ARTICLE IV

CITIZENSHIP

SECTION 1. THE FOLLOWING ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES:

(1) THOSE WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES AT THE

TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS CONSTITUTION;

(2) THOSE WHOSE FATHERS OR MOTHERS ARE CITIZENS OF

THE PHILIPPINES;

(3) THOSE BORN BEFORE JANUARY 1 7 , 1 9 7 3 , OF FILIPINO

MOTHERS, WHO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE
AGE OF MAJORITY; AND

(4) THOSE WHO ARE NATURALIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

LAW.

1. Citizenship.

Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership

in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular
political community of full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications such as minority. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of
allegiance to the political community.

Modern law recognizes three distinct modes of acquiring citizen-

ship: (1) jus sanguinis — acquisition of citizenship on the basis of
blood relationship; (2) jus soli — acquisition of citizenship on the basis
of place of birth; (3) naturalization — the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the privilege of a native bom-citizen. Basic Phil-
ippine law follows the rule of jus sanguinis.
The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights,
that is, the right to participate in government principally through the
right to vote, the right to hold public office, and the right to petition the

629
 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 1
630
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

government for redress of grievances. It is with reference to these rights

that Chief Justice Warren says: "Citizenship is man's basic right for it
is nothing less than the right to have rights. Remove this priceless pos-
session and there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in
the eyes of his countrymen."'

2. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of

the 1973 Constitution.
Article IV, Section 1(1) refers to Article III, Section 1(1) of the
1973 Constitution which read:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Article III, Section 1(1) of the 1973 Constitution in turn referred

to those who were citizens under Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
which contained the following basic provisions on citizenship:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
2
time of the adoption of this Constitution.

'Dissenting in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44,64 (1958).

2
The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines was adopted on November 15,1935. Who were
citizens of the Philippines then?
1. "... [a]ll inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
in said Islands..." (Section 4, Philippine Bill of 1902), provided they had not yet lost their citizen-
ship on November 15,1935.
This provision of the Philippine Bill is an act of mass naturalization. It implements Article
IX of the Treaty of Paris. For the first time, it creates the category of Filipino citizen. Prior to the
Philippine Bill there were only Spanish subjects.
The provision includes (a) persons born in the Philippines, (b) persons bom in Spain and
(c) all other inhabitants of the Philippines provided that they were subjects of Spain and residents
of the Philippines on April 11,1899, the date of the exchange of ratification of the Treaty of Paris.
Palanca v. Republic, 80 Phil. 578 (1948).
Sec. 1 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 631

(2) Those bom in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents

who, before adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to pub-
3
lic office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizen-
ship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Article IV, Section 1, however, should not be read as having the

effect of curing any defect in the acquisition of citizenship under the
1935 or 1973 Constitutions. If a person's citizenship was subject to ju-
dicial challenge under the old law, it remains subject to challenge under

Not included, however, were those who had "elected to preserve their allegiance to the
crown of Spain in accordance with the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain..."
(Sec. 4, Philippine Bill). The Treaty of Paris allowed Peninsular Spaniards residing in the Philip-
pines to "preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record,
within a year from the date of the exchange of ratification of this treaty [April 11, 1899], by a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance...."
2. The children of those who became Filipino citizens under the Philippine Bill (Sec. 4,
Philippine Bill), provided they had not lost their citizenship prior to November 15, 1935.
3. Those who became Filipino citizens under the Naturalization Law enacted on March
26,1920, provided they had not yet lost their citizenship by November 15, 1935.
4. Children who were minors at the time of the naturalization of their parents under (3),
if dwelling in the Philippines, and children born in the Philippines subsequent to the naturalization
of their parents [Act 3448 (1928)], provided they had not lost their citizenship by November 15,
1935.
5. Foreign women married to citizens of the Philippines who may have acquired Phil-
ippine citizenship under Act 3448, provided they had not lost their citizenship by November 15,
1935.
6. Those who were citizens of the Philippines by the principle of res judicata, that is,
those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision
even if on the mistaken application of the principle of jus soli. Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79
Phil. 249 (1947); RodriguezTioTiam v. Republic, 101 Phil. 195 (1957).
There are two things noteworthy about this provision: (1) it is a stop-gap provision; (2) an
understanding of its stop-gap nature clarifies the misleading phraseology.
The provision was tailor-made for one of the delegates to the constitutional convention,
Delegate Fermin Caram. Caram had been bom in the Philippines by Syrian parents and, although
he had never been naturalized, prior to the constitutional convention he had been elected provin-
cial board member of Iloilo. To erase all doubts as to the citizenship of Caram, this provision was
inserted. I A R U E G O , THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE (1936) 204-205. Hence, too, the antecedent of
the pronoun "who" is not "parents" but "those bom in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents.
The Supreme Court has also held that a minor child of one in the same position as Caram
acquired Filipino citizenship through the father, thus rejecting the claim that the grant of citizen-
ship was strictly personal to the one who had been elected to public office. Chiongbian v. de Leon,
82 Phil. 771 (1949).
 632 T H E 1987 C O N S T I T U T I O N Sec. 1
O F THE REPUBLIC O F T H E PHILIPPINES

the new — whether or not the judicial challenge had been commenced
4
prior to the effectivity of the new Constitution.

