Vision Report en
Vision Report en
Vision Report en
Gender Equality
Francesca Bettio and Silvia Sansonetti (editors)
Language editor: Jacki Davis
Justice and
Consumers
This report was financed by, and prepared for the use of the European Commission, Directorate-General for
Justice and Consumers, Unit D2 ‘Equality between men and women’, in the framework of a contract managed
by Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini (FGB) in partnership with Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale (IRS). It does not ne-
cessarily reflect the opinion or position of the European Commission or of the Directorate-General for Justice,
nor may any person acting on their behalf be held responsible for the use which may be made of the informa-
tion contained in this publication.
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed.
Introduction
By Francesca Bettio and Silvia Sansonetti 7
Part I. New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality
policy be? 12
Part II: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key
areas?28
References96
Contributors107
List of Figures
Figure 1. Gender Gap in Pension vis-à-vis Gender Gap in Annual Earnings 37
Figure 2. Average hours per week devoted to paid and unpaid work, by gender and country 41
Figure 3. Average hours per week devoted to paid work, by gender and country 42
Figure 4. Little or no stress due to work-life balance issues 43
List of Tables
Table 1 Mean time in selected activities 40
Table 2 Time devoted to total work, Spain 2002-03 and 2009-10 42
List of Boxes
Box 1. Bringing gender to the negotiation of fiscal space 19
Box 2. Effects of cuts in public spending 33
Box 3. Gender pay gap and real wages in UK 34
Box 4. Average time spent by women and men active on the labour market on paid and unpaid work. 47
Box 5. Elderly care and middle-aged women’s opportunities for paid work 48
Box 6. The example of Scotland 66
Box 7. Integration of a gender perspective into integration policy (a Swedish case) 69
Box 8. Swedish government´s 2011 platform for gender mainstreaming: 5 strands 71
Box 9. The harm caused by stereotyping 80
Box 10. The importance of targeted rights information 82
Box 11. The Dutch example 86
Box 12. Nordic Initiative 1: Nordicom project Nordic Gender & Media Forum 90
Box 13. Nordic Initiative 2: Swedish Film Institute 90
Box 14. Nordic Initiative 3: KVINFO expert database 90
Box 15. Nordic Initiative 4: The Swedish Association of Communication Agencies KOMM 90
Box 16. The Austrian project GeKoS (Gender Competence Schools) 92
Box 17. Examples of the different concepts of learning 94
Box 18. An example from the GeKoS project 95
Country Abbreviations
Introduction
By Francesca Bettio and Silvia Sansonetti
As the European Commission’s current work programme for gender equality - out-
lined in its Strategy for equality between men and women 2010-201 - draws to
a close and the EU considers the way forward for gender equality policies, this
publication offers a range of perspectives on what has been achieved to date, the
challenges that lie ahead, and possible priorities for policy action to stimulate chan-
ge and accelerate progress in key areas. It is designed to feed into the development
of a new strategic and comprehensive vision to guide action at EU level post-2015,
as the new EU leadership which took office in 2014 looks to the future and seeks
to identify priorities for action at European level in the wake of the worst economic
crisis for generations.
The editors of this collection of essays asked the authors to reflect on what future
gender equality policies should look like, in the light of achievements and gaps in
past policies. The resulting essays by leading experts on gender equality, published
under the auspices of the European Network of Experts on Gender Equality (ENE-
GE), address key questions such as: how important will a continued focus on gender
equality be for Europe’s economy and society in future? How is the context in which
gender equality policies operate likely to evolve? What should the key overarching
priorities for the future be? What role should the EU play in this? And what implica-
tions does all of this have for the future gender equality policy agenda?
This publication is divided into three parts:
The first chapter, New Frontiers, outlines visions for the future of gender equality
policies, considering where the focus should be in the next generation of policies
and how to accelerate progress to achieve genuine gender equality for all.
The second chapter, Achievements and Challenges, assesses the remaining challen-
ges in the priority areas identified in the European Commission’s strategy for 2010-
2015 and the gaps that need to be addressed.
The third chapter, Governance and Communication , considers how best EU can
meet the challenges identified in the previous sections and highlights the key cross-
cutting issues that need to be addressed in relation to governance and tools, com-
munication, stakeholder mobilisation, etc.
A recurring theme of these essays is the need to maintain awareness of gender
equality as a political and policy issue, and ensure that it remains a priority for ac-
tion in the coming months and years. Otherwise, there is a serious risk of ‘gender
equality fatigue’, with many people assuming that the most important battles have
already been won and that gender equality is now a reality, so there is no need to
do much more.
There are worrying signs that this is already happening, with evidence that gender
equality policy is being downgraded by the governments of many EU Member Sta-
tes through, for example, cuts in public spending on gender-relevant actions as part
of general austerity drives; a growing trend towards replacing independent bodies
for protection against discrimination on grounds of sex with bodies for protection
against discrimination on various grounds, thus diluting the focus on gender equali-
7
Introduction
ty; and, more generally, a growing imbalance in favour of narrowly defined econo-
mic concerns over social concerns.
However, as these essays reveal, it would be a profound mistake to assume that
the battle for gender equality has been won: progress has been spectacular in a
few areas, such as levels of education, but painfully slow in others, including sexual
balance in the various fields of education.
So what is to be done to accelerate progress and deliver true equality for all? Ge-
nerally speaking, the authors of these essays do not argue so much for a change in
priorities as for a sharper focus on specific issues and new tools to address them.
They maintain that policy-makers need to find new ways to tackle issues that have
long been a focus of gender equality policies at national and European level - such
as work-life balance, combating gender stereotypes, more equality in earnings and
fighting violence – as well as addressing others which may have been somewhat
neglected or overlooked up until now.
Work-life balance
Experts from outside the EU argue that generous work-life balance policies in Eu-
rope (part-time work, long parental leave, etc.) may have had both positive and
negative effects, boosting female employment in Europe but lowering the share
of high-quality jobs for women (Bertrand), and hindering the redistribution of hou-
sehold duties to men (Hirschmann), with women still shouldering a disproportionate
share of housework, working about eight hours a week more than men on paid and
paid work combined (Nadal). Looking at Europe from a US perspective, Bertrand and
Hirschmann therefore argue for a radical change of focus in work-life balance poli-
cies, targeting men as well as women and challenging the sexual division of labour
within households.
European experts contributing to this volume take a different view: they agree that
men should be targeted, but are more concerned about protecting the welfare in-
frastructure and benefits from erosion by austerity policies (Knijn, among others).
They also propose a different vision of work-life balance policies, with the focus on
investment in the social care sector (from health to personal care) and the provi-
sion of education (from kindergarten to university) as ‘productive’ investments that
create jobs, improve skills and increase the efficiency of social spending (Perrons).
A clear implication of all this is that the scope of work-life balance policies should
be enlarged rather than simply redesigned to accommodate men by, for example,
focusing more on care of the elderly given its growing importance as Europe’s po-
pulation ages (Nordstrom).
Female migration
The growing importance of employment in the care sector for growth and jobs
raises broader issues about the role and treatment of women migrants. Anderson
warns that although growing attention is being paid to women migrants in acade-
mic and policy circles, this has not been matched by full understanding and reco-
gnition of gender issues. At national or community level, some attempts have been
made since the 1990s to acknowledge specific hazards faced by female refugees
(such as violence) or specific grounds for claiming asylum (such as Female Genital
Mutilation). However, “…where progress had been made, it has tended to be in areas
associated with the vulnerability of migrant women”, such as violence in prostitu-
tion or economic exploitation in (non-professional) care work.
8
Introduction
The EU needs to consider the implications of such biases and review its policies
in light of this. Take the specific needs of those who do not fit the ‘victim’ stereot-
ype - skilled female migrants in particular. These needs are often ignored as if, for
example, the requirement to earn 1.5 times the average gross national salary to be
eligible for an EU Blue Card1 gives equal chances to male and female candidates, when this is
not the case because of gender pay gaps.
Stereotypes
Targeting men as well as women is also seen by the authors of these essays as
central to any attempt to combat stereotypes. This is seen as a goal in itself (Gresy),
and as a cross-cutting issue. For example, differences in the labour market beha-
viour of men and women are often rooted in social norms which feed on stereotypes
(Bertrand); stereotypes hamper the struggle for equal pay (Grimshaw); and stere-
otypes can be used to justify and tolerate violence against men (Hearn) as well as
against women (Lombard).
One common plea is for new policy tools to be considered in this area. How effective
have attempts to fight stereotypes in schools been over the past 20 years? Can we
simply count how often boys visit old people’s homes or girls attend technical wor-
kshops to assess progress? Paseka argues for a ‘gender professionalism’ strategy
for schools to overhaul existing policies. Edstrom makes a similar plea for pursuing
gender equality in and through the media, starting with the development of appro-
priate indicators at EU level.
The drive for equal pay and earnings has been at the core of European social policy
from the very beginning – and should remain there, according to the experts who
contributed to this publication, given that the gender pay gap has changed little over
the past 20 years. Grimshaw argues that the roots of this persistent imbalance lie in
the lower visibility and undervaluation of women’s work, stereotypical views about
careers, the low value added of some jobs typically held by women, etc.
Another equally important reason for maintaining the focus on this issue is that
the earnings gap has a sequel – the pensions gap – with studies showing that the
average gap in pension income between men and women is around 40% for the
EU-28 (Tinios). This is close to the 37% ‘Total gap in earnings’ that obtains for the
EU-27 when the earnings of all women of working age are compared to those of
men, including women and men working shorter hours or not working at all2. The
similarity between these two figures is striking.
Violence
The EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency surprised many Europeans in 2014 when it
published the results of its survey on the prevalence and distribution of violence
against women. Long regarded by many as a private affair, violence against women
has finally become a public issue (Lombard). Yet there is no European hard law co-
9
Introduction
vering forms of violence against women beyond sexual harassment and trafficking,
nor an EU directive covering protection, prevention, prosecution and partnership
(Krizsan). In the past, it was argued that the EU had no legal basis for acting in this
area, but this view is increasingly being questioned and the essays in this collection
discuss possible tools and options, from adoption of the Instanbul Convention to
taking inspiration from national legislation and practices.
Equality in decision-making
More than one contributor to this volume voices concerns that the gender equality
agenda has lost ground in the EU since the turn of the century, with the crisis and
austerity accelerating this trend (Perrons, Aseskog, Kantola). One specific argument
advanced to support this is the decision to move the European Commission’s Gender
Equality Unit from the Directorate-General for Employment to DG Justice which, it is
claimed, underlies a policy shift from a positive action and a social policy approach
to a narrower anti-discrimination approach ( with the notable exception of quotas).
A number of changes to EU governance are proposed to combat this trend, from a
shift of focus back to social policy to the launch of a new gender equality platform
tasked with pursuing, among other goals, systematic implementation of gender
impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation at national level – in short, a more
effective mechanism for gender mainstreaming.
Governance works well if it is supported from below. Are we sure that adequate
efforts are being made to enable European citizens to understand what is really
10
Introduction
meant by ‘gender equality’ and to support it? Kristoffersen, a right-wing mayor from
Norway, confesses that she was not interested in ‘gender equality’ until she entered
politics, but woke up to the issue when faced with the challenge of raising stan-
dards of living in her municipality. Based on her experience, she launches the idea
of developing practical, effective equality plans in each municipality to bring gender
equality issues to ordinary men and women, and particularly to young people, who
all too often take equality for granted. Right-wing parties, she pleas, should embra-
ce gender equality and not leave such issues to the left, saying: “Gender equality is
very simple: it is about taking away unfair obstacles so that everyone has the same
opportunities. Who can be against that?”
All the issues analysed in this publication underline the importance of effective
communications on gender equality issues, not only targeted at politicians and po-
licy-makers to ensure that this issue remains high on the agenda, and not just to
‘preach to the converted’ but to go beyond the ‘usual suspects’ to rally more people
to the cause and generate greater momentum for gender equality initiatives. It is
also important to use the right language when talking about gender and gender
equality, and to be aware of the different meanings of some common terms, such
an ‘economic independence’, when they are applied to men or women (Nordstrom).
Do we therefore need new terms to convey precisely what we are talking about?
One point of tension in the debate over gender equality is how to strike the right
balance between addressing this issue in a holistic way, given the many factors that
have an impact on gender equality such as age, ethnicity, class and the linkages
between different forms of discrimination, and ensuring that this does not result
in a weakening of the focus on gender equality, which risks downgrading and mar-
ginalising it as a political goal. It is crucial for Europe to get this balance right in
order to be able to develop effective policies to tackle the fundamental causes and
consequences of gender inequality in all its many facets, which can lead to multiple
discrimination, as highlighted in these essays.
Given estimates that it will take between 20 and 70 years to reach the goal of ge-
nuine gender equality at the current rate of change, it is obvious that more needs
to be done to build on the achievements of the past and accelerate progress in
future if the EU is to abide by its commitment to the fundamental principle of equal
treatment of men and women. To this end, both the EU as a whole and its member
states individually will need clear new strategies, targets and top-level commitment
to achieve this. This publication aims to provide some pointers as to what the core
elements of those strategies could be and thus to provide inspiration for policy-
makers as they begin work on the development of a new vision to guide action at
EU level post-2015.
11
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
Feminists have long argued for equality between the sexes, but women around the
globe still appear to be moving toward this goal too slowly, facing continuing dome-
stic and sexual violence, barriers to education and paid work, and multiple forms of
discrimination in the workplace.
Economic factors such as labour force participation and pay equity are particularly
discouraging: according to the World Economic Forum’s 2014 Global Gender Gap
Report, “the gender gap for economic participation and opportunity now stands at
60% worldwide, having closed by 4% from 56% in 2006.”
The diversity of inequalities experienced by women in different countries and cultu-
res has often led to arguments for equality among women, eliminating discrimina-
tion by categories of race, class, ethnicity and sexuality. But the struggle for sexual
equality emerged out of a more fundamental struggle - the struggle for freedom.
It was feminists of the European Enlightenment era such as Mary Astell (who asked,
referring to the theorist John Locke, “if all Men are born free, how is it that all Wo-
men are born slaves”?) who made this link between freedom and equality so clear
and strong (see Springborg, 1996: 18; 1997). In the following century, Mary Woll-
stonecraft argued for the abolition of laws restricting women’s control over property
as well as increased access for girls to education (see Brody, 1992) and Olympe
de Gouges (2003) attacked the male subjugation of women, arguing for rights of
divorce, property and the freedom of women to engage in public life and speech. In
the 19th century, Harriet Taylor went further, calling for far-reaching liberalisation
of divorce laws and even the abolition of marriage to enhance women’s freedom
from control by men (see Rossi, 1970).
These early European feminists set the tone for my argument in this essay: that we
need to shift the focus back to freedom if we want to succeed in the struggle for
equality; and the keys to this are new ways of tackling the unequal sexual division
of labour (SDL).
Freedom is a concept that covers a variety of gendered experiences, and a value
that has different meanings and significance for different women in different cultu-
res. However, this focus on the SDL might seem surprising: am I really saying that
‘the next big thing’ for the EU to address is simply ‘the same old thing’ dating back
12
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
3 States also provide “maternity” and “paternity” leaves upon the birth of a child, and these offer
women much more time than men. This is presumably because of the physical toll that pregnancy and
parturition take on women’s bodies. But such policies are closely tied to social biases about women’s
role as mothers; otherwise, the length of maternity leave would not vary so widely from country to
country, since average time of recovery is based on biology, not nationality. Furthermore, these same
gender differences in maternal and paternal leave persist in cases of adoption, where there is no need
for medical recovery. (Moss, 2014: 181).
4 For a cross country comparison see (Moss, 2014: 31-33).
5 Note that this is for parental leave, not paternity leave, which is minimal except in unusual cir-
cumstances such as the mother’s death, in which case the father may take up to three months at 80
percent of pay (Moss, 2014: 179).
13
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
total (although 90% of fathers do take leave, a dramatic increase over the past two
decades)6.
Such policy inequalities almost certainly perpetuate other inequalities in relation to
household labour. A recent European Commission report stated that “women spend
an average of 26 hours on care and household activities, compared with 9 hours
for men”, a reduction of three hours in the gap found earlier in the 21st century,
suggesting modest progress (European Commission, 2014a). This is comparable to
the US where (according to research funded by the National Science Foundation, the
National Time Use survey and other government data) women work 17-28 hours
per week in unpaid household labour versus 7-10 hours per week for men. In fact,
the NSF study found that marriage creates seven additional hours of housework per
week for women, while men spend less time on household labour after they marry
(Mixon, 2008; Pew Research Center: 2013 Ch. 5; Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2014).
Furthermore, men’s participation in household work often does not involve much
childcare: even unemployed fathers only spend 11 more minutes on caring (from
40 to 51 minutes per day), while mothers who do not work double their caring time
(from 74 to 144 minutes per day) (Veerle, 2011).
In both Europe and the US, these gender gaps in household work are significant
and certainly large enough to drive women into part-time labour, more frequent
and longer interruptions in labour force participation, and lower-status jobs offering
more flexible work hours, all of which have a serious negative impact on their life-
time earnings, job security and pensions in retirement. They also increase women’s
vulnerability to poverty in case of divorce, and this in turn creates an increased risk
of losing custody of their children, particularly if their ex-husbands remarry. This
may be less pronounced in the EU than the US and women do retain custody in most
divorced families - but often because men often do not seek it; when they do, they
often win, at least in the US (Gender Bias Study Committee of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, 1990: 745).
Returning to my opening theme of freedom, however, could it be that the differen-
ces in the allocation of household and childcare duties reflect the choices mothers
and fathers make? For example, many women still choose to be full-time wives and
mothers, so why wouldn’t they want to take more leave than men? What makes
this seem plausible is the even greater injustices that persist in the workplace for
women: inferior pay, inferior opportunities, sexual harassment, discrimination, etc.
Thus it may seem a ‘good choice’ to take more leave or be ‘just’ a wife and mother,
given the alternatives.
But injustice in one arena hardly ameliorates it in another. Indeed, many feminists
have noted that women’s unpaid work in the home directly affects their economic
prospects, not just by hampering their ability to compete for the better-paid jobs
(e.g. the need to accept part-time work, pressure to seek lower-status jobs to avoid
long hours), but also by directly affecting the economic value attached to the kinds
of work women do because they do it (with nurses paid less than doctors, childcare
providers less than firemen). (Abby, 2011: 65; Okin, 1989: 142-48).
Injustice in the family bleeds into every aspect of society, and particularly the labour
market: gender injustice is a complex and intricate network of inequalities in which
addressing one inequality does little or nothing to address the others, and indeed
6 See: Reeves (2011), and The Economist 22 July 2014. See also “Quick Facts: Childcare, Equality” at
https://sweden.se/quick-facts/parental-leave/. The data on parental leave in Sweden was not provided
in the Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum, 2014: 339), though Sweden was ranked fourth.
14
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
sometimes makes them worse (for example, when women promoted to managerial
positions have less leisure time than their male colleagues because they are still
doing most of the housework). (Hochschild, 2001)
As American political theorist Susan Moller Okin said: “Any just and fair solution to
the urgent problem of women’s and children’s vulnerability must encourage and
facilitate the equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of produc-
tive and reproductive labour.”(Okin, 1989: 5, 116, 149-154, 171, 176, 179) Such
injustice impacts on women’s freedom by restricting their options, socially coercing
them into specific duties, roles and ‘choices’. But how to bring about the necessary
redistribution of household labour eluded her.
That problem challenges any feminist concerned with freedom. Government incen-
tives to encourage men to do more housework hold some promise, although they
are of limited success. Sweden’s allocation of leave specifically for fathers, and
incentives to take it, has certainly led more men to do so and this model, which has
been adopted by some other EU countries, should be developed more aggressively.
But parental leave may not in itself lead to greater equity in the overall SDL, for
while Swedish men do more housework, the impact is underwhelming: official stati-
stics show that the time spent by women on domestic work fell from 32 hours per
week in 1974 to 19 in 1991, while among men, it increased from two to five hours;
and over the next decade, the time spent by men “hardly changed at all”, while
among women, it fell by another four and a half hours per week (Chronholm, 2007).
