066R

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DANGAL

AT DANGAL

IN THE MATTERS OF

BECHARA LIMITED.………………………………...……………………………………….PETITIONER 1

(Represented by the Chief Executive Officer, Bechara Limited.)

v.

DYNAMO LIMITED …………………………………………….……………RESPONDENT 1

(Represented by Chief Executive Officer, Dynamo Limited)

CIVIL SUIT NO.: 1080/2019

[APPLICATION FILED UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 READ WITH

ARTICLE 225 OF THE SALDANA CONSTITUTION

-M EMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-

……………………………….
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................v

STATEMENT OF FACTS....................................................................................................vii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................viii

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION........................................................................................ix

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................x

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED................................................................................................11

1. THE APPLICATION FILED UNDER SECTION 11 OF ARBITRATION &

CONCILIATION ACT IS INADMISSIBLE......................................................................11

A. The scope of Enquiry under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act,1996 is limited to establishing existence of an Arbitration clause between the parties

…………………………………………………………………………….11

B. The arbitration clause mentioned in the Agreement to Sell cannot be extended to the

subsequent agreement......................................................................................................12

C. The Present application is time-barred..................................................................16

2. THE RULE 7 OF THE BAR COUNCIL IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE ARTICLE 19

OF THE CONSTITUTION..................................................................................................17

A. Proportionality test should be applied as a standard of judicial review by the court

in the present matters.......................................................................................................17

B. The impugned rule satisfies the Proportionality test.............................................18

iii
 3. THE IMPUGNED RULE IS INTRA VIRES TO THE ARTICLE 220

CONSTITUTION................................................................................................................23

4. THE IMPUGNED RULE IS INTRA VIRES TO THE ADVOCATES ACT,1961.......25

PRAYER FOR RELIEF...........................................................................................................27

iv
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

A.G Row v. State of Madras (1952) AIR 196..........................................................................16

Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. (1997) 5 SCC 516..........25

Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi & Sons, Civil Appeal 10025/2017.....................................13

Chloro Control (India) Private Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water 2013 1 SCC 641..........................12

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835................................................20

Duro Felguera S.A v. Gangavaram Port, (2017) 9 SCC 729...................................................11

In Re: Delhi Laws Act, AIR 1951 SC 332...............................................................................25

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India SCC Online SC 1642......................................................17

Kesavanada Bharati v. Union of India 1973 4 SCC 225…………………………………….27

Mahanagar Telecom Nigam Ltd. v. Canara bank (2019) 10 SCC 32......................................12

Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of MP 2012 4 SCC 707.........................18

P.S Mudholkar v Bar Council of IndiaAIR 1980 Bom 38.......................................................21

Premium Granite v. State of Tamil Nadu 1994 2 SCC 691.....................................................19

PS Mudholkar v Bar Council Of India AIR 1980 Bom 38......................................................22

R v. Oakes [1986] S.C.R. 103..................................................................................................16

Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India 2016 5 SCC 1..............19

Statutes

v
Article 19, Saldania Constitution,1950....................................................................................16

Article 55, Limitation Act,1963...............................................................................................15

Saldania Arbitration & Conciliation Act (Amendment),2015.................................................10

Section 11, Arbitration & Conciliation Act,1996....................................................................10

Advocates Act, 1961………………………………………………………………………..19

Proposition

Proposition, Winter Intra-Moot Court Competition,2020........................................................11

Books

B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution Select Documents, Volume IV, 196

(1967)...................................................................................................................................22

Samaraditya Pal, India’s Constitution: Origins and Evolution, Volume VII, 190, (2017)......23

Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation (Cambridge

University Press 2012………………………………………………………………………21

vi
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Dynamo Limited [Respondent No. 1] undertakes land aggregation services in Dangal.

