The Philippines in 2006: Democracy and Its Discontents
Author(s): Sheila S. Coronel
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January/February 2007), pp. 175-182
Published by: University of California Press
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THE PHILIPPINES IN 2006
Democracy and Its Discontents
Sheila S. Coronel
Abstract
A wide range of groups attempted to force President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
out of power in 2006 but failed. The attempt prompted the declaration of a state of
emergency and plunged the country deeper into crisis. The year was marked by
internecine rivalries among the country’s elites, restiveness in the armed forces,
and a renewed campaign against communists. But the economy seemed insu-
lated from political uncertainty, posting high growth because of rising export re-
ceipts, more foreign investments, and record remittances from overseas workers.
Keywords: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, People Power, Communist Party of the
Philippines, New People’s Army, Moro Islamic Liberation Front
For Filipinos, 2006 was the year of “People Power” fatigue.
In February they marked the twentieth anniversary of the fall of Ferdinand
Marcos. But there was no joyous celebration, just weariness and disillusion-
ment about the prospects of democracy. In 1986, there was dancing in the streets
as news of Marcos’s fall reverberated throughout the country and the world.
Filipinos felt proud that they had toppled a dictator without bloodshed and were
certain this was the beginning of a new era. Two decades later, these hopes have
been replaced by skepticism about the desirability—and long-term viability—
of the elite democracy established after Marcos’s fall.
On February 24, 2006, exactly 20 years after the anti-Marcos uprising, dis-
gruntled political and military groups aimed for a reprise of “People Power.”1
Sheila S. Coronel is Professor and Director, Toni Stabile Center for Inves-
tigative Journalism at the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University. Email: ssc2136@
columbia.edu.
1. Marites Dañguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria, “Failed Enterprise,” Newsbreak (Metro Manila),
March 27, 2006.
Asian Survey, Vol. 47, Issue 1, pp. 175–182, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2007
by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-
sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and
Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2007.47.1.175.
175
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176 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007
They failed. The replicability of the 1986 formula for ousting presidents—
popular mobilization and the military’s withdrawal of support from an unpop-
ular head of state—was also now in serious doubt.
The formula had worked in 2001, when the movie actor-president Joseph
Estrada was deposed by a four-day uprising in Manila. But Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, who took over the presidency after Estrada’s fall, moved quickly to
frustrate attempts in 2006 to oust her. She got the armed forces top brass on
her side and declared a state of emergency on the morning that rebel soldiers
and their civilian sympathizers were to march from their camps to the People
Power monument on Edsa, the avenue where the anti-Marcos uprising had
taken place.2
In a hurriedly drafted proclamation that sounded eerily like the one Marcos
signed when he declared martial law in 1972, Arroyo banned rallies and or-
dered the arrest of those who dared defy the ban. Tanks and heavily armed
troops were sent to Edsa. The presidential palace was surrounded by barbed wire,
container vans, and battalions of battle-ready soldiers.
That morning in February saw the meeting of the two most powerful narra-
tives of recent Philippine history, the declaration of martial law in 1972 and
the 1986 popular uprising. What Filipinos got in 2006 were pale versions of
both. The attempted uprising fizzled as water cannons and truncheons were
unleashed on protesters. The state of emergency lasted only three weeks: Ar-
royo faced widespread opposition to repressive measures. Months later, the
Supreme Court declared illegal the official acts committed under the emergency
proclamation.
The End of People Power?
Today, Arroyo remains in power despite rumors of a military revolt. She is be-
holden to her generals and a coalition of politicians whose loyalties have to
be constantly purchased through patronage. Rejected by the Manila elite, she
has carefully built alliances among provincial politicos. In 2006, as in 2005,
she showed remarkable survival skills, outwitting a fractious opposition and di-
viding the People Power constituency composed of the Manila middle class,
business people, politicized soldiers, and the influential bishops of the Roman
Catholic Church. In the past 20 years, this constituency had acted as the arbi-
ter of presidential power, mobilizing protests against chief executives whom it
deemed immoral or corrupt. No longer. The constituency is divided, the oppo-
sition to Arroyo headless, and the hopeful middle class that had marched on
the streets in 1986 and 2001, fatigued and disillusioned.
2. Glenda Gloria, “Pretaped Victory,” ibid., November 4, 2006, http://newsbreak.com.ph/
newsbreak/story.asp?ID177.
