RULE 130 SECTION 24 – DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
1. Saura vs Atty Agdeppa AC 4426 February 17, 2000
FACTS:
- This case involves two complaints for disbarment filed against Atty. Agdeppa
- These cases are related and arose from the respondent’s handling of a settlement case involving
a piece of property co-owned by petitioners and the respondent’s clients (who are the other co-
owners)
o Respondent notarized and facilitated sale of co-owned property without the knowledge of
the other co-owners
- As a defense, respondent is saying that she could not answer the administrative charges against
her without divulging certain pieces of information in violation of the attorney-client privilege
The request for the information regarding the sale of the property and to account for the proceeds is not a
violation of the attorney-client privilege. The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The
petitioners are only asking for the disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds.
Petitioners certainly have the right to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs of
the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators of the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to
divulge such information to them and hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client relationship.
2. Gonzales vs Court of Appeals GR 117740 October 30, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioners: Siblings of decedent Ricardo Abad
Private Respondents: Honoria Empaynado (alleged common law wife of decedent, who gave birth to two
illegitimate children of decedent), Cecilia and Marian Abad (said illegitimate children), Rosemarie Abad
(child of decedent with another woman)
This case involves the settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad, the deceased brother of petitioners
herein. Private respondents opposed the proceeding, alleging that petitioners (the siblings) are not the
only heirs, and that the decedent had in fact two illegitimate children, whom the petitioners were trying to
deprive of their legitime.
Petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that in 1935,
he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had
become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado. (Jose is the legal husband of Honoria)
ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of Dr Arenas is admissible (no)
RULING:
As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in
which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of
physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and
the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician
while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his
professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the
patient.
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the
finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be
sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence.
And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As
stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: "The
privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents.
It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be
promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and
disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are
not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and
disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by
the quantum of evidence required by law. TLDR - Private respondents won and were able to prove their
filiation with decedent
3. Sanvicente vs People GR 132081 November 26, 2002
- Petitioner charged with homicide
- Counsel sent a letter (exhibit LL) to the station commander of the police station saying that: “this
is in connection with the death of Dennis Wong; done in self defense… For all intense
(sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without admission of
guilt on the part of my client.)
- In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its
evidence and rested its case. The trial court subsequently dismissed the case after finding that
the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge against
petitioner.
- The prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL as the basis for the indictment against
petitioner, however, contested the dismissal of the case allegedly because the trial court
prevented it from further identifying the genuineness and due execution of said document "in the
manner that it wanted.
- In the trial, the prosecution wanted the counsel to testify in order to identify the letter to be
admitted into evidence, which the trial court rejected. And petitioner was acquitted
- The CA however faulted the TC in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution
and authenticity of Exhibit LL which, it claimed, "positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator
of the crime charged."
The trial court correctly rejected the prosecution’s motion to have Exhibit LL further identified "in the
manner that it wanted,"38 i.e., through the proposed testimony of petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who
incidentally refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within the scope of
"privileged communication", it would, more importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a
confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the shooting
communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business for
which petitioner retained the services of the latter.More specifically, said communication was relayed by
petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or assistance in relation to the subject
matter of the employment, or to explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better
advice his client or manage the litigation.40
It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon petitioner himself to testify although he too was a
signatory of Exhibit LL. Apparently, it was aware that petitioner could well invoke his right against self-
incrimination and refuse to answer its questions. The prosecution then attempted to draw out what it could
not constitutionally extract from his lawyer. Yet, and as stated previously, said Exhibit LL had earlier been
admitted in evidence by the trial court in its Order dated August 27, 1996. What was objectionable was
the prosecution’s sole reliance on the document without proof of other facts to establish its case against
petitioner because of its mistaken assumption that the same was a confession.
Significantly, the prosecution was neither barred nor prevented by the trial court from establishing the
genuineness and due execution of the document through other means.
