People v.

Marti
G.R. No. 81561; 18 January 1991
FACTS:
On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the booth of the Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland. When asked if the
packages could be examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts of books
cigars, and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and was sealed with masking tape for shipment.

As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau of Customs and/or Burueau of
Posts, the proprietor of the forwarding agency opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted
therefrom and he found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to NBI, and informed them that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the shipment containing bricks of
dried marijuana leaves, some of which were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked underneath
tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the appellant in violation of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found guilty. Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the
evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and
further, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized packages.

ISSUE:
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked against
the State?

HELD:
No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State in the absence of governmental interference. This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government; and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals. In the present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made
search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the alleged act of the private individual in violation of a
constitutional right cannot be invoked against the State.

NB:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass
the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

 
Reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
 
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
 
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC
Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10
bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico
overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640.  YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the
jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition.
Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico
from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
Employment.

ZULUETA vs CA
Summary:

Cecilia Zulueta broke into her husband’s office and obtained his alleged private correspondence with his
paramours. What happened next will shock you! RTC, CA, and SC all rendered the evidence as inadmissible.

Doctrine:

The Law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making in privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the otheras to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Facts:

 The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
 The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution)
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)
 The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
 A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
 The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the
consent of the other  ,as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Issues Ratio:

1. WON the evidence is admissible. – NO.

 The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
 The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution)
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)
 The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
 A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
 The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the
consent of the other  ,as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court)

Gamboa vs Chan
July 14, 2012

Facts:

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa Commission which was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the
future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the office of the President. Marynette
Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte
conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides and classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining
PAGs. Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly tagging her as a
PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of
habeas data to destroy the unverified reports from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless
reports against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy.
However, the RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish
the source of the information.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful act that
violated petitioner’s right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper

HELD:

Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is

NOT an intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy
 
It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate
objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions
accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa. This court
holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the report listing her as a PAG
coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the
Commission was not unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP
was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for
the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to
deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted,
inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or
affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region
interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government
Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to
municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of
1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 171947-48

18 December 2008

TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the
water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
 RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government agencies to clean up
and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and
do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted
that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents?
2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to
the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the
bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to
public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that these government
agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded
from choosing not to perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.