3. Children of Filipino fathers or mothers.

The 1935 Constitution adopted the principle of jus sanguinis as an
absolute rule. The child of a Filipino father, whether b o m in the Philip-
pines or abroad, was a Filipino citizen from the moment of birth. At the
1935 Constitutional Convention, an attempt was made to make citizen-
ship by birth "subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by the
5
National Assembly." The attempt failed.

The 1973 Constitution preserved the principle of jus sanguinis

as the basic foundation of citizenship and expanded its application by
placing the Filipino woman on the same level as the male in matters
6
of citizenship. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines,
even if the father is an alien, are Filipino citizens. To c o m e under this
expanded rule, however, it is essential that the mother must be Filipina
at the time of the birth of the child. Moreover, the new provision is
not retroactive. It applies only to those b o m of a Filipina mother on or
7
after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. H e n c e , it is important to
remember that the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 1 7 , 1 9 7 3 .

This 1973 innovation came under assault during the deliberations

of the 1986 Constitutional Commission from two venerable m e m b e r s ,
Commissioners Roberto Concepcion and A m b r o s i o Padilla. Concep-
cion, looking at it from a nationalist perspective, saw it as a dangerous
facilitation of the acquisition of citizenship which could open up the
8
exploitation of natural resources to "half-breeds." Unstated in his argu-
ment, however, was the chauvinistic fact that he would not object to
citizenship of "half-breeds" provided that the Filipino half of the child
came from the father. Padilla more explicitly looked on the 1973 rule

"Convention Session of November 2 7 , 1 9 7 2 , said this about Section 1 ( 1 ) of the 1 9 7 3 provi-

sion. It is also true of the present provision.
The limitation was proposed by Delegate Jose P. Laurel. I A R U E G O , THE FRAMING OF THE
PHIUPPINE CONSTITUTION ( 1 9 3 6 ) 2 0 5 - 2 0 8 .
For a discussion of cases incorrectly applying the principle of jus soli in the Philippines,
see I T A N A D A A N D C A R R E O N , POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHIUPPINES 1 4 7 - 9 and Tan Chong v. Secretary of
Labor, 79 Phil. 2 4 9 ( 1 9 4 7 ) .
'Convention Session of November 2 5 , 1 9 7 2 .
7
Convention Session of November 2 7 , 1 9 7 2 .
I RECORD 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 , 3 5 0 , 3 5 1 . Concepcion spoke at great length on the subject.
Sec. 1 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 633

as the fruit of the feminist movement which, he said, ignored real dif-
ferences between children of a Filipino father and those of a Filipina
mother. The latter most often must leave her country with her foreign
9
husband to raise her child abroad. Commissioner Felicitas Aquino saw
the arguments of Padilla as "blandishments of purism" and "monumen-
10
tal hypocrisy." In the end, only three voted to return to the male chau-
vinist 1935 rule.

It is also a settled rule that the principle of jus sanguinis applies

only to natural filiation and not to filiation by adoption." Likewise, it
is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of
the father and that "illegitimate children are under the parental author-
ity of the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the illegitimate
12
father." This rule, based on parental authority, remains unchanged by
the new Constitution.

Moreover, an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien

mother is Filipino, if paternity is clear. Jus sanguinis makes no distinc-
tion between legitimate and illegitimate children. This was the case of
13
Fernando P o e , Jr. Needless to say, the child might also have the citi-
zenship of the mother, in which case the child might have dual citizen-
ship.

Finally, while the principle of jus sanguinis is the basic rule in

Philippine law, there is nothing either in the 1935 or in the 1973 or 1987
Constitution to prevent the legislature from adopting the principle of
jus soli or any of its features as supplementary law on citizenship. The
legislature is endowed with broad powers to pass naturalization laws.

4. Citizens by election.
For a proper understanding of Section 1(3), which is a reformu-
lation of Section 1(3) of Article HI of the 1973 Constitution, two ques-
tions must be considered: (1) What is the scope of the right of election
given by the 1935 Constitution? (2) What is the relation between the

•'Id. at 204, 347

"•Id. at 348-349.
"Ching Leng v. Galang, L-11931, October 10, 1958, unreported.
,2
ld.; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12,1952, unreported; ZamboangaTransportation Co.
v. Lim, 105 Phil. 1321 (1959), unreported; Board of Immigration v.Gallano,25 SCRA 890 (1968).
"Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3,2004.
 634 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 1
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

right of election given by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and the right
of election given by the 1935 Constitution?
By Article IV, Section 1 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, counted as
Philippine citizens were: "Those whose mothers are citizens of the Phil-
ippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizen-
ship." This provision was supplemented by Commonwealth Act N o .
M
6 2 5 which prescribes the procedure for making the election.