Thus, respondent could have called to the witness stand P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, the addressee of Exhibit
LL, to identify the said document since it was supposedly delivered to him personally. Samples of the
signatures appearing on the document which can be readily obtained or witnesses who are familiar with
them could have also been presented. The prosecution did not. Neither did it subpoena P/Senior
Inspector Alejandro M. Casanova, who prepared the detailed Police Report of the incident used as the
basis of the inquest proceedings, nor were any eyewitnesses presented, notwithstanding that there
appeared to be at least two eyewitnesses to the incident.
in addition –
In holding that petitioner was identified as the person who committed the offense, the appellate court
relied on the following circumstances: (1) he admitted responsibility therefor through Exhibit LL, which
was signed by him and his counsel; (2) he surrendered even before the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
(3) his gun was also surrendered to the police authorities by his counsel; (4) empty shells recovered at
the scene of the crime matched his gun; and (5) the letter-referral of P/Senior Inspector Alejandro
Casanova to Quezon City Prosecutor indicated that petitioner was under the custody of the policeman on
detail supposedly to guard him at the hospital.52
With regard to the first circumstance, suffice it to state that, as has lengthily been discussed earlier,
Exhibit LL is merely an admission and not a confession. In fact, petitioner specifically denied criminal
intent therein. By and of itself it is insufficient to support a conviction unless it is considered in connection
with other proof to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
The second and third incidents actually support petitioner’s innocence because were he indeed guilty of
the felony, he would not likely have surrendered even before the warrant was issued for his arrest. Courts
go by the biblical truism that the "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as
a lion."53
The fourth event merely proves the fact that the empty shells recovered from the crime scene were fired
from the surrendered gun. It, however, does not answer the penultimate question of who actually pulled
the trigger of the firearm.
Lastly, the appellate court’s reading of the letter-referral, 54 mentioning that petitioner had been placed
under the custody of a policeman, was inaccurate. As explained by Atty. Valmonte in Exhibit LL, the
policeman was actually requested for petitioner’s personal safety owing to the untoward incident which
caused petitioner serious anxiety and depression, and for which he had to undergo treatment and
confinement.55
All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges against petitioner.
4. Air Philippines vs Pennswell GR 172835 December 13, 2007
- respondent sold several goods to petitioner, which the petitioner failed to pay for, hence the complaint
for sum of money filed by respondent against petitioner
- as a defense, petitioner said that its refusal to pay was due to respondent’s defrauding of petitioner and
duping into buying goods which the respondent claimed as a different kind
- during trial, petitioner filed a motion to compel respondent to give a detailed list of ingredients of some of
its products
- respondents objected, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components
sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon
constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. Respondent maintained that its
products are specialized lubricants, and if their components were revealed, its business competitors may
easily imitate and market the same types of products, in violation of its proprietary rights and to its serious
damage and prejudice.
YES TRADE SECRETS
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of
general manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares,
merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids,
alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others. It is
unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondent’s products proceed from a
formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants, respondent expended efforts,
skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be wrested from
respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner’s defense against a collection for a sum
of money. By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients
constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business. No doubt, the information is also
valuable to respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s business, and to
place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondent’s lubricants are opened to
public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in
nothing less than the probable demise of respondent’s business. Respondent’s proprietary interest over
the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our
conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a commercial value to respondent.
Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive advantage; we also find
that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the information confidential and not
available to the prying public.
---
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. 16 The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value.17 A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information. 18 Generally, a trade secret is a
process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for example, a machine or
formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list. 19 It is indubitable that trade
secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar
innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted
to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or
through a "confidential relationship."20 American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors 21 to
determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the
business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.
5. Limvs.CA–214S273
- annulment case due to schizophrenia, physician of petitioner is presented by counsel of respondent, not
as to treatment and case of petitioner, but as an expert witness
ALLOWED
The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient
privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion
testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental
condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon
the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may
have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it
is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in
the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through
the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his
personal professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to
his expert opinion.”
6. Krohnvs.CA–233S146
- Another annulment of marriage case
- Married; wife underwent psychological testing to relieve the marital strain but failed
- Husband was able to get a copy of the psychiatric report on the wife and used it in his petition for
annulment
- On the witness stand, husband tried to testify as to the contents of the psychiatric report
- Objected to by the wife on the ground that it violated the physician patient privilege
His testimony is allowed
The testimony of Edgar, the husband, on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report is
allowed because it is not covered by the physician-patient privilege communication.
