10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 603

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

*
G.R. No. 124013. June 5, 1998.

ROSARIO MANEJA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANILA MIDTOWN
HOTEL, respondents.

Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Labor Arbiters; Voluntary

Arbitration; Grievance Procedure; Collective Bargaining
Agreements; Dismissal of Employees; Termination cases fall under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, not
voluntary arbitrators.—As can be seen from the aforequoted
Article, termination cases fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted, however, that
in the opening paragraph there appears the phrase: “Except as
otherwise provided under this Code x x x.” It is paragraph (c) of
the same Article which respondent Commission has erroneously
interpreted as giving the voluntary arbitrator jurisdiction over the
illegal dismissal case. However, Article 217(c) should be read in
conjunction with Article 261 of the Labor Code which grants to
voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide all unresolved grievances

________________

* SECOND DIVISION.

604

604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective

bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies. Note the phrase
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

“unresolved grievances.” In the case at bar, the termination of

petitioner is not an unresolved grievance.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the

dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or
enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery
set up in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or by voluntary
arbitration, but where there is already actual termination, i.e.,
violation of rights, it is already cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.—
The stance of the Solicitor General in the Sanyo case is totally the
reverse of its posture in the case at bar. In Sanyo, the Solicitor
General was of the view that a distinction should be made
between a case involving “interpretation or implementation of
Collective Bargaining Agreement” or interpretation or
“enforcement” of company personnel policies, on the one hand and
a case involving termination, on the other hand, It argued that
the dismissal of the private respondents does not involve an
“interpretation or implementation” of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement or “interpretation or enforcement” of company
personnel policies but involves “termination.” The Solicitor
General further said that where the dispute is just in the
interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be
referred to the grievance machinery set up in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement or by voluntary arbitration. Where there
was already actual termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is
already cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. We fully agree with the
theory of the Solicitor General in the Sanyo case, which is
radically opposite to its position in this case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Only disputes

involving the union and the company shall be referred to the
grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.—Moreover, the
dismissal of petitioner does not fall within the phrase “grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies,” the jurisdiction of
which pertains to the grievance machinery or thereafter, to a
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. It is to be
stressed that under Article 260 of the Labor Code, which explains
the function of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator,
“(T)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include
therein provisions that will ensure

605

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 605

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 2/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall

establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.”
Article 260 further provides that that parties to a CBA shall name
or designate their respective representative to the grievance
machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated
in advance by the parties to a CBA of the union and the company.
It can thus be deduced that only disputes involving the union and
the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitrators.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;

“Company Personnel Policies,” Explained.—It should be explained
that “company personnel policies” are guiding principles stated in
broad, long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of
an organization’s top authority regarding personnel matters. They
deal with matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees
and include, among others, the procedure in the administration of
wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and other personnel
movements which are usually not spelled out in the collective
agreement. The usual source of grievances, however, are the rules
and regulations governing disciplinary actions.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Estoppel; The issue of

jurisdiction is mooted by a party’s active participation in the
proceedings.—Clearly, estoppel lies. The issue of jurisdiction was
mooted by herein private respondent’s active participation in the
proceedings below. In Marquez vs. Secretary of Labor, the Court
said: “x x x. The active participation of the party against whom
the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the
jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is
pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said
party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.”

Same; Dismissals; Requisites for Valid Dismissal.—The

requisites of a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal must be for
any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the Labor Code, and
(2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself. The substantive and procedural laws must be
strictly complied

606

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 3/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

with before a worker can be dismissed from his employment

because what is at stake is not only the employee’s position but
his livelihood.

Same; Same; Social Justice; Presumption of Good Faith; Our

norms of social justice demand that we credit employees with the
presumption of good faith in the performance of their duties.—
Given the factual circumstances of the case, we cannot deduce
dishonesty from the act and omission of petitioner. Our norms of
social justice demand that we credit employees with the
presumption of good faith in the performance of their duties,
especially petitioner who has served private respondent since
1985 up to 1990 without any tinge of dishonesty and was even
named “Model Employee” for the month of April, 1989.

