ARTICLE VI, SEC.

27 veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of
the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the
GONZALES v. MACARAIG item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto
over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.
Facts:
As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an
                On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to
General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the
eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion
submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on of the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section
the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision,
consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the extent of the President’s veto power as previously defined by the
the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated
process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55, a “General Provision,” were proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and
vetoed. On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 (“Authorizing severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The
and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards
Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes”) that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate
was adopted. On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales, Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara, Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. relates. In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an
Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D. Lina, Jr., John Osmeñ a, Vicente T. Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal Abdul J. appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
Tamano, Wigberto E. Tañ ada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY
Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ‘90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of
Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and ex-officio members of the different branches of government to augment any item in the General
Committee on Finance of the Senate and as “substantial taxpayers whose Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other
vital interests may be affected by this case,” with a prayer for the issuance items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI,
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power
mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When
55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90) prohibit the restoration or increase
Dominguez, Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes Quisumbing, by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress,
Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson, Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita they impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President
Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague, Rosalina Cajucom and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from
and Eufemio C. Domingo from implementing RA 6688. No Restraining savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such
Order was issued by the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.’s cause is authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests
anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President’s line-veto power as in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings. More importantly, for
Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) which are provisions; (2) such a special power as that of augmentation from savings, the same is
when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An
cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) Appropriations Bill is “one the primary and specific aim of which is to
the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out make appropriation of money from the public treasury”. It is a legislative
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of augmentation
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific
Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an
by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to appropriation measure.
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. The Solicitor General,
Issue:
as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present case is
a political question beyond the power of the Supreme Court to determine;                 whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the
that Gonzales et al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional
veto; that Section 55 is a “rider” because it is extraneous to the
Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the President’s veto; that the Held:
power of the President to augment items in the appropriations for the
executive branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law,                 Yes. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the
specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4 veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid
August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be
to veto provisions or other “distinct and severable parts” of an overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987
Appropriations Bill. Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1]). But Congress made no attempt to
override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.’s argument that the veto is
Issue: ineffectual so that there is “nothing to override” has lost force and effect
with the executive veto having been herein upheld. There need be no
                whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government
accorded by the Constitution or differently put, has the President the adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective
power to veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill powers with due deference to the constitutional responsibilities and
functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of governmental
Held:
powers remains on even keel.
                No. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI,
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general
 BENGZON v. DRILON In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions
of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañ ada and Alberto Romulo sought the
1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former President issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive
Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al.  Tañ ada et al contest the
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing
government officials. Authority (NHA).

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices  filed a petition with the ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed
out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañ ada
Tañ ada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme
Court then readjusted their pensions. Veto on special provisions

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt
for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is
following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañ ada et al averred that the
allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount
allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that
for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing
explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
she vetoed H.B. 16297.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and
justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the
President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income
Franklin Drilon. and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañ ada et al
General Appropriations bill is constitutional. claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it
is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued redundancy.
pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which
was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the road maintenance
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
less to the repeal of existing laws. The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a
breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance,
and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended –
same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.  The 1987 Constitution
others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items
entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary
item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment
authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any
1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be provisions.
applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of
for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the of Staff may not be given authority.
officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The
SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s BOLINAO ELECTRONICS v. VALENCIA

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of
payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting
Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio
the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia,
P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit
reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation
the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his
department.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right
Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further,
or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the
unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and
heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines
adhere to the well-established principle on compensation does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon.
standardization. Tañ ada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no
President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department
court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this
the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally
merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, appropriation bill.
such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it
appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements
the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in
may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
Pork Barrel Constitutional produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being
representatives of their local districts know more about the problems in
their constituents areas than the national government or the president
MILLER v. MARDO
for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a
better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated. FACTS:
-- This is a consolidation of cases, which originated from different CFIs
posing question about the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by
FACTS:
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under RA997 as
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act
amended by RA 1241 in so far as it confers jurisdiction to RO of DOLE
of 1994.
created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the
separation pay, et al.
Congress the REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses,
provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded. Manuel Gonzales filed before Regional Office (RO) of DOLE against his
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the employer Bill Miller of Miller Motors, claiming that he was his dirver from
House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution 1956 to 1956, on which he was arbitrarily dismissed without separation
to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves. pay. The Chief Hearing Office required Miller to file for an answer. Miller
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and filed before CFI of Baguio a petition to prohibit CHO from proceeding with
imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is the case for he does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject
authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the matter. CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction.
Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Whether the new conferment to DOLE of jurisdiction to take cognizance
Constitution. of cases affecting money claims not before exercised by it is valid under
Constitution and applicable statutes as accorded under RO Plan 20-A.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed HELD:
to approve the realignment.
No. RO Plan 20-A in so far it confers quasi-judicial function to RO of DOLE
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned
is invalid and without effect.
are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting
the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made. RA 997, which was later amended by RA 1241 created Government
Survey and Reorganization Commission (GSRC). GSRC was empowered
to: 1) abolish department offices which may not be necessary and 2. BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA v. PROVINCIAL BOARD
Create those which may be necessary for efficient conduct of the
government service, activities and functions. FACTS:

