MONCADO VS PEOPLES COURT

Facts:

Prosecutor Ladaw filed an information against petitioner accusing him of Treason, before the People’s Court on
February 28, 1946. But prior to such, or on April 4, 1945, petitioner had been arrested by the Counter Intelligence
Corps of the United States Army in his residence in Manila, without any warrant of arrest. He was then taken to the
Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa.

On April 11, 1945, petitioner’s wife, who was then staying in their house in Quezon City, was approached by CIC
Officers. She was ordered to accompany the latter to their house in Manila as a witness as they take documents
and things belonging to petitioner. She originally refused after finding that they had no search warrant, to which
the CIC Officers responded that with or without her, they would proceed with their search. Thus, she accompanied
them. Upon arrival, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been ransacked by said officers. Lt. Olives,
head of CIC, informed Mrs. Moncado that they were taking the bundle of documents and things since they proved
her husband’s guilt. No receipt was issued to her either.

Issue:

May illegally seized evidence be admissible in court?

Ruling:

The application is denied with costs.

Ratio:

The Constitution guarantees the inviolability of individual rights in the following terms; "The right of the people to
the safety of their persons, dwellings, papers and effects against searches and kidnappings arrest will not be
violated, unless for probable cause that will be determined by the judge after examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and the witnesses that I will present, and with a detailed description of the site to be registered
and of the people to be apprehended or of the things to be seized. " (Title III, article 1. or , paragraph 3 or .)

However, in the instant case, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily
inadmissible. The guilty must be punished, even if the evidence against them was obtained illegally. 2 And those
who, in violation of the law and the Constitution, improperly seize such proofs, must also be punished. This is how
the law rules, majestic and unimpeachable. Citing the US case of Wolf vs. Colorado, if the rules of evidence permit,
such may be admitted without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability against the erring officer.
Furthermore, it is admissible long as it is not excluded by the Rules of Court on the theory that a criminal should
not be allowed to go freely merely because “the constable has blundered”

G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Harry Stonehill,etc.

vs Hon. Jose Diokno, etc.

 Ponente: Conception

Facts:

Respondents secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners and the corporations of which they were
officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to
above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and
the Rules of Court for being general warrants. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in
the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal  and cannot be availed of by third parties. 

Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively  to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 

People vs Andre Marti GR 81561 18 January  1991

Facts: Andre Marti and his common-law wife sent 4 gift wrapped packages via Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders. When Anita Reyes asked if she can examine the packages, Marti refused and assured her that it only
contains books and cigars. Before delivery to Bureau of Customs it is SOP to open  the boxes for inspection and
found dried leaves with peculiar odor from the said box. They asked NBI to test the dried leaves. The NBI made
inventory and took charge of the box. Dried leaves are found to be marijuana. When Marti was claiming his mail at
post office he has invited for questioning by the NBI. Marti contends that the evidence subject of the imputed
offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication.
Issue: Whether or not Marti’s right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated?
Decision: Judgment affirmed. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. The search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon private individuals. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Therefore, In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of
Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per
unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an
envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there
was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition.
Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:

Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On
the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite
this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
 People vs Bongcarawan G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002

Facts:

The security officer of Super Ferry 5, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her
missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4)
other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at
the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. Bongcarawan was informed
of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his
baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the
security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the
matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called
the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and
the seized items. NBI Forensic Chemist later confirmed the substance to be shabu. Accused was convicted of
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.

Bongcarawan appealed, arguing that the Samsonite suitcase containing the shabu was forcibly opened and
searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him. He also contends that People v. Marti is not applicable in this case because some vessel security
personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.

Issue:

Whether the drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against accused.

Held:

As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, [i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was
only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel
security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former
are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private
employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state
tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and
other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.

People vs. Domantay

307 SCRA 1

Facts:
 Bernardino Domantay alyas Junior otot was picked by the police at the market because he is the suspect
and the lone accused for the killing of the 6 yrs old child, which it with fall that he is already in custody. And in the
forgoing event junior utot made admissions of the crime in different occasion and different persons, with a police
officer and a news reporter, and this amounted to extra judicial confessions which became inadmissible. In the
lower court junior otot was convicted of rape and homicide and was maximum penalty was sentenced to him. But
on the other hand the Supreme Court modified the sentence and lessens it.

Issue: whether the confession of the accused is admissible

Ruling: In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of
October 17, 1996, 37 he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He
was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, � 12(1) of the
Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza narrated what transpired during accused-appellant's interrogation:

Accused-appellant was picked up by the police without any warrant of arrest, although his case did not fall under
any of the three instances where warrantless arrests are authorized under Rule 113.

Filoteo Vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. (Filoteo) was a police investigator of the Western Police District inMetro Manila.
Together with his co-accused, he was being charged of being a mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal
delivery van. This happened on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in Bulacan, wherein the said accused, two of
whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation, stop the
Postal Delivery Truck while it was travelling along the said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take,
rob and carry away with them the following, to wit:(1) Postal Delivery Truck, (2) Social Security System Medicare
Checks and Vouchers (3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers (4) Treasury Warrants, and (5)
Several Mail Matters from abroad. The Sandiganbayan found them GUILTY as co-principals beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known
as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. On appeal to the SC, the petitioners claim that the rights
of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which includes the right against anuncounselled
waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place
in 1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. This is for the reason that it is favorable to him as an
accused pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Issues:

W/N Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should apply to the accused retroactively.

Held:

No. Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for
being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a
habitual criminal, what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of
Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual
rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by
individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of
the state.

Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed.

RECIT-READY:

Filoteo was a police investigator in Manila. He was one of the suspects being charged for violating the Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law for hijacking a postal delivery van. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the
crime, in which one of the evidence that was used against him was his sworn statement admitting the crime. On
appeal to the SC, he claimed that the rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which includes the right against an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively,
even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
This is for the reason that it is favorable to him as an accused pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

DOCTRINE: Penal laws are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the
executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and
enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law.

Serrano vs National Labor Relations Commission

Facts:

A petition was filed seeking a review of a resolution made by the National Labor relations commission which
reversed the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal and
denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store. Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting
measure, said respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an
independent security agency. A memorandum was subsequently wrote to petitioner informing him of his
termination immediately (date of effectivity of termination was exactly the same as the date the memorandum
was made).
Issue:

WON there was a violation of petitioner's right to due process when respondent-employer failed to give the
required 1 month notice provided in the Labor Code.

Held:

"It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to
be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and
opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance
with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process."

There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be
considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff.

The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not
apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. This is plain
from the text of Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property of
the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with
what are considered civilized methods.

The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of
organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of
employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose
for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard
on any charge against him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual
loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment.

The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due
Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.
This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282.

We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the
notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual. Indeed, under the
Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an
employee illegal.

G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,

vs.

GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

(ART.3 SEC. 1.RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY)

FACTS: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides these conditions; that otherwise, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a
“transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the
company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised
the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in
that area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict
of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in
September 1998.

Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with
Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra.

Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. Thereafter, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s
milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.

Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to
reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as
medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they
submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration, but Tecson declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships
between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer
Tecson to another sales territory.

