
brushed it aside. Based on the foregoing, the general rules on venue admit of
exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or
when the parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.

Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive. "Written

stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in
the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not
only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter."

G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014

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A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. EMMA MONDEJAR

FACT Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small
S Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of
₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2005. The MTCC rendered a Decision holding that since petitioner was
issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) by the National Water Resources
Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed
flat rate of ₱75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of ₱1,050.00 for the period June 1,
2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total payments
equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid
petitioner.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the MTCC. The RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari,
finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of
small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small
Claims Cases. The RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with
another decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has
been awarded. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE Whether the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 assailing the
propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
HELD The petition is meritorious. Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to
assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to
the RTC’s ruling. Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it
is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the
MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an
evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.

The decision shall be final and unappealable. Considering the final nature of a small
claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed,
and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless,
the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari.
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G.R. No. 198752

ARTURO C. ALBA, JR. vs. RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO
FACT Petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr. filed with the RTC of Roxas City, a Complaint against
S respondents Raymund D. Malapajo, Ramil D. Malapajo and the Register of Deeds of
Roxas City for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or cancellation of title
and damages alleging, among others, that he was the previous registered owner of a
parcel of land; that his title was subsequently canceled by virtue of a deed of sale he
allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo; and that the deed of sale was a
forged document which respondents Malapajo were the co-authors of. Petitioner filed a
Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stating, among others, that
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of respondents' permissive
counterclaim. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing as if a
Motion to Dismiss had been filed alleging that respondents' counterclaims are in the
nature of a permissive counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of docket fees and
filing of a... certification against forum shopping; and, that the supposed loan extended
by respondents' mother to petitioner, must also be dismissed as respondents are not the
real parties-in-interest.

RTC: Issued an Order denying petitioner's motion finding that respondents'

counterclaims are compulsory.
CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE Whether respondents' counterclaim is permissive in nature which requires the payment
of docket fees and a certification against forum shopping for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the same.
HELD We find that the CA erred in denying petitioner's petition for certiorari after the latter had
clearly shown compliance with the proof of service of the petition as required under
Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “A counterclaim is any claim
which a defending party may have against an opposing party.” A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of
or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be
within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except
that in an original action before the RTC, necessarily connected with the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third
persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if
not set up in the same action.

A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected

with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent
claim that may be filed separately in another case. Since respondents' counterclaim is
compulsory, it must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it would be barred forever.
If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different proceeding, it would be
abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate
on the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore, no need for respondents to pay docket
fees and to file a certification against forum shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the said counterclaim.
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G.R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015

LIM TECK CHUAN vs. SERAFIN UY AND LEOPOLDA CECILIO, LIM SING CHAN @ HENRY
LIM
FACT Lot 5357 was sold by Antonio to the Spouses Cabansag as evidenced by a Deed of
S Sale. Apparently, Francisco failed to transfer the title of the property to their names
because of his work and frequent travels abroad. Spouses Cabansag sold the lot to
Serafin. To pave the way for the transfer of title to Serafin’s name, Spouses Cabansag
attempted to have the same transferred under their names first. However, Francisco
failed to do so as he lost the owner’s copy of TCT together with other documents
pertaining to the sale of the subject lot. Serafin filed a petition before the RTC, praying
for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate TCT in his name, thereby cancelling TCT in
the name of Antonio. Serafin filed a Complaint for quieting of title before the RTC.
Leopolda filed her Answer (with counterclaim, and cross-claim against Henry), asserting
that she was the buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE Whether the dismissal of the complaint, specifically upon motion of the plaintiff under
Section 2 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court also calls for the dismissal of the defendant’s
counterclaim.
HELD The RTC erred when it dismissed the case when the present rules state that the
dismissal shall be limited only to the complaint. A dismissal of an action is different from
a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the
action is dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his
counterclaim in the same action. Nonetheless, the records show that Serafin had been
aware of the petitioner’s claim over the property as descendants of Antonio and Dy
Ochay even before the institution of this case, which was why he impleaded the
petitioner in this case.

Then, the Joint Motion to Dismiss was filed by Serafin and Leopolda on the ground that
both parties were able to settle their differences. It is rather intriguing that in said joint
motion, it was alleged that Serafin was already able to secure a certificate of title in his
name dated July 26, 2001 and that both parties agreed for its cancellation and have a
title over said property issued in their common names.52 Clearly, the petitioner was
peremptorily left out of the picture. From the case’s inception, the petitioner’s interests
and that of his siblings over the subject property were vigilantly defended as evidenced
by the numerous and exchange of pleadings made by the parties. It cannot therefore be
denied that the petitioner has certainly valid defenses and enforceable claims against
the respondents for being dragged into this case. Thus, the petitioner’s manifestation of
his preference to have his counterclaim prosecuted in the same action is valid and in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
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G.R. No. 200567 June 22, 2015

METOROPLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
vs.
CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC. and SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR.
and LEONIZA* F. REYSONO
FACT To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage
S on separate dates. All of the mortgaged properties are registered under the spouses
Reynoso's names, except for TCT No. 565381, which is registered under CPR
Promotions. Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted, prompting MBTC to file
a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages. The mortgaged
properties were sold at a public auction sale. MBTC participated therein and submitted
the highest bid. The day after, petitioner again participated and won in the public auction
sale of the remaining mortgaged properties, having submitted the highest bid. As a
result, petitioner was issued the corresponding Certificates of Sale on July 15 and 16,
1998, covering the properties subjected to the first and second public auctions,
respectively. petitioner MBTC alleged that there remained a deficiency balance, plus
interest and charges as stipulated and agreed upon in the PNs and deeds of real estate
mortgages. Despite petitioner's repeated demands, however, respondents failed to
settle the alleged deficiency. Petitioner filed an action for collection of sum of money
against respondents.
ISSUE Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it grossly misappreciated the
promissory notes, real estate mortgages, petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage, certificates of sale and statement of account marked in evidence and ruled
that petitioner MBTC failed to prove that a deficiency balance resulted after conducting
the extrajudicial foreclosure sales of the mortgaged properties.
HELD It is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à-vis the amount
due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a
deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases,
substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim.
Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two
actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and
partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same
set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate
trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time
by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same
transaction, and the same evidence. The only difference here would be in the findings of
the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of whether or not
the bid prices substantially cover the amounts due. Having determined that a claim for
recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a
deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, the Court rule that respondents failed to timely
raise the same.

It is elementary that a defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be interposed

at the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim.
As it appears from the records, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Then, realizing, based on its
computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price,
respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant’s Brief filed before
the CA. Unfortunately, respondents’ belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it
did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently,
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respondents’ claim for the excess, if any, is already barred. With this, we now resolve
the substantive issues of this case.

A.M. No. CA-07-21-P June 22, 2007

NELSON P. VALDEZ vs. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON M. DABON
FACT Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the
S Court of Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous
relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which was made possible by
sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation. Nelson Averred that he
married Sonia on January 28, 1998 in Paniqui, Tarlac; that Sonia was employed as
Court Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her resignation on May 15, 2006; that
Sonia admitted to have had an adulterous and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon,
from 2000 to 2006, a span of more than five years; that he came to know of the
relationship only on April 18, 2006 after receiving an anonymous text message
hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit affair between the two; and that initially,
Sonia denied the affair but eventually broke down and admitted her sexual liaison with
Atty. Dabon when confronted with a text message he received from Atty. Jocelyn Dabon
(Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent. Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her
infidelity and described her extramarital affair with Atty. Dabon to have been attended by
sexual assaults and maintained through intimidation and threats of exposure, humiliation
and embarrassment.
ISSUE Whether respondent violated Adm. Matter No. 99-12-08-SC when he left for the United
States before his travel authority could be issued.
HELD There is no dispute that respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and immoral
conduct. The illicit relationship which spanned a period of five years was committed
under scandalous circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a
Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals, respondent occupied a position of great
responsibility. As such, he is expected and required to comport himself with dignity and
propriety at all times. Unfortunately, respondent miserably failed to comply with the
demands of his office. Despite the apparent refusal by Sonia Valdez to continue with
their illicit affair, respondent refused to let go and even continued to harass the former.
In one instance, he forcibly boarded Sonia’s car which was parked at the Court of
Appeals’ parking lot and insisted on talking with her. His refusal to alight from the car
elicited shouts from Sonia which in turn drew the attention of other persons in the
vicinity.

It has not also escaped our attention that respondent tried to evade and continue to defy
the processes of the court. After he was formally charged with a complaint for gross
immorality on May 15, 2006, respondent immediately left the following day, May 16,
2006, for the United States. Although the Personnel Division of the Court of Appeals
certified that he filed an application for leave of absence from May 8 to June 2, 2006, the
application however remained unacted upon. This proves that Atty. Dabon left for the
United States before the approval of his application for leave by the authorized official of
the Personnel Division. Moreover, respondent’s application for leave did not indicate the
type of leave he is taking, whether vacation or sick leave, or whether the leave will be
spent here or abroad. In short, respondent’s absence was unauthorized.

Disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense, punishable by suspension of six

months and one day to one year for the first offense, and for the second offense, by
dismissal.3 In this case, respondent’s offense is aggravated by his continued refusal to
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receive and comply with the court processes. His leave was unauthorized and he went
abroad without the requisite travel authority.

G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
FACT One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the
S recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President
and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the
very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her
assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February
28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship." In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG,
this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay
or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the
merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all
parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly
and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its
search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases
on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation,
misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of
these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from
all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.
ISSUE Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a President
during his term of office.
HELD It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties;
(b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c)
in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case. Thus, facts pleaded
in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and
respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take
a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions. The sum of $304,372.43
should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth
could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities. Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.

We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or
income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as
between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there
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were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful
income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as
petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of
respondents.

G.R. No. 142896 September 12, 2007

CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION
vs.
HON. REYNALDO M. ALON, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ERIC B. DE VERA
FACT Caneland Sugar Corporation filed with the RTC of Silay City a complaint for damages,
S injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the LBP and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera. The RTC
issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Order, but was denied. Petitioner then filed with the
CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction, to which the CA dismissed.
ISSUE Whether the RTC’s act of authorizing the foreclosure of its property amounts to a
prejudgment of the case since it amounts to a ruling that respondent has a valid mortgage
in its favor.
HELD Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner’s bone of
contention before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were
covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property
covered by TCT No. T-11292. It does not categorically deny that these promissory notes
are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are, in fact, negative
pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression
which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted."

Petitioner’s allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the granting of any
injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were disputing the amount being sought from
them, upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the
mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with
the doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must show, at least
prima facie, a right to the final relief.
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G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012

PRISCILLA ALMA JOS vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL
FACT Margarita Alma Jose (Margarita) sold to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of
S conditional sale two parcels of land. They agreed that the registration shall be undertaken
by Margarita within a reasonable period of time, and that should Margarita become
incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla
M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application
for registration. Juvenal predeceased Margarita, and Margarita died, making Priscilla
Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to
cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to
improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting
the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Thus, Javellana commenced
an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her.

RTC: Ruled against Javellana.

CA: Reversed RTC decision.
ISSUE Whether or not the RTC order denying Javellana’s Motion for Reconsideration was
appealable.
HELD Yes. The denial of the motion for reconsideration by the RTC of the order of dismissal
was a final order, hence, appealable. Priscilla’s submission that the order of the RTC was
not the proper subject of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is erroneous and cannot be sustained. The distinction between a final
order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in
its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate

special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule
65 allowed to be resorted to. Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal
from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition
against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial
of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
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G.R. No. 186720 February 8, 2012

ELSA D. MEDADO vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSING
FACT Petitioner Spouses Medad and the estate of the late Antonio Consing, as represented by
S Soledad Consing, executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. As part of the
deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with PNB. Subsequent to
the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the government. The
Estate of Consing instituted with the RTC an action for rescission and damages against
Spouses Medado, PNB and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged failure
of the spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement. While the rescission was
pending, LBP issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate of deposit of cash and
agrarian reform bonds, as compensation for the lots covered by the VOS. Spouses
Medado feared that LBP would release the full proceeds thereof to the Estate of Consing.
They claimed to be the ones entitled to the proceeds considering that they had bought the
properties through the Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage which they and the
Estate of Consing had earlier executed. Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio
Consing (Consing) questioned the RTC's order via a petition for certiorari filed with the
CA. They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction for
violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping. Spouses Medado questioned,
among other matters, the authority of Soledad to sign the petition's certification of non-
forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners. CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 797-C for injunction during the pendency
of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission and damages as this violates the rule against
forum shopping.
ISSUE Whether or not the CA correctly admitted the petition for certiorari filed before it,
notwithstanding alleged deficiencies in its verification and certification against forum
shopping.
HELD The authority of Soledad includes the filing of an appeal before the CA, including the
execution of a verification and certification against forum shopping therefor, being acts
necessary "to protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary and
proper" in relation to their rights over the subject properties. In addition, the allegations
and contentions embodied in the CA petition do not deviate from the claims already made
by the heirs in Civil Case Nos. 00-11320 and 797-C, both specifically mentioned in the
SPA. We emphasize that the verification requirement is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of
the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. We
rule that there was no deficiency in the petition's verification and certification against
forum shopping filed with the CA.

In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a
common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the
petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the
court from proceeding with the action. The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of
them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum
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shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances,
the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering
that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS vs. CELSO M. PALER
FACT Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II with the
S Technical Support Service of the Commission on Appointments. He submitted a request
for vacation leave for 74 working days. Mr. Paler's Application for Leave may be acted
upon depending on the completion of his work load and submission of the medical
certificate." Paler left for the United States without verifying whether his application for
leave was approved or denied. The Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was
being dropped from the roll of employees due to his continuous 30-day absence without
leave and in accordance with Section 63, CSC Memorandum Circular. Paler moved for
reconsideration but this was denied on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.

CSC: Reversed the decision of the Commission Chairman.

CA: Affirmed with modification the decision of CSC.
ISSUE Whether the Commission Secretary has the authority to file the petition and sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission
Chairman.
HELD The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity
created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the
Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who
personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification.
With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is
that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.
In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman
to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf.
There is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to
controvert Paler’s allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.

Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it merely restates the arguments presented
before the CSC and CA. It does not advance any cogent reason that will convince this
Court to deviate from the rulings of both tribunals.
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G.R. Nos. 174365-66 February 04, 2015

ROMEO BASAN, et. al. vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES
FACT Petitioners Romeo Basan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against
S respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, alleging that respondent dismissed them
without just cause and prior written notice required by law. Respondent corporation,
however, countered that it hired petitioners as temporary route helpers to act as
substitutes for its absent regular route helpers merely for a fixed period in anticipation of
the high volume of work in its plants or sales offices. As such, petitioners’ claims have no
basis for they knew that their assignment as route helpers was temporary in duration.

LA: Ruled in favor of petitioners.

NLRC: Affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
CA: Reversed the decision of the LA and NLRC.
ISSUE Whether the petition should be denied due course for its verification and certification of
non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
HELD We hold that while the general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of
them, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial
compliance with the procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the
rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct.16 Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
certification requirement. Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by petitioner
Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with
substantial justice to overlook petitioners’ procedural lapses. Indeed, the application of
technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.
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G.R. No. 173186 September 16, 2015

ANICETO UY
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MINDANAO STATION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, CARMENCITA
NAVAL-SAI, REP. BY HER ATTORNEY-IN FACT RODOLFO FLORENTINO
FACT Private respondent Carmencita Naval-Sai acquired ownership of a parcel of land from her
S brother. The land was later subdivided, with the corresponding titles issued in Naval-Sai's
name. Subsequently, Naval-Sai sold the subject lot to a certain Bobby Adil on installment,
on the condition that the absolute deed of sale will be executed only upon full payment.
Adil failed to pay the amortization, forcing him to sell his unfinished building on the
property to spouses Francisco and Louella Omandac. Naval-Sai learned that petitioner
filed a case for recovery of possession against Francisco Omandac. Naval-Sai filed a
motion for new trial before the Court of Appeals, arguing that her signature in the
purported deed of sale presented in the case between her and petitioner was a forgery.
Naval-Sai prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void ab initio because the
alleged sale between her and petitioner was a forgery. Naval-Sai argued that she never
sold the lots and that her signature in the purported deed of sale is spurious. Petitioner
claimed that he and Naval-Sai entered into a valid contract of sale in 1981 and that the
lots were sold for value. The corresponding TCTs were issued in his name shortly
thereafter and since then, he had been in complete control of the properties.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred when it ruled that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements on certification for non-forum shopping.
HELD There was substantial compliance with the requirements on certification against forum
shopping. The original complaint contained a proper verification and certification against
forum shopping duly signed by Naval-Sai as plaintiff. The verification and certification in
the amended complaint, on the other hand, was only signed by her counsel, Atty.
Norberta L. Ela. Atty. Ela was not authorized to sign on behalf of Naval-Sai, as in fact, she
assigned one Rodolfo Florentino as agent. The Court of Appeals pointed out that in the
certification in the amended complaint, Atty. Ela specified that it should be taken and read
together with the original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this as a cautionary move
on the part of Naval-Sai, justifying the relaxation of the rules on the ground of substantial
compliance. We find, however, that this cautionary move is ineffectual because under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. For
all intents and purposes, therefore, the original complaint and its verification and
certification ceased to exist. This, notwithstanding, we find there was still substantial
compliance with the Rules.

A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the

party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending
cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It must be
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executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. We have ruled
that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable
by its subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where we
exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the
presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.

