4.

Accessories are not liable for light felonies, even if they are
BOOK ONE committed against persons or property. (Art. 16)
GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE ---------------------------------------------------------
DATE OF ENFORCEMENT AND
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ---------------------------------------------------------
CODE, AND REGARDING THE OFFENSES, ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SUBJECT
THE PERSONS LIABLE AND THE PENALTIES In all crimes there are always two parties, namely:
- the active subject (the criminal)
TITLE 2: PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR - Art. 16 of the Code enumerate s the active
subjects of the crime.
FELONIES
- 1. Principals.

Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The - 2. Accomplices.

following are criminally liable for grave and less
grave felonies: - 3. Accessories.

1. Principals. - the passive subject (the injured party).

2. Accomplices. ACTIVE SUBJECT

3. Accessories. Only natural persons can be the active subject of crime

because of the highly personal nature of the criminal
The following are criminally liable for light responsibility
- Only natural persons because he along by his act can
felonies:
set in motion a cause of by his inaction make possible
the completion of a modification of the external world.
1. Principals - Only natural persons can act with malice.
- Juridical persons cannot commit crimes with willful
2. Accomplices. purpose or malicious intent.
- Penalties consisting in imprisonment or deprivation of
--------------------------------------------------------- liberty can only be executed on natural persons
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE - EXCEPTION: Juridical persons, however, are criminally
liable under certain special laws.
- Officers, not the corporation, are criminally
THEORIES:
liable.
- The treble division of persons criminally liable for an
- General Rule: a director or other officer
offense rests upon the very nature of their participation
of a corporation is criminally liable
in the commission of the crime
for his acts though in his official
- When a crime is committed by many, without being
capacity, if he participated in the
equally shared by all, a different degree of
unlawful act either directly or as an
responsibility is imposed upon each and every one of
aider, abettor or accessory, but is
them.
not liable criminally for the
- In that case, they are criminally liable either as
corporate acts performed by other
principals, accomplices, or accessories.
officers or agents thereof.
-------------------------------------------------------- - It is a settled rule that since a
--------------------------------------------------------- corporation can only act through its
officers and agents, the president or
Rules relative to light felonies:
manager can be held criminally
liable for the violation of a law by
1. Light felonies are punishable only when they have been the entity
consummated. (Art. 7) - The president and general
manager of a corporation
2. But when light felonies are committed against persons or violated the Motor Vehicle
property, they are punishable even if they are only in the Law was held criminally
attempted or frustrated stage of execution. (Art. 7) liable for the offense
imputable to the
3. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies. corporation.
(Art. 16)
• __

- However, if the law provides a penalty

for the corporation, it may be
punished even though the crime
was perpetrated through its agents.

PASSIVE SUBJECT

- Passive Subject (Injured Party)

- The passive subject of a crime is the holder of the
injured right:
- the man,
- the juristic person, and
- the state.

- RULE: While a corporation or partnership cannot be the active

subjet, it can be a passive subject of a crime

- RULE: The dead and the animals have no rights that may be
injured.
- REASON: Corpse or animal cannot be passive subject.
As such, the dead and animals have no rights that may
be injured.
- Exception: Article 353, the crime of
defamation may be committed if the
imputation tends to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.
---------------------------------------------------------

2
• __

PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION

PARTICIPATION

the killer paid to do the act A common-law wife who

induced the killing of another
common law wife of her
husband by giving money to
the killer

Article 17. Principals. - The following are

considered principals: EXAMPLE:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of Where the two accused each inflicted a serious wound which
the act; contributed to the death of the victim, they are co-principals
(People vs. Cagod, No. L-36016, Jan. 18, 1978, 81 SCRA 110,
2. Those who directly force or induce others to 118)

commit it;
REQUISITES: For two or more principals [BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION]
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not 1. That they participated in the criminal resolution;
have been accomplished. - MEANING: when they were in conspiracy at the time
of the commission of the crime.
---------------------------------------------------------
- It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for
Article 17. — Principals the criminal act of another where, between them,
there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and
- RULE: Single individual committing a crime is always a intention in the commission of the crime charged.
principal by direct participation (take direct part in the (People vs. Talla, G.R. No. 44414, Jan. 18,1990,181
execution of the act) SCRA 133,148, citing People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664;
People vs. Serrano, L-45382, May 13,1985, 136 SCRA
Principals under Article 17 Co-Conspirator 899)
- A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
criminal liability is limited to his (His) responsibility includes to an agreement concerning the commission of a
own acts the acts of his fellow felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, par. 2)
conspirators - The conspiracy contemplated in the first requisite is
not a felony, but only a manner of incurring criminal
--------------------------------------------------------- liability.
PAR 1: THOSE WHO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN THE - Conspiracy must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence.
EXECUTION OF THE ACT.”
- RULE: When there is no conspiracy
- each of the offenders is liable only for the
(PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION.) act performed by him.
- RULE: Conspiracy is implied when the accused had
- RULE: The principal by direct participation personally takes part a common purpose and were united in its
in the execution of the act constituting the crime. execution.
- one who shoots at and kills another: personally - RULE: In multiple rape, each rapist is equally liable
executes the act of killing another [principal by direct for the other rapes. In a long line of cases, it has
participation in the crime of homicide] been held that in multiple rape, each defendant is
- one who burns the house of another” personally responsible not only for the rape personally
executes the act of burning the house of another. committed by him, but also for the rape committed
[principal by direct participation in the crime of arson] by the others, because each of them cooperated in
the commission of the rape perpetrated by the
- RULE [NOT A PRINCIPAL by direct participation]: One who only others, by acts without which it would not have
orders or induces another to commit a crime is not a principal been accomplished. (People vs. Fernandez, G.R.
by direct participation, No. 62116, March 22, 1990, 183 SCRA 511, 517-518)
- because he does not personally execute the act - RULE: Participation in another's criminal resolution
constituting the crime. must either precede or be coetaneous with the
criminal act.
- RULE INSTEAD: It is the one personally committing the crime in - RULE: There could be no conspiracy to commit an
obedience to that order or because of the inducement, who is offense through negligence.
the principal by direct participation. - RULE: In cases of criminal negligence or crimes

