PIRACY & ARMED ROBBERY
Prepared by Mehedi Hossain Mithil
INTRODUCTION
Piracy is a major problem that will not go away.
According to figures released by the lCC International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) the total number of piracy
attacks had reached 294 by October 2009, already
overtaking those of 2008. Of these attacks, 34 resulted
in successful hijackings in which 559 hostages were
taken.
For every hostage involved that represents a hugely
upsetting experience, with the likelihood of
imprisonment and threats now made worse by the
increasing use of firearms. Even the risk of attack, as
seafarers cross the world’s oceans, puts more pressure
on an already tough job. In certain high risk areas it will
be an ever present danger.
For shipping companies too, each attack is significant.
No successful business can operate without the safety of
its workforce as its number one priority - an unbreakable
commitment that informs all its decisions. That is why
over recent years there have been a number of
initiatives designed to tackle the scourge of piracy. For
example the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in
PIRACY NOW
Kuala Lumpur, which acts as a link between Masters of
attacked ships and relevant law enforcement agencies,
the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) which
works with the shipping industry and Combined Military
Fotces (CMF), the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) who
operate the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)
MSC (HOA), and finally NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization).
The formation of the EU NAVFOR organisation is an
important development because it marks a shift in focus
towards the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and Horn of
Africa, where the majority of piracy attacks are now
taking place. 0f the 31 hijackings in 2008, 26 were off the
coast of Somalia. Whilst there are other areas of
growing concern -the Pacific coast of Latin America, for
example -this document uses current issues in East
Africa as the most relevant to present Best Management
Practices (BMPs) for all areas where piracy has been
encountered. Many of the lessons learnt there can be
applied elsewhere.
The IMB defines piracy as ‘the act of boarding or
attempting to board any vessel with intent to commit
theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity
to use force in furtherance of that act’. This is generally
accepted to fall into two main categories:
Opportunistic -Armed pirates come on board at
anchor and steal whatever comes to hand.
Planned -Organised gangs of pirates who operate as
a business, hijacking ships and holding the crew to
ransom, sometimes over long periods of time.
Both types are increasing not only in frequency but also
in ferocity. Grenades and rocket launchers have joined
the more traditional pirate's armoury of knives and
machetes. Firearms are widespread. Evidence collected
by the IMB also suggests a growing involvement of
organised crime in pirate gangs, with access to satellite
technology, financial backing and a network of bases.
Once on board, however, their methods can be more
ruthless, and
their attacks often involve violence. Seafarers have been
beaten and, on occasion, murdered.
Whilst piracy attacks are on the increase worldwide their
spread tells a different story. The news is not all bad. In
factHIGH RISK
attacks offAREAS
Indonesia have actually fallen during
2009 to 7, compared to 23 over the same period in 2008
(IMB). However, in other areas such as Asia, South
America and West Africa - ships are still highly
vulnerable. But even their risk is considerably less than
that of the main hotspots off Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden, where headlines are made frequently.
international shipping is highly competitive, & ships
must be allowed to travel freely. Yet the requirements of
world trade often mean that transiting close to countries
with little or no political stability, like Somalia, is
unavoidable. A dysfunctional state encourages
criminality -pirates take to the seas because they see
opportunities to make money & they believe they can be
successful.
Where attacks occur (source: ICS)
A measure of the seriousness of the situation is the
recent directive ot the US Coast Guard listing ‘High Risk
Waters’ and suggests ‘operators may consider
supplementing ship’s crew with professional armed or
unarmed security'. Many ship owners think this would
only make the situation worse. Surely armed security is
more likely to lead to violence? How would they protect
crew safety then?
So if the maritime industry is understandably reluctant
to go down that route, what can they do instead? What
additional measures can be adopted by shipping
companies to fight piracy
PREPARATION as a threat, and a reality?
> Risk Assessment
More to the point, what can you do, either as crew,
officer or Master? How can your individual actions help
maintain the whole ship’s defence?
There are three principal areas to consider:
THE THREE AREAS OF BEST PRACTICE
PREPARATION: How best to plan the ship's
defences. How best to prevent a pirate attack.
CONTAINMENT: How best to respond to an attack.
How best to co-operate with the pirates. How best
to maintain crew morale.
RECOVERY: How best to deal with the immediate
aftermath. How best to follow up any investigation.
How best to deal with longer term effects. e.g. Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD)
Before transiting any High Risk area, the shipowner and
Master should carry out their own risk assessment,
based on the latest available information. This
assessment should follow two main criteria.
The first is the International Code for the Security of
Ships and Port Facilities (ISPS Code), which applies to the
whole industry. Its aim is to provide a framework within
which to judge the security threat to any ship
worldwide, and to react accordingly.