For a child to benefit from the 1935 provision, when must the
mother be a citizen of the Philippines? At the time of the birth of
the child? Or at the time of the election? There is a hint, obiter and
oblique and very likely unintended, in Villahermoso v. Commissioner
of Immigration,^ that the mother must be Filipina at the time of the
election by the child. Such a suggestion, however, would render the
provision nugatory because the rule, rejected by Philippine law only in
1973, used to be that the woman loses her citizenship upon marriage to
a foreigner if she acquires the citizenship of her husband. T h u s , the bet-
ter interpretation seems to be that, to benefit from the right of election
under the 1935 Constitution, it is sufficient that the mother be a Filipino
citizen, either by birth or by naturalization, at the time of her marriage.

Assuming that the mother lost her Philippine citizenship by mar-

riage but subsequently reacquired it during the minority of the child,
does the minor child automatically acquire the citizenship of her mother
or must he still elect Philippine citizenship? T h e same Villahermoso
case ruled that it is still necessary for the child to m a k e the election if he
16
wishes to become a Filipino citizen.

Section 1 of C o m m o n w e a l t h Act 6 2 5 , enacted on June 7, 1 9 4 1 ,

provides that the election must be expressed in a statement s w o m be-
fore any officer authorized to administer oaths and filed with the nearest
civil registry and accompanied by an oath of allegiance to the Philip-
pine Constitution. Before June 1,1947, there was no fixed procedure for
election. For purposes of proof of election before such date, the Court
has accepted such acts as participating in elections and campaigning for
17
a candidate as an adequate form of election.

I4
5 PAL, Title 18,ss.32-5.
"80 Phil. 541,544 (1948).
"•Id.
Sec. 1 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 635

H o w soon after reaching majority must the child make the elec-
tion? In Dy Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice,™ the Supreme Court cited
with approval the ruling of the Secretary of Justice to the effect that
three years is the reasonable period within which the child must make
the election. After such period, the right is lost. However, justifiable cir-
cumstances, such as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino citizen, may justify the extension of the three-year
period."

Another twist to the election rules is found in Co v. Electoral Tri-

20
bunal of the House of Representatives. Jose C o , born a Chinese na-
tional, married a Filipina in 1932. In 1955, when their son Jose, Jr. was
nine years old, Jose, Sr. was naturalized and took his oath of allegiance.
In 1987 J o s e , Jr. was elected to the House of Representatives. When his
citizenship qualification was challenged on the ground that he had nev-
er elected Philippine citizenship, the Court said that it would be ridicu-
lous to require h i m to elect citizenship w h e n , by the naturalization of
his father, he too had b e c o m e a Filipino citizen even while still a minor.
21
T h e Court also appealed to In re Mallare as recognizing informal elec-
tion under special circumstances. In Mallare the Court had recognized
participation in the election process on the belief that one was a citizen
as a valid informal election of citizenship.

With the adoption of the 1973 Constitution which by Article ILT,

Section 2, allowed the Filipina who marries an alien to retain her origi-
nal citizenship and which by Section 1(2) allowed the child to follow
the citizenship of his Filipino mother, a child born under the 1973 Con-
stitution of a Filipino mother would not have to make the election in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship. He is already a Filipino citi-
zen by birth. However, since the new provision allowing the legitimate
child to follow the citizenship of the Filipino mother is not retroactive,
provision had to be made for legitimate children born of Filipino moth-
ers under the 1935 Constitution who by reason of minority had not yet
exercised their option when the 1973 Constitution took effect.

Can the right to elect Philippine citizenship still be available to

children b o m after the 1973 Constitution took effect? This question is

"5 SCRA 108,110(1962).

"Id., obiter.
"G-R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991.
21
59 SCRA 45 (1974).
 636 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 1
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

asked with reference to children of Filipino mothers who lost their orig-
inal citizenship by marriage under the 1935 Constitution or who after
marriage to an alien under the 1973 Constitution lost their Philippine
citizenship by voluntary act or omission. It is submitted that there is no
right of election for children born under the 1973 Constitution. It is very
22
clear from the convention deliberations that Section 1(3) is intended
to be in the nature of a transitory provision applicable to children born
under the 1935 Constitution who had not yet reached majority when
the 1973 Constitution took effect. Moreover, if it had been the intention
of the Convention to preserve the 1935 provision as a permanent part
of the 1973 Constitution, the Convention would not have worded the
new provision the way it did: "Those w h o elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five." The clear implication of such language is that the right of
election referred to by the new provision can only be one which was
acquired under the 1935 Constitution. T h e 1973 Constitution does not
grant but merely preserves a right already acquired. However, there is
nothing in the new Constitution to prevent the Congress from granting
a statutory right of election identical with the right formerly given by
the 1935 Constitution. Should such a statute be enacted, however, will
a child who elects under such statute be a natural-bom citizen under
Section 2? It is submitted that he would not because the election would
not be in virtue of Section 1(3).