Bechara Limited [Petitioner No. 1] is a realty developing firm engaged in construction in

Dangal. Just Chips Limited approached petitioner no. 1 for building its facility in Dangal

approximately over 70 acres of land. Petitioner no. 1 approached Respondent No. 1 for joint

development of the Just Chips Limited facility in Dangal. All three parties then entered into

an agreement to sell as per which Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent no. 1 had the joint and

several liability buy the land. The agreement had an arbitration clause. Petitioner No. 1 and

Respondent No. 1 entered into a subsidiary agreement which imposed the obligation on

Respondent No. 1 to undertake the acquiring of the land. This subsidiary agreement had no

arbitration clause. Respondent breached the agreement on 31.01.2015. Petitioner No. 1 sent a

notice to Respondent No. 1 on 01.02.2018. The parties couldn't choose the arbitrator hence

the Petitioner No. 1 filed an application u/s 11 of the arbitration and conciliation act.

II

Uday Bhan was prohibited from practising in any judicial, administrative, court or tribunal.

because Rule 7 of the Bar Council of Saldana prohibited any offices referred u/s 30(ii) of the

Advocated Act,1961 to practise for a period of three years after retirement. Uday Bhan

contended the Rule 7 of Bar Council to be unconstitutional.

HENCE THE INSTANT MATTERS

vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1. The petitioner most humbly submits before the jurisdiction of this Honourable High

Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration &Conciliation Act,1996 read with

Article 225 of the Constitution of Saldana,1950.

The parties most humbly submit to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

viii
 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

1. Whether the application under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation

Act,1996 maintainable?

2. Whether the impugned rule is ultra vires to the Article 19 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the impugned rule runs contrary to the legislative intention behind

Article 220 of the Constitution?

4. Whether the impugned rule is ultra vires to the Advocates Act, 1961?

ix
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THE APPLICATION IS INADMISSIBLE UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE

SALDANIA ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996?

The scope of Enquiry under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 is

limited to existence of an Arbitration clause between the parties [A] The arbitration

clause mentioned in the Agreement to Sell cannot be extended to the subsequent

agreement [B] The application is time-barred and hence its reference will be against the

interests of justice. [C]

2. THE RULE 7 OF THE BAR COUNCIL IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE ARTICLE

19 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Proportionality test should be applied as a standard of judicial review by the court in the

present matters [A] The impugned rule satisfies the proportionality test [B]

3. THE IMPUGNED RULE IS INTRA VIRES TO THE ARTICLE 220 OF THE

CONSTITUTION

The impugned rule is intra vires to the Article 220 of the Constitution because it does

not run contrary to the intention of the legislators

4. THE IMPUGNED RULE IS INTRA VIRES TO THE ADVOCATES ACT,1961.

The impugned rule is intra vires to the Advocates Act,1961 as it suffers from the vice of

excessive delegation.

x
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. The application filed under Section 11 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act is

inadmissible

The scope of Enquiry under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 is

limited to establishing existence of an Arbitration clause between the parties [A] The

arbitration clause mentioned in the Agreement to Sell cannot be extended to the subsequent

agreement [B] The application is time-barred and hence its reference will be against the

interests of justice [C]

A. The scope of Enquiry under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act,1996 is limited to establishing existence of an Arbitration clause between the

parties

i. Section 11(6) of Arbitration & Conciliation Act,1996 gives court, the power to

appoint arbitrator in cases where the parties are unable to agree upon the appointment

within thirty days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other party1

ii. The scope of judicial enquiry in this section was specified by the legislature in the

2015 amendment by introduction of Section 6A of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act.2 The section confined the scope of judicial enquiry to establishing existence of an

arbitration agreement.

iii. Interpreting the recent amendment, the SC in the matters of Duro Felguera SA v.

Gangavaram Port Limited has opined that

1
Section 11, Arbitration & Conciliation Act,1996.
2
Saldania Arbitration & Conciliation Act (Amendment),2015.
11
 “After the amendment, all that the Courts need to see is whether an arbitration

agreement exists - nothing more, nothing less. The legislative policy and purpose

is essentially to minimize the Court’s intervention at the stage of appointing the

arbitrator and this intention as incorporated in Section 11 (6A) ought to be

respected.”3 (Emphasis Provided)

iv. Hence in conclusion, this court does not have the jurisdiction to enquire anything