But in order to make that judgement the ISPS Code must
also have information about the specific area of transit,
which is the second criteria. The more accurate and
comprehensive that information is, the better the expert
advice to support the lSPS Code.
Combined together, the risk assessment will meet all the
necessary regulations ol the ISPS Code whilst also
responding to the particular demands of
that region. That could mean taking extra measures to
combat piracy.
Once completed, the Master should register the ship
and passage plan prior to transit, as well as report to
UKMTO if intending to transit in the Gulf of Aden area.
A good example of how this works is the industry’s
response to the East Africa/Soma ia situation. UKMTO
Dubai is the first point of contact for ships in the region,
CASE STUDY > Somalia
who then liaise with MSC (HOA), the co-ordinating
authority for EU NAVFOR in the Gulf of Aden and the
area off the coast of Somalia. EU NAVFOR head up a
dedicated mission to fight piracy called OPERATION
ATALANTA. It does this by offering support to vulnerable
ships as they transit the Internationally Recommended
Transit Corridor (IRTC) within the high risk area. In
addition, UKMTO requires regular updates on the
position and any intended changes a ship makes prior to
or during the transit. Meanwhile, the IPRC in Kuala
Lumpur is providing up to date information about
incidents throughout the world, which is then passed on
to all Masters of ships.
PREPARATION > The Pirate's Methods
REPORTING TO UKMTO DUBAI REPORTING DUBAI
It is an unfortunate fact that the increase in piracy has
provided a great deal of information about a typical
attack. Once you analyse that Information a pattern
emerges.
PREPARATION > The
First Strike: Pirates security
mostly Plan
attack ships in ‘skiffs’,
small boats with powerful outboard motors (up to
25 knots). Several skiffs can approach from different
directions.
Mother Ship: These skiffs often come from larger
vessels, which give pirates greater range offshore.
Intimidation: Once within range they use automatic
weapons and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) to
scare the crew.
Boarding: Any freeboard lower than 8 metres is
particularly vulnerable to a hijack attempt
Weather: Stuffs find it difficult to operate in sea
states 3 and above.
Timing: Pirates favour attacks during daylight hours.
Early morning or late evening are especially
vulnerable times.
The ISPS Code requires every ship to have a written Ship
Security Plan. A shore based Company Security Officer
(CSO) will work with the Master and the Ship Security
Officer (SSO) to keep this a working document that can
be adapted in response to any changes m
cnrcumstances. It must also be clear about individual
crew member’s responsibilities, and communicate that
effectively.
The key word is vigilance. Whether in port or at sea a
constant awareness of the ship's status is always the
first line of defence. It will help you anticipate any
situation that might arise - and respond quickly to it.
In a High Risk area like the Gulf of Aden a Maritime
Security Patrol Area (MSPA) has been established for
merchant shipping.
Following registration
PREPARATION with MSCin
> Strength (HOA), ships can
Numbers
conduct their passage through the Internationally
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in groups based
on their transit speed and during the night. All transits
are advised at full sea speed. A force of coalition navy
warships patrols the area, with aircraft covering the
airspace above.
The corridor itself is 460 miles long. Being part of the
group transit doesn’t eliminate risk, and neither should
the Master assume safety once out of the IRTC. Vigilance
should be maintained at all times. But it can give a
crucial advantage in the event of an attack, as any delay
to the pirates gaining access to the ship allows
assistance to arrive on scene and chase them off.
Early intervention is vital. Identifying suspicious
individuals or craft at the first opportunity not only gives
you extra time but also makes it clear to your attackers
that you are alert and determined.
ThisPREPARATION
is achieved in a>number
StayingofAlert
ways:
Ports: Control access to the ship while in port.
Search for stowaways, illegal drugs and suspect
devices before sailing.
Good Habits: Brief the Watch on typical methods of
PREPARATION
pirate attack and> encourage
Good Communication
a proactive approach to
reporting any suspicious craft.
Known Suspects: Keep photographs of known
motherships on the bridge for reference.
Visibility: Establish security inspections, especially
to restricted areas and vulnerable points on the ship.
It is important to be seen, but keep the patrols
frequent but irregulat.
Blind Spots: Sometimes visual watchkeeping isn’t
enough. An effective use of the radar by the OOW
can often pick up a pirate attack, by looking out for
small, fast moving objects.
Night Vision: Consider using night vision optics.
Of course a high level of vigilance is only truly effective if
other measures are in place to support it. Chief amongst
those is good communication.
Amongst the Crew: Make sure the crew members
know how to raise the alarm, and the difference
between warning and the all clear.
VHF/AIS: Pirates have been known to monitor VHF
communications, and the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) used to give out data. The Master must
decide how cautious the crew should be about
giving out information?
Ship Security Alert System (SSAS): The Master/SSO
must agree a procedure for using SSAS. Are the crew
fully briefed?