It is clear that the right of election provided for in the 1973 Con-
stitution is in the nature of a transitory provision whose usefulness will
expire once all those w h o acquired the right to elect under the 1935
Constitution have either elected or forfeited their right to.elect. A n d
since that time will not c o m e until some time after 1994, or twenty-one
years after 1973, the right of election in the 1973 Constitution has been
carried into the 1987 Constitution. T h e formulation of the 1987 provi-
sion, moreover, spelled out the meaning of Section 1(3) of the 1973
Constitution, that is, that it has reference to those b o m before January
1 7 , 1 9 7 3 , the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

'Session of November 27, 1972.

Sec. 1 ART. iv - CITIZENSHIP 637

5. Naturalization, judicial and administrative.

Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing

23
him with the rights that belong to a natural b o m citizen. Naturaliza-
tion may be obtained through a general law of naturalization applied
through a judicial process. Such is the process prescribed in the existing
Revised Naturalization Law, C.A. 4 7 3 , June 1 7 , 1 9 3 9 . Named individu-
als may also acquire citizenship through a special act passed by the leg-
islature (or by the President in the exercise of special legislative power
if granted by the Constitution.) Of historical interest is the Philippine
Bill of 1902 which was a mass naturalization law making Filipino citi-
zens of "all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside in
them w h o were Spanish subjects" on 11 April 1899 "and then resided
in said islands."

T h e accepted rule on admission to citizenship is positivist.

"[Over] no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
24
more complete than it is over" admission to citizenship. Naturalization
is considered "not a matter of right, but one of privilege of the most
discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting as it
does, public interest of the highest order, and [it] may be enjoyed only
25
under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor." The right to
determine rules on admission to citizenship is considered an aspect of
sovereignty. Every independent nation has the inherent and indepen-
dent right to determine for itself what classes of people shall be entitled
26
to its citizenship.

Letter of Instruction N o . 270, in effect for a limited period from

its promulgation by President Marcos on April 11, 1975, is sometimes
erroneously referred to as a statute which granted naturalization. In fact,
however, it merely provided for an administrative screening process
preparatory to the grant of citizenship by presidential decree. Commis-
sioner Ople explained that this provision was a measure to counteract

"Naturalization is treated in greater detail in BERNAS, THE 1973 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION:

NOTES AND CASES Part II.
"Oceanic Navigation Company v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,339 (1909).
"Cuaki Tan Si v. Republic, 6 SCRA 545,546 (1962).
"United States v. Wong Kim Aok, 169 U.S. 649,668 (1898). It may be doubted therefore
whether an express constitutional grant of naturalization power is at all necessary. "As a govern-
ment, [the Philippines] is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of
nationality it has the power of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and inter-
course with other countries." Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,311 (1915).
 638 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 1
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

the potential national security threat posed by a vast number of Chinese

nationals residing in the Philippines at the time when the country was in
the process of establishing diplomatic relations with Peking in the mid-
seventies. Ople recalled that "the decision was that it would be helpful
to the national security, if the laws were changed so that there would be
27
greater simplification and liberalization of the naturalization law." Pre-
cisely because of this historical background, citizenship obtained under
this liberalized process came under scrutiny by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.

The first proposal arising from this scrutiny was a provision

absolutely disallowing authorization for any President to grant nat-
uralization. On the general principle that questions on naturalization
28
should be left to the legislature, the amendment was readily rejected.
More serious, however, was a proposal to subject all naturalizations
granted by President Marcos to judicial scrutiny and confirmation. D e -
fending the proposition, Commissioner de los Reyes argued that, prior
to the grant of citizenship under the liberalized system, there were " n o
searching inquiries on the motives of the applicants and their past ac-
tivities to show their sincere desire to b e c o m e Filipinos" nor were the
applicants subjected to the "usual period of probation under ordinary
29
naturalization procedure." In opposing the proposal, which C o m -
missioner Davide had concretized into an a m e n d m e n t of Section 1(4),
Commissioner Bernas appealed to the presumptive regularity of official
action, to the principle of not distinguishing between natural-born and
naturalized citizens except in those instances where the Constitution
itself makes the distinction, and to the need to protect those w h o truly
deserved the citizenship already granted. But Bernas granted that citi-
zenship problems could be reopened on a case to case basis. "After all,
it is also a principle embodied in our jurisprudence that the grant of
citizenship is never res judicata. It can always be reopened for valid
reasons. But let us not reopen them en masse. Let us reopen only those
cases where there is perceived evidence or grounds for reopening." Ber-
nas preferred that "remedial measures be left to ordinary legislation
30
within the limits of the Constitution."

