FIRST DIVISION served a Notice of Garnishment upon El Grande Hotel, where petitioner was

then employed, garnishing her "salary, commission and/or remuneration."

Petitioner then filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion to lift
G.R. No. L-44169 December 3, 1985 said garnishment on the ground that her "salaries, commission and, or
remuneration are exempted from execution under Article 1708 of the New Civil
Code. Said motion was denied by the lower Court in an order dated November
7, 1975. A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied, and on
ROSARIO A. GAA, petitioner,
January 26, 1976 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
vs. certiorari against filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EUROPHIL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, said order of November 7, 1975.
and CESAR R. ROXAS, Deputy Sheriff of Manila, respondents.
On March 30, 1976, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. In
dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner is not a mere
laborer as contemplated under Article 1708 as the term laborer does not apply
Federico C. Alikpala and Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr. for petitioner. to one who holds a managerial or supervisory position like that of petitioner,
but only to those "laborers occupying the lower strata." It also held that the
Borbe and Palma for private respondent.
term "wages" means the pay given" as hire or reward to artisans, mechanics,
PATAJO, J.: domestics or menial servants, and laborers employed in manufactories,
agriculture, mines, and other manual occupation and usually employed to
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals distinguish the sums paid to persons hired to perform manual labor, skilled or
promulgated on March 30, 1976, affirming the decision of the Court of First unskilled, paid at stated times, and measured by the day, week, month, or
Instance of Manila. season," citing 67 C.J. 285, which is the ordinary acceptation of the said term,
and that "wages" in Spanish is "jornal" and one who receives a wage is a
It appears that respondent Europhil Industries Corporation was formerly one of
"jornalero."
the tenants in Trinity Building at T.M. Kalaw Street, Manila, while petitioner
Rosario A. Gaa was then the building administrator. On December 12, 1973, In the present petition for review on certiorari of the aforesaid decision of the
Europhil Industries commenced an action (Civil Case No. 92744) in the Court of Court of Appeals, petitioner questions the correctness of the interpretation of
First Instance of Manila for damages against petitioner "for having perpetrated the then Court of Appeals of Article 1708 of the New Civil Code which reads as
certain acts that Europhil Industries considered a trespass upon its rights, follows:
namely, cutting of its electricity, and removing its name from the building
directory and gate passes of its officials and employees" (p. 87 Rollo). On June ART. 1708. The laborer's wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment,
28, 1974, said court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Europhil except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.
Industries, ordering petitioner to pay the former the sum of P10,000.00 as
It is beyond dispute that petitioner is not an ordinary or rank and file laborer but
actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages
"a responsibly place employee," of El Grande Hotel, "responsible for planning,
and to pay the costs.
directing, controlling, and coordinating the activities of all housekeeping
The said decision having become final and executory, a writ of garnishment was personnel" (p. 95, Rollo) so as to ensure the cleanliness, maintenance and
issued pursuant to which Deputy Sheriff Cesar A. Roxas on August 1, 1975 orderliness of all guest rooms, function rooms, public areas, and the
surroundings of the hotel. Considering the importance of petitioner's function in constitutional provision making stockholders of a corporation liable for "labor
El Grande Hotel, it is undeniable that petitioner is occupying a position debts" of the corporation.
equivalent to that of a managerial or supervisory position.
In Kline vs. Russell 113 Ga. 1085, 39 SE 477, citing Oliver vs. Macon Hardware
In its broadest sense, the word "laborer" includes everyone who performs any Co., supra,  it was held that a laborer, within the statute exempting from