So the gap is declining, but not because men are doing more. Perhaps women are
‘letting things go’, being more efficient, relying on outside help (housecleaning, re-
staurants), or perhaps improved technology is having an effect. But the bottom line
is that inequality persists.
American philosopher Ann Cudd has a more radical suggestion: that women should
go on a housework strike, (Cudd, 1998) insisting on a 50/50 split in household and
childcare responsibilities. This idea, going back to early Marxist feminism, may ap-
pear naïve and simplistic. It is hard to see people you love as the target for a battle,
especially since women are socialised to be pliant and get along with others, not to
mention the risk of domestic violence. Moreover, it may presuppose a middle-class
heterosexual household.
That is why state support and incentives to draw men into greater participation in
household labour and childcare are so vital to back up women’s efforts. For what is
promising about Cudd’s idea is that it can give individual women the support and
strength to stand up to their partners - because as a strike, it is a collective action.
This is not enough by itself, but it may be what Elizabeth K. Markovits and Susan
Bickford call a “non-coercive nudge…to intervene in the feedback loop connecting
the gender division of labour with women’s inequality” (Markovits and Bickford,
2014: 83). When combined with the kinds of incentives Sweden is using, the “nud-
ge” of women’s demands in the family could be more effective.
This means that the EU needs to develop ways to encourage member states to
adopt strong gender equality values and put in place policies founded on the basic
truth that until men do an equal share of childrearing and housework, gender equa-
lity - and genuine freedom for women - will never be achieved.
15
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
“Equal pay for equal work is a founding principle of the European Union, but sadly is
still not yet a reality for women in Europe.” Former EU Justice Commissioner Vivia-
ne Reding made this remark on European Equal Pay Day - February 28 2014 - 59
days after the start of the year.
She chose this date to mark the end of a period in which, given the gender pay gap
(16.4% - EC, 2014a), women effectively work without pay. This gap is one indicator
of an unequal world in which, for instance, a CEO of one of the FTSE 100 firms in
the UK would only have to work one and a half days to earn the annual salary of an
average social care worker (High Pay Centre, 2014). These gaps reflect both rising
inequality and the persistence of gender inequality - conditions that result from the
pursuit of neoliberal economic policies and associated priority given to the economy
over society.
The scale of contemporary income and earnings inequality has generated widespre-
ad public concern, demonstrated by activist movements such as Occupy, and is now
evident among more orthodox world leaders, some of whom have called for a more
inclusive form of capitalism to ensure political and social stability and economic
growth.
In 2014, Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund,
pointed out that inequality is returning to levels not seen since the onset of the
1929 recession; Pope Francis tweeted that inequality was “the root of social evil”;
and European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker said that “it is not com-
patible with the social market economy that during a crisis, ship-owners and spe-
culators become even richer, while pensioners can no longer support themselves”
(EC, 2014b).
By contrast, gender inequality has not aroused the same degree of public interest,
even though women continue to be disadvantaged in the labour market, underre-
presented in decision-making and are more likely than men to experience domestic
violence (EC, 2014c). Indeed, women are, as Lagarde put it, “underutilised, under-
paid, under-appreciated and over-exploited”. What makes this situation in Europe
surprising is that there have been five decades of equality policies.
So why have gender equality policies not been more effective and what scope is
there for such policies in times of austerity? This essay addresses these questions
and argues that only by ensuring that the economy serves societies rather than vice
versa will it be possible to realise the EU’s objectives for sustainable and inclusive
development and make it more likely that gender inequality will be resolved.
Contemporary Europe is emerging slowly and unevenly from the deepest recession
ever recorded. Following a coordinated and expansionary response to the crisis in
2008, member states experienced a sovereign debt crisis and subsequently, from
2010 - simultaneously yet without collective co-ordination - embarked on austerity
policies to reduce the size of the public sector deficit and debt (Bettio et al 2012).
16
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
To meet the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact’s conditions (SPG), the public sector defi-
cit can be no more than 3% and public debt no greater than 60% of GDP. By 2013,
ten member states were still above the deficit guidelines and 16 above those for
debt. Potentially of greater potential concern is that public debt is rising in all but
two of the countries where it exceeds 60% of GDP (Germany and Hungary), as it is
for the EU as a whole (Eurostat, 2014).
Thus, while the deficit is falling, public debt continues to rise and for this reason
austerity policies continue to dominate the policy agenda even though feminist and
heterodox economists (Fukuda Parr et al., 2013; Stiglitz, 2012) have demonstrated
they are counterproductive for the economy. Such policies also make it very difficult
to secure social objectives for inclusion and gender equality.
What implications does this have for the future gender equality agenda?
Since the original Treaty of Rome, the EU’s commitment to gender equality has
waxed and waned over the years, being stronger in periods of economic growth and
labour shortage and withering away in periods of low growth, crisis and austerity
(Smith and Villa, 2013).
Perhaps the high point for gender equality policies was the decision in 2000 to
enshrine gender mainstreaming in the Lisbon Treaty, which requires that policies
and measures should “actively and openly take into account at the planning stage
their possible effects on the respective situations of men and women” (EC, 1996).
Subsequently, allegiance towards gender equality has weakened in both EU policies
and practice, as analysis of recent EU policy documents shows. Attention to gender
issues has become less effective than in previous decades, indicating that social
policies remain subordinate to economic ones especially the SGP.
This differential treatment rests on the neoliberal assumption that the economy and
economic policies are wealth-creating or productive while social policies are costly
and concerned with redistributing rather than creating wealth, and should therefore
be side-lined while policy focuses on the urgent task of dealing with the crisis and
restoring growth. In the EU Recovery Plan, for example, neither gender nor equality
were mentioned (Bettio et al., 2012). The idea that economic growth can be redistri-
butive or that social policy can be economically productive are consequently over-
looked (Perrons and Plomien, 2013) - and yet austerity policies are bad for growth
and, as discussed below, have marked gender impacts.
Given the different roles that women and men play in the economy, they have been
affected in different ways by the crisis and austerity. Men were more adversely af-
fected in the initial aftermath owing to their over-representation in the construction
and manufacturing sectors, but benefitted more from the subsequent expansionary
policies which focused on physical infrastructure.. By contrast, women are badly
affected by austerity policies owing to their over-representation in public sector em-
ployment, among users of public sector services and welfare claimants.
This seems to be the broad picture, though the experience of different countries
varies. In the UK the coalition government is seeking to do more than meet the EU’s
stability targets by completely eliminating the public sector deficit altogether and
reducing the level of government expenditure as a proportion of GDP to 35% – i.e.
to pre-welfare state levels (HM Treasury 2014). Yet House of Commons research
found that in the 2010 budget, 73% of the cuts in public expenditure fell on women
(see also WBG 2014). The groups that gain from these policies are those with higher
income who are largely immune from state welfare spending and creditors whose
17
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
incomes depend on a stable economy and low levels of inflation. This deflationary
bias has negative effects for employment and the well-being of the majority throu-
gh depressing demand.
So what alternatives are there and how can the EU help to ensure that the commit-
ments to gender equality and social inclusion more generally are not lost?
Clearly countries cannot run up government deficits and debt indefinitely, not least
because large amounts of public money would have to be spent on interest re-
payments to creditors. But there is no clear idea as to what a maximum should be,
and this would depend in part on what the debt was being used for – whether it was
generating returns in the future or whether it was being dissipated in unproductive
ways. There are, therefore, a number of ways in which fiscal space can be managed
and each of these have gender differentiated outcomes, see Box 1.
Thomas Piketty (2014: 499-541) points out that of the possible solutions to re-
solving public debt - privatisation of public assets, taxation, inflation or prolonged
austerity - the latter is “the worst solution in terms of both justice and efficiency”.
Europe has both the highest level of private wealth in the world, yet ironically also
the “greatest difficulty in resolving its public debt crisis”, which would not be so se-
vere had taxes on top incomes stayed at 1980 levels – around 80% in the UK and
closer to 60% in Germany and France.
The UK Women’s Budget Group also argues for increased taxes but recognises that
if gender equality policies are to be more effective, it is critical that they are deve-
loped within a gender sensitive macroeconomic framework, as otherwise gender
equality policies will always be palliatives rather than resolutions. This sentiment
has been voiced many times, but evidence is growing to support the analysis.
For a group of countries in both northern and southern Europe, Hannah Bargawi
and Giovanna Cozzi (2014) - using the CAM Cambridge-Alphametrics Model (CAM)
- show that a gender-sensitive macroeconomic scenario based on an expansion
of government investment and expenditure and targeted at female employment
would produce better outcomes in terms of EU economic and social objectives than
the ‘business-as-usual’ approach of pursuing austerity. More specifically, they find
that this would result in higher levels of employment, greater reductions in the em-
ployment differential between men and women, higher levels of economic growth
and a greater reduction in debt.
Instead of growing wealth for a few amidst rising inequality, this gender-sensitive
expansion thus provides sustainable growth that benefits the wider society. In their
model, the deficit also falls, albeit less than in the business-as-usual scenario, but
the gains elsewhere still suggest that the alternative model is preferable and more
sustainable (see also Antonopoulos and Kim, 2011).
Research on alternatives is therefore emerging. The EU’s key role is to be less blin-
kered in its economic thinking and to be open to the work and findings of feminist
and heterodox economists. It should also reinvigorate the gender mainstreaming of
policies and broaden this analysis in order to assess the impact on different social
groups, including class, race, and migrant status, to name but a few. To facilitate
18
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
this process, Eurostat should ensure that data is sufficiently gender differentiated to
facilitate gender budgeting.
What is clear is that the existing policies are not working and have extremely nega-
tive impacts on those already marginalised. By ensuring that the economy serves
society rather than being managed by a few for a few, the EU is more likely to reach
its objective for economic and social cohesion and greater gender equality.
Fiscal space can be defined in a number of ways. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) states that it is “room in a government’s budget that allows it to provide re-
sources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial
position or the state of the economy” (IMF cited by UNDP 2007). In this definition,
the needs of the economy are prioritised and these needs are determined by a
neoclassical view of the economy which advocates a small state, low deficit and
minimum taxation to allow maximum market flexibility.
By contrast, the United Nations’ Development Programme (UNDP) defines fiscal
space as the “financing that is available to government as a result of concrete
policy actions for enhancing resource mobilization, and the reforms necessary to
secure the enabling governance, institutional and economic environment for these
policy actions to be effective, for a specified set of development objectives” (UNDP
2007:1). This definition could be modified by gender mainstreaming to become:
19
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
20
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
I must be honest and confess that gender equality was not a topic that interested
me at the beginning of my political career. I was not passionate about it at all. It was
an issue that had long been ‘owned’ by the socialist parties and was often associa-
ted with radical 1970s’ feminists who were referred to often in the media and in di-
scussions. This was not a group that I could identify with – hence my lack of interest.
Then, in 2004, I received a report showing that my municipality was ranked the
fourth worst in Norway for gender equality. This aroused my competitive instincts
and marked the start of my engagement on gender equality and the challenges this
poses for living standards, even though it was still largely the preserve of politicians
from the left at that time in Norway. Now gender equality is a key issue for all
Norwegian parties, although we do not always agree on how to achieve it.
It is extremely important that both left- and right-wing parties pay attention to gen-
der equality. I have noticed a big change in public attitudes towards this issue. Those
who previously regarded work on gender equality as unnecessary and pointless now
see the importance of making it a priority. So my plea to all those working on this is-
sue is to do whatever you can to make conservative parties ‘pick up the ball’. If only
left-wing parties focus on this issue, we lose half of the population in Europe; right-
wing parties must also engage in gender-equality issues and be active in debates.
What disturbs me most is the portrayal of women as victims! I believe that it is es-
sential for women to take responsibility for their own lives: we need to see ourselves
as strong and resourceful people who can and will make a difference. It is a mistake
to see women as weaker members of society, as people who have to be helped and
looked after. Instead of angry voices talking about “poor” women, activists should
focus on facts, use all the good role models we have and show them to the world.
If young people never find female role models, how on earth can they believe that
it is normal for women to hold leading positions in business, in board rooms, in the
workforce or in politics. For me, it is important to use all our resources to the full,
which means that women also must contribute.
To do this, it is important to evaluate the current degree of equality in all countries
and municipalities. Only by focusing on facts can we show how important it is for
societies to give everyone equal opportunities.
Women in politics
Politicians have power and play an important role in society, so why don’t more wo-
men play an active part in politics? We need more women who are willing to make
a difference by getting involved at both the local and national level.
It is vital to involve members of nomination committees in this debate to make
them see the importance of getting women on to their party lists at election time.
My experience is that it takes time to persuade women to say yes: you have ask
them early in the process and explain why their experience and abilities make them
21
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
interesting for the party. It is a good idea to promise them a mentor if they agree to
be a candidate. What does not work well is simply calling them and assuming that
they will agree after a ten-minute chat on the phone. Men might do that – and they
seldom think that they are not good enough – but most women think that to beco-
me a candidate for elected office, they need to be experts on all political subjects.
This difference is both striking and sad.
Norwegian research tells us that women do not give more of their votes to other
women, but that may be because the men on the list are better known, are more
often in the newspapers and attract more attention. Or could the answer be that
we are used to grey-haired men with ties in politics and feel safer giving them our
votes?
There is no doubt that we have a job to do to explain why it is important that more
women stand for and get elected to public office.
Striving for power and leadership does not come naturally to many of us. We must
change these attitudes. We must cheer on success in politics and in the workforce,
not just in sports, if we are to have a robust workforce able to compete with the
rest of the world.
In the southern part of Norway, women are still expected to devote the majority of
their time to their families; to take most of the responsibility for taking care of their
homes, children, parents, in-laws etc. In reality, this means many women have two
full-time jobs and often fail to take any time out for themselves, with the conse-
quent risk of falling ill. In some cases, this may reflect their men’s lack of interest in
domestic responsibilities. In others, the women themselves may be partly respon-
sible by not allowing men into their home ‘domain’. If women are not willing to let
men take over some of their domestic responsibilities, then they are also responsi-
ble for men not contributing more on the home front.
22
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
Well-educated mothers can support their children better, whether in discussing im-
portant matters in life or helping them with homework, and can in general be better
role models than mothers who stay at home 24/7. In the south of Norway, many
women work part-time; having a full-time job is crucial to being entitled to better
welfare benefits: nine out of ten low-income pensioners in Norway are women. Sa-
lary, sick leave, maternity leave and pensions are based on income.
Having a job contributes to defining who you are, and it influences how others per-
ceive you. Society needs as many people as possible to contribute to maintain our
current levels of social welfare and the competitiveness of our businesses and in-
dustries. Those who are part of the work force are also more economically indepen-
dent: women who do not work or have part-time jobs, are for example, the financial
losers in a divorce. Women must understand the links between these issues.
23
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
There are many reasons why men can become interested in gender equality inclu-
ding, as Mike Messner discusses, to highlight and redress the costs of ‘being a man’;
to tackle differences amongst men; and to end male privileges (Messner, 1997).
These motives are not necessarily in conflict, but they may become so if taken to
their logical conclusion, for example, when only costs are emphasised and privilege
is forgotten.
First, the costs. These might include costs to some men’s health and life expectancy,
risks from occupational hazards and lower educational achievements. These are
especially important when coupled with disadvantages of class, ethnicity and other
inequalities. Being a patriarchal man is probably not good for your health. There
is also the key question of violence and sexual violence towards men and boys by
other men and older boys. There is a strong case for men to become more involved
in gender equality on all these grounds.
Next, differences. The motivation for engagement here comes from differences
amongst men: age, ethnicity, gender identity, migration status, sexuality, and much
more, as well as composite interests of, for example, black gay men or white older
24
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
men. Policies for men are developed in various areas, including fatherhood and
health and anti-violence programmes, but these may not recognise differences
between them. The very question of ‘what is a man?’ is becoming problematic, not
least because of increasing numbers of older and old men living lives that are a very
long away from the stereotypes of their masculine youth (Jackson, 2003; 2015).
From the perspective of ending male privileges, men’s involvement in gender equa-
lity means acting against oppression, injustice and violations of gender systems,
and seeking a better life for all - women, men, children. It suggests a need for pro-
feminist, (pro)-gay strategies across all policy areas. Rather than seeking to change
only those men defined as ‘problems’ or excluded, the focus may shift to men in
positions with the power to exclude and control. For example, anti-violence interven-
tions could be directed to ending men’s silence on these issues.
These three motivations may come from different directions, but they are not mu-
tually exclusive. There is much to be done to bring them together. In developing
effective policy responses, splits between ‘problems which some men experience’
and ‘problems which some men create’ need to be bridged (Hearn and Pringle,
2006/2009). An example is the link between men as fathers, and men as violent
partners or parents: in many countries, there may be policies to promote fatherhood
and then, quite separately, a policy to tackle violence by men. This gap needs to be
bridged.
According to recent research by Øystein Gullvåg Holter, greater gender equality is
likely to bring greater happiness, less depression, and better well-being not only for
women, but also for men, through better health and a reduced threat of violence
from other men (Holter, 2014). This refutes the argument of anti-feminist men who
suggest that greater gender equality harms men. Ending violence and the threat of
violence by men against men is a fundamental motivation for ending gender ine-
quality. Other benefits include positive impacts of increased love and care for and
from men, and less likelihood of nuclear annihilation and ecological disaster.
Men are not only men; boys are not only boys. So how are men’s relations to gen-
der equality, inequality gender discrimination to be understood? There may be rare
cases of discrimination against men by women, but much more common are men’s
negative treatment of other men for being gay, black, old, young, unmanly, and so
on. The disadvantages experienced by some men and boys largely results from
domination by other men.
Poorer outcomes for some men and boys are not the same as gender discrimina-
tion. Most inequalities that affect men and boys do not result from domination by
women. Lower educational performance by some boys, for example, results largely
from poverty, class, migration status and attitudes towards masculinity that are not
conducive (or are even antagonistic) to education.
Unequal social divisions – by class, race and religion – all have an impact on men.
Gender equality policies have to be pro-equality and anti-hierarchy more generally.
Though, in one sense, some forms of ‘gender equality’ can co-exist alongside power
hierarchies and inequalities, reducing wider inequalities generally promotes more
25
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
The ‘man problem’ and differences amongst men may remain obscured partly be-
cause so much policy is about men, but not recognised as such, partly because
explicit policies are at uneven stages of development. Strategies for change are
needed at all levels and in all forums: this means thinking about gender agendas
more broadly, in transport, trade, environment, security and foreign policy. While
gender policy around ‘domestic’ and interpersonal violence is well recognised, this
is less the case for civil disorder, terrorism, racist violence, riots, state violence, mi-
litarism and war.
The economic crisis has highlighted key biases in policy. Finance ministers, financial
boards, economists and banks have generally maintained a ‘strategic silence’ on
gender, even though their policies have an uneven impact on men and women. De-
flationary policies, policies based on assumptions of male breadwinners and public
spending cuts (rather than higher taxes) tend to affect men less than women. In
some countries, the crisis initially had a stronger impact on men’s employment, but
later more on women. Policies designed to boost economic growth without conside-
ring their overall impact tend to benefit men more than women overall, not least in
terms of the resources allocated by governments, investments and priorities. Men
tend to work in the capitalist sector more than women, and to identify more closely
with narrowly economic ideologies and less with welfare values.
Gender policies that are directed explicitly and specifically at men have been deve-
loped most fully when they address issues, such as men’s health and ‘domestic’ vio-
lence, that may appear as immediate and close to the individual. Such policies are
mostly framed within national welfarism concepts rather than within transnational
capitalism, global finance, or ecology frameworks. All the issues outlined above are
affected by transnational changes, raising the need for transnational strategies.
Internet and the use and development of ICTs create new challenges in this area.
Many transnational agencies now address, at least rhetorically, the place of men
in moving towards gender equality; the links between masculinity, nationalism and
racism; and the risks of failing to act. Taking transnational action to foster change
is essential, not least to counter transnational neoliberal hegemonies (Hearn, 2015).
Engaging men in gender equality means dealing with many contradictions, between:
the power and privileges of some men, and the marginalisation of others; the expli-
cit naming of men as men, and questioning the very category of ’men’ per se; seeing
gender in terms of binaries, such as masculinity/femininity, and as a continuum; and
26
PART 1: New frontiers: what should the next ‘big thing’ in gender equality policy be?
fostering changes in attitudes among men and boys to become more gender equal,
while supporting those who are suffering. Men and gender equality is neither a zero
sum game, nor a win-win situation.