In order that the privilege may be successfully invoked:
o (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases;
o (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
o (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
o (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and,
o (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient."
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition.
Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
7. Fortich vs. CA – 268 S 152
- Inter-office memorandum imputing misappropriation to Fortich and calling him an avid gambler
- He was dismissed so he filed libel case against the private respondent
- Respondent said that the memorandum was covered by the privileged communication rule
It is.
1. An imputation is legally malicious if done without any reason that would justify a normally conscious man
in making the imputation. The law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, but there are
exceptions. One is privileged communication, under which the inter-office memo in question is classified.
2. A privileged communication is one made in good faith (bona fide) upon any subject matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. Galleron, in this case, had the
duty of conducting the initial investigation of possible irregularities in customer accounts in order to
suggest further action.
3. Even if the memo contained statements which could be slanderous and actionable if not for the protection
of the rule on privileged communications, no malice was shown, so the memo was an official act done in
good faith.
RULE 130 SECTION 27 – ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY
1. People vs. Agustin – 240 S 541
- in separate informations, the accused Quiaño and respondent Agustin were charged with murder,
frustrated murder, and attempted murder for the death of two people, and the wounding of three others
- according to the prosecution, when Quiaño was picked up and brought to the fiscal’s office, he
confessed during the investigation that he was the triggerman and he was hired to kill the victims; he also
named the people who provided him the gun
- the other accused Agustin was also brought to the fiscal’s office wherein he was similarly investigated,
with the assistance of the same lawyer and with the stenographer whose notes similarly became his
sworn statement; conspiracy
- according to the defense, Agustin was just on his way to buy fertilizer when he was grabbed by armed
men who brought him to the fiscal’s office, and whose threatening presence during the investigation
prevented him from speaking up
- he also said that he wanted his unlce lawyer, and not Cajucom, but they nevertheless did not
heed his demand, and Cajucom only interviewed him for ten minutes in English and Tagalog, not in
Ilocano, his known dialect
- the TC admitted the extrajudicial statement and convicted him for two counts of murder, for being in
conspiracy with the triggerman
Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the appellant, which is the only
evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible
because it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a
blatant disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
the assailed extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission.
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt.
We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are satisfied that nothing
therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some facts or
circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only tend to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in
evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3
thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have broadened the
aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any counsel, but a
"competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice"; (2) the right to remain silent and to
counsel can only be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility
expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.
In Morales vs. Enrile, 21 this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, laid down the
duties of an investigator during custodial investigation and ruled that the waiver of the right to counsel
would not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory of
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, 32 contained in twenty-two pages of yellow pad, does, indeed,
appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. what we find in these yellow pads are
stenographic notes. these were transcribed by the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes,
but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit "C"), which consists of
twelve pages, 33 was not signed by the appellant since it does not indicate any jurat. On the other hand,
the same stenographic reporter, who took down the stenographic notes when accused Wilfredo Quiaño
was being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia, transcribed the notes, and the transcription 34 was
subscribed and sworn to by the accused before City Fiscal Balajadia and also signed by Atty. Cajucom,
who represented the accused in the investigation.
Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we cannot expect the
appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. We
have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its accuracy. A perusal of the transcript convinces us
that the appellant was not given a fair deal and was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III
of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights
2. Tuason vs. CA – 241 S 695
- Petitioner, along with others, were charged with robbery and carnapping, which the maid of the
house, Madaraog witnessed. Petitioner was the only one apprehended
- At the trial, he was convicted based on the testimony of Madaraog and two others who saw
petitioner in the vicinity of the house which was robbed
The SC reversed his conviction.
The trial court and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness
Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner
allegedly participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the identification
of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction
of petitioner.
The lower courts gave credence to the doubtful testimonies of the witnesses who identified petitioner
The doubtful identification of petitioner was not at all cured by the process followed by the NBI agents
when petitioner was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses in their headquarters.