G.R. No. 207041 November 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ROXAS CITY vs. JESUS A. ARROJADO
FACT In an Information, Jesus Arrojado was charged with the crime of murder by the Office of
S the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz. Arrojado filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Information filed against him on the ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the
said Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter
No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was promulgated by this Court via an En Banc
Resolution dated June 3, 2008. The People of the Philippines (The People), represented
by the office of the City Prosecutor, filed its Comment/Opposition to Arrojado’s Motion to
Dismiss.

The RTC dismissed the subject Information without prejudice. The People filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the trial court denied. The People then filed a petition for certiorari
and/or mandamus with the CA. The CA denied The People’s petition and affirmed the
questioned RTC Orders. Hence, he filed a petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme
Court. The People contends that: (1) the term “pleadings” as used in B.M. No. 1922 does
not include criminal Information filed in court; (2) the failure of the investigating prosecutor
to indicate in the Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of
Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss the subject
Information which is otherwise complete in form and substance.
ISSUE Whether the failure of the of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the Information the
number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a valid ground to
dismiss the subject Information.
HELD Failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the subject Information the number
and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a valid ground to dismiss such
Information. Suffice it to state that B.M. No. 1922 categorically provides that “failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records.”

The Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the Information, without prejudice, did
not leave the prosecution without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. To avoid
undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal case and to uphold the parties'
respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case, the prosecution, mindful of its duty
not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do justice, could have simply re-
filed the Information containing the required number and date of issue of the investigating
prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various
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petitions in court to stubbornly insist on its position and question the trial court's dismissal
of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time and effort and the State's resources.

G.R. No. 190203 November 07, 2016

POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. ROMELIA REY, et. al.
FACT Powerhouse hired respondents s operators for its foreign principal, Catcher Technical Co.
S Ltd./Catcher Industrial Co. Ltd. (Catcher), based in Taiwan, for the duration of two years
commencing upon their arrival at the jobsite. Catcher informed respondent employees
that they would be reducing their working days due to low orders and financial difficulties.
The respondent employees were repatriated to the Philippines. Respondent employees
filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against Powerhouse and Catcher. On the
other hand, Powerhouse maintained that respondent employees voluntarily gave up their
jobs following their rejection of Catcher's proposal to reduce their working days. It
contended that before their repatriation, each of the respondents accepted payments by
way of settlement, with the assistance of Labor Attache Romulo Salud. Powerhouse
moved to implead JEJ as respondent on account of the alleged transfer to the latter of
Catcher's accreditation. The motion was granted and JEJ submitted its position paper,
arguing that the supposed transfer of accreditation to it did not affect the joint and solidary
liability of Powerhouse in favor of respondent employees. It averred that any contract
between JEJ and Powerhouse could not be enforced in the case as it involved no
employer-employee relationship and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter.

LA: Ruled in favor of respondent employees.

NLRC: Affirmed LA’s decision with modifications.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner substantially complied with the requirements of verification and
certification against forum shopping.
HELD Powerhouse substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification
against forum shopping.

In this case, the verification and certification attached to the petition before the CA was
signed by William C. Go, the President and General Manager of Powerhouse, one of the
officers enumerated in the foregoing recognized exception. While the petition was not
accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate, his authority was ratified by the Board in its
Resolution adopted on October 24, 2007. Thus, even if he was not authorized to execute
the Verification and Certification at the time of the filing of the Petition, the ratification by
the board of directors retroactively confirms and affirms his authority and gives us more
reason to uphold that authority.
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In previous cases, we held that the following officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3) the General
Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case. The rationale applied in these cases is to justify the authority of
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate
against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of
the allegations in the petition."

G.R. No. 222737 November 12, 2018

HEIRS OF JOSEFINA GABRIEL vs. SECUNDINA CEBRERO, CELSO LAVIÑA, AND MANUEL
C. CHUA
FACT Segundina Cebrero, through her attorney-in-fact Remedios Muyot, executed a real estate
S mortgage over the subject property registered under the name of Cebrero's late husband
as security for the payment pursuant to an amicable settlement entered into by the parties
in the case of annulment of revocation of donation. In the said settlement, Josefina
Gabriel recognized Cebrero's absolute ownership of the subject property and relinquished
all her claims over the property in consideration of the payment. Upon Cebrero's failure to
pay the amount within the period of extension, Gabriel filed an action for foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage. In their Answer, respondents alleged that Gabriel has no legal
capacity to sue as she was bedridden and confined at the Makati Medical Center. The
complaint should be dismissed because Caniza signed the verification and certification of
the complaint without proper authority.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred when it dismissed the complaint on the sole basis of mere
technicality that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not supported
with the Special Power of Attorney of Eduardo Cañiza.
HELD The complaint filed before the RTC was filed in the name of Gabriel, however, it was
Cañiza who executed the verification and certification of forum shopping, alleging that he
was Gabriel's attorney-in-fact. It was held that when an SPA was constituted precisely to
authorize the agent to file and prosecute suits on behalf of the principal, then it is such
agent who has actual and personal knowledge whether he or she has initiated similar
actions or proceedings before various courts on the same issue on the principal's behalf,
thus, satisfying the requirements for a valid certification against forum shopping. The
rationale behind the rule that it must be the "petitioner or principal party himself” who
should sign such certification does not apply. Thus, the rule on the certification against
forum shopping has been properly complied with when it is the agent or attorney-in-fact
who initiated the action on the principal's behalf and who signed the certification against
forum shopping.

However, there was no duly executed SPA appended to the complaint to prove Cañiza's
supposed authority to file and prosecute suits on behalf of Gabriel. The Court cannot
consider the mere mention in the December 15, 1993 Decision that he was Gabriel's
attorney-in-fact as evidence that he was indeed authorized and empowered to initiate the
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instant action against respondents. There was also no evidence of substantial compliance
with the rules or even an attempt to submit an SPA after filing of the complaint.

G.R. No. 207970 January 20, 2016

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, INC.
FACT The petitioner and the respondent entered into an agreement whereby the former agreed
S to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted
obligation on installment basis within 36 months. In the letter, the respondent notified the
petitioner that its new administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the
contracts defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was
consequently declining to recognize the agreement because of the lack of approval by its
Board of Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had
expired. The petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the respondent's
failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC.
The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis
pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated
that it had earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the
February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of
that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by
relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.
HELD Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on
the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the
petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on
the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34
of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the
complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the
respondent's averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made
in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the
total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should
have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not
allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to
buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's
denial of liability as insincere.
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G.R. No. 187487 June 29, 2015

GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. AND GEORGE C. GO, Petitioners, v. BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT ONE [SPV-
AMC], INC.
FACT Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners seeking that the latter be held jointly
S and severally liable to it for the payment of their loan obligation. As alleged by
respondent, Go Tong Electrical had applied for and was granted financial assistance by
the then Bank of South East Asia (BSA). In their Answer with Counterclaim (Answer),
petitioners merely stated that they "specifically deny" the allegations under the
complaint. Of particular note is their denial of the execution of the loan agreement, the
PN, and the CSA "for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
[respondent's] purposes."

RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents.

CA: Sustained RTC’s ruling in toto.
ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC's ruling.
HELD A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution
of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of the above-quoted rule.
The mere statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they "specifically deny"
the pertinent allegations of the Complaint "for being self-serving and pure conclusions
intended to suit plaintiffs purposes," does not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by
the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not become specific by the use
of the word "specifically." Neither does it become so by the simple expedient of
coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are
"self-serving" or are intended "to suit plaintiffs purposes."

Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the "specific denial under oath"
requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at
by the CA, is that petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness
of the documents evidencing their loan obligation to respondent. The defendant must
declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument
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was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due
execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and
due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not
affecting either.

G.R. NO. 160242 May 17, 2005

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MONARK EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
FACT Monark (MEC) filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Asian
S Construction (ACDC), alleging that ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida
mobile floodlighting systems from MEC, but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals
therefor; that various equipment from MEC were leased by ACDC for the latter’s power
plant; and, that ACDC also purchased and took custody of various equipment parts
from MEC, which, despite demands, MEC failed to pay. ACDC filed a motion to file and
admit answer with third-party complaint against Becthel. In its answer, ACDC admitted
its indebtedness to MEC, but alleged the following special and affirmative defenses:
that Becthel incurred an obligation with ACDC and refused to pay the overdue
obligation; and that the equipment covered by the lease were all used in Becthel’s
construction project.

RTC: denied the motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party complaint, and granted
the motion of MEC.
CA: Affirmed RTC ruling.
ISSUE Whether or not a third-party complaint is proper.
HELD The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to
assert an independent claim against a third-party which he, otherwise, would assert in
another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties
concerned would then be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure
and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the
substantial rights of any litigant. This right to file a third-party complaint against a third-
party rest in the discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually
independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint, such that were it not
for the rule, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint. The third-
party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be recovery against
the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show possibility of recovery.
In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original
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complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party complaint must
allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.