CA sustained; MR denied.

Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on
account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry; that Tecson was
constructively dismissed

GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying
an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not violate the
equal protection clause;
The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and
policies; that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he signed his contract of
employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein.

ISSUE: WON Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid

HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential
programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.

Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21

EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees
and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of
their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and
the company that may arise out of such relationships.

Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about
by his relationship with Bettsy. PETITION DENIED.

G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his

failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being

166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November

1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again

went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On

January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he

satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight

checks, which he failed to comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be

dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company

standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were

not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, “and

considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)

years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of

petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did

not hamper the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly

failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by

petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing

qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article

282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was

able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the

proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992,

petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the

answer is yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the

advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes

an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity

may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means

that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his

actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful

action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks

the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in

particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can

show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called

a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used

because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for

satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order

to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on

board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its

employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.

Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on

equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

Atienza v COMELEC G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010

Facts:

Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced that his party withdrew support for the

administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo. However, Atienza, LPChairman, alleged that Drilon made

the announcement without consulting first the party.

Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with Atienza as LP president.

Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming that it was illegal

considering that the party’s electing bodies, NECO and NAPOLCO, were not properly convened. Moreover, Drilon

claimed that under the LP Constitution, there is a three-year term. Meaning, his term has not yet ended.

However, Atienza contested that the election of new officers could be likened to people power removing Drilon as

president by direct action. Also, Atienza alleged that the amendment to the LP Constitution providing the three-

term had not been properly ratified. The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since

the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution.

The COMELEC ruled that since the said Constitution was not ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a hold-overcapacity

since his term has been ended already. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders

before respondent Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP president. Atienza

et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP questioning the validity of the quorum. The

COMELEC issued resolution denying petitioners Atienza et al’s petition.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al’s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a

membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an

internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

Issue:

WoN the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party dispute.

Held:

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any

and all controversies involving political parties.

Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC

may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.
The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2,

Article IX-C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate

officers responsible for its acts.” Moreover, the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved

the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party

leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

The COMELEC did not err when it upheld Roxas’s election but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza’s

expulsion.

People vs. Lauga Case Digest

Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in evidence.

Facts:

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses for

the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance

was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to

the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter

AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged

confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the

confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of

such requirement.

Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer admissible in

evidence?

Held:

No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their

community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay

bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and

order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and

the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to

conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective

insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the

Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of

appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in evidence. [People vs Antonio Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March

15, 2010]

Ruben Del Castillo

vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of
petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the
search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front
of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances
and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay
tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of
petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence
of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found
guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for
certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because
they were found inside the nipa hut.
Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere presumption
that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?
Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under petitioner’s control
or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was
it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that
petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the
place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that
the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In
considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused
— in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

B.3 Provisions of the Bill of Rights are self –executing

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC
matched the bid price  in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which
GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections

GR No. 161872
April 13, 2004
FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its
due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC
again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other
people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The
COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political
party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities
for public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the
COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also
stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and
supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage
national and international campaigns, and his government platform.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right
to equal access to opportunities for public service.
HELD
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential
candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal
access to opportunities for public service. – NO
The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-
self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the
article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the
policies presented.
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections
GR No. 161872
April 13, 2004
FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its
due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC
again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other
people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The
COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political
party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities
for public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the
COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also
stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and
supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage
national and international campaigns, and his government platform.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right
to equal access to opportunities for public service.
HELD
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential
candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal
access to opportunities for public service. – NO
The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-
self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the
article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the
policies presented.
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections
GR No. 161872
April 13, 2004
FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its
due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC
again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other
people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The
COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political
party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities
for public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the
COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also
stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and
supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage
national and international campaigns, and his government platform.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right
to equal access to opportunities for public service.
HELD
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential
candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal
access to opportunities for public service. – NO
The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-
self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the
article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the
policies presented.

ev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his
right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for
the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

Ruling:

NO
The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-
self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the
article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the
policies presented.
The court noted that the provisions under Art 2 are generally considered not self-executing. As such, the provision
in Sec 26 along with other policies in the article does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Art 2 merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action by presenting ideals or standards through the policies
presented.

Art 2 Sec 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office one that is subject to limitation provided by the law. As
long as these limitations are enforced without discrimination, then the equal clause is not violated. The court
justified the COMELECS need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational,
objective and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a mockery if
anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government is allowed to run.

Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy but the Court stated that it is
not within their power to make such assessments.

Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is
subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without
discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court justified the
COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring
rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election
process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to
hold a government position, is allowed to run
B.4 Hierarchy of Constitutionally protected Rights (Preferred rights)

1. Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila

Facts:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions
questioned for its violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in
open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue:
Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held:
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no
violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoying the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. As such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory
note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and
instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction
lifted.

2. PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

Facts:
Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in protest for the
alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA agreement
however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress of their
grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer. Respondent dismissed the
petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the petitioners.
Held:
The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid and protection against
alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in
such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart from violating the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental
law to these lowly employees.
3. SSS vs Atienza
Facts:
The city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified the Pandacan Area from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from effectivity date of the ordinance. Most affected
are the oil companies composed of Shell, Chevron (Caltex) and Petron whose oil depots are located therein.

Despite the ordinance, the Sangunian adopted a Resolution no. 13 extending the agreement of scaling down of the
Pandacan depots up to April 2003 and authorized the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Nevertheless, the petitioners filed a petition for mandamus sought to compel the Mayor to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. The Oil companies questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance No 8027 is constitutional and valid

Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. In the present case, Ordinance No 8027 was enacted for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The
Sangunian was impelled to take measure to protect its residents from catastrophic devastation in case if terrorist
attack on the Pandacan depots. Further, the zoning ordinance which reclassified the area is reasonable and not
arbitrary enactment to the oil companies because they were not prevented nor prohibited from doing business in
the city other than the now reclassified location of the depot where such operations are no longer permitted. The
power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and
is exercise for the protection and benefit of the residents.

Averring that they shall not be compensated, the court ruled that the property condemned under the exercise of
police power is not compensable. The restriction imposes to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is
not a taking.

4. Canlas et. al., vs NAPICO Homeowners Association

 GR No 182795                                                                                  June 5, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or is about to be
demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to summon some unprincipled
Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the issuance of fraudulent titles to NAPICO. 

Issue:
Whether or not  writ of amparo is proper in this case.

Ruling:
No, writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity.
The threatened demolition is not included among the enumeration of rights protected by the writ. Their claim to
their dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty, and security.

5. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. BPI Employees Union Davao Chapter – Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, G.R.
No. 164301, August 10, 2010.

FACTS

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) and was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Articles of Merger and Plan of Merger did not contain any specific stipulation with respect to the employment
contracts of existing personnel of the non-surviving entity which is FEBTC. Pursuant to the said Article and Plan of
Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation.
FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own
employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained.

ISSUE: Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger between
FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between petitioner and
respondent Union.