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THE PHILIPPINES IN 2006 177
The failed People Power revolt indicated a deeper malaise. Twenty years of
democracy have brought neither more accountable government nor a more
equitable and prosperous society. As in the past, the Philippines is divided by
wide income gaps.3 The middle class, once the agent of democratic reform, is
increasingly impoverished and looking to overseas migration, rather than po-
litical action, as the outlet for their frustrations. In politics, money and patron-
age dominate. Congress remains the bastion of political families who have ruled
the country for generations.4
The communist insurgency, once wracked by dissension and abandoned by
cadres who wanted to take part in the democratic experiment of the early post-
Marcos era, is gaining strength. The military, politicized by Marcos and by its
own subsequent involvement in popular revolts, believes politicians have made a
mess of the country. Many officers harbor the illusion that the armed forces
are the nursemaid of change. Even the traditional political class, a major bene-
ficiary of post-Marcos democracy, is nervous and unhappy. Electoral politics
has given rise to a kind of populism that has allowed movie stars, news anchors,
and sports celebrities to win national positions, once the preserve of the old
elite.
All across the political spectrum, there is deep dissatisfaction with the coun-
try’s dysfunctional democracy but no consensus on how it should be reformed.
This year saw intense debate on the country’s future direction. These issues
remained unresolved as 2006 ended, although they will likely consume much
political energy in the coming years.
Arroyo and her allies in Congress want to change the 1987 Constitution and
move toward a unicameral, district-based parliamentary system. They say a par-
liamentary government is less prone to the executive-legislative gridlocks that
have paralyzed law and policymaking. At the same time, such a shift would
preserve legislative seats for political bosses who hold power in their districts,
keeping away popular candidates who have no local machines but could win
national positions on the basis of sheer popularity.
In the aftermath of the failed revolt of February 2006, Arroyo channeled the
energies of the political class into the charter change (or “cha-cha”) debate. The
Constitution allows charter amendments by Congress, but there was stiff opposi-
tion from the Senate, which would be abolished in the proposal to convene a
3. In 1985, the top 10% of the Philippine population accounted for 37% of the national income,
while the bottom 20% got only 5%. In 2005, the top 10% still controlled 36% percent of total income,
and the share of the poorest 20% was stuck at the same level as previously.
4. Since 1987, two in every three members of the House of Representatives belonged to political
families who have held elective posts for at least two generations. Representatives are also getting
richer, with increasingly fewer from the lower and lower-middle classes. See Sheila S. Coronel,
Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban, and Booma C. Cruz, The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-
born Dominate Congress (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004).
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178 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007
unicameral parliament. Instead, Arroyo allies mobilized a signature campaign
in an attempt to amend the charter through a “people’s initiative.” In October,
however, the Supreme Court ruled that the signature campaign had failed to
comply with constitutional requirements. In December the president’s con-
gressional allies tried another tack: they tried to get the House of Representa-
tives to approve a resolution to turn the House into a “constituent assembly”
that would amend the charter. But they backed off from this plan after threats
of popular opposition and loud protests from Catholic bishops. This was a vic-
tory for the anti-Arroyo factions of the political elite, which include former
Presidents Corazon Aquino and Joseph Estrada. It also was a triumph for middle-
class reformers who fear that the system being proposed would result in the
preservation of the power of traditional politicians, popularly known as “trapos”
(dish rag in Filipino).
The debate on the Constitution eclipsed the second impeachment charge
filed against the president, in June. In 2005, Arroyo survived impeachment
after her allies in Congress threw out the allegations of corruption and election
fraud. The second attempt to impeach her—on the same charges, as well as for
political killings supposedly perpetrated or tolerated by the military,5 and her
government’s efforts to clamp down on dissent—ended in August 2006 as Ar-
royo’s congressional coalition, led by House Speaker Jose de Venecia, junked
the complaint.
De Venecia, who lost his presidential bid to Estrada in 1998, is a staunch
advocate of a parliamentary government, not least because it would allow him
to be prime minister without going through a national election. The speaker
has the support of the majority of the House of Representatives and could
sway an impeachment vote either way. Many believe his support for Arroyo
hinges on her commitment to charter change.
By the end of the year, Arroyo had consolidated her political base, coming
out ahead of her rivals in the factional politics that has become increasingly
contentious. Frustrated by her tenacity, some opposition elements have flirted
with the political left and with ambitious military officers reportedly plotting
extra-constitutional means to oust the president.6 Even as Arroyo’s opponents
scheme though, the weariness of many Filipinos with politics as usual makes
it unlikely that these efforts will garner wide public support. While she remains
unpopular, the inertia of public cynicism and lack of a charismatic alternative
5. Amnesty International, “Philippines: Political Killings, Human Rights, and the Peace Process,”
report released August 15, 2006; also in http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA350062006.
6. See, for example, the account of the alliance between the military and a wide range of oppo-
sition groups, including various factions of the left, including possibly the Communist Party, main-
stream politicians, and “civil society” organizations, in Miriam Grace A. Go, Aries Rufo, and Carmela
Fonbuena, “Romancing the Military,” Newsbreak, March 27, 2006.