There is no causal connection between the claim of MEC for the rental and the balance
of the purchase price of the equipment and parts sold and leased to the ACDC, and the
failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its account to ACDC after the completion of the
project.

G.R. No. 117434 February 9, 2001

BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SWITZERLAND GENERAL INSURANCE, CO., LTD., and SEAWOOD
SHIPPING, INC.
FACT Petitioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against
S Seawood Shipping, Inc. (Seawood Shipping) with the RTC of Makati. Then, Petitioner
Benguet filed another complaint for damages against respondent Switzerland General
Insurance, Co., Ltd. (Switzerland Insurance). The two cases were consolidated.
Switzerland Insurance filed a third-party complaint against Seawood Shipping, praying
that the latter be ordered to indemnify it for whatever might be adjudged against it in
favor of petitioner. Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried. RTC dismissed Benguet’s
complaint and Switzerland’s third-party complaint against Seawood. CA affirmed the
decision.

Petitioner Benguet now contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that it failed to
establish the loss or shortage of the cargo, because such loss was sufficiently
established by documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as admissions of private
respondents. The cargoes have been properly identified by the bill of lading, Certificate
of Weight, and Mates receipt, all of which stating that 2,243.496 wet metric tons of
copper concentrates were loaded.
ISSUE Whether or not genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e., Bill of
Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mates Receipt, were properly
established by the testimony of its witness, and that as a result, there is a prima facie
presumption that their contents are true.
HELD NO. The contents of such documents can be rebutted.

The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that
the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
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figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document
was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. When the law
makes use of the phrase genuineness and due execution of the instrument it means
nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import
on its face from the one executed. Considering the discrepancies in the various
documents showing the actual amount of copper concentrates transported to the
loading point and loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of
copper concentrates shipped. Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the
transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution of the Bill of
Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mates Receipt was
successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by respondent Switzerland Insurance
which showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro Point and
loaded on the vessel.

CA correctly held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a
rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment and as between
the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital. Resultingly, the
admissions elicited from appellant’s witnesses that they could not confirm the accuracy
of the figures indicated in their documentary evidence with regard to the actual weight
of the cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the port of destination, in
effect rebuts the presumption in favor of the figure indicated in the bill of lading.

G.R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. (formerly Equitable PCI Bank) vs. JOHN TANSIPEK
FACT The Complaint alleges that J. O. Construction, Inc (JOCI) entered into a contract with
S Duty Free Philippines, Inc. as actual construction went on, progress billings were made.
Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein respondent John Tansipek,
its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were initially
remitted to JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check in the amount of
P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI but instead, Tansipek deposited the same
to his account in PCIB. PCIB allowed the said deposit, despite the fact that the check
was crossed for the deposit to payee’s account only, and despite the alleged lack of
authority of Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount
of the check despite demands made by the latter.
PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC denied PCIB’s Motion to
Dismiss.
PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. Upon Motion,
respondent Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the Third-Party Complaint.
He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to Reconsider the
Default Order was denied. Upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to
attach the assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the correct
remedy.
HELD NO. Respondent Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from
the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the
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Rules of Court. A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in
that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.

It is important to note that a party declared in default – respondent Tansipek in this case
– is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he
had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result
of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the
Decision’s being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the
alleged invalidity of the default order.

G.R. No. 199990 February 4, 2015

SPOUSES ROLANDO and HERMINIA SALVADOR
vs.
SPOUSES ROGELIO AND ELIZABETH RABAJA and ROSARIO GONZALES
FACT Spouses Rabaja learned that Spouses Salvador were looking for a buyer of the subject
S property. Petitioner Herminia Salvador (Herminia) personally introduced Gonzales to
them as the administrator of the said property. Spouses Salvador even handed to
Gonzales the owner's duplicate certificate of title over the subject property. Gonzales
then presented the Special Power of Attorney (SPA), executed by Rolando Salvador
(Rolando) and dated July 24, 1998. The parties executed the Contract to Sell which
stipulated that for a consideration of P5,000,000.00, Spouses Salvador sold, transferred
and conveyed in favor of Spouses Rabaja the subject property. Spouses Rabaja made
several payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by Gonzales pursuant to
the SPA provided earlier as evidenced by the check vouchers signed by Gonzales and
the improvised receipts signed by Herminia. Spouses Salvador instituted an action for
ejectment against Spouses Rabaja. In turn, Spouses Rabaja filed an action for
rescission of contract against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales, the subject matter of
the present petition. Spouses Salvador filed their answer with counterclaim and cross-
claim contending that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and that
the SPA in favor of Gonzales was falsified. In fact, they filed a case for falsification
against Gonzales, but it was dismissed because the original of the alleged falsified SPA
could not be produced. They further averred that they did not receive any payment from
Spouses Rabaja through Gonzales. In her defense, Gonzales filed her answer stating
that the SPA was not falsified and that the payments of Spouses Rabaja amounting to
P950,000.00 were all handed over to Spouses Salvador.
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ISSUE The CA erred in not finding that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in
declaring petitioners in default and in depriving them of the opportunity to cross-
examine respondents Sps. Rabaja as well as to present evidence for and in their
behalf, given the meritorious defenses raised in their answer that categorically and
directly dispute respondents Sps. Rabaja's cause of action.
HELD The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse consequences. If the
absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who
fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence Ex Parte and the
court shall render judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is
given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the
likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having
forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. The stringent application
of the rules on pre-trial is necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial stage in
the litigation process. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition
of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made
mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. "The
importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized." There is no dispute
that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference
despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the
fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of
carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as
a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador
could no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were
properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence Ex Parte against Spouses Salvador
as defendants. Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to attend the pre-
trial conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC could only render
judgment based on the evidence presented during the trial.

GR No. 212256 December 09, 2015

FARIDA YAP BITTE v. SPS. FRED AND ROSA ELSA SERRANO JONAS
FACT This controversy stemmed from two civil cases filed by the parties against each other
S relative to a purported contract of sale involving a piece of property. before Rosa Elsa
went to Australia, she had executed an SPA authorizing her mother, Andrea C. Serrano
(Andrea), to sell the property. Cipriano, son of Andrea and brother of Rosa Elsa, offered
the property for sale to Spouses Bitte showing them the authority of Andrea. Spouses
Bitte sought a meeting for final negotiation with Rosa Elsa, the registered owner of the
subject property. At that time, Rosa Elsa was in Australia and had no funds to spare for
her travel to the Philippines. To enable her to come to the country, Spouses Bitte paid
for her round-trip ticket. Rosa Elsa revoked the SPA, through an instrument of even
date, and handed a copy thereof to Andrea. Spouses Bitte filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages seeking to compel Rosa Elsa,
Andrea and Cipriano to transfer to their names the title over the subject property.
Spouses Bitte were again declared in default by RTC for their failure to attend the pre-
trial. The counsel of Spouses Bitte withdrew and a new one entered his appearance
and then filed a verified motion for reconsideration. Spouses Bitte once again failed to
appear in the pre-trial and were, thus, declared non-suited. Rosa Elsa then presented
her evidence ex parte.
ISSUE Whether the Spouses Bitte, being in default, already lost the legal personality to resort
to this petition.
HELD The rule is that "right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done
on grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that
prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or
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that the decision is contrary to law." If a party who has been declared in default has in
his arsenal the remedy of appeal from the judgment of default on the basis of the
decision having been issued against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be
denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court.
Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all
other remedies available to question not only the judgment of default but also the
judgment on appeal before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The second is on the propriety of the questions raised in the petition. Spouses Jonas
claims that that the issues raised here, being factual, are inappropriate for being
beyond the inquiry of this Court; that the factual findings of the CA could no longer be
modified or even reviewed citing the long-standing rule that they are final and
conclusive. Although the rule admits of exceptions, they insist that none of them obtains
in this case.

G.R. No. 211113 June 29, 2015

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO vs. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., ATTY.
RICHARD J. NETHERCOTT AND ATTY. HONORATO R. MATABAN
FACT Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City an injunction
S complaint seeking to enjoin the sale at public auction mentioned in Atty. Nethercott’s
notice. Petitioner argued that the planned auction sale of the stocks pledged under the
Pledge Agreements is void as the same suffers from a multitude of fatal defects; one of
which is the supposed lack of authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate such a sale on
behalf of URAMI. URAMI emerged as the winning bidder for all of the stocks pledged
under the Pledge Agreements. However subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, which effectively prevented URAMI from appropriating the stocks
it had purchased during the auction sale. RAMI agreed with the petitioner that the
auction sale was void; URAMI admitted that it never authorized Atty. Nethercott to
cause the sale of the stocks pledged under the Pledge Agreements. URAMI, however,
pointed out that, since it never sanctioned the auction sale, it similarly cannot be held
liable to the petitioner for any prejudice that may be caused by the conduct of such
auction sale. URAMI changed its counsel and filed with the RTC an amended answer
with compulsory counterclaim (amended answer).
ISSUE Whether or not the amendment by URAMI with leave of court should be allowed.
HELD YES. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED. One of the key documents that
URAMI plans to present during trial, which it also attached in its amended answer as is
URAMI’s Board Resolution that evinces Atty. Nethercott’s authority to cause the
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foreclosure on the pledged stocks on behalf of URAMI. With the existence of such
board resolution, the statement in URAMI’s original answer pertaining to the lack of
authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate the auction sale thus appears mistaken, if not
entirely baseless and unfounded. Hence, we find it only right and fair, that URAMI
should be given a chance to file its amended answer in order to rectify such mistakes in
its original answer. The amended answer aims to correct certain allegations of fact in
the original answer which, needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper disposition
of the case. It is, therefore, in the best interest of justice and equity that URAMI should
be allowed to file the amended answer. We find absolutely no cause to overrule the
grant of leave granted to URAMI to file its amended answer. The said grant is
consistent with our time-honored judicial policy of affording liberal treatment to
amendments to pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of trial. We should
always remember that our rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their application should never be allowed to frustrate the truth and
the promotion of substantial justice.