HELD: All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are
subject to its terms.  However, under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from
its coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of
a religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds; employees
already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union shop
agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit; and
employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the agreement.
II- DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

A. Article III, sec 1 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws”)

A.1 Due process and equal protection clauses vis-à-vis- Fourteenth Amendment of US Constitution (who
are protected)
1. Smith, Bell &co. vs, Natividad, 40 Phil 1

A.2 Origin, Evolution and meaning of due process:

- The great Charter of the liberties of England and liberties of the forest
1. Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, Gr. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
2. CLT Realy Development Corporation vs. High Grades Feeds Corp., Gr No. 160684, September 2, 2015
Cases:
U.S vs Toribio;

G.R. No. L-5060 – 15 Phil. 85 – Political Law – Police Power – Limitations on Private Ownership – General Welfare

Facts:

Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a permit to have his carabao slaughtered for human consumption. His
request was denied because his carabao was found not unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao
without the necessary license. He was eventually sued in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. and was sentenced by the trial court. His
counsel argued that the law requiring one to acquire a permit before slaughtering a carabao is not a valid exercise
of police power.

Issue:
Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power and unconstitutional.

Held:
The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use, within the
meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of
others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.” The wisdom behind said law: the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a “reasonably necessary” limitation on private ownership, to protect the community
from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of
the community may be measurably and dangerously affected

Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-
appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Facts:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions
questioned for its violation of due process: refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless
it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; usurious
increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or
rent more than twice every 24 hours; and cancellation of license for subsequent violation. The lower court issued
preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue:
Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held:
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no
violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. .As such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory
note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and
instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction
lifted.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, digested

GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Equal Protection)

FACTS:
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years
old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in
Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.
Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of
police power.

HELD:
No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general
welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common
knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a
substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

Department of Education vs. San Diego180 SCRA 533

Facts:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the three-flunk rule
that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. He then filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela petition for mandamus. He invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. Respondent judge held that the private respondent had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission rule by the petitioner is an arbitrary exercise of police power.

Held:
The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed
the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. It is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The right to quality
education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that “every citizen has
the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements. The decision of the respondent court is reversed, with costs against the private
respondent.

GSIS v. MONTESCLAROS

FACTS:
Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal protection
clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied claim, it said
surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.

HELD:
There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is outright confiscation of
benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard. There is also violation of equal
protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness in marriage before the employee’s death is
valid to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for
the pension. Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the
pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place
within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There is no
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended.

Chavez vs. Comelec, 437 SCRA 415, 2004; G.R. No. 162777

FACTS:
In 2003, before he filed candidacy, Chavez was contracted to be the model of certain brands by which he appeared
on billboards. Subsequently in December, Chavez filed candidacy on the race for the senate. In 2004, COMELEC
enacted Res. No. 6520 which prohibited the appearance of the candidate in any broadcast or propaganda material,
or if existing shall be removed within three days after the effectivity of said resolution, the violation of such would
be considered premature campaigning thus a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Chavez, sought exception
from COMELEC, but was denied. Petitioner now contends the unconstitutionality of said law, saying that it is an
invalid exercise of police power.

ISSUES:
Whether the Resolution was a valid exercise of police power

RULING:
Yes. It had lawful subject as shown in its will for fair play during elections, and a lawful means since a candidate
may pay the company to use him as endorser for publicity purposes. Such billboards gave Frank Chavez an unfair
advantage against other candidates for Senator because it became political in nature. The very nature of the
assailed statute was to prohibit premature campaigning of the candidates. Chavez, in exposing himself in these
billboards, was already campaigning prematurely, and as such, gaining undue advantage.

Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 430, 2004;

Facts:
GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance pf Permit to
Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of
residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied.
Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief
Ebdane.

Issue:
Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the banning of carrying
firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?

Decision:
Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked any time. It does
not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee
takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any
property, immunity, or privilege.

The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do not entirely
prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence.
However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is
a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.

Beltran Vs. Secretary 476 SCRA 168, 2005;

Fact:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of
R.A. 7719 provides Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.” Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall
effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a
careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” On August 23, 1994, the National
Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was
promulgated by DOH. The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH. Hence, petitioners were
granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On
May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

Issue:
Whether the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the
Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is
not germane to the purpose of the law.

Held:
No, the court deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was based on
substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the
latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats
blood as a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily
involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise,
and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary
blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

City of Manila vs. Laguio Jr. 455 SCRA 308, 2005;

GR # 118127, April 12, 2005 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Regulation by Ordinance)

FACTS:
Manila Ordinance No. 7738, prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, to include motels and inns, was
enacted by herein petitioners contending that the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State
in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) assailed the ordinance as an invalid exercise of
police power on the grounds that the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
Petition denied. The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. An ordinance which permanently restricts
the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is violative
of the private property rights of individuals.

CARLOS SUPERDRUG ET. AL V. DSWD G.R. No. 166494 June 29, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically tasked to
monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent
(20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private
property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and
capital because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines, and the
law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.

HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. The State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose
upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Senior Citizens Act was
enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and
privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our
society. Police power has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.” For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no
basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.

The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component
of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business
and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an
impairment of property rights in the process

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V. CITY OF MANILA G.R.No.122846 January 20, 2009

FACTS:
In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No. 7744 that prohibits hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
“wash up” rates or other similarly concocted terms, in the City of Manila.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.

Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
ISSUE:

WON the ordinance is constitutional.

HELD:

NO. The ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process
clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to
be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that
individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
Hence, Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner,

vs.
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSON’S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM
PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner seeking
the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons
Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime)
could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.

The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is
contrary to National Building Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated” the land for parking.
Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of
the Philippines) as to the State’s policy of protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the
National Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the
Code, including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of Public Works.
This is not being strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of DPWH instead of
DPWH instead.

As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should institute the action to enjoin
the collction of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to
RA 7394 should enforce the provisions of Code relative to parking; and 3) Congress should amend and update the
National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking fees and its waiver of liability.

Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court against DPWH and local building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX
of Implementing Rules and Regulations of National Building Code is unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent has
the legal right to lease parking spaces; and 3) National Building Code IRR is ineffective as it was not published for 3
consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation as mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.

OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and
contending that their practice of charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a controversy of public welfare; 2) a
petition for declaratory relief is proper since all the requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does
not necessarily impose that parking spaces shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can be
considered as unlawful taking of property right without just compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient evidence
to justify any award for damages. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces
free of charge.

OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National Building Code did not intend
the parking spaces to be free of charge. On the otherhand, respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA,
contending that: 1) RTC erred in failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to
declare IRR ineffective for not having been published as required by law; 3) RTC erred in dismissing the OSG’s
petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal
standing as it is not a real party-in-interest.

CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the following grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust
administrative remedies and that an administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; 2) the
validity of National Building Code IRR cannot be proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy
could be settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity since the courts should refrain from
passing upon the constitutionality of a law; and 3) Section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are
clear that they are only intended to control the occupancy of areas and structures, and in the absence of provision
of law, respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of charge.