GSRC, an administrative body, was merely granted power to create The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church represented by the Bishop of
functions in connection with reorganization and should not validly confer Nueva Segovia, possessed and owned a parcel of land in the municipality
quasi-judicial power. GSRC argued that this defect was cured when of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, 4 sides of which face the public streets. On
Congress did not disapprove of the same under the provisions of Section south side is the church yard, the convent and an adjacent lot used as
691 of RA997. vegetable garden. At the center is the rest of the yard and the church on
the north is an old cemetery with two of its walls still standing, and a
The Supreme Court held that procedure of enactment of law by legislative portion were formally stood a tower.
inaction is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. Under our Constitution,
to pass a bill or law, there must be a requisite for and separate action by As required by the Provincial Board, plaintiff paid under protest on July 3,
each House of Congress to pass a law. Mere non-disapproval will not 1925 the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent which formerly was the
suffice as source for conferment of quasi-judicial function. cemetery. Plaintiff filed action for recovery of sum paid by to the
Provincial Board by way of land tax, alleging that the collection of tax is
Legislature may confer on administrative bodies quasi-judicial powers illegal. The Lower Court absolved the Provincial Board and declared that
involving exercise of discretion and judgement as incident to the tax collected on the lot was legal. Both parties appealed from this
performance of administrative functions. But in so doing must be stated judgment.
in express terms that leave no doubt.
ISSUE:   WON Plaintiff is exempted in the payment of land tax?
--
HELD:    YES.
Facts: Republic Act 991 provided that the reorganization plan drafted by
Department of Labor and Employment and submitted it to the president The exemption from payment of land tax of a convent refers to the home
for approval shall deemed as approved by the Congress after its of the party who resides over the church and who has to take care of
adjournment unless in the meantime, Congress by resolution disapproved himself in order to discharge his duties. It is therefore include not only
the plan and assailed its constitutionality. the land actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground
destined for the ordinary and incidental uses of the occupant. Except in
Issue: Whether or not enactment of law by legislative inaction is valid? large cities where density of the population and the development of
commerce require the use of larger tracts of land for buildings, a
Decision: The contemplated procedure violates the constitutional vegetable garden belongs to a house and in the present case, its use is
provisions requiring positive and separate actions of each house. It is limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes under exemption.
contrary to the “settled and well-understood parliamentary law” which
requires that the “two houses are to hold separate sessions for their As regards to the lot which formerly was the cemetery, while it is no
deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to longer used as such, neither is it used for commercial purposes and
be submitted to the separate determination of the other.” according to the evidence, is now being used as a lodging house by the
people who participate in religion festivities, which constitutes an
incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within the
exemption.
ARTICLE VI, SEC. 28
The judgment appealed from is reversed in all its part and it is held that
YMCA v. CIR both lots are exempt from land tax and the defendants are ordered to
refund to plaintiff whatever was paid as such tax, without any special
Facts: YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution which conducts various
pronouncement as to cost. So Ordered.
programs and activities that are beneficial for the public, especially the
young people pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable
objectives. YMCA earned an income from leasing a portion of its premises
to small shop owners and from parking fees collected from non-members, PROVINCE OF ABRA v. HERNANDO
upon w/c CIR assessed taxes. YMCA protested the assessment and got
denied. This led to filing for petition for review with Court of Tax Appeals. The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic
CTA decided in favour of YMCA citing that the income from the lease and Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of
fees are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that  there “is no question
accomplishment of the objectives of YMCA. The earnings from these for that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are
the use of recreational facilities constitute the bulk of its income w/c is properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.”
used to support its many activities to attain its objectives. CIR elevated Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce
the case to CA w/c reversed CTA decision. are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop
of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes.”
Issue: Whether or not income of YMCA from lease and fee are exempt
from tax? ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is
exempt from taxes.
Decision: The income is not exempt from tax. Under NIRC, the income
received by civic league or clubs not organized for profit are exempt from HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution
tax in respect to income received by them. The exemption does not apply provides that “charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit
to income derived from any of their properties or any activities cemeteries” are required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and
conducted for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income. improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually”
Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, stict interpretation in and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption
construing tax exemptions should be applied. Exemption “must be from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it
granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.” must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, in this case,
there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used
for religious or charitable uses.
The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the
exemption of religious property from taxes as tehy should not only be
“exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious GONZALES v. NARVASA
purposes. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the
FACTS:
Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the
constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999,
should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the province
assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop.
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory
granted, it must be strictly construed  against the taxpayer. There must be
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President
proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O.
improvements for religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted from
No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
taxation.
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the
same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the
grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by
APOSTOLIC PREFECT v. TREASURER way of a law.