Finally, even among men who oppose privileging one gender over another, there
are totally different notions of the aims of gender equality in the long term, never
mind among those who are anti-gender equality. To paraphrase Judith Lorber, is
the key task we face to introduce reforms and abolish gender imbalances between
women and men, to resist and abolish patriarchy as a general gender system, or to
be rebellious and abolish gender categories? (Lorber, 2005) Do we aim to celebrate,
transform or abolish ‘men’ as a category of gender power? These questions suggest
reasons for involving men in gender equality and very different futures for them.
27
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
It is now 40 years since the EU and its Member States drew up policies on equality,
with a mixture of regulations and incentives. Reality is very different, however.
In France, we still face the serious problem of the ‘20%’: 27% of pay discrimination
and while women account for over 50% of the population, they only make up just
over 20% of those in national politics, on boards of directors and media experts, and
only 20% of domestic tasks and part-time jobs are carried out by men.
There are still some inescapable paradoxes – a formidable incursion by women into
the labour market in the 20th century, with 83% of women aged 25 to 49 now in
work, but facing some deep-rooted inequalities: since the 1990s women’s access to
the labour market has been mainly related to an increase in part-time jobs ; there
has been an increase in job insecurity for women; a widening gap between qualified
and unqualified women; unbalanced parenthood7 as women devote an hour and a
half more each day to housework and parental duties than men, who never allow
domestic responsibilities to threaten their careers; and, the ultimate paradox, the
fact that there are more women than men graduating upon completion of their ini-
tial training, but their qualifications are less valued on the labour market.
Equality is making ambiguous progress, and this is quite clearly the result of a lack
of effectiveness in public policies on equality between men and women. To resolve
this, we must make a step change and modify our vision of the future.
Indeed, the imperative nowadays is to confront the systems of representation that
explain these opposing trends. Everything moves on as if our thought processes
were forged using two different brains: one modern, shouting ‘long life to equality’
loud and clear; and the other one archaic inciting us, albeit against our will, to re-
produce old systems of representation with the division of the sexes into traditional
social roles. Thus, we all put on ostentatious displays of seemingly discussing things
in an egalitarian manner – the only politically correct way to behave – while in fact
continuing to behave and act in a profoundly archaic way on a day-to-day basis.
The problem has to do with stereotypes which legitimise inequalities, with men and
women frozen in their respective complementary roles based on their expected be-
7 See the latest INSEE Working hours survey, for 2009 and 2010
28
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
29
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
human resources and communications are mainly given to women, thus reflecting
their ‘natural’ skills, while men continue to perform roles involving money, strategy,
and power, even though these skills have nothing to do with sex.
Are there obstacles in men’s paths as well? No, because despite growing desires
for a better balance in life, resistance to change remains very strong. But yes, in
the sense that the set of ‘masculine’ characteristics – competitiveness, control over
emotions, and exclusion of anything which is not ‘masculine’ – often creates exces-
sive behaviour in men, causing harm to others and to themselves. There is a high
price to be paid for hegemonic masculinity, so much so that this is now unleashing a
sense of double ‘dispossession’: in the professional sphere, which no longer delivers
the promises men expected and in which many resolute competitors are emerging,
i.e. talented women; and in the private sphere, where they must play a parental role
which has been weakened by their absence.
For men and women to be considered equal, they must be able to do the same
jobs, as differences between the sexes do not necessarily imply any differences
in aptitude and skills. Yes, there are biological and physiological differences which
mean that male and female bodies behave, reproduce and approach each other in
different ways (thus children learn about ‘otherness’, which gives them feelings of
both power and frustration, of incompleteness and interdependence). But this does
not mean differences in aptitudes, qualities, and skills moulded and legitimised by
these types of ‘male’ or ‘female’ labels – mere social constructions which are often
presented as facts of nature. Is emotion female and rigour male? Certainly not. Ri-
gour is rigour, and varies from one individual to another, depending on the learning
process and their talents.
So, here as elsewhere, only a systematic approach can have an impact on both
real inequalities and the rigidity of systems of representation. Four levers may be
activated:
1. Offering sufficient, flexible, quality, and affordable childcare and, more broadly,
services for families, provided by either public bodies or private companies.
2. The fostering of parental equality by public bodies and companies, as well as
promoting the concept of lifelong parenting, thus breaking or challenging the
stereotype of mothers unavailable for work, and developing new ways for pa-
rents to allocate responsibility for different tasks. Enabling men to take paterni-
ty leave without facing criticism, or (even better), introducing childbirth leave –
a month for each parent, non-transferable – and shortening paid parental leave
at a given percentage of previous pay for a number of months which cannot
be transferred to the other spouse, are just some of the pathways which could
contribute towards increased acceptance of parenthood in the world of work.
There are two components to this as far as companies are concerned: firstly,
that of time, especially the management of day-to-day time – meeting times,
responses to emergencies, flexi-time, time–banking schemes, and recourse to
teleworking or part-time working with the necessary contractual patterns; and
secondly, that of career management – skills assessment, done nowadays using
so-called ‘neutral’ criteria which are de facto male ones (presenteeism, linear
career structures, detection of potential at about the age of 30) must be recon-
sidered from the standpoint of parenthood, for both men and women.
30
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
3. Promoting diversity in companies, to smash both glass ceilings and glass walls:
the logic of quotas must be applied to boards of directors and quantified objec-
tives set for the progression of under-represented sexes throughout the gover-
nance chain, as well as in recruitment and training. To smash glass walls, there
needs to be a drive to revalue professions that are dominated by women, and
reassess the way they are graded. And judges themselves, through the jurispru-
dence they develop on sex discrimination law and the concept of equal pay for
the same employment or work of equal value, can ensure that companies fulfil
their responsibilities in relation to equality.
4. Challenging representational systems and driving out (from birth but especially
in schools) anything which encapsulates so-called ‘male’ and ‘female’ beha-
viour. It is essential to fight the helplessness instilled into girls and boys, to do
away with the moulding which resigns girls to dressing up and playing mother,
and boys to clambering about and figuring things out. So, for women, the ur-
gency lies in unashamedly challenging male and female labels on everything
related to aptitudes, qualities and social skills, to dare to train in any area where
there are opportunities and they want to work, to seek role models other than
top models, and to learn to confront and relate to others, and negotiate a fair
division of labour. As for men, they must throw themselves fearlessly into le-
arning emotional literacy and becoming domesticated, without falling into an
exhausting daily adjustment in how responsibilities are shared.
Because ultimately, whether you are a man or a woman, you must learn to make
good use of people’s inability to be everything; somehow, it is not in the least about
being preoccupied with whether you are a man or a woman, but rather being an
individual connected to others. It is about negotiating a viable economic contract
which relies on both provision of and support for care, and a new sexual contract
between men and women.
31
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
There is a long-standing consensus within Europe that women and men should
receive equal pay for work that is considered to be the same or of equal value. This
principle of ‘equal pay’ was enshrined in the EU’s 1957 Treaty of Rome, and the ac-
companying directives - introduced in the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s - were incorporated
into the single Equal Opportunities Directive of 2006.8
Alongside rising employment rates and greater equality in structures of care, welfa-
re and households, women in many EU member states have undoubtedly benefited
from significant progress towards equal pay. However, there are no grounds for
optimism in the current economic and political climate. Indeed, the current path of
European development appears deaf to Amartya Sen’s advice that the freedoms
required for women and men to enjoy equal, participative and healthy lives are
constitutive of economic development rather than a luxury to be set aside during
periods of economic uncertainty (Sen, 1999: 35-53). Furthermore, too many mem-
ber states have failed to shake off their institutional and cultural legacies of a
strong male-breadwinner approach to women’s position in society. Without radical
changes in their gender regimes, (Pascall and Lewis, 2004; O’Connor et al., 1999;
Lewis, 1997) policies addressing pay transparency and gender-neutral job evalua-
tion systems will not achieve equal pay.
Four issues demand urgent policy action. All four are endemic across much of Eu-
rope and exert a seemingly intractable stranglehold on efforts to build a European
society that promises women and men the freedom to earn equal pay.
8 The 2006 Directive (2006/54/EC) merged previous Directives, in particular the 1975 and 1976
Directives on equal pay and equal treatment (regarding access to employment, training, promotion
and working conditions).
9 This definition and the description of ‘the five Vs’ of undervalued work are adapted from Grimshaw,
and Rubery (2007): 7 and 58-64.
32
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
The Great Recession and subsequent austerity regimes have had a radical impact
on equal pay in Europe, by reducing the scope and scale of the welfare state (Bettio
et al., 2012; Karamessini and Rubery, 2013; Leschke and Jepsen, 2014). Two pillars
of current European macroeconomic policy have caused particular damage to equal
pay: public spending cuts and reduced welfare benefits.
Public spending cuts put new obstacles in women’s path to equal pay both by redu-
cing good employment opportunities in the public sector and by cutting pay in jobs
with high concentrations of women. In many member states, fair pay for public sec-
tor jobs (underpinned by gender-neutral job evaluations and collective negotiation)
has been ideologically re-interpreted as an undeserved premium. Instead of rooting
out persistent sex discrimination in the private sector, policy-makers have tended to
use the private sector as a benchmark and unilaterally implement public sector pay
cuts.10 In countries where the public sector has not traditionally been regarded as
a source of decent pay, public sector cuts have had an especially damaging effect
on moves towards equal pay by reversing the limited progress made (see Box 2).
Cuts in welfare benefits have lowered women’s ‘reservation wage’ - that is, their
freedom to either wait or bargain for better working conditions. Countries with lo-
wer welfare benefits support larger stocks of low-wage ‘junk jobs’ - and the greater
the incidence of low-wage jobs, the wider the gender pay gap.11 Cuts in eligibility
33
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
for unemployment insurance and income assistance disadvantage women, who are
already less likely to be entitled to welfare support, and increase their risks of low-
quality employment.
In a context of falling or stagnant real wages across Europe.12 there is a risk that
gains in gender equality result from a levelling down of men and women’s pay. For
the EU as a whole, the gender pay gap narrowed from 17.6 to 16.4 points during
the initial crisis period (2007-2010), with significant gains in ten member states.13
However, as Bettio and colleagues put it, “the recession is making everybody worse
off, men a little more so than women” (Bettio et al. 2012: 99): men were more likely
than women to suffer cuts in bonuses and overtime, and private sector job losses hit
men more than women. This pattern may have changed since 2010, with austerity
in most of Europe contributing to continuing reductions in real wages, possibly af-
fecting women more than men (see Box 3).
The gender pay gap in the UK has narrowed in the last decade, but should be
interpreted in light of trends in real average pay (adjusted for inflation). Pre-
crisis (2003-2009), women and men benefited from rising real earnings and
the gender pay gap narrowed by almost four points (see figure). Post-crisis
(2009-2013), real wages fell for both sexes and the gender pay gap narrowed,
but at a slower rate. Real pay in 2013 was around 8% lower for men and 6%
lower for women than in 2009.
£18.00
24
£17.00
22
Gender pay gap (percentage points)
£16.00 20
Real average hourly pay
18
£15.00
16
£14.00
14
£13.00
12
£12.00 10
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
12 See evidence in the ILO’s Global Wage Report 2014/15, Figures 1.5 and 1.6.
13 A significant gain is defined here as a reduction in the pay gap by more than one percentage point
and occurred in Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Sweden, Cyprus, Denmark, the UK
and Malta (in rank order), see Bettio et al. (2013), table 2.1.
34
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Across much of Europe, working mothers suffer a wage penalty over and above
that for being a woman: mothers earn less on average than women without de-
pendent children and far less than fathers with similar household and employment
characteristics.14 The evidence raises fundamental questions about member states’
capacity to deliver a fair distribution of income that can support the reproduction
and rearing of children.
The size of the motherhood wage penalty varies, with evidence that it is lower in
Sweden and Finland than in Germany and the UK, for example (Harkness and Wal-
dfogel, 2003). These penalties continue even after children become adults: research
suggests that although fathers’ earnings are unaffected by childbirth, mothers ex-
perience cumulative and persistent wage inequality over their lifetimes. The fact
that gender gaps widen with age in many member states suggest that mothers may
not be able to make up for lost ground and become trapped into careers with limited
pay/promotion opportunities.
Further research for different European countries is needed, but the available evi-
dence identifies key factors that influence motherhood wage penalties: a mother’s
age when her first child is born, low levels of education, short maternity leave, retur-
ning to full-time work and employment in a male-dominated workplace.15 Moreover,
a country’s welfare state regime plays an over-riding role, especially via family
support policies (leave arrangements, childcare, flexible working and informal family
security) and the tax treatment of second earners.
Women’s entitlement to work for equal pay with men ought to be re-instated as a
core goal of European development rather than a luxury dependent on economic
growth. Reflecting the issues outlined above, European policy-makers ought to com-
mit to:
1. Develop programmes of accreditation and professionalisation for targeted are-
as of undervalued women’s work (e.g. childcare, care for the elderly, clerical
work).
2. Halt fiscal retrenchment programmes to avoid the adverse equal pay effects of
cuts in public sector jobs, pay and welfare.
3. Ensure wage growth is distributed fairly to lower-paid workers (e.g. by raising
the statutory minimum wage and encouraging collective bargaining in low-wa-
ge sectors).
4. Strengthen family policies to support mothers’ pay and employment prospects,
and counteract stereotypical expectations about their commitment at work.
14 Examples of the many studies on this issue include Davies and Pierre (2005); Ejrnæs and Kunze
(2013); Joshi et al. (1999).
15 For a review of international literature see Grimshaw and Rubery (2015).
35
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
The key battles for gender balance were fought and (mostly) won in the field of
employment. As the population ages and increasing numbers of women complete
their careers, will these victories carry forward into retirement? Or will women born
in the 1950s discover that the independence they achieved while working may be
denied them in old age?
Independence is a loaded concept and certainly cannot be confined to financial
indicators. Nevertheless, being able to claim title to a steady income is, for many
people, the decisive step in securing economic independence. It is for this reason
that our focus when looking at working lives is on work discrimination and pay gaps.
Has the battle for independence already been won? Pensions as a filter
Once individuals leave employment, labour earnings are replaced by pensions. Whi-
le it is true that savings play a role, a pension is the main source of income that
comes with a ‘gender tag’ attached. Moreover, when men and women are living
together as couples, we are not able to ‘look inside the household’ and see who is
the true beneficiary of income paid to that household, such as rents or dividends.
Poverty and other well-being statistics can thus only treat this kind of income as
accruing to men and women equally. So, if we are to deal seriously with the issue of
the economic independence of older women, we must take a close look at how they
are treated by the pension system.
Pensions replace earnings from work when attachment to the labour market is se-
vered. So it is not surprising that many people assume that gender balance in the
labour market should somehow translate into pensions. The implicit conclusion may
be that this issue has already been dealt with and there is no point in fighting the
battle twice over: if women were able to secure better conditions at work than their
mothers, their pensions would be equivalently better, as a matter of course. Time
should be working in their favour.
However, pensions may not be a neutral filter. If the world of pensions has chan-
ged less than the world of work, then it is possible that some women may get an
unpleasant surprise when they retire: they may enjoy less freedom than men and
possibly less than they think they deserve. As a growing number of women are on
the threshold of finding out, the relative silence and lack of debate in this policy
area could be taken to mean that this fear is deemed by most to be far-fetched.
Is it, though? In a book published in 2015 (Betti et al., 2015), some ENEGE members
attempted to approach this question systematically, looking at the EU, Israel and
the US. They created and defined a Gender Gap in Pensions indicator to shadow the
more familiar gender earnings and pay gap measures. This new indicator measures
how far women are lagging behind men; i.e. the percentage by which women’s ave-
rage pensions are lower than men’s.
36
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Their conclusion is that pensions are anything but a neutral filter reflecting what
happened while a person was in employment. For a start, pension gaps were found
to be very wide (the EU average was 39%) - far wider than earnings gaps and twice
the size of pay gaps (Figure 1). Moreover, whilst being very dispersed, the link to pay
gaps was weak: the country with the lowest pension gender gap (Estonia) was also
the one with the second widest pay gap. So, while a wide pay gap is associated with
greater gender inequality in pensions, the link is not automatic. The heterogeneity
across Europe was also striking. In some countries (e.g. Malta, Spain, Belgium and
Greece), gaps in coverage remain – i.e. there are women with no access to pensions
at all. In those countries with a developed occupational pension system, access to
supplementary pensions appears to add to gender gaps. Similarly, trends over time
and across age groups (those aged 65-80 and 80-plus) were complex and hard to
generalise.
46 44
48 41 41 40 39
40 37 37 37 34 34
33 33 32 31 31
30 29 28 27
32 27 24
23
24 18 16
15 15 14 12
16 11
8 3
0
8
6
16 11 9
15 16 16 18 14 16 14
24 19 21 20 21 19 18 18 17
20 20 22 22
24 23 24 23 23 24
32 27
31 30
40
Gender Gap (%) in Pension: Pensioners aged 65+ Gap in annual earnings
Source: Betti et al 2015, p 41. Based on EU-SILC 2011; Structure of Earnings Survey 2010. Note: Estimate for the
GGP in Ireland is based on 2010 data.
Wide national variations may reflect institutional factors, both those of the past and
the attempts that have been made to change them through pension reform. As a
result of all this, two apparently simple (and critical) questions proved difficult to
answer: do older groups who faced more discrimination in their working lives face
wider pension gaps? And is pension reform widening or narrowing those gaps over
time?
Complexity is inevitable. The pensions drawn by today’s older citizens are the cumu-
lative result of three types of factors.
First, pensions are affected by long-term societal trends. Today’s pension rights
result from yesterday’s work, and we know that emancipation in the labour market
and the decline of the male breadwinner paradigm proceeded at different paces
across Europe. Operating in the opposite direction, labour market innovations such
as part-time or contract working have also spread at different speeds.
37
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Second comes the role of policy-driven change. Today’s pensions reflect the impact
of past reforms. As the busiest reform period has been since 2000, today’s pensio-
ners are mostly covered by transitional arrangements: they have worked under one
system and will collect their benefits under a new system which is now being set up.
These transitional generations are ‘stuck in the middle’, being protected neither by
the logic of the old system nor the new. This exposes them to discretionary policy
change. Younger pensioners in countries that reformed early will test the new sy-
stems. They will confront new risks whose social impact is not yet fully understood.
The third set of influences are short-term conjunctural changes, often linked to the
impact of the current financial crisis. Public pensions are one of the largest catego-
ries of public expenditure and can be a target of fiscal retrenchment, while private
pre-funded pensions have been hit by the fall in asset values.
As these changes sweep through society, older people - and particularly older wo-
men - may all too often find they are the victims of a kind of ‘collateral damage’;
i.e. they may suffer the unintended consequences of policies whose primary impact
is thought to be elsewhere. This vulnerability is exacerbated by three gaps in awa-
reness: in statistics, pensions are often a kind of ‘gender blind spot’; in politics, older
women frequently lack a voice; and in policy-making, very technical discussions can
lead to gaps in understanding.
These awareness gaps obscure three types of pension issues, each with different
implications for pension policies.
First, issues related to the extended periods of transition: homemakers may, for in-
stance, rely on derived pension rights from their spouses and women are frequently
among those called on to make the largest adjustment.
Second, the design features of new pension systems: there are aspects of reform
which may be desirable in principle, but end up exacerbating disadvantages that
endemically affect women. Linking benefits more closely to contributions promotes
efficiency, but exacerbates the problems caused by, for example, broken careers or
the ‘motherhood penalty’. Survivors’ pensions run counter to the individualisation
of rights, but could translate into unanticipated falls in living standards for widows.
Third, flaws in the new systems: in some cases, the new arrangements may not
work as foreseen. An example of this could be the extent to which the three pillars
of pension protection complement each other: individually negotiated (third pillar)
pensions ought to help individuals with inadequate cover in work-related pensions,
but we often see the personal pension industry concentrating on groups already well
covered and turning its back on less fortunate groups. ‘Navigating’ the new systems
may also require a degree of financial sophistication that is lacking.