As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.

Issues:

Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid exercise of the police power of
State.

Held:

No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid exercise of the police power of State.

It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and
maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control,
partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory
agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-
compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable
power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only
as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies
have the power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even
so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned
parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or
prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must
pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends
sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State,
through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the
collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court
finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting
beyond the bounds of police power.

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The
power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising police
power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to
impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule
that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title
remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use
of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to
permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably
restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the
owner may recover therefor.

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already
tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote
a portion of the latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access
to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not
only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further
prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and
operation of the required parking facilities.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the
mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property
without payment of just compensation.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007
and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint
Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and
No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD v. NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, GR No. 184778, 2009-
10-02
Facts:
Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) conducted examinations of
the books of the following banks
SED examiners provided them with copies of Lists of Findings/Exceptions containing the deficiencies discovered
during the examinations.

Petitioner Chuchi Fonacier, officer-in-charge of the SED, sent separate letters to the Board of Directors of each
bank, informing them that the SED found that the banks failed to carry out the required remedial measures.

basis for the capital infusion figures be disclosed, and noted that none of them had received the Report of
Examination (ROE) which finalizes... the audit findings.

the RBPI filed a complaint for nullification of the BSP ROE with application for a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC

RTC denied the prayer for a TRO of Pilipino Rural Bank,... petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss against all the
complaints (except that of the San Pablo City Development Bank, Inc.), on the grounds that the complaints stated
no cause of action and that a condition precedent for filing the cases had not been complied... with

RTC, on June 4, 2008, ruled that the banks were entitled to the writs of preliminary injunction prayed for. It held
that it had been the practice of the SED to provide the ROEs to the banks before submission to the MB.

The CA ruled that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and when it ordered the consolidation of the 10 cases.

By reason of the TRO issued by this Court, the SED was able to submit their ROEs to the MB

The MB then prohibited the respondent banks from transacting business and placed them under receivership
under Section 53 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8791

Issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT VIOLATED SECTION 25 OF THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT AND EFFECTIVELY HANDCUFFED
THE BANGKO SENTRAL FROM DISCHARGING ITS FUNCTIONS TO THE GREAT AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE

OF THE COUNTRY'S BANKING SYSTEM;

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO BE
FURNISHED COPIES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ROEs BEFORE THE SAME IS SUBMITTED TO THE MONETARY BOARD IN
VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS AND TRANSPARENCY DESPITE LACK OF EXPRESS PROVISION

IN THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT REQUIRING BSP TO DO THE SAME

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent... serious damage.

The respondent banks have failed to show that they are entitled to copies of the ROEs.
hey can point to no provision of law, no section in the procedures of the BSP that shows that the BSP is required to
give them copies of the ROEs. Sec. 28 of RA 7653, or the New Central Bank

Act

The respondent banks cannot claim a violation of their right to due process if they are not provided with copies of
the ROEs.

The same ROEs are based on the lists of findings/exceptions containing the deficiencies found by the SED
examiners when they examined the books of the... respondent banks... espondent banks are already aware of
what is required of them by the BSP, and cannot claim violation of their right to due process simply because they
are not furnished with copies of the ROEs

The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an unwarranted interference with the powers of the
MB

, the respondent banks have shown no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction to prevent serious damage.

This "close now, hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted
dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors,... creditors,
stockholders, and the general public.

petition is hereby GRANTED

Roxas & Co. vs. DAMBA-NFSW 607 SCRA 33, 2009;

Facts:
Petitioner, Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987,
the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. This
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was
signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6,
1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions
of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by Department of
Agrarian Reform in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 petitioner, through its President, sent a letter to
the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its voluntary offer to sell of Hacienda Caylaway.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion
of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE
PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Essentially, Petitioner, filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-
agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which declared Nasugbu,
Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-
beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering
513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Petitioner filed with the DAR an application for exemption from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all lands already classified as commercial,
industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-
Nasugbu tourism zone to non- agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP
coverage.

Held:
No. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three
municipalities including Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 merely recognized
the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not
reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. It bears emphasis that a mere reclassification of an agricultural land
does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before
one is permitted to use it for other purposes.
Petitioner, Roxas & Co., can only look to the provisions of the Tourism Act, and not to Presidential Proclamation
No. 1520, for possible exemption.

People vs. Siton, et al.,

GR 169364, 18 Sept. 2009

Facts: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202
(2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were found wandering and loitering around San Pedro and
Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
Respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague
and overboard. The municipal trial court denied the motions, directed respondents to file their respective counter-
affidavits, and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power (or the power
of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property) and justified by the Latin
maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” (which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the
greater number). Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause. The
RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2) unconstitutional.

Issue:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?

Ruling:
No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the
poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause
alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act
indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.

Remnan Enterprise, Inc vs. PRC, G.r No. 197676, Feb 4, 2014;

FACTS
This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate ServiceAct of the
Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the
real estate service sector under regulatory scheme oflicensing, registration and supervision of real estate service
practitioners. The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC). The law required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the employ of duly
licensed real estate brokers.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clauseand infringes the
ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the CivilCode. Furthermore, they claim that it
violates the equal protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell their properties without the
need of a licensed real estate broker.

The provisions in question are –

Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service.
Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service.

ISSUES AND HOLDING:

Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly substantive due process.
No.

The requirements for substantive due process are –

1.Lawful government purpose; and
2. Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose.

The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards. The law
recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor
confidence, and in promoting national progress.

The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as it merely
regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.

Carolina vs. Senga, G.r No. 189649, April 20, 2015;

Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. vs. Trans Asia Oil Gr No. 207942, January 12, 2015

Facts:
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and
mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI). PIMI's portion was sold to the Manila Banking Corporation(MBC) and
BDO. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area from 1986 onwards.
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had acquired the
mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale.
Issue:
Are rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior to
November 15, 1935, vested rights that cannot be impaired?
RULING:
Yes. The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties. The Government, whether
through the DENR or the MGB, could not alienate or dispose of the lands or mineral through the MPSA granted to
Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the minerals
therein, and it could legally transfer or assign such exclusive right. Mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be impaired even by
the Government. Indeed, the mining patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were
subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest
had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be impaired even
in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work obligations.

C. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

C.1 Meaning

C.2Scope of the Equality

C.2.1- Economic Equality –

Art. III sec II; Art.XIII sec 2 par.2 and sec.10; Art XIII sec 1,2,and 3;

Ichong vs. Hernandez 101 phil 1155;

G.R. No. L-7995 – 101 Phil. 1155 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by
Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Facts:
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the
said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

RULING:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.”

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong

G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

Facts:
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in
any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila violates the due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution.

Held:
Yes. The ordinance violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines
to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

C.2.2- Political Equality -Art IX-C sec 10; Art. XIII sec 1;

Forbes vs. chouco Tiaco 16 phil 534;

Facts:
Defendant Chinese national was deported to China and was allegedly threatened to be deported again
when he came back to the Philippines. He filed for a premliminary injuction prohibiting plaintids from
deporting him. Said injuction was issued by the CFI.

