6. Calang vs P, G.R. No. 190696. August 3, 2010.
FACTS:
Calang was driving a Philtranco Bus when the left side of the bus hit the front left portion of a
jeep coming from the opposite direction. The jeep's driver lost control and bumped and killed a
bystander. Two of the jeep's driver were also killed and several pasengers injured.
Calang was charged with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence befor the RTC. Calang was found guilty and ordered to
indemnify the victims. Philtranco was held jointly and severally liable with Calang.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not Philtranco should be held jointly and severally liable with Calang.
2.What is the liability of Philtranco?
RULING:
1.No. Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was
based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable
with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 21761 and 21802 of the Civil Code. Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts
that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising
from delict.
2.Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary as held under Art 102 of the RPC. The subsidiary
liability mentioned in Art 102 applies to employees, according to Art 103 of RPC
7. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC vs. PEREZ et al, G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
Facts: On August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the OCP Las
Piñas charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the
same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB
praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor. On October 23, 2000, the OCP
Las Piñas rendered its resolution, dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or
against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation
of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of
the HLURB that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal
action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by
the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had
been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being
the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale. San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s
resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus and the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’
petition.
Issue (1): WON the HLURB case presents a "prejudicial question" to the subject criminal case
since the former involves an issue separate and distinct from the issue involved in the latter?
Ruling (1): YES. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule
111 of the
Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The concept of a
prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil
action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in
the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining
the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true
simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not
be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive
and original.
Issue (2):
WON the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a
reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question?
Ruling (2): YES. the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or
not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs,
while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously
precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled
to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF
Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the
criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate,
thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Doctrine (Simplified Take away):
1. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the
criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so
intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
8. Pimentel vs Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060. September 13, 2010 - When the principle of
prejudicial question does not apply@Diana Atienza p. 171- 173
FACTS:
Maria Pimentel charged her husband, Joselito Pimentel, of frustrated parricide. She then filed a
civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner, Joselito, filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. He asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case
would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC.
The RTC denied his motion and the CA dismissed his petition for review. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
RULING:
No. Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the elements of
prejudicial question namely, (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issueraised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In this case, the civil
action was instituted AFTER the criminal case. Besides, the issue in the annulment of marriage
is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
NOTE:
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt
acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for
the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the
marriage is still subsisting.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
9. Argovan vs San Miguel GR 188767, July 24, 2013 @Anna Ingan
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses Argovan and Florida Gadiano purchased beer products from San
Miguel Corporation (SMC). Petitioners paid through a check drawn against Argovan’s AsiaTrust
Bank Checking Account. When said check was presented for payment, the check was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite three written demands
petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case for
violation of BP 22 and estafa against petitioners with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).
Petitioners maintained that funds from the savings account were automatically transferred to
their checking account whenever a check they issued was presented for payment. The reason
for the insufficiency of funds was due to AsiaTrust Bank's garnishment of ₱378,000.00 from the
joint savings account of petitioners because in a previous transaction made by one Fatima
Padua to Florida, the check issued to Florida with the amount of ₱378,000.00 was not cleared
but was credited to her savings account. Hence, petitioners filed a civil action for specific
performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank et al. Petitioners assert that the issues they
have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 and estafa. The OTP recommended that the criminal proceedings be
suspended pending resolution of civil case. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration
before the OTP but was denied. SMC filed with the Department of Justice a petition for review
but was dismissed. SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari. The
CA reversed the Resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice, suspending the preliminary
investigation of on the ground of prejudicial question. Aggrieved, petitioners filed this present
case.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that there was no prejudicial question below because two
different bank accounts are involved in the civil and criminal cases?
RULING: No. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two
elements necessary for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in
one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would
likely exist, provided that the other element or characteristic is satisfied. Here, the court ruled
that the resolution or the issue raised in the civil action (the dishonor of another check, which
was issued by Fatima) is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal investigation against them (whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the
payment of beer products). Hence, there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal complaints.
NOTE: A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor
of another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading
to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners’ savings account. The source of the
funds of petitioners’ savings account is no longer SMC’s concern. The matter is between
petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is
whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer products. The
gravamen of the offense punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look
either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn,
or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. The thrust of the law is to prohibit
the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the unlawful
garnishment of petitioners’ savings account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free
from criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of
worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself
the offense. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case
does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. The material facts
surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being conducted by the
prosecutor.
10. Bayotas en banc GR 102007, Sept 2, 1994 @Ven Buenaobra
FACTS: Bayotas was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to a disease.
Consequently, the SC in its Resolution dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the SolGen to file its comment regarding Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the SolGen expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of
the offense charged. The SolGen, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the
appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on
which the civil liability is based.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability?
RULING: Yes. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation I other than delict. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
11. Lagbo GR 207535 Oct 12, 2016 @Shanielle Qim
Facts: Lagbo raped his daughter numerous times. After trial, the RTC found him guilty of three
counts of qualified rape which the CA affirmed. In this petition, Lagbo assails the credibility of
AAA’s testimony and contends that his defense of denial and alibi should not have been
outrightly discounted in light of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the SC should re-examine the facts found by the RTC and CA?
Ruling: No. The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court. In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that
the prosecution has alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of qualified
rape. The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the trial court that, in
light of the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that Lagbo raped her, the mere denial of
Lagbo, without any corroborative evidence leaves the court with no option but to pronounce a
judgment of conviction.
(ADDITIONAL FOR RECIT - LAGBO CONTENTIONS)
First, the Court does not agree with accused-appellant's contention that AAA's inconsistent
testimony with respect to the places where she was raped in 2000 and 2002 bears heavily
against her credibility. This Court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the
stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in
testing the credibility of a witness.
Second, accused-appellant attributes ill motive against AAA and claims that she may have
concocted a story against him as she never had a harmonious relationship with accused-
appellant by reason of his constant mauling of her mother and siblings. This Court has held that
it takes much more for a young lass to fabricate a story of rape, have her private parts
examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of ridicule.
Third, the Court is neither persuaded by accused-appellant's argument that the physical
evidence on record does not support AAA's allegation of rape considering that the examination
made by the physician showed that there was no laceration in the hymen and there was no
evident injury found at the time of the examination. Contrary to accused-appellant's assertions,
there was no definitive statement in the medico-legal report of Dr. Punongbayan, the physician
who examined AAA, that the victim could not have been subjected to sexual abuse.
Lastly, accused-appellant contends that his defense of denial and alibi should not have been
outrightly discounted in light of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The settled rule is that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime.)