Same; Same; Dismissal must be based on a clear and not on

an ambiguous or ambivalent ground—any ambiguity or
ambivalence on the ground relied upon by an employer in
terminating the services of an employee denies the latter his full
right to contest its legality.—Petitioner has been charged with a
very serious offense—dishonesty. This can irreparably wreck her
life as an employee for no employer will take to its bosom a
dishonest employee. Dismissal is the supreme penalty that can be
meted to an employee and its imposition cannot be justified where
the evidence is ambivalent. It must, therefore, be based on a clear
and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. Any ambiguity or
ambivalence on the ground relied upon by an employer in
terminating the services of an employee denies the latter his full
right to contest its legality. Fairness cannot countenance such
ambiguity or ambivalence.

Same; Same; Due Process; Well-settled is the dictum that the

twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process in the dismissal of employees.—Well-
settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the
dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction
that the employer must furnish the employee with two written
notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (a)
the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and, (b) the second informs the
employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The
requirement of a hearing, on the other
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 4/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

607

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 607

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be

heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.

Same; Same; Same; Consultations or conferences may not be a

substitute for the actual holding of a hearing.—An examination of
the record reveals that no hearing was ever conducted by private
respondent before petitioner was dismissed. While it may be true
that petitioner submitted a written explanation, no hearing was
actually conducted before her employment was terminated. She
was not accorded the opportunity to fully defend herself.
Consultations or conferences may not be a substitute for the
actual holding of a hearing. Every opportunity and assistance
must be accorded to the employee by the management to enable
him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation. Considering that petitioner denied having
allegedly taken the second P500.00 deposit of the Japanese guest
which was eventually found; and, having made the alteration of
the date on the second RLDC merely to reflect the true date of the
transaction, these circumstances should have at least warranted a
separate hearing to enable petitioner to fully ventilate her side.
Absent such hearing, petitioner’s right to due process was clearly
violated.

Same; Same; Same; A worker’s employment is property in the

constitutional sense.—It bears stressing that a worker’s
employment is property in the constitutional sense. He cannot be
deprived of his work without due process of law. Substantive due
process mandates that an employee can only be dismissed based
on just or authorized causes. Procedural due process requires
further that he can only be dismissed after he has been given an
opportunity to be heard. The import of due process necessitates
the compliance of these two aspects.

Same; Same; Damages; Where the termination of the services

of an employee is attended by fraud or bad faith on the part of the
employer, as when the latter knowingly made false allegations of a
supposed valid cause when none existed, moral and exemplary
damages may be awarded in favor of the former.—The award of
moral and exemplary damages to petitioner is also warranted
where there is lack of due process in effecting the dismissal.
Where the termination of the services of an employee is attended
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 5/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

by fraud or bad faith on the part of the employer, as when the

latter knowingly made false allegations of a supposed valid cause
when none existed, moral

608

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

and exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of the former.

The anti-social and oppressive abuse of its right to investigate and
dismiss its employees constitute a violation of Article 1701 of the
New Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either
capital or labor against the other, and Article 21 on human
relations. The grant of moral damages to the employees by reason
of such conduct on the part of the company is sanctioned by
Article 2219, No. 10 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of
such damages in actions referred to in Article 21.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Raissa H. Jajurie for petitioner.
     Marasigan & Valerio-Padilla Law Office for private
respondent.

MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under1 Rule 65 of the

Revised Rules of Court are the Resolution dated June 3,
1994 of the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC NCR-00-10-05297-90, entitled
“Rosario Maneja, Complainant vs. Manila Midtown Hotel,
Respondent,” which dismissed the illegal dismissal case
filed by petitioner against private respondent company for
lack of jurisdiction
2
of the Labor Arbiter over the case; and
its Resolution dated October 20, 1995 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Rosario Maneja worked with private
respondent Manila Midtown Hotel beginning January,
1985 as a telephone operator. She was a member of the
National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and
Allied Industries

_______________

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 6/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

1 Penned by Presiding Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale and

concurred in by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso and Commissioner
Alberto R. Quimpo (on leave), First Division.
2 Ibid.