27
I RECORD 190-191.
"Id. at 352.
"Commissioner de los Reyes proposed the following: "Naturalization obtained by execu-
tive decree shall be subject to judicial confirmation in the manner and within the time prescribed
by law. Failure to obtain said confirmation shall be a ground for revocation." I RECORD 342.
"Id. at 343.
Sec. I ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 639

Another proposal, also immediately but not exclusively occa-

sioned by the experience with naturalization by decree and vigorously
supported by Commissioner Concepcion, was to limit naturalization to
judicial naturalization only but "without prejudice to legislative grants
of honorary citizenship, without the rights of naturalized citizens."
Concepcion argued that corruption in the judicial grant of naturaliza-
tion was bad enough; legislative grants would compound the corruption
and further erode the nationalistic intent of the provisions on the ex-
31
ploitation of natural resources. Again Commissioner Bernas opposed
the proposal on the general principle that naturalization should be left
to ordinary legislation. He added: " T h e [immediate] background of the
proposed amendment is the situation of the Marcos regime when leg-
islation was in the hands of one m a n . ... If we insure that legislative
power will not be exercised by one person, then the abuses which re-
32
sulted from the possession of legislative power will be avoided."

T h e power of the legislature includes control over processes

through which citizenship is acquired or lost, determination of substan-
tive criteria for admission to citizenship, and fixing the consequences
of the grant of citizenship on the wife or minor children of the grantee.
In general, the prevailing policy, reflected in the Revised Naturaliza-
tion Law, has been to make the acquisition of citizenship not only a
slow but also an arduous and cumbersome process. Briefly, Section 2 of
C.A. N o . 4 7 3 prescribes requirements of age, residence, moral charac-
ter and political belief, real property or lucrative occupation, language,
and education of children. The procedural requirements include the fol-
lowing steps: declaration of intention, filing of petition, hearing and
initial judgment, period of probation, rehearing and final judgment. The
applicant is allowed to take the oath of citizenship only after satisfying
the court that he has passed the probation requirements.

The grant of citizenship to a parent also extends citizenship to

33
minor children under parental authority. The rule on the citizenship of
the wife upon the naturalization of the husband is a little more involved.

31
W.at 188-9.
32
W. at 345-6. The Davide amendment read: "Those who are judicially naturalized in ac-
cordance with law."
"C.A. No. 473, Sees. 15, 16. The repatriation of a mother also entitles her son to a decla-
ration that he is entitled to Philippine citizenship. Republic v. Judge Tandayag, G.R. No. 32999,
October 15, 1982, reiterating Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952).
 640 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 2
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

The law says that she is "deemed a citizen" of the Philippines. This has
been interpreted to mean that she becomes a Filipino citizen, provided
she shows, in an administrative procedure for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration, that she has none of the disqualifications
found in C.A. N o . 4 7 3 , i.e., even if she does not have all the qualifica-
tions found in C.A. N o . 4 7 3 , Sec. 2 . "

Aside from judicial naturalization there is now administrative

naturalization. The matter is handled through the Special Committee
on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor General and is governed by
Sections 3 , 4 , 5 and 6 of R.A. N o . 9139.

S E C 2. NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS ARE THOSE WHO ARE CITIZENS

OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM BIRTH WITHOUT HAVING TO PERFORM ANY
ACT TO ACQUIRE OR PERFECT THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. THOSE
WHO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH
(3), SECTION 1 HEREOF SHALL BE DEEMED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS.

1. N a t u r a l - b o r n citizen.

The first sentence of Section 2 first appeared as Section 4 of the

1973 Constitution. It gives the basic definition of a natural-bom Fil-
ipino citizen. Under the definition, and without the second sentence
which was added only by the 1987 Constitution, one w h o elects Phil-
ippine citizenship by virtue of Section 1(3) would definitely not be a
natural-bom Filipino.

Under the 1935 Constitution it w a s never definitively settled

whether a child of a Filipina mother w h o elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching majority was a natural-bom Filipino. T h e strict view,
which defined a natural-bom Filipino in the tenor of the first sentence
of Section 2, held that he was not. A liberal view, however, held that he
was. This view was anchored on the argument that the election retroacts
to the moment of birth since it was birth which gave the child the poten-
tial to make the election. This liberal view was in fact followed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention when it acted as j u d g e of the citizen-
ship qualification of Delegate Ernesto O n g . It was a practical solution
to a hitherto unsettled question.
Sec. 2 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 641

The addition of the second sentence by the 1987 Constitution de-

finitively settled the issue. The purpose of this addition is to equalize the
status of those born of Filipina parents before January 17, 1973, with
35
those b o m of Filipina parents on or after January 17, 1973. (Strictly
speaking, however, the children might not be equally situated because,
as already explained, to have the right of election under the 1935 Con-
stitution, it is enough that the mother was Filipina at the time of mar-
riage even if she no longer was one at the time of the birth of the child;
whereas under Section 1(2) the mother must be Filipina at the time of
the birth of the child.) To the objection that one who is only " h a l f Fili-
pino might b e c o m e President on the basis of this provision, the answer
given on the floor was that the appropriate place to discuss the qualifi-
cations of a President, if it is desired that a President should be "pure"
36
Filipino, will be in the article on the executive department.