As state systems are increasingly being supplemented by private or collective pro-
vision, issues linked to how the new systems operate could lead to new types of
gender pension gap. In the US, access to non-state (401k) pensions is becoming the
most important determinant of gender pension gaps.16
16 This is largely corroborated in those European countries where occupational provision has pro-
ceeded furthest Betti et al. (2015).
38
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Writing in the 1960s, Simone de Beauvoir said the fact that “speculation upon old
age is considered primarily in terms of men” could prevent women from realising
the potential of the last age as “a kind of liberation – when at last they can look
after themselves” (de Beauvoir, 1996). Fifty years on, ‘gender blindness’ may be put-
ting this potential at risk once again. Lack of awareness of the gender implications
of pensions could allow multiple disadvantages to snowball for older women.
In years to come, some women may feel more constrained once they reach old age
and a few may even be severely affected. Exactly where and for whom such threats
are greatest cannot at this stage be determined with any degree of certainty. The
challenge for European countries is firstly to monitor pension gender imbalances
and then to help prepare a policy toolbox to deal with them. In the past, the EU has
taken a leading role in both gender balance and in ageing; it is only right that it
should now help to fix our policy radar screens on gender and ageing.
39
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
40
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Figure 2 shows the average hours per week devoted to paid and unpaid work by
those in work in 2010, and reveals that women devote more time than men to paid
and unpaid work combined (with the sole exception of the United Kingdom). So if
we consider leisure time as what is left over after work – paid or unpaid – then it is
clear that women have less leisure time than men.
Figure 2. Average hours per week devoted to paid and unpaid work, by
gender and country
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Men Women
Source: European Working Conditions Survey 2010. Averages are obtained as average value to the question “Num-
ber of hours spent in paid and unpaid work per week”.
The general narrowing of the gender gap in leisure time has been accompanied by
the gradual incorporation of women into the labour market, which is itself a result
of increased levels of education among women and their growing economic inde-
pendence from men. However, there are distinct differences in leisure time from
country to country. Figure 1 shows that the gap is comparatively small in Austria,
Belgium and France (less than 10 hours per week), and more significant in the Czech
Republic, Ireland and Spain (more than 10 hours per week).
In all countries, the main reason for this gender inequality is the time spent on hou-
sehold tasks (e.g. housework, and paid child and adult care). Figure 3 shows that in
almost all EU member states, the time devoted by women to paid work is lower than
that by men (with the sole exception of Romania). If women devote more time to
paid and unpaid work combined, it is because they spend much more time on hou-
sehold tasks than men. Thus, they are shouldering the bulk of the responsibility for
household duties even though they are also in paid work, contributing to the gender
inequality in leisure time.
41
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Figure 3. Average hours per week devoted to paid work, by gender and
country
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
Men Women
Source: European Working Conditions Survey 2010. Averages are obtained as average value to the question “Num-
ber of hours spent in paid work per week”.
Table 2 shows the change in the amount of time devoted to paid and unpaid work
in Spain from 2002 to 2009, for men and for women. Clearly, the gender gap in
these activities has increased. Generally speaking, when men become unemployed
they do not take on extra household tasks, especially in Mediterranean countries,
because of deeply-entrenched and gender-based divisions of household labour. So,
when the onset of the economic crisis in 2007-2008 destroyed a large number of
jobs, the women who found themselves out of paid work devoted part of the extra
time they now had available to housework, while men in the same situation spent
more time on leisure activities.
Total work, mean hours per week Year 2002-03 Year 2009-10
42
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Men Women
Source: European Quality of Life Survey 2011-2012. Percentages are obtained as the percentage of people repor-
ting “Little or no stress” to the item related to “Stress due to work-life balance issues”.
43
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
44
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
45
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
58 to 63%. Since then, it has remained flat. The participation rate among men has
fallen since the 2008 financial crisis from 78 to 75%. The gap between women and
men has thus continued to decrease to some extent.
However, almost one-third of women who have a job work part-time, compared
with only 8% of men. This is partly due to women taking more responsibility for
household duties than men do. On average, working women in Europe spend 26
hours a week on unpaid care-giving, compared with nine hours for the average
working man.
The difference between the sexes has narrowed, but this is more due to women de-
voting less time to unpaid work than to men spending more time on it (in 2005, wo-
men spent 28.9 hours on unpaid work and men spent 8.5 hours). Women have, for
example, reduced the time they spend caring for children, which probably reflects
the EU’s efforts to extend the provision of childcare. The percentage of children in
childcare has increased, from 81% of those aged three and older in 2007 to 86%
in 2011 and from 26% of under-threes to 30%.
The trend is in the right direction, but it is slow and there are very significant diffe-
rences between countries. The reason for this, in my opinion, is a failure to take a
holistic approach to the provision of care. Attention is now being paid to this issue,
but the various elements do not tally. For example, how is childcare to be managed
when parental benefits end after eight months under the Parental Leave Directive if
there are only places in childcare once a child reaches the age of three?
Another important piece of the puzzle that has been missing from the analysis to
date is care for the elderly. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) has shown that the more of a country’s public resources are
devoted to caring for the elderly, the more women aged 55-64 are in paid work.
The provision of care for the elderly, like childcare, makes it possible for those with
such responsibilities to have a job. In Sweden, the significance of care for the elderly
for gender equality became clear after the economic crisis in the 1990s, when re-
sources for this decreased relative to needs. More relatives had to take on greater
responsibility and the burden fell, above all, on the middle-aged daughters of el-
derly parents. These women were worn out, reduced their working hours or gave up
paid work completely. The Swedish example shows the clear connection between
the provision of care for the elderly and economic independence for women.
Another piece of the puzzle that is often overlooked is how tax systems and family
policies can be designed to support gender-equal economic independence. Several
European countries have tax systems and policies for supporting families that are
based on the single breadwinner model: for example, joint taxation of spouses’
incomes, tax deductions for housewives or allowances for child-raising. This crea-
tes economic incentives that conflict with efforts to foster gender-equal economic
independence and must ultimately be changed if this objective is to be achieved.
A third piece of the puzzle is the value assigned to the provision of paid care. This
needs to be upgraded to reflect the qualified work that it is. The quality of childcare
and care for the elderly is closely associated with staff conditions. Sufficient time
and continuity are needed to build up the relationships that good care requires. The
provision of paid care today is a sector dominated by women, so pay and conditions
in the caring occupations are also of great importance for enabling women to be
economically independent.
In several countries, mixed systems are now being created where support for the
single breadwinner model continues alongside new measures that make it easier
46
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
for citizens both to support themselves and to take responsibility for caring for
others. However, these have so far failed to have significant impact and stratified
societies are being created in which middle-class women achieve economic inde-
pendence, but the reforms have no effect on working-class women.
The EU institutions’ role in the drive for a more equal and gender-equal Europe is
not without problems. Different countries have different traditions and it is difficult
to implement reforms at EU level that can be widely accepted and have a serious
impact on traditional gender roles and attitudes towards family life.
One key area for action is to support investments in social infrastructure that make
it possible to combine paid work with care-giving responsibilities. Apart from in-
vestments in more childcare provision, the EU also needs to support investment in
care for the elderly. These investments are at least as important for Europe’s eco-
nomic growth as investments in physical infrastructure such as railways or digital
networks.
The European Commission should also begin analysing how the various pieces of
the tax and family policy puzzle fit together. Key EU statistics on employment ra-
tes, differences between women and men’s working hours, and the percentage of
children in childcare need to be supplemented by a holistic approach to the provision
of care. This does not need to be exactly the same in each country, but all countries
should be able to answer key questions about, for example, how the transition from
paying benefits to parents to stay at home with their children to providing those
children with a place in childcare works. Governments also need to consider whe-
ther the tax system and/or support provided for families conflicts with the drive for
gender-equal economic independence.
Box 4. Average time spent by women and men active on the labour
market on paid and unpaid work.
70
60
50
34
40
30 41
1
20
13
10 1
12 3
5
0
Women Men
47
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
80
70
SE
Employment rate for women aged 55-64år
R² = 0.5749
60
50 FI
UK DK
PT DE
40
IE NL
CZ
30 FR
ES LU
AT BE
EL HU
20
IT
PL
10
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Middle-aged women’s gainful employment and public resources for elderly care as percentage of GDP in a
number of EU countries 2005-2007. Sources: EUROSTAT, OECD
48
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Everyone is talking about immigration. Globally, the story is one of unparalleled mo-
vement and huge demographic change driven by both international and rural-urban
migration. In Europe, fears of an overwhelming influx of the world’s poor and de-
sperate have contributed to turning the Mediterranean and certain border-crossing
points into graveyards. But the proportion of people who move internationally (ap-
proximately 3% of the world’s population) has long been stable. What has changed
are the meaning, significance and make-up of mobility.
A crucial development has been that women are no longer rendered invisible in
the migratory process. Their movement - as workers, as refugees, as partners,
dependants and students - is now firmly on the agenda. While this is often referred
to as the “feminisation of migration”, the fact is that women and girls have always
moved: what has been “feminised” is the debate about migration (Shrover and Mo-
loney, 2013).
Like any social process, migration is deeply gendered and women’s motivations,
constraints and opportunities for moving can differ in important ways from those
of men. The economic and social relationships that migration engenders for women
and men may also be differently shaped and experienced. This recognition is itself
an achievement in migration/asylum regimes, where gender was for decades ren-
dered invisible by the assumption that asylum-seekers and migrant workers were
men and dependant spouses were women.
The legal framework for the protection of international refugees was established at
the end of the Second World War, a time when the gendered implications of these
kind of policies was largely ignored. In the 1990s, this led to changes in asylum
regimes and attempts to make them more sensitive to violence against women
and gender-based persecution (UNHCR, 1995; UNHCR, 1997), and to mitigate insti-
tutionalised discrimination and gendered assumptions inherent in asylum decision
making procedures (Dumper, 2004).
Across Europe, women account for approximately one-third of asylum claims
(Asylum Aid, 2012), and recent years have seen the development of multiple in-
ternational and European standards and guidelines on gender and asylum. The
European Refugee Fund has undertaken a number of initiatives to facilitate gen-
der equality in the asylum process, and the European Refugee Legal Framework
acknowledges the existence of gender-related persecution and the importance of
countries having gender-sensitive processes.
Some EU member states have issued their own guidelines to help decision-makers
take account of the gender dimension of claims and in some (but not all) member
states, gendered forms of harm such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM ) can be
recognised as a form of persecution. As the Asylum Aid Annual Report 2012 stated:
“There is a common understanding that the refugee definition can encompass gen-
der-related asylum claims and that the purpose and object of the Refugee Conven-
tion require a gender-inclusive and gender-sensitive approach. However, there are
vast and worrying disparities in the way different EU States handle gender-related
asylum claims.”
49
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
50
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
17 European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2014 on undocumented women migrants in the Eu-
ropean Union available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2014-0068+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
51
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Women are less likely to participate in the workforce then men in virtually every
country around the world. In 2010 in the US, about 75% of women between 25
and 54 years old were in the labor force (compared to 90% of men); in other OECD
countries, the equivalent figure is 80% for women (compared to 92.5% for men).
This gender inequality in labor force participation is accompanied by even larger
gender disparity in earnings and occupational prestige among those employed.
Across the OECD, men are much more likely than women to hold higher earnings
managerial and professional jobs. While gender differences in educational achieve-
ment used to play a large role in explaining gender differences in economic success,
this is no longer the case today. In fact, what used to be an education deficit for
women has now turned into an education deficit for men in most of the developed
world. Rapidly aging nations face an urgent need to engage more women in the
labor market and make better use of women’s under-tapped and growing skill pool
if they want to insure their future economic success.
It is by now well accepted that one of the major (if not the major) hurdles towards
greater gender equality in the labour market are strong remaining imbalances in the
allocation of non-market work between the genders. Women remain the primary
provider of home production work, and the primary caregiver for young children and
elderly within their households. Differences in earnings trajectories between career-
oriented women and career-oriented men can be timed to the arrival a child. The
child penalty for professional women in the business, finance and legal sectors of
the economy appears particularly large as these sectors of the economy are cha-
racterized by long hours and inflexible schedules that are difficult to reconcile with
the need to also provide for the home or the family.
The European Union has been much more aggressive than the US in introducing
policies to address the remaining gender inequality in labour market outcomes.
Quotas for women in business have gained traction in Europe. In 2003, Norway was
the first country to pass a law requiring 40% representation of each gender on the
board of directors of publicly limited companies. Following Norway’s lead, Spain,
Iceland, Italy, Finland, France, and the Netherlands have all passed similar reforms.
In November 2013, the European parliament voted in favour of a proposed draft
law that would require 40% female board members in about 5,000 listed compa-
nies in the EU by 2020.
My own research on the Norwegian experience suggests that this particular policy
should not be viewed as a magic bullet. On the positive side, the policy did result in
more equal boards, not just in terms of its mechanical effect on the relative number
of men and women on the board, but also in terms of the relative competence of
male and female directors. Despite businesses’ main lobbying argument against
the policy being that they would not be able to find enough qualified women to
serve, the women appointed to the boards after the reform looked if anything more
qualified than the (very few) women that were serving before. The pay gap with
male counterparts on boards narrowed from about 38 percent to about 30 percent.
Moreover, female board members post-reform were actually better-educated than
the pre-reform cohort and had MBA degrees on par with the male board members
(Bertrand et al., 2014). On the other hand, we did not find much evidence that the
52
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
policy had any effects beyond its direct impact on board composition, and hence the
number of women affected ultimately remained extremely limited. We observed no
evidence of trickle-down of the reform to other top managerial positions in targeted
companies. Moreover the policy had no obvious impact on highly qualified women
whose qualifications mirror those of board members but who were not appointed
to boards. Finally, there is little evidence that the reform was accompanied by any
change in female enrollment in business education programs, or a convergence in
earnings trajectories between recent male and female recent graduates of such
programs.
Another EU policy focus has been towards addressing the central work-family con-
flict. It is quite likely that the increased generosity in parental leave and statutory
rights to part-time work in the EU relative to the US over the last quarter century
can explain why female labor participation in the US is now lagging behind that in
many European countries. What is less clear is whether such family-work balance
policies have resulted in better jobs for women. These policies may instead have
made employers more reluctant to hire women for higher-level positions because
they are unsure of the strength of commitment to the labor force these women
have, or made employers less willing to groom female employees for higher-level
positions because they cannot (or feel they cannot) afford to do without a top em-
ployee with hard to replace skills for the length of time of the generous parental
leave. So, while more generous work-family balance policies may have succeeded in
growing women’s labour force participation in Europe compared to the US, they may
also have resulted in a higher share of women working part-time and into low-level
occupations in Europe. Blau and Kahn (2013) present compelling evidence of such
possible adverse effects.
Achieving a more unambiguous success for such work-family balance policies will
require these benefits no longer being reserved for women, nor being perceived as
reserved for women. While the move in many countries away from maternity leave
towards parental and paternity leaves satisfies the first requirement, the true chal-
lenge lies in the second requirement. As long as strong social norms such as “men
work in the labor force and women provide for the home” or “a working mom cannot
have a warm relationship with her child” remain, work-family balance benefits for
which men or women are equally eligible will remain disproportionately taken up by
the woman, even if the woman has higher earnings or earnings potential than her
spouse. While economists tend to assume that social norms will simply adjust to
new economic realities (such as the current reality of women being more educated
than men and hence becoming the gender with the higher earnings potentials), the
reality is that social norms move slowly. Research has shown that survey measures
of the strength of the social representation of women as homemakers and men
as breadwinners are quite predictive of women’s labour force participation across
countries. In the US, while women’s gender role attitudes steadily became less
traditional (e.g. more and more men and women disagreeing with the notion that
husbands should be the breadwinners and wives should be the homemakers) until
the mid-1990s, this trend reversed in the mid-1990s despite a growing educational
advantage for women.
An important and exciting question is whether public policy can be designed to
speed up the changes in social norms that I believe will be crucial to achieve greater
gender equality in the labour market sooner than later. Some of the existing rese-
arch on the malleability of gender norms offers a pessimistic outlook. For example,
a study shows that ethnicities and countries whose ancestors practiced plough cul-
tivation in ancient times (which required more physical strength than shifting culti-
53
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
vation, and hence was less suited for female labor) have beliefs today that exhibit
greater gender inequality, as well as lower rates of female labor force participation.
But other research suggests much more malleability, and mechanisms for change
within a generation. For example, a study shows that men having grown up with
working mothers (because their fathers had been mobilized to serve during WW II)
are more likely to have working wives.
Policymakers looking into speeding up the weakening of gender norms may well
consider leveraging the school environment, and in particular what are highly in-
fluential early years of schooling in terms of development of preferences and be-
liefs, to either undo the conservative gender norms some kids are bringing to school
from their home, or reinforce the progressive norms other kids are being exposed
to in their home.
An education policy that actively tries to undo gender norms may have additional
benefits. Women have been shown to be less willing to take risk than men, to have
a dislike for very competitive environments, as well as a dislike for negotiating for
more for themselves. To the extent that higher status positions in the economy are
also those that require more risk taking and in a more cut-throat workplace, and to
the extent that promotions to these positions will not happen unless one asks, these
psychological traits may contribute to women’s under-representation in the upper
part of the income distribution. A lower tolerance for risk may also be a contribution
factor in explaining why women are much less likely to be entrepreneurs than men.
It is possible that gender norms are also responsible for these gender differences in
psychological attributes. Psychologists have shown that people expect women to be
docile, while they expect men to be confident and self-assertive. Some have argued
that a higher degree of risk aversion is viewed as the norm for females while part
of the male identity is to be risk-takers. These expectations could be part of socially
constructed gender norms, rather than a reflection on innate differences; behaving
according to these expectations may reflect a willingness to conform with what
is expected from one’s social category. Hence, policies that would weaken gender
norms might also reduce gender differences on these psychological traits, further
boosting women’s economic success and independence.
54
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Gender equality has been a key priority for the EU for the past five decades, and
continues to be so. Equality in decision-making was one of the six priority issues
identified by the European Commission in its strategy for equality between women
and men 2010-2015. However, while progress has been made, power still lies in
men’s hands. Women are outnumbered by men by an average of three to one in go-
vernments and national parliaments, and data collected by Commission in October
2013 shows that women only account for an average of 18% of top-level board
members in the largest publicly listed companies in the EU-28 and 3% of CEOs.
As noted by the Commission, at the current rate of progress it will take over 20
years to achieve parity in national parliaments and over 20 years to achieve gen-
der balance on company boards. Thus, while progress has been made, the pace of
change has been slow and the goals set may take generations to achieve. Also, if
one reflects on which groups of women are under-represented in decision-making
bodies, the picture looks even gloomier.
In this essay, I will discuss what the Commission could do to address these chal-
lenges to equality in decision-making and what the ultimate objective should be.
Given the EU-28’s increasingly complex social diversity and changing migration pat-
terns, internal differences among women and men in relation to equality need to
be addressed. To address the full range of gender equality concerns, discussions on
power and decision-making need to address multiple equality concerns. It no longer
makes sense to conceive of or pursue these matters in relation to gender alone. A
more dynamic and democratic model is needed, with both ‘norm critical’ and ‘inter-
sectional’ perspectives applied in the debate.
A ‘norm critical’ perspective can be defined as a way to scrutinise how norms result
in the inclusion of some people and the exclusion of others. An ‘intersectional’ per-
spective refers how structures such as gender, ethnicity, age, ability and sexuality
interact, subordinating some people while giving privileges to others. In order to
develop a more dynamic model of candidate selection, a combination of these two
approaches could offer a way forward.
A norm critical perspective requires a new focus on gender equality and gender
equality policies. By asking the question “Who is considered to be ‘normal’?”, it focu-
ses not on what is perceived as different or deviant, but rather questions the norms
and power structures that foster perceptions of deviation. Looked at this way, it is
the norms and standards that must change, not those who deviate from them.
Applying a norm-critical perspective to gender equality policies shifts the focus of
attention to the norms and structures of power that foster perceptions that some pe-
ople are ‘different’, and the consequences of this. A norm-critical perspective differs
from a so-called tolerance or diversity (multicultural) perspective, where the objecti-
ve is to create an understanding of people who are discriminated against by focusing
on those who are ‘vulnerable’ and ‘in need of help’, thus overlooking the agents who
‘expose’ people to ‘suffering’, which is also likely to consolidate attitudes.
