GOITIA vs.

CAMPOS-RUEDA
(35 Phil 252, 1916) ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other
TRENT, J
FACTS: HELD:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married No. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila.  They stayed spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home.  Goitia filed a property rights of one of the pair are invalId, an action for restitution of such rights can be
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home.  It was alleged that maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs.  process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights
Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
valid cohabitation.  Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the
deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts.  The trial court ruled in court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the
favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the
or divorce from respondent.  Goitia filed motion for review. return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
ISSUE: presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore,
Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home. reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the
cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital
HELD: home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of
marriage.  The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill either instance.
the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at
his option.  However, this option given by law is not absolute.  The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away ILLOSORIO vs. BILDNER
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.  In the case at bar, the wife was forced (G.R. No. 139789, 139808)
to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband,
she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside PARDO, J
the conjugal home. FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
ARROYO vs. VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and
(G.R. No. 17014, August 11, 1921) begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia,
Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at
STREET, J Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he
FACTS: was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived
together as man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
home with the intention of living separate from her husband. Mariano’s efforts to induce her Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
to resume marital relations were all in vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May
cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo
and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance. instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents
the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning
furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the to Antipolo.
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
ISSUE: 2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued. grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion
of her husband.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which HELD:
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant 1. YES
for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under
nominal or moral. the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal
separation.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC.
years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalousdiscrimination in favor of wealthy
He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them
of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
will be deprived of his right to privacy. Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a 2. YES
wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings
right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process. Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation
has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.
(G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965) But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded
to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal
REYES, J.B.L., J abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the
FACTS: deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae
1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest
Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of precise cogi and factum".
Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13,
1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in PANA vs. HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR.
California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, (G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012)
1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against
VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu. ABAD, J
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an FACTS:
award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before
proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually a decision was rendered acquitting
Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and another person
cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed RTC’s decision
no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of but modified the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua. As for the monetary awards, the court
affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual
alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act. damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the court made an award of php15, 000
each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the court awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary
ISSUE: damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. The decision became executory of October
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued. 1, 2001.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the FERNANDO, J
writ resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. FACTS:
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. On April 3, Felix  Matabuena  cohabitated  with  Respondent.  During  this  period,  Felix Matabuena
2002, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that donated to Respondent a parcel  of land. Later  the two were married. After the death of
the properties levied were conjugal assets and Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of
not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16, 2002, the RTC denied the motion. Thespouses the donation  citing  Art.133  of  the Civil  Code “Every  donation between  the spouses during
moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it is submitted that the marriage shall be void.”
Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code was still in effect. They did not execute The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation
a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their property relations. However, both RTC was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply
and CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason cohabitating.
out that Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so
far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil ISSUE:
Code or other laws. W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is true that the
personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to HELD:
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore none of them can be said Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within  the spirit of the
to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that Article 256 of the Family law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community for the ban  on  donations  between  spouses  during  the  marriage  is  to  prevent  the possib
of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only ility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other,
those with prenuptial agreements. there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.The 
court,  however,  said  that  the  lack  of  the  donation  made  by  the deceased to
ISSUE: Respondent  does  not  necessarily mean that  the Petitioner  will have exclusive rights to the
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melencia’s civil liability in the aforesaid murder case. by marriage.

HELD:
YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. ARCABA vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL
First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that Efren and (G.R. No. 146683, November 22, 2001)
Melencia were married when the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages.
The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the MENDOZA, J
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code provides FACTS:
that the future spouses main in marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots
community or conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete separation of property, or in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law
upon any other regime. The family code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her
settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and clearly, under this situation, ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no
the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modification of settlements can take children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s
place only where (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store. 
liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated
reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)judicial separation Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room
cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand,
property under article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. 
of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances
exists in this case. A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila,
who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was
MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten
(G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971) years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for
declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages.
Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco,
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. 

HELD:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. 

Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and