besides establishing presence of an arbitration agreement

B. The arbitration clause mentioned in the Agreement to Sell cannot be extended to the

subsequent agreement

i. Petitioner no. 1, Respondent No. 1 and one Just Chips Ltd. Entered into an

agreement to sell where the petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 1 collectively took

the responsibility to acquire a land of 70 acres 4. The agreement to sell contained an

arbitration clause.5 Subsequently the petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 1 entered into

a separate agreement by which they agreed that respondent no. 1 would undertake to

acquire the land and petitioner no. 1 would undertake to develop the land.6

ii. The agreement to sell [Main Agreement], puts joint and several liability on the

petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 1 to acquire the subject matter property. 7 However

the main aim of the subsequent agreement [Ancillary Agreement] is to change the

nature of their liability to an individual liability.

3
Duro Felguera S.A v. Gangavaram Port, (2017) 9 SCC 729.
4
Proposition, Winter Intra-Moot Court Competition,2020.
5
Proposition, Winter Intra-Moot Court Competition,2020.
6
Proposition, Winter Intra-Moot Court Competition,2020.
7
Proposition, Winter Intra-Moot Court Competition,2020.
12
 iii. According to the principle of composite reference, court can extend the arbitration

agreement in the parent agreement to the ancillary agreement when both of them form

a single composite transaction.8

iv. Composite transaction has been defined by the SC in the matters of Mahanagar

Telecom Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank, where it stated that

“Composite transaction where the performance of the agreement may not be feasible

without the aid, execution, and performance of the supplementary or the ancillary

agreement, for achieving the common object, and collectively having a bearing on the

dispute.”9

v. Hence for two contracts to be composite in nature, it is necessary for them to be of

such a nature so as to achieve a common object. Thus, if the terms of two agreements

are in contradiction to each other, then it is a clear indication that they cannot form a

composite contract.

vi. For application of the principle of composite reference the court enumerated

certain essentials in the matters of Cheran Propertiees Ltd vs Kasturi And Sons

Ltd which are as follows.

“(a) there must be a mother agreement;

(b) the mother agreement must contain an arbitration agreement;

(c) agreements ancillary to the mother agreement need not contain an arbitration

agreement; and

(d) there must be a finding that the ancillary agreements cannot be performed in the

absence of the mother agreement.

lead to a final and binding resolution of the dispute”10

vi. Apart from these principles, the court also has to consider the wording of the

arbitration clause which should be wide enough to include all agreements inter-

connected to the parent agreement.11

vii. Disputes regarding tripartite agreements can be a finally resolved, only if all three

parties are joined in the arbitration proceedings.

viii. Firstly, the intention and object of the both agreements are not same, the

intention and object of the agreement to sell [Parent Agreement] was to put joint and

several liability on the parties. However, the intention of the subsequent agreement

was to change the nature of their liability. Hence, terms of both the agreements are in

clear contradiction to each other. Thus, they cannot be said to share common intention

or object.

ix. The ancillary agreement in no way aids or executes the main agreement but on the

contrary attempts to negate the intention of the main agreement. Thus, they cannot

form composite agreement.

x. Secondly, The Composite reference will not lead to a final resolution of the

dispute The Petitioner No. 1 has not impleaded the Just Chips, which was one of the

parties to the tripartite agreement to sell. However, the dispute cannot be resolved

without joining of all the three parties.

xi. It was only due to the act of Just Chips to announce their intention to set up the

largest facility in the world near Frazer Town, which made the acquiring of land

Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi & Sons, Civil Appeal 10025/2017.

Duro Felguera SA v. Gangavaram Port Limited 2017 9 SCC 729.

14
 impossible for the respondent. Thus, for resolution of the dispute in question assumes

importance in the provided case.

xii. Since, Just Chips is a necessary party, referring of the dispute to an arbitrator

without impleading Just Chips is a wastage of time and resources of the parties and

thus contrary to interests of justice.

xiii. Thirdly, the language of the arbitration is not wide so as to include the

ancillary agreement in question. The arbitration agreement only related to the

“performance of the agreement to sell” but on the contrary, the ancillary agreement

had a larger scope as it also covered the obligations of petitioner with regard to

development of the land.

xiv. Thus, the language of arbitration agreement is not wide enough to include the

subsequent contract

xv. So, in conclusion it can be ascertained that the arbitration clause cannot be

extended to the subsequent agreement between the respondent and the petitioner.