3
• __

of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the

punishable by special law, allowing or failing to
crime. (U.S. vs. Indanan, supra)
prevent an act to be performed by another, makes
one a co-principal.
REQUISITES for how a person may be
RULE: It is not enough that a person participated in the assault
made by another in order to consider him a co-principal in convicted as a principal by inducement
the crime committed. He must also participate in the criminal
resolution of the other. 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime;
The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance - EXAMPLE: When the accused, blinded by the
which is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not grudge which she bore against the deceased,
possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose. caused her co-accused thru promise of pecuniary
(People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 74048, Nov. 14, 1990, 191 SCRA 377, gain to shoot the victims with a gun which she had
385) furnished the latter, it is clear that she had the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime.
2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244)
its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. - RULE [NOT INDUCEMENT]: A thoughtless expression
(People vs. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788, 790; People vs. without intention to produce the result is not an
Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 45-46) inducement to commit a crime.
- RULE: The principals by direct participation must be - RULE: [NOT INDUCEMENT]: imprudent advice, not
at the scene of the crime, personally taking part in its constituting sufficient inducement.
execution. - In a decision by the Supreme Court of
- This is the reason why Dalmacio Timbol, Spain rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, it
who merely conspired with his co-accused was held that "a person who advised a
to kill the deceased but left the place married woman whose husband was very
before his co-accused began shooting the stingy and treated her badly that the only
deceased, was acquitted of the charge of thing for her to do was to rob him, was not
murder. (People vs. Timbol, G.R. Nos. L- guilty of the crime of robbery by
47471-73, August 4,1944) inducement, for the reason that an
- RULE: The acts of each offender must directly tend to imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not
the same end. sufficient." (Cited in the case of U.S. vs.
- RULE: One serving as guard pursuant to the Indanan, supra)
conspiracy is a principal by direct participation. - The person who gave the advice did not
- RULE: When the second requisite is lacking, there is have the intention to procure the
only conspiracy. commission of the crime.
- - "Kill him and we will bury him" as an
imprudent utterance said in the excitement
--------------------------------------------------------- of the hour or in the heat of anger, and
--------------------------------------------------------- not, rather, in the nature of a command
that had to be obeyed, does not make the
PAR 2: THOSE WHO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN THE utterer a principal by inducement. (People
EXECUTION OF THE ACT.” vs. Agapinay, G.R. No. 77776, June 27,
1990, 186 SCRA 812, 821)
(PRINCIPALS BY INDUCEMENT) - RULE [INDUCEMENT]: MAY EXIST IN :
- The inducement and the commission of a
crime whereby the inducer becomes a
- Those who directly induce others to commit the act are called
principal, to the same extent and effect as
"principals by inducement" or "principals” by induction," from
if he had physically committed the crime,
the Spanish "autores por induction."
may exist in
- The word "inducement" comprises, in the opinion of
- acts of command,
Viada and the Supreme Court of Spain, price, promise
- sometimes of advice, or
of reward, command, and pacto. (People vs. Gensola,
- agreement for a consideration, or
No. L-24491, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 483, 490)
- through an influence
- so effective that it alone
- RULE: The principal by induction becomes liable only when the
determines the commission of the
principal by direct participation committed the act induced.
crime.
- RULE [INDUCEMENT]: The words of advice or the
- RULE: To constitute inducement,
influence must have actually moved the hands of
- there must exist on the part of the inducer the most
the principal by direct participation.
positive resolution and
- Thus, a person who persuaded an
- the most persistent effort to secure the commission of
inexperienced boy of tender age to steal
the crime,
certain jewels of his grandmother was
- together with the presentation to the person induced
found guilty of theft by inducement.

4
• __

(Viada, cited in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra) - a. By using irresistible force.

Minors under 15 years of age are easily - b. By causing uncontrollable fear.
susceptible to the suggestions of the
inducer, because usually they have no - In these cases, there is no conspiracy, not even a
discernment or judgment of their own. unity of criminal purpose and intention.
When induced to commit a crime, the - RULE: Only the one using force or causing fear is
influence of the inducer is the determining criminally liable. The material executor is not
cause of the commission of the crime. criminally liable because of Art. 12, pars. 5 and 6.

2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the (2) by directly inducing another to commit a crime.
commission of the crime by the material executor. (U.S. vs. There are two ways of directly inducing another to commit a
Indanan, 24 Phil. 203; People vs. Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil. 609) crime.
- a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise.
- [inducement be the determining cause] - Both the one giving the price or offering
- that is, without such inducement the crime reward or promise and the one committing
would not have been committed. (Decision the crime in consideration thereof are
of the Supreme Court of Spain, cited in U.S. principals — the former, by inducement;
vs. Indanan, supra). and the latter, by direct participation.
- RULE: Inducement exists if the command or advice is - There is collective criminal
of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the responsibility.
crime would not have materialized. (People vs. Cruz, - A wife, who induced the killing of the
G.R. No. 74048, Nov. 14,1990,191 SCRA 377, 385) mistress of her husband by giving money to
- RULE [NO INDUCEMENT] Thus, if the principal by the killer, is a principal by induction.
direct participation had personal reason to commit - The killer is a principal by direct
the crime so that he would commit it just the same participation. (People vs. Lao, No.
- even if no inducement was made by L-10473, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 42)
another, - b. By using words of command.
- this second requisite does not exist. - Both the person who used the words of
- RULE [NOT INDUCEMENT]: Thus, command and the person who committed
- the price given to the principal by direct the crime, because of the words of
participation after the commission of the command, are equally liable. There is also
crime, collective criminal responsibility. (U.S. vs.
- without prior promise to give a price or Gamao, 23 Phil. 81)
reward, - With respect to command, it must be the
- could not be an inducement. moving cause of the offense.
- RULE [NOT INDUCEMENT]: - RULE: it must appear that the inducement
- If the person who actually committed the was of such nature and was made in such
crime a way as to become the determining
- had a reason of his own to commit the cause of the crime and that such
crime, inducement was uttered with the intention
- it cannot be said that the inducement was of producing the result. (People vs. Castillo,
influential in producing the criminal act. No. 19238, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 721, 723-
- In such case, the one charged with having 724)
induced the commission of the crime is not - [INDUCEMENT] In other words, the inciting
criminally liable. words must have great dominance and
- [INDUCEMENT] For the utterances of an influence over the person who acts; they
accused to make him a principal by ought to be direct and as efficacious or
inducement, it is necessary that the words powerful as physical or moral coercion or
be of such nature and uttered in such violence itself. (People vs. Canial, Nos. L-
manner as to become the determining 31042-43, Aug. 18,1972, 46 SCRA 634, 651)
cause of the crime, and that the - [INDUCEMENT] Words of command of a
inducement precisely was intended to father may induce his son to commit a
serve such purpose. pe crime.
- [NOT INDUCEMENT] [IMPRUDENT
UTTERANCE]: "Kill him and we will bury him"
as an imprudent utterance said in the
excitement of the hour or in the heat of
Two ways of becoming principal by
anger, and not, rather, in the nature of a
induction. command that had to be obeyed, does
not make the utterer a principal by
(1) by directly forcing another to commit a crime inducement. (People vs. Agapinay, G.R.
- two ways of directly forcing another to commit a No. 77776, June 27, 1990, 186 SCRA 812,
crime. 821)

5
• __

- [NOT INDUCEMENT] If the crime committed

is not contemplated in the order given, the
(5) The material executor of the crime has no personal
inducement is not material and not the
reason to commit the crime.
determining cause thereof.
- If the principal by direct participation has a
personal reason to commit the crime, the
supposed words of inducement cannot be the
REQUISITES TO BE PRINCIPAL: determining cause.
using words of command

In order that a person using words of command may be - RULE: One who planned the crime committed by another is a
held liable as principal under paragraph No. 2 of Art. 17, principal by inducement.
the following five requisites must all be present:
- The persons who planned the crime committed by
(1) That the one uttering the words of command must have other persons are guilty as authors by inducement.
the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. (People vs. Asaad, 55 Phil. 697 [Syllabus])

- RULE: Principal by inducement in falsification.

(2) That the one who made the command must have an - In this case, the employee was not criminally liable,
ascendancy or influence over the person who acted. because he had no knowledge of the falsity of the
facts supplied by the accused.
- A was a poor, ignorant fisherman, dependent - While it is true that it was the employee of the office of
upon his uncle B. On the other hand, B was a man the treasurer who performed the overt act of writing
of great influence in the community. B was the the false facts on the residence certificate of the
local political leader of his party. In the meeting accused, it was, however, the accused who induced
where the plan to murder the priest was him to do so by supplying him with those facts. The
discussed, B was the prime mover and the accused was a principal by inducement. The
dominant figure. B selected A who was present in employee was a mere innocent agent of the accused
the meeting to commit the crime and directed in the performance of the act constituting the crime.
him to do it. The influence exercised by B over A (People vs. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 919)
was so great and powerful that the latter could
not resist it. (U.S. vs. Gamao, 23 Phil. 81)
principal by inducement offender who made proposal
- RULE: Ascendancy or influence as to amount to
to commit a felony.
moral coercion is not necessary when there is
conspiracy.
In the first, the inducement in the second, the proposal
involves any crime; to be punishable must
(3) That the words used must be so direct, so efficacious, so
involve only treason or
powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion.
rebellion.