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THE PHILIPPINES IN 2006 179
will likely keep her in power, at least if she keeps her political and military
allies happy until her term ends in 2010.
Crushing the Communists
The year 2006 was marked by intensification of the conflict between the gov-
ernment and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing,
the New People’s Army (NPA). In the wake of the state of emergency declared
in February, the armed forces denounced what it said was a “tactical alliance”
among disgruntled military factions, politicians, and various leftist groups plot-
ting to oust Arroyo.
The government’s ire, however, has largely focused on the legal left groups,
which the military claims act as fronts for the communists. On February 28,
police filed rebellion charges against more than 50 prominent left leaders in-
cluding top communist cadres exiled in the Netherlands and members of left-
ist party-list groups who have been elected to Congress. Many of those on the
charge sheet were involved in the peace talks with the government. In October
cases were also filed against non-left members of the “tactical alliance,” appar-
ently to tighten the noose on the broad left opposition and to beef up charges
against the military mutineers.7
In June Arroyo called for “all-out war” against the communists and set aside
an extra P 1 billion (about $20 million) for counterinsurgency operations. She
vowed to crush the 37-year-old rebellion and force the communists to abandon
their strongholds on Luzon by 2008. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., named armed
forces chief of staff in July, targeted a “decisive downgrading” of the CPP-NPA
from its current 7,000 armed combatants to 4,000 by the end of Arroyo’s term.8
Since the beginning of 2006, there have been intensified military operations
in communist bases as well as an unprecedented rise in the number of killings
of leftist activists working for aboveground organizations. In a scathing report
released in August, Amnesty International noted a “pattern of politically tar-
geted extrajudicial executions taking place within the broader context of a con-
tinuing counter-insurgency campaign.” It noted that at least 51 political killings
took place in the first half of 2006, compared to 66 recorded in the whole of
2005.9 The report asked whether the intensified anti-communist operations were
not so much a response to an immediate national security threat as an effort to
7. “More Than 50 Accused of Rebellion Before DOJ,” Manila Standard, October 13–14, 2006;
also in http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?pagenews3_oct14_2006.
8. “I’m Going for a 20-Percent Reduction of NPA Forces,” interview with Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, Jr., Newsbreak, October 23, 2006.
9. Amnesty International, “Philippines: Political Killings, Human Rights, and the Peace Process.”
The body count, however, is probably higher. The Philippine Daily Inquirer says more than 100
leftist activists were killed in 2006, while the leftist human-rights monitor, Karapatan, claims that
more than 700 have been killed since Arroyo became president in 2001.
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180 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007
consolidate the government’s support within the military and counter the future
electoral successes of leftist party-list groups.
In July 2006, the CPP-NPA announced an escalation of guerrilla warfare,
including the creation of special units to target those responsible for political
killings. The previous year the communists had already withdrawn from the
formal talks that began in 2004 with Norway as third-party facilitator, citing a
lack of confidence in the legitimacy and durability of the Arroyo government.
Talking Peace with the MILF
While the government was going after the communists, it was talking peace
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The negotiations made sub-
stantial progress in 2006 despite sporadic gun battles between MILF guerrillas
and government troops. Brokered by Malaysia, the talks have progressed be-
yond an agreement to cease hostilities to tackle substantial issues related to a
negotiated settlement of the 29-year conflict between the government and the
largest insurgency in Mindanao Province.
In September, however, the talks were stalled by among other things, dis-
agreements on the issue of “ancestral domain” or state recognition of territory
that comprises the traditional Moro homeland and would eventually be governed
by the MILF. The MILF wants more than 1,000 villages to be part of the new ter-
ritory in central Mindanao, which would be called the Bangsamoro Entity. The
government asserts that only slightly more than 600 should be included. More-
over, it wants a plebiscite to ratify the creation of the territory, a demand that
the MILF rejected. The MILF subsequently agreed to the demand but only if the
plebiscite would not include the 600 villages the government had agreed would
be declared autonomous. The government asked to be given time to submit a
counterproposal to break the impasse. As the year ended, government spokesmen
said that it appeared likely that a compromise on the issue would be reached.
Meanwhile, tensions rose as the issues remained unsettled, with the MILF
accusing government troops of firing at rebel positions. Further adding to the
strain, the police filed in October multiple murder charges against MILF chair
Al Haj Murad and eight alleged MILF commanders for their supposed involve-
ment in bombings in two towns in North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat. Experts
say that the bombings, which killed 10 people, were largely the handiwork of
the extremist group Abu Sayaff, which has been linked to abductions and
terrorist attacks. Philippine and Western intelligence analysts believe that the
Abu Sayaff has received training from operatives of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI;
loosely translated, Islamic Community), the Southeast Asia-wide extremist or-
ganization said to be inspired by al-Qaeda.10 The training for both Abu Sayaff
10. Maria A. Ressa, “The Threat of Terrorism and the Year Ahead,” in ABS-CBN Interactive,
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryID61345.
