CaseDig: Padunan vs.
DARAB
G.R. No. 132163; January 23, 2003
By: Pearlie Jane Q. Binahon | July 25, 2018
FACTS:
Angelina Rodriguez was the original beneficiary under P.D. 27 of 3 parcels of
agricultural land covered by Certificates of land transfer (CTC). By virtue of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay duly executed and thumb marked by Angelina, she waived
her rights over the said landholdings in favour of Marcos Rodriguez. Thereafter,
the latter possessed and cultivated the landholdings as tenant-beneficiary under
P.D. 27.
Private respondent obtained a loan of Php. 50, 000 from Padunan. The said
landholdings were the collateral for the loan. In the Kasunduan, it was provided
that petitioner was authorized to possess and cultivate the land for two years
and/or until repayment of the mortgage debt.
Emancipation Patent (EP) covering the 3 parcels of land were however issued to
Angelina Rodriguez despite her waiver of her rights over the said lands in favor of
Marcos.Angelina executed for the second time a waiver of rights by way of sale,
this time in favour of Padunan for the sum of Php. 55, 000. Petitioner
constructed a house and warehouse thereon as a way of claiming ownership. This
caused Marcos Rodriguez to file a case for injunction before the PARAD of Nueva
Ecija. The PARAD decided in favour of Marcos, declaring him the lawful tenant –
beneficiary of the subject land, directing the issuance of the corresponding EPs in
his name and ordering petitioner Padunan to vacate the premises upon payment
of the mortgage debt. On Padunan's appeal thereof, the DARAB confirmed in toto
the decision of the PARAD prompting petitioner to elevate the case to the CA.
CA dismissed the petition of Padunan for his claim based on the alleged
sale/waiver of rights by Angelina Rodriguez. CA along with DARAB also affirmed
the findings by the PARAD that Angelina Rodriguez no longer had any rights over
the subject parcels of land. That was the date she executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay waiving her rights over the subject landholdings in favor of private
respondent Marcos Rodriguez, a waiver of rights duly confirmed by the local
Samahang Nayon in its Kapasyahan Blg. 15 in accordance with existing laws and
DAR issuances. Clearly therefore, private respondent Marcos Rodriguez was
already the lawful tenant-beneficiary of the subject land under PD 27 at the time
Angelina Rodriguez entered into the questionable agreement with petitioner
Graciano Padunan, thus making the second transfer null and void ab initio and
Padunan at best a mere mortgagee of the subject landholdings by virtue of the
Kasunduan between him and private respondent Marcos Rodriguez.
Furthermore, the annulment adjudged in the decision under review, springs from
the finding that the issuance of Emancipation patents in the name of farmer
beneficiary Angelina R. Rodriguez was erroneous. The issuance of said
Emancipation patents was due to inadvertence. Thus, annulment thereof is a
correction of an administrative error; a matter within the exclusive competence
of the public respondent as adjudicating arm of DAR. And as stressed by public
respondent, the said Emancipation patents in question were not even registered
with the proper Registry of Property. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority to cancel the erroneously issued EPs belongs to the
DARAB.
HELD:
Yes. It must be stated at the outset that it is the law that confers jurisdiction and
not the rules. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution
or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated,
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.
The DARAB derives its jurisdiction from RA 6657 or popularly known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
To implement Sec. 50 (f) of RA 6657 regarding the adjudication of agrarian
reform matters, the DAR adopted the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, issued on
May 30, 1994.[32Under Section 1, Rule II of the said Rules of Procedure, the
DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority;
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act. No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the
exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
In the case at bar however, the EPs under the name of Angelina Rodriguez are
UNREGISTERED. Thus, Sec. 2 of DARAB New Rules of Procedure provide for
cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall
include:
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and
CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall or cancellation of
Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs)
not yet registered with the Register of Deeds.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED in so far as it upholds the ruling of the DARAB that (1)
private respondent Marcos Rodriguez is the lawful tenant beneficiary of the three
parcels of and (2) petitioner Graciano Padunan is only a mortgagee thereof,
thereby ordering him to vacate the premises upon payment by private respondent
Marcos Rodriguez of the mortgage debt in the amount of P50,000.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that DARAB has jurisdiction to cancel the
unregistered emancipation patents in the name of Angelina Rodriguez is
REVERSED. The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform has
jurisdiction to cancel the said unregistered emancipation patents. Private
respondent Marcos Rodriguez, the new legal agrarian reform beneficiary of the
subject land, should file the proper action before the DAR to cancel the said
unregistered emancipation patents.