G.R. No. 143264 April 23, 2012

LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A. SORIANO
vs.
BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL
BANK)
FACT Defendant Lilian S. Soriano and the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., in their personal
S capacity and for their own use and benefit, obtained a loan from defendant PCIB (now
BDO) the amount of P20 Million. As security for the payment of the aforesaid credit
accommodation, Spouses Soriano, as president and treasurer, respectively of plaintiff
LEI, without authority and consent of the board of said plaintiff and with the use of a
falsified board resolution, executed a real estate mortgage over the above-described
property of plaintiff LEI in favor of defendant PCIB, and had the same registered with
the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as Corporate Secretary of
plaintiff LEI, had never signed a board resolution nor issued a Secretary’s Certificate to
the effect that a resolution was passed and approved by plaintiff LEI, LEI authorizing
the Spouses Soriano as president and treasurer, respectively, to mortgage the above-
described property of plaintiff LEI neither did she appear personally before a notary
public to acknowledge or attest to the issuance of a supposed board resolution issued
by plaintiff LEI. That immediately upon discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on behalf
and for the benefit of plaintiff LEI, made demands upon defendants by paying in full
their personal indebtedness to defendant However, said defendants continued to ignore
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said demands, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs.

ISSUE Whether petitioner Lolita Soriano, corporate Secretary, has a legal capacity to file a
derivative suit.
HELD The amended complaint reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been alleged
therein. The amended complaint states “that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made
demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to
protect the interest of the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but
unfortunately, until now, no such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this
action for the benefit and in behalf of the corporation,”. The amended complaint
remedied the defect in the original complaint and now sufficiently states a cause of
action.

In Hi-Yield Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the

requisites for filing a derivative suit, as follows:

a) the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or
transaction complained of, the number of his shares not being material;
b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the
board of directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed
his plea; and
c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm
having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder
bringing the suit.

G.R. NO. 151932 August 19, 2009

HENRY CHING TIU, CHRISTOPHER HALIN GO, and GEORGE CO vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS
FACT In a collection suit filed by PBCOM against petitioners Tiu, et al., the former demanded
S from the latter the full payment of its secured loan obligation. PBCOM’s claim is
supported by a Suretyship Agreement signed by all members of the Board of Directors
of Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), including petitioners. This was controverted in
petitioners’ Answer saying that the Surety Agreement was falsified to insert the
wordings “IN THEIR OWN CAPACITY” without their consent, attaching a certified copy
of the same document from the Records Management and Archives Office in Davao
City. PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of
Court to Substitute Annex “A” of the Complaint, wherein it attached the duplicate
original copy retrieved from the file of the notary public. PBCOM also admitted its
mistake in making the insertion and explained that it was made without the knowledge
and consent of the notary public. PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a
falsification, but was made only to speak the truth of the parties’ intentions. The trial
court allowed the substitution of the altered document. Petitioners move for
reconsideration but was denied. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but only to affirm in toto the trial court’s assailed
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order.
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals correct in affirming the trial court’s order allowing the
substitution of the “falsified” actionable document, notwithstanding it appears to have
substantially altered the cause of action.
HELD With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents
annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus:

“Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the
former rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered” was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear
import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should
only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of
action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests
of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of
the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.”

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the
limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or
alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless,
as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of
action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the
higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

G.R. No. 133657 May 29, 2002

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
BRITISH STEEL (ASIA), LTD.
FACT Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of
S contract. Impleaded as principal defendant therein was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with
Ferro Trading GMBH (Ferro) and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants.
ISL and respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them. RTC denied the
motions to dismiss, as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration. On the other
hand, respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals. ISL then filed its answer to the complaint. Meanwhile, petitioner
sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional factual allegations
constitutive of its cause of action against respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of
right because respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto.
ISSUE Whether a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been
filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court.
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HELD Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may
be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only
means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend
the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.
Substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an
answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained in
the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer. In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense
that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 10.

Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a
matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant. The right granted to the
plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has been
served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding
contesting its sufficiency. Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be
liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as
possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. The fact that the other
defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not bar petitioner’s right
to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the
defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter
of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but
not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.

G.R. No. 179638 July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR. vs. PABLO R. MIRANDA
FACT Petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance was decided
S by the RTC against their favor on August 30, 1999. Without any appeal, the Decision
became final and executory. On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of
Execution but was not implemented. On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte
Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and Demolition Order” in order to
compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years have
elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC
denied the Motion in its Order dated August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file
with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was granted.

On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by
respondent on the ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become
final and executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records
of the case to the CA, insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit. Finding the
appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its Order dated
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October 10, 2006. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the
CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course, but was denied on June 14,
2007 for being filed out of time. Petitioners assert that an action to revive judgment is
appealable, and that their appeal was perfected on time. They insist that the Notice of
Appeal, which they filed on the 15th day via LBC, was seasonably filed since the law
does not require a specific mode of service for filing a notice of appeal. Besides, even if
their appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in the interest of
justice, considering that their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused by
typhoon “Florita” just to file their Notice of Appeal on time.
ISSUE Whether the Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th day via private courier like LBC
considered to be belatedly filed.
HELD It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.Under Section 3, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered
mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the
date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners
filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the
Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’
Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of
delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the
date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is
deemed the date of filing of that pleading.” Records show that the Notice of Appeal was
mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day
beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal
was filed out of time.

Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the
Notice of Appeal because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not
suspended on July 13, 2006, the day petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC.
And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late
filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal would still be denied for lack of
merit. The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and executory.

G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996

LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION and ROSITA DIMALANTA
FACT Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo
S are husband and wife both residents of South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his
profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the
state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office. Private respondent Rosita
Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an action for partition against former and
her husband. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel to her husband
as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of
summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D.
Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly, the process server
left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A.
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Valmonte. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim.
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason,
private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private
respondent’s motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner
Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.
ISSUE Whether petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.
HELD The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is
essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific property
and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be
made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may
deem sufficient.

In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was
not done by means of any of the first two modes. This mode of service, like the first
two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in
the foreign country where the defendant resides. The service of summons on petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14,
and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and, on that basis, declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer. Secondly, the service in the
attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as
required also in Rule 14. Such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported
by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for
the application. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting
such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.

G.R. No. 131724 February 28, 2000

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. JACKSON TAN
FACT Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
S over its real property in favor of respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed
to secure payment of petitioner’s indebtedness to respondent. Respondent filed against
petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the RTC. Summons and a copy of
the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches,
described in the sheriff’s return, as “a Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and
(discretion) working therein, he is the highest-ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of
defendant’s Corporation, to receive processes of the Court.” Petitioner moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service of summons
upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Petitioner
invoked Rule 14, of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that service on Lynverd
Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff’s return, was invalid as he is not one of the authorized
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persons on whom summons may be served and that, in fact, he was not even its
employee.
ISSUE Whether summons upon the draftsman was valid.
HELD Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule.
However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other
than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. this Court enumerated the
requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there
must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring
possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the
person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff’s return; and (c) there must be actual
receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons
was actually served.The third requisite is the most important for it is through such
receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained. There is no
dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the third, there
is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the
summons to any of the officers of the corporation. For there to be substantial
compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served
must be shown.

