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G.R. No. 152564 September 13, 2004

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Agrarian laws were enacted to help small farmers uplift their economic status by providing them with
a modest standard of living sufficient to meet their needs for food, clothing, shelter and other basic
necessities. The law grants them the right to constitute a home lot as their dwelling and subsistence.
Because it is intimately connected with the tenancy relationship of the landowner and the agricultural
lessee, any dispute regarding its transfer, removal or retention falls within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB -- the quasi-judicial body specially tasked to hear and adjudicate all agrarian disputes,
matters or incidents involved in or related to the implementation of agrarian laws.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 29, 2001
Decision2 and the March 13, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 45948.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision

The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration of the Decision.

The Facts

The CA narrates the facts in this wise:

"The agricultural lot in question, designated as Lot No. 26, is situated at Poblacion, San Rafael,
Bulacan, and covered by TCT No. RT-6304. Along with another parcel of land with an area of
2½ hectares, it was originally owned by Maria Lopez Caluag (or "Caluag"), who is now
deceased. The original tenant-tiller of this agricultural land was the late Aqui[li]no Villena,
husband of [respondent], Susana Mag[-I]sa Villena (or "Susana"). The tenancy relationship
dated back to 1946 and continued even after the demise of Aquilino through his surviving
spouse, Susana.

"In 1957, upon the instruction of Caluag, the house of Susana was transferred to the subject
lot, because Caluag had given Susana a portion thereof with an area of 1000 square meters
as [home lot] and seedbed. Since then, Susana had been in peaceful possession thereof until
1987 when a case for ejectment was filed against her by [petitioners] Eugenio Bautista, Romeo
Cruz and Carmencita B. Cruz x x x."5

The ejectment case did not prosper. Thus, at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan on March 26,
1990, petitioners filed against respondent an action for quieting of title and recovery of
possession.6 The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, prompting respondent to appeal to the
CA.1awphil.net
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Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court ruled that as tenant of the previous owner of the land,
respondent was entitled to a home lot and the right to maintain a house thereon. 7 It also opined that
since the case involved the right to continue and enjoy the home lot, jurisdiction belonged to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not to the trial court. 8

Hence, this Petition.9

The Issue

The sole issue raised by petitioners for our consideration is as follows:

"x x x [W]hether or not this case falls under the ambit of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) pursuant to Executive Order
129-A."10

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:

Jurisdiction of the DARAB

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 11 For agrarian
reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Executive Order 22912 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.13 This law divested the regional trial
courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.14

Under Republic Act 6657,15 the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The
pertinent provision reads:

"Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. —The DAR is hereby vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

"It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear
and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity
and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to
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achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before
it.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be
immediately executory."16

In the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A17 was enacted;
it created the DARAB to assume the adjudicatory powers and functions of the Department. 18 Rule II
of the Revised Rules of the DARAB provides as follows:

"Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The board shall have
primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) under Republic Act no. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. x x x.

"x x x x x x x x x."19

Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements -- whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise -- over lands devoted to agriculture. Such disputes include those
concerning farm workers’ associations or representations of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. 20 Also
included is any controversy relating to the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries -- whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.21

The Existence of Tenancy

The instant case involves the tenancy rights of respondent against petitioners. Consequently, there
exists an agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB.

Tenants are defined as persons who -- in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households -- cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latter’s consent; for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or
both under the leasehold tenancy system.22

Respondent was a tenant of petitioners’ predecessors. Petitioners’ own evidence confirmed this fact.
The CA keenly observed thus:

"x x x. The status of the [respondent] as tenant of Maria Lopez Caluag and later of Lorenzo
Caluag has been clearly established thru the testimonies of several witnesses, namely:

1. [Petitioner] Eugenio Bautista, who testified on direct examination, thus:

‘Q. How about the [respondent], Susana Mag[-I]sa Vda. De Villena, do you know
her?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you know her?

A. She is one of the tenants of my in-law in the farm, sir.

Q. Who is that in-law of yours?

A. Maria Lopez Vda. De Caluag, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. At the time Susana Mag[-I]sa transferred her house to the lot in question, who
was the owner of it?

xxx xxx xxx

A. My in-law, Maria Lopez Vda. De Caluag, sir.

COURT:

Q. And she asked permission from Maria Lopez Vda. De Caluag who gave her
permission?

A. Yes, your Honor, because she owns it.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Is there a relationship between your mother-in-law, Maria Lopez Vda. De

A. Yes, there is, sir.

Q. What?

A. Maria Lopez Vda. De Caluag is the grandmother of Lorenzo, your honor.

Q. Do you know if there is a tenancy contract between Susana Mag[-I]sa Vda. De

A. There is, sir.

Q. I am showing to you an agricultural leasehold contract dated August 25, 1987.

xxx xxx xxx

A. This is the contract, sir.’

On cross examination, he further declared as follows:

‘ATTY. AURE:

xxx xxx xxx

How [was respondent] able to possess the land in question?

COURT:

What was your answer last time?

A. I was against it. Since there was no other way to allow them to stay, so I
allow[ed] them to stay.

ATTY. AURE:

And this landholding being tenanted by Susana is also the land of Maria Lopez,
but transferred to her grandchildren?

A. Yes, sir, they are all heirs, so they have the right to [the] share of the land.

Q. And you said that Susana has a leasehold with the owners of the land?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, before you bought the land, you know that Susana was already there in
the premises?