- (a) Efficacious — One who makes the accused

In the first, in the second, the mere
believe that the person to be killed was the one
the principal by inducement proposal to commit a felony
who had stolen the property of the accused, is
becomes liable only when is punishable in treason or
guilty as principal by inducement.
rebellion.
- Note: It would seem that the material
- the crime is
executor had a reason to kill the victim,
committed by the The person to whom the
but it was furnished by the inductor who
principal by direct proposal is made should not
made him believe that the deceased
participation; commit the crime;
had stolen his property.
- (b) Powerful — The influence exercised by B over
otherwise, the proponent
A was so great and powerful that the latter could
becomes a principal by
not resist it. (U.S. vs. Gamao, 23 Phil. 81)
inducement.

(4) The words of command must be uttered prior to the

In both, there is an inducement to commit a crime.
commission of the crime.
- Thus, when the commission of the crime has
already been commenced when the words of
inducement are uttered, this requisite is lacking.
- In a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, cited
Effects of acquittal of principal by direct
in People vs. Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil. 609, it was held
that a father who simply said to his son who was participation upon the liability of principal by
at the time engaged in a combat with another, inducement.
"Hit him," was not responsible for the injuries
inflicted after such advice was given.
(1) Conspiracy is NEGATED by the acquittal of co-defendant.

6
• __

(2) One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the

commission of a crime without first being shown that the
crime has been actually committed by another. (People vs.
Ong Chiat, 60 Phil. 788, 790)

EXCEPTION: But if the one charged as principal by direct

participation is acquitted because he acted without criminal
intent or malice,
- his acquittal is not a ground for the acquittal of the
principal by inducement. (See People vs. Po Giok To,
supra)
- The reason for the rule is that in exempting
circumstances, such as when the act is not voluntary
because of lack of intent on the part of the
accused, there is a crime committed, only that the
accused is not a criminal.
- In intentional felonies, the act of a person does not ---------------------------------------------------------
make him criminal unless his mind be criminal. PAR 3: "Those who cooperate in the commission of
the offense by another act without which it would
- RULE: Possessor of recently stolen property is a principal. not have been accomplished."
- It is clear from Section 5(j), Rule 131, of the Rules of
Court, that the possessor of a recently stolen article is (PRINCIPALS BY Indispensable Cooperation.)
considered a principal, not merely as an accessory or
an accomplice,
- Meaning of the term "cooperate."
- [BURDEN OF PROOF] unless he proves in a
- means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that
satisfactory manner that he is but an
common will or purpose does not necessarily mean
accessory or an accomplice thereto and that
previous understanding, for it can be explained or
another person, from whom the article came,
inferred from the circumstances of each case. (People
is the one who stole it from the owner thereof.
vs. Apelgido, 56 Phil. 571, 576)
(People vs. Javier, No. L-36509, Feb. 25, 1982,
112 SCRA 186, 190)
--------------------------------------------------------- REQUISITES
PRINCIPALS BY Indispensable Cooperation

1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is,

- there is either
- anterior conspiracy or
- unity of criminal purpose and intention
- immediately before the commission of the crime
charged;

- RULE: there must be conspiracy.

- RULE: concurrence with the principal by direct participation

in the purpose of the latter is sufficient, because the
cooperation is indispensable to the accomplishment of the
commission of the offense.

- RULE: May there be cooperation by acts of negligence?

- One who, by acts of negligence, cooperates in the
commission of estafa through falsification or
malversation through falsification, without which
negligent acts the commission of the crime could
not have been accomplished,
- is a co-principal.
- But the one who cooperated in the commission of
the crime was held guilty of the same crime through
reckless imprudence.
- (Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 103 Phil. 277, 282-283;
People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294, 1295 [Unrep.])

7
• __

- To be liable as principals, the offender must fall under any of the

2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by
three concepts defined in Article 17.
performing another act, without which it would not have been
accomplished.
- Collective criminal responsibility.
- There is collective criminal responsibility when the
- RULE: The cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without
offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and
which the commission of the crime would not have been
to the same extent.
accomplished.
- The penalty to be imposed must be the same
for all.
- RULE [ONLY AN ACCOMPLICE]: If the cooperation is not
- Principals by direct participation have collective
indispensable, the offender is only an accomplice.
criminal responsibility.
- Principal by induction have collective criminal
- "by another act,"
responsibility.
- which means that it should not be the act of one
- except that who directly forced another to
who could be classified as principal by direct
commit a crime
participation.
- Principal by indispensable cooperation has collective
criminal responsibility with the principal by direct
- RULE [MUST BE DIFFERENT ACT]: The act of the principal by
participation.
indispensable cooperation should be different from the act of
the principal by direct participation.
- Individual criminal responsibility.
- it will be noted that the cooperation of the other
- In the absence of
accused consisted in performing an act which is
- previous conspiracy,
different from the act of execution of the crime
- unity of criminal purpose and intention
committed by the other accused.
- immediately before the commission of the
- R, an employee of a bank, had the duty to examine
crime,
the account of the drawer of a check, to determine
- OR community of criminal design,
whether or not the drawer of the check had
- the criminal responsibility arising from different
sufficient balance to his credit to require the
acts directed against one and the same
payment of the check, and to indorse upon the
person is
check, if it was entitled to payment, the words
- individual and not collective,
"Corriente, P.O. Luciano de los Reyes." After the
- and each of the participants is liable only for
check was marked in this manner, it would pass to
the act committed by him. (U.S. vs.
the cashier of the bank who, in reliance upon the
Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386, 390; U.S. vs. Abiog, 37
indorsement, would pay or order the same to be
Phil. 137,139-140)
paid. R, in connivance with B, and knowing that the
- RULE: Where there is no pretension that there was any
latter had no sufficient funds in the bank, indorsed
conspiracy between the accused nor concerted
upon a check drawn by B the words "Corriente, P.O.
action pursuant to a common CTiminal design
Luciano de los Reyes." The cashier, relying upon the
between them, each is responsible only for the
indorsement, ordered the payment of the check,
consequences of his own acts (Araneta, Jr. vs. Court of
thus enabling B to draw the amount of the check. In
Appeals, G.R. No. 43527, July 3,1990, 187 SCRA 123,
this case, R was a principal by indispensable
133)
cooperation. (U.S. vs. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 484)
- EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
- The deceased was the one who assaulted a
- Liability of conspirators who took turns in raping a girl. [For own group of three individuals with a knife,
acts, and for all the acts of others] - and in the course of an incomplete self-
- Four persons each took turns in having sexual defense, two of them caused less serious
intercourse with a girl by force. It was held that each of physical injuries upon the assailant,
them is responsible, not only for the act of rape - while the third inflicted the fatal wound.
committed personally by him, but also for the rape - In this case, the party who inflicted the fatal
committed by the others, because while one of them wound would be the only one responsible as
was having sexual intercourse with the girl, the others principal for the crime of homicide;
were holding her, so that each one of them - the other two would be held liable only for
cooperated in the consummation of the rape less serious physical injuries. (Dec. Sup. Ct. of
committed by the others by acts without which it could Spain, June 2, 1874, 11 Jr. Crim. 11-14; 1
not have been accomplished. Four sentences were Viada, Cod. Pen., 342-343; People vs.
imposed on each accused. (People vs. Villa, 81 Phil. Martinez, 42 Phil. 85, 89; People vs. Tamayo, 44
193, 197; People vs. Alfaro, 91 Phil. 404, 408-409; People Phil. 38, 44-45)
vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 62116, March 22, 1990, 183 ---------------------------------------------------------
SCRA 511, 517)
---------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY ARTICLE 17

8
• __

Article 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are those

persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.
---------------------------------------------------------

9
• __

- the other two would be held liable only for

less serious physical injuries. (Dec. Sup. Ct. of
THREE criminal responsibility
Spain, June 2, 1874, 11 Jr. Crim. 11-14; 1
Viada, Cod. Pen., 342-343; People vs.
- Quasi-collective criminal responsibility.
Martinez, 42 Phil. 85, 89; People vs. Tamayo, 44
- Collective criminal responsibility.
Phil. 38, 44-45)
- Individual criminal responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------

- Quasi-collective criminal responsibility.