609

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 609

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

(NUWHRAIN) with an existing Collective Bargaining

Agreement (CBA) with private respondent.
In the afternoon of February 13, 1990, a fellow telephone
operator, Rowena Loleng, received a Request for Long
Distance Call (RLDC) form and a deposit of P500.00 from a
page boy of the hotel for a call by a Japanese guest named
Hirota Ieda. The call was unanswered. The P500.00 deposit
was forwarded to the cashier. In the evening, Ieda again
made an RLDC and the page boy collected another P500.00
which was also given to the operator Loleng. The second
call was also unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to
petitioner for follow-up. Petitioner monitored the call.
On February 15, 1990, a hotel cashier inquired about
the P1,000.00 deposit made by Ieda. After a search, Loleng
found the first deposit of P500.00 inserted in the guest folio
while the second deposit was eventually discovered inside
the folder for cancelled calls with deposit and official
receipts.
When petitioner saw that the second RLDC form was
not time-stamped, she immediately placed it inside the
machine which stamped the date “February 15, 1990.”
Realizing that the RLDC was filed 2 days earlier, she wrote
and changed the date to February 13, 1990. Loleng then
delivered the RLDC and the money to the cashier. The
second deposit of P500.00 by Ieda was later returned to
him.
On March 7, 3
1990, the chief telephone operator issued a
memorandum to petitioner and Loleng directing the two to
explain the February 15 incident. Petitioner 4and Loleng
thereafter submitted their written explanation.
5
On March 20, 1990, a written report was submitted by
the chief telephone operator, with the recommendation that
the offenses committed by the operators concerned covered
violations of the Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions
(OSDA):

_______________

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 7/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

3 Annex “D” of Respondent’s Memorandum; Rollo, p. 105.

4 Annex “E” of Complainant’s Position Paper; Rollo, p. 59; Annex “E” of
Respondent’s Memorandum; Rollo, p. 106.
5 Annex “F” of Respondent’s Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 107-108.

610

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

(1) OSDA 2.01: forging, falsifying official document(s), and

(2) OSDA 1.11 culpable carelessness-negligence or failure
to follow specific instruction(s) or established procedure(s).
On March
6
23, 1990, petitioner was served a notice of
dismissal effective April 1, 1990. Petitioner refused to sign
the notice and wrote therein “under
7
protest.”
Meanwhile, a criminal case for Falsification of Private
Documents and Qualified Theft was filed before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila by private respondent
against Loleng and petitioner. However, the resolution
recommending the filing of a case for estafa was reversed
by 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Virgilio M. Patag.
On October 2, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against private respondent before the
Labor Arbiter. The complaint was later amended to include
a claim for unpaid wages, unpaid vacation leave conversion
and moral damages.
Position papers were filed by the parties. Thereafter, the
motion to set the case for hearing filed by private
respondent was granted by the Labor Arbiter and trial on
the merits ensued. 8
In his decision dated May 29, 1992, Labor Arbiter
Oswald Lorenzo found that the petitioner was illegally
dismissed. However, in the decision the Labor Arbiter
stated that:

“Preliminarily, we hereby state that on the face of the instant

complaint, it is one that revolves on the matter of the
implementation and interpretation of existing company policies,
which per the last par. of Art. 217 of the Labor Code, as amended,
is one within the jurisdictional ambit of the grievance procedure
under the CBA and thereafter, if unresolved, one proper for
voluntary arbitration. This observation is re-entrenched by the
fact, that complainant claims

_______________

6 Annex “F” of Complainant’s Position Paper; Rollo, p. 60.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 8/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

7 Entitled “Manila Midtown Hotel, Complainant, vs. Rowena Loleng y Sanares,

et al., Respondents.”
8 Annex “I” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 133-144.

611

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 611

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

she is a member of NUWHRAIN with an existing CBA with

respondent hotel.
On this9
score alone, this case should have been dismissed
outright.”

Despite the aforequoted preliminary statement, the Labor

Arbiter still assumed jurisdiction “since Labor Arbiters
under Article 217 of the same Labor Code, are conferred
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all termination case
(sic).” The dispositive portion of the decision states that:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring complainant’s dismissal by respondent hotel as

illegally effected;
(2) Ordering respondent to immediately reinstate
complainant to her previous position without loss of
seniority rights;
(3) Ordering further respondent to pay complainant the full
backwages due her, which is computed as follows:

3/23/90-10/31/90=7.26/mos.  
P2,540 x 7.26/mos. P18,440.40
11/1/90-1/7/91=2.23/mos.  
P3,224.16 x 2.23/mos. 7,189.87
1/8/91-4/29/92=15.7/mos.  
P3,589.16 x 15.7/mos. 56,349.89
  P81,980.08

(4) Moreover, respondent is ordered to pay the 13th month

pay due the complainant in the amount of P6,831.67
including moral and exemplary damages of P15,000.00
and P10,000.00 respectively, as well as attorney’s fees
equivalent to ten (10) percent of the total award herein in
the amount of P11,381.17;
(5) Finally, all other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 9/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

“SO ORDERED.”