55
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
The purpose of applying a norm critical perspective is to make visible and problema-
tic and transform the beliefs and standards that form the basis for discrimination,
harassment and abusive treatment. The emphasis is on highlighting the privileges
enjoyed by those considered to fit into the ‘norm’ in society.
Intersectionality
It is well-known that inequalities do not only relate to gender differences. Age, natio-
nality, race, ethnicity, sexuality, functionality/ability and class also affect the oppor-
tunities and barriers people are exposed to in their daily lives. Factors like these not
only impact on inequalities at work, at home and in politics, but are also embedded
in the norms, values and attitudes that segregate, subordinate and marginalise pe-
ople perceived to deviate from the norm.
Intersectionality is a concept designed to highlight specific situations of oppression
created in the intersections of power relations based on, for instance, race, gender
and class (Hooks, 1981; Yuval Davis, 2005). An important starting point for this is
that peoples’ experiences, identities and opportunities are based on a variety of po-
sitions in society that cannot be understood in isolation from one another. Women
are therefore never ‘just’ women, and men are never ‘just’ men. As Collins puts it,
“viewing gender with a logic of intersectionality redefines it as a constellation of
ideas and social practices that are historically situated within and that mutually
construct multiple systems of oppression”. (Collins, 2000: 263).
The purpose of applying an intersectional perspective to gender equality is thus to
address the fact that differences among women (and men) related to age, ethnicity,
class, etc. may result in a plethora of different positions, including multiple margina-
lisation and inequalities for some and multiple privileges and equalities for others.
An intersectional perspective could help by identifying opportunities and challenges
that are not usually noted in analyses of gender equality. For instance, when we di-
scuss issues related to power and decision-making, such as political representation,
we not only need to pursue gender balance, but also to reflect on which women and
which men are included. Who are we actually talking about? Which group of people
are we drawing inferences from?
It is important to stress, however, that intersectionality is not about adding one kind
of inequality or oppression to another; rather, it deals with the interaction between
various structures. As pointed out by Choo and Ferree (2009), it means the perspec-
tives of ‘multiply-marginalised’ groups are included in analysis as well as the social
experiences of privileged groups, challenging the ‘universal’. Thus, an essential part
of an intersectional analysis, as emphasized by Borchorst and Teigen (2010: 19),
is to investigate “how oppression, subordination and privilege cut across different
systems of differentiation”.
56
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
about? Which men are we talking about? Who is included in the descriptions, targets
and policies, and who is excluded? Who belongs to the ‘norm’ in society, thus being
perceived as ‘normal’ and part of ‘we’, and who does not, thus being seen as the
‘other’, and part of ‘them’? Whose needs will be satisfied by political means and
whose will not? What problems are to be solved? And, not to forget, who has the
privilege of defining the problems and solutions?
A norm-critical perspective highlights the importance of identifying where power lies:
who has the power to identity, formulate and interpret problems, and consequently
identify what is judged to be a legitimate and plausible solution. An intersectional
perspective reminds us that various discriminatory structures interplay in enabling
and conflicting ways, and that gender-related problems always are contextual.
b) Who is the ’other’? Who is not considered to be part of the norm? More
concretely, how can the pool of candidates better reflect the composition of
society in terms of ethnicity, age, gender, etc. and those groups of people
not perceived as naturally belonging to the majority group in society?
a) How many women are selected compared to men? To what extent has
gender balance been taken into in consideration in the composition of a
list? To what extent have gender quotas been applied to achieve gender
balance?
b) Which women (and men) have been selected? If quotas have been ad-
opted to secure an equal balance between women and men, which women
(and men) have been selected? How diverse are those who have been cho-
57
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
sen? In what ways could the composition of the list better reflect minority
groups?
The last two questions relate to the principle of ’always gender, but never gender
only’. By asking these questions, selectors would be required not only to consider
how many women are involved in decision-making, but also why certain segments
of the female population are proportionally represented and under-represented.
Also, by asking these questions, selectors would target and question the homoge-
neity among the women (and men) who are usually selected via systems of gender
quotas. Hence, this framework addresses the heterogeneity among women as a
group (and men as a group) and highlights the importance of making sure certain
groups do not fall between the cracks when focusing on issues of gender OR ethnic-
ity, and ensuring that issues relating to power and equal decision-making are not
only tackled with respect to women in majority groups.
Conclusion
There is no quick fix to the problem of inequality between women and men in de-
cision-making. To achieve gender equality, people’s different positions in life must
be addressed. Norm-critical and intersectional perspectives help us to reflect on
the gaps in all factors of privilege, as well as all factors of oppression. They also
contribute to an extent to a further dynamic of gender quotas. By going beyond
just requiring that women and men are equally represented in decision-making via
quotas, which is a goal in itself, the perspectives develop and strengthen the demo-
cratic principle that underpins gender quotas by asking “which women” and “which
men”? If candidate selection were to be based on these perspectives, the potential
for identifying multiple inequalities would improve and the pursuit of a more demo-
cratic and inclusive society would be enhanced.
58
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
59
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
with coverage of some forms of gender-based violence, but not specific to those;
and the European protection order has relevance particularly for intimate partner
violence, but not for other forms.
This lack of hard law on violence against women is often justified on the basis that
there are no legal grounds for the EU to regulate in this area. The first comprehen-
sive study to examine this was the ‘Feasibility study to assess the possibilities,
opportunities and needs to standardise national legislation on violence against wo-
men, violence against children and sexual orientation violence’ (2010), which gave
a narrow interpretation of EU competences in this respect and concluded that there
were no legal grounds for addressing violence against women.
More recent reports question this approach and argue for the possibility of an exten-
ded interpretation of EU competences that would allow violence against women to
be covered more generally within EU policies. Benlolo-Carabot et al. (2013) argue
for including this under Article 19.2 of the TFEU on gender discrimination or even-
tually for extending Article 83.1 to cover more forms of gender-based violence, such
as intimate partner violence, rape or stalking.
In her study on legal perspectives for action at EU level Walby (2013), argues that
is it possible to give more extensive interpretations of both procedural (82) and
substantive (83) criminal law treaty instruments, as well as a proactive interpreta-
tion of Article 19 on gender discrimination, making it possible to regulate forms of
violence against women not currently covered. Walby also argues that adopting a
‘violence against women’ directive would help improve understanding of the EU’s
competences in this field as well as their limitations.
Furthermore, the recent European Parliament Resolution on this issue asked the Eu-
ropean Commission to propose measures to promote and support member states’
actions aimed at preventing violence against women and girls (VAWG) by the end
of 2014. The Resolution also suggested introducing a specific definition of violence
against women and accession of the EU to the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Conven-
tion, the most progressive international instrument applicable to violence against
women and domestic violence to date.
While legal interpretation debates are ongoing, there is less of a constraint on EU
strategy documents.
The Commission’s European Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 2010-
2015 devotes a specific chapter to gender-based violence, which starts by recogni-
sing this to include domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape and sexual violence
during conflict, and harmful traditional practices; and proposes the adoption of an
EU-wide strategy on combating violence against women, along the lines of the
Stockholm Programme. However, when it comes to specific references within the
chapter, the main focus is on female genital mutilation (FGM), a relatively limited
form of violence against women in Europe. The same tendency is manifested in the
choice of the main policy sector to be targeted: asylum policy. While both FGM and
asylum policy are important fields for intervention, focusing on these in the EU’s
five-year strategy sends the message that core forms of violence against women
are being sidelined, as well as the many other sectors that may be crucial for inter-
vention such as law enforcement, judiciary or victim support.
The activities of the European Institute of Gender Equality (EIGE) in the field of
data and good practice collection and the FRA survey on violence against women
go beyond the limited and fragmented approach taken in EU laws and policies.
60
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
61
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
tackle this issue across the EU, supported both by including the principle in European
policy and by giving women’s rights advocates access to European funding schemes
such as Structural Funds.
Thirdly, Europe’s approach should be multi-sectoral and coordinated across sec-
tors. Interventions can only be effective if they are mainstreamed across policy
areas including crime, social, housing, education, labour, healthcare, family, child
protection and external policy, to mention the most important. Such multi-sectoral
interventions require coordination to ensure policy cohesion and complementarity,
and that procedures remain victim-centred and secondary victimisation is avoided.
Coordination at European, national and local levels should be key principles taken
up in the new European policy on violence against women.
The EU has come a long way in this area over the last five years, but not far enough.
Developing a comprehensive new European policy to tackle violence against wo-
men, including the hard law required, would be beneficial for EU citizens as well as
for European identity.
62
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Gendered violence is rooted in the structural inequalities between men and women.
It is both a cause and consequence of gender inequality. It incorporates a range
of crimes and behaviours including physical, emotional, sexual, psychological and
economic abuse. It takes many forms and can involve a myriad of behaviours and a
multitude of consequences, physical injuries, emotional abuse, personal and sexual
violations or material deprivations (Lombard, 2015).
The ENEGE report (2013) provided an online tool to illustrate how protection ser-
vices across the EU respond to victims of gender-based violence (GBV). It lists five
types of GBV: sexual assault, rape, sexual harassment, intimate partner violence
and stalking. Skinner et al. (2005) maintain that ‘gender violence’ is a more inclu-
sive term than [men’s] violence against women, as the definition does not restrict
itself to women, but engages with the theoretical connection between violence and
gender relations, thus including gay and lesbian people, children and young people.
Gender is significant because men’s violence is so often treated as gender-neutral
through terms such as ‘spousal abuse’, ‘date rape’, ‘sexual harassment’, ‘marital
rape’, ‘battery’ and ‘child sexual abuse’ (Hague and Malos, 1998). Gender is impor-
tant in any analysis of violence because men and women use violence in different
ways and have different motives for doing so (Hester, 2009).
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women - which was adopted in 1979, became an international treaty in
1981 and was ratified by almost 100 nations by 1989 - provides a definition of
gender-based abuse, calling it: “Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or
is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
occurring in public or in private life.”
Article 2 of this declaration identifies three areas in which physical, sexual and psy-
chological violence commonly takes place:
In the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household,
dowry related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional
practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploi-
tation.
Within the general community, including rape; sexual abuse; sexual harassment and
intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere; trafficking in women;
and forced prostitution.
Perpetrated or condoned by the state, wherever it occurs.
The family is the most violent group in society: you are more likely to get killed,
injured or physically attacked in your own home by someone you are related to
63
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
than in any other social context (Gelles, 1979). Unlike men, who are more likely to
be victims of assaults and violence by strangers, women and children are attacked,
beaten, raped and killed by their family and partners (Department of Health, 2005);
by men known to them.
Feminism seized the slogan ‘the personal is political’ to demonstrate that experien-
ces personal to individuals were also social, in terms of the power relations they
engendered. The term ‘private’ related not only to individuals, but also to the space
they occupied. Feminists aimed to deconstruct the highly gendered nature of this
space, as well the ethnic and class divides it reproduces (Edwards and Ribbens,
1998; Hill Collins, 1990).
In second-wave feminism, the initial focus was on making women more visible,
bringing the private into the public and political spheres. ‘Calling out’ men’s violence
against women was an example of this. However, the spheres remained unchanged,
which meant challenging women’s positions and limitations within them, which sim-
ply reinforced the rigid dichotomies of public/private (Elshtain, 1981). It also meant
that the spheres were seen as the main barriers to personal and social equality,
whereas it was the significance and, in particular, the value attributed to them that
needed to be challenged (Rosaldo et al 1974; Imray and Middleton, 1983).
Until the 1980s, men’s violence against women was judged a ‘private’ issue. It of-
ten occurred in the ‘private’ space of the home, between individuals in a ‘private’
relationship, was hidden by those involved and rarely discussed, and crucially was
judged to be a ‘private’ matter by the police. Initially, it was important for femini-
sm to emulate the ‘private’ label to highlight all the incongruities associated with
violence taking place within this sphere, including the lack of statutory help and
support available and the myth of the home as a safe haven. However, 40 years on,
we need to stop hiding behind this dichotomous term.
Women and children still believe that public places are more dangerous than the
sanctity of their home and that strangers pose a greater threat than men who are
known to them. The perpetuation of these stereotypes encourages women to police
their own behaviour and reinforces the dichotomy of the public and private spheres,
as well as the sanctity associated with the latter. It also leads to hierarchies of vio-
lence where some violence (usually by a stranger and seen in public) is judged as
more serious or is more likely to be validated officially (Lombard, 2014).
Wider society may often believe that women are complicit in their own victimisation,
particularly if they are viewed as transgressing traditional gender roles. Details such
as a woman’s choice of dress, the decisions she takes (to walk home alone, hitchhi-
ke, invite a man back to her home) and her social standing (married, single mother,
divorced, in a relationship with the man who raped her) have all been brought to a
jury’s attention by judges who deemed them relevant to whether or not a defendant
committed rape (Lees, 1992). Myths around women’s alleged complicity in their
own experiences of violence still need to be challenged.
It is by controlling of women’s behaviour, actions and activities that men are able to
oppress, subordinate and ‘keep them in their place’ (Mooney, 2000). Defining men
as the protectors of women also reinforces gendered notions and gets women into
arguably more dangerous situations. Indeed, Stanko (1990) argues that “the very
people women turn to for protection are the ones who pose the greatest danger”, a
view echoed by Kelly (1988): “Whilst not all women live in constant fear, many of
women’s routine decisions and behaviours are almost automatic measures taken to
protect themselves from potential sexual violence.”
64
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
Women are at greater risk from men known to them, but this ‘fact’ cannot detract
from the seriousness of the offence. Theories of violence against women need to
acknowledge that it can happen in public places as well as private, and that more
than a quarter of incidents occur between intimates who have never lived together
(Walby and Allen, 2004). The onus of the violent act needs to rest solely on the
perpetrator and not on what the woman could or should have done to prevent the
violence.
In 2011, the Council of Europe adopted ‘The Convention on Preventing and Comba-
ting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence’ (Istanbul Convention), which
makes it clear that violence against women and domestic violence is not a private
matter; states have an obligation to prevent violence, protect victims and punish the
perpetrators. By accepting the Convention, governments are compelled to change
or bring in new laws, introduce and implement practical measures such as helplines
and shelters, and assign adequate resources to tackle violence against women and
domestic violence effectively.
Most European countries (even prior to signing up to the convention and including
those who have not, such as the UK) have focused on a framework of protection,
provision and prevention, with varying degrees of success. How they define the
violence in the first place can determine their response to it. Scotland is the only
country in the UK with a gendered definition of domestic abuse, and prevention
work undertaken there seeks to reduce the gender inequality seen as causing men’s
violence against women; whereas in Wales, with its gender neutral definition and
framing of domestic violence as a criminal justice issue, prevention work primarily
focuses on reducing crime (Charles & Mackay, 2013).
It needs to be recognised that (feminist-inspired) advances have been made in
policy and provision, and that media and educational campaigns have also raised
awareness of this issue in society. As Kelly remarks, the “creation of knowledge has,
therefore, given social recognition to hidden and silenced experiences”. “Making visi-
ble what was invisible, defining as unacceptable what was acceptable and insisting
what was naturalised is problematic” (Kelly, 1988: 139) has been an important part
of this process. It enables women to name, understand and challenge what happe-
ned to them, moving the private into the public domain and shifting the boundaries
of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.
A study carried out by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2014, based
on interviews with 42,000 women across the 28 EU’s member states, revealed
extensive abuse that goes unreported. In its recommendations, it looked at solutions
going beyond criminal law, stressing the need to examine and challenge other areas
of their lives where women experience inequality.
Research has found that when gender divisions and stereotypes are perpetuated,
young people are less likely to challenge men’s violence against women (McCar-
ry, 2010; Lombard, 2013, 2014). Whilst we can teach children that all violence is
wrong, we also need to scrutinise how we may be limiting what children can be or
become. Boys and girls are continuously told that they are ‘different’ from each
other, or this is implied by putting them in different lines at school; having gender
specific sports, toys or activities; speaking to them in different ways; or expecting
different things from them. We also need to challenge the normalisation of violence.
We must contest the dynamics in heterosexual relationships where men’s power
65
PART 2: What have we achieved so far and what challenges remain in key areas?
over women is naturalised, normalised and used as a justification for the violence
(McCarry and Lombard, forthcoming 2015).
Promoting gender equality would mean that violence against women is no longer
normalised or endorsed by gendered stereotypes. As such, gender segregation and
division must end, and all members of society need to challenge all forms of violen-
ce against women. Until they do so, women will never achieve equal status, which
is the main barrier to preventing gendered violence.
Scotland has recognised the social problem of domestic abuse within the con-
tinuum of violence against women as a form of gender-based violence. In so
doing, it explicitly acknowledges domestic abuse as an issue which dispropor-
tionately affects women, is overwhelmingly perpetrated by men and is asso-
ciated with long-held cultural assumptions about the roles of men and women
in society. In 2014, Scotland updated its Violence Against Women Strategy,
retaining its gendered approach. Examples of good practice include:
Protection: In 2013, the Chief Constable made domestic abuse one of three
top priorities for the new national police force, recognising that it constituted
one-third of all violent crime in Scotland and sending out a clear message to
perpetrators, victims and fellow officers.
Provision: Police officers in Scotland officers who work on rape, sexual assault
or domestic abuse are now being trained in understanding its complexities,
to improve experiences of women reporting to them. A domestic abuse advo-
cacy service works alongside the police and domestic abuse courts to reduce
victimisation by assessing risks and increasing the safety of clients at risk of
harm from partners or ex-partners, and NGOs work in partnership with the
government to adapt, develop and pilot a multi-agency approach which en-
courages mothers and children to work together towards recovery from their
experiences of abuse. All users of mental health, maternity, addiction, sexual
and reproductive health, accident and emergency, and primary care services
are now routinely asked about their experience of domestic abuse.
Prevention: A range of initiatives have been launched to involve communities
in prevention; raise awareness and challenge myths about rape; and run edu-
cational programmes that challenge young people to confront their own and
others’ role in perpetuating and sustaining gender-based violence. A gender
equality training programme for primary school teachers is currently in it pilot
phase.
66
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
Over the past five decades, the EU has built a solid framework for the promotion of
equality between women and men. Gender equality, as a value and a goal, is enshri-
ned in the Treaty as well as a commitment to gender mainstreaming.18 Multiannual
strategies for the promotion of gender equality, annual reporting and institutional
mechanisms at EU and national level are also in place.
When the programming period of the current strategy ends in 2015, the EU will
have an opportunity to take stock of gender equality policies so far and, building on
experience, reinforce the commitment to promote gender equality in a new strategy
post-2015.
Since 2010, new challenges have emerged. The global economic crisis has resulted
in austerity policies, with cuts in many member states’ public budgets resulting in
a downgrading of gender equality and/or gender mainstreaming structures. Institu-
tional structures/bodies supporting gender equality have been abolished or merged
with other institutions in some countries and deep cuts are the reality for others.
There is also a trend towards replacing independent bodies for protection against
discrimination on grounds of sex by bodies for protection against discrimination
on various grounds. In some countries, policy units have been moved to units/de-
partments on diversity or human rights issues, which risks marginalising gender
equality as a political goal and changing policies from structural measures to tackle
gender gaps and inequality to equal treatment policies; a legalistic, individualistic
approach focusing on protection from sex discrimination (EIGE, 2014).
At EU level, the Group of European Commissioners on Equal Opportunities coordi-
nating gender mainstreaming and equality policies was dismantled in 2010 when
a new Commission took office. The status of the annual progress report was also
reduced from a political report to the Spring European Council to a Commission staff
working document. This can be seen as a downgrading of gender mainstreaming,
since a clear prerequisite for gender mainstreaming is involvement and accountabi-
lity at the top level in an organisation.
However, the Commission´s annual reports for 2013 and 2014 (European Com-
18 Treaty of the European Union (2009), Article 2 and 3, Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Article 8.
67
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
mission, 2014; 2015) show some progress in most of the 2010-2015 Strategy’s
priority areas.19 It also shows that it will take between 20 and 70 years to reach the
targets at the current rate of change. The conclusion is obvious: both the EU and
its member states need new clear strategies, targets and top-level commitment to
improve and accelerate progress towards gender equality.