Issue:
WON the political rights of aliens are protected by due process of law.
Ruling:
No. political rights of aliens is not governed by the “due process of law” which governs in deallin with
their civil rights. The certificate of admission is a mere license and may be revoked at any time. An aliens
right to remain in the territory of a foreign government is purely a political one and may be terminated
at the will of such government. No cases have been found, ant it is confidently asserted that there are
none, which establish the contrary doctrine.

Peralta vs. Comelec 82 SCRA 30;

Facts:
The 1978 Election Code grants voter the option for straight party or block voting where the vote for a
party, group or aggrupation would be counted as a vote for all its candidates.

Issue:
WON block voting violates the equal protection clause of the constitution.

Ruling:
No. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What it proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based
upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies
equally to all those belonging to the same class. Instant petition are dismissed.

Ceniza v. Comelec, 96 Scra 763 (1980)

FACTS:
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which
effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized
(those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in
provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one
or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in
provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction:
Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said
that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further,
petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51
and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and
historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,
close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their
charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as
highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is
inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of
the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal
protection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD:
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary
of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being
only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of
the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular
annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it
is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit.
It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its
independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need
thecontinued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the
voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law
since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is
without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and
denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which
violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

Dumlao vs. Comelec 95 SCRA 258;

FACTS:
Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 disqualifies retired elective officials who has received retirement benefits and is already
65 years old to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Petitioner said it is
concocted and designed against him to prevent him from running again.

ISSUE:
WON Paragraph 1, Section 4, BP Blg. 52 violates the equal protection and due process gurantee of the
Constitution.

HELD:
No violation of equal protection. It is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from the others.
Here, persons over 65 are classified differently from younger employees to promote emergence of
younger blood. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated. It does not forbid all legal classification,
what is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is
not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.

Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC

FACTS:

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

BACKGROUND:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution.

HELD:

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of
sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
constitutional.

RULING:

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits civil
service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in
partisan political campaign is unmistakable.

The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike
under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

Ang Ladlad vs. Comelec 618 SCRA 2010

Procedural Posture
The Commission on Elections denied the petitioner, Ang Ladlad, registration as a political organisation in
2009. Ang Ladlad petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review, which was granted. The
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) intervened on behalf of Ang Ladlad in this case before the Supreme
Court.

Facts
Ang Ladlad was a political organisation composed of members of the Filipino LGBT community. In 2006,
in accordance with Filipino law, Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the Commission on Elections.
The application was denied because the Commission on Elections found that the organisation lacked a
substantial membership base. The group applied again in 2009, but the Commission on Elections again
dismissed the application, this time on moral and religious grounds.

The Commission on Elections found that Ang Ladlad, as an LGBT organisation, “tolerate[d] immorality
which offends religious beliefs”. It cited the Bible and the Koran as proof that homosexual activity
violated standards of morality, and held that it could only recognise law-abiding parties.

The Commission believed that Ang Ladlad’s support of LGBT issues violated several statutes (including
Articles 201, 695 and 1306 of the Civil Code of the Republic of the Philippines) that referred to concepts
such as “morality,” “mores, good customs,” “public morals,” and “morals”. Additionally, the Commission
believed that approving Ang Ladlad would violate the constitutional duty to “promote and protect [the
youth’s] physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being”.

Issue
Whether the Commission on Elections’ refusal to register Ang Ladlad violated the right of the
organisation and its members to freedom of association, freedom of expression, and political
participation.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection
is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
C.2.3- Social Equality Art.XIII sec 1

C.3 Cases: -

PASEI vs. Drilon 186 SCRA 356;

G.R. No. 81958 • June 30, 1988

Constitutional Law | Equal protection of the laws | Valid Classification

FACTS:
PASEI is a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement. -DOLE issued Department Order No. 1, GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.
PASEI then went to the SC via certiorari and prohibition.
PASEI contentions: (1) D.O. 1 discriminates against females, and it does not apply to all Filipino workers
but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills; (2) It is violative of the right to travel; and
(3) It constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power.
ISSUES:
Whether or not D.O. 1 violates the equal protection clause;

HELD:
No. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers” but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. There is a strong evidence that women
domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances. Such is not the case for male
workers.

Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to “enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas worker.” SC has no quarrel in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipino
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. Petition is
dismissed.

PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

February 5, 2017
G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.

FACTS:
Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was found guilty
of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin)
which is not a native wine. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a
member of the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their
so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment. Cayat challenges
the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of police power.

ISSUES:
Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?

RULING:
No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications. The
classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests on real and
substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the
geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act
No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the
past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their
standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the
conditions exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in
hand with it must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members
of same class.

Conference of Maritine Agency vs. POEA, 243 SCRA 666;

Facts:
POEA issued Resolution No. 1 series of 1994 amending and increasing the compensation and other
benefits under Part 2, Section C Paragraph 1 and Section L, Paragraph 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seaferers. POEA also issued Memorandum Circular No. 5 Series of 1994
informing all Filipino seaferers manning agencies, shipowners, manager and pricipals hiring Filipino
seaferers of the said adjustment.

Issue:
WON the assailed issuances violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Ruling:
No. there can be no dispute about the dissimiliarites between land-based and sea-based Filipino
overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life
and limb and accessibility to social, civic and spiritual activities. Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Himagan vs. pp 237 SCRA 538;

“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

FACTS:
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and
attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the
murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD
807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that
an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be
a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD:
No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Almonte vs. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286;

Facts:
Respondent Ombudsmand subpoenaed petetioners in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)

Issue:
WON there was a violation of petitioners right to the equal protection of the laws.

Ruling:
No. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the
constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filling of the complaints “in
any form and in manner” the framers of the constitution took into account the well-known reticence of
the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutor agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against him.

Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc 22 SCRA 603;

Facts:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one (1%) percent per export
sale to the US and other foreign countries. In lieu, Ormoc Sugar filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint
against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging said ordinance is violative
of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things. Ormoc Sugar
Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is violative of the constitutional provision on equal protection?

Ruling:
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established
sugar central, of the same class as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even
if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.
EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classification of
the subject of legislation.

A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real

differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
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Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433;

Facts:
Petitioner is an accused for Estafa through falsification of public documents, in connivance his other co-
accused in respondent court. He filed a motion to quash on constitutional grounds which was rejected
twice. He now raises the cases to the Supreme Court for a Certiorari Proceeding The motion to quash
hinges upon the validity of PD 1486, the law creating the Sandiganbayan as a special court, with
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and other offenses
committed by public officers, including GOCCs, in relation to their office. The constitutional grounds
relied upon are 1) Equal Protection 2) Due Process 3) Ex-post facto clauses of the constitution

Issue:
Whether or not PD 1846 creating Sandiganbayan violated equal protection right?

Decision:
Petition dismissed. The classification satisfies the that it “must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The Constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to
a problem – dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such
court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came
into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is
or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Chua vs. Civil Service 206 SCRA 85;

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA
project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the coverage of R.A.
6683.