G.R. No. L-44570 May 30, 1986
MANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA GUERRERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, respondents.
A.D. Guerrero for petitioners.
Bureau of Legal Assistance for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and
Apolinario Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights and obligations to one another is the
issue in this petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate
Appellate Court, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case
No. 6793-NE (SA-Q) '73, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to reinstate plaintiff
Apolinario Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare coconut holding in
question, located at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora Sub-province Quezon and to
maintain said plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof, with all the
rights accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law;
(2) ordering defendants Paulino and Rogelio both surnamed Latigay to vacate the
said ten-hectare portion and deliver possession thereof to plaintiff Apolinario Benitez;
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay damages to
plaintiffs in the amount of P14,911.20 beginning from July, 1973 and to pay the same
amount every year thereafter until plaintiff is effectively reinstated to the ten-hectare
portion;
(4) denying plaintiff-tenants' prayer for reconstruction of the copra cottage: and
(5) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay plaintiff the
amount of P200.00 by way of litigation expenses.
All other claims of the parties are denied. With costs against defendants-spouses.
The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings of fact excepting, however, to its conclusion
that tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and the respondents, thus:
In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants- spouses Manuel and
Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their
21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora,
Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut
within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the
cows, he was made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves
and grass and to do such other similar chores. During harvest time which usually
comes every three months, he was also made to pick coconuts and gather the fallen
ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation. He had to husk and split
the nuts and then process its meat into copra in defendants' copra kiln. For his work
related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed
and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.
Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from
the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to
gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to
the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in
Malacanang, Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement, now marked as Exh.
D, whereby defendants agreed, among others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare
portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by
the provisions of republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines.
Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare
portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits
therefrom. Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio
and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into
copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage
where plaintiff and his family lived, thus, making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants)
meant business. Hence, this case for reinstatement with damages.
The lower court formulated four (4) issues by which it was guided in the resolution of
the questions raised by the pleadings and evidence and we pertinently quote as
follows:
(1) whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on the coconut landholding in question
consisting of sixteen (16) hectares;
(2) In The affirmative, whether or not he was unlawfully dispossessed of ten (10)
hectare thereof;
(3) Whether or not the parties are entitled to actual and moral damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.
This petition for review poses the following questions of law:
Whether or not with the passage of Presidential Decree 1038 only last October 21,
1976, Republic Act 6389 otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms has
repealed in their entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) and the
Agricultural Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) abrogating or nullifying therefore all
agricultural share tenancy agreements over all kinds of lands, as the one involved in
the case at bar-over coconut plantation-and hence, the complaint below as well as
the challenged decision by the courts below, based as they are on such share
tenancy agreements, have lost their validity cessante ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex.
II
Assuming arguendo that said laws have not thus been repealed, is respondent
Benitez hereunder the undisputed fact of the case as found by the courts below a
share tenant within the purview of the said laws, i.e., Republic Acts 1199 and 3844,
or a mere farmhand or farm worker as such relationship were extensively discussed
in Delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574. (Copied verbatim from Petition, p. 31-
rollo)
Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was dismissed as
an employee from the landholding in question and not ousted therefrom as tenant. Whether a person
is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the findings of the respondent court and the trial
court are, generally, entitled to respect and non-disturbance.
The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the
labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which
the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either
in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as
amended.)
With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor,
with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating
the land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not
limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise,
and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current
agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and
regular employment" (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
The petitioners contend that the two courts below applied erroneous definitions of "tenancy" found in
repealed laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code
have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which the trial court and
the Court of Appeals failed to cite and apply.
There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms seeks to abolish agricultural
share tenancy as the basic relationship governing farmers and landowners in the country.
On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead
the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic
Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the basis of this
national policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar and the lower
court's committed grave error in upholding the respondent's status as share tenant in the petitioners'
landholding.
The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian
reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark
the movement not only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of land by its
tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into
mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.
It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform
Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if
the same have been substantially modified by the latter.