Two horizontal areas require specific attention in the Commission´s post-2015 stra-
tegy - the need to: (1) examine and clearly explain the relationship and differences
between discrimination/equal treatment policies and proactive gender equality po-
licies/gender mainstreaming; and (2) go from words to action and fully implement
gender mainstreaming.
The need to examine and clearly explain the relationship and differences between
discrimination/equal treatment policies and proactive gender equality policies/gen-
der mainstreaming.
The tendency to merge all grounds of discrimination within the tasks of one inde-
pendent body for promoting equal treatment can be seen as an efficient strategy
to address both the heterogeneity of women and men and multiple discrimination.
But it too often results in a reduction in the existing institutional capacity for gender
equality policies and a tendency to view gender equality as a human right requiring
legal, judicial measures that address discrimination at an individual level, and more
seldom as a structural issue that requires a political approach to tackle gender gaps
and transform policies with a view to achieving gender equality.
Economic pressure and budget cuts have contributed to this shift of policies from a
structural to a more individualistic approach which downgrades gender equality as
a political goal and undermines gender mainstreaming.
The post-2015 strategy should therefore address this development, which is con-
fusing and unclear. Initiatives to examine and clearly explain the relationship and
differences between discrimination/equal treatment policies on the one hand, and
proactive gender equality policies/gender mainstreaming on the other, would be
welcome. The aim should be to regain a broad perspective on equality policies and
a clear understanding among member states and EU institutions of how to fight
inequality.
A renewed commitment to promote gender equality by strengthening and monito-
ring of equal treatment/discrimination legislation, and through a clear focus on en-
hancing gender equality policies through special measures and a well-informed im-
plementation of gender mainstreaming, is imperative to step up the pace to achieve
the Treaty goal.20
19 Strategy for equality between women and men 2012-2015. COM(2010) 491 final, SEC(2010)
1079 and SEC(2010) 1080.
20 Treaty of the European Union (2009), Article 2 and 3
68
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
21 See for example the Swedish Government dedicated website: http://www.government.se/sb/
d/4096/a/125215
22 Communication from the Commission of 5 March 2010 – A Strengthened Commitment to Equality
between Women and Men (COM (2010) 78 final).
23 Council of the European Union New European Pact for Equality between Women and Men for the
period 2011 - 2020 (7349/11).
69
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
24 Now replaced by the new Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC) Programme.
25 Mid-term review of the Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015) SWD(2010)
339 final
26 See http://eige.europa.eu/
27 See http://eige.europa.eu/content/gender-equality-index
70
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
71
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
Gender equality governance and tools: the need for renewed fo-
cus and a clear vision
By Johanna Kantola
The EU has an impressive repertoire and range of tools at its disposal for the gover-
nance of gender equality policy.
Its anti-discrimination law – a wide range of gender directives – now reach beyond
the labour market and cover issues such as sexual harassment, and goods and ser-
vices. It endorses positive action that can potentially correct the historical disadvan-
tages women have suffered from. Many EU documents mention gender mainstrea-
ming as a central governance strategy and call for gender to be taken into account
in a number of different fields. The EU’s action programmes on gender equality are
used to endorse key aspects of the policy. Finally, the EU not only generates words
and produces documents, but also provides money through various funding sche-
mes.
Sophie Jacquot (2015) has described the formulation of these five pillars as a phase
of professionalisation and normalisation of gender equality governance in the EU
that lasted from the late 1990s until the 2000s, with gender equality policy resting
on these different mechanisms.
Indeed, practical examples from member states illustrate that it is necessary to
strike a balance between various tools in gender equality policy. For example, the
Nordic countries have benefited from the EU’s anti-discrimination approach, the
southern European countries from funding and soft law in reconciling work and
family life, and the UK from positive action. In this way, the EU gender governance
and tools have strengthened those aspects of national policy that may otherwise
have been neglected.
At the same time, the most recent scholarly assessments of the state of EU gover-
nance of gender policy are pessimistic.29 They suggest, in a nutshell, that each of
the dimensions of EU gender policy governance – anti-discrimination law, positive
action, gender mainstreaming, action programmes and funding – has been scaled
down, downsized and marginalised over the past decade. This has not always been
intentional; nor is it only related to the current economic crisis and the hard times
the EU is in. However, combined with a lack of a clear vision on the governance and
tools for gender equality, the effects of this downward spiral are potentially detri-
mental to gender equality.
At the same time, the economic crisis is resulting in austerity measures across
policy areas in member states that are traditionally important for gender equality
(social, welfare, pensions, health care etc.). In addition, the governance tools that
the EU is using to combat the financial and economic crisis have not been gender
mainstreamed (pointing in itself to the weak position of gender mainstreaming in
the EU). Market-based policies are central, which in turn signifies that less attention
is being paid to promoting gender equality as a value in such.
EU anti-discrimination law has been developed in various gender directives that
now cover equal pay equal pay, access to employment, training, working conditions,
72
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
social security, maternity and parental leave, and part-time work. The 2004 Equal
Treatment Directive famously extended the reach of these directives to access to,
and the provision of, goods and services. Directives have also been used in other
areas crucial for gender equality, such as anti-discrimination on the basis of other
inequalities (race and ethnicity, sexuality, age, religion and belief, disability), sexual
harassment and trafficking. In other key areas, such as gender violence, this tool has
not been used so far.
On the plus side are the increased role of the European Parliament in the legislative
process, which has enhanced the progressive gender content of the directives, and
the fact that directives offer clear legislative measuring sticks which can be used to
hold member states accountable for their correct implementation. Yet it is precisely
in the transposition and implementation phase that directives face resistance from
the member states. The use of this tool has also been undermined by the crisis,
with a number of directives stalled in the Council, including the 2010 proposal for a
new maternity leave directive (92/85/EEC) and the 2008 proposal for a directive on
equal treatment of people irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation.
The anti-discrimination framework is famously complemented in the EU with the
possibility to take positive action in the labour market in favour of the under-repre-
sented sex. Although the path to positive action has not been easy – with contra-
dictory court rulings in the 1990s – its position is now confirmed in EU law. Recent
years have seen renewed interest in this governance tool, with plans to introduce
company board quotas (a proposed directive aimed at ensuring women account
for 40% of board members in listed companies and public enterprises), although in
terms of overall gender policy, critics have questioned the wider benefits of a mea-
sure that targets a group of women who are already privileged.
The third governance tool - gender mainstreaming - widened the scope of gender
policy to all EU policy-making without being restricted by budgetary or competence
issues. Again, implementation of this principle has faced a number of challenges
both within EU institutional structures and policy-making, and in the member sta-
tes. The soft governance approach taken towards gender mainstreaming has faced
the challenges of a soft approach in general. Most significantly, recent years have
witnessed the disappearance and weakening of gender mainstreaming provisions
from many important EU policy documents, such as the Europe 2020 strategy (in
contrast to the previous Lisbon Agenda and European Employment Strategy). For
example, the Europe2020 goals and indicators remain gender blind and thus offer
limited opportunities for achieving gender equality.
Other softer governance tools that the EU has used in gender policy include funding
and action programmes. Sophie Jacquot (2015) has studied the patterns of EU
funding for gender policy and argues that there has been a reduction in funding for
gender-specific actions across the board. The position of gender has been weakened
in action programmes too (e.g. the Daphne programmes on violence were subsumed
to PROGRESS) that now focus on multiple inequalities rather than just on gender.
Institutionally, it is significant that gender issues were moved from the Commis-
sion’s Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs to the Directorate-
General for Justice. Whilst there has always been a tendency in the EU gender policy
governance to prioritise anti-discrimination measures over positive action and gen-
der mainstreaming, this has been accentuated by the institutional shake-up. There
is a danger that this will further distance EU gender governance from the social
policies that are so central to achieving equality, raising questions about access to
and influence in these fields and narrowing the definition of gender equality.
73
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
Does the governance of gender equality policies at the EU level need to be refor-
med? To answer this question, we need to understand what worked well before. As
illustrated above, a successful gender governance framework rests on different pil-
lars and the use of different tools. In other words, the complexity of gender equality
makes it necessary to develop different tools in a balanced way. Each one needs to
be strengthened, not downgraded as is happening now - silently and partly unin-
tentionally - as part of bigger trends. For example, there should not be an exclusive
focus on anti-discrimination when dealing with multiple inequalities (‘multiple di-
scrimination’) - positive action and mainstreaming need to be considered too.
A renewed strong focus on social policy and employment is also required. The po-
sition of gender needs to be confirmed in this area as well as in economic policies,
especially those relating to austerity and the economic and financial crisis. Gender
mainstreaming is a potentially useful tool if it is implemented in an expansive and
binding way. The extensive feminist research into its strengths and weaknesses
needs to be better integrated into the development of policies to achieve it.
To underpin successful governance of gender policy, we need a vision not only of
the governance and tools required, but also of gender equality itself. This calls for a
political debate on how to achieve gender equality and what form this should take.
Ultimately, there is a need to strengthen definitions that use a broad notion of gen-
der equality – as equality of outcomes – as a starting point, as opposed to narrow,
market-oriented definitions of equality of opportunities. We also need to understand
the ways in which gender intersects with other inequalities and what this means for
governance.
74
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
Cross-cutting challenges
The present, recent past and near future of the EU is marked by an ongoing econo-
mic crisis, with high unemployment and increasingly complex inequalities. In order
to drive the gender equality agenda forward and make it effective in the five years
to come, EU-policy makers face several cross-cutting challenges.
A first one is the strikingly ‘gender blind’ nature of the public debates that do take
issue with the financial crisis and its societal impacts, but without highlighting the
problem of gender disparities. While the unequal distributional consequences of
Troika programmes have become key topics of debate in debtor states (such as Ire-
land, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus) as well as in creditor states (for instance, Germany),
issues of gender inequality and discrimination have not received much attention
in the context of the euro-zone crisis. This is surprising since – in contrast to the
Europe 2020 targets - progress towards the equality of women and men in the EU
evidently has stalled or even fallen back as a consequence of the crisis.
The second challenge for future gender equality policy lies in the new constraints
the EU has introduced when building the ‘genuine economic and monetary union’.
This new governance regime for the euro zone has made the rule of austerity (Fi-
scal Compact) compulsory and significantly strengthened the tools for the fiscal
surveillance of the Member States (European Semester). The new rules and tools
profoundly change how the risks, benefits and costs of financial and economic pro-
cesses will be distributed among the citizens of the euro zone within and across the
member states. However, they do not take advantage of the tried-and-tested tool
kit for gender equality.
A third and final challenge to forward-looking EU gender policy stems from the
unprecedented drop of popular trust in EU institutions, the mobilisation of anti-
EU sentiment among citizens and the empowerment of organised actors striving
for renationalisation of EU competences. These trends threaten to further multiply
gender equality gaps instead of reducing them among the EU-28 Member States.
What needs to be done to make the governance of gender equality work effectively
in the EU? More specifically, what is needed to mobilise key stakeholders such as
companies, social partners and civil society in ways that help re-build citizens’ trust
in the EU? Currently, there are deficits in three realms: 1) gender awareness, compe-
tence and capacity-building; 2) policy-relevant knowledge about the gender impacts
of Economic and Monetary Union; and 3) opportunities for citizen participation in EU
gender policy.
A number of small-scale innovations are sufficient to tackle these deficits. For this
purpose, the following tools are proposed:
75
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
76
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
To tackle gender equality issues in the future, it is important that the EU build on the
significant advances it has made in the past. The principle of equality is prominently
enshrined in the EU Treaties. Equality between women and men and non-discrimi-
nation are amongst the most fundamental values, rights and principles of the peo-
ples of Europe. They are shared on the basis of their constitutional traditions and
the international obligations of their states. Recognised by the successive European
Community treaties and by the Treaty on European Union, they became objectives
for innovative policy-making in the EU’s multi-layered system. At the supranatio-
nal level, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) reaffirmed rights to non-
discrimination and equality between women and men, on which the EU Union under
the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) now relies. Moreover, over the past four decades, an
extensive body of gender equality directives has gained teeth in the member states,
driven by the evolving case law of the European Court of Justice.
In relation to current practices, however, the EU appears to have advanced little
more than halfway towards gender equality. As the 2013 Gender Equality Index Re-
port (EIGE )30 put it: “Despite 50 years of gender equality policies and actions at the
European level, member states have not yet managed to overcome gender gaps,
thus there is a need for further efforts.” In fact, in the context of the crisis, gender-
sensitive statistical data collected by EIGE (2013) reveal the persistence of gender
gaps in six core domains: work, health, money, knowledge, time and power. There
are also two cross-cutting domains: intersecting equalities and violence; and how
macroeconomic policies perpetuate gender inequality, a lower female than male
labour force participation rate and unpaid care work.
The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other international organisations
have recently prioritised women and girls. The best IMF gender-focused report to
date31 synthesises a market-based, instrumentalist gender-approach that embraces
“gender equality as smart economics” and upholds women’s employment as an in-
strument to boost economic growth. NGO gender-equality advocates argue that this
is a problematic one-dimensional approach, because it does not simultaeneously
promote women’s and men’s equal human rights as the only way to overcome per-
sistent patriarchal patterns. Questioning human rights-based proposals, economists
warn that the upgrading of EU powers and resources would put too heavy a burden
on companies and national economies.
What can be done differently in the future? The EU should develop an approach
which differs from that of the IMF, the World Bank and other economic organisations
in three respects.
First, it should not instrumentalise gender equality by reducing gender inequalities
and biases and discrimination against women primarily to their impact on women’s
contribution to measured economic activity and the enhancement of macroecono-
mic performance.
Second, it should fully endorse the rights-rooted approach to gender equality, which
emphasises gender equality as an intrinsically desirable good. It should develop this
through quality-of-life indicators for assessing the contribution and consequences
of EU macroeconomic policies on gender equality, women’s economic empower-
77
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
ment and their overall well-being.32 If the starting point is the human and funda-
mental rights‘ obligations of EU member states, women must have equal access to
both tangible and intangible resources to the same extent as men, so that they can
maximise their choices and options in society. To date, the inter-linkages between
the EU’s management of the crisis and EMU-related lending, economic and financial
surveillance, policy advice and gender equality have not been sufficiently explored.
The Union must discuss the adverse impacts of its monetary, fiscal and structu-
ral adjustment policies on gender equality and women’s empowerment, assessing
how fiscal and monetary policy impact on the poverty dynamics underlying the link
between women, paid work and unpaid reproductive work.
Third, the EU must also engage with European and – as a global actor – internatio-
nal rules for transnational corporations that enhance their compliance with national
tax systems. This is a necessary precondition for fiscally-weak Member States to
generate more tax revenues to spend on social policies, including gender priorities.
78
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
Over the past two decades, there has been a significant broadening of the legal pro-
tection against discrimination in Europe. Implementing new EU directives, member
states’ equality legislation has expanded to cover not only gender but also racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation – the EU “six
strands” policy base. This has been accompanied by an increasingly complex set of
institutional arrangements to address inequalities. 33
The EU is now seen as a major actor in promoting equality policies and in Europe,
new politics of equality have emerged within a ‘multiple discrimination’ framework.
Three major questions regarding these reform processes are asked regularly: Is the
new equality framework of “multiple grounds” sufficiently anchored in EU law and
policy? Is it implemented in ways which do not marginalise gender equality policy?
Is it able to address intersectional problems?
EU directives on non-discrimination take a ‘ground by ground’ approach. The need
to protect against multiple discrimination is mainly addressed in recitals and soft
law supplements to formal legal texts. Initiatives are still largely contained within
a strict non-discrimination framework, with positive duty programmes or gender
mainstreaming policies tending to remain one dimensional. The European Commis-
sion’s “Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-1015” and its most
recent progress report substantiate this: in these documents and reports, the domi-
nant equality notion is mainly one-dimensional.
What have recently been termed ‘gender+’ equality policies 34 - i.e. policies which
address gender inequalities in relation to other inequalities - are rather few and far
between. (The most notable exception deals with the implementation of non-discri-
mination law, where it highlights “the aggravated consequences of discrimination
on two or more grounds”.)35
Yet it is now commonly recognised that one-dimensional policy making misses out
on the interaction between complex differences in people’s lives and experiences as
well as in social, cultural and institutional practices. What more needs then to be
done? This is a challenge on a truly grand scale. In this essay, I will argue for three
simple proposals, which mainly relate to base-line policy; i.e. the legal protection
against multiple and intersectional discrimination.
33 For a comprehensive mapping of equality institutions in Europe, see for instance Krizsan et al.
2012.
34 See summary and sources for the European research project QUING, led by Mieke Verloo, http://
www.quing.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=34 visited 10-28-14
35 Strategy for equality between women and men 2012-2015. COM(2010) 491 final, SEC(2010)
1079 and SEC(2010) 1080., chapter 6.2. Legislation.
79
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
36 For a first and most instructive review, see Burri and Schiek (2009) and Krizsan et al. (2012) for
such examples.
37 An English translation of the decision (case 1/2008) can be found at http://www.diskriminering-
snemnda.no/wips/1529714557/
80
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
In 2010, the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discri-
mination against Women (CEDAW) committee clarified the core obligations of state
parties under Article 2 of the Convention. It states that protection against intersec-
tional discrimination is such an obligation: “The discrimination of women based on
sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as
race ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orien-
tation and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may affect
women belonging to such groups to a different degree or in different ways to men.
States parties must legally recognise such intersecting forms of discrimination and
their compounded negative impact on the women concerned and prohibit them.”
A reasonable follow-up to this general recommendation would be to secure an ex-
plicit protection against such discrimination in the legal texts. Ground-specific le-
gislation should contain a clause which makes it clear that discrimination on one
protected ground in combination with other protected grounds is prohibited. This is
irrespective of how national legislation and national equality bodies are organised;
whether ‘ground by ground’ or in combined framings.
Such a proposal is in line with earlier recommendations made by the network of
legal experts on multiple discrimination: there is a need for a common clarifying
clause on protection against multiple discrimination in the legal texts of the EU’s
non-discrimination directives. 38
Why is this important? Such a simple provision would make it clear to all those who
read the legal texts that multiple and intersectional grounds are protected. Plain-
tiffs, victims and perpetrators, judges and tribunal members would all be equally
enlightened to this simple fact. This is a clear-cut way to overcome repeatedly
observed obstacles to the handling of multiple and intersectional discrimination
cases in courts and tribunals across Europe.
Broad equality laws typically combine discrimination bans with positive duties. In
the same vein, regulations on positive equality duties and/or gender mainstreaming
should contain a similar provision, whether they seek to bind public authorities, em-
ployers or educational institutions: implementation of positive duties must address
gender-based discrimination in relation to other protected grounds for discrimina-
tion.
38 Cf. Burri and Schiek 2009: 24, and note their comment on comparators; that this is only one way
of proving discrimination.
39 The European Union Agency on Fundamental Rights, see http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/access-
justice visited 10-28-14
81
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
The Norwegian Ombud and Tribunal system operates on the basis of a low-th-
reshold arrangement for treating complaints about discrimination. The Ombud
has a duty to provide counsel in such cases, and adjudication is free. A review
of the Ombud´s case portfolio in 2011 nevertheless showed that complaints
were clearly skewed with regard to age, class, and place of residence. Relati-
vely few multiple discrimination cases involving gender and ethnicity could be
identified. Investigations also revealed that there is no systematic rights in-
formation work in place in Norway (apart from the regular Ombud’s activities).
It seems reasonable to suppose that the lack of broad rights information helps
to explain the low representativeness of complaints.
Conclusion
The CEDAW committee now places legal protection against intersectional forms of
discrimination among the core obligations of state parties. Further development
of European equality legislation must recognise this obligation. The same concern
should, of course, inform all efforts to improve low-threshold access to justice. Equal
access to justice is vital for real equality.
82
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
Today’s concerns about gender equality have to be placed within the framework of
three devolutionary trends.
Firstly, the EU and its member states are still coping with the aftermath of the fi-
nancial and economic crisis, the effects of economic decline, flexible labour markets
and work insecurity, social insecurity and the mobility of (young) migrant workers.