_______________

9 Rollo, p. 136.

612

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Private respondent appealed the decision to the respondent

commission on the ground inter alia that the Labor Arbiter
erred in “assuming jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal
case after finding that the case falls within the
jurisdictional ambit of the grievance procedure under the 10
CBA, and if unresolved,
11
proper for voluntary arbitration.”
An Opposition was filed by petitioner.
12
In the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1994,
respondent NLRC dismissed the illegal dismissal case for
lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because the same
should have instead been subjected to voluntary
arbitration. 13
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent NLRC for lack of merit.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ascribes to
respondent NLRC grave abuse of discretion in—

1. Ruling that the Labor Arbiter was without

jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case;
2. Not ruling that private respondent is estopped by
laches from questioning the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter over the illegal dismissal case;
3. Reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter based
on a technicality notwithstanding the merits of the
case.

Petitioner contends that Article 217(a)(2) and (c) relied

upon by respondent NLRC in divesting the labor arbiter of
jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal
14
case, should be read
in conjunction with Article 261 of the Labor Code. It is the
view

_______________

10 Annex “J” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 145-155.

11 Annex “K” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 157-164.
12 See note 1; Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 28-32.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 10/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

13 Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 33-39.

14 Article 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators.—The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement

613

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 613

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

of petitioner that termination cases arising from the

interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies pertaining to violations of Offenses Subject to
Disciplinary Actions (OSDA), are under the jurisdiction of
the voluntary arbitrator only if these are unresolved in the
plant-level grievance machinery. Petitioner insists that her
termination is not an unresolved grievance as there has
been no grievance meeting between the NUWHRAIN union
and the management. The reason for this, petitioner adds,
is that it has been a company practice that termination
cases are not anymore referred to the grievance machinery
but directly to the labor arbiter.
In its comment, private respondent argues that the
Labor Arbiter should have dismissed the illegal dismissal
case outright after finding that it is within the
jurisdictional ambit of the grievance procedure. Moreover,
private respondent states that the issue of jurisdiction may
be raised at any time and at any stage of the proceedings
even on appeal, and is not in estoppel by laches as
contended by the petitioner.
For its part, public respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, cited the ruling of this Court in Sanyo15
Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU vs. Cañizares in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.
The legal issue in this case is whether or not the Labor
Arbiter has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.
The respondent Commission, in holding that the Labor
Arbiter lacks jurisdiction to hear the illegal dismissal case,
cited as basis therefor Article 217 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715. It said:

“While it is conceded that under Article 217(a), Labor Arbiters

shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
“termination disputes,” the Supreme Court, in a fairly recent case
ruled:
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 11/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

_______________

and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company

personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
15 211 SCRA 361 [1992].

614

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

‘The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances

originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery, and when not
settled at this level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBAs
does not only include grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the
implementation of company personnel policies. No other body shall take
cognizance of these cases. x x x.’ (Sanyo vs. Cañizares, 211 SCRA 361,
16

372)”

We find that the respondent Commission has erroneously

interpreted the aforequoted portion of our ruling in the
case of Sanyo, as divesting the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction
in a termination dispute.
Article 217 of the Labor Code gives us the clue as to the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:

Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.—

a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the
case by the parties for decision without extension even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practices cases;

2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases
that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours
of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims,

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 12/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

_______________

16 Resolution of respondent commission dated June 3, 1994; Rollo, pp. 28-32.

615

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 615

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

arising from employer-employee relations, including those

of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.

b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction

over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall
be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be
provided in said agreements.”