G.R. No. 131724 February 28, 2000

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. JACKSON TAN
FACT Private respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the
S RTC Makati due to an alleged failure of the petitioner to comply with its contractual
obligation. There were a few unfinished low-cost housing units and no substantial
developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon the
defendant through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero. Petitioner then filed a
Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, alleging that jurisdiction was not acquired
over the partnership, as the service of summons was improper. It alleges that the
service violated Rule 14, Sec. 11—the service was merely served upon its employee in
its branch office, an officer not included among the enumerations made in said rule.
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The RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. The petitioners then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, stating that the enumeration of persons under Rule 14,
Sec. 11 is exclusive, and that the amendment excluded agent and director. The same
was denied, prompting petitioner to file the present petition for certiorari, alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motions to
dismiss and reconsideration, still alleging that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the partnership.
ISSUE Whether the court validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.
HELD NO. When the complaint was filed by petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure was already in force. Hence, the new rule (Rule 14, Sec. 11)
now aptly states: When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be
made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. The Court agrees with the petitioner that the
enumeration of persons to whom summons must be served is ‘restricted, limited and
exclusive.” The latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius squarely applies in this
case. Since branch manager is not among those enumerated in the rule, the service
was improper. In the new set of rules, service of summons upon an agent of a domestic
corporation is no longer authorized. Jurisprudence has affirmed that a strict compliance
with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over the
corporation. Officers upon whom service may be made must be the one named in the
statute, otherwise the service is insufficient. Service made upon persons other than
those mentioned is, therefore, improper.

G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008

PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION
FACT Respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in
S the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid
balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of
its board of directors. Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed
because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts
to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of
summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in
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Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent

submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondent’s
employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to
petitioner’s last known address. Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed
period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the
reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with
the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Petitioner appeals to the CA
via a petition for certiorari contending that the court committed grave abuse of
discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, failure to
furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality over
equity and justice.
ISSUE Whether there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with copies
of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings.
HELD No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus
Motion to Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a
finding that the Santos was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the
period fixed. It is illogical to notify him of the order simply on account of the reality that
he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts
unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could not reasonably demand that
copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not
known and he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice
can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not
require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they
are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it
may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at his last known
address but it was unclaimed.

G.R. No. 144662 October 13, 2003

SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION
FACT Petitioners spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land located along
S Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City. On March 30, 1993, petitioners and
private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation (hereafter Columbus)
entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building
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worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the third year of the lease. Because
private respondent failed to comply with this stipulation, the petitioners on November
13, 1998, filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Summons was served upon
private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the
summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return described
Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal
processes. Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading;
hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The motion
was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
ISSUE Whether private respondents’ motion to lift order of default was in order.
HELD The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it denied private respondent's
motion to lift order of default. The appellate court pointed out that private respondent
was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an
Answer. Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service
of summons upon domestic private juridical entity shall be made through its president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house
counsel. Since service upon private respondent was made through a certain Ayreen
Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in private respondent's office, as evidenced by the latter's
employment record, such service cannot be considered valid. Consequently, the
subsequent proceedings, including the order of default, judgment by default and its
execution, were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
private respondent. Besides, judgments by default are not favored, especially so when
there is prima facie showing that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, which
in this case was grounded on the contract of lease sued upon, said the Court of
Appeals.

G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003

Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE vs. Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO
BOYON
FACT Sps. Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance in RTC of Muntinlupa against
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S Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of
a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to
respondents. The process server went to the residence of Sps. Boyon in Alabang on
July 22, 1998 to try to serve the summons personally. However, he found out that
Helen was in the United States and Romeo was in Bicol. Hence, the process server
explained in the Return of Summons that substituted service was resorted to because
efforts to serve personally failed. Meanwhile, Sps. Jose filed before the RTC an ex
parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication. The court granted the
motion. Sps. Boyon were declared in default and Sps. Jose was allowed to present
their evidence ex parte. On December 7, 1999, the RTC issued a Resolution in favor of
Sps. Jose. Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her
sister of the resolution issued by the court. Sps. Boyon filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court
a quo. The RTC denied the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent
supposed loss of standing in court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
ISSUE Whether the summons were validly served upon Sps. Boyon.
HELD The extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when
the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of
against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of property to
the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed
before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against
respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or
possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that
an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the
summons on Sps. Boyon properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their
persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings conducted
subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.

A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza
Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons
personally on respondents (Sps. Boyon). While the Return of Summons states that
efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United
States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any --
were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from
whom the process server obtained the information on their whereabouts.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service
made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method
extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute.

G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC
vs.
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HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO

FACT Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
S Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in
US for a certain time. He went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a
management committee for both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC
requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure, and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner.

Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for
estafa against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for
permission to leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire
to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." His
motion was denied. He also wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall
or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to
annul the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of the SEC, denying his
leave to travel abroad. The same was denied; hence, he appealed to the Supreme
Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, the courts
which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.
ISSUE Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines.
HELD A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any
court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The order of the
trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by
the above-quoted constitutional provision.

G.R. No. 191972 January 26, 2015

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HENRY ONG LAY HIN, Petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2ND DIVISION), HON.
GABRIEL T. INGLES
FACT Hiring legal counsel does not relieve litigants of their duty to "monitor the status of [their]
S case[s]," especially if their cases are taking an "unreasonably long time" to be resolved.
The Court of Appeals then issued an Entry of Judgment, declaring that the case
became final and executory. The Court of Appeals based the date of finality on the date
of receipt indicated in the registry return card corresponding to the mail sent to Ong's
former counsel, Zosa & Quijano Law Offices. Based on the registry return card, Zosa &
Quijano Law Offices received a copy of the Court of Appeals' Resolution denying Ong's
Motion for Reconsideration. In its Comment, the People of the Philippines argues that
the registry return card "carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of
official duties that have been regularly performed [and must be] presumed to be
accurate unless proven otherwise”. In this case, the registry return card corresponding
to the copy of the Court of Appeals' Resolution sent to Ong's former counsel indicates
that his counsel received the Resolution. This date, therefore, must be presumed to be
the date of receipt of the Resolution. Since Ong failed to appeal within the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals' Decision became final and executory and the Court of
Appeals correctly issued the Entry of Judgment.
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the entry of
judgment.
HELD The affidavits of petitioner's wife and mother-in-law, Mary Ann Ong and Nila Mapilit,
stating that petitioner's former counsel told them that the law office never received a
copy of the Resolution, are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. Moreover,
contrary to petitioner's false claim, his former counsel had notice that the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration as early as April 21, 2004 when his
counsel received a copy of the trial court's Order directing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against petitioner. With petitioner failing to rebut this presumption, it must be
presumed that his former counsel received a copy of the Resolution on April 29, 2003
as indicated in the registry return card. The 15-day period to appeal commenced from
this date. Since petitioner did not file an Appeal within 15 days from April 29, 2003, the
Decision became final and executory on May 15, 2003.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
Entry of Judgment, which declared petitioner's conviction final and executory as of May
15, 2003. Under Rule 51, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on "Judgment," "if no appeal
or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules,
the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes
executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry." As for the trial court, it likewise did
not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the arrest warrant against petitioner and
ordering his commitment to the Cebu City Jail. Since the Court of Appeals had already
issued the Entry of Judgment and had remanded to the trial court the original records of
the case, it became the trial court's duty to execute the judgment.
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G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005

FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN
FACT Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against Jensen before the MTC of
S Calasiao, Pangasinan. Petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered
owner of a parcel of land. The respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth,
gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter
constructing a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a portion of her
property along the boundary line. The summons and the complaint were not served on
the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the
summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same. The respondent
failed to appeal the decision. Respondent filed a complaint in the RTC of Dagupan for
the annulment of the decision. RTC ruled in favor of Jensen. Petitioner appealed to the
CA. The CA ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in
rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of
the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via
extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no
prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court
was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service
of summons and complaint upon the respondent, the defendant.
ISSUE Whether the action is quasi in rem or in personam.
HELD The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.18
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is
a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and
is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose
of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility r liability
directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on
him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against
the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its
state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for
injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam.

A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in
rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions
quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the
action.
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G.R. NO. 168723 July 9, 2008

DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (TROPIFRESH DIVISION) v. HON. REINATO G. QUILALA and ALL
SEASON FARM, CORP.
FACT Private respondent All Season Farm Corporation sought the recovery of a sum of
S money, accounting and damages from petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. and several of
its officers. According to Dole, an alias summons was served upon it through a certain
Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd.,
which is an entity separate from Dole. Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds: (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to
improper service of summons; (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (c) All
Season was not the real party in interest; and (d) the officers of Dole cannot be sued in
their personal capacities for alleged acts performed in their official capacities as
corporate officers of Dole. The RTC denied said motion. Dole moved for partial
reconsideration raising the same issues but its motion was denied. The appellate court
ruled otherwise. It reasoned that Dole's president had known of the service of the alias
summons although he did not personally receive and sign it. It also held that in today's
corporate setup, documents addressed to corporate officers are received in their behalf
by their staff. Dole sought reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied.
ISSUE Whether there was a valid service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
HELD In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant,
received the alias summons. Contrary to private respondent's claim that it was received
upon instruction of the president of the corporation as indicated in the Officer's Return,
such fact does not appear in the receiving copy of the alias summons which Marifa
Dela Cruz signed. There was no evidence that she was authorized to receive court
processes in behalf of the president. Considering that the service of summons was
made on a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the
designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over petitioner.