In this process, the impact of an imbalance between the economic forces of the EU
– particularly the free trade in goods, people and services – and social citizenship
rights that are still mainly derived from the nation state demand serious attention.
This imbalance raises new cross-cutting gender-equality issues, and implies work
and income protection for vulnerable groups in the labour market such as mobile
youngsters of both sexes and mainly-female migrant care workers. Rights related
to family formation and reproduction are additional core issues for this growing
population of cross-border workers that demand policy attention.
Secondly, devolution refers to processes of scale. Member states and their political
elites appear to be increasingly hesitant to upscale policy responsibility to the EU.
By contrast – and for budgetary reasons, retrenchment and austerity – there is a
tendency to downscale policy responsibility to local or regional governments.
Thirdly, gender equality as a policy aim appears to be losing priority. Once a ‘catch-
all principle’ – to provide a labour reserve and resources for increasing household
income, contribute to the knowledge economy and maintain fertility – gender equa-
lity today is seemingly being sacrificed as a high-priority policy aim.
Against this backdrop, it may be necessary for the EU to shift attention as well as
governance to those aspects of gender-equality policy that worry many of its popu-
lations. In fact, the percentage of women on company boards, in parliaments and
in higher education is not the real cause of concern. To frame it positively: the EU
might gain support for its gender equality policy if it succeeds in developing gender-
related human and social rights policies that foster labour- and income-related
social protection as well as family- and care-related social rights that support the
reconciliation of work and care. These are not new policies - it is what the EU has
done in the past (1980s and 1990s) – but this time the economic and governance
context is different, and it remains necessary to highlight examples of good practice.
European governments have reacted to financial and economic crises in different
ways. The EU does not speak with a single voice on the strategy required to over-
come the effects of the crisis and preserve the European Social Model, or on the
preferred outcomes for its populations in terms of at least maintaining pre-crisis le-
vels of gender equality. From this perspective, it might be useful for the governance
tools for benchmarking gender equality from 2015 onwards to address the impact
of the crisis, and the reforms introduced in response to it.
83
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
84
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
need migrants to reduce the costs of caring for the elderly without reducing em-
ployment opportunities for their own female workforce.
So far, the EU debate on these issues has been very much an internal one, with a
huge gap between the neo-liberalist EU approach and what the populations of the
EU member states had hoped for.
Addressing these issues is not easy. Communication on gender equality might be
improved by explaining the problems instead of advertising what are sometimes
minimal results, making people confront the real issues; by encouraging young
journalists to take part in internships, workshops and seminars; and by funding an
exchange programme for the new generation of journalists in the member states.
Finally, it is my conviction that the main problem at the moment is that gender
equality - to which the EU made a major contribution before the start of the 21st
century - is being poisoned by the neo-liberal route the Union has taken since then.
The focus on getting higher-educated women in top positions illustrates such a per-
spective and undermines public identification with the EU as well as its credibility. It
also devalues the Union’s meaning and importance in the hearts and minds of the
population.
If the EU does not succeed in reaching the ‘common’ woman – and man - gender
equality objectives stand no chance of being reached. For this reason, we need to
focus on tensions and dilemmas, on reforms and their outcomes, on complexities
instead of on straightforward results, on conflicting interests and – in the end – on
the gender impact of the recent reforms.
85
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
86
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
The role of the Internet and new media: amplifier of gender in-
equalities or vehicle for change?
By Maria Edström
The media can both hinder and accelerate progress towards gender equality. They
can communicate the results of efforts to tackle this issue, but may also contribute
to producing gender stereotypes.
Films, advertising, computer games and journalism can make us informed, excited,
angry, hopeful or engaged. Whether the topic is education, crime, climate change
or gender equality, our opinions and willingness to act are often based on the way
these issues are portrayed in the media. That is why the media cannot be left out
of the equation when considering how to achieve gender equality in society.
The United Nations’ member countries committed themselves to ensuring women’s
access to - and combating gender stereotypes in - the media as early as 1995,
through the Beijing Platform for Action, but much closer monitoring of what is being
done to live up to those commitments is needed. It is of crucial importance that pro-
ducers and users of media have the skills required to counter stereotypes and that
they allow room for a fair portrayal of people regardless of gender, age, ethnicity or
other categorisations, and give them a voice.
Gender equality and freedom of expression are integral parts of human rights, and
you cannot have one without the other. Yet they are often talked about as separate
values and rights. Gender equality has been an important component of recent di-
scourses on freedom of expression. One example of this is the UNESCO World Tren-
ds in Freedom of Expression and Media Development (2104), which emphasises the
link between the two issues.
However, in many gender equality discourses, the media and freedom of expression
are disregarded. The EU’s former strategy for gender equality, A Roadmap for Equa-
lity Between Women and Men 2006–2010, identified six priority areas for action,
one of which was to combat and eliminate gender stereotypes in education, training
and culture, the labour market and the media. But today, the media is no longer pri-
oritised. The current EU Strategy for Equality Between Women and Men 2010-2015
does not mention ‘freedom of expression’ at all, and the word ‘media’ is mentioned
only once in the list of areas of concern in the Beijing Platform for Action.
The EU remains committed to meeting the goals of the UN Convention on the Eli-
mination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), such as changing
gender stereotypes; and to the Beijing Platform for Action, with its two targets re-
lated to women and the media: to increase women’s participation and access to
expression and decision-making in and through the media and new communication
technologies; and to promote a balanced and non-stereotyped portrayal of men and
women in the media. Yet the EU strategy no longer mentions any specific goals for
the media.
This might explain why it is taking so long to address this issue. The EU has crea-
ted indicators for almost all areas of the Beijing Platform, but none in the area of
women and media until 2013. The Union now calls on the member states to report
87
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
annually on: (1) the proportions of women and men in decision-making posts in
media organisations; (2) the proportions of women and men on the boards of media
organisations; and (3) policies to promote gender equality in media organisations. It
is noteworthy that there is still no indicator for progress on the Beijing Platform for
Action’s second target, non-stereotypical portrayals.
It remains to be seen whether member states will include media statistics in their
annual reports. There is still a lack of consistent, reliable and comparative data on
gender equality in the media and without statistics, how can we know what the pro-
blem is and where we are going? Monitoring of actions already decided on should
be mandatory.
This lack of action can be explained by a fear of interfering. Self-regulation has
been the main strategy for the media industry, with many politicians reluctant to
act amid concern that a more regulated media industry could be seen as a form of
censorship or a way of limiting freedom of expression. It is, however, time to ask
ourselves whose freedom of expression is being protected or hampered. When new
technology and the search for new business models challenge older media and
structures, it is even more important to commit to safeguarding freedom of expres-
sion and gender equality.
In 2006, Agnés Callamard, from the NGO Article 19, coined the expression ‘gender-
based censorship’ to describe the failure of news media to include women in their
coverage, with news content still very male dominated. Globally, only 24% of news
reports are about women (Global Media Monitoring Project, 2010).
In terms of numbers of men and women working in the media, there seems to be
parity in many news rooms, according to the Global Report on the Status of Women
in the News Media (Byerly, 2011), but there also appears to be a glass ceiling, with
high-level decision-making still dominated by men. Progress towards gender equa-
lity in the media also seems to have been hampered by the recent economic crisis,
with many media companies facing major challenges to their business models and
women more likely to be found in part-time jobs and temporary positions while
more technology-driven positions are held by men.
Systematic, transparent self-monitoring could be a first step in addressing the lack
of gender sensitivity in the media industry. Authorities can also insist on monitoring
of media content. This is being done through national legislation in some countries,
but could also be enforced at EU level.
There have been a number of initiatives in the film sector, by both the industry and
governing bodies, and the advertising industry is starting to address the lack of
gender equality. It is also important to tackle this issue in the gaming industry, a
fast-growing sector of the media industry that may have the most significant gen-
der equality problems (there is no data to prove otherwise).
There are positive examples of newsrooms that include gender and diversity as a
core part of their future strategy to remain relevant for their readers and viewers.
This is not only a matter of rights and democratic values; these companies use the
business argument that more women and more diversity in the news delivers bet-
88
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
ter journalism and attracts more readers, which in turn leads to increased financial
stability. These newsrooms are demonstrating that gender awareness, gender-sen-
sitive leadership, regular monitoring and measurable goals can deliver important
change (see also Edström, 2012 and Edstrom & Mølster, 2014).
It is also time to acknowledge that gender parity in the media is not enough on its
own, as other power structures intersect with gender and make some people even
more invisible and voiceless in the media. Greater diversity in the news in terms of
gender, ethnicity, age and other dimensions can make it more interesting and rele-
vant and engage more people.
New technologies and new media offer fantastic new ways to communicate. Today’s
problem is not a lack of information, but the abundance of it. This also means pe-
ople can create their own worlds, where only the news they like reaches them. The
era of media as a public sphere for common discussions may be over, and there is
a risk that really important information will only be available to those who pay for
it. Open access to public documents and research is therefore crucial, and the most
important issue here is to address the digital divides, between countries, between
age groups and between people from different socio-economic backgrounds.
To access, evaluate and use information, we need more media literacy skills. These
skills are also important when we produce media. It is popular to talk about media
users as ‘prosumers’, since many of us both use and produce media. But you do not
become a journalist or a director just because you can publish a film on YouTube.
Ethics, accountability and a critical approach to sources are just some examples of
the knowledge and skills that should be included in the curriculum (and perhaps
computer coding should be mandatory for all children, girls and boys).
Women who speak out have always faced risks and unfortunately, this has not
changed with new technology. Sexualised hate speech is a serious problem not only
for young people on visual platforms such as Snapchat and Instagram, but also for
professional media workers. Women journalists appear to suffer from more sexual
harassment and sexualised threats of various kinds than men, both on- and offline.
Some female journalists have chosen to speak openly about this through the me-
dia and this seems to have yielded positive results. Here, much more research and
action are needed.
The media can contribute to sustainable development if gender equality and free-
dom of expression are taken into account and regarded as crucial for reaching
future goals set at national, European or global level. The lack of gender equality
in the media is often an echo of a lack of gender equality overall. Making changes
and tackling gender-limiting norms in the media cannot be treated as a stand-alone
issue, nor will self-regulation or one legislative change suffice. It is time to step up
action - at both the structural level and on behalf of individuals in the media indust-
ry - to realise the media’s potential to be a real vehicle of change in driving progress
towards gender equality.
89
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
Box 12. Nordic Initiative 1: Nordicom project Nordic Gender & Media
Forum
The Nordic Gender and Media Forum project has compiled sex-disaggregated
statistics for the Nordic media industry (film, journalism, advertising and com-
puter games). This data provides a knowledge base for discussion on good
gender practices in the media. During the project, it has become evident that
sex-disaggregated media statistics are seldom prioritised and there is a lack
of consistent, reliable and comparative data. In the anthology Making Change.
Nordic Examples of Working Towards Gender Equality in the Media (Nordi-
com 2014), representatives from academia, civil society, activism and industry
identify both problems, solutions and ways to move forward.
www.nordicom.gu.se http://www.nordicom.gu.se/en/media-trends/nordic-gen-
der-media-forum
Since 1963, Swedish film production has been subsidised by the Swedish Film
Institute, through an agreement between the Swedish state and the film in-
dustry. Since 2005, gender equality is emphasised in this agreement, with
support for film production to be divided evenly between the sexes. The distri-
bution of production support by the institute between the sexes is carefully
monitored and reported. It has also set up a website Nordic Women in Film:
www.nordicwomenfilm.com
For many years, KVINFO – The Danish Centre for Information on Gender, Equa-
lity and Diversity – has been working strategically to increase the visibility of
women experts through its online database. This database (kvinfo.dk) is free to
access and can be used by anyone. During the 2013 Irish EU Presidency, it was
designated ‘Good Practice’ for relentlessly promoting the existence of women
experts, despite their persistent underrepresentation in the media. KVINFO and
its regional partners have established expert databases in Jordan, Palestine,
Egypt and Lebanon – all using KVINFO’s Expert Database as their template.
90
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
After almost 20 years of gender mainstreaming and plenty of targeted projects and
initiatives, it is necessary to step back and reflect on the depth and sustainability of
this strategy in schools. A closer look reveals various challenges and asks for further
strategies to cope with them.
Over the past two decades, many strategies have been launched to achieve greater
gender equality. Curricula were reformulated; school books and classroom materials
changed; initiatives like special “boys’ days” and “girls’ days” in schools and at uni-
versities organised; and guidelines written for teachers in primary schools, seconda-
ry schools and teacher education programmes, with the aim of encouraging schools
to launch gender projects and, by doing so, challenge traditional behaviour and choi-
ces, for example concerning subjects, types of school, job and family aspirations.
What are the results?
Boys and girls sit shoulder-to-shoulder in the classroom. But still they have – and
are assumed to have – different expectations concerning their choice of subjects,
behaviour and attitudes.
Women have conquered the teaching profession at all levels, but schools are still
“gendered organisations” (Acker 1991), and vertical and horizontal segregation still
exists (Burchell et al 2014):
The higher the position, the more likely it is to be occupied by a man (e.g. school
principals or members of school boards at local, regional and national levels).
The vast majority of teachers in elementary and primary education are women
(90-100% in European countries), but the opposite is the case at the other end of
the spectrum, at universities, where men are in the majority, especially at professor
level.
The more ‘feminine’ the type of school and subject, the more likely it is that the
teachers will be women. Likewise, in ‘masculine’ type schools and subjects, teachers
are more likely to be male.
Men are now in a minority in teaching and have to cope with ambivalent messages:
on the one hand, they are welcomed by school principals and female teachers and
admired by the pupils; on the other, they experience difficulties in being accepted
as a ‘real teacher’ instead of as a ‘dad’, or as a ‘real colleague’ instead of as a man
(Paseka 2012, 94).
Women can now reach any position they want: in politics, in companies, in the fi-
nancial world. Equality seems to be possible and if women were tough enough,
they could be very successful. However, they still encounter ‘leaky pipelines’, ‘glass
ceilings’ and a gender pay gap, including in the teaching professions (OECD 2013,
Burchell et al 2014). One reason for this is that most young women still choose jobs
in female-dominated areas, prefer part-time jobs and take (long) maternity leave.
91
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
A closer look at what schools have done with regard to gender issues reveals
that one-third of schools emphasised the differences between girls and boys,
with the measures taken based (at least in part) on traditional gender norms,
for example that all girls prefer particular sports or have special needs. Ano-
ther one-third of schools realised that gender behaviour is also dependent on
the context. Only in one-third of the schools were teachers able to question
traditional thinking in terms of two gender categories and look at differen-
ces within gender groups (Wroblewski & Paseka 2009, 51).
92
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
All this demonstrates the clear need to anchor gender mainstreaming within a bro-
ader debate on professionalism and to extend school-development efforts beyond
superficial numbers, events and projects.
But how can gender competence be learnt? The underlying assumptions about gen-
der are deeply ingrained, making resistance to gender issues and gender mainstre-
aming seem inevitable. To change such internalised attitudes and values requires
more than just information on a cognitive level. Learning must be seen “as a process
– as a process of construction, reconstruction and deconstruction of reality” (Reich
2005, 118f.). This requires a ‘crisis’ and creating a ‘crisis’ means initiating situations
in which routines, traditional patterns and attitudes we take for granted no longer
work. We then have to rethink our own knowledge or attitudes to find an explanation
or cope with a situation.
With this notion of learning in the background, teachers would have to provoke cri-
ses to start learning processes in their classes. How? First and foremost, they must
be provoked into asking questions, real questions. Three concepts might be useful
here (Paseka 2008a): enquiring learning, case-orientated learning and biographical
learning. These concepts are not specific to gender issues, but are the core of tea-
ching in general and therefore part of teachers’ professional knowledge.
93
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
However, if we want teachers who can provoke learning processes in this way, we
need to provide an education which offers such learning processes to trainee tea-
chers.
However, anchoring gender issues within the professionalism debate still does not
seem to be enough. To bring about sustainable change, it is not only the professio-
nals as individuals who have to reflect on their situation. To bring gender into the
mainstream of schools as organisations, gender issues must be anchored within
school-development processes.
In this context, it is important not only for teachers to reflect on their situation and
learning processes as individuals, but also to collaborate and provide space for
reflexivity on a higher level, for example in so-called ‘professional learning commu-
nities’. They have to exchange knowledge and experiences, and become aware of
blind spots and visions. The implementation of gender issues in schools must not
be seen as an isolated process, but should rather use existing structures (e.g. school
meetings, subject groups or steering groups), giving teachers a much better chance
of revealing ‘theories-in-use’ - the practical knowledge which underlies so many
processes in organisations. Only then might organisational consciousness emerge
among the teaching staff.
94
PART 3: Governance and communication for gender equality
One of the lower secondary schools (for children aged 10-14) in this project
cooperated with a primary school and an upper secondary school with a tech-
nical bias. Some of the teachers organised an in-service training, supported by
their principals. Those who took part started to rethink some of their subjects
and tried to add a technical bias, not only for girls but for all pupils. Through
this, they expanded their professional knowledge in several dimensions: not
only from a subject perspective, but also with regard to how to organise le-
arning processes for pupils in a different way. Exchanges about gender topics
were established through school-wide conferences. As a consequence, orga-
nisational consciousness increased, along with awareness that gender must
be a topic for the whole organisation and cannot be considered an individual
matter for only some teachers.
Conclusions
95
References
References
Altwicker-Hámori and Köllő (2013). Hungary: Public sector labour market from crisis
to crisis, in Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (ed.) Public Sector Schock, ILO and Edward Elgar.
Astell, M. (1997). A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of Their True
and Greatest Interest, in Patricia Springborg (ed.). Brookfield, VT: Pickering and Chatto.
Asylum Aid (2012).’I feel like as a woman I’m not welcome’: a gender analysis of
UK asylum law, policy and practice. London: Asylum Aid. Available at http://www.asy-
lumaid.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ifeelasawoman_EXEC_SUM_WEB.pdf
Ballantyne, J. (8 October 2005). France pays mothers to have more children. News
Weekly, available at newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=2338 . Accessed 13 October
2014.
Bargawi, H. and Cozzi, G. (2014a). Engendering recovery for Europe: Modelling al-
ternatives to austerity. Foundation for Progressive Economic Research, Policy Brief
1B. Available at: http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/142f7bf4-baea-46c6-bcb7-
15583a23fee5/policy-brief-1b-2014pdf.pdf
Bertrand, M., Black, S. E., Jensen, S. and Lleras-Muney, A., Breaking the Glass Ceil-
ing? The Effect of Board Quotas on Female Labor Market Outcomes in Norway. NBER
Working Paper No. 20256, pp.1-54.
Betti, G., Bettio, F., Georgiadis, Th. and Tinios, P. (2015). Unequal Aging in Europe:
Women’s Independence and Pensions. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
96
References
Bettio, F., Corsi, M., D’Ippoliti, C., Lyberaki, A., Lodovici, M. S. and Verashchagina, A.
(2012). The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and
on Gender Equality Policies: Synthesis Report. Prepared for the European Commis-
sion DG Justice.
Bettio, F., Platenga, J. and Smith, M. (2013). A new vision for gender equality in
Europe, in Bettio, F., Platenga, J. and Smith, M. (eds) Gender and the European labour
market. London: Routledge.
Blau, F. D. and Kahn, L. M. (2013). Female Labor Supply: Why is the US Falling
Behind? American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, 103 (3), 251-256. Avail-
able at http://ftp.iza.org/dp7140.pdf
Burchell, B., Hardy, V., Rubery, J. and Smith, M. (2014). A New Method to Understand
Occupational Gender Segregation in European Labour Markets. EU-report.
Burda, M., Hamermesh D., S., Weil , P., (2013). Total work and gender: facts and
possible explanations. Journal of Population Economics, 26: 239–261. Available at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00148-012-0408-x
Byerly, C. M. (2011). The Global Report on the Status of Women in News Media.
Washington, DC: International Women’s Media Foundation.
Charles, N. and Mackay, F. (2013). Feminist politics and framing contests: Domestic
violence policy in Scotland and Wales. Critical Social Policy 33:593.
Collins, Hill, P. (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the
Politics of Empowerment. New York: Routledge.