As can be seen from the aforequoted Article, termination

cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted, however, that in the
opening paragraph there appears the phrase: “Except as
otherwise provided under this Code x x x.” It is paragraph
(c) of the same Article which respondent Commission has
erroneously interpreted as giving the voluntary arbitrator
jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.
However, Article 217(c) should be read in conjunction
with Article 261 of the Labor Code which grants to
voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies. Note the phrase “unresolved grievances.” In the
case at bar, the termination of petitioner is not an
unresolved grievance.
The stance of the Solicitor General in the Sanyo case is
totally the reverse of its posture in the case at bar. In
Sanyo, the Solicitor General was of the view that a
distinction should be made between a case involving
“interpretation or implementation of Collective Bargaining
Agreement” or interpretation or “enforcement” of company
personnel policies, on the one hand and a case involving
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 13/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

termination, on the other hand. It argued that the

dismissal of the private respondents does not involve an
“interpretation or implementation” of a Collec-
616

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

tive Bargaining Agreement or “interpretation or

enforcement” of company personnel policies but involves
“termination.” The Solicitor General further said that
where the dispute is just in the interpretation,
implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to
the grievance machinery set up in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement or by voluntary arbitration. Where
there was already actual termination, i.e., violation 17
of
rights, it is already cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. We
fully agree with the theory of the Solicitor General in the
Sanyo case, which is radically opposite to its position in
this case.
Moreover, the dismissal of petitioner does not fall within
the phrase “grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies,” the jurisdiction of which
pertains to the grievance machinery or thereafter, to a
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. It is
to be stressed that under Article 260 of the Labor Code,
which explains the function of the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitrator, “(T)he parties to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions
that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and
conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the
adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.” Article 260 further provides that that parties to a
CBA shall name or designate their respective
representative to the grievance machinery and if the
grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically
be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in
advance by the parties to a CBA of the union and the
company. It can thus be deduced that only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred
18
to
the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 14/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

_______________

17 Sanyo, supra.
18 Ibid.

617

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 617

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

In the case at bar, the union does not come into the picture,
not having objected or voiced any dissent to the dismissal of
the herein petitioner. The reason for this, according to
petitioner is that “the practice in said Hotel in cases of
termination is that the latter cases are not referred
anymore to the grievance committee;” and that “the
terminated employee who wishes to question the legality of
his termination usually goes to the Labor Arbiter for
arbitration, whether the termination arose from the
interpretation or enforcement
19
of the company personnel
policies or otherwise.”
As we ruled in Sanyo, “Since there has been an actual
termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter.” The aforequoted doctrine is applicable
foursquare in petitioner’s case. The dismissal of the
petitioner does not call for the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies but is a
termination dispute which comes under the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter.
It should be explained that “company personnel policies”
are guiding principles stated in broad, long-range terms
that express the philosophy or beliefs of an organization’s
top authority regarding personnel matters. They deal with
matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees
and include, among others, the procedure in the
administration of wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and
other personnel movements which are usually not spelled
out in the collective agreement. The usual source of
grievances, however, are the 20
rules and regulations
governing disciplinary actions. 21
The case of Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. NLRC
sheds further light on the issue of jurisdiction where the
Court cited the Sanyo case and quoted the decision of
therein Labor Arbiter Olairez in this manner:

_______________

19 Petition, Rollo, p. 15.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 15/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

20 San Miguel Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
108001, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 133, 140; citing C.A. Azucena, The
Labor Code With Comments And Cases, Vol. II, 1993 ed., p. 272.
21 G.R. No. 95940, July 24, 1996, 259 SCRA 161, 167-168.

618

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

“In our honest opinion we have jurisdiction over the complaint on

the following grounds:
First, this is a complaint of illegal dismissal of which original
and exclusive jurisdiction under Article 217 has been conferred to
the Labor Arbiters. The interpretation of the CBA or enforcement
of the company policy is only corollary to the complaint of illegal
dismissal. Otherwise, an employee who was on AWOL, or who
committed offenses contrary to the personnel policies (sic) can no
longer file a case of illegal dismissal because the discharge is
premised on the interpretation or enforcement of the company
policies (sic).
Second. Respondent voluntarily submitted the case to the
jurisdiction of this labor tribunal. It adduced arguments to the
legality of its act, whether such act may be retirement and/or
dismissal, and prayed for reliefs on the merits of the case. A
litigant cannot pray for reliefs on the merits and at the same time
attacks (sic) the jurisdiction of the tribunal. A person cannot have
one’s cake and eat it too. x x x.”