Would the second sentence of Section 2 apply only to those who

elect citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution? The an-
swer of Commissioner B e m a s to this question was: "It would apply to
anybody w h o elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the proviso of
the 1935 Constitution, whether the election was done before or after
37
January 1 7 , 1 9 7 3 . "

If a natural-bom Filipino citizen loses his citizenship by renun-

ciation or by any other mode recognized by law, would he still be con-
sidered natural-bom if he subsequently reacquires citizenship? It is sub-
mitted that, whether under the 1973 or 1987 provision, such a person
38
would not be a natural-bom Filipino.

T h e distinction between natural-bom citizens and naturalized citi-

zens is significant because the Constitution has reserved certain consti-
tutional offices for natural b o m citizens, and, under Article XII, Section
8, allows natural-bom citizens who have lost their Philippine citizen-
ship to be transferees of private lands. Other than for these purposes,
however, the Supreme Court has taken the position that the distinction
is without significance and "that a naturalized citizen is entitled to simi-
lar treatment as a native-bom citizen except where the Charter itself

"I RECORD 189,206,356.

at 355,369. The article on the President makes no provision for any distinction.
"Id. at 228.
"The same answer to the question was given in Meeting of the 166-Man Special Commit-
tee, November 16,1972.
 642 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 3
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

provides otherwise. If it were not so, there would be an infringement

39
of the equal protection guarantee." The 1986 Constitutional Commis-
sion took such a position when it rejected as unnecessary a propos-
al which said: "Both naturalized and natural-bom citizens shall have
40
equal rights." On this basis, can cancellation of naturalization based
on grounds occurring after final grant of citizenship, such as permanent
residence in the country of origin, as prescribed in Section 18 of C o m -
monwealth Act 4 7 3 , be challenged as violative of equal protection? A
similar provision in the United States was struck down as violative of
41
the equal protection clause. It is submitted, however, that the new Sec-
tion 5, infra, which deals with "dual allegiance," should m a k e the ratio-
nale of the American decision inapplicable in this jurisdiction.

SEC. 3. PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED

IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.

1. Loss of c i t i z e n s h i p .

There are two laws on loss of citizenship. T h e first, C o m m o n w e a l t h

Act N o . 6 3 , applies to both natural-bom and naturalized citizenship.
Section 1 provides, subject to stated exceptions, that citizenship is lost
by naturalization in a foreign country, by express renunciation of citi-
zenship, by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, by rendering service
in the armed forces of a foreign country, and by being a deserter of the
armed forces. The second, C o m m o n w e a l t h Act 4 7 3 , applies to natural-
ized citizenship. Section 18 provides that a certificate of naturalization
may be canceled when found to have been fraudulently or illegally ob-
tained, or by permanent residence in the country of origin within five
years from naturalization, or when the petition is found to have been
made on an invalid declaration of intent, or upon failure to comply with
the requirements for the education of minor children, or if the person
allows himself to be a " d u m m y " for aliens.

The case of Emilio Osmefia, w h o would later run for Vice-Pres-

ident with Fidel R a m o s , comes under the first law. Osmefia, a son of
a Filipino father (and a grandson of President Osmefia) was a holder
of a valid subsisting passport and a continuous resident of the Philip-

39
Chan Teck Lao v. Republic, 55 SCRA 1,6 (January 4, 1974)
"°I RECORD 369.
"'Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
Sec. 3 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 643

pines and a registered voter since 1965. He w a s , however, also a holder

of an alien registration certificate. His right to hold public office was
challenged on the ground that he was an alien. Deciding in his favor,
the Court said that by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the
presumption was that he was Filipino and remained Filipino until proof
could be shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship.
There was no proof that he had been naturalized in a foreign country,
or had expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, or had sworn alle-
giance to a foreign country. T h e Court said that possession of an alien
registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts
whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost was not adequate proof
42
of loss of citizenship. T h e Court has consistently followed this rule
saying that in order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. T h e m e r e application or possession of an
43
alien certificate of registration does not amount to renunciation.

It is interesting to compare this with Willie Yu. Yu had been issued

a Portuguese passport in 1971. He was given naturalization as Filipino
citizen in 1978. In 1980, however, he still declared his citizenship as
Portuguese in commercial documents and in 1981 he still obtained a
Portuguese passport which expired in 1986. The Court held that his
actions constituted renunciation of Philippine citizenship. "While nor-
mally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philip-
pine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has b e c o m e unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon
insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on
whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
44
meritorious."

