1.
Carbonel v CA, 69 SCRA 99
Article 1544, New Civil Code, which is decisive of this case, recites:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith (emphasis supplied).
It is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the
protection of the second paragraph of said Article 1544.
Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the one who first
takes possession in good faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that ownership
of immovable property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good faith first recorded" his right.
Under the first and third paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of anterior registration (DBP vs.
Mangawang, et al., 11 SCRA 405; Soriano, et al. vs. Magale, et al., 8 SCRA 489).
If there is no inscription, what is decisive is prior possession in good faith. If there is inscription, as in the
case at bar, prior registration in good faith is a pre-condition to superior title.
2. Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley), Inc. v. CA, 448 SCRA 347 [2005]
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
The provision is not applicable in the present case. It contemplates a case of double or multiple sales by a
single vendor. More specifically, it covers a situation where a single vendor sold one and the same
immovable property to two or more buyers. 42 According to a noted civil law author, it is necessary that the
conveyance must have been made by a party who has an existing right in the thing and the power to
dispose of it.43 It cannot be invoked where the two different contracts of sale are made by two different
persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold. 44 And even if the sale was made by the
same person, if the second sale was made when such person was no longer the owner of the property,
because it had been acquired by the first purchaser in full dominion, the second purchaser cannot acquire
any right.45
In the case at bar, the subject property was not transferred to several purchasers by a single vendor. In
the first deed of sale, the vendors were Gamiao and Dayag whose right to the subject property originated
from their acquisition thereof from Rizal Madrid with the conformity of all the other Madrid brothers in
1957, followed by their declaration of the property in its entirety for taxation purposes in their names. On
the other hand, the vendors in the other or later deed were the Madrid brothers but at that time they were
no longer the owners since they had long before disposed of the property in favor of Gamiao and Dayag
3. Cheng v. Cheng vs. Genato, 300 SCRA 722 (1998);
To our mind, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the agreement between Genato and
Cheng is a contract to sell, which was, in fact, petitioner connection in his pleadings before the said
courts. Consequently, both to mind, which read:
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith
However, a meticulous reading of the aforequoted provision shows that said law is not apropos to the
instant case. This provision connotes that the following circumstances must concur:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in the issue must pertain to exactly the same subject matter,
and must be valid sales transactions.
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
represent conflicting interests; and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have
bought from the very same seller.
These situations obviously are lacking in a contract to sell for neither a transfer of ownership nor a sales
transaction has been consummated. The contract to be binding upon the obligee or the vendor depends
upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of an event.
4. Mendoza v. Kalaw, 42 Phil. 236 (1921);
It will be noted from the foregoing that Federico Cañet made two sales of the same property — one of the
oppositor and the other to the petitioner. The first was but a conditional sale while the latter was an
absolute sale. It will also be noted that while the absolute sale to the petitioner was subsequent to the
conditional sale to the oppositor, the former obtained the actual possession of the property first. It will
further be noted from a reading of Exhibits 1 and B that the petitioner actually paid to his vendor the
purchase price of the property in question, while the payment by the oppositor depended upon the
performance of certain conditions mentioned in the contract of sale. 1awph!l.net
While was have stated that there were two sales of the parcel of land in question, that is hardly the fact,
because a conditional sale, before the performance of the condition, can hardly be said to be a sale of
property, especially where the condition has not been performed or complied with. That being true, article
1473 of the Civil Code can hardly be said to be applicable.
5. San Lorenzo Dev. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 449 SCRA 99 (2005);
However, it must be stressed that the juridical relationship between the parties in a double sale is
primarily governed by Article 1544 which lays down the rules of preference between the two purchasers
of the same property. It provides:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater significance in
case of double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who
acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith, shall be deemed the
owner.38 Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with good faith' that is, the registrant must have no
knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should
have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects
in the title of his vendor.
6. Cruz v. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656 (1984);
As the Court held in Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals 2 "it is essential that the buyer of realty must act in
good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the second paragraph of [the above
quoted] Article 1544." As the writer stressed in his concurring opinion therein, "(T)he governing principle
here is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of
the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as provided by the Civil Code and that is
where the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge of
the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her
purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first
sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior
registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer
being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he
must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's
rights) — from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing
registration, by delivery of possession. The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence
or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration
as provided by law."