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THE PHILIPPINES IN 2006 181
and JI guerrillas supposedly took place in MILF camps and many analysts say
the MILF has provided sanctuary to JI in its bases on Mindanao.11 Since late
2005, the military has monitored renewed Abu Sayyaf activity on the island
province of Sulu and in parts of central Mindanao, launching offensives against
the group in the first and third quarters of 2006. In the latter part of the year, the
Philippine army beefed up its presence in Sulu, adding 1,500 more troops, which
now total 7,500. U.S. troops have been stationed in the province since 2005,
providing training to the army and doing civic action work such as building
water systems.
Still, 2006 saw the most dramatic progress on the Mindanao front since the
MILF and the government began formal negotiations in Kuala Lumpur in 2003.
Nearly 80% of the contentious issues were settled and the fighting has dimin-
ished. While the peace is tenuous, the ceasefire is generally holding despite in-
creased truce violations in 2006. The relative lull in the fighting has allowed a
measure of normalcy to return to parts of central Mindanao that had been badly
hit in the military offensives in 2001 and 2003.12
Despite Everything, the Economy Holds
No doubt about it, the bright spot this year was the economy. Despite the polit-
ical wrangling and uncertainty of the government’s rule, a rise in remittances
by Filipinos overseas as well as overall macroeconomic stability meant rela-
tively high levels of economic growth, estimated at 6% for 2006.
Although she is besieged on the political front, the economy remains Ar-
royo’s strength. During her state-of-the-nation address in July she boasted that
the economy had been growing for 22 consecutive quarters and gave credit to
her administration’s reforms, including the enactment of additional corporate,
excise, and value-added taxes. The tax measures, passed by Congress in 2005
and 2006, meant additional revenues that plugged the fiscal deficit and made
the country more attractive to investors.
In the first seven months of 2006, the Philippines netted nearly $1.2 billion
in foreign direct investments, a 60% increase from the same period the previ-
ous year. Many of the new investments were made in energy and mining after
a Supreme Court decision opened these sectors to foreigners. The stock mar-
ket reached record highs, comparable to the boom years before the 1997–98
Asian financial crisis. Remittances by some eight million Filipinos overseas are
11. Zachary Abuza, “A Week of Bombings in Mindanao: Making Sense of It All,” in the Coun-
terterroism blog, October 17, 2006, http://counterterrorismblog.org/.
12. Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Dialogue Is the Only Option, Mindanao Leaders Tell GRP, MILF,”
mindanews.com, October 11, 2006, http://mindanews.com/index.php?optioncom_content&
taskview&id1048&Itemid75.
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182 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007
expected to top $12 billion in 2006, a 15% increase from the previous year.13
Merchandise exports grew during the first eight months of the year, and both
agriculture and manufacturing were expected to grow by 5%.
Despite the generally rosy economic picture, analysts are worried about the
sustainability of economic growth. The Philippines is famous for its boom and
bust cycles and for complacency during good times. World Bank country direc-
tor Joachim von Amsberg observed that the country was underperforming: its
growth rate was below potential given an English-speaking work force, abundant
natural resources, and the dynamism of the electronics industry and business
process outsourcing. More reforms were needed, von Amsberg said, including
more open and competitive bidding for public infrastructure and better certainty
over government contracts.
But as in previous boom cycles, growth did not trickle down to the poorest
sectors. Joblessness among the poor is a problem, with employment rising by
a meager 2.3% even as the labor force grew 2.6%. A 2006 study by the Asian
Development Bank and the United Nations found that the Philippines was
among Asia’s worst laggards in achieving the U.N.’s Millennium Development
Goals. The report said that the country failed to meet targets in lowering child
malnutrition, improving access to education, increasing forest cover, reducing
carbon dioxide emissions, and providing urban areas with water. The country’s
progress, the report said, was on a par with that of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and
Papua New Guinea.14
Those countries are hardly the company that Arroyo wants to keep, but the
comparison is nonetheless an indicator of the paradoxical state of the Philip-
pines in 2006. It is a country marked on the one hand by internecine rivalries
among its elites, a restless military, and a communist insurgency that feeds on
mass poverty, and on the other by booming shopping malls, thriving call cen-
ters, and a lively stock market. The Philippines has always been a country where
paradoxes thrive.
13. David Llorito, “Philippine Economy on the Mend,” Asia Times Online, October 26, 2006,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HJ26Ae01.html.
14. Asian Development Bank, “Many Asian Countries Falling Short of MDG Targets, Joint
Report Says,” http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2006/10790-regional-MDGs/.
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