Madaraog's identification of petitioner from a line-up at the NBI was not spontaneous and independent.
An NBI agent improperly suggested to them petitioner's person.
The respondent appellate court dismissed petitioner’s testimony as to the NBI’s suggestive action as self-
serving and dismissed it.
Self-serving evidence is not to be literally taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our
law of evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include
a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that
is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its
admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's
testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination. 34 Clearly,
petitioner's testimony in court on how he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI
headquarters is not self-serving.
3. People vs. Chua Uy – 327 S 335
- Respondent Ramon was charged and convicted of illegal sale of shabu (pursuant to a buy bust
operation)
- The drugs were identified by the forensic chemist, but the chemist did not anymore testify during
the trial, only his report was considered
- This alleged waiving of the forensic chemist’s testimony was construed by the lower courts as an
admission of Ramon and his counsel that the drugs were indeed shabu
- Allegedly, Ramon is saying that the non-presentation of the chemist is fatal because only he
could identify the chemist report, without such testimony, the report becomes hearsay. Ramon is
saying that he did not waive the testimony of the chemist but only "stipulated on the markings
of the prosecution's evidence."
o RAMON submits that without the testimony of NBI Forensic Chemist, the prosecution's
case "falls to pieces." Bravo's testimony cannot be waived since only he could say
whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed shabu, and also determine its actual
weight upon which depends the penalty to be imposed. Thus, whatever he said in his
report is hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value. He insists that at the pretrial he did not waive the testimony of the chemist but only
"stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence."
- On the other hand, the OSG is saying that Ramon actually waived the testimony of the chemist
during the pre-trial
o On the non-presentation of the NBI forensic chemist, the OSG argues that Bravo's finding
that the drugs seized from RAMON were indeed shabu, is not hearsay. Bravo did not
testify anymore because the parties agreed during the pre-trial to dispense with his
testimony. RAMON never objected to the order. Neither did he move to reconsider it. The
facts thus stipulated and incorporated in the pre-trial order bound him. 16
o Moreover, at the trial RAMON never raised the question of the non-presentation of the
forensic chemist; what his counsel objected to was with respect to the presentation and
identification of the shabu wherein defense objected to the irregular act of showing the
confiscated drug to SPO1 Nepomuceno without laying the basis therefor. 17 The defense
counsel did not also object to the direct examination of SPO4 Regalado concerning the
whereabouts and identification of the subject shabu.
TLDR: they just agreed to the marking of the evidence nevertheless, they did not object when the reports
were offered in evidence
- Ramon’s contention that since the NBI Forensic Chemist did not testify, his findings are hearsay.
He contends that at pre-trial, he did not waive the Forensic Chemist’s testimony but only
"stipulated on the markings of the prosecution’s evidence”.
- Court held that neither Ramon nor his counsel made express admission that the contents of the
plastic bags contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, it cannot be considered as an
admission that what Bravo found in the plastic bag were indeed shabu. It is clear that RAMON
and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits.
- Even granting for the sake of argument that Ramon admitted during the pre-trial that the plastic
bag indeed contained shabu, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the
Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides:
SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against
the accused unless reduced to writing and signed and his counsel.
The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against
improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered into
without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference. It is to
eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon.
- Nevertheless, Ramon cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels signatures
on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in evidence what it had marked in
evidence during the pre-trial, Ramon did not object to the admission of Bravos Preliminary
Report, Final Report, another Final Report, and of the plastic bags.
- He likewise never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist
Bravo. Ramon cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered,
he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain
documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot, for the first
time, be raised on appeal.
- Moreover, Forensic Chemist Bravo, as an NBI Forensic chemist, is a public officer who enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duty. Besides, by virtue of
Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records made in the performance of office duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
- Where "there is no evidence... to show that the positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) are erroneous... coupled with the undisputed
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, said results" may "adequately
establish" that the specimens submitted were indeed shabu.
- All the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are present in this
case:
(1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
4. People vs. Cepeda – 324 S 290
- Cepeda accused of raping Conchita, his defense is that they are lovers
Court did not give weight to his lone and self-serving testimony; no other evidence to prove that they are
indeed lovers