A. Yes, sir x x x.’

2. Angelina Caluag, whose testimony given on November 27, 1990, further bolsters
[respondent’s] tenancy status. Her declarations read:

‘Q. Now, Mrs. Witness, do you know when the house of Susana Mag[-I]sa was
constructed on this land?

A. As far as I can remember, 1957.

Q. Are you in a position to tell the Court how Susana Mag[-I]sa came to build her
house on that land?

A. x x x they requested my mother-in-law if they can transfer to the lot and they
were allowed.
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xxx xxx xxx

Q. You stated that you came to know the [respondent] when she became the
tenant of your mother-in-law, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When was that?

A. It was in 1950 when I knew her.

Q. You want to convey to the Hon. Court that it was only in 1950 that you [knew]
that the [respondent] became the tenant of your mother-in-law?

A. I do not know if she had been the tenant of my mother-in-law before 1950. As
far as I know, it was only in 1950 that I came to know her as a tenant of my
mother-in-law.’

3. Atty. Jose Caluag, another witness for [petitioners], who testified on December 4,
1990, thus:

‘Q. And, what else, Mr. witness?

A. And, the [respondent] whom I know to be the tenant of my grandmother in the

x x x.’

"The foregoing testimonies which categorically confirm the tenancy of the [respondent] are
judicial admissions, and thus, do not require further proof. Section [4], Rule 129 of the Rules of
Evidence pertinently provides:

‘Section [4]. Judicial admissions. —[An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.]’"23

Tenancy Rights Enforceable Against Petitioners

The law protects agricultural lessees by conferring upon them security of tenure over the landholding
they are working on.24 The tenancy relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the term
or period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, the alienation or the transfer of legal possession of
the landholding.25

Respondent’s rights as an agricultural lessee are therefore enforceable against Maria Lopez and
Lorenzo Caluag’s transferees, herein petitioners. In Tanpingco v. IAC, 26 we explained the reason for
this rule:
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"Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore, there is
nothing to prevent a landowner from [transferring] his naked title to the land. However, the new
owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the
landholding once the leasehold relationship is established. It also entitles him to security of
tenure on his landholding. He can only be ejected by the court for cause. Time and again, this
Court has guaranteed the continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in cases of a mere
transfer of legal possession. As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168
SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the
leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is
extinguished are found in Sections 8, 28 and 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines. x x x."27

Tenancy Dispute

To justify respondent’s ejectment, petitioners argue that no tenancy relationship exists with respect to
the subject lot, since the property is a residential and not an agricultural land.28 They further contend
that even on the assumption that a tenancy relationship existed, the CA erred in considering the area
as respondent’s home lot.29 According to them, a home lot should be constituted on the farm that the
lessee is tilling, not on the residential lot of the landowner.30 For these reasons, they claim that
jurisdiction lies with the regular courts, not with the DARAB.

There is no legal basis for petitioners’ restrictive interpretation of the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Its
jurisdiction encompasses "all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of all agrarian laws." A home lot is incident to a tenant’s rights. The right
to retain or remove it is therefore an agrarian dispute that should be resolved by the
DARAB.1awphil.net

Not binding on the courts is the Certification issued by the municipal agrarian reform officer of San
Rafael, Bulacan, that respondent is "NOT a bonafide tenant of a parcel of land registered in the name
of EUGENIO BAUTISTA, et al."31 In a given locality, merely preliminary or provisional are the
certifications or findings of the secretary of agrarian reform (or of an authorized representative)
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties;
hence, such certifications do not bind the judiciary. 32 Moreover, in this case the CA found the
Certification to have been issued without any prior investigation. 33

It should be noted that even if the tenurial arrangement had been severed, the action still involved an
agrarian dispute. On this point, this Court has ruled:

"x x x. [J]urisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant
— at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from
the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly,
before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has
been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwise springs or originates from the relationship
of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable only by the [DARAB]." 34
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Entitlement to a Home Lot

Tenants are entitled to home lots located at a convenient and suitable place within the landholder’s
property, where they can construct and maintain their houses. 35 These home lots will be considered
as part of the tenants’ leasehold.36

The right to a home lot is provided under the following provision of RA 1199, 37 as amended by RA
2263:38

"Sec. 22. Rights of the Tenant.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area
of not more than 3 per cent of the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one
thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within
the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his
dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor
industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The Tenant's dwelling
shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as
provided in section twenty-six39 unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship
between them as provided under section nine, 40 or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and
only after the expiration of forty-five days following such severance of relationship or dismissal
for cause."41

The evidence presented by petitioners established how the home lot was constituted on the subject
lot. Their witnesses -- Eugenio Bautista, Angelina G. Caluag and Atty. Jose Caluag -- all testified that
sometime in 1957, respondent was allowed to construct her house on the subject lot, because there
was trouble with the Hukbalahaps in the farm she was tenanting. 42 Under the circumstances, it was
not convenient and suitable to situate the home lot on the farm.

Since the primary purpose of a home lot is to accord the tenant a dwelling place, there can be no
valid opposition if the only available place for it is a residential land. The current location of the home
lot in the present case was, at the time, the convenient and suitable place for dwelling. Significantly,
the landowner acceded to constitute the home lot on the alleged residential land.1awphi1.net

Having situated the home lot on the subject lot since 1957, respondent can be ejected therefrom only
for cause or upon proof that the tenancy relationship has already been severed. Petitioners should
prove before the DARAB their grounds for ejectment.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.