97
References
Council of the European Union. New European Pact for equality between women
and men for the period 2011 – 2020. (7349/11) Available at https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/119630.pdf
Cudd, A. E. (1998). Strikes, Housework, and the Moral Obligation to Resist. Journal
of Social Philosophy, 29: 20-36.
Davies, R. and Pierre, G. (2005). The family gap in pay in Europe: A cross-country
study. Labour Economics, 12(4): 469-486.
de Beauvoir, S., (1996). The Coming of Age, (translated by P.O’Brian). NY: Norton & co.
Dumper, H. (2004). Women Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK . London: ICAR.
Edwards, R. and Ribbens, J. (1998). Living on the edges: public knowledge, private
lives, personal experience in Ribbens, J and Edwards, R (1998) (eds.). Feminist Dil-
lemas in Qualitative Research. CA: Sage.
EIGE (2013). Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the
EU Member States: Women and the Media: Advancing gender equality in decision-
making in media organisations.
EIGE (2014). Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in
the EU Member States. Institutional Mechanisms for the Advancement of Gender
Equality. Available at http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/effectiveness-of-insti-
tutional-mechanisms-for-the-advancement-of-gender-equality
EIGE (2015). Beijing+20: The 4th Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Plat-
form for Action in the EU Member States.
Ejrnæs, M. and Kunze, A. (2013). Work and wage dynamics around childbirth. The
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(3): 856-877.
Elborgh-Woytek, K., Newiak, M., Kochhar, K., Fabrizio, S., Kpodar, K., Wingender, P., Cle-
ments, B., and Schwartz, G. (2013). Women, work, and the economy: macroeconomic
gains from gender equity. International Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note (SDN
13/10). Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1310.pdf
98
References
England, P. (2005). Gender inequality in the labour market: the role of motherhood
and segregation. Project Muse, 264-288.
European Commission (2010). Strategy for equality between women and men
2010-2015. COM(2010) 491 final.
European Commission (2013). The Gender Gap in Pensions in the EU. Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/130530_pensions_en.pdf
European Commission (2014b). Gender Pay Gap stagnates at 16.4% across EU.
Luxembourg: European Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/unitedking-
dom/press/frontpage/2014/14_14_en.htm
European Commission (2014c). Memo. Questions and Answers: The Juncker Com-
mission. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-523_en.htm
99
References
European Parliament, (2014c). A new Strategy for gender equality post 2015,
Compilation of in-depth analyses, Workshop 3 September 2014 for the Femm Com-
mittee. Brussels: European Parliament.
Global Media Monitoring Project (2010). Who Makes the News? Global Media Moni-
toring Project 2010, (WACC, World Association for Christian Communication).
Gresy, B. (2009). Petit traité contre le sexisme ordinaire. Paris: Albin Michel.
Grimshaw, D. (2011). What do we know about low-wage work and low-wage work-
ers? ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series, No. 28.
Grimshaw, D. and Rubery, J. (2015). The Motherhood Pay Gap: A Review of the Is-
sues, Theories and International Evidence, Geneva: ILO.
100
References
High Pay Centre (2014). Reform agenda. How to make top pay fairer. Available at
http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/london/Reform_Agenda_Final_Report.pdf
Hague, G. and Malos, E. (1998). Domestic Violence: Action for Change. Cheltenham:
New Clarion Press.
Harkness, S. and Waldfogel, J. (2003). The family gap in pay: Evidence from seven
industrialized countries. Research in Labor Economics 22: 369-414.
Hearn, J., Pringle, K., with members of Critical Research on Men in Europe
(2006/2009). European Perspectives on Men and Masculinities: National and Trans-
national Approaches. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hochschild, A. R. (2001). The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home
Becomes Work. Holt Paperbacks.
Holter, Ø. G. (2014). “What’s in it for men?”: Old Question, New Data, Men and Mas-
culinities. 17 (5): 515-548.
House of Commons (2010). House of Commons Library, 2010 June Budget - Direct
Taxes, benefits and tax credits - gender impact, July 2010. Available at http://www.
yvettecooper.com/women-bear-brunt-of-budget-cuts
Ida, K. (2013). LSE Feminists Economics Graduate Option Week 4 discussion blog.
Jackson, D. (2015), Aging Masculinities: The Body, Sexuality and Social Lives.
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
101
References
Joshi, H., Paci, P. and Waldfogel, J. (1999). The wages of motherhood: Better or
worse? Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23 (5): 543-564.
Karamessini, M. and Rubery, J. (eds.) (2013). Women and Austerity: the Economic
Crisis and the Future for Gender Equality. London: Routledge.
Kelly, L. (1988). Surviving Sexual Violence. Polity Press in assoc. with Basil. Cam-
bridge: Blackwell.
Lees (2002). Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial. The Women’s Press: London.
Leschke, J. and Jepsen, M. (2014). Is the economic crisis challenging the prevail-
ing gender regime? A comparison of Denmark, Germany, Slovakia, and the United
Kingdom. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, jxu013.
Lewis, J. (1997). Gender and welfare regimes: further thoughts. Social Politics:
International Studies in Gender, State and Society, 4(2): 160-177.
Lombard, N. (2014). Because they’re a couple she should do what he says’: Jus-
tifications of Violence: Heterosexuality. Gender and Adulthood’ Journal of Gender
Studies.
Mac Rae H. and Weiner E. The Persistent Invisibility of Gender in EU Policy. Eu-
ropean Integration Online Papers. Available at http://econpapers.repec.org/article/
erpeiopxx/
102
References
McCarry, M. (2010). Becoming a ‘Proper Man’: Young People’s Attitudes about inter-
personal Violence and Perceptions of Gender. Gender and Education, 22 (1)17-30.
McCarry, M. and Lombard, N. (forthcoming 2015). Same old story: Children and
Young People’s Continued Normalisation of Violence Against Women. Feminist Re-
view (special edition).
Meyers, M. K., Gornick, J. (2001). Gendering Welfare State Variation: Income Trans-
fers. Employment Supports, and Family Poverty, in Hirschmann. N. J.and Liebert,
U., Women and Welfare: Theory and Practice in the United States and Europe. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Migration Observatory (2014). Love and Money: how immigration policy discrimi-
nates between families. Oxford: Migration Observatory Commentary.
Mixon, B., (2008). Chore Wars: Men, Women and Housework. Washington, DC: Na-
tional Science Foundation. Available at http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.
jsp?cntn_id=111458 Accessed 27 September 2014.
Mooney, J. (2000). Gender, violence and the social order. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
Moss, P. (ed.) (2014). 10th International Review of Leave Policies and Related Re-
search 2014. International Network on Leave Policies and Research. Available at
http://www.leavenetwork.org/fileadmin/Leavenetwork/Annual_reviews/2014_an-
nual_review_korr.pdf
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2008). Trafficking, modern slavery, and the human security
agenda. Human Security Journal 6: 8-15.
O’Connor, J. S., Orloff, A. S. and Shaver, S. (1999). States, Markets, Families: Gen-
der, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United
States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
OECD (2013). Closing the Gender Gap. Act Now. OECD Publishing.
Okin, S. M. (1989). Justice, Gender and the Family. Boston: Basic Books.
Pascall, G., Lewis, J. (2004). Emerging gender regimes and policies for gender
equality in a wider Europe, Journal of Social Policy, 33(3): 373-394.
103
References
Paseka, A. (2008b). Political Will is not Enough. Results from the Evaluation of a
Pilot Scheme to Implement ‘Gender Mainstreaming’. In Grenz, S. et al. (eds) Gender
Equality in Higher Education. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 137-152.
Perrons, D. and Plomien, A. (2013). Gender, Inequality and the Crisis: towards more
sustainable development, in Karamessini, M. and Rubery, J. (eds) Women and Aus-
terity. The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender Equality. Abingdon: Routledge.
Pew Research Center Social & Demographic Trends (2013). On Pay Gap, Millennial
Women Near Parity—For Now, Chap. 1, “Trends from Government Data,” and Chap.
5, “Balancing Work and Family,” (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, December
11 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/chapter-5-balancing-work-
and-family/ Accessed 27 September 2014.
Pope Francis (2014). Inequality is the root of social evil #Tweet. Reprinted in Win-
field, N. (2014). Pope Francis Calls For ‘Legitimate Redistribution’ Of Wealth To The
Poor.
Reeves, P. (2011). Parental Leave: The Swedes are the Most Generous. National Public
Radio. Available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/babyproject/2011/08/09/139121410/
parental-leave-the-swedes-are-the-most-generous accessed 27 October2014.
Rosaldo, M. Z., Lamphere, L., & Bamberger, J. (Eds.). (1974). Woman, culture, and
society. Stanford University Press.
Imray, L., & Middleton, A. (1983). Public and private: Marking the boundaries. The
public and the private, 12-27.
Scambor, E., Wojnicka, K., Bergmann, N., (eds.) (2013). The Study on the Role of Men
in Gender Equality. Brussels: European Commission. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/genderequality/files/gender_pay_gap/130424_final_report_role_of_men_
en.pdf
104
References
Skinner, T., Hester, M. and Malos, E. (eds.) (2005). Researching Gender Violence:
Feminist Methodology in Action. Devon: Willan Publications.
Smith, M. and Villa, P. (2013). Recession and Recovery. Making gender equality
part of the solution, in in Bettio, F., Platenga, J. and Smith, M. (eds.) Gender and the
European labour market. London: Routledge.
Stanko, E.A. (1990). When precaution is normal: A Feminist critique of Crime Pre-
vention in Gelsthorpe, L. and Morris, A. (eds) Feminist perspectives in Criminology.
Buckingham Open University Press.
Stiglitz, J. (2012). The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers
Our Future. London: W. W. Norton and Company.
Taylor, H. (1970) Marriage and Divorce, in Mill, J. S. and Taylor, H., Essays on Sex
Equality, in Rossi, A. (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, H. (1970) The Enfranchisement of Women, in Mill, J. S. and Taylor, H., Es-
says on Sex Equality, in Rossi, A. (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Economist (22 July 2014). Why Swedish Men Take So Much Paternity Leave.
Available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/07/econo-
mist-explains-15 Accessed 28 October 2014.
UNDP (2007). Fiscal space for what? Analytical issues from a human development
perspective. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/
publications/poverty-reduction/poverty-website/fiscal-space-for-what/FiscalSpace-
forWhat.pdf
UNESCO (2014). Bali Road Map: The Roles Of The Media In Realizing The Future We
Want For All. Unesco Global Media Forum.
105
References
Veerle, M. (2011). Cooking, Caring, and Volunteering: Unpaid Work Around the
World. OECD Social, Employment, and Migration Working Papers. Paris: Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development. Available at: http://www.oecdilibrary.
org/docserver/download/5kghrjm8s142.pdf?expires=1411244066&id=id&accnam
e=guest&checksum=F0E0FD1ED576ECD6427BB04E83AF7670 Accessed 10 Octo-
ber 2014.
Walby, S. and Allen, J. (2004). Domestic Violence, sexual assault and stalking: find-
ings from the British Crime Survey. Home Office Research Study No. 276 London:
Home Office.
WBG (2014). The impact on women of Budget 2014 No recovery for women. Avail-
able at http://wbg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/FINAL-WBG-2014-budget-
response.pdf
Wirth, A., Defilippis, C. and Therkelsen, J. with the assistance of Research Associ-
ates Adil, S., Phair, C. and Benavides, B. (2014). Asylum Access and the Refugee
Work Rights. Coalition Annual Report 2014. Available at http://asylumaccess.org/
AsylumAccess/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/FINAL_Global-Refugee-Work-Rights-
Report-2014_Interactive.pdf
World Economic Forum (2014). The Global Gender Gap Report, Geneva, Switzer-
land: World Economic Forum. Available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR14/
GGGR_CompleteReport_2014.pdf
Wroblewski, A. and Paseka, A. (2009). Vertiefende Analyse der Umsetzung von Ge-
KoS. Ergebnisse aus Fallstudien an Schulen. Unveröffentlichter Endbe.
106
Contributors
Contributors
Birgitta Åseskog is an independent gender equality expert. She retired from her
position as a Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality in
Sweden in 2010 – after 20 years in the governmental offices. During the late 1990s
she managed a gender mainstreaming project for the Nordic Council of Ministers.
She has also participated in gender mainstreaming expert groups in the Council of
Europe, the United Nations, and the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE).
From 2001 until 2005 she worked in the Gender Equality Unit of the European
Commission.
107
Contributors
Recent publications include: Betti G., Bettio F., Georgiadis T., Tinios P. (2015), Unequal
Ageing in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan; Bettio F., Plantenga J. and Smith M. (2013),
Gender and the European Labour Market Routledge; Bettio F., Corsi M., D’Ippoliti C.,
Lyberaki A., Samek Lodovici M. and Verashchagina A., (2013) The Impact of the Eco-
nomic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies,
Publications Office of the European Union; Bettio F., Tinios P., Betti G., (2013) The
Gender Gap in Pensions, Publications Office of the European Union 2013.
Jacki Davis is a leading commentator and analyst on European Union affairs. She
is an experienced journalist, speaker and moderator of high-level events both in
Brussels and in EU national capitals, the editor of many publications, a regular
broadcaster on television and radio news programmes, and a Senior Adviser to the
European Policy Centre think tank. Jacki has been based in Brussels for 23 years,
and was previously Communications Director of the European Policy Centre; editor-
in-chief of E!Sharp, a magazine on the EU launched in 2001; and launch editor of
European Voice, a Brussels-based weekly newspaper on EU affairs owned by The
Economist Group, from 1995-2000.
Janne Fardal Kristoffersen, born in 1970, has been the major of the Municipa-
lity of Lindesnes (Norway) since 2011. She is representing the conservative party
called ‘Høyre’. She was deputy major from 2003 to 2011, and substitute member
of the Norwegian Parliament from 2009 to 2013. In 2007 she received a prize for
her engagement in gender equality. In 2008-2011 she participated in an EU-funded
project between Spain and Norway on the issue of balance among personal, family,
and professional life. Furthermore, she participated in an EU conference in Slovenia
in 2014, talking about how to include gender equality in the municipal agenda, and
especially her personal experience as a woman holding a high-level political position.
108
Contributors
Brigitte Grésy is Secretary General of the High Council on Gender Equality of Wo-
men and Men at Work, a body bringing together social partners, qualified experts,
and the public administration, and dealing with all legislative and policy documents
concerning the labour market and the elimination of discrimination against women.
She is currently working on sexism at work and on the indicators to be set up to en-
sure that companies bargain on equality in the workplace. In the past she served as
Director of the Women’s Rights Service and as Cabinet Director in charge of equality.
Her publications include several reports to the ministers, the latest of which deals
with sexism at work, as well as two books: Grésy B. (2008), Petit traité contre le
sexisme ordinaire (Albin Michel); Grésy B. (2014), La vie en rose, pour en découdre
avec les stéréotypes (Albin Michel).
109
Contributors
Jeff Hearn is Guest Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities and Social
Sciences, based in Gender Studies, Örebro University, Sweden; Professor of Socio-
logy, University of Huddersfield, UK; Professor of Management and Organization,
Hanken School of Economics, Finland; and Fellow of the Academy of the Social
Sciences, UK. He was formerly Professor of Gender Studies, Linköping University,
Sweden, and Research Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences, Manchester Uni-
versity, UK, based in Social Policy. Current research focuses on gender, sexuality, vio-
lence, men, organizations and transnational processes. He is co-editor of Routledge
Advances in Feminist Studies and Intersectionality book series. His latest books
are Hearn J., Blagojević M. and Harrison K., (2013) Rethinking Transnational Men
Routledge; Hearn J., Lämsä A. M. et al (2015), Opening Up New Opportunities for
Gender Equality Work, Edita; Hearn J. (2015), Men of the World: Genders, Globaliza-
tions, Transnational Times, Sage.
110
Contributors
pals of the ORA programme ‘Governing “new social risks”’ (PolChi), and Co-Principal
of a research on HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Her fields of expertise are: comparative
welfare state studies, gender relations, family policy, care, citizenship, and activa-
tion. Her recent publications include: Knijn T. (ed.) (2012), Work, family policies and
the transition to adulthood in Europe (Palgrave); Le Bihan B., Martin C., Knijn T. (eds.)
(2013), Work and Care under Pressure. Care Arrangements in Europe (Amsterdam
University Press).
Andrea Krizsan is Research Fellow at the Center for Policy Studies of the Central
European University, Budapest. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Central
European University. She worked in the European comparative research projects
‘Quality of Gender+ Equality Policies in Europe’ (QUING) and ‘Multiple Meanings
of Gender Equality’ (MAGEEQ). She provided consultancy services to the European
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe on gender equality
and gender-based violence issues. Her research concerns understanding progressive
policy change on gender equality, gender-based violence, ethnic discrimination, and
intersectionality. Her recent project analyses domestic violence policy reforms in five
Central and Eastern European countries. She published in Social Politics, European
Journal of Women Studies, Violence against Women, European Integration Online
Papers, and Policy Studies, and edited a volume on ethnic monitoring (2001). Her
works also include: Krizsan A., Skjeie H., Squires J. (eds.) (2012), Institutionalizing
Intersectionality and the Changing Nature of European Equality Regimes (Palgrave).
Ulrike Liebert is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Euro-
pean Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany). With a PhD in Social and Politi-
cal Science from the European University Institute (Italy) she has also taught at the
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain) and the Cornell University (Ithaca, USA).
Her research focuses on gender equality in EU governance, European economic and
social constitutionalism, European citizenship, civil society and the public sphere,
the Eurocrisis, and the democratic Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reform. Re-
cent publications include: Liebert U., Gattig A., Evas T. (eds.) (2013), Democratising
the EU from Below? Citizenship, Civil Society and the Public Sphere (Ashgate); Lie-
bert U., Trenz H.J. (eds.) (2012), The New Politics of European Civil Society (Routled-
ge); Schiek D., Liebert U., Schneider H. (eds.) (2011), European Economic and Social
Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP).
111
Contributors
Annelie Nordström has been the President of Kommunal, the Swedish Municipal
Workers’ Union, since 2010. It is the largest trade union in Sweden with more than
500 000 members, of whom 80% are women. Last year she was elected President
of the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU). She has been active in
the trade union movement since 1974 at different levels. She has also been a poli-
tician at local and regional level in Sweden for 10 years. The Swedish Government
recently appointed her to the office of chair of a committee tasked with analysing
future challenges in the Swedish labour market, and with submitting possible so-
lutions and policy proposals. She is a board member of various organisations in-
cluding the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), Public Services International
(PSI), and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and sits in the Board of
Directors of the Folksam insurance company.
Diane Perrons is Director of the Gender Institute and Professor of Economic Ge-
ography and Gender Studies at the London School of Economics. Her research
focuses on the gender dimensions of economic inequality and the social and spatial
implications of economic change paying particular attention to economic crises,
austerity and socially sustainable recovery. She is currently co-directing the LSE
Commission on Gender, Inequality and Power and a member of the UK Women’s
Budget Group. Her recent publications include: ‘Gendering the inequality debate’,
forthcoming in Gender and Development; ‘Gendering inequality: a note on Piketty’s
Capital in the Twenty-First Century’, British Journal of Sociology 2014; Gender, Mi-
gration and Domestic Work. Masculinities, Male Labour & Fathering in the UK and
USA, with Kilkey M. and Plomien A., Palgrave, 2013.
112
Contributors
Hege Skjeie has been professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo since
2000. She teaches equality policies, and is currently associated professor at Core,
a Norwegian multidisciplinary research centre on equality and labour market po-
licies. She has advised the Norwegian Government on equality policies in several
capacities, and chaired the Gender Equality Commission from 2010 to 2012, a
governmental commission mandated to investigate and propose gender equality
policies from an intersectional perspective. From 2006 to 2010 she was member of
the first Norwegian Equality Tribunal, i.e. the board that monitors all the Norwegian
equality legislation. Her research interests include: intersectionality, religious plura-
lism, equality institutions, comparative equality law, and international human rights.
Her works include: Krizsan A., Skjeie H., Squires J. (eds.) (2012), Intersectionality: the
Changing Nature of European Equality Regimes (Palgrave).
113
European Commission
Visions for Gender Equality
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2015
ISBN 978-92-79-47777-5
doi: 10.2838/00811
DS-02-15-320-EN-N
doi: 10.2838/00811