As to the second ground, petitioner correctly points out that

respondent NLRC should have ruled that private
respondent is estopped by laches in questioning the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Clearly, estoppel lies. The issue of jurisdiction was
mooted by herein private respondent’s active participation
in the22 proceedings below. In Marquez vs. Secretary of
Labor, the Court said:

“x x x. The active participation of the party against whom the

action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the
jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is
pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said
party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.”

_______________

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 16/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

22 171 SCRA 337, 346; cited in Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.),

Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 105396, November 19, 1996, 264 SCRA 307, 319.

619

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 619

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

23
In the assailed Resolution, respondent NLRC 24
cited La
Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals in holding
that private respondent is not in estoppel. Thus,

“The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of

jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel’ (5
C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position-that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will
of the parties, has no bearing thereon.” (Italics ours)

Again, the respondent NLRC has erroneously interpreted

our ruling in the La Naval case. Under the said ruling,
estoppel lies in this case. Private respondent is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
before the respondent NLRC having actively participated
in the proceedings before the former. At no time before or
during the trial on the merits did private respondent assail
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Private respondent
took the cue only from the preliminary statement in the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, which was a mere obiter, and
raised the issue of jurisdiction before the Commission. It
was then too late. Estoppel had set in.
Turning now to the merits of the case, We uphold the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was illegally
dismissed.
The requisites of a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal
must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of
the

_______________

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 17/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

23 Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 41-42.

24 236 SCRA 78.

620

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

25
Labor Code, and (2) the employee must be given 26
an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. The
substantive and procedural laws must be strictly complied
with before a worker can be dismissed from his
employment because what is at stake 27
is not only the
employee’s position but his livelihood.
Petitioner’s dismissal was grounded on culpable
carelessness, negligence and failure to follow specific
instruction(s) or established procedure(s) under OSDA
1.11; and, having forged or falsified official document(s)
under OSDA 2.01.
Private respondent blames petitioner for failure to follow
established procedure in the hotel on a guest’s request for
long distance calls. Petitioner, however, explained that the
usual or established procedures are not followed by the
operators and hotel employees when circumstances
warrant. For instance, the RLDC forms and the deposits
are brought by the page boy directly to the operators
instead of the cashiers if the

_______________

25 Article 282 of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 282. Termination by employer.—An employer may terminate an employment

for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful

orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or duly authorized
representative, and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

26 Midas Touch Food Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111639, July 29, 1996,
259 SCRA 652, 657; citing Mapalo vs. NLRC, 233 SCRA 266; Pizza

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 18/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

Hut/Progressive Development Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 117059, January

29, 1996, 252 SCRA 531, 535 citing Mapalo vs. NLRC, supra.
27 Midas Touch Food Corp. vs. NLRC, supra., 657.

621

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 621

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

latter are busy and cannot attend to the same.

Furthermore, she avers that the telephone operators are
not conscious of the serial numbers in the RLDCs and at
times, the used RLDCs are recycled. Even the page boys do
not actually check the serial numbers of all RLDCs in one
batch, except for the first and the last.
On the charge of taking of the money by petitioner, it is
to be noted that the second P500.00 deposit made by the
Japanese guest Ieda was later discovered to be inserted in
the folder for cancelled calls with deposit and official
receipts. Thus, there exists no basis for personal
appropriation by the petitioner of the money involved.
Another28 reason is the alleged tampering of RLDC No.
862406. While petitioner and her co-operator Loleng
admitted that they indeed altered the date appearing
therein from February 15, 1990 to February 13, the same
was purposely made to reflect the true date of the
transaction without any malice whatsoever on their part.
As pointed out by Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo,
thus:

“The specifics of the grounds relied by respondent hotel’s

dismissal of complainant are those stated in Annex ‘F’ of the
latter’s POSITION PAPER, which is the Notice of Dismissal,
notably:

1. OSDA 2.01—Forging, falsifying official document(s)

2. OSDA 1.11—Culpable negligence or failure to follow
specific instruction(s) or established procedure(s)

On this score, we are persuaded by the complainant’s

arguments that under OSDA 1.11, infractions of this sort is not
without qualifications, which is, that the alleged culpable
carelessness, negligence or failure to follow instruction(s) or
established procedure(s), RESULTING IN LOSS OR DAMAGE
TO COMPANY PROPERTY. From the facts obtaining in this
case, there is no quantum of proof whatsoever, except the general
allegations in respondent’s POSITION PAPER and other
pleadings that loss or damage to company property resulted from