Accomplices
- Between collective criminal responsibility and individual (541-562) = 21 pages
criminal responsibility, - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] participation of an accomplice
- there is the so-called quasi-collective presupposes the commission of the crime by the principal by
criminal responsibility. direct participation.
- RULE: some of the offenders in the crime are principals
and the others are accomplices. - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] cooperates by
- previous acts or
- Collective criminal responsibility. - simultaneous acts
- There is collective criminal responsibility when the - in the execution of the offense by the principal.
offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and
to the same extent. - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] "Not being included in Article 17."
- The penalty to be imposed must be the same - participation or cooperation of the accomplice is not
for all. any one of those mentioned in Article 17
- Principals by direct participation have collective - direct participation
criminal responsibility. - by inducement
- Principal by induction have collective criminal - indispensable cooperation
responsibility.
- except that who directly forced another to RULE: [cannot be held as PRINCIPAL] : [THUS ACCOMPLICE]
commit a crime - When there is no conspiracy between or among the
- Principal by indispensable cooperation has collective defendants
criminal responsibility with the principal by direct - but they were animated by one and the
participation. same purpose to accomplish the criminal
objective,
- Individual criminal responsibility. - those who cooperated by previous or simultaneous
- In the absence of acts
- previous conspiracy, - but cannot be held liable as principals
- unity of criminal purpose and intention - are accomplices.
- immediately before the commission of the
crime, - In case of doubt as to whether principal or accomplice.
- OR community of criminal design, - In case of doubt,
- the criminal responsibility arising from different - the participation of the offender
acts directed against one and the same - will be considered that of an accomplice rather than
person is that of a principal.
- individual and not collective, - In the case of appellants Carlos and Pascual
- and each of the participants is liable only for Clemente, while they joined their brother in
the act committed by him. (U.S. vs. the pursuit of the fleeing Matnog, and in the
Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386, 390; U.S. vs. Abiog, 37 attack on him as he fell,
Phil. 137,139-140) - yet the prosecution eyewitness was unable to
- RULE: Where there is no pretension that there was any assert positively that the two managed to hit
conspiracy between the accused nor concerted the fallen man.
action pursuant to a common CTiminal design - There being no showing of conspiracy,
between them, each is responsible only for the - and the extent of their participation in the
consequences of his own acts (Araneta, Jr. vs. Court of homicide being uncertain,
Appeals, G.R. No. 43527, July 3,1990, 187 SCRA 123, - they should be given the benefit of the doubt,
133) and consequently,
- EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY - they are declared to be mere accomplices in
- The deceased was the one who assaulted a the crime. (People vs. Clemente, G.R. No. L-
group of three individuals with a knife, 23463, Sept. 28,1967, 21 SCRA 261, 270-271)
- and in the course of an incomplete self- - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] When the participation of an accused is
defense, two of them caused less serious not disclosed, he is only an accomplice.
physical injuries upon the assailant, - A person who assists one who commits the crime of
- while the third inflicted the fatal wound. arson and who knows the latter's purpose, but whose
- In this case, the party who inflicted the fatal participation in the arson is not disclosed, may not be
wound would be the only one responsible as considered as a principal,
principal for the crime of homicide;

10
• __

- because his acts are neither direct nor homicide or murder is of a minor
absolutely necessary for the commission of character,
the offense, - may properly be held
- nor do they induce the said commission. liable as accomplice.
- (2 Viada, pp. 369-370, cited in People vs. Ubina, 97 Phil.
515, 533)
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] In criminal cases, the participation of the
accused
- must be established by the prosecution [BURDEN]
- by positive and competent evidence.
- It cannot be presumed.

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] It cannot be presumed. accomplice conspirator

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] they know and agree with the criminal design.
- does not have previous agreement
- with the principal by direct participation. come to know about it after know the criminal intention
- does not have understanding the principals have reached because they themselves
- with the principal by direct participation. the decision, and only then have decided upon such
- is not in conspiracy do they agree to cooperate course of action.
- with the principal by direct participation. in its execution.

- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] An accomplice participates to a certain Accomplices merely concur Conspirators decide that a
point in the common criminal design. (People vs. Aplegido, 76 in it. crime should be committed;
Phil. 571, 576) BUT:
- does not have previous agreement Accomplices do not decide
- does not have understanding . whether the crime should be
- is not in conspiracy committed; they merely
assent to the plan and
- EXCEPTION RULE: [CO-CONSPIRATOR] [considered as cooperate in its
ACCOMPLICE] accomplishment
- [ROLE IS MINOR CARACTER ONLY] In some exceptional
accomplices are merely Conspirators are the authors
situations, having community of design with the
instruments who perform acts of a crime;
principal does not prevent a malefactor from being
not essential to the
regarded as an accomplice
perpetration of the offense.
- if his role in the perpetration of the homicide
or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor
(People vs. de Vera, G.R. No. 128966, 18 August 1999)
character. (People vs. Nierra, 76 O.G. 6600,
No. 37, Sept. 15,1980)
- The ruling in People vs. Nierra failed to
- RULE: [NOT AN ACCOMPLICE]: NO knowledge/cognizance of
distinguish between "community of design"
the PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTTICIPATION’s intention to commit
and "participation in the criminal resolution" of
any crime:
two or more offenders
- cannot exist without previous cognizance of the
- [PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL
criminal act intended to be executed by the principal
RESOLUTION] If a malefactor entered
by direct participation (U.S. vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526, 528;
with the others into an agreement
People vs. Cajandab, No. L-29598, July 26, 1973, 52
concerning the commission of a
SCRA 161, 166)
felony and the decision to commit it,
- The sentry improperly permitted certain convicts to go
- [PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL
out of jail, accompanied by the corporal of the guards.
RESOLUTION] the malefactor and
The convicts committed robbery. Was the sentry an
the others participated in the
accomplice in the crime of robbery committed by the
criminal resolution.
convicts? No. When the sentry permitted the convicts
- Such agreement and decision may be
to go at large, the sentry had no knowledge of their
inferred from the facts and
intention to commit any crime. (U.S. vs. Bello, supra)
circumstances of the case.
- [OPPOSITELY] But the driver of a taxicab who, knowing
- [Community of design] If there was no
that his co-accused were going to make a hold-up,
such agreement and decision, but,
permitted them to use the taxicab driven by him in
knowing the criminal design of the
going to a store where his said co-accused staged the
others, the malefactor merely
hold-up, and waited for them until after the hold-up, is
concurred in their criminal purpose,
an accomplice in the crime of robbery. (People vs.
there is only community of design.
Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12)
- [Community of design] The malefactor,
whose role in the perpetration of the

11
• __

- EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT CONSIDERED ACCOMPLICE] [A