However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant's voluntary appearance in

the action is equivalent to service of summons. As held previously by this Court, the
filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time
to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court.

Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time.
It was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of
summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file
responsive pleading. Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the
summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative
relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. It is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this
Court. The RTC therefore properly took cognizance of the case against Dole
Philippines, Inc., and we agree that the trial and the appellate courts committed no error
of law when Dole's contentions were overruled.
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G.R. No. 181517 July 06, 2015

GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO SAYSON, JR. vs. NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORPORATION
FACT Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned figured in a
S vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.’s (Green Star) passenger
bus, resulting in the death of the van’s driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto
Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent Nissin- Universal Robina
Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to P567,070.68.
NURC denied any liability therefor and argued that the criminal case shall determine
the ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without
prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence. Sayson and Green Star then filed a
complaint for damages against NURC before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis
Tinio, one of NURC’s employees, was the one who received the summons. NURC filed
a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service. RTC issued a
Resolution denying NURC’s motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC.
ISSUE Whether the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting the trial court with
jurisdiction.
HELD No. There was no proper service of summons.

It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic

private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be
said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the

defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership
duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors.

The rule now likewise states “general manager” instead of “manager”; “corporate
secretary” instead of merely “secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” It has now
become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the
aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the express
mention of one person excludes all others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons expressly listed in the rules. If
the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Since the service of summons was
made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under Section
11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, 14 although
the corporation may have actually received the summons.
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G.R. No. 206147 January 13, 2016

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT
FACT It appears from the records that Atty. Glenn Gacott from Palawan purchased two (2)
S brand new transreceivers from QSC in Manila through its employee Rey Medestomas.
Due to major defects, Gacott personally returned the transreceivers to QSC and
requested that they be replaced. Medestomas received the returned transreceivers and
promised to send him the replacement units within two (2) weeks. Time passed and
Gacott did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC informed him that there
were no available units and that it could not refund the purchased price. Despite several
demands, both oral and written, Gacott was never given a replacement or a refund.
Thus, Gacott filed a complaint for damages. Summons was served upon QSC and
Medestomas, after which they filed their Answer, verified by Medestomas himself and a
certain Elton Ong (Ong). Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but was in
fact a general partnership registered with the SEC. In the articles of partnership, Guy
was appointed as General Manager of QSC. Guy filed his Motion to Lift Attachment
Upon Personality, arguing that he was not a judgment debtor and, therefore, his vehicle
could not be attached. Gacott filed an opposition to the motion.
ISSUE Whether the trial court's jurisdiction over QSC extended to the person of Guy insofar as
holding him solidarity liable with the partnership.
HELD The Court answers in the negative. A partner must be separately and distinctly
impleaded before he can be bound by a judgment.

Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual agency, whereby any

partner can generally represent the partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitur
that a suit against the partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and every
partner. It must be remembered that a partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct
and separate personality from the persons composing it. Guy was never made a party
to the case. He did not have any participation in the entire proceeding until his vehicle
was levied upon and he suddenly became QSC's "co-defendant debtor" during the
judgment execution stage. It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are
enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor.
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued
only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of
the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For,
as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.

A careful reading of the provision shows that notice to any partner, under certain
circumstances, operates as notice to or knowledge to the partnership only. Evidently, it
does not provide for the reverse situation, or that notice to the partnership is notice to
the partners. Unless there is an unequivocal law which states that a partner is
automatically charged in a complaint against the partnership, the constitutional right to
due process takes precedence and a partner must first be impleaded before he can be
considered as a judgment debtor. To rule otherwise would be a dangerous precedent,
harping in favor of the deprivation of property without ample notice and hearing, which
the Court certainly cannot countenance.
 94 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 201378 October 18, 2017

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. vs. TIARA COMMERCIAL CORPORATION
FACT The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages against GV
S Florida and its bus driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC. This action arose
out of a vehicle collision between the buses of VLI and GV Florida. VLI claimed that
Vizquera's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to
exercise due diligence in supervising its employee. In its Answer, GV Florida alleged
that the Michelin tires was the proximate cause of the vehicle collision. GV Florida
instituted a third-party complaint against Tiara Commercial Corporation (TCC), the
seller of the Michelin tires, The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC. TCC
eventually filed a motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint on the ground
that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service of summons
under Section 11of Rule 14. RTC denied TCC's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE Whether the third-party complaint should be dismissed for failure to implead an
indispensable party—Michelin, the manufacturer of the tires which GV Florida claims
are defective.
HELD In the present case, TCC's petition for certiorari did not identify the RTC's specific acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Rather, it imputed errors in the RTC's proper
interpretation of the law. Further, the CA's Decision makes no finding of any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA, in choosing to reverse the RTC in a
special civil action for certiorari, based its decision on its disagreement with the RTC as
to the correct application of the law. This is not an error in jurisdiction but merely an
error in judgment. Instead of granting the petition and reversing the RTC, what the CA
should have done was to dismiss the petition for certiorari for failing to allege grave
abuse of discretion. We further note that the RTC Order challenged before the CA
through the petition for certiorari is an interlocutory order. As there was no showing of
grave abuse of discretion, TCC's recourse is to proceed to trial and raise this error in its
appeal in the event of an adverse judgment.

In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of
TCC. While she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find
that TCC has voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed
its pre-trial brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it. At no point
in its pre-trial brief did TCC raise the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over it. In fact, it
even asked the RTC that it be allowed to reserve the presentation of additional
evidence through documents and witnesses. While it is true that TCC initially filed an
Answer Ad Cautelam, we rule that TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the
jurisdiction of the court when it subsequently filed its pre-trial brief without any
reservation and even prayed to be allowed to present additional evidence. This, to this
Court's mind, is an unequivocal submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC to conduct the
trial.
 95 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 158836 September 30, 2015

SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND FIRST ALLIANCE REAL
ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, INC.
FACT The Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
S Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos
Highway. Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property was
located in Barangay Cupang, which Sunrise Garden Corporation planned to develop
into a memorial park. The city road project, thus, became a joint project with Sunrise
Garden Corporation. Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden
Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move the construction
equipment. Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc. While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to
encroach on the area of the proposed city road. The trial court granted Sunrise Garden
Corporation's Motion. The trial court issued an Order stating that since First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. could not prove ownership over the properties, then First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or any of its hired security agencies must
comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Security Agency and First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating
their arguments that since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
ISSUE Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.
HELD The Court rules that the Court of Appeals did not err when it annulled and set aside the
trial court's Orders. In this case, petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Sunrise
Garden Corporation did not refute that respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. was never a party to the case. During the hearings before the Court
of Appeals, counsel for petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation placed much emphasis
on its argument that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. did not
prove ownership over the property but did not refute the primary issue of lack of
jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. This is an
admission that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc.

While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is
equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance."

The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9
Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for
the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case
show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and
repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. in their pleadings.
 96 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE vs. ANA KARI CARMENCITA NUSTAD
FACT Respondent filed a petition before the RTC of Lucena City and prayed that Ma.
S Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds the
owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title, which were all issued in
Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles.
The RTC set the petition for a hearing. Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed
an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul Proceedings. She averred that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not able to receive summons.
Moreover, she argued that the Order appeared to be a decision on the merits, as it
already ruled with certainty that she is in possession of the subject titles. The RTC
denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. Further
the RTC stated that it has not yet decided on the merits of the case because it merely
set the petition for a hearing.

Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration and alleged that the Power of
Attorney executed by respondent in favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. Tujan-
Militante likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a Norwegian, who is not
allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the case, petitioner
prayed that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration Authority be
impleaded. In a Decision, the CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of
petitioner, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by petitioner's filing of her
Motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied by the CA.
ISSUE Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over a person who was not able to receive
summons.
HELD A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of
summons. However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons,
a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter
voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the

action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds of relief aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the
court a quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to
voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative
relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made,
and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the
court's jurisdiction.
 97 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 202069 March 07, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN C. DIMARUCOT AND NAILYN TAÑEDO-
DIMARUCOT
FACT Respondents' whirlwind romance resulted in a problematic marriage, as Alvin filed a
S Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before the RTC. The Republic,
through the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of even date, alleging that "[Alvin]
failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his wife's alleged
psychological incapacity." However, the Notice of Hearing annexed to the MR
erroneously set the same for hearing on July 6, 2010 (instead of August 6, 2010). The
Republic claimed that its MR substantially complied with the requirements of Sections
4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 governing motions. Hence, the RTC should not have treated said
MR as a mere scrap of paper solely because of the misstatement of the proposed
hearing date in the Notice of Hearing appended thereto, considering that the RTC is
"not without any discretion" to set the MR for hearing on a different date. The CA
rendered the Assailed Decision denying the CA Petition.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred when it caused the outright dismissal of the CA Petition because
it was filed without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration of the September
2010 RTC Order.
HELD A prior motion for reconsideration is not necessary for a petition for certiorari to prosper
in cases where such motion would be useless. The Republic invokes the fourth
exception (where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless), and argues that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the September
2010 RTC Order would have been useless as it was based on the earlier August 2010
RTC Order. The Court agrees. Clearly, the Republic's direct resort to the CA via
certiorari was warranted under the circumstances, as it was led to believe that seeking
reconsideration of the September 2010 RTC Order would have been a useless
exercise. The CA thus erred when it caused the outright dismissal of the CA Petition
solely on the basis of the Republic's failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration.