7. Tañedo v. CA, 252 SCRA 80 (1996)
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration of the sale in
favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as
follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall
belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed
of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest
in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not
registered the sale to them at all.
8. Agricultural and Home Extension Dev. v. CA, 213 SCRA 563 (1992)
A purchaser in good faith is defined as "one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property."
9. Navera v. CA, 184 SCRA 584
The possession mentioned in Article 1544 for determining who has better right when the same piece of
land has been sold several times by the same vendor includes not only the material but also the symbolic
possession, which is acquired by the execution of a public instrument. This means that after the sale of a
realty by means of a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it to another, does not transmit anything to
the second vendee, and if the latter, by virtue of this second sale, takes material possession of the thing,
he does it as mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights of the thing
lawfully acquired by the first vendee (Quimson vs. Rosete, 87 Phil. 159; Sanchez vs. Ramos, 40 Phil.
614; Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388). In the case at bar, the prior sale of the land to respondent Arsenio
Nares by means of a public instrument is clearly tantamount to a delivery of the land resulting in the
material and symbolic possession thereof by the latter. Verily, factual evidence points to the prior actual
possession by respondent Nares before he was evicted from the land by petitioners and their
predecessors in 1957 when the latter entered the disputed property. No other evidence exists on record
to show the contrary.
10. Naawan Community Rural Bank, Inc. v. CA, 395 SCRA 43 (2003);
Thus, the only issue left to be resolved is whether or not private respondents could be considered as
buyers in good faith.
The priority in time principle being invoked by petitioner bank is misplaced because its registration
referred to land not within the Torrens System but under Act 3344. On the other hand, when private
respondents bought the subject property, the same was already registered under the Torrens System. It
is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land have the legal right to rely
on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need to inquire further, except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry.[8cräläwvirtualibräry
11. (Siy Cong Bieng vs Hongkong & Shanghai bank GR No. L-34655)
12. (Phil. Trust Co. vs. PNB G.R. No. L-16483 December 7, 1921)
The execution of the notes, the physical possession of the negotiable quedan, or warehouse receipt, and
the recognition of ownership by the warehouseman, legally carries with it both the title to, and the
possession of, the property. In such a case, title is not founded on a public instrument which should be
authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official. Legally speaking, the execution of the
promissory notes and the pledging of the quedans, or warehouse receipts, as collateral, and the
describing of them in the notes, and the manual delivery of the quedan, or warehouse receipt itself,
carries with it not only the title, but the legal possession of the property. In other words, as to the property
described in the quedans, or warehouse receipts, which were pledged, as collateral, in January, 1919, to
secure the eight respective promissory notes, both the title and the possession of that property were
delivered to and vested in the defendant bank in January, 1919. Three of those quedans, or warehouse
receipts, were returned to the firm by the bank on February 10, 1919, but the bank still owned and held
the notes, which were secured but those warehouse receipts, and no part of the debt itself was paid by or
through the surrender of the receipts. For such reasons as to the first cause of action, the plaintiff cannot
recover, and, as to it, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
13. (Martinez vs. PNB, 93 Phil 765)
14. Paulmitan v. CA, 215 SCRA 866 (1992)
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the
Civil Code, Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because
under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)].
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are
valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which
culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby
became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court
since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof
[Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his
daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely
transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the
land in question with the respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of the fact that when
the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land after it was forfeited for non-payment of
taxes, she redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the
entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue raised by petitioners, the Court,
in Adille v. Court of Appeals, 16 resolved the same with the following pronouncements:
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership
over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject of dispute devolved
upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period
required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article
1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of
the entire property.