C. The Present application is time-barred

i. The cause of action arose when the respondent allegedly breached the contract on

31.01.2015. According to the Article 55 of the Limitation Act,196112 . The

limitation period for institution of legal proceedings relating to damages due to

breach of agreement is 3 years. Hence the limitation period expired after 3 years

on 31.01.2018. However the applicant sent the first notice to the respondent on

1.02.2018, hence the legal proceedings are time- barred.

Article 55, Limitation Act,1963.

15
 ii. Though according to the Section 6A of the Arbitration Act, the court is only

required to look into the existence of an arbitration agreement, however the power

of composite reference should be applied by the court only after a careful

consideration of the facts of the case and determining whether the reference will

be interests of justice as laid down in the matters of Cheran Properties Case13.

iii. Hence in this case, the court should not refer the dispute to arbitration as it will be

counterproductive exercise.

2. The Rule 7 of the Bar Council is not ultra vires the Article 19 of the Constitution.

Proportionality test should be applied as a standard of judicial review by the court in the

present matters [A] The impugned rule satisfies the proportionality test [B]

A. Proportionality test should be applied as a standard of judicial review by the court

in the present matters

i. The article 19(1)(g) provides the freedom of trade to citizens, 14 however it is

subject to reasonable restrictions as mentioned in Article 19(6). Similarly,

right to practise as an advocate is also covered in it and can be subjected to the

restrictions imposed by the Bar Council of Saldana.

ii. According to the decision of courts in several cases, the nature of restrictions

should be imposed only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ and should be

‘minimally intrusive’ to the rights.15

iii. In order to maintain this standard of review with respect to state actions, the

courts around the world have accepted the test of proportionality to be

13
Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi & Sons, Civil Appeal 10025/2017.
14
Article 19, Saldania Constitution,1950.
15
A.G Row v. State of Madras (1952) AIR 196.
16
 standard. This test was first enunciated by the apex court of Canada in the

matters of R v. Oakes16 and has since then been applied by various courts

around the world such as UK, Israel and South Africa. In the matters of K.S

Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the supreme court has accepted this test to be

inherent under article 19 of the constitution. 17

iv. The proportionality test is generally applied when the court attempts to

balance between a right and a compelling state interest.18

v. The right to practise law a statutory right as well as a fundamental right

protected under article 19(1)(g) of the constitution. However, it is subjected to

certain restrictions which can be imposed by BCI.

vi. The impugned rule attempts to preserve the integrity and independence of

judiciary. It is introduced with the view to minimize the conflict of interests. It

is introduced with the aim of to reduce unfair influence of retired judges on the

sitting judges. Moreover, it also attempts maintain the dignity of judges.

vii. Hence in this case the court is faced with the dilemma of balancing two

competing interests thus it is a fit case for application of proportionality test.

B. The impugned rule satisfies the Proportionality test

i. The test was also applied in similar facts when the court reviewed

constitutional validity of a legislation alleged to have contravened article

19(1)(g) of the constitution in the matters of Modern Dental College v. State

16
R v. Oakes [1986] S.C.R. 103
17
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India SCC Online SC 1642
18
Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation (Cambridge
University Press 2012)
17
 of MP where the court observed that in order to test the constitutional validity

of a legislation it has to consider

a. “whether the policy resulting in a restriction of a right is in pursuance of a

legitimate purpose;

b. whether the policy is capable of achieving this purpose;

c. whether, among alternatives, the policy measure impairs the right the least;

d. whether the loss to the State by not pursuing the purpose in that particular

manner is outweighed by the loss to the right.”19

ii. Generally, when this test is applied the court has to consider whether it should

apply the strict scrutiny method where the burden of proof rests on the state to

prove that their legislation is constitutionally valid. Or It has to apply the

reasonable method where the burden rests on the petitioner that the statute is

unconstitutional. In India the courts have applied the reasonable method due

to presence of presumption of constitutionality.20

iii. However, in Indian context the courts should apply the rest by keeping in

mind that the court must not impinge on the scope of executive or legislature.