PRINCIPAL] WHEN Concurrence with the criminal purpose of
another may make one a co-principal.
- RULE [NOT AN ACCOMPLICE]: [NO EVIDENCE OF
- Even if only one of the offenders originated the criminal
design and AWARENESS] [NO EVIDENCE OF ABETTING]
- the other merely concurred with him in his criminal - Although Serapio got the carbine from Sulpicio, the
purpose, but before the actual commission of the latter cannot be considered a principal by
crime both of them agreed and decided to commit it, indispensable cooperation or an accomplice.
the other is not merely an accomplice. He is also a - [NO EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE] There is no evidence
principal, because having agreed and decided to
at all that Sulpicio was aware Serapio would use the
commit a felony with another, he becomes a co-
rifle to kill Casiano. Presumably, he gave the carbine to
conspirator.
Serapio for him to shoot Rafael only as per their
agreement. (People vs. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-20911,
October 30,1967,21 SCRA 569, 586-587)
- [NO EVIDENCE OF ABETTING] Neither is there concrete
proof that Sulpicio abetted the shooting of Casiano.
(People vs. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-20911, October
- RULE [NOT AN ACCOMPLICE] No knowledge of the
30,1967,21 SCRA 569, 586-587)
criminal design of the principal — not an accomplice.
- There is no proof that they pursued Cosme because
they had accepted a challenge coming from him.
Apparently, their intention was only to prevent him
from taking from his house a weapon with which to
carry out an attack. They were, therefore, just
advancing a legitimate defense by preventing an
illegitimate aggression. Sixto's act of holding Cosme's
neck from behind is no proof of intention to kill. At that - RULE [AN ACCOMPLICE]: [IF THERE IS EVIDENCE OF
time he did not know yet what his brother's intention AWARENESS] [IF THERE IS EVIDENCE OF ABETTING]
was. It was not shown that Sixto knew that his brother - Sulpicio might have been liable if after the
was armed. (People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664) shooting of Rafael, Serapio returned the
carbine to him but upon seeing Casiano
fleeing, immediately asked again for the
carbine and Sulpicio voluntarily gave it to
- RULE [NOT AN ACCOMPLICE] simultaneousness does
him.
not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of
- Serapio's criminal intention then would be
action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of
reasonably apparent [EVIDENCE OF
two or more individuals. (People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664)
AWARENESS] to Sulpicio and the latter's giving
- There is no proof that they pursued Cosme because
back of the rifle would constitute his assent
they had accepted a challenge coming from him.
thereto [EVIDENCE OF ABETTING].
Apparently, their intention was only to prevent him
- But such was not the case. Sulpicio, therefore,
from taking from his house a weapon with which to
must be acquitted for the killing of Casiano
carry out an attack. They were, therefore, just
Cabizares. (People vs. De la Cerna, G.R. No.
advancing a legitimate defense by preventing an
L-20911, October 30,1967,21 SCRA 569, 586-
illegitimate aggression. Sixto's act of holding Cosme's
587)
neck from behind is no proof of intention to kill. At that
time he did not know yet what his brother's intention
was. It was not shown that Sixto knew that his brother
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [RELATION BETWEEN ACTS]: CAN BE
was armed. (People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664)
PUNISHED FOR A DIFFERENT CRIME.
- An accomplice may be liable for a crime different from
- RULE [ACCOMPLICE]: Common purpose is enough, that which the principal committed.

even if the crime actually committed is just a

natural/probable consequence of that purposes.
- The community of design need not be to commit the accomplice principal

crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a

An accomplice is one who An accomplice is one who
common purpose to commit a particular crime and
does not take a direct part in take a direct part in the
that the crime actually committed was a natural or the commission of the act, commission of the act,
probable consequence of the intended crime.

12
• __

who does not force or induce who force or induce others to 161, 166)
others to commit it, commit it,

or who does not cooperate or who cooperate in the - RULE: [AT LEAST THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIMINAL DESIGN]
in the commission of the commission of the crime by
crime by another act without another act without which it
- How an accomplice acquires knowledge of the
which it would not have would not have been
criminal design of the principal.
been accomplished, accomplished,
- [HEAR?] When the principal informs or
tells the accomplice of the former's
criminal purpose.
yet cooperates in the indispensable = without
- Thus, when the master told his
execution of the act which it would not have
servant that he would abduct
- by previous or been accomplished,
(abduction with consent) a girl
simultaneous
under 18 years of age and
actions.
instigated his said servant to
- necessary but not
induce the girl to leave her
indispensable
home for immoral purposes,
and the servant assisted in the
In both, there is community of criminal design.
commission of the crime by so
As to the acts performed, inducing the girl, the master
there is no clear-cut was the principal by direct
distinction between the acts participation and the servant
of the accomplice and those was an accomplice. (U.S. vs.
of the principal by direct Sotto, 9 Phil. 231, 236)
participation. That is why, in - [SAW?] When the accomplice saw the
case of doubt, it shall be criminal acts of the principal.
resolved in favor of lesser - There is no showing that the
responsibility, that is, that of attack was agreed upon
mere accomplice. between the two accused
beforehand. No motive for it
between the principals and Between or among principals was shown other than the
the accomplices, there is no liable for the same offense, provocation given by the
conspiracy. there must be conspiracy; deceased; and such motive
(People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. was true only insofar as the
571, 575) other accused was concerned.
The circumstances indicate
that if the accused embraced
the deceased and rendered
him helpless, it was to stop him
REQUISITES from further hitting the other
“ACCOMPLICE” accused with his fists. However,
even after the first knife thrust
1. That there be community of design; that is, knowing the had been delivered, he did not
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he try to stop the other accused,
concurs with the latter in his purpose; either by word or overt act.
Instead, the accused
- RULE: Note that before there could be an accomplice, there continued to hold the
must be a principal by direct participation. deceased, even forced him
down on the bamboo bed with
- RULE: Principal by direct participation authors. Accomplice the other accused still pressing
merely concurs. the attack. If the initial intent of
- cannot exist without previous cognizance of the the accused was free from
criminal act intended to be executed by the guilt, it became tainted after
principal by direct participation (U.S. vs. Bello, 11 Phil. he saw the first knife thrust
526, 528; People vs. Cajandab, No. L-29598, July 26, delivered. (People vs.
1973, 52 SCRA 161, 166) Manansala, No. L-23514, Feb.
17,1970, 31 SCRA 401, 405)
- RULE: [NO PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL RESOLUTION]

- RULE: The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance

2. That he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
knowingly or intentionally rendered (U.S. vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526,
previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying
528; People vs. Cajandab, No. L-29598, July 26, 1973, 52 SCRA
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an

13
• __

efficacious way; not indispensable.

- One who acted as a look-out or guard and also
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS] assisted in taking the stolen articles in the crime of
- cooperation of an accomplice is only necessary, robbery with homicide, absent a conspiracy.
not indispensable. (People vs. Parcon, Nos. L-39121-22, Dec. 19, 1981,
110 SCRA 425, 434, 435)
- EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT ACCOMPLICE] : IF CONSPIRACY, even
if is only necessary cooperation and not indispensable = - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [MATERIAL OR MORAL AID]: BUT:
principal by consipiracy - The accomplice merely supplies the principal with
- However, if there is conspiracy between two or material or moral aid without conspiracy with the
among several persons, even if the cooperation of latter.
one offender is only necessary, the latter is also a - [STAYED WITH THE CRIMINALS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF
principal by conspiracy. THE CRIME, EVEN JUST MORAL SUPPORT, AN
- In Conspiracy, the nature of the cooperation ACCOMPLICE] Where the evidence does not prove
becomes immaterial. that appellant conspired with the malefactors, he
cannot be considered as a principal. However, in
- EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION OF AN ACCOMPLICE: only going with them, knowing their criminal intention,
necessary, not indispensable. and in staying outside of the house with them while
- [PREVIOUS ACT] The example of cooperation by the others went inside the store to rob and kill the
previous act is the lending of a dagger or pistol to victim, the appellant effectively supplied the
the murderer, knowing the latter's criminal purpose. criminals with material and moral aid, making him
- [PREVIOUS ACT] In the crime of rape, the pharmacist guilty as an accomplice. (People vs. Balili, No. L-
who, knowing the criminal purpose of another, 14044, Aug. 5,1966,17 SCRA 892,898; People vs.
furnishes him the drug with which he will put his Doctolero, G.R. No. 34386, Feb. 7,1991,19 3 SCRA
victim to sleep in order to rape her, is also an 632, 645)
accomplice in the crime. (U.S. vs. Flores, 25 Phil. 595,
597-598) - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [IF WOULD INFLICTED DID NOT CAUSE
- [SIMULTANEOUS ACT] : The defendant who held one DEATH]
of the hands of the victim and tried to take away the - The wounds inflicted by an accomplice in crimes
latter's revolver, while his co-defendant was against persons should not have caused the death
attacking him, is an accomplice, for he cooperated of victim.
in the execution of the crime by simultaneous acts - 1. People vs. Azcona, 59 Phil. 580, because
- [EVEN?] without any previous agreement or the wounds inflicted by the accused did
understanding with his co-defendant. (People vs. not materially contribute to the death of
Escarro, 89 Phil. 520, 524) the deceased.
- The three persons who actually detained the - 2. People vs. Tamayo, 56 Phil. 587, because
offended woman were principals in the crime of the wound inflicted by the accused was
illegal detention and the three other accused who not of a character that would have
held the victim's companion, in order to prevent the resulted in the death of the deceased.
latter from rendering any help to the victim, were - 3. People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143, because
accomplices, the accused who were armed with clubs
- [EVEN?] there being no conspiracy among them. merely struck the victim, as he fell by the
(People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775, 784) fatal blow made by the principal, without
causing the victim serious injuries.
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS] : - 4. People vs. Antonio, 73 Phil. 421, stoning
- The cooperation of an accomplice is not due to a the victim already mortally wounded by
conspiracy. other accused, the stoning not being the
cause of death.
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS] :
- When the acts of the accused are not indispensable -RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [being present and giving moral
in the killing, they are merely accomplices. support, you are an accomplice.]
- EXAMPLE: The act of one, blocking people coming
to the aid of the victim while being assailed is - Being present and giving moral support when a
undoubtedly one of help and cooperation to the crime is being committed will make a person
assailants. But, it is not indispensable to the stabbing responsible only as accomplice in the crime
of the victim. Hence, he is merely an accomplice. committed.
(People vs. Resayaga, No. L-49536, March 30, 1988,
159 SCRA 426, 432; People vs. Anin, No. L-39046, - RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [MATERIAL OR MORAL AID]: must be
June 30,1975,64 SCRA 729, 736 [hitting the victim's external acts [prosecution must prove by evidence]
companion with a piece of wood, apparently to - The moral aid may be through
dissuade him from going to the succor of the victim]) - advice,
- encouragement or
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE’S COOPERATION IS]: being a look-out is - agreement.

