Suntay vs. Suntay GR No.
132524 December 29, 1998
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of
Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of
Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his
oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the
marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail? Related
thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?
HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to
its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the
body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85
enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the
dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction
between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of
void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces
all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides
that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are
also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second
paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children conceived of voidable marriages before the
decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”
Ninal vs Bayadog
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on
April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito
and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they
had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car
accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after
his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had
elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned
even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Ninal vs. Bayadog [G.R. No. 133778]
March 14, 2000
by Quolete
Fact:
Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfa’s death. Pepito and Norma got
married without any marriage license because they lived together for 5 years and thus exempt from marriage license. Some
years after, Pepito died in a car accident.
The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only occurs after the death of an ascendant)
due to the second marriage, filed a ‘petition for declaration for nullity of marriage’ (a.k.a. declaration of nullity of void
marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence of a marriage license as a legal basis.
Issues:
The lower court dismissed the petition because:
(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a ’cause of action’. Can there be such a petition when the heirs’
parent is deceased?
(2) Are the heirs a ‘proper party’?
(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the beginning) is a must but is a different matter.
Void marriages cannot be attacked collaterally.
(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has prescribed.
The lower court ruled:
(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their father’s marriage before the latter’s death.
(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding were used as a basis to dismiss petitioner’s
case.
Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that:
(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family Code. (In determining the
validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was contracted.)
(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The exemption for a
marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not the one described by the Civil
Code because the cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty months whereas the law requires five years. If the
respondent took into consideration the other years and months before the second marriage, then the cohabitation would
include the period of the first marriage. This is in violation of the law.
(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count cohabitation.
“This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity – that is unbroken.”
(4) The judge’s ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made identical is erroneous. Void and
voidable marriages are not identical.
“A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place.”
“A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while a void marriage can never
be ratified.”
“A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally.”
“Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid.”
“The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.”
“Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.“
“Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code.
On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.”
(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before determining succession rights.
“Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.”
“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.”
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Ninal vs. Bayadog Case Digest
Niñal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the
Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing
a marriage license.
Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is
unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between
the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and
wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents.
On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the
Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed
away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man
and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment
from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on
1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor.
As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUES:
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita
RULING:
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14,
2003, covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage
of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the
order. The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirscan still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
Ty vs CA
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in
Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void
ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage
was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on
April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint
to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of
the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case
for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages
against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to
private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife.
To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the
award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as
they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
Terre vs Terre
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre
successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that
they are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothy’s status.
After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to
Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD:
Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin thereby against
public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted
her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a
former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
TERRE v. TERRE
July 28, 2012 § Leave a comment
TERRE v. TERRE
July 3, 1992 (A.M. No. 2349)
PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the
Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting No
judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by complainant. Dorothy Terre was then
married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully
convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their
marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote “single” as her status. After getting the complainant
pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem
believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab initio.
ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage
HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic fact which underscores
that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by
which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was
free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or
should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court
which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN, GR No. 204169, 2013-09-11
Facts:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the
Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since then,
the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came... back to the Philippines and
married private respondent on November 28, 2002
After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.[4]
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have
happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed
to him that she received news that her previous husband passed... away.[5]
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife's confession and discovered that indeed, she was married
to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.[6] This
prompted petitioner to file a petition[7] for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and
void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
Certificate of Marriage[8] between petitioner and private respondent
Certificate of Marriage[9] between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo
Certificate of Death[10] of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo
Certification[11] from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office
pertaining to private respondent
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the authenticity
and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove private respondent's prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while
petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to
Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner's
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent's prior marriage nor
of Arambulo's death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage... certificate between private
respondent and Arambulo and the latter's death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner's testimony about
the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC
Issues:
whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the
public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
Ruling:
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. As
provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness.
the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following
facts: (1) that private... respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that
private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay
City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent... with
Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only
on said date that private respondent's marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and
(4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is... bigamous, hence null and void, since
the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
Republic v Olaybar
October 19, 2016
Article 50 and 51
Republic v Olaybar G.R.189538
by Steve Louie C. Corpuz
Facts
Respondent requested CENOMAR finding that she is married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean national. Thus she filed a petition for Cancellation of Entries in Marriage Contract.
The court granted the petition in favor of the respondent
The petition for the reconsideration of the assailed marriage contract on the grounds that:
There was no clerical spelling, typographical and innocuous errors in the marriage
contract for it fall within the provision of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
Granting the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the marriage contract is, in
effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio
Issue
Whether of not the cancellation of entries in marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding
Held
Yes. Aside for the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage
was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