In 1937, an ordinance (Ordinance No. 137: Special Assessment List, City ISSUE:
of Baguio) was passed in the City of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to
assess properties of property owners within the defined city limits. The Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the
Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province (APMP), on the other hand, is a religious constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
corporation duly established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to the
ordinance, it paid a total amount of P1,019.37  in protest. APMP later HELD:
averred that it should be exempt from the said special contribution since
as a religious institution, it has a constitutionally guaranteed right not to The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he
be taxed including its properties. can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes.
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
HELD: No. In the first place, the ordinance was in the nature of an redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has
assessment and not a taxation. sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to
the creation of the PCCR.  If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the
purposes mentioned in the Constitution. Based on Justice Cooley’s words: President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public
office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.
While the word ‘tax’ in its broad meaning, includes both general taxes and Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. 
special assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an
assessment is a tax, yet there is a recognized distinction between them in Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in
that assessment is confined to local impositions upon property for the danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or
payment of the cost of public improvements in its immediate vicinity and burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities.  Clearly, petitioner has failed
levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed. The to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as
differences between a special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special a citizen.
assessment can be levied only on land; (2) a special assessment cannot
(at least in most states) be made a personal liability of the person Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a
assessed; (3) a special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and (4) a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
special assessment is exceptional both as to time and locality. The disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is
imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
area, is a tax and not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a spending power.  The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O.
local improvement on a street or highway. A charge imposed only on No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the
property owners benefited is a special assessment rather than a tax amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be
notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax. sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case,
petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand
In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption because the to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to
assessment is not taxation per se but rather a system for the benefits of the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume
the inhabitants of the city. to make such a representation.
In its broad meaning, tax includes both general taxes and special
assessment. Yet actually, there is a recognized distinction between them
in that assessment is confined to local impositions upon property for the LUNG CENTER v. QUEZON CITY
payment of the cost of public improvements in its immediate vicinity and
levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed. FACTS:
A special assessment is not, strictly speaking, a tax; and neither the
decree nor the Constitution exempt the Apostolic Prefect from payment
of said special assessment.
Furthermore, arguendo that exemption may encompass such assessment,
the Apostolic Prefect cannot claim exemption as it has not proven the
property in question is used exclusively for religious purposes; but that it
appears that the same is being used to other non-religious purposes.
Thus, the Apostolic Prefect is required to pay the special assessment. 
The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the
land in Quezon City.  Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration,
hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines.  The ground floor is Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.
being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as
their private clinics, as well as to other private parties.  The right portion 4.   CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.
of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance,
and Garden Center.  The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.
patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and
5.    Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order
non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner
contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the
receives annual subsidies from the government.
same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82
Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The
6.    Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or
city assessor denied the Claim.  When appealed to the QC-Local Board of
B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to
Assessment, the same was dismissed.  The decision of the QC-LBAA was
the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax
affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the
Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for
appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
charity.
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that
ISSUE: appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the
Supreme Court.
Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes
notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a 7.    While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may
portion of its property for commercial purposes. have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of
venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the
HELD: Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4)
years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based
on its charter and articles of incorporation.  As a general principle, a ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying RULING: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82
patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to
subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions
or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly
and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
operating the institution.

Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are
DIAZ v. CA
leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these
are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.  Facts:
(strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions
as regards to:                 On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc.
(DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for
         income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service.
endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by
authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of                 The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and
the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at One Billion One Hundred
benefit of the Lung Center; and Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos
(P1,141,774,000.00).
          taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to                 On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC
equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum). (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used
by DLPC in its operation.

                On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on

ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29 certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of ERB on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.

FIRST LEPANTO v. CA                 In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court
referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which
Facts: subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of
the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of
1.    Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art.
appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of
82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the
Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the
jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial
petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the
agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
date when the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it
2.   BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly
amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its received the denial of their motion by ERB.
registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor
Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision
                On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are
reconsideration contending that our resolution of 8 September 1992 was now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular. petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to
In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. agencies.

Issue: ---

                whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of FACTS:
the Constitution PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project
including those under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant
incidents developed between the parties. Fabian tried to terminate their
Held: relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.  She
                Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a
and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this provision never became letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19,
Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807
remains. (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive
suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman - who
inhibited himself - and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the
FABIAN v. DESIERTO private respondents from the administrative charges.
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary
the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
District (FMED).
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts
of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed ISSUE:
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Supreme Court.
Guerrero.
RULING:
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
pertinently provides that: proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an GENERAL PLENARY POWERS
appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the REVIEW CENTER v. ERMITA
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC
argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to
give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.

Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the

appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised
over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-
judicial bodies or agencies.

But what is the proper remedy?

Fact: Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city
33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
converting 24 other municipalities into cities. construction.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills
in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of
or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
13th Congress.
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However,
the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint

Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate
for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 IMPLIED SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL
requirement in RA 9009.
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from The President may by executive order define the boundary… of
March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as  a taxpayer, filed a special
conversion of their municipality into a city. civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be
as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law,
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
Issue:
barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,
Constitution; and
Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
President.
Held:
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create
We grant the petitions.
barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional. HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than
that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
five years later.
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate   — and
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. of his functions.  In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
local government units. determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the laws,
welfare may require” – which would mean that the President may and in obvious partiality to Zubiri
exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still,
such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from
power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may the Court, the canvass proceedings before the NBC continued, and by 14
require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the July 2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with 10,984,807
proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and thirteenth Senatorial
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public candidates with the highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007
welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the elections.
President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and evidence
municipality.
presented by all the parties before this Court, this Court rules to dismiss
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is the present Petition
essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not
ISSUE
executive).
HELD : A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, as follows:

SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any question

pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which
may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236
in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
ACTS AS BOARD CANVASSERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS appearance of the election returns.

Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and
local elections, pre-proclamation controversies refer to matters relating
PIMENTEL III v. COMELEC
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of
Facts : The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for election returns and certificates of canvass
12 senatorial posts. At the time of filing of the Petition, around two
Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for
months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest
Senators, did not violate Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended
number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had taken
by Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied Pimentel’s request to question
their oaths of office as Senators. With other candidates conceding, the
PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-
only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were
Maguindanao, and his subsequent motion to exclude the second
Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public
Maguindanao PCOC.
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct canvass The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings,
proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at
14 May 2007 elections. that stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-
Maguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the alleged manufactured
Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted
nature of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-
Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-
proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166,
Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of
even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.
Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were
respectively canvassed. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
the canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial Board of Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and the COMELEC en banc, acting as the
Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao) NBC, shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators,
Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S.
respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to them by the local
Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected
boards of canvassers. For the province of Maguindanao, it is the PBOC
21 MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly copy 2, or the
which transmits the PCOC to the NBC.
copy intended to be posted on the wall. Due to the consistent denial by
the SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s request before
Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the the NBC to still question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao regarding the Maguindanao
and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentel’s counsel MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC
manifested her continuing objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs. from the national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity and
due execution had been determined by the NBC in accordance with the
On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the
criteria provided by the law.
second PCOC for Maguindanao. In the proceedings before the NBC,
Pimentel’s counsel reiterated her request to propound questions to PES This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the SPBOC- problematic since he has not established what he is being deprived of:
Maguindanao. The NBC, however, refused to grant her request. Pimentel’s life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate in the senatorial elections. At
counsel thereafter moved for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao the time he filed the instant Petition, he might have been leading in the
PCOC from the canvass canvassing of votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and
no winner for the twelfth and last senatorial post had been proclaimed.
Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the
May he already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination
NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao in violation of his constitutional rights to
of the canvass proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may such
a right be considered a property right which he cannot be deprived of
without due process? These were clearly substantial and weighty issues ISSUE:
which Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court cannot argue Whether or not the appointment is valid.
and settle them for him.
RULING:
Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, did introduce an additional Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
exception to the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA
elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators, this Court has for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
already established in the preceding discussion that Pimentel cannot functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
invoke the same in his Petition. The provisions in question did not pertaining thereto.
materially change the nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of
canvassers, which still remain summary and administrative in nature for
officers whom the President shall appoint:
the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the elected official
with as little delay as possible and in time for the commencement of the 1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads,
new term of office. ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the
consent and confirmation of the CoA.
CONFIRM CERTAIN APPOINTMENTS
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not
SARMIENTO v. MISON otherwise provided by law;

