Acevedo Vs
Acevedo Vs
Acevedo Vs
Sometime in July 1998, Acevedo failed to comply with Jalapadan's instructions. At However, Jalapadan later asked him to return to work 5 and
the latter agreed.
On October 7, 1998, Acevedo failed to report for work. The next day, Jalapadan inquired why he failed to check and wash the truck. Jalapadan
berated Acevedo and ordered him to get his personal belongings and leave. He then signed a Letter 7 dated October 10, 1998, informing
Jalapadan that he was resigning effective that date.
On October 26, 1998, Acevedo filed a complaint against Jalapadan, ACI and its general manager, Felipe Loi, for illegal dismissal and for the
recovery of backwages and other monetary benefits.
The NLRC held that the complainant was an employee of respondent Jalapadan, not of respondent ACI, and that he voluntarily resigned.
Issue
Whether the petitioner is the employee of respondent ACI
Held
Respondent Jalapadan bound and obliged himself to work exclusively for respondent ACI during the terms of the agreement. Under the
agreement, ACI had the right to control not only the end to be attained but also the manner and means to be used in accomplishing the end. The
Court declares Jalapadan as a labor-only contractor and respondent ACI as the principal employer of Acevedo.
The complainants claimed that they were fillers of SMC Bottling Plant, engaged in
activities necessary and desirable in the usual business of SMC. They assert,
therefore, that they are regular employees of SMC.
SMC utilized AMPCO, thus making it appear that the latter was the complainants
employer, with intentions of evading the responsibility of paying the benefits due to
the complainants. The complainants further claim that AMPCO and SMC failed to give
them their 13th month pay, and that they were prevented from entering the premises
of SMC.
ISSUE:
Held
The petition is DENIED, and the February 19, 2004 decision of the CA AFFIRMED.
The Court is not convinced that AMPCO exercised exclusive direction in the
discharge of respondents, based on Merlyn Polidarios instructions to the
respondents to wait for further instructions from SMCs supervisor after
being prevented from entering SMC premises. Therefore, it would be logical
to conclude that SMC wielded the power of control.
Atok Big Wedge Company vs. Gison, G.R. No. 169510, August 8, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Gison was a part time consultant of the petitioner for 11 years. Upon
respondents request to be registered in SSS by the petitioner, the latter refused.
Respondent complained of the refusal in SSS and he was also terminated because his
services were no longer necessary.
As a result, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th Month pay, vacation pay and sick leave. The
Labor Arbiter and NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner ruling that there is no
ER-EE relationship. CA reversed the decision of LA and NLRC and said that Art. 280 should
apply which distinguishes between the two kinds of employees, i.e., regular and casual
employees. The respondent is deemed a regular employee of the petitioner after the lapse
of one year from his employment.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in applying Article 280
Held
Employer-employee relationship is absent. Respondent was not required to report everyday
during regular office hours of petitioner. Respondent's monthly retainer fees were paid to
him either at his residence or a local restaurant. Petitioner did not prescribe the manner in
which respondent would accomplish any of the tasks in which his expertise as a liaison
officer was needed. Element of control is absent.
No.
Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business are provided for in the
Insurance Code. They serve as guidelines without dictating the means or methods
to be employed in attaining it. None of these really invades the agents contractual
prerogative to adopt his own selling methods or to sell insurance at his own time
and convenience, hence cannot justifiable be said to establish an employeremployee relationship between Basiao and the company.
CAGAMPAN
vs.
NLRC G.R. Nos. 85122-24 March 22, 1991
Facts
petitioners, all seamen complain of non-payment of overtime pay, vacation pay and terminal
pay against private respondent. They also claim that although they agreed to render
services on
board the vessel Rio Colorado, they actually
boarded MV "SOIC I" and more so, petitioners de Castro and de
Jesus claim that although they were employed as ordinary seamen, they actually performed
the work and
duties of Able Seamen. The POEA decision granted
overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay.
ISSUE:
WON NLRC gravely abused its discretion REVERSING the decision of POEA in granting
overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay
HELD:
No. The NLRC
ruling on the disallowance of overtime pay is ably supported by the fact that petitioners
never produced any proof of actual performance of overtime work.