M u c h clearer were the cases of Ramon Labo, Jr. and Juan Fri-
valdo. Labo had taken the oath of allegiance to Australia. His claim
that his acquisition of Australian citizenship was invalid was not seen
45
as negating the fact that he had taken an oath of allegiance. Frivaldo,
for his part, had taken American citizenship. The Court did not accept

42
Aznar v. COMELEC and Osmefia, 185 SCRA 703 (1990). But see the separate dissents
cf Justices Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Padilla.
"Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, G.R. No. 135083, May 26,1999; Valles v. COM-
ELEC, GJt. No. 137000, August 9,2000.
••Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, GJt. No. 83882, January 24,1989.
45
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989).
 644 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 3
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

the explanation that he had taken it involuntarily as a protection against

6
Mr. Marcos."
The decisions on cancellation of naturalization exhibit both posi-
tivistic and individualistic characteristics. The positivistic trait, a con-
tinuation of the positivistic character of admission to citizenship, is
reflected in the ruling that "unlike final decisions in actions and other
proceedings in court, a decision or order granting citizenship to the ap-
plicant does not really become executory, and a naturalization proceed-
ing not being a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered
therein is not res judicata as to any of the reasons or matters which
would support a judgment canceling the certificate of naturalization for
47
illegal or fraudulent procurement." M o r e individualistic is the affirma-
tion not only that the burden of proof is shifted to the government in a
cancellation proceeding but also that citizenship acquired through natu-
ralization is not second class citizenship and, hence, it may be canceled
only upon evidence that is "clear, unequivocal and convincing" and not
48
merely preponderant. Moreover, only rules for denaturalization in ex-
istence at the time a person's application was heard and favorably acted
on can be used against a naturalized citizen.

There are no cases which deal with the validity of substantive

49
statutory grounds for loss of citizenship.

2. Reacquisition of citizenship.

Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by naturalization or

50
by repatriation or by a direct grant by law.

For women who have lost their citizenship through marriage to

aliens, and for natural born Filipinos, including their minor children,
as well as persons who have lost their citizenship on account of e c o -
nomic or political necessity, and w h o are not disqualified, repatriation

"*Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 (1989).

"'Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244,254 (July 20, 1982), quoting Republic v. Go Bon Lee,
111 Phil. 805.
""Republic v. Cokeng, 23 SCRA 559,578 (1963) and 34 SCRA 668 (1970).
"'Of interest are Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967) upholding a law withdrawing
American citizenship from persons voting in foreign elections, and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163 (1964) declaring unconstitutional a law withdrawing citizenship from naturalized citizens who
resided continuously for three years in their country of origin. But, again, see Section 5, infra.
'"Commonwealth Act No. 63, Sections 2 , 3 , 4 .
Sec. 3 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 645

is accomplished by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic and

registering in the proper Civil Registry and in the Bureau of Immigra-
tion. Processing of applications is done by the Special Committee on
Naturalization consisting of the Solicitor General as Chairman, an Un-
dersecretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Intel-
51
ligence Coordinating Agency.

Under R . A . N o s . 965 and 2 6 3 0 , those who lost citizenship by

serving in the United States A r m e d Forces, could avail of repatriation
simply by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic and registering
the same in the local Civil Registry where one resides or where one last
52
resided. However, now under Republic Act N o . 8171 only (1) women
w h o lost citizenship by marriage and (2) those who lost citizenship for
53
political or economic reasons may be repatriated may be repatriated.
The procedure is found in Section 2 of R . A . N o . 8 1 7 1 :

Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath

of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration
in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The
Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification
as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

54
Registration is an essential element.

Since repatriation is the reacquisition of lost citizenship and not

the acquisition of a new citizenship, one who is repatriated regains the
level of his former citizenship. If he was previously a natural-born Fili-
pino citizen, upon repatriation he or she regains his or her natural born
citizenship. This was the ruling of the Court in Bengzon v. Cruz" The
Court reasoned that there are only two kinds of citizenship — natu-
ral b o m and naturalized. Since, however, one who is repatriated is not
naturalized, he must be a natural-bom citizen. As the Court put it:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under

the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-bom and (2) those who are naturalized

5,
R.A.No.8171;Angatv.Republic,G.R.No. 132244, September 14, 1999.
"Bengzon v. Cruz, GR. No. 142840, May 7,2001; R.A. Nos. 965 and 2630.
"Tabasa v. CA, August 29,2006.
"Altarejos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163256, November 10, 2004.
"Id.
 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 3
646
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,

i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-bom Filipino. Note-
worthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category
for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they
would either be natural-bom or naturalized depending on the rea-
sons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings
in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-bom
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to
be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

Justice Melo, however, filed a vigorous dissent:

Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original

nationality upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. While an ap-
plicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time consuming
process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, as
amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express
and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and
reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Re-
public of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be considered a
natural-bom citizen under the first part of section 2, Article IV, of
the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at all
or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him
to reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines that a natural-bom
citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship without any prior
declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this
view, the term 'natural bom' citizens could also cover those who
have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of
Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been ac-
corded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those bom
in the Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of the
1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.

What is the effective date of a grant of repatriation? A plurality

opinion in Lee v. Commission on Elections & Frivaldo,™ ruled that the
effective date is the date of application for repatriation not the date
when repatriation is approved.

*C-R. No. 120295. June 28,1996.

Sec. 4 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 647

What may be gathered from Bengzon and Frivaldo is that juris-

prudence values natural born citizenship highly and will facilitate giv-
ing it back to its former possessor as to a prodigal son if it was once lost.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act N o . 9225 compels natural-

bom Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign coun-
try, but w h o reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to
take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act N o . 9225,
and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simulta-
neous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candi-
57
dates in Philippine elections.