15. Mindanao v. Yap, 13 SCRA 190 (1965)
These premises are not challenged by appellant. But he calls attention to one point, namely, that the four
children of Rosenda Nuqui who did not take part in the sale, besides Erlinda Dionisio Diaz, quitclaimed in
favor of the latter their interests in the properties; and that the trial court held that Erlinda as well as her
husband acted in bad faith, because "having reasonable notice of defendants' having unlawfully taken
possession of the property, they failed to make reasonable demands for (him) to vacate the premises to
respect their rights thereto." It is argued that being herself guilty of bad faith, Erlinda D. Diaz, as owner of
5/12 undivided interest in the properties (including the 4/12 ceded to her by her four sisters), is in no
position to ask for annulment of the sale. The argument does not convince us. In the first place the
quitclaim, in the form of an extrajudicial partition, was made on May 6, 1956, after the action for
annulment was filed, wherein, the plaintiffs were not only Erlinda but also the other co-owners who took
no part in the sale and to whom there has been no imputation of bad faith. Secondly the trial courts'
finding of bad faith is an erroneous conclusion induced by a manifest oversight of an undisputed fact,
namely, that on June 10, 1954, just a month after the deed of sale in question, Erlinda D. Diaz did file an
action against Ildefonso D. Yap and Rosenda Nuqui, among others, asserting her rights as co-owner of
the properties (Case No. 1646). Finally, bad faith on the part of Erlinda would not militate against the
nullity of the sale, considering that it included not only the lands in common by Rosenda Nuqui and her six
children but also the buildings and school facilities owned by the Mindanao Academy, Inc., an entity which
had nothing to do with the transaction and which could be represented solely by its Board of Trustees.
16. Republic v. Heirs of Francisca Dignos-Sorono, 549 S 58
Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Court’s decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan
v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to
his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)].
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect
to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private
respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land
as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
17. Bucton v. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499 (1974)
Petitioners' appeal is predicated on the proposition that as owners of the property by purchase from
private respondents, and being in actual, continuous and physical possession thereof since the date of its
purchase, their action to compel the vendors to execute a formal deed of conveyance so that the fact of
their ownership may be inscribed in the corresponding certificate of title, had not yet prescribed when they
filed the present action.
We hold that the present appeal is meritorious.
1. There is no question that petitioner Nicanora Gabar Bucton paid P1,500.00 to respondent Josefina
Gabar as purchase price of one-half of the lot now covered by TCT No. II, for respondent Court of
Appeals found as a fact "that plaintiffs really paid for a portion of the lot in question pursuant to their
agreement with the defendants that they would own one-half (1/2) of the land." That sale, although not
consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding between petitioners
and private respondents, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate
produces legal effects between the parties. [1] Although at the time said petitioner paid P1,000.00 as part
payment of the purchase price on January 19, 1946, private respondents were not yet the owners of the
lot, they became such owners on January 24, 1947, when a deed of sale was executed in their favor by
the Villarin spouses. In the premises, Article 1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[w]hen a person
who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires
title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee," is applicable.
18. City of Manila v. Bugsuk, 101 Phil. 859(1957)
A “merchant store” defined as any place where goods are kept for sale; or where goods
are deposited & sold by one engaged in buying & selling them. Placing of an order for
goods & the making of pmt at a principal office does not transform said office into a
store, for it is necessary element that there must also be goods/ wares stored or on
display, & provided also that the firm/person maintaining that office is actually
engaged in the business of buying & selling.
Sun brothers & co, vs Velasco
Par. 3 of art 1505, a person who buys a thing at merchant’s store after the same
has been put on display, acquires a valid title to the thing although his predecessors in
interest did not have any right of ownership over it. A buyer cannot reasonably expected
to look behind the title of every article when he buys at a store.
19. Aznar v. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA 486 (1965);
Aznar v. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA 486 (1965);
Where the owner had not yet consented to the sale of the vehicle when it was
taken & driven away by the would-be buyer, the acquisition subsequently of another
person who took it in good faith, would still entitle the original owner to recover the same
since it constituted unlawful deprivation under art. 559 entitling the owner to recover it
from any possessor thereof. Aznar also held that the provisions of art. 1506 would not
apply to the present possessor since it was essential that his seller should have a
voidable title at least. In the case of the present possessor his seller did not even have
any title to the property since it as never sold to him nor delivered to him pursuant to a
valid or at least voidable sale.
Held the line that non-delivery of the vehicle by the seller could not have possibly
given any sort of title to the would-be buyer, & the latter could not in turn convey any title,
valid/voidable, to his own buyer to bring the case under art. 1506. The court pointed out
that perfection of the contract does not transfer ownership; & that ownership is not
transferred by contract but by tradition.