14
• __

- or material, — through external acts.

- Such an intent, concurring with some overt act, must
be specifically shown by the evidence of the
prosecution.

- RULE: [NOT AN ACCOMPLICE]: “MATERIAL/MORAL AID”

should not be the determining cause,
- But the advice, encouragement or agreement
should not be the determining cause of the
commission of the crime by the principal by direct
Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those
participation; otherwise, the one who gave the
advice or encouragement or the one who entered
who, having knowledge of the commission of the
into the agreement would be a principal by crime, and without having participated therein,
inducement. either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the
3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the
following manners:
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice. (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49) ---------------------------------------------------------
Accessories
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [RELATION BETWEEN ACTS]: not enough -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: SHOULD NOT BE IN CONSPIRACY WITH THE
to have an identical criminal design.
PRINCIPAL
- It is not enough that a person entertains an identical - A conspired with others to steal certain goods in the
criminal design as that of the principal. There must
customhouse. A agreed to pay, as in fact he paid
be a relation between the It is not enough that a them, a substantial sum of money upon delivery of the
person entertains an identical criminal design as that
stolen goods in his warehouse from the wagons on
of the principal. There must be a relation between which his coconspirators loaded the goods at the
the
customhouse. It was held that A was guilty of the crime
of theft as a principal and not merely as an accessory.
- RULE: [ACCOMPLICE] [RELATION BETWEEN ACTS]: CAN BE
(U.S. vs. Tan Tiap Co., 35 Phil. 611)
PUNISHED FOR A DIFFERENT CRIME.
- An accomplice may be liable for a crime different
- RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: One who kept silent with regard
from that which the principal committed. to the crime he witnessed is not an accessory.
- A person who saw the commission of a crime, say
murder, by another whom he knew, kept silent with
regard to it, and did not report it to any of the
authorities is not liable even as an accessory. (U.S. vs.
---------------------------------------------------------
Caballeros, 4 Phil. 350; U.S. vs. Callapag, 21 Phil. 262)

- RULE: [ACCESSORY] [principal not yet apprehended] [principal

remain at large]: If the principal is still at large, as long as there
is a crime committed, the accessory may be convicted.
- Apprehension and conviction of the principal is not
necessary for the accessory to be held criminally liable.
- Even if the principal is still unknown or at large, the
accessory may be held responsible provided the
requisites prescribed by law for the existence of the
crime are present and that someone committed it.
- Thus, a person, knowing the illegal source of a thing
that is stolen, benefits therefrom, is guilty as an
accessory after the fact, even if the author of the theft
has not been discovered.
- when the principal is not yet apprehended, the
accessory may be prosecuted and convicted.
- It may be asked whether or not appellant
may be legally convicted as accessory after
the fact of the crime of qualified theft, when
up to now the principal has not yet been
prosecuted for failure to identify and
apprehend him. We believe that the answer
should be in the affirmative. The crime of
qualified theft has been proved; the
nonprosecution of the principal for the reason

15
• __

that his identity has not as yet been - REQUISITE 2: But the crime committed by the real culprit
discovered, cannot serve as basis to free must be:
appellant from the liability incurred by him as - treason,
an accessory after the fact. (People vs. - parricide,
Ramos, C.A., 62 O.G. 6862) - murder, or
- an attempt to take the life of the President,
- RULE: [ACCESSORY ONLY WHEN]: Accessories' liability is - that he is known to be habitually guilty of
subordinate and subsequent. Principal must also be tried first some other crime,
- The arraignment, trial and conviction of an accessory - REQUISITE 3: because this is possible only when the
after the fact without the principal of the crime having accessory is a private individual.
first been tried and convicted in the separate case
filed and pending at the time of the arraignment, trial - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Heavy penalties for accessories in robbery
and decision of the case against the accessory, is not and theft.
proper and violates the legal system of procedural - PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1612 ANTI-FENCING LAW OF
orderliness. 1979
- - In other crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
- EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY] [IN EXEMPTING?]: by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
conviction of accessory possible, even if principal is acquitted upon the accessories to the commission of a
[because a crime is still committed in this case] consummated felony. (Art. 53, Revised Penal Code)
- Conviction of an accessory is possible notwithstanding
the acquittal of the principal, if the crime was in fact
IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 19.
committed, but the principal was not held criminally
liable, because of an exempting circumstance (Art.
“having knowledge”
12), such as insanity or minority. In exempting
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Must have knowledge of the commission
circumstances, there is a crime committed. Hence,
of the crime
there is a basis for convicting the accessory.
- An accessory must have knowledge of the
- Thus, if a minor, eight years old, stole a ring worth
commission of the crime, and having that
P500.00 and B, knowing that it has been stolen, buys it
knowledge, he took part subsequent to its
for P200.00, B is liable as accessory in the crime of theft,
commission.
even if the principal (the minor) is exempt from criminal
- In the absence of positive proof, direct or
liability. (See U.S. vs. Villaluz, 32 Phil. 376)
circumstantial, of his knowledge that the goods
- RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: If the PRINCIPAL is acquitted
were of illegal origin or fraudulently acquired by the
because there was NO CRIME committed.
vendors at the time of the transaction, a customer
- Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, supra,
who purchases such goods cannot be held
where it was held in an arson case that the acquittal of
criminally responsible as accessory. (People vs.
the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the
Labrador, C.A., 36 O.G. 166).
accessory where it was shown that no crime was
- Thus, if A buys a stolen property, not knowing that it
committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an
was stolen, he is not liable.
accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction
of the accessory.
-RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: IF THIEF IS ALREADY CONVICTED,
when possession of stolen property is discovered.
- RULE: [ACCESSORY]: participation of the accessory in all cases
- The legal principle that unexplained possession of stolen
always takes place after the commission of the crime.
articles is sufficient evidence to convict one of theft is not
applicable where the principal or author of the robbery has
- RULE: [ACCESSORY]: it is not necessary that there be a principal
already been convicted and where there is no proof that the
duly convicted
alleged accessory knew of the commission of the crime and
- For one to be found guilty and punished as an
that he profited himself by its proceeds.
accessory, it is not necessary that there be a principal
duly convicted (Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, Tomo I,
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: it is not necessary that he should have
pages 515-516, Octava Edicion). Neither the letter nor
acquired the property knowing it was stolen. Knowledge may
the spirit of the law requires that the principal be
be after.
convicted before one may be punished as an
- Knowledge of the commission of crime may be
accessory.
acquired subsequent to the acquisition of stolen
- As long as the corpus delicti is proved and
property.
- the accessory's participation as such shown,
- Facts: The robbers took and carried away carabaos
- he can be held criminally responsible and meted out
belonging to another. These animals were found in
the corresponding penalty. (Inovero vs. Coronel, C.A.,
the possession of A who acquired them without
65 O.G. 3160)
knowing that they had been illegally taken. When
the owners of the carabaos informed A that they
- RULE: [ACCESSORY]: there can be an accessory even after the
were illegally deprived of their animals, A
principal was convicted
demanded the payment of one-half of what he had
- REQUISITE 1: presenting oneself to serve out the
paid for them. The owners promised to come back
sentence in lieu of the real culprit.