Held:
No. There is no substantial between a co-terminus employee and a contractual, casual, emergency
employee which are all tenurial employees with no fixed term, non career and temporary. The Early
Retirement Law would violated equal protection clause if a group or class of employees would be denied
with benefits that are received by a class of equal or similar footing. The doctrine of necessary
implications should be applied. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute us as much as that
which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose.

Tiu vs CA 301 SCRA 279;

Facts of the case:
The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the
benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.

Issue:
WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

RULING:
No, EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection of the laws.The fundamental right of equal
protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses.
The Government provides enticements as to persuade and attract investors to pour in capital with the
said military bases. Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2)
tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the
zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the
grant of resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and
workers.
The purpose of the law is to convert former military base to productive use for the benefit of the
Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.

Lacson vs. executive 301 SCRA 298, 1999;

FACTS:
Panfilo Lacson was charged with multiple murders for the shooting and killing of 11 persons who were
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang after SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had testified that the killing of
the 11 gang members were summary executions and not shootout. After due hearing. the trial court
judge issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal cases against Lacson. As a result, 11 Informations for
murder involving the same allegations of killing the 11 persons of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were
refiled against Lacson.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution

RULING:
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class,

all of which are present in this case. The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions.

De Guzman vs. Comelec 336 SCRA 188, 2000;

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic
Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996". De Guzman vs.
Comelec

SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of
this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality
shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to different stations by
the COMELEC. De Guzman vs. Comelec

Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of
the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4)
years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials,
and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause. De Guzman vs. Comelec

HELD:

No. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De Guzman vs. Comelec
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none".

This is so for under inclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all
the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be
addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the
noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189,
election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or
municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters can hardly be carried out. De Guzman vs. Comelec. The petition is dismissed and
upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.

Philreca vs. Secretary, 403 SCRA 558, 2003;

FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to annul as unconstitutional sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf
and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who are members
of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). Petitioners contend that
pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, as amended, and the provision in the loan agreements of the
government of the Philippines with the government of the United State of America, they are exempt
from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local
Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In
particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground that the
said provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they
submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts
between the Philippine Government and the United States Government.

ISSUE:
Did Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code violate the equal protection clause?

Held:
There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection clause under the Constitution
means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification.
The court hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the
different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric
cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.

First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at least two material respects
which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A. No. 6938 and which characteristics are not
present in the type of cooperative associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.

1. Capital Contributions by Members

2. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives
3.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the
purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local government unit shall enjoy local
autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power by local governments is beyond regulation by
Congress. Thus, while each government unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue,
Congress, in light of its broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing
powers of local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy

Farinas vs. Executive Secretary 414 SCRA 503, 2003;

FACTS:
A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or “The Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election
Practices” as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation
from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same
embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated
the equal protection clause since the said law didn’t repeal provision relating to appointive officials.
Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective certificates
of candidacy.

Issue:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

Ruling:
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute
especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective official
and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another
substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

International vs. Quisumbing 333 SCRA 13, 2000;

FACTS:
International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as members
of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local
hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

Issue:
Whether Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires is an
invalid and unreasonable classification and violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Held:
Yes, Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The foregoing
provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay for
equal work.” Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its “international
character” notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-
hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The employer in this case has failed to show evidence
that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. In this case,
the court find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in
the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the
sympathy of the Court.

GSIS vs. Monteclaros 434 SCRA 442, 2004;

FACTS:
Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal
protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS
denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.

HELD:
There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard. There is
also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness in
marriage before the employee’s death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary
gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose intended.

Central Bank employees vs. Banko Sentral G.R. No. 148208, Dec 15, 2004;
FACTS:

The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:

The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653,
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial
distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.

The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably
alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653.
This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7
other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of
the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are
without differences.

The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests on the
policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support the inequality
of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of
treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are similarly situated.

The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress inconsistent
and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The challenge to the
constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory
policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or
indirectly.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not identical are
analogous.

Pp vs. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689, 2000;

FACTS

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to
fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE

Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the
“mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING

NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The
Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply
to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

Beltran Vs. Secretary 476 SCRA 168 , 2005;

Fact:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of
R.A. 7719 provides Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.” Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall
effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a
careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” On August 23, 1994, the National
Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was
promulgated by DOH. The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH. Hence, petitioners were
granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On
May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

Issue:
Whether the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the
Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is
not germane to the purpose of the law.

Held:
No, the court deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was based on
substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the
latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats
blood as a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily
involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise,
and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary
blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

Dy Caico vs. SSS 476 SCRA 538, 2005;

FACTS:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a
member of the SSS on January 24,
1980. In his self-employed
data, he named the petitioner,
Elena P. Dycaico, and their 8
children as his beneficiaries. At
that
time, Bonifacio and Elena lived
together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was
considered retired and began
receiving his monthly pension
from
the SSS. He continued to receive
the monthly pension until he
passed away on June 19, 1997.
A few months prior to his death,
however, Bonifacio married the
petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the
petitioner filed with the SSS an
application for survivors
pension. Her application, however,
was denied on the ground that
under the Social Security Law
she could not be considered a
primary beneficiary of Bonifacio
as of the date of his retirement.
The petitioner filed with the SSC a
petition alleging that the denial of
her survivors pension was
unjustified. She contended that
Bonifacio designated her and
their children as primary
beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-
1 and that it was not indicated
therein that only legitimate
family members could be made
beneficiaries.
The SSC promulgated its
Resolution affirming the denial
of the petitioners claim. The SSC
refuted the petitioner’s
contention that primary
beneficiaries need not be
legitimate family
members by citing the definitions
of primary beneficiaries and
dependents.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed
with the CA a petition for
review of the SSCs February
6,
2002 Resolution. In the assailed
Decision, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. The CA
declared that since the petitioner
was merely the common-law wife
of Bonifacio at the time of
his retirement, his designation of
the petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-
1
in 1980 is void. The CA further
observed that Bonifacios children
with the petitioner could no
longer qualify as primary
beneficiaries because they have all
reached 21 years of age.
FACTS:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a
member of the SSS on January 24,
1980. In his self-employed
data, he named the petitioner,
Elena P. Dycaico, and their 8
children as his beneficiaries. At
that
time, Bonifacio and Elena lived
together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was
considered retired and began
receiving his monthly pension
from
the SSS. He continued to receive
the monthly pension until he
passed away on June 19, 1997.
A few months prior to his death,
however, Bonifacio married the
petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the
petitioner filed with the SSS an
application for survivors
pension. Her application, however,
was denied on the ground that
under the Social Security Law
she could not be considered a
primary beneficiary of Bonifacio
as of the date of his retirement.
The petitioner filed with the SSC a
petition alleging that the denial of
her survivors pension was
unjustified. She contended that
Bonifacio designated her and
their children as primary
beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-
1 and that it was not indicated
therein that only legitimate
family members could be made
beneficiaries.
The SSC promulgated its
Resolution affirming the denial
of the petitioners claim. The SSC
refuted the petitioner’s
contention that primary
beneficiaries need not be
legitimate family
members by citing the definitions
of primary beneficiaries and
dependents.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed
with the CA a petition for
review of the SSCs February
6,
2002 Resolution. In the assailed
Decision, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. The CA
declared that since the petitioner
was merely the common-law wife
of Bonifacio at the time of
his retirement, his designation of
the petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-
1
in 1980 is void. The CA further
observed that Bonifacios children
with the petitioner could no
longer qualify as primary
beneficiaries because they have all
reached 21 years of ag
Mirasol vs. DPWH 490 SCRA 318, 2006;
Facts:
Petitioners filed for TRO for DPWH Administrative Order 1, Series of 1968 (prohibiting bicycle, tricycle,
pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized) to drive in limited access facilities) and DPWH
Department Order 74, Series of 1993 (Declaration of the North Luzon Expressway from Balintawak to
Tabang and the South Luzon Expressway from Nichols to Alabang as Limited Access Facilities). Whilst
this is pending, DPWH acting thru TRB issued Department Order 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities. Petitioners assail the DPWH’s
failure to provide “scientific” and “objective” data on the danger of having motorcycles plying our
highways. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. Trial court dismissed
the petition but declared DO 123 invalid.

