G.R. No.
L-1164 September 17, 1903
MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. HENRY HOSKYN defendant-appellant
Note: Maikli lang po cases.
PRINCIPLE:
Gen Rule: There is no vested right of property in rules of evidence. The parol
evidence of the contents of the document was properly received.
FACTS: Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question in 1855 from Don Pablo
Garcia.
Doña Petrona lived on the land until her death, in 1876, when Don Miguel Aldeguer,
their grandfather, was appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four children, the present
plaintiffs.
In 1884 Don Manuel sold the land to one Martinez, who sold it to the defendant, Henry
Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to Martinez, Don Manuel stated that he acquired the
property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia twenty-four years before. The court finds
that this declaration was the only evidence in the case that Don Manuel had any title to
the land.
Defendant(Hoskin) below assigns as error that the court found from parol evidence
alone the existence of the contract of sale between Don Pablo and Doña Petrona. It is
true the court says that no documentary evidence was received on this point, but it is
also stated that the existence of a written contract was proved, as also its record
in the registry of property, its attachment to a complaint filed in court by the plaintiffs
in 1892, its subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the contents
thereof.
The appellant has moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
This evidence is to the effect that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner of the land
in question and never sold it to the mother of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Whether that judgment is supported by the findings of fact stated in the
decision.
RULING: The motion for a new trial is denied and the judgment of the court
below affirmed,.
The general rule is that there is no vested right of property in rules of evidence. The
recital in the document of sale by Don Manuel to Martinez proves nothing
against the plaintiffs, either according to the former law (Civil Code, art. 1218) or
according to the new Code (secs. 277 et seq .), and the claim of the appellant to the
contrary can not be sustained.
After such preliminary proof had been made, parol evidence of the contents of the
document was properly received. Such a ruling does not infringe section 795, par.
6, of said Code, which provides "that nothing in this act contained shall be so construed
as to divest or injuriously affect any property right that has already become vested
under existing law," even if under article 1221 or other provisions of the Civil Code,
after the destruction of the instrument, such parol evidence of its contents could not
have been given.
The general rule is that there is no vested right of property in rules of evidence.
The appellant(Hoskin) says that the plaintiffs in their complaint alleged that the mother
bought the property of Don Bonifacio. What took place during the trial we do not know,
but it is certain that evidence was introduced showing that the purchase was
made from Don Pablo, because the court has so found. We must presume that this
was done without objection on the part of the defendant (Hoskin), for no exceptions
relating to the matter appear in the record. If such objections had been made, the
court had power to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint by striking out the
name of Bonifacio and inserting that of Pablo.