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 19/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

the charged infraction. To our mind, this is where labor tribunals

should come in and help correct

_______________

28 Annex “C” of Private Respondent’s Position Paper; Rollo, p. 90.

622

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

interpretation of company policies which in the enforcement

thereof wreaks havoc to the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure. Apparently, the exercise of little flexibility by complainant
and co-employees which is predicated on good faith should not be
taken against them and more particularly against the
complainant herein. In this case, to sustain the generalized
charge of respondent hotel under OSDA 1.11 would unduly be
sanctioning the imposition of too harsh a penalty—which is
dismissal.
In the same tenor, the respondent’s charge under OSDA 1.11
on the alleged falsification of private document is also with a
qualification, in that the alleged act of falsification must have
been done ‘IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MISLEAD THE USER(S)
THEREOF, Again, based on the facts of the complained act, there
appeared on one to have been misled on the change of date from
RLDC #862406 FROM 15 TO 13 February 1990.
As a matter of fact, we are in agreement with the
jurisprudence cited by VIRGILIO M. PATAG, the 2nd Asst. City
Prosecutor of the City of Manila, who exculpated complainant
MANEJA from the charges of falsification of private documents
and qualified theft under IS No. 90-11083 and marked Annex ‘H’
of complainant’s POSITION PAPER, when he ruled that an
altercation which makes the document speak the truth cannot be
the foundation of a criminal action. As to the charge of qualified
theft, we too are of the finding, like the city prosecutor above-
mentioned that there was no evidence on the part of MANEJA to
have unlawfully taken the P500.00 either from the hotel or from
guest IEDA on 13 February 1990 and moreover, we too, find no
evidence that complainant MANEJA had the intention to 29
profit
thereby nor had misappropriated the P500.00 in question.”

Given the factual circumstances of the case, we cannot

deduce dishonesty from the act and omission of petitioner.
Our norms of social justice demand that we credit
employees with the presumption
30
of good faith in the
performance of their duties, especially petitioner who has

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 20/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

served private respondent since 1985 up to 1990 without

any tinge of dishonesty

_______________

29 Decision of Labor Arbiter; Rollo, pp. 140-141.

30 Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corp. vs. NLRC, supra., 539.

623

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 623

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

and was even31

named “Model Employee” for the month of
April, 1989.
Petitioner has been charged with a very serious offense
—dishonesty. This can irreparably wreck her life as an
employee for no employer will take to its bosom a dishonest
employee. Dismissal is the supreme penalty that can be
meted to an employee and its imposition32
cannot be justified
where the evidence is ambivalent. It must, therefore, be
based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent
ground. Any ambiguity or ambivalence on the ground relied
upon by an employer in terminating the services of an
employee denies the latter his full right to contest its
legality. Fairness
33
cannot countenance such ambiguity or
ambivalence.
An employer can terminate the services of an employee
only for valid and just causes which must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence. The employer has the
burden of proving 34
that the dismissal was indeed for a valid
and just cause. Failure to do 35
so results in a finding that
the dismissal was unjustified.
Finding that there was no just cause for dismissal of
petitioner, we now determine if the rudiments of due
process have been duly accorded to her.
Well-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of
notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule
in our

_______________

31 Rollo, pp. 91-92.

32 Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corp. vs. NLRC, supra., 540.
33 Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 114333, January
24, 1996, 252 SCRA 237, 243-244.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 21/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

34 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. NLRC, et al., G.R.

No. 99030, July 31, 1997.
35 Uy vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 117983,
September 6, 1996, 261 SCRA 505, 512; citing Labor Code, Article 277(b);
Golden Donuts, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 230 SCRA
153 [1994]; Reyes & Lim Co., Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 201 SCRA 772, 775 [1991].