kind of mental or physical labor, but as commonly and customarily used and garnishment the wages of a "laborer," is one whose work depends on mere
understood, it only applies to one engaged in some form of manual or physical physical power to perform ordinary manual labor, and not one engaged in
labor. That is the sense in which the courts generally apply the term as applied services consisting mainly of work requiring mental skill or business capacity,
in exemption acts, since persons of that class usually look to the reward of a and involving the exercise of intellectual faculties.
day's labor for immediate or present support and so are more in need of the
So, also in Wakefield vs. Fargo, 90 N.Y. 213, the Court, in construing an act
exemption than are other. (22 Am. Jur. 22 citing Briscoe vs. Montgomery,  93 Ga
602, 20 SE 40; Miller vs. Dugas,  77 Ga 4 Am St Rep 192; State ex rel I.X.L. making stockholders in a corporation liable for debts due "laborers, servants
and apprentices" for services performed for the corporation, held that a
Grocery  vs. Land, 108 La 512, 32 So 433; Wildner vs. Ferguson,  42 Minn 112, 43
NW 793; 6 LRA 338; Anno 102 Am St Rep. 84. "laborer" is one who performs menial or manual services and usually looks to
the reward of a day's labor or services for immediate or present support. And
In Oliver vs. Macon Hardware Co.,  98 Ga 249 SE 403, it was held that in in Weymouth vs. Sanborn,  43 N.H. 173, 80 Am. Dec. 144, it was held that
determining whether a particular laborer or employee is really a "laborer," the "laborer" is a term ordinarily employed to denote one who subsists by physical
character of the word he does must be taken into consideration. He must be toil in contradistinction to those who subsists by professional skill. And
classified not according to the arbitrary designation given to his calling, but with in Consolidated Tank Line Co. vs. Hunt,  83 Iowa, 6, 32 Am. St. Rep. 285, 43 N.W.
reference to the character of the service required of him by his employer. 1057, 12 L.R.A. 476, it was stated that "laborers" are those persons who earn a
livelihood by their own manual labor.
In Wildner vs. Ferguson,  42 Minn 112, 43 NW 793, the Court also held that all
men who earn compensation by labor or work of any kind, whether of the head Article 1708 used the word "wages" and not "salary" in relation to "laborer"
or hands, including judges, laywers, bankers, merchants, officers of when it declared what are to be exempted from attachment and execution. The
corporations, and the like, are in some sense "laboring men." But they are not term "wages" as distinguished from "salary", applies to the compensation for
"laboring men" in the popular sense of the term, when used to refer to a must manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times, and measured by the
presume, the legislature used the term. The Court further held in said case: day, week, month, or season, while "salary" denotes a higher degree of
employment, or a superior grade of services, and implies a position of office: by
There are many cases holding that contractors, consulting or assistant contrast, the term wages " indicates considerable pay for a lower and less
engineers, agents, superintendents, secretaries of corporations and livery stable responsible character of employment, while "salary" is suggestive of a larger
keepers, do not come within the meaning of the term. (Powell v. Eldred,  39 and more important service (35 Am. Jur. 496).
Mich, 554, Atkin v. Wasson,  25 N.Y. 482; Short v. Medberry,  29 Hun. 39; Dean v.
De Wolf,  16 Hun. 186; Krausen v. Buckel,  17 Hun. 463; Ericson v. Brown,  39 The distinction between wages and salary was adverted to in  Bell vs. Indian
Barb. 390; Coffin v. Reynolds,  37 N.Y. 640; Brusie v. Griffith,  34 Cal. 306; Dave v. Livestock Co.  (Tex. Sup.), 11 S.W. 344, wherein it was said: "'Wages' are the
Nunan,  62 Cal. 400). compensation given to a hired person for service, and the same is true of
'salary'. The words seem to be synonymous, convertible terms, though we
Thus, in  Jones vs. Avery, 50 Mich, 326, 15 N.W. Rep. 494, it was held that a believe that use and general acceptation have given to the word 'salary' a
traveling salesman, selling by sample, did not come within the meaning of a significance somewhat different from the word 'wages' in this: that the former is
understood to relate to position of office, to be the compensation given for
official or other service, as distinguished from 'wages', the compensation for
labor." Annotation 102 Am. St. Rep. 81, 95.