However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats
all actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere general principle. Among the established
exceptions are when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna
vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481).
The records establish the private respondents' status as agricultural tenants under the legal
definitions.
Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously from 1969 until he was
ejected from it. Such possession of longstanding is an essential distinction between a mere
agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law (Moreno, Philippine Law
Dictionary, 1972 Edition), a tenant being one who, has the temporary use and occupation of land or
tenements belonging to another (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 3254) for the purpose of
production (Sec. 3, Republic Act 1199; delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574). Respondent
Benitez lives on the landholding. He built his house as an annex to the petitioner's copra kiln. A hired
laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his
dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant
who enjoys security of tenure under the law.
Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It is
admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the land in
question and planted the coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the landholding only
after the same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had
actually seeded the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of
cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the
promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of
the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice,
the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on
the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof
covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major
work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruitbearing. Then it is cultivated
by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding
and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his
family, handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra,
although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a
tenant, not a mere farm laborer. (delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, supra Marcelo vs. de Leon, 105 Phil.
1175).
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent is their
agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of
the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of tenancy
relations perse the sharing of harvest taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy
shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a
tenant. The case of delos Reyes vs. Espinelli (supra) clearly explains the matter thus:
The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary
or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the
share tenant par ticipates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily
dependent on the amount of harvest.
Hence, the lower court's computation of damages in favor of respondent based on the number of
normal harvests. In most cases, we have considered the system of sharing produce as convincing
evidence of tenancy relations.
The petitioners entered into an agreement on May 2, 1973 which in clear and categorical terms
establishes respondent as a tenant, to wit:
AGREEMENT
This agreement entered into by and between Manuel Guerrero hereinafter referred to
as the landowner and Apolinario Benitez hereinafter referred to as tenant.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was used to
mean a hired laborer farm employee as understood agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their
relationship would be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines militates against such an assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199
to govern an employer-employee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning other than its
general acceptation had been given the word "tenant", the instrument should have so stated '. Aided
by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent could not be said to have misconstrued the same. In
clear and categorical terms, the private respondent appears to be nothing else but a tenant:
Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners' counsel of the respondent's status as tenant:
ATTY. ESTEBAN:
Q You said you are living at San Joaquin, who cause the sowing of
the lumber you made as annex in the house?
ATTY. NALUNDASAN
Please remember that under the law, tenant is given the right to live
in the holding in question. We admit him as tenant.
xxxxxxxxx
(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN, June 25, 1974, pp. 4950).
The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question.
Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such
relationship is extinguished according to law.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), the Agricultural Land Reform Code of
1963 (Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act 6389) and Presidential
Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing
Agricultural Lands) all provide for the security of tenure of agricultural tenants. Ejectment may be
effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:
l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and conditions of
the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;
2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share
unless the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;
3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the
agreement of the parties;
4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:
5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;
6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate
family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his
immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been unlawfully deprived of
his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the
reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.
Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent's right as share tenant do
not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to "uplift the farmers from poverty,
ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens ...
active participants in nation-building", agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold
tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved
by the government program of land reform.
It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented.
The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the
consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it
may be implemented, the eventual goal of having strong and independent farmers working on lands
which they own remains. The petitioners' arguments which would use the enactment of the Agrarian
Reform Code as the basis for setting back or eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no
merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108941 Case Digest
G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000
Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa
vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan
Ponente: Pardo
Facts:
This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro
owned by Isabel Candelaria. October 1974, Candelaria entered into a
3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed
to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and
other seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants thereon
exist, to make the necessary harvest of fruits.
Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to
clear it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a 6-year usufruct
over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted Jaime
Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration
over the land.
October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with
Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a 1-year term. On December
1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an
"pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year.
After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to vacate,
but Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any consideration
for its use, be in rent or share. Candelarian again entered with a
3-year lease agreement with Dinglasans, and made Jaime her
attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint before
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking for
ejectment of Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint.
Jaime then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case
was referred to DAR. DAR certified that the case was not proper for
trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint
of Jaime including the leasehold claim of Bejasas. Bejasas then
filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and recovery of
damages against Candelaria and Jaime.
RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying
that (1) there was no tenant relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere
overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract
have expired, (4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the
element of personal cultivation was not proven.
Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.
Ruling:
There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared
harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner) and the Bejasas, there is
no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the
authority of Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in a
tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such presented.
REYNALDO BEJASA v. CA, GR No. 108941, 2000-07-06
Facts:
This is a petition[1] assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals[2] reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro[3] and ordering petitioners Reynaldo
and
Erlinda Bejasa (hereinafter referred to as "the Bejasas") to surrender the possession of the
disputed landholdings to respondent Isabel Candelaria ("hereinafter referred to as
Candelaria") and to pay her annual rental from 1986, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and... costs.[4]
This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-58191[7] and TCT No. T-
59172,[8] measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares more or less, situated in Barangay Del
Pilar, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. The parcels of land are... indisputably owned by Isabel
Candelaria.
On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land
with Pio Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract, Malabanan
agreed among other things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase or procure
calamansi,... citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants
are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits, etc."[9]
Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The
Bejasas claim that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the land
and shouldered all expenses of production.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying
their first agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no obligation to share
the harvests with Candelaria.[10]
Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.
On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with
Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife (hereinafter referred to as "Victoria"). The contract had a
term of one year.[12]
On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in
consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga"[13] agreement, with a term of one
year.
During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed.
The balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00 was paid on
January 11, 1985.[15]
After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas
continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form
of rent or a shared harvest.[16]
On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease
agreement over the land.[17] The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also
renewed by Candelaria on the same date.[18]
On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the Bejasas
On May 26, 1987, COSLAP dismissed the complaint.
Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan
Oriental, Mindoro[19] against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages." The case was referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform ("DAR").
On December 28, 1987, the DAR certified that the case was not proper for trial before the
civil courts.[20]
The trial court dismissed Jaime's complaint, including the Bejasas' counterclaim for
leasehold, home lot and damages.
On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of
damages."[21] against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan.[22]
On February 20, 1991, after trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas.[23] First, they
reasoned that a tenancy relationship was established.[24] This relationship can be created
by and between a "person who furnishes the... landholding as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor and the person who personally cultivates the same."[25]
Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure.
On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's
ruling.[29] Reasoning: First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship
were met.[30] There was no consent given by... the landowner. The consent of former civil
law lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy relationship.[31] Second, when
Malabanan engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted them as mere
overseers and did not make them "permanent... tenants". Verily, even Malabanan knew that
his contract with Candelaria prohibited sublease.[32] Third, the contract ("aryenduhan")
between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its very terms, expired after one year. The contract did
not provide for sharing... of harvests, means of production, personal cultivation and the like.
[33] Fourth, sharing of harvest was not proven. The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa on this
point is self-serving. Fifth, the element of personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo
Bejasa... himself admitted that he hired laborers to clear and cultivate the land.[34] The
Court of Appeals disposed of the case, thus:[35]
Issues:
Inescapably, the appeal involves the determination of a factual issue. Whether a person is a
tenant is a factual question.
The issue raised is whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas.
Ruling:
The elements of a tenancy relationship are:[37]
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the
Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land.
However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a
tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.
There was no proof that they shared the harvests.
Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as consideration for the possession of the land, he agreed to
deliver the landowner's share (1/5 of the harvest) to Malabanan.[38] Only Reynaldo
Bejasa's word was presented to prove this. Even this is cast into... suspicion. At one time
Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the harvest went to him, that 25% was for
Malabanan and 50% went to the landowner, Candelaria.[39] Later on he stated that the
landowner's share was merely one fifth.[40]
In Chico v. Court of Appeals,[41] we faulted private respondents for failing to prove sharing
of harvests since "no receipt, or any other evidence was presented."[42] We added that
"Self serving statements ... are inadequate;... proof must be adduced."[43]
Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as
landowner never gave her consent.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria.[44] They
acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's
arrangement with them.[45] True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge... that the
Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the land.[46] However, the Bejasas claim that
this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for
P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983.[47]
We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest
sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000
per year,[48] such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a... mere civil law
lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil
law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is
the "aryenduhan",[49] which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be
paid, and the term of the contract.
Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.
Principles:
tenancy relationship was established.[24] This relationship can be created by and between
a "person who furnishes the... landholding as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor and the person who personally cultivates the same."
In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing.
