CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No.

L-2746 December 6, 1906

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of
a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information
and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation.
The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by
reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the
land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the
presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals,
except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the
petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length
of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from
them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and
its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants
to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources
in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Oposa vs Factoran
 Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet
unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for
the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK,
petitioners, vs. ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
No. L-30389. December 27, 1972.

FACTS: Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari seek to reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower
court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title of respondent Aniano David declared null and void.
According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the
proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs
appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director
of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of
the Naga Cadastre, On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959.

ISSUE: Can petitioners bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent?
RULING: NO. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent Whether the grant was
in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and
set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the
government.

OH CHO, applicant and appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor and appellant.
[No. 48321. August 31, 1946]

FACTS: The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain. The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to the filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940. The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be
confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired
the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrees promulgated by the
Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496).

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicant is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the provisions of the Public Land
Act (C. A. No, 141)?

RULING: No. Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of registration of the
lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C. A. No. 141).The sale
of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void.

Judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents.
G.R. No. 57667. May 28, 1990.*

FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari, San Miguel Corporation seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals denying its application for registration of a parcel of land in view of its failure to show entitlement thereto. On
December 23, 1975, petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC for brevity) purchased from Silverio Perez Lot 684, a
14,531-square-meter parcel of land located in Sta. Anastacia, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in consideration of the sum of
P133,084.80.2 On February 21, 1977, claiming ownership in fee simple of the land, SMC filed before the then Court of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Batangas an application for its registration under the Land Registration Act.
The Solicitor General, appearing for the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the application for registration contending
that SMCs claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant could no longer be availed of by the
applicant as the six-month period from February 16, 1976 prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 892 had elapsed; that
the parcel of land in question is part of the public domain, and that SMC, being a private corporation, is disqualified under
Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution from holding alienable lands of the public domain. The Solicitor General
thereafter authorized the Provincial Fiscal of Batangas to appear in said case, subject to his supervision and control.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling that SMC and/ or its
predecessor-in-interest has a registrable right over Lot 684?

RULING: The Court holds that there is paucity of evidence of actual, notorious and exclusive possession of the property
on the part of vendor Silverio Perez so as to attach to it the character of an express grant from the government. Indeed,
as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, Silverio Perezs testimony, being uncorroborated, is simply self-serving and
hence, undeserving of any weight.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

ALFREDO M. ALMEDA, LEONARDO M. ALMEDA and ERNESTO M. ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents.
G.R. No. 85322. April 30, 1991.*

FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters located in Barrio Pampangin, Pateros,
Rizal, and described in Survey Plan Psu-128539. It was originally owned and possessed by EmilianoAlmeda, father of the
petitioners, by virtue of an Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial executed on June 15, 1935, between him and his brother
Adriano, wherein they attested the fact that the land in question was inherited from their parents, VedastoAlmeda and
Josefa C. Concepcion, who had inherited the same from their own parents (great-grandparents of herein petitioners). After
Emilianos death on May 1, 1948, his wife, Ana Menguito, and their children received the produce of the land and rented
out to third persons portions of the property where Emiliano had three houses built. Upon Anas death on April 3, 1950, her
children with Emiliano inherited the property and the lessees moved out. On June 9, 1980, the brothers Alfredo, Leonardo
and Ernesto executed an extrajudicial partition adjudicating the land to themselves. The Almeda brothers applied for
the registration of the land in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLVI.

ISSUE: Whether or not applicants possession of the disputed land prior to January 3, 1968 was valid for purposes of a
grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

RULING: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or
before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into
private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in
concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:

Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

Collado vs. CA G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, and
covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-
162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his
survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." Then petitioner Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional
co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal
Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application.

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.

HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources belong to the State.
Watersheds are considered natural resources which are not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or
alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public
Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA,
several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila
Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed,
violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!

Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates
glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose
object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the
beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended
JVA null and void ab initio.
CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ
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CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] - F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest,
took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His
successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church,
convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by a
written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the
parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands,
and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was
the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that
it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was
retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff.

HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands.
This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in
Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the
temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration.

Secretary of DENR vs Yap

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,
Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands
alienable.

HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.