Issue:
Whether AO1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional on the ground of violating equal protection law?

Decision:
Petition partly granted. DO 74 / 215 / 123 declared void and AO 1 valid. The sole standard in measuring
its exercise is reasonableness. What is “reasonable” is not subject to exact definition or scientific
formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness exists for its determination rests upon human
judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. We find that AO 1 does not
impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way
users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic
within limited access facilities.
DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to
the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.

Parreno vs. COA 523 SCRA 390, 2007;

FACTS:
Salvador Parreño served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years.
On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank
of 2nd Lieutenant. Parreño availed and received payment of a lump sum pension
equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, Parreño started receiving his monthly
pension amounting to Php13,680.00.

Parreño migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In

January 2001, the AFP stopped Parreño’s monthly pension in accordance with
Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended by PD 1650, provides that a retiree
who losses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list
and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Parreño filed
a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension but COA
denied the same.

Issue:
Whether petitioner was denied of equal protection and due process clause of
the Constitution.

Ruling:
NO. The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but
is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a)
must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference
between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost
their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country such as Parreño in
this case.

The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and
military service necessarily includes not only private citizen but also citizen who
have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino
citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state, thus, he may no longer
be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need
arises. Parreño’s loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that
distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.

There was no denial of due process in this case. When Parreño lost his
Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in
accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. He had opportunity to
contest the termination of his pension when he requested for reconsideration of the
removal of his name from the list of retirees and the termination of his pension.
The JAGS denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended.

Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, Aug 14, 2008;

FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees
of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the
President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of
separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s
implementing rules.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.

HELD:
NO. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public
policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.
Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC,
the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform
the special function of being the instrumentality through which the State exercises one of its great
inherent functions–taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related
to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

British American Tobacco vs. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, Aug 20, 2008;
Facts:
This petition for review assails the validity of: (1) Section 145 of the National InternalRevenue Code
(NIRC), as recodified by Republic Act (RA) 8424; (2) RA 9334, whichfurther amended Section 145 of the
NIRC on January 1, 2005; (3) RevenueRegulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, and 22- 2003; and (4) Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 6-2003.
Petitioner argues that the said provisions are:(1) violative of the equal protection and uniformity of
taxation clauses of theConstitution;(2) contravene Section 19,[1] Article XII of the Constitution on unfair
competition; and(3) infringe the constitutional provisions on regressive and inequitable taxation.
Lucky Strike further argues the classification freeze provision violates the equal protection and
uniformity of taxation clauses because older brands are taxed-based ontheir 1996 net retail prices while
new brands are taxed based on their present-day netretail prices.

ISSUE
W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
and uniformity provisions of the Constitution

RULING:
No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "xxx It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
If the law be looked upon in tems of burden on charges, those that fall within a class should be treated
in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. xxx"
Thus, classification if rational in character is allowable. In Lutz v. Araneta: "it is inherent in the power to
tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe
no constitutional limitation" SC previously held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power
has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation"
Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection challenge,
must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest. The classifications must be reasonable
and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation

A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws. The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things being equal,
to both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.
Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such impact as the price is not the
only factor that affects competition.

MIAA vs. Olongapo Maintenance 543 SCRA 63, 2008;

Facts:
OMSI (Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc) and TCSI (Triple Crown Services, Inc) were among the five
contractors of MIAA which had janitorial and maintenance service contracts covering various areas in
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Before their service contracts expired on October 31, 1998, the
MIAA Board of Directors, through Antonio P. Gana, then General Manager (GM) of MIAA, wrote OMSI
and TCSI informing them that their contracts would no longer be renewed after October 31, 1998. OMSI
and TCSI, in a letter to Gana, expressed its concern over the award of its concession area to a new
service contractor through a negotiated contract. It said that to award TCSIs contract by mere
negotiation would violate its right to equal protection of the law. TCSI thus suggested that a public
bidding be conducted and that the effectivity of its service contract be meanwhile extended until a
winning bid is declared.
20. Consequently, OMSI and TCSI instituted civil cases against MIAA to forestall the termination of their
contracts and prevent MIAA from negotiating with other service contractors.
Issue:
Whether the right of OMSI and TCSI to equal protection of the law was violated by MIAA
Ruling:
According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional right of Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. (OMSI)
and Triple Crown Services, Inc. (TCSI), the incumbent service contractors, to equal protection of the law
was violated by MIAA and its general manager when no public bidding was called precisely because the
latter were going to award the subject service contracts through negotiation. Worse, the Court
continued, the acts of MIAA and Gana smack of arbitrariness and discrimination as they not only did not
call for the required public bidding but also did not even accord OMSI and TCSI the opportunity to
submit their proposals in a public bidding

Trillanes vs. Pimentel 556 SCRA 79, 2009;

FACTS:
July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a
seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to
validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:
No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose
of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He
is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized
by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be
a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Soriano vs. Luguardia 587 Scra 79, 2009;

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister
of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUES:
W/N petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection for lack of due hearing in the case.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in response to a written notice
after petitioner appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents complaint, no violation
of the guarantee was made. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension
shall issue any time during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB
duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that
had been filed against him for such violation. At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be
meted out even without a hearing

Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied. Petitioner argues that he was unable to answer
the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. The equal protection clause demands that all persons
subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot, under the premises,
place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof to such allegations.

League of Cities vs. Comelec 608 Scra 636, 2009;

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of
the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and
struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the
equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

RULING:
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized
this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit
for cityhood up to the present.

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.

Serrano vs. Gallant Maritine G.r. No.167614, March 24, 2009;

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.

Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only
two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article
II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

RULING:
The answer is in the affirmative. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity. Upon cursory reading, the subject
clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the
subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Chamber of real vs. Romulo 614 Scra 605, 2010;

FACTS:
CREBA assails the imposition of the minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) as being violative of the due
process clause as it levies income tax even if there is no realized gain. They also question the creditable
withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets stating that (1) they ignore
the different treatment of ordinary assets and capital assets; (2) the use of gross selling price or fair
market value as basis for the CWT and the collection of tax on a per transaction basis (and not on the
net income at the end of the year) are inconsistent with the tax on ordinary real properties; (3) the
government collects income tax even when the net income has not yet been determined; and (4) the
CWT is being levied upon real estate enterprises but not on other enterprises, more particularly those in
the manufacturing sector.

ISSUE:
Are the impositions of the MCIT on domestic corporations and CWT on income from sales of real
properties classified as ordinary assets unconstitutional?

HELD:
NO. MCIT does not tax capital but only taxes income as shown by the fact that the MCIT is arrived at by
deducting the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its goods, i.e., the cost of goods and other
direct expenses from gross sales. Besides, there are sufficient safeguards that exist for the MCIT: (1) it is
only imposed on the 4th year of operations; (2) the law allows the carry forward of any excess MCIT paid
over the normal income tax; and (3) the Secretary of Finance can suspend the imposition of MCIT in
justifiable instances.

The regulations on CWT did not shift the tax base of a real estate business’ income tax from net income
to GSP or FMV of the property sold since the taxes withheld are in the nature of advance tax payments
and they are thus just installments on the annual tax which may be due at the end of the taxable year.
As such the tax base for the sale of real property classified as ordinary assets remains to be the net
taxable income and the use of the GSP or FMV is because these are the only factors reasonably known
to the buyer in connection with the performance of the duties as a withholding agent.
Neither is there violation of equal protection even if the CWT is levied only on the real industry as the
real estate industry is, by itself, a class on its own and can be validly treated different from other
businesses.

Biraogo Vs. Phillipine Truth Commission, G.r No. 192935, Dec 7, 2010;
FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino.
The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial
body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job
is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts
if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power
duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
Issue:

WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:

Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not
a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.

League of cities Vs Comelec G.r. No. 176951, April 12, 2011;

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of
the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and
struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the
equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

RULING:
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized
this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit
for cityhood up to the present.

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.

Garcia vs, Executive Secretary, 677 Scra 750 (2012);

FACTS:

The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security, the President, subject to limitations therein provided, may increase xxx existing
protective rates of import duty xxx when necessary. Pursuant to the TCC, the President issued EO 475
and 478 imposing an additional duty of 9% ad valorem to imported crude oil and other oil products, and
a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. Rep.
Garcia contests the validity of the foregoing EOs averring that they are violative of Sec 24, Art VI of the
Constitution which provides: All xxx revenue or tariff bills shall originate in the House of Representatives
xxx. He also argues that said EOs contravene the TCC because the latter authorizes the President to,
according to him, impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries.

ISSUE:

Are said EOs unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. There is explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President to, “subject to
such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose”, fix “within specific limits tariff rates xxx and
other duties or imposts xxx.”¹ Moreover, Garcia’s argument that the “protection of local industries” is
the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of the delegated authority—that
which was provided in the TCC to be exercised by the President in “the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security”—is a stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for instance, that the
protection of consumers is at the very least as important a dimension of the “the interest of national
economy, general welfare and national security” as the protection of local industries.
Garcia vs. Drillon, 699 Scra 352 (2013);
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:
No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women
and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men
and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review
or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Remnan Enterprise, Inc vs. PRC, G.r No. 197676, Feb 4, 2014;
FACTS
This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate ServiceAct of the
Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the
real estate service sector under regulatory scheme oflicensing, registration and supervision of real estate service
practitioners. The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC). The law required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the employ of duly
licensed real estate brokers.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clauseand infringes the
ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the CivilCode. Furthermore, they claim that it
violates the equal protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell their properties without the
need of a licensed real estate broker.

The provisions in question are –

Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service.
Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service.

ISSUES AND HOLDING:

Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly substantive due process.
No.

The requirements for substantive due process are –

1.Lawful government purpose; and
2. Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose.

The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards. The law
recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor
confidence, and in promoting national progress.

The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as it merely
regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.

SR Metals, Inc. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, Gr. No. 179669, June 4, 2014;
FACTS:
Petitioners were awarded a 2-year Small-Scale Mining Permit(SSMP) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board of Agusan del Norte; they were allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt(Ni-Co) in a 20-hectare mining
site. These permits were granted after the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XIII of the
DENR issued Environmental Compliance Certificates(ECCs) with a validity period of one year. The mining
corporations’ ECCs contain a restriction that the amount of Ni-Co ore they are allowed to extract
annually should not exceed50,000 MTs pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899:

Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining operation having an annual production of not more
than 50,000 metric tons of ore x x x
.
#
Subsequently, however, Agusan del Norte Governor, Erlpe John M. Amante (Governor Amante),
questioned the quantity of ore that had been mined and shipped by the mining corporations. In reply,
the mining corporations denied having exceeded the extraction limit of50,000 MTs. They explained that
an extracted mass contains only a limited amount/percentage of Ni-Co as the latter is lumped with
gangue, i.e., the unwanted rocks and minerals. And it is only after the Ni-Co is separated from the
gangue by means of a scientific process should the amount of the Ni-Co be measured and considered as
‘ore.’ Excluding the gangue, the mining corporations pegged the volume of Ni-Co ore they had extracted
from the time they started shipping the same.

ISSUE:
W/N Section 1, PD 1899 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.

HELD:
No. With the 50,000-MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA7076, the issue raised on
the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the DENR treats all small-scale miners
equally as the production limit applies to all of them. There is therefore no more reason for the mining
corporations to not recognize and comply with the said limitation. It must be stressed that the DENR is
the government agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the country’s resources; it is
also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of
mining laws.

Maria Carolina P. Araullo vs Benigno Aquino Gr No. 209287, July 1, 2014;

FACTS:
In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases
were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the Court’s interpretation of
savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is defined in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They aver that the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used for
augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially
the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion. On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial
reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and
illegal all moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of
appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items
beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects
(PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI
of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal protection, constitutional

RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is
viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP
and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and
unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from
savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to
augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best
intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable
purposes must be carried out through legal methods.

Ferrer vs. Bautista, G.r No. 210551, June 30 2015

FACTS:
The LGU of QC enacted two ordinances. One imposes socialized housing tax (SHT) based on the assessed
value of realty, to be paid by landowners. The other imposes a garbage fee (GF) to be paid by
landownsers based on the floor area or land area of their property. Ferrer a landowner in QC, want to
question the validity of these two ordinances.
ISSUE:
Does the SHT violate equal protection, considering that those who occupy land illegally or informally do not pay
while legitimate owners of land are made to pay?

HELD:
No, equal protection admits of exception. As long as there is real and substantial distinction, which is germane to
the purpose of the law, it does not violate. The difference between informal settlers and property owners is very
clear and unmistakable. Again, the foundation is police power, that power which allows the State to regulate life,
liberty and property in order to promote the welfare of the people.
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections
GR No. 161872
April 13, 2004
FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its
due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC
again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other
people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The
COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political
party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities
for public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the
COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also
stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and
supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage
national and international campaigns, and his government platform.