624

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee

with two written notices before the termination of
employment can be effected: (a) the first apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and, (b) the second informs the
employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The
requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied
with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, 36
and
not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.
In the case at bar, petitioner and her co-operator Loleng
were issued a memorandum on March 7, 1990. On March
11, 1990, they submitted their written explanation thereto.
On March 20, 1990, a written report was made with a
recommendation that the offenses committed by them were
covered by OSDA 1.11 and 2.01. Thereafter, on March 23,
1990, petitioner was served with a notice of dismissal for
said violations effective April 1, 1990.
An examination of the record reveals that no hearing
was ever conducted by private respondent before petitioner
was dismissed. While it may be true that petitioner
submitted a written explanation, no hearing was actually
conducted before her employment was terminated. She was
not accorded the opportunity to fully defend herself.
Consultations or conferences may not be a substitute for
the actual holding of a hearing. Every opportunity and
assistance must be accorded to the employee by the
management to enable him to prepare 37adequately for his
defense, including legal representation. Considering that
petitioner denied having allegedly taken the second
P500.00 deposit of the Japanese guest which was
eventually found; and, having made the alteration of the
date on the second RLDC merely to reflect the true date of
the transaction, these circumstances should have at least
warranted a separate hearing to enable petitioner to fully
ventilate her side. Absent
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 22/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

_______________

36 Pono vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 118860, July 17, 1997.
37 Ibid.

625

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 625

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

such hearing,
38
petitioner’s right to due process was clearly
violated.
It bears stressing that a worker’s employment is
property in the constitutional sense. He cannot be deprived
of his work without due process of law. Substantive due
process mandates that an employee can only be dismissed
based on just or authorized causes. Procedural due process
requires further that he can only be dismissed after he has
been given an opportunity to be heard. The import of due
process necessitates the compliance of these two aspects.
Accordingly, we hold that the labor arbiter did not err in
awarding full backwages in view of his finding that
petitioner was dismissed without just cause and without
due process. 39
We ruled in the case of Bustamante vs. NLRC that the
amount of backwages to be awarded to an illegally
dismissed employee must be computed from the time he
was dismissed to the time he is actually reinstated, without
deducting the earnings he derived elsewhere pending the
resolution of the case.
Petitioner is likewise entitled to the thirteenth-month
pay. Presidential Decree No. 851, as amended by
Memorandum Order No. 28, provides that employees are
entitled to the thirteenth-month pay benefit regardless of
their designation and40 irrespective of the method by which
their wages are paid.
The award of moral and exemplary damages to
petitioner is also warranted where there is lack of due
process in effecting the dismissal.

______________

38 Ibid.
39 G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996, cited in the case of Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 99030, July
13, 1997; Mabeza vs. NLRC, Hotel Supreme, et al., G.R. No. 118506, April
18, 1997.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 23/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

40 Jackson Building Condominium Corporation vs. National Labor

Relations Commission, G.R. No. 111515, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 329,
333.

626

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Where the termination of the services of an employee is

attended by fraud or bad faith on the part of the employer,
as when the latter knowingly made false allegations of a
supposed valid cause when none existed, moral and
exemplary
41
damages may be awarded in favor of the
former.
The anti-social and oppressive abuse of its right to
investigate and dismiss its employees constitute a violation
of Article 1701 of the New Civil Code which prohibits acts
of oppression by either capital or labor against the other,
and Article 21 on human relations. The grant of moral
damages to the employees by reason of such conduct on the
part of the company is sanctioned by Article 2219, No. 10 of
the Civil Code, which allows recovery
42
of such damages in
actions referred to in Article 21.
The award of attorney’s fees amounting to ten percent
(10%) of the total award by the labor arbiter is justified
under Article 111 of the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED and the assailed resolutions of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated June 3, 1994
and October 20, 1995 are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The decision dated May 29, 1992 of the Labor
Arbiter is therefore REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

     Regalado (Chairman) and Puno, JJ., concur.

     Melo, J., On leave.
     Mendoza, J., In the result.

Petition granted, resolutions reversed and set aside.

Decision of Labor Arbiter reinstated.

_______________

41 Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 63 SCRA 374,
385, April 14, 1975.
42 Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Garcia, 81 SCRA 107, September 27,
1966.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 24/25
10/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 290

627

VOL. 290, JUNE 5, 1998 627

People vs. Feloteo

Notes.—A meeting merely for the purpose of informing

an employee about her questionable “work report,” and to
serve her a written notice detailing her infractions in her
“work sheet” is not the hearing contemplated by law. (Pono
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 275 SCRA 611
[1997])
While it is true that the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, meetings
in the nature of consultation and conferences, however,
may not be valid substitutes for the proper observance of
notice and hear-ing. (Equitable Banking Corporation vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 352
[1997])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001751feb6bddfbb99e23003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 25/25