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador 3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law
then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla,
vest in the President alone.
being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law
questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated
(COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Appointments, the President appoints.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then 2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction
payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment. that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated,
it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed
stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Commission on Appointments.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the
(a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments
Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four
where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)
1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
groups are:
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public Commission on Appointments.
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution; CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA v. SALONGA

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not FACTS:
otherwise provided for by law;
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be
law vest in the President alone.
authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163,
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad
fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to
Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.
group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.
ISSUES:
-- 1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
FACTS:
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the RULING:
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which
confirmed by CoA.
provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested
upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as
executive officials without confirmation of CoA. “ad interim”. Since the position of chairman and members of the CHR are
not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its permanent and cannot be ad interim.
constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments,
cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman
reserved to the President alone. and members of the CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the
president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of
to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and the
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
only to appointments where the review of the Commission on president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to can only be removed upon cause and with the observance of due process.
remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the
President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments. CONCUR IN TREATIES

-- COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. EASTERN SEA TRADING

In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from
Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of
Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because
permanent.  Bautista then took her oath of office. EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The
said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand,
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial
Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit certain documents for her Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the
qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among
to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines
that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST
confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison. from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.

Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive
Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR. agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by
the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She concurrence by the Senate.
impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No.
163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject
pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.
and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
to take his seat as chairman of the CHR. commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common
in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments —
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
confirmation. notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is
not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other
Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive
on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to
the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded
pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers of entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with
government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show
appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make appointments that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in
to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163. character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for
heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the
confirmation is merely political in nature and it has no basis in law or in
Senate.
the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the
participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues,
of Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of jurisdiction. income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs
matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment
matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of
to the COA for the latter’s approval or rejection, such submission is not
them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
valid because at the time of submission, the office of the chairman
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
(chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly
took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson.
those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
 consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,
PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although
the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
Facts:
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by
of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to
this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed
accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which
executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
“shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
Statute to the Senate.
most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction
SO ORDERED.
covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Statute was opened --
for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained
open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations We rule in the negative.
Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
December 28, 2000 through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect
that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with
states. respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs — withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties,
to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
for ratification. treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both other states.
domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and
the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by
Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the
respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the
Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement
law and customary international law. shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties all the Members of the Senate.”
enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process
and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of
ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the
parties to the treaty. treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy
system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political
Issue: maturity and growth.
W/N the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute
to the Senate for concurrence; or Signing vs. Ratification of Treaty
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification
have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As
Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
Nations even without the signature of the President. authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the
parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in
Held: the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act,
country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the Purpose of Ratification
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without
and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof.
other states. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or
enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the
requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By
validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to
1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is
all the Members of the Senate.” The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the
required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest
the executive. of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or
is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of
states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required
pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the
moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the Batasan for
plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial
without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and to proceed.
not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would
be justified in taking offense. 5.       Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice
of the Batasan Pambansa contend that that the petition should be
President has the Power to Ratify Treaties dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in
is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even
the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasan’s power of
this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over
impeachment
actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed RULING: NO.
for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the
executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome 1.      The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the
Statute to the Senate. impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the
exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution
beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the
Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A
dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint
POWER OF IMPEACHMENT, PROCEDURE for impeachment  makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted.
ROMULO v. YÑIGUEZ
2.   Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the
Facts: Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without
revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's
1.      Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore,
Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint said Committee is in no position to comply with any order from the Court
calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, be a direct order to the Batasan itself. 
Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the
complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further 3.     The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine
consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in Senate, then it does not have the authority to control the actions of
the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The
by the Batasan and sent to the archives. secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere
agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that
2.      On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the spectacle
motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and
the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the
the Batasan. Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.