16
• __

with the money. When the owners came back, A been committed.
informed them that he had returned the animals to
the persons from whom he had bought them.
- Held: To declare the accused guilty as accessory, it
is not necessary that he should have acquired the
property, knowing at that time that it had been
stolen. It is sufficient that after acquiring that
knowledge, he concealed or disposed of the
property, thereby depriving the owner thereof.

-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Knowledge of the commission of crime

may be established by circumstantial evidence.
- When a person knew that his co-accused had no
legitimate business; that some of the goods were
taken to him as early as 5:00 to 6:00 o'clock in the
morning; and that said co-accused was neither a
barber nor the owner of a sari-sari store such as
would induce in him a rational belief that the latter's
possession of said goods (among them barber's
utensils) was legitimate; the conclusion is that he
had knowledge of their illegal source. (People vs.
Dalena, CA-G.R. Nos. 11387-R and 11388-R, Oct. 25,
1954)

“commission of the crime”

- The crime committed by the principal must be proved

beyond reasonable doubt.

- The crime must actually be adjudged committed by the

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the
principal, if someone will be adjudged as an accessory: offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
- Thus, where it is doubtful whether a woman killed her
husband maliciously, as it is possible that she might 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the
have acted in self-defense, the fact that their servant crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in
took part in the burial of the deceased in a secluded
order to prevent its discovery.
place would not make the servant an accessory in
parricide, an offense which was not conclusively
proven. (See People vs. Pardito, G.R. No. L-3234,
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
March 1,1952 [Unrep.]) escape of the principals of the crime, provided
the accessory acts with abuse of his public
“without having participated therein, either as functions or whenever the author of the crime is
principals or accomplices” guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt
- If they are already adjudged as principal or accomplice,
they cannot anymore be adjudged as accessory
to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known
- A attacked and fatally wounded B. Seeing B fall to to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
the ground as a result of the fatal blow made by A,
C and D hit B with a piece of wood each was ---------------------------------------------------------
carrying. When B died, A, C, and D buried the
Specific acts of accessories.
corpse to prevent the authorities from discovering
the crime.
- Can A be held liable as an accessory? No, because takes part in three ways:
he already participated as principal. Are C and D (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime;
accessories? No, because they already participated (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the
as accomplices. crime in order to prevent its discovery; and
(c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal
“take part subsequent to its commission” of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public
-RULE: [ACCESSORY] The accessory takes part after the crime functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder,
has been committed. or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
- Note that paragraphs Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Art. 19, known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
which describe the different acts of the accessory,
refer to those acts performed after the crime had

17
• __

same for the thief to whom he gives the proceeds of

(a) by profiting from the effects of the
the sale, is guilty of the crime of theft, as an
crime; accessory. (U.S. vs. Galanco, 11 Phil. 575)

-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Runners or Couriers in obtaining the

- EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: In light felonies
ransom money
- The crime committed by the principal under this
- In kidnapping for ransom, those who acted as
paragraph may be any crime, provided it is not a
runners or couriers in obtaining the ransom money
light felony.
(People vs. Magsino, G.R. No. L-3649, Jan. 29, 1954)
assisted the offenders to profit by the effects of the
a. By profiting themselves by the effects of the crime.
crime.
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Takes part in cattle rustling
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: shared in the fruits/effects of the crime - One who takes part in cattle rustling by profiting
- In murder, one who shared in the reward given for himself by its effects with knowledge of the crime is
the commission of the crime (U.S. vs. Empainado, 9 only an accessory after the fact. (Taer vs. Court of
Phil. 613) profited by the effects of the crime. Appeals, G.R. No. 85204, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA
598, 604-605)
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: received any property from another, - Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means,
and used it [with knowledge of the crime] method or scheme, without the consent of the
- A person who received any property from another, owner/raiser, of any of the above-mentioned
and used it, knowing that the same had been animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether
stolen, is guilty of the crime of theft as an accessory. committed with or without violence against or
(People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463, 467) intimidation of any person or force upon things. It
includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat
-RULE: [NOT ACCESSORY]: when profit is in the nature of a or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser. PD
reward and not fruits or effects of the crime. 533
- But one who received f*200 from the owner of a
stolen jeep, as a reward for locating it in the -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: SHOULD NOT BE IN CONSPIRACY WITH
possession of someone who had bought it, is not an THE PRINCIPAL
accessory, because the amount of P200 was in the - A conspired with others to steal certain goods in the
nature of a reward and not fruits or effects of the customhouse. A agreed to pay, as in fact he paid
crime. (People vs. Yatco, C.A., 51 O.G. 260) them, a substantial sum of money upon delivery of
the stolen goods in his warehouse from the wagons
-RULE: [NOT ACCESSORY, INSTEAD A PRINCIPAL for theft]: when on which his coconspirators loaded the goods at the
the person take the property without the consent of the customhouse. It was held that A was guilty of the
principal. crime of theft as a principal and not merely as an
- In profiting by the effects of the crime, the accessory accessory. (U.S. vs. Tan Tiap Co., 35 Phil. 611)
must receive the property from the principal. He
should not take it without the consent of the
principal. If he took it without the consent of the
principal, he is not an accessory but a principal in (b) by concealing the body, effects or
the crime of theft. Theft may be committed by instruments of the crime in order to
taking with intent to gain, personal property from
one who stole it, without the latter's consent. prevent its discovery; and

- EXCEPTION RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: In light felonies

-RULE: [NOT ACCESSORY] [PROFITING PUNISHED AS PRINCIPAL - The crime committed by the principal under this
ART 307 RPC] When is profiting by the effects of the crime paragraph may be any crime, provided it is not a
punished as the act of principal, and not the act of light felony.
accessory?
- When a person knowingly acquired or received
property taken by the brigands. (Art. 307, Revised “"Body of the crime”
Penal Code)
- Same as "corpus delicti."
b. Assisting the offender to profit by the effects of
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Assist in the burial of the victim. hiding
the crime. the body.
- Those who assist in the burial of the victim of a
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Someone who sells the stolen property
homicide to prevent the discovery of the crime incur
for the thief.
the responsibilities of accessories. (U.S. vs. Leal, 1 Phil.
- A person who receives any property from another,
118)
which he knows to have been stolen, and sells the
- In homicide or murder, it is necessary to prove that a