To recall, the denial of the Republic's Notice of Appeal through the September 2010
RTC Order was premised on the RTC's earlier finding that the MR was a pro-forma
motion due to non-compliance with Rule 15. As well, it is necessary to emphasize that
the September 2010 RTC Order explicitly states that the RTC Decision had "attained
finality" because the Republic's MR did not toll the Republic's period to appeal.
 98 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 198531 September 28, 2015

ETHEL, EMMIE, ELVIE, EARLYN, EVELYN, ALL SURNAMED ACAMPADO vs. SPOUSES
LOURDES R. COSMILLA AND FELIMON COSMILLA
FACT The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of
S Document filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC. In their Amended
Complaint, respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of their share on the
subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and is
therefore null and void. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were forged. Aggrieved,
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 6 May 2005 seeking for the reversal
of the earlier RTC Decision. For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the
requirement of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in its resolutions which reconsidered its own decision of
dismissing the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
HELD The Court resolves to grant the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration is a
contentious motion that needs to comply with the required notice and hearing and
service to the adverse party as mandated by the provisions of the Revised Rules of
Court. The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties
concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion — are
mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A
motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to
receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.

It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively to a motion, since
a motion invariably contains a prayer, which the movant makes to the court, which is to
repeat usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose and in the observance of
due process, the other party must be given the opportunity to oppose the motion. In
keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford
the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded. Failure to
comply with the required notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to
respondents’ cause. We here follow the rule and so pronounce that contrary to the
findings of the appellate court, petitioners were not given ample opportunity to vent their
side on the issue since they were not able to promptly receive a copy of the notice of
hearing impinging the latter's right to due process.

We consulted the records and we found that no notice of hearing was appended to the
Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent. As discussed above, a motion for
reconsideration is a litigated motion where the right of the adverse party will be affected
by its admission. The adverse party in this case had the right to resist the motion
because it may result to the reversal of a prior favorable decision. The proof of service
was therefore indispensable in order to avoid surprises on the opposite party. The
absence thereof is fatal to the motion.
 99 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015

MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE vs. HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE
FACT Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude was allegedly killed by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph
S Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling,
Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton. Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the
general headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. public respondents, as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their (First) Motion for Extension
of Time to File Comment for 60 days. On the same day, Pemberton posted his Motion
for Additional Time to File Comment21 for 10 days. Petitioners argue that "Respondent
Judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of
jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody o[f] Accused to the Olongapo City Jail [based] on
mere technicalities.” In particular, they argue that the three-day rule on motions under
Rule 15, Section 425 of the 1997 Rules of Court is not absolute, and should be liberally
interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances.
ISSUE Whether the failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified.
HELD Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the concurrence
of the Public Prosecutor to move for an interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution
cannot be excused by general exhortations of human rights. This Petition fails to show
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. Furthermore, the
accused, while undergoing trial and before conviction, is already detained in the
Philippines in compliance with the obligations contained in the Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the
Philippines (Visiting Forces Agreement).

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule
15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be
acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other
party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to
study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the
arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton
was not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his
right to procedural due process.
 100 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 232189 March 7, 2018

ALEX RAUL B. BLAY vs. CYNTHIA B. BANA
FACT Petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage seeking
S that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.7 Subsequently,
respondent filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. However, petitioner later
lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition. In her
comment/opposition thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule 17), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared
as remaining for the court's independent adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his reply,
averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same
action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which - according to petitioner - was required under
the same Rules of Court provision. In particular, petitioner alleged that respondent filed
the required manifestation only on March 30, 2015.
ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's
counterclaim for independent adjudication before the same trial court.
HELD The petition is meritorious. n this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2,
Rule 17 to that portion of its second sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the same provision's third sentence,
which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a
counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may
be clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his
counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be
prosecuted only in a separate action.

The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-
day period triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars
the conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in
the same action. Thus, in order to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file
the required manifestation within the aforesaid period; otherwise, the counterclaim may
be prosecuted only in a separate action. By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 1 7 of the
Rules of Court, the CA clearly violated the foregoing principle and in so doing,
erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders declaring respondent’s counterclaim
"as remaining for independent adjudication" despite the latter's failure to file the
required manifestation within the prescribed fifteen (15)-day period.
 101 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 175507 October 08, 2014

RAMON CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. vs. JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG,
MERCEDES IGNE1 AND LUCINA SANTOS
FACT Joseph Cheng, et.al. filed a Complaint against Ching, et. al and all persons claiming
S rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest. In the
Complaint, they alleged six causes of action, emphasizing on Ramon Ching’s
fraudulent acts which resulted to the latter claiming the entire estate of the late Antonio
Ching, Cheng et. al’s predecessor-in-interest. Ching, et.al filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a Motion to Dismiss. The RTC denied said motion. Thereafter, Cheng,
et.al filed an amended complaint adding a seventh cause of action (release of CPPA
totalling P4M in the custody of Metrobank) and impleading a new party-defendant
(Metrobank). Ching, et.al again filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on
the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
Complaint. They argued that jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not
to the RTC acting as an ordinary court. The RTC denied the said motion. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of the Amended Complaint as the
latter arguably sought the release of the trust funds c/o of Metrobank to Cheng et.al.,
the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance,
which suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity.
HELD Although the Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the
disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the Cheng, et.al of the CPPA now
under Metrobank's custody, the civil case remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not
a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court. An action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Under Article 916 of the NCC,
disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall
be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the Complaint and
Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence,
despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, the civil case does not partake of the
nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its
limited jurisdiction.
 102 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 185954 February 16, 2010

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. MAXIMO D. SISON
FACT The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004
S conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA),
which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went
without proper bidding procedures... and documentations; that calamity funds were
expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that
purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.
In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to adduce
substantial evidence in order to convict Sison. On July 22, 2008, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA.
ISSUE Whether the [CA] gravely erred in denying petitioner's right to intervene in the
proceedings.
HELD The appeal lacks merit. Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court.

In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene,
because (1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in
the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was
filed after the CA... rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the
quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision. It is fundamental that the
allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court
the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention.

Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the
suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect
their right or interpose their claim.[10] Its main purpose is to settle in... one action and
by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the
persons involved. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two
requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
(2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
parties, nor should the claim... of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in
a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where
their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such a
doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must
leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court
to decide the issues without the judges' active participation. Furthermore, the Rules
provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for
Intervention was belatedly filed.
 103 | C i v i l P r o c e d u r e | A t t y . J o s e P a r u n g o | C a s e D i g e s t s |
SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P. 2017-0064

G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G.
JALANDONI as Special Administrator
FACT Rodolfo Jalandoni died. His brother filed at the RTC a petition for Issuance of Letters of
S Administration for the property of Rodolfo. The petitioners intervened and said that their
mother, Sylvia, was the daughter of Isabel and John. Isabel who, at the time of
Rodolfo’s death, was actually legally married to the deceased and is therefore entitled
to a share in the latter’s property. The proof of which is based on a marriage certificate
between Isabel and Rodolfo. Both Sylvia and Isabel are dead at the time of the
manifestation. The petitioners pray that they may be allowed to intervene on behalf of
Isabel. Rodolfo’s brother opposed their intervention because the birth certificate of
Sylvia states that Isabel and John were married. Therefore, Isabel’s marriage to
Rodolfo was null and void. Petitioners argue, however, that such statement in the birth
certificate was not enough evidence to prove a valid marriage between Isabel and
John. Further, it was only done to save face and is customary.
ISSUE Do the petitioners have legal standing to intervene in the proceedings.
HELD No, they do not have standing to intervene. The Birth Certificate of Sylvia, which shows
that she and John were married, is sufficient proof that indeed they were married.
Although there were no marriage certificates given as proof, it is not considered as the
sole source of evidence marriage. Sylvia’s birth certificate hold prima facie weight and
the petitioners showed no contrary evidence. The reason of ‘facesaving / customary’
holds no merit and the courts cannot take judicial notice of a folkway. Therefore,
Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo is void seeing that at the time of the marriage, Isabel was
still married to John. Thus, the descendants of Isabel have no share in the Estate of
Rodolfo.

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent
evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it
contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married"
and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s
birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They
are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence,
they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested. In the case at bench, the
petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal. The petitioners did no better than
to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements made
only in order to "save face." They urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice
among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear
that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.