3.       Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from 4.       The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly
enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to
Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan execute it. 
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from
the archives and report out the resolution together with the verified --
complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines.
Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they FACTS
amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying
Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan,
with the mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI
filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the impeachment of President Marcos
of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and
together with a verified complaint by impeachment. Said resolution and
overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice,
the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned
Human Rights and Good Government (CJHRGG). The committee found the
provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by
complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further
vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to
consideration and disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all the
impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a
charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report
collegiate body.
which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the Archives. The next
4.       Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the
unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal archives of RN 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said
condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can motion was disapproved by the Batasan. The present petition was then
proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the filed with the Court praying that pertinent provisions of the Batasan
members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth Rules granting power to the Batasan to determine whether an
impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power to approve of deny
such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also pray that On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the impeachment complaint sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed
attached thereto be declared null and void. It is the petitioner’s the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are unconstitutional legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
complying with the amendatory process provided in the Constitution. (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
Further, the said provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
collegiate body and not by a small body of the Batasan. They also content Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted
of Impeachment, the Rules impose at least 1/5 of all the members of the to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings. substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been
sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
ISSUEs Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint? alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional? by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

HELD
ISSUES: 
No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for
the recall from the Archives of RN 644 and the complaint for 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls
said complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that no official within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of its
members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan 2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a
confirming the action of the CHRGG makes mathematically impossible the political crisis. 
required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the members. It would
HELD:
serve no purpose to proceed any further when it is obvious that the
require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained. Dismissal of the 1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and complaint for Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
impeachment – as in the dismissal of Mitra’s motion in the case – makes Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
irrelevant under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The dismissal by initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of the the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
powers vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of the court complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
to review. The court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the CJHRGG to June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
recall from the Archives the complaint and resolution would produce the 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
effect of ordering the Batasan to proceed with the impeachments Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed provisions are Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to adopt rules of its the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure to govern officer within a one-year period.
impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in
impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an impeachment 2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
not been established, or requiring majority vote of all members of the specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Batasan for the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1973 not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this
Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
provisions of the Rules (aside from the fact that the question involved is a questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
political one), because the acts of the committee sought to be restrained truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond
had already been consummated. They are fait accompli. judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.
FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
--
FACTS:
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the
complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no
since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by components of the calibrated system of independence and
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond
was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official FACTS:
more than once within a period of one year." 
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
impeachment proceedings.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a
Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario
indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution crowd at EDSA Shrine.
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a
departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the
guilty verdict will remove him from office.
Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap
to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency
Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of Philippines.
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious CRUZ v. PARAS
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an Facts:
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left
1.  Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation
Malacañ ang Palace.
of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid,  tainted
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful
countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without
until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming judicial hearing.
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
2.  RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial
provisions of the Constitution.”
Jurisdictions.' 
ISSUE: The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
1.)    Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets,
justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard
did he truly resign. pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
jurisdiction:
2.)    Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits. On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely
"the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however,
HELD:
remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to 3.  As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a
the legislative or executive branch of the government.  It is concerned municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit.
measure.” The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that
of regulation, not prohibition.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the
Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was 4.   Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of
a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court
the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
(president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court
held that the issue is legal and not political. RULING: NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves  a measure not
embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an power to prohibit. 
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.  It is important to follow the succession of events that 1.  The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject
struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as
statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in
resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the
questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety,
seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the
resigned by the use of the totality test:  prior, contemporaneous and Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance needs.
on the issue.
2.   In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it
suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends
trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive itself.
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting
3.  Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations
President.  From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that
cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but
the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his
not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an
tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and
exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that
not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as
petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate
of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could
succeed one another).
legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply
with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of
night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
AS TO TITLES OF BILLS compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of
an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of a. Separation of Powers
their business.
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of
4.  Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements
regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.  the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds
REQUIREMENTS AS TO CERTAIN LAWS should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted
– a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older
BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar
as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel
is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
manner:
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads,
Exceptions to the rule are:
buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.); (i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects; (ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of imposts within the framework of the national development program of
funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is the Government.
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
Presidential Pork Barrel identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation
of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members.
the  Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes
of Luy et al. d. Local Autonomy

