[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005.

]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005.]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J p:

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura
on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein
respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he
and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response,
respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and
defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus
attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiff's separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust
Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of
P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this
decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park
and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount
of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein
defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties. EHaCTA
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate court,
respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly supportpendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura.
Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument. 3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to
P20,000. 4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution. 5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioner's appeal for lack of merit and
affirming in toto the trial court's decision. 6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the
abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son. 7 Petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.

1
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari 8 and the Petition for Certiorari 9 were ordered consolidated by
this Court. 10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with
law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT
OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST
FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES;
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES' MINOR
CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS
ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS
TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON. 11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
SET RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES' SON FOR
HEARING. 12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY'S MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES. 13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY'S SUPPORT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED
BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF
MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS
SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL." 14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD
TO INCREASE JAVY'S SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated: AcSCaI
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not
only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists,
awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying
him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to
marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into
marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate
not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no
inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that
of leaving defendant-appellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and
their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,

2
 sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their
separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court's decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a
breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded.
While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by
reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not
follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in
the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full
justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb
the ruling of the trial court. 16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 17 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral
damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that
the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in
complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have
assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of
moral damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
 
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: aEHTSc
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . . 18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It
is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on
specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and
yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the
petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful
act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.

3
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the
Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. 19
With respect to the grant of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorney's fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiff's act or omission has
compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2),
and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered. (par. 11) 20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the
award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. 21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing
the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to
litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner's psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity
causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney's fees
and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award
of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila
Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court
has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572-
573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings. ASTcEa
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family
Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership
properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are
the parties' conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed
during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as
Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the said
bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave
him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this

4
 particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there
been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wife's share in the conjugal
partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in
their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12,
1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended
to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had
allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in
the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2)
portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid
support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal
partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession
of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same
reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband
with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. 22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-
half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his
outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-
appellee as the latter's share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that
henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which
plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-
President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiff-appellant's service
for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the
trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-
appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as
her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. 23
 
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation
to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership. ASICDH
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, 24 this Court expounded on the consequences of a void
marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the

5
 property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the
law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age
of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of
the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-
ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in
default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage. aCHDAE
xxx xxx xxx
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare
the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized
for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void

6
 marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes
of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the
second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not
to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary
rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It
must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the
Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family
Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. 25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No
fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a
quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about
to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 26 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact
that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996
which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of
the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner's shares of stock in
Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals' Resolutions of September 2,
1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente litein favor of the parties' son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127358, 127449, [March 31, 2005], 494 PHIL 264-282)