Similar view was taken by the SC in matters of Premium Granite v State of

Tamil Nadu where it observed that

“It is not the domain of the court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public

policy in an exercise to consider as to whether a particular public policy is wise

Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of MP 2012 4 SCC 707.
19

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India SCC Online SC 1642.

18
 or a better public policy can be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the

discretion of the executive and legislative authorities as the case may be.”21

iv. Hence the court should very carefully apply the proportionality test so as not

to impinge upon the function of legislature thus, upholding the cherished

principle of separation of power.

v. The impugned rule is integral to preserving the independence and integrity of

the judiciary. It attempts to reduce the chances of unfair influence of the

retired officers on the sitting judges. The rule is also important for the sake of

maintaining the dignity of the judges.

vi. The independence of judiciary has been accepted by the SC in the matters of

Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India as to

be a part of the basic structure which is kept at the highest pedestal in

constitutional law.22

vii. Thus, there is indeed a legitimate aim of this impugned rule. The rule also

achieves this legitimate aim by reducing the probability of exercise of undue

influence on sitting judges by the retired officers.

viii. After settling that there is a legitimate aim of the state action and the action

also has a rational relationship with fulfilment of the aim. The court needs to

tread on the next sub-test with caution so as to make sure that it does not

impinge on the functions of the legislature.

ix. In the given case the prohibition is only temporary in nature which bars a

retired officer from practising for only 3 years. As per the observations of the

Premium Granite v. State of Tamil Nadu 1994 2 SCC 691

Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India 2016 5 SCC 1

19
 supreme court of Canada in the matters of Dagenais v. Canadian

Broadcasting Corp. the nature of the restriction such as whether it is

temporary or permanent is necessary to be considered by the court before

deciding on its proportionality.23

x. Moreover, sweeping restriction barring the retired officers from all courts,

tribunals and authorities is necessary because judges transfer in short intervals

thus there is a high probability that a judge earlier working as a junior of the

retired officer in say Delhi HC may after some time may be the chief justice

of Allahabad HC. Thus, if the retired officers are only barred from practising

in the high courts from where they retired then there will still be probability of

him influencing the sitting judges. Thus, such rule will be defeated in

achieving its purpose.

xi. It is also reasonable to assume that the influence will wane after a time period

of 3 years hence the impugned rule is minimally intrusive24

xii. The impugned rule is also proportionate in its application to additional high

court judges. Because, at the time of their posting even they have similar

powers as those of permanent judges. The comments of Sapru committee are

relevant in this context which said that

“I am also of the opinion that temporary or acting Judges do greater harm

than permanent Judges, when after their seat on the Bench for a short period

they revert to the Bar. A seat on the Bench gives them a pre-eminence over

their colleagues and embarrasses the subordinate Judges who were at one

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835

P.S Mudholkar v Bar Council of IndiaAIR 1980 Bom 38

20
 time under their control. and thus, instead of their helping justice they act as a

hindrance to free justice” 25

xiii. Moreover, the dignity of the post of judge will also fall down if they are

allowed to revert back to the bar. This observation was also endorsed in the

constituent assembly debate where it was stated that

“the dignity of the High Court demands that an ex-judge should not come

back to the Bar. A High Court Judge may not have much money but his

dignity is far greater than that of anyone else. So if he comes back to the Bar

he would bring down the dignity of his office. I have seen some advocates

who have been ministers of justice going back to the Bar thus bringing down

the dignity of their office. Probably during office, they cultivated special

relations with the Chief Justice and other judges as they know they might

have to revert to the Bar. This should not be permitted.”26

xiv. Moreover it will be irrational for us to assume that a relaxation would be

justified in favour of an additional high court judge because he commands

same powers as that of a permanent judge 27So, in conclusion it can be said

that the impugned rule is proportional to the compelling state interest it seeks

to achieve.

3. The impugned rule is intra vires to the Article 220 Constitution

25
Samaraditya Pal, India’s Constitution: Origins and Evolution, Volume VII, 154, (2017)
26
Samaraditya Pal, India’s Constitution: Origins and Evolution, Volume VII, 156, (2017)
PS Mudholkar v Bar Council Of India AIR 1980 Bom 38
27

21
 i. In the original draft constitution, which was introduced in the constituent

assembly, there was a complete bar on all judges from practising after

retirement.28 The opinions regarding the same was divided but the assembly

was unanimous in their conclusion that there should be restriction on right to

practise of permanent judges.

ii. However, there was some opposition regarding restrictions on right to practise

of additional judges. Several members like B.M Gupte and HV Kamath who

considered that the restrictions on additional judges would be unfair to them.29

iii. The constituent assembly still passed the version which prohibited all the

judges regardless no matter they were permanent or temporary. However, the

position was soon changed when the restrictions on temporary judges were

relaxed.30

iv. However as seen from the practise of the high courts, the bar on practise still

exists. The practise was observed in the matters of Supreme Court

Advocates On Record Association v. Union of India

“an undertaking was taken from them at the time of their initial appointment,

that if and when a permanent judgeship of that Court was offered to them,

they would not decline the same. And additionally, the Chief Justice of the

Bombay High Court would require them to furnish a further undertaking, that

if they decline to accept such permanent judgeship, or if they resigned from

28
B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution Select Documents, Volume IV, 196
(1967)
29
Samaraditya Pal, India’s Constitution: Origins and Evolution, Volume VII, 165, (2017).
The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,1956 Also See Also: Samaraditya Pal, India’s
30

Constitution: Origins and Evolution, Volume VII, 160, (2017) .

Bombay High Court, or any court or tribunal subordinate to it.31

v. So, the impugned rule cannot be said to impose any restriction contrary to the

intent of legislature on the contrary these rules are merely spelling out the long

-standing custom which have been followed even after amendment providing

relaxation to the temporary judges.

vi. So, in conclusion it can be stated that the impugned rule cannot be said to be

unconstitutional on the ground of imposing unwarranted restrictions on

temporary judges.

4. The impugned rule is intra vires to the Advocates Act,1961

i. The impugned rule is made by the Bar Council of Saldana under the powers

granted to it under Section 49(ah) of the Advocates Act,1961 according to which

no judicial or administrative officer shall be allowed to practise in any court or

tribunal.32

ii. By doing so Advocates Act, 1961 delegates the power to Bar Council to frame the

rules to impose conditions subject to which advocates shall be entitled to practise,

however the statute provides no guidelines or policy for exercise of this power.

iii. According to the doctrine of excessive delegation, any delegation of power by a

statute is unconstitutional if it delegates the power without any guidelines or

policy.33

31
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1.
32
Section 49(1)(ah) of the Advocates Act, 1961.
33
In Re: Delhi Laws Act, AIR 1951 SC 332.
23
 iv. In Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., the

permissibility of delegation was restricted only to ‘mode of implementation’.34

v. However impugned rule does not lay down any policy but merely facilitates the

long standing and cherished policy of independence of judiciary which is

enshrined under the basic structure of the constitution.35

vi. Since the impugned rules only function as a mode of implementation of the

intention of constitutional makers to preserve the independence of judiciary and

facilitates to uphold the basic structure which puts the sanctity and independence

of judiciary at the highest pedestal36, thus it can be concluded that it only

facilitates the policy of independence of judiciary.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

34
Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. (1997) 5 SCC 516.
35
Kesavananda Bharati v Union Of India (1973) 4 SCC 225
36
Supreme Advocates On Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1.
24
It is most humbly and respectfully prayed before this court to kindly pass following orders in

favour of respondents

1. Reject the present application [Civil Suit No. 1080/2019 under Section 11 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996

2. Appoint arbitrator in pursuance of Section 11 of the Arbitration Conciliation

Act,1996.

3. Declare the impugned rule Constitutional.

And pass any such order it may deem fit in the interests of justice, equity and good

conscience.

25