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
constitutionality of the pork barrel system. develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But
with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
ISSUES:  representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either
bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own.
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman
is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government –
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
HELD: 
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is the part of legislators.
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional
statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient
is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or
the Constitution which provides: substantial controversy before the Court.

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
appropriation made by law. alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation
difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing
from a particular legislation.
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the
fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the
resource development and for other purposes which the President may Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
direct;
II.
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
The Court rules in the negative.
PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court
does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article
acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its
VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not
implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful,
have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation
because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of
LAMP v. SEC. OF DBM the executive which approved it.”

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was
assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse
(GAA of 2004). of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and
lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all capable of lawful enforcement.
forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According
to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an PORK BARREL:
automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and
congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to
Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF.
projects to be funded out of PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with
powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This
chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation
executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function
devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing
must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds
out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary
circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. process remain intact.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of

judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the
implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional PICHAY v. ODESLA
and illegal.
(pdf file)
HELD:

I.
ARAULLO v. AQUINO
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or
Program (DAP). to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
and said funds will then be reallotted to  other priority projects. The DAP funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
noted by the Supreme Court). violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP,
even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does On the issue of what are “savings”
not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA,
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the basis at all for the transfers.  Further, savings should only be declared at
DAP. Among their contentions was: the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art.
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively). V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects
of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Issues:
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than
(Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the
DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact
impoundments by the executive. may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is

constitutional.
PASCUAL v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated
HELD: P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision.
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA.
from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched
were merely being realigned via the DAP.
at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
then  prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives.
hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of
Pasig. In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that
of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
In January 1994, HB  8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994,
private purpose. The subsequent donation of the property to the the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its
government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with
defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the
taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of
by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate
advantage of private individuals.”  Inasmuch as the land on which the from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city.
the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, That in the computation of the reported average income of
was null and void. P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.

ISSUES:

DEMETRIA v. ALBA 1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the
HOR.
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan
Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, 2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an
from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the LGU’s income.
Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the
paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The
for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are
enactment.”
items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue
Constitution. to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit.  They thus constitute income which the local
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
constitutional.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local
Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds
the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. or-controlled corporations.

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the

privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the
one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to ironic however to note that  Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even
another here. signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge,
holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated GUINGONA v. CARAGUE
in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that FACTS:
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation
rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated
are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a
been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if P27,017,813,000.00.
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No.
18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing
Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
PJA v. PRADO Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD
No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities
Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from certain
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For
government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain
The Purpose.”
agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for
expenditure of the postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the education.”
judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said
franking privilege. ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.
questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said
provision is violative of the equal protection clause. HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
judiciary is valid. education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it objectives.
is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy
intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it unconstitutional.
altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do
not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, AGLIPAY v. RUIZ
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by
violating the Constitution. Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it is true that the Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional
postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the
government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of
largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of
sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa,
prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that
the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not
privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound
category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
privilege. appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the
government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The
issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of
showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the
Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that
congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be
inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and
propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of
the Government.

--

Facts of the Case:

The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that
he would order the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of
Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member
of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps
in consideration were actually issued already and sold though the greater
part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought
to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress

Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling
the commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of
Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the
Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new
postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course,
the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the
postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or
denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church,
nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
The purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an
international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity
to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In
evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the
Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the
location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads
“Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In
considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the
Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is
constitutional.

SUPLICO v. ROMULO NERI