18
• __

particular person is the victim. The victim must be is guilty of the same crime as accessory. The ladder is
properly identified. Thus, if the body of the victim an instrument of the crime.
cannot be found, the crime cannot be proved.
Hence, the concealing of the body of the victim is in -RULE: [ACCESSORY]: receiving stolen property and
effect concealing the crime itself. concealing that it is a stolen property
- A person who received personal property knowing
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Planting false evidence on the victim that it had been stolen, for the purpose of
- Furnishing the means to make it appear that the concealing the same, as in fact he concealed it, is
deceased was armed, by placing a weapon in his guilty of the crime of theft as an accessory. (U.S. vs.
hand when already dead, and that it was necessary Villaluz, 32 Phil. 376)
to kill him on account of his resistance to the
constabulary men; or making it appear that the - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: concealing a crime/murder weapon
deceased who had been arrested ran away. (U.S. - He is guilty of the crime of homicide as an
vs. Cuison, 20 Phil. 433; People vs. Saladino, G.R. No. accessory, under paragraph No. 2 of Art. 19, who
L-11893, May 23, 1958) received a pistol or a knife, knowing that it had been
- used in killing the deceased, and concealed it
-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Mere act of carrying the body (which is
to be concealed)
- The mere act of a person of carrying the cadaver of “"To prevent its discovery."”
one unlawfully killed, when it was buried to prevent
the discovery of the crime, is sufficient to make him - its = CRIME
responsible as an accessory under paragraph 2 of - The pronoun "its" refers to the word "crime."
Art. 19. (People vs. Galleto, 78 Phil. 820) - In the case of U.S. vs. Villaluz, 32 Phil. 376, 380, the
Supreme Court stated: "Such facts also show that her
-RULE: [NOT AN ACCESSORY]: Act of carrying but there was no concealment of said articles was for the purpose of
attempt to hide the body of the crime.(no knowledge of the preventing and defeating the discovery of the
crime either in this case) crime."
- With respect to appellant A.R., he should be
acquitted. According to his affidavit — the only - RULE: [ACCESSORY]: Receives stolen property for the
evidence against him — he was merely ordered to purposes of concealing
board the jeepney, not knowing, not even - In the same manner that a person who receives
suspecting, the reason or purpose of the ride. stolen property for the purpose of concealing the
- He did not take part in the killing, neither did he same, is likewise guilty of the crime of theft as an
profit by it, nor try to conceal the same from the accessory after the fact." (U.S. vs. Villaluz, 32 Phil.
authorities. 376)
- It is true that he helped his companions in removing
the two dead bodies from the jeepney and throwing
them into the ditch; but there was no attempt to bury
(c) by assisting in the escape or
or hide said bodies, not even cover them with grass concealment of the principal of the
or bushes.
- In fact, the evident design and plan of the culprits as
crime, provided he acts with abuse of his
unfolded during the trial was not to hide the bodies, public functions or the principal is guilty
but to just leave them on the roadside so as to make
it appear that the two victims were killed by Huks in
of treason, parricide, murder, or an
an encounter with the Government forces. (People attempt to take the life of the Chief
vs. De la Cruz, 100 Phil. 624, 633)
Executive, or is known to be habitually
“"Concealing/Destroying effects or instruments” guilty of some other crime

effect of the crime instrument of the crime

The stolen property The pistol or knife

Two classes of accessories are contemplated in

-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: act of Concealing or destroying the
effects or instruments of the crime to prevent its discovery. paragraph 3 of Article 19.

- EXCEPTION RULE: [for paragraph 3 of Article 19 ONLY] [NOT

-RULE: [ACCESSORY]: destroying an instrument of the crime AN ACCESSORY]: Even if there is a crime, if failed to
- A person who destroyed the ladder which he knew convict principal:
had been used by another in climbing the wall of - The accused cannot be held liable as accessory
the house where the latter had committed robbery, under paragraph 3 of Art. 19, if the principal

19
• __

charged with murder died before trial, because - (e) that the principal is known to be habitually
had he been alive he might have been found guilty of some other crime.
guilty only of homicide. - Thus, if a person was previously punished
three times for less serious physical
Public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the injuries and now commits estafa,
- the one who helps in his escape is liable
escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with
as an accessory although the accessory
abuse of his public functions.
is a private individual.
- RULE: [ACCESSORY]: accessory must
Requisites:
have knowledge of the principal being
(1) The accessory is a public officer.
habitually guilty
(2) He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the
- But the accessory must have
principal.
knowledge of the principal
(3) The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions.
being habitually guilty of some
(4) The crime committed by the principal is any crime,
other crime, because the law
provided it is not a light felony.
says "or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other
crime."
- RULE: [ACCESSORY]: A mayor who refused to prosecute
offender is accessory.
- Abusing his public office, the president of the town
of Cabiao refused to prosecute the crime of
homicide and thus made it possible for the
principal offender to escape. principal accomplice accessory
- He refused to make an investigation of the serious
occurrence, of which complaint was made to does not take
him. The municipal president was found guilty as direct part or
accessory. (U.S. vs. Yacat, 1 Phil. 443) cooperate in, or
induce, the
- RULE: [ACCESSORY]: PUBLIC OFFICER IS NOT LIABLE FOR commission of the
BEING AN ACCESSORY TO A RELATIVE. crime.
- a public officer who, with evident abuse of his
office, furnished the means of escape to his does not
brother who had committed murder IS NOT cooperate in the
criminally liable as accessory commission of the
- Such a public officer does not incur any offense by acts
criminal liability. Ties of blood or either prior thereto
relationship constitutes a more powerful or simultaneous
incentive than the call of duty. therewith.
- REMINDER: ONLY EXEMPTION IS PROFITING:
Furthermore, Article 20 does not grant the benefits participation of
of exemption only to accessories who profited or the accessory in
helped the offender profit by the effects of the all cases always
crime. This is the only case where the accessory takes place after
who is related to the offender incurs criminal the commission of
liability. the crime.

---------------------------------------------------------
Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the
escape of the author of the crime — guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt against the life of the
President, or who is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.

Requisites:
(1) The accessory is a private person.
(2) He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the
author of the crime.
(3) The crime committed by the principal is either:
- (a) treason,
- (b) parricide,
- (c) murder,
- (d) an attempt against the life of the President, or

20
• __

- RULE: [ACCESSORY EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY]: Only accessories

under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 19 are exempt from criminal
liability if they are related to the principals.

“with the single exception of accessories falling

within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.”
- Paragraph 1 of Article 19, covers the accessories who
take part subsequent to the commission of the crime in
any of the following manners:
- 1. By profiting by the effects of the crime.
- 2. By assisting offender to profit by the effects
of the crime.

- RULE: [ACCESSORY EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY]: PROFITING

mentioned in Para 1 is the only exception, whichever is the
case, there must be profit to not be exempted.
- Paragraph 2 of Article 19 requires that the purpose of
the concealment is to prevent the discovery of the
crime. On the other hand, paragraph 1 says, "by
profiting themselves by the effects of the crime." Does
paragraph 1 mean that the accessory should actually
---------------------------------------------------------
profit from the effects of the crime? That seems to be
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from the meaning. But suppose a husband conceals the
criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for property stolen by his wife in order to profit from it later,
accessories shall not be imposed upon those is he liable as accessory?
- It would seem that he may be held liable as accessory,
who are such with respect to their spouses,
because his said act is prompted not by affection but
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and by a detestable greed. In that case, his purpose in
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by concealing the stolen property is not to prevent the
affinity within the same degrees, with the single discovery of the crime.
exception of accessories falling within the - IF he did not profit by the effects of the crime. The
reward received by him was not the effect of the crime
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding
of parricide.
article.
---------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------
Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability

- RULE: [ACCESSORY but EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY]: An accessory

is exempt from criminal liability, when the principal is his
- spouses,
- ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters,
- or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees

- RULE: [ACCESSORY NOT EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY]: EXCLUSIVE

LIST? Nephew not incuded
- A nephew, who had witnessed the killing by his uncle
of the deceased, helped in burying the dead body. Is
the nephew criminally liable as an accessory? Yes,
because the relationship of uncle and nephew is not
included in Art. 20.
- In the case of U.S. vs. Insierto, 15 Phil. 358, it was held
that the relationship between uncle and niece does
not come within any of the degrees of relationship of
spouse, or ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural,
or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the
same degree.

21