We do not think that the legislature intended the exemption in Article 1708 of
the New Civil Code to operate in favor of any but those who are laboring men or
women in the sense that their work is manual. Persons belonging to this class
usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support,
and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any others. Petitioner
Rosario A. Gaa is definitely not within that class.

We find, therefore, and so hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying in its
order of November 7, 1975 the motion of petitioner to lift the notice of
garnishment against her salaries, commission and other remuneration from El
Grande Hotel since said salaries, Commission and other remuneration due her
from the El Grande Hotel do not constitute wages due a laborer which, under
Article 1708 of the Civil Code, are not subject to execution or attachment.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the present petition to be without merit

and hereby AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson) and Relova, JJ., is on leave.

 "Board Res. No. 99-52

FIRST DIVISION "'RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED' that in line with the policy of the bank
to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations and
further strengthen the existing internal control system[,] all officers and
G.R. No. 155421             July 7, 2004 employees are subject to reshuffle of assignments. Moreover, this resolution
does not preclude the transfer of assignment of bank officers and employees
from the branch office to the head office and vice-versa."

ELMER M. MENDOZA, petitioner, "Board Res. No. 95-53

vs.
RURAL BANK OF LUCBAN, respondent. "Pursuant to Resolution No. 99-52, the following branch employees are hereby
reshuffled to their new assignments without changes in their compensation and
DECISION other benefits.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
NAME OF PRESENT NEW ASSIGNMENT
The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of In EMPLOYEES ASSIGNMENT
management. Courts will not interfere with business judgments of employers, a
provided they do not violate the law, collective bargaining agreements, and JOYCE V. ZETA Bank Teller C/A Teller
general principles of fair play and justice. The transfer of personnel from one
area of operation to another is inherently a managerial prerogative that shall be CLODUALDO C/A Clerk Actg. Appraiser
upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose of advancing business ZAGALA
interests, not of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees.

The Case ELMER L. Appraiser Clerk-Meralco Collection

MENDOZA
The Court applies these principles in resolving the instant Petition for
Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 14, 2002 CHONA R. Clerk-Meralco Bank Teller"5
Decision2 and September 25, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in MENDOZA Collection
CA-GR SP No. 68030. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."4 letter dated April 30, 1999, Alejo B. Daya, the bank's board chairman, directed
Briccio V. Cada, the manager of the bank's Tayabas branch, to implement the
The challenged Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
reshuffle.6 The new assignments were to "be effective on May 1, 1999 without
The Facts changes in salary, allowances, and other benefits received by the
aforementioned employees."7
On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc.,
issued Board Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, which read: On May 3, 1999, in an undated letter addressed to Daya, Petitioner Elmer
Mendoza expressed his opinion on the reshuffle, as follows:
"RE: The recent reshuffle of employees as per 53, dated April 25, 1999. Management merely shifted the duties of employees,
Board Resolution dated April 25, 1999 their position title [may be] retained if requested formally.

"Dear Sir: "Being a standard procedure in maintaining an effective internal control system
recommended by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, we believe that the conduct
"This is in connection with the aforementioned subject matter and which the of reshuffle is also a prerogative of bank management." 9
undersigned received on April 25, 1999.
On June 7, 1999, petitioner submitted to the bank's Tayabas branch manager a
"Needless to state, the reshuffling of the undersigned from the present position letter in which he applied for a leave of absence from work:
as Appraiser to Clerk-Meralco Collection is deemed to be a demotion without
any legal basis. Before this action on your part[,] the undersigned has been "Dear Sir:
besieged by intrigues due to [the] malicious machination of a certain public
"I wish I could continue working but due to the ailment that I always feel every
official who is bruited to be your good friend. These malicious insinuations were
baseless and despite the fact that I have been on my job as Appraiser for the now and then, I have the honor to apply for at least ten (10) days sick leave
effective June 7, 1999.
past six (6) years in good standing and never involved in any anomalous
conduct, my being reshuffled to [C]lerk-[M]eralco [C]ollection is a blatant "Hoping that this request [merits] your favorable and kind consideration and
harassment on your part as a prelude to my termination in due time. This will understanding."10
constitute an unfair labor practice.
On June 21, 1999, petitioner again submitted a letter asking for another leave of
"Meanwhile, may I beseech your good office that I may remain in my position as absence for twenty days effective on the same date. 11
Appraiser until the reason [for] my being reshuffled is made clear.
On June 24, 1999, while on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a
"Your kind consideration on this request will be highly appreciated." 8 Complaint before Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National Labor Relations
On May 10, 1999, Daya replied: Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for illegal dismissal, underpayment,
separation pay and damages -- was filed against the Rural Bank of Lucban
"Dear Mr. Mendoza, and/or its president, Alejo B. Daya; and its Tayabas branch manager, Briccio V.
Cada. The case was docketed as NLRC Case SRAB-IV-6-5862-99-Q. 12
"Anent your undated letter expressing your resentment/comments on the
recent management's decision to reshuffle the duties of bank employees, please The labor arbiter's June 14, 2000 Decision upheld petitioner's claims as follows:
be informed that it was never the intention (of management) to downgrade
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
your position in the bank considering that your due compensation as Bank
Appraiser is maintained and no future reduction was intended. 1. Declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal.
"Aside from giving bank employees a wider experience in various banking 2. Ordering respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position without
operations, the reshuffle will also afford management an effective tool in loss of seniority rights with full backwages from date of dismissal to actual
providing the bank a sound internal control system/check and balance and a reinstatement in the amount of P55,000.00 as of June 30, 2000.
basis in evaluating the performance of each employee. A continuing bankwide
reshuffle of employees shall be made at the discretion of management which
may include bank officers, if necessary as expressed in Board Resolution No. 99-
3. Ordering the payment of separation pay if reinstatement is not possible in the "How and by what manner a business concern conducts its affairs is not for this
amount of P30,000.00 in addition to 13th month pay of P5,000.00 and the Commission to interfere with, especially so if there is no showing, as in the case
usual P10,000.00 annual bonus afforded the employees. at bar, that the reshuffle was motivated by bad faith or ill-will. x x x." 15