SEC. 4. CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO MARRY ALIENS

SHALL RETAIN THEIR CITIZENSHIP, UNLESS BY THEIR ACT OR OMISSION
THEY ARE DEEMED, UNDER THE LAW, TO HAVE RENOUNCED IT.

1. Marriage to an alien spouse.

The 1973 Constitution's version of this provision read: "A female

citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philip-
pine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the
law, to have renounced her citizenship." The 1987 provision makes no
reference to sex thus making the rule applicable to both males and fe-
males on the chance that some country might have a law which divests
58
a foreign husband of his citizenship.

Commonwealth Act N o . 6 3 , Section 1(7), provided that a Filipino

woman lost her Philippine citizenship "upon her marriage to a foreigner
if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires
his nationality." The 1973 constitutional provision repealed the above
statutory rule. The fact alone of marriage to an alien cannot strip a Fili-
pino woman of her Philippine citizenship. Only acts and omissions,
which under Article III, Section 4 , Congress may prescribe, constitute
59
explicit or implicit renunciation of citizenship. The 1973 provision,

"Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, Novenber 26,2008.

58
I RECORD 229.
"See id. at 230-32.
 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 5
648
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

therefore, like Section 1(2), placed the Filipino woman on the same
60
level as the Filipino male.
The provision, however, is prospective. It does not serve to restore
citizenship already lost by marriage under the old law.

S E C 5. DUAL ALLEGIANCE OF CITIZENS IS INIMICAL TO THE

NATIONAL INTEREST AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH BY LAW.

1. Dual citizenship.
Section 5 , a new provision, deals with a new concept, dual alle-
giance. But it will be helpful to treat dual citizenship first, a closely
related topic.

Since the universal rule is that the child follows the citizenship of
the father, and since under Section 1(2) the child also follows the citi-
zenship of the Filipino mother, and since under Section 4 the Filipino
woman does not lose Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien hus-
band, it is clear that the Constitution allows for the possibility of dual
citizenship. It is, after all, a condition which arises from the fact that
Philippine law cannot control international law and the laws of other
61
countries on citizenship.

If, however, Philippine citizenship is acquired by naturalization

and not by operation of the Constitution, it is well within the p o w e r of
Philippine law to require prior renunciation of foreign nationality as a
62
condition. Likewise, by Section 3, it is well within the power of the
legislature to make acquisition of foreign nationality a cause of loss of
Philippine citizenship, provided that the acquisition of a new citizen-
ship is not through marriage.

The 1986 Constitutional Commission preferred to leave the mat-

63
ter of dual citizenship to ordinary legislation.

"When Delegate Astilla proposed that a female citizen should lose her citizenship upon
mamage to an alien, Delegate Lilia de Lima countered with a proposal that a male citizen who
marries an alien should also lose his citizenship. Whereupon, Astilla said: "Mr. President, so that it
may not be said that knighthood is no longer in flower in this session hall, I surrender to the wishes
of the gentle female delegates and I withdraw in the meantime." Session of November 27, 1972.
The self-dubbed knight was not heard from again on the same subject.
"Convention Sessions of November 25, and 27, 1972.
"See Oh Hek Hew v. Republic, 29 SCRA 94 (1969).
6J
I RECORD 190-191.233.
Sec. 5 ART. IV - CITIZENSHIP 649

2. Dual allegiance.

This provision originated from the concern expressed by a num-

ber of Commissioners, notably Commissioners Concepcion and Ople,
about the impact of liberalized naturalization procedures on the policy
64
on the exploitation of natural resources and on national security. Ople
distinguished dual allegiance from dual citizenship saying that dual
allegiance "is larger and more threatening than that of mere double
citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious.
[Dual citizenship] is often a function of the accident of marriage or of
birth on foreign soil." He said that dual allegiance referred to that "un-
settled kind of allegiance of ... [persons] w h o are already Filipinos but
w h o , by their acts, m a y be said to be bound by a second allegiance ei-
ther to Peking or Taiwan." He added that dual allegiance could "siphon
scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and
65
this is already happening."

Ople's formulation, however, as approved by the Commission

merely recognizes the problem and leaves concrete ways of dealing
with it to Congress.

Citizenship, of course, involves allegiance to the country of citi-

zenship. Congress has dealt with dual allegiance by allowing dual citi-
zenship. R.A. N o . 9 2 2 5 , entitled " A n Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens who Acquire Foreign Citzenship Permanent," has
the following key provision:

Sec. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provi-

sion of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-bom citizen-
ship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign coun-
try are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I

will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Phil-
ipgines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obli-

"Id. at 207-210, 233-235.

"Id. 361.
 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 5
650
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

gation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose

of evasion."
Natural-bom citizens of the Philippines who, after the effec-
tivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Although their civil and political rights are restored, there are re-
strictions:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. —
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must
Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitu-
tion, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renun-
ciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe

and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philip-
pines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption
of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the

Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public of-

fice in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens.