THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 96107. June 19, 1995.]

CORAZON JALBUENA DE LEON , petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS (SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION) and ULDARICO INAYAN ,
respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER;

CONFERRED ONLY BY THE CONSTITUTION OR BY LAW. — Jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is determinable on the
basis of allegations in the complaint.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE OF ERROR OF JURISDICTION. — An error in
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the rst time on appeal. Barring
highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, neither estoppel nor waiver may be
raised as defenses to such an error.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN DETERMINING WHETHER COURTS HAVE
JURISDICTION. — In order to determine whether the court below had jurisdiction, it is
necessary to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before it.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL AS DEFENSE IN RAISING THE ERROR THEREOF ON
APPEAL; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — Still on the question of jurisdiction,
private respondent Inayan, as appellant before the respondent court, claimed that the
trial court, acting as a court of agrarian relations, did not have jurisdiction over the
complaint led by petitioner because the latter did not concern itself with tenancy or
agrarian matters. The Court of Appeals, in its original decision, ruled that private
respondent was guilty of estoppel. Accordingly, he can not successfully raise the issue.
In the past, the principle of estoppel has been used by the courts to avoid a clear case
of injustice. Its use as a defense to a jurisdictional error is more of an exception rather
than the rule. The circumstances outlining estoppel must be unequivocal and
intentional, for it is an exception to standard legal norms and is generally applied only in
highly exceptional and justi able cases. We nd that the situation in the case at bench
falls within the ambit of justi able cases where estoppel may be applied. The trial
court's recourse to agrarian procedure was undoubtedly provoked by private
respondent Inayan's insistence on the existence of a tenancy relationship with
petitioner. Private respondent cannot now use these same misrepresentations to
assert the court's lack of jurisdiction. He cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure
a rmative relief against petitioner and, after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. Participation in judicial proceedings where the court
was devoid of jurisdiction is not normally considered as estoppel because the
jurisdiction of a court is mandated by law. Estoppel is likewise not appreciated where a
mistaken belief in the court's jurisdiction is maintained. But private respondent's case is
different for it does not involve an honest mistake. He is directly responsible for the
trial court's use of the special rules of agrarian procedure. His insistence brought about
the want of jurisdiction he conveniently asserted before the appellate court, and only
after an adverse decision was levelled against him. Private respondent cannot be
allowed to seek refuge under the protective mantle of the law after he has abused and
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 made a mockery of it. He is, therefore, considered estopped from asserting the court's
want of jurisdiction to try the case.
5. ID.; ID.; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; AS A COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
A MATTER TO BE RESOLVED BY IT IS A PROCEDURAL QUESTION INVOLVING A MODE
OF PRACTICE WHICH THEREFOR MAY BE WAIVED. — the case was ostensibly one that
involved agrarian matters, as alleged by private respondent. Hence the trial court
cannot be faulted for its use of agrarian procedure. The respondent court also correctly
held: "Finally, and more importantly, while it is true that when the trial court decreed that
the procedure outlined in P.D. 946 was to be observed at the trial of the case at bar, it,
in effect assumed its character as an agrarian court which is a court of limited
jurisdiction, and that since agrarian matters are solely cognizable by agrarian courts in
the exercise of their limited jurisdiction (Depositario vs. Herbas 121 SCRA 756)
conversely, agrarian courts have no jurisdiction in cases where there is no tenancy
relation between the parties (Dumlao vs. De Guzman, 1 SCRA 144). We believe, however,
that the dictum enunciated in the Dumlao case obtains only when, as before, the then
C.F.I. and C.A.R. are two separate and distinct entities. Consequently, the foregoing
legal principle no longer nds much relevance under the present system, said agrarian
courts having been integrated into the Regional Trial Courts which, by express mandate
of Section 24 of B.P. 129, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over agrarian cases
although they are ordained to continue applying the special rules of procedure provided
for said cases. This being the case, it is no error for the court below, acting as an
agrarian court, to resolved a controversy involving a civil lease since it is already a
settled rule that inasmuch as the RTC is a court of general jurisdiction, whether a
particular matter should be resolved by it in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, or in
its limited jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural question
involving a mode of practice which, therefore, may be waived (Manalo vs. Mariano, L-
33850, Jan. 22 1976; Santos vs. Banayo, L-31854, Sept. 9, 1982.)"
6. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDICIAL ACTIONS TO RECOVER POSSESSION;
CITED. — An unlawful detainer suit ( acción interdictal) together with forcible entry are
the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be led to recover the right of possession
of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, acción publiciana or the
plenary action to recover the right of possession and acción reivindicatoria or the
action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three
kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND FORCIBLE ENTRY; CONSTRUED. —
Illegal detainer consists in withholding by a person from another of the possession of a
land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the
former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An
ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical
possession only or possession de facto and not possession de jure, where
dispossession has lasted for not more than one year. Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are quieting processes and the one-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action. The use of summary procedure in ejectment cases is
intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to
possession of the property. They are not processes to determine the actual title to an
estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership
raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession. Its
determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCION PUBLICIANA; DISTINGUISHED FROM ACCION
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 REIVINDICATORIA. — Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession when dispossession had lasted for more than one year or when disposition
was effected by means other than those mentioned in Rule 70. Under these
circumstances, a plenary action may be brought before the regional trial court. Accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership, including the recovery of
possession, should also be filed in the regional trial court.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner's
complaint was for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of Possession; Recovery
of Unpaid Rentals Damages." After alleging the facts regarding the lease of the subject
property, including Inayan's refusal to pay rent and to vacate, petitioner prayed that the
trial court declare the civil law lease (and not "tenancy or agricultural lease") terminated.
Plaintiff likewise prayed that defendant be ordered to vacate the premises, pay back
rentals, unpaid irrigation fees, moral and exemplary damages and litigation fees. Clearly,
the case involves more than just the issue of possession. It was necessary for the trial
court below to determine whether the lease was civil and not an agricultural or tenancy
relationship and whether its termination was in order. More speci cally, the complaint
emphasized, in paragraph 4: "That in entering into the contract, Jesus Jalbuena and
defendant Uldarico Inayan de nitely agreed that the contract was to be CIVIL LAW
LEASE NOT TENANCY OR AGRICULTURAL LEASE, for a period of one (1) year
renewable for the same period at the option and agreement to the parties;" As correctly
determined by the trial court, one of the issues in the case below was whether or not
the contract entered into by the plaintiff and defendant was a civil law lease or an
agricultural lease. If the former, the next issue was whether the lease contract between
the parties had been terminated in 1983 for failure of defendant to pay his annual
rental. A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue of physical possession. The case
below, however, did not concern merely the issue of possession but as well, the nature
of the lease contracted by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest and private respondent.
It likewise involved the propriety of terminating the relationship contracted by said
parties, as well as the demand upon defendant to deliver the premises and pay unpaid
rentals, damages and incidental fees. Where the issues of the case extend beyond
those commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits, such as for instance, the respective
rights of parties under various contractual arrangements and the validity thereof, the
case is converted from a mere detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary estimation, "
thereby placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts
(formerly the courts of rst instance). Not being merely a case of ejectment, the
regional trial court possessed jurisdiction to try and resolve the case.

10. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; RES JUDICATA AS A GROUND; NOT

APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — On matter of res judicata raised by private
respondent, we conclude that the same does not find application in instant petition. The
issues herein and in the petition on G.R. No. 89312 are not the same. In the latter, the
issue involved execution pending appeal granted by the trial court judge to petitioner
Jalbuena De Leon.

DECISION

ROMERO , J : p

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 In this petition for review, we are asked to set aside the amended decision of the
court of Appeals dated November 8, 1990 in "Corazon Jalbuena de Leon v. Uldarico
Inayan," (CA-G.R. CV No. 19777) 1 which reversed its original decision dated May 24,
1990. 2
The subject property in the case at bench involves two parcels of irrigated
riceland covering an area of 117, 785 square meters located in Barangays Guintas and
Bingke, Napnod, Leganes, Iloilo. Jesus Jalbuena, the owner of the land, entered into a
verbal lease contract in 1970 with Uldarico Inayan, for one year renewable for the same
period. Inayan, private respondent herein, bound himself to deliver 252 cavans of palay
each year as rental to be paid during the rst ten days of January. Private respondents
who was a godson of Jesus Jalbuena, was allowed to continue with the lease from year
to year.
Petitioner Corazon Jalbuena de Leon is the daughter of Jesus Jalbuena and the
transferee of the subject property.
Although private respondent cultivated the subject property through hired men,
the cavans of palay were paid annually until 1983 when Inayan ceased paying the
agreed rental and instead, asserted dominion over the land. When asked by the
petitioner to vacate the land, he refused to do so, prompting the latter to bring an action
in court.
In March 1984, herein petitioner led a complaint against private respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for "Termination of Civil Law Lease;
Recovery of Possession; Recovery of Unpaid Rentals and Damages."
Private respondent, in his Answer, claimed that the land had been tenanted by his
father since 1938 and that he has already been issued Certi cates of Land Transfer
(CLT) for the subject property. These Certi cates of Land Transfer were subsequently
cancelled by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform on November 22, 1983 upon a nding that
said lands were owned by Jesus Jalbuena and that the CLTs were erroneously issued. 3
On April 11, 1984, the lower court issued an order adopting the procedure in
agrarian cases.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision dated February 26, 1988 in
favor of petitioner De Leon reads:
"WHEREFORE, Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1 Declaring the lease contract between plaintiff and defendant as a

Civil law lease, and that the same has already been terminated due to defendant's
failure to pay his rentals from 1983 up to the present;

2. Ordering defendant Uldarico Inayan and his privies and successors-

in-interest to immediately vacate the land subject-matter of this complaint and to
return possession thereof to plaintiff;
3. Ordering defendant Uldarico Inayan to pay plaintiff Corazon
Jalbuena de Leon, one thousand two hundred sixty (1,260) cavans of palay
representing unpaid rentals from 1983 up to 1987, or its money equivalent
computed at the current market price of palay, less whatever amount may have
been deposited by defendant with the court during the pendency of this case,
which deposit should be released in favor of plaintiff;

4. Ordering defendant Inayan to pay to plaintiff Jalbuena de Leon the

sum of P38,501.28 representing the unpaid irrigation fees, and all fees thereafter
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 until possession of the land has been transferred to the plaintiff;
5. Ordering defendant Inayan to pay to plaintiff Jalbuena de Leon the
of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees; P1,000.00 as litigation expenses, and P2,000.00
as moral damages, plus costs; and

6. Dismissing defendant's counterclaim for lack of merit." 4

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, private respondents raised the sole issue of
jurisdiction and alleged that the lower court, acting as Court of Agrarian Relations, had
no jurisdiction over the action.
The respondent appellate court, on May 24, 1990, a rmed the trial court's
decision, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from should be,
as it is hereby AFFIRMED, with a MODIFICATION that the period within which
appellant should be ordered to pay the rentals in arrears now covers the years
1983 to 1990. Costs against appellant." 5

It held that while jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law, private respondent's
attack on the jurisdiction of the lower court must fail for he is guilty of estoppel. 6
Despite several opportunities to question the jurisdiction of the lower court, he failed to
do so. Moreover, it was he who insisted, through his misrepresentation, that the case,
involving, as it does, purely agrarian issues, should be referred to the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform. 7 Finally, the appellate court held that since regional trial courts, by
express provision of B.P. 129, Section 24, now have exclusive original jurisdiction over
agrarian cases, but still applying the special rules of agrarian procedure, it was no error
for the court below, even if acting as an agrarian court, to resolve a controversy
involving a civil lease. 8
Private respondent's motion to reconsider the above decision was granted by
the Court of Appeals on November 8, 1990. Respondent court then set aside its earlier
decision and dismissed the civil case led by petitioner below (Civil Case No. 15628)
for want of jurisdiction. In its amended decision, the appellate court held that
petitioner's complaint below was anchored on acción interdictal, a summary action for
recovery of physical possession that should have been brought before the proper
inferior court. To make private respondent a deforciant so that the unlawful detainer
suit may be properly led, it is necessary to allege when demand to pay rent and to
vacate were made. The court found that this requisite was not speci cally met in
petitioner's complaint below. Such failure on her part is fatal to her cause since the one-
year period within which a detainer suit may be instituted had not yet elapsed when Civil
Case No. 15628 was led. Therefore, the court below was devoid of jurisdiction to
entertain the case. 9
Hence this petition for review.
It is petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
case below is an unlawful detainer action. Since the parties did not con ne themselves
to issues pertaining solely to possession but also to the nature of the lease contract,
the case is not one unlawful detainer but one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Next, petitioner argues that the issue of lack of jurisdiction should not have been
resolved in favor of private respondent who had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court a quo and raised the issue only after an adverse decision was rendered
against him.
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 Aside from emphasizing the correctness of respondent court's ruling that the
case below was a mere ejectment case, private respondent raises the issue of res
judicata in his comment.
Private respondent Inayan claims that the issue in the instant petition, e.i.
whether or not the trial court, acting as an agrarian court, had jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer suit led by petitioner, had already been ruled upon by the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 15700 entitled "Uldarico Inayan v. Hon. Alonsagay and
Corazon Jalbuena" and the petition for review of said decision had already been denied
by this Court in G.R. No. 89312. 1 0
The petition is impressed with merit.
The primary issue presented here resolves around the jurisdiction of the trial
court, then acting as a court of agrarian relations employing agrarian procedure, to try
the suit filed by petitioner.
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. 1 1 It is determinable on the basis of allegations in the complaint.
12

An error in jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the rst time on
app eal. 1 3 Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, 1 4 neither
estoppel nor waiver may be raised as defenses to such an error. 1 5
In order to determine whether the court below had jurisdiction, it is necessary to
first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before it.
A study of the complaint instituted by petitioner in the lower court reveals that
the case is, contrary to the ndings of the respondents appellate court, not one of
unlawful detainer.
An unlawful detainer suit (acción interdictal) together with forcible entry are the
two forms of an ejectment suit that may be led to recover the right of possession of
real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, acción publiciana or the
plenary action to recover the right of possession and acción reivindicatoria or the
action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three
kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. 1 6
Illegal detainer consists in withholding by a person from another of the
possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or
termination of the former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or
implied. 1 7 An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover
physical possession only or possession de facto and not possession de jure, where
dispossession has lasted for not more than one year. Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are quieting processes and the one-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action. 1 8 The use of summary procedure in ejectment cases
is intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to
possession of the property. They are not processes to determine the actual title to an
estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership
raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession. 1 9 its
determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive.
Acción publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when disposition was effected by
means other than those mentioned in Rule 70. 2 0 Under these circumstances, a plenary
action 2 1 may be brought before the regional trial court. 2 2
Acción reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership, including the
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 recovery of possession, should also be filed in the regional trial court.
Petitioner's complaint was for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of
Possession; Recovery of Unpaid Rentals Damages." 2 3 After alleging the facts
regarding the lease of the subject property, including Inayan's refusal to pay rent and to
vacate, petitioner prayed that the trial court declare the civil law lease (and not "tenancy
or agricultural lease") terminated. Plaintiff likewise prayed that defendant be ordered to
vacate the premises, pay back rentals, unpaid irrigation fees, moral and exemplary
damages and litigation fees.
Clearly, the case involves more than just the issue of possession. It was
necessary for the trial court below to determine whether the lease was civil and not an
agricultural or tenancy relationship and whether its termination was in order. More
specifically, the complaint emphasized, in paragraph 4:
"That in entering into the contract, Jesus Jalbuena and defendant Uldarico
Inayan de nitely agreed that the contract was to be CIVIL LAW LEASE NOT
TENANCY OR AGRICULTURAL LEASE, for a period of one (1) year renewable for
the same period at the option and agreement to the parties;" 2 4
As correctly determined by the trial court, one of the issues in the case below
was whether or not the contract entered into by the plaintiff and defendant was a civil
law lease or an agricultural lease. If the former, the next issue was whether the lease
contract between the parties had been terminated in 1983 for failure of defendant to
pay his annual rental. 2 5
A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue of physical possession. The case
below, however, did not concern merely the issue of possession but as well, the nature
of the lease contracted by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest and private respondent.
It likewise involved the propriety of terminating the relationship contracted by said
parties, as well as the demand upon defendant to deliver the premises and pay unpaid
rentals, damages and incidental fees.
Where the issues of the case extend beyond those commonly involved in
unlawful detainer suits, such as for instance, the respective rights of parties under
various contractual arrangements and the validity thereof, the case is converted from a
mere detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary estimation, " thereby placing it under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts (formerly the courts of rst
instance). 2 6
Not being merely a case of ejectment, the regional trial court possessed
jurisdiction to try and resolve the case.
Still on the question of jurisdiction, private respondent Inayan, as appellant
before the respondent court, claimed that the trial court, acting as a court of agrarian
relations, did not have jurisdiction over the complaint led by petitioner because the
latter did not concern itself with tenancy or agrarian matters. The Court of Appeals, in
its original decision, ruled that private respondent was guilty of estoppel. Accordingly,
he can not successfully raised the issue.
In the past, the principle of estoppel has been used by the courts to avoid a clear
case of injustice. Its use as a defense to a jurisdictional error is more of an exception
rather than the rule. The circumstances outlining estoppel must be unequivocal and
intentional, for it is an exception to standard legal norms and is generally applied only in
highly exceptional and justifiable cases. 2 7
We nd that the situation in the case at bench falls within the ambit of justi able
cases where estoppel may be applied. The trial court's recourse to agrarian procedure
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 was undoubtedly provoked by private respondent Inayan's insistence on the existence
of a tenancy relationship with petitioner. Private respondent cannot now use these
same misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction. He cannot invoke the
court's jurisdiction to secure a rmative relief against petitioner and, after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. 2 8
Participation in judicial proceedings where the court was devoid of jurisdiction is
not normally considered as estoppel because the jurisdiction of a court is mandated by
law. Estoppel is likewise not appreciated where a mistaken belief in the court's
jurisdiction is maintained.
But private respondent's case is different for it does not involve an honest
mistake. He is directly responsible for the trial court's use of the special rules of
agrarian procedure. His insistence brought about the want of jurisdiction he
conveniently asserted before the appellate court, and only after an adverse decision
was levelled against him. Private respondent cannot be allowed to seek refuge under
the protective mantle of the law after he has abused and made a mockery of it. He is,
therefore, considered estopped from asserting the court's want of jurisdiction to try the
case.
Moreover, the case was ostensibly one that involved agrarian matters, as alleged
by private respondent. Hence the trial court cannot be faulted for its use of agrarian
procedure.
The respondent court also correctly held:
"Finally, and more importantly, while it is true that when the trial court
decreed that the procedure outlined in P.D. 946 was to be observed at the trial of
the case at bar, it, in effect assumed its character as an agrarian court which is a
court of limited jurisdiction, and that since agrarian matters are solely cognizable
by agrarian courts in the exercise of their limited jurisdiction (Depositario vs.
Herbas 121 SCRA 756) conversely, agrarian court have no jurisdiction in cases
where there is no tenancy relation between the parties (Dumlao vs. De Guzman, 1
SCRA 144). We believe, however, that the dictum enunciated in the Dumlao case
obtains only when, as before, the then C.F.I. and C.A.R. are two separate and
distinct entities. Consequently, the foregoing legal principle no longer nds much
relevance under the present system, said agrarian courts having been integrated
into the Regional Trial Courts which, by express mandate of Section 24 of B.P.
129, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over agrarian cases although they
are ordained to continue applying the special rules of procedure provided for said
cases. This being the case, it is no error for the court below, acting as an agrarian
court, to resolved a controversy involving a civil lease since it is already a settled
rule that inasmuch as the RTC is a court of general jurisdiction, whether a
particular matter should be resolved by it in the exercise of its general jurisdiction,
or in its limited jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural
question involving a mode of practice which, therefore, may be waived (Manalo
vs. Mariano, L-33850, Jan. 22 1976; Santos vs. Banayo, L-31854, Sept. 9 1982."
2 9 (Emphasis supplied)

On matter of res judicata raised by private respondent, we conclude that the

same does not nd application in instant petition. The issues herein and in the petition
on G.R. No. 89312 3 0 are not the same. In the latter, the issue involved execution
pending appeal granted by the trial court judge to petitioner Jalbuena De Leon. The
Court of Appeals 3 1 enjoined the respondent judge from enforcing the execution
pending appeal after having found no valid and compelling reason to justify said
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 execution. Then too, private respondent asserted, and the appellate court found, that an
agrarian court has no jurisdiction on a case where there exists no tenancy relation
between the parties. The court said:
"In any event, the matter of jurisdiction of respondent court having been
impugned and said issue permeating and going as it does into the very
competence of the trial court to act on CAR Case No. 15628, it behooves us to
tread softly and gone the bene t of the doubt to petitioner, for should execution
pending appeal be allowed and the judgment is later ordered vacated on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, then it would be
well-nigh impossible to restore petitioner to his former status." 3 2
From the foregoing quote, we nd that the decision of the appellate court did not
categorically rule on the matter of jurisdiction but only made mention of it in passing
and in ruling upon the real issue of the correctness of execution pending appeal
ordered by the respondent judge. The decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 15700 became nal
after the petition for review of said decision was dismissed by the court for failure to
pay the prescribed legal fees and to attach duplicate original or certi ed true copies of
the questioned decision. 3 3
In sum, we have concluded that the case led by petitioner below, not being one
of unlawful detainer, the regional trial court had jurisdiction to hear and try the case.
Moreover, as shown in the foregoing paragraphs, private respondent is estopped
from asserting the lower court's lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The amended decision of the court of
Appeals dated November 8, 1990 in CA G.R. CV No. 19777 ("Corazon Jalbuena de Leon
v. Uldarico Inayan ") is SET ASIDE and the original decision dated May 24, 1990 is
REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Melo and Francisco, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Antonio M. Martinez, concurred in by Justices Jose A. R. Melo and
Filemon H. Mendoza, Rollo, p. 50.
2. Rollo, p. 47.
3. Inayan's motion for reconsideration was denied by Minister Conrado Estrella in an
Order dated October 4, 1985. Part of the Order reads:
"After a careful study of the facts borne out by the records, this Office finds that
Uldarico Inayan is not a landholding and the generation of CLT's covering the same in
his favor was erroneous." (Quoted in the Court of Appeals decision dated May 24,
1990; Rollo, p. 48.)
4. Penned by Judge Jesus G. Alonsagay, Rollo, pp. 34-35.

5. Rollo, p. 52.
6. Rollo, p. 50.
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 7. Rollo, p. 51. Inayan moved to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to
determine the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties despite the
cancellation of the CLTs erroneously issued to him. When the aforesaid motion was
denied, he elevated the case to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The Court of Appeals,
to which the case was referred, on September 15, 1988 denied the petition in "Uldarico
Inayan v. Hon. Judge Ramos et. al." (CA. G.R. SP No. 07026), Rollo, p. 48.
8. Rollo, pp. 51-52.
9. Rollo, p. 55.
10. Per Resolution of the Court dated September 25, 1989, which noted without action
petitioner's leave to file a second motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 89312 entitled
"Corazon Jalbuena de Leon v. Court of Appeals, et al.," Rollo, p. 111.

11. Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514, cited in M. Moran, 1 Comments on the Rules of Court
53 (1979 ed.).

12. Time, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-28882, May 31, 1972; Ganadin v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-
23547, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 613; Abo v. Philame Employees and Workers
Union, G.R. No. L-19912, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 120; Bautista v. Fernandez, G.R.
No. L-24062, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 744.
13. Bloomfield Academy v. CA, G.R. No. 99042, September 26, 1994; People v. Que Po
Lay, 94 Phil. 6400; Roxas v. Rafferty, 37 Phil 957; Government v. American Surety Co.,
11 Phil 203.

14. Jimenez v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 219 SCRA 230;
Pantranco North express Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477;
Romualdez v. RTC, G.R. No. 104960, September 14 1993, 226 SCRA 408; Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Lobudan v. Gil, G.R. No.
221663, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17; Crisostomo v. CA, G.R. No. L-27166, March 25,
1980.
15. La Naval Drug Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994; SEAF-DEC v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 86773, February 14, 1992, 206 SCRA 283.
16. Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 164.
17. Rule 70, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court; Tenorio v. Gomba, 81 Phil. 54 Dikit v. Icasiano,
89 Phil 44.

18. Monteblanco v. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil. 797; Sarona v. Villegas, G.R. No.
L-22984, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1256.
19. Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, B.P. No. 129, Sec. 33.

20. Rule 70, Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding sections, a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat. strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession,
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession or any person or persons claiming, together with damages and costs.
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 The complaint must be verified.
The provisions of this rule shall not apply to cases covered by the Agricultural Tenancy
Act.

21. Gumiran v. Gumiran, 21 Phil. 174; Medina v. Valdellon, G.R. No. L-38510, March 25,
1975, 63 SCRA 279.

22. Aguilon v. Bohol, G.R. No. L-27169, October 20, 1977, 79 SCRA 482.
23. Rollo, p. 18.
24. Rollo, p. 19.
25. Rollo, p. 29.
26. De Rivera v. Halili, G.R. No. L-15159, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 59, 64.
27. La Naval Drug Corp. v. CA, supra.
28. Manalo v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-33850, January 22, 1976, 69 SCRA 80, citing Dean v.
Dean, 86 ALR 79 and Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36.
29. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 24, 1990, Rollo, pp. 51-52.
30. "Corazon Jalbuena de Leon v. Hon. Jesus G. Alongsagay, et el.,"

31. "Uldarico Inayan v. Hon. Jesus G. Alongsagay, et al., "CA-G.R. SP No. 15700, decision
dated February 20, 1989, penned by Justice Jose A.R. Melo and concurred in by
Justices Manuel C. Herrera and Jorge S. Imperial. Rollo, p. 124.

32. Rollo, p. 127.

33. Resolution of the Court dated June 26, 1989 in UDK-9328, "Corazon Jalbuena de Leon
v. Court of Appeals, et al."

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