4. Ordering the payment of unpaid salary for the period covering July 1-30, 1999 After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration, 16 petitioner brought
in the amount of P5,000.00 before the CA a Petition for Certiorari 17 assailing the foregoing Resolution.

5. Ordering the payment of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Ruling of the Court of Appeals

6. Ordering the payment of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 Finding that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC, the
CA Decision ruled thus:
7. Ordering the payment of Attorney's fees in the amount of P18,000.00 which is
10% of the monetary award."13 "The so-called 'harassment' which Mendoza allegedly experienced in the
aftermath of the reshuffling of employees at the bank is but a figment of his
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter. 14 In its July 18, 2001 Resolution, imagination as there is no evidence extant on record which substantiates the
it held: same. His alleged demotion, the 'cold shoulder' stance, the things about his
"We can conceive of no reason to ascribe bad faith or malice to the respondent chair and table, and the alleged reason for the harassment are but allegations
bank for its implementation of its Board Resolution directing the reshuffle of bereft of proof and are perforce inadmissible as self-serving statements and can
employees at its Tayabas branch to positions other than those they were never be considered repositories of truth nor serve as foundations of court
occupying. While at first the employees thereby affected would experience decisions anent the resolution of the litigants' rights.
difficulty in adjusting to their new jobs, it cannot be gainsaid that the objective "When Mendoza was reshuffled to the position of clerk at the bank, he was not
for the reshuffle is noble, as not only would the employees obtain additional demoted as there was no [diminution] of his salary benefits and rank. He could
knowledge, they would also be more well-rounded in the operations of the bank even retain his position title, had he only requested for it pursuant to the reply
and thus help the latter further strengthen its already existing internal control of the Chairman of the bank's board of directors to Mendoza's letter protesting
system. the reshuffle. There is, therefore, no cause to doubt the reasons which the bank
"The only inconvenience, as [w]e see it, that the [petitioner] may have propounded in support of its move to reshuffle its employees, viz:
experienced is that from an appraiser he was made to perform the work of a 1. to 'familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations,'
clerk in the collection of Meralco payments, which he may have considered as and
beneath him and his experience, being a pioneer employee. But it cannot be
discounted either that other employees at the Tayabas branch were similarly 2. to 'further strengthen the existing internal control system' of the bank.
reshuffled. The only logical conclusion therefore is that the Board Resolution
was not aimed solely at the [petitioner], but for all the other employees of the x "The reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot be made
the basis of a finding of constructive dismissal.
x x bank as well. Besides, the complainant has not shown by clear, competent
and convincing evidence that he holds a vested right to the position of "The fact that Mendoza was no longer included in the bank's payroll for July 1 to
Appraiser. x x x. 15, 1999 does not signify that the bank has dismissed the former from its
employ. Mendoza separated himself from the bank's employ when, on June 24,
1999, while on leave, he filed the illegal dismissal case against his employer for Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when
no apparent reason at all."18 continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when
there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when a clear
Hence, this Petition.19 discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to
The Issues the employee.21 Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for
constructive dismissal, because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration: and not given any work to do, while his table had been placed near the toilet
and eventually removed.22 He adds that the reshuffling of employees was done
"I. Whether or not the petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily separated
in bad faith, because it was designed primarily to force him to resign. 23
himself from the service and/or abandoned his job when he filed his Complaint
for constructive and consequently illegal dismissal; Management Prerogative to Transfer Employees

"II. Whether or not the reshuffling of private respondent'[s] employees was Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives. For this
done in good faith and cannot be made as the basis of a finding of constructive reason, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of
dismissal, even as the [petitioner's] demotion in rank is admitted by both employers.24 Indeed, labor laws discourage interference in employers'
parties; judgments concerning the conduct of their business. 25 The law must protect not
only the welfare of employees, but also the right of employers.
"III. Whether or not the ruling in the landmark case of Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC
[and Isetann Department Store (323 SCRA 445)] is applicable to the case at bar; In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the
prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation
"IV. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner's
to another -- provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary,
money claims, damages, and unpaid salaries for the period July 1-30, 1999,
benefits, and other privileges; and the action is not motivated by discrimination,
although this was not disputed by the private respondent; and
made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without
"V. Whether or not the entire proceedings before the Honorable Court of sufficient cause.26 This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control
Appeals and the NLRC are a nullity since the appeal filed by private respondent and manage their enterprise effectively.27 The right of employees to security of
before the NLRC on August 5, 2000 was on the 15 th day or five (5) days beyond tenure does not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of
the reglem[e]ntary period of ten (10) days as provided for by law and the NLRC depriving management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to
Rules of Procedure."20 transfer them.28

In short, the main issue is whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from Managerial prerogatives, however, are subject to limitations provided by law,
his employment. collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and
justice.29 The test for determining the validity of the transfer of employees was
The Court's Ruling explained in Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC 30 as follows:

The Petition has no merit. "[L]ike other rights, there are limits thereto. The managerial prerogative to
transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing
Main Issue:
in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not
Constructive Dismissal
be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be
used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. In
particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not serving statement that he had been positioned near the comfort room, made to
unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a work without a table, and given no work assignment. 35 Purely conjectural is his
demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. claim that the reshuffle of personnel was a harassment in retaliation for an
Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's alleged falsification case filed by his relatives against a public official. 36 While the
transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been defined rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law are not controlling in proceedings
as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, before the NLRC,37 parties must nonetheless submit evidence to support their
unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rank and contentions.
diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so Secondary Issues:
unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his Serrano v. NLRC Inapplicable
continued employment."31
Serrano v. NLRC38 does not apply to the present factual milieu. The Court ruled
Petitioner's Transfer Lawful therein that the lack of notice and hearing made the dismissal of the employee
The employer bears the burden of proving that the transfer of the employee has ineffectual, but not necessarily illegal. 39 Thus, the procedural infirmity was
remedied by ordering payment of his full back wages from the time of his
complied with the foregoing test. In the instant case, we find no reason to
disturb the conclusion of the NLRC and the CA that there was no constructive dismissal.40 The absence of constructive dismissal in the instant case precludes
the application of Serrano. Because herein petitioner was not dismissed, then he
dismissal. Their finding is supported by substantial evidence -- that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as justification for a is not entitled to his claimed monetary benefits.
conclusion.32 Alleged Nullity of NLRC and CA Proceedings
Petitioner's transfer was made in pursuit of respondent's policy to "familiarize Petitioner argues that the proceedings before the NLRC and the CA were void,
bank employees with the various phases of bank operations and further since respondent's appeal before the NLRC had allegedly been filed beyond the
strengthen the existing internal control system" 33 of all officers and employees. reglementary period.41 A careful scrutiny of his Petition for Review42 with the
We have previously held that employees may be transferred -- based on their appellate court shows that this issue was not raised there. Inasmuch as the
qualifications, aptitudes and competencies -- to positions in which they can instant Petition challenges the Decision of the CA, we cannot rule on arguments
function with maximum benefit to the company. 34 There appears no justification that were not brought before it. This ruling is consistent with the due-process
for denying an employer the right to transfer employees to expand their requirement that no question shall be entertained on appeal, unless it has been
competence and maximize their full potential for the advancement of the raised in the court below.43
establishment. Petitioner was not singled out; other employees were also
reassigned without their express consent. WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the June 14, 2002 Decision and the
September 25, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs
Neither was there any demotion in the rank of petitioner; or any diminution of against petitioner.
his salary, privileges and other benefits. This fact is clear in respondent's Board
Resolutions, the April 30, 1999 letter of Bank President Daya to Branch Manager SO ORDERED.
Cada, and the May 10, 1999 letter of Daya to petitioner.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,  concur.
On the other hand, petitioner has offered no sufficient proof to support his
allegations. Given no credence by both lower tribunals was his bare and self-