Subject: Persons and Family Relations Law

Topic: Parental Authority

G.R. No. L-23253 March 28, 1969

Facts:

1. Pacita Chua, petitioner, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a hostess and she
had sexual liaison with man after man without benefit of marriage.

2. Among those men is Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert and Betty
Chua Sy. Shortly after birth of Betty, Pacita and Sy Sia Lay separated.

3. Pacita thereafter lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints until she met
Victor Tan Villareal. In due time, she became the latter's mistress. In 1960, another child,
a girl, was born to her. In 1961, when this last child was still an infant, she and Villareal
separated. Without means to support the said child, Pacita Chua gave her away to a
comadre in Cebu.

4. Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired
the custody of the child Betty who was then barely four months old. They have since
brought her up as their own. They had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on September
12, 1958.

5. It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang spouses by
Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua.

Issue: Whether or not a parent can be deprived of parental authority if they abandon their child.

Ruling:

Yes, the mother may be deprived of parental authority if they abandon their child.

Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, "The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or
suspend the exercise of the same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or
should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make them beg or abandon
them."

There was abandonment by the petitioner in 1958 when she surrendered the custody of her child
to the Cabangbangs. Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because the
Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence. The
petitioner's attitude confirms her intention to abandon the child — from the very outset when she
allowed Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment
took place when the child, barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed
the utmost care and solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once
move to recover the child. She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which she
owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity to
display maternal affection; and totally denied her support and maintenance. Her silence and
inaction have been prolonged to such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total
relinquishment of parental claim over her, can and should be inferred as a matter of law.

Moreover, the court finds it of incalculable significance that nowhere in the course of the
petitioner's lengthy testimony did she ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty
Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang — or, for that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal — because
she loves her, cares for her, and wants to smother her with motherly affection. Far from it. She
wants Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged father would resume giving
her (the petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate and embarrass the respondent
Villareal who, with her knowledge and consent, gave the child to the Cabangbangs. But — "most
unkindest cut of all"! — she nevertheless signified her readiness to give up the child, in exchange
for a jeep and some money.

Hence, the lack of sincere desire to recover her child, and the abandonment thereof, is a ground
to deprive a mother of parental authority of her child.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23253 March 28, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE CABANGBANG" FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Francisco R. Sotto and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal direct to this Court from the decision of May 21, 1964 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chua's petition for habeas corpus directed against Bartolome
Cabangbang and his wife Flora Cabangbang.

Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a
hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after man without benefit of marriage. She first
lived with a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She
afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert and Betty
Chua Sy. The latter child was born on December 15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita
Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua
lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due
time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961
when this last child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support
the said child, Pacita Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.

Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the
custody of the child Betty who was then barely four months old. They have since brought her up
as their own. They had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on September 12, 1958. 1

There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses acquired custody of the
girl Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in October 1958, while she and Villareal were still
living together, the latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs,
allegedly in recompense for favors received. She supposedly came to know of the whereabouts
of her daughter, only in 1960 when the girl, who was then about three years old, was brought
to her by Villareal, who shortly thereafter returned the child to the Cabangbangs allegedly thru
threats intimidation, fraud and deceit. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs.
Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of their residence; that she
reared her as her own and grew very fond of her; and that nobody ever molested them until the
child was 5-½ years of age.

At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang
spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua.
 By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished to
Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the custody of the child.
Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed on
June 14, 1963 a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that
the court grant her custody of and recognize her parental authority over the girl. Named
respondents in the petition were Villareal and the spouses Cabangbang.

On June 15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any of his
deputies to produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang before the court a quo on
June 17, 1963, at 8:30 a.m. However, for reasons not stated in the record, the child was not
produced before the lower court as ordered.

On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed their answer
the next day.

After due trial, the lower court on May 21, 1964 promulgated its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court has come to the conclusion that it will be for
the welfare of the child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace Cabangbang to be under the
custody of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. Petition dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

In this appeal now before us, the petitioner tenders for resolution two issues of law which, by
her own formulation, read as follows: "The lower court erred when it awarded the custody of
petitioner's daughter Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old,
in favor of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, and [2] illegally deprived
petitioner of parental authority over her daughter."

We resolve both issues against the petitioner.

I.

Stated succinctly, the petitioner's thesis is that pursuant to the mandate contained in article
363 of the Civil Code she cannot be separated from her child who was less, seven years of age,
and that she cannot be deprived of her parental authority over the child because not one of the
grounds for the termination, loss, suspension or deprivation of parental authority provided in
article 332 of the same Code obtains in this case.

Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot and academic. Having been born on December 15,
1957, the child is now 11 years of age. Consequently, the second paragraph of art. 363 of the
Civil Code, which prohibits the separation of a child under seven years of age from her mother,
"unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure," has no immediate relevance. The
petitioner correctly argues, however, that the reasons relied upon by the lower court
— i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright woman" and "it will be for the welfare of the child" —
are not strictly speaking, proper grounds in law to deprive a mother of her inherent right to
parental authority over her child. It must be conceded that minor children — be they legitimate,
recognized natural, adopted, natural by legal fiction or illegitimate, other than natural as
specified in art. 269 of the Civil Code — are by law under the parental authority of both the
father and the mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be. But we take the
view that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual premises, the petitioner
can be deprived of her parental authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code lays
down the rule that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of
guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by concession," it indicates
in the next that "The courts may, in cases specified by law deprive parents of their [parental]
authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the
petitioner of parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.

It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal with the
knowledge and consent of the petitioner. In support of this finding, it cited the facts that the
petitioner did not at all — not ever — report to the authorities the alleged disappearance of her
daughter, and had not taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that she
was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim that she did not
make any move to recover the child because the Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The
petitioner is bound by the foregoing findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this
Court, she is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial
court. 2

Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:

The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the
same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them
corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make them beg or abandon them.
(emphasis supplied)

Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority over
their children.

Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to the Cabangbangs
tantamount to abandonment of the child? To our mind, mere acquiescence — without more —
is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. But the record yields a host of circumstances
which, in their totality, unmistakably betray the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to
completely forego all parental response possibilities and forever relinquish all parental claim in
respect to the child.

She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963,
or after the lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to recover custody.
Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were
powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence. A mother who really
loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction
of the petitioner — once informed, as she alleged, and her child was in the custody of the
Cabangbangs — should have been to move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out but still
respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.

It is a matter of record — being the gist of her own unadulterated testimony under oath — that
she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing the
petitioner the support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the
child away. A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as a means of embarrassing
Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her and altogether stopped living with and supporting
her. But the record likewise reveals that at the pre-trial conducted by the court a quo, she
expressed her willingness that the child remain with the Cabangbangs provided the latter would
in exchange give her a jeep and some money.
 The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings below, reveal that her
motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's heart. Upon the contrary, they are
unmistakably selfish — nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to obtain concessions
— financial and otherwise — either from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the
child back, support for her would be forthcoming so she thinks — from the alleged father, Sy
Sia Lay. On the other hand, if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided
they gave her a jeep and some money.

Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing but confirm her intention to
abandon the child — from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to give her away to the
Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment took place when the child, barely four
months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care and solicitude of
her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once move to recover the child. She
continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which she owed to the child; completely
withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity to display maternal affection; and
totally denied her support and maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been prolonged to
such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim
over her, can and should be inferred as a matter of law. 3

Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her own flesh and
blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu
because she could not support it.

Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere in the course of the petitioner's lengthy
testimony did she ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang — or, for that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal — because she loves her,
cares for her, and wants to smother her with motherly affection. Far from it. She wants Betty
Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged father would resume giving her (the
petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate and embarrass the respondent Villareal
who, with her knowledge and consent, gave the child to the Cabangbangs. But — "most
unkindest cut of all"! — she nevertheless signified her readiness to give up the child, in
exchange for a jeep and some money.

We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a
ground which the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child. 4

Contrast the petitioner's attitude with that of the respondents Cabangbang — especially the
respondent Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment the child was given to them, took care of
her as if she were her own flesh and blood, had her baptized, and when she reached school age
enrolled her in a reputable exclusive school, for girls.

Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in this case would consist not in taking the
child away from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to the custody of the petitioner.

For, by her own admission, the petitioner has no regular source of income, and it is doubtful,
to say the very least, that she can provide the child with the barest necessities of life, let alone
send her to school. There is no insurance at all that the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay — an unknown
quantity, as far as the record goes — would resume giving the petitioner support once she and
the child are reunited. What would then prevent the petitioner from again doing that which she
did before, i.e., give her away? These are of course conjectures, but when the welfare of a
helpless child is at stake, it is the bounden duty of courts — which they cannot shirk — to
respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to a child's natural and legal right to live and
grow in the proper physical, moral and intellectual environment. 5

This is not to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and secure future is guaranteed
for her. For life is beset at every turn with snares and pitfalls. But the record indubitably
pictures the Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of consequence in the community, who
have given her their name and are rearing her as their very own child, and with whom there is
every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of normal growth and development into
respectable womanhood.

Verily, to surrender the girl to the petitioner would be to assume — quite incorrectly — that
only mothers are capable of parental love and affection. Upon the contrary, this case precisely
underscores the homiletic admonition that parental love is not universal and immutable like a
law of natural science.

II.

The petitioner assails as illegal and without basis the award of the custody of Grace
Cabangbang or Betty Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon the grounds, first, that the
couple are not related by consanguinity or affinity to the child, and second, because the answer
of the spouses contains no prayer for the custody of the child.

The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar
the lower court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in certain
cases the custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or
the mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are separated
— either legally or de facto — and where it appears that both parents are improper persons to
whom to entrust the care, custody and control of the child, "the court may either designate the
paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable
and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to and suitable asylum, children's
home, or benevolent society." 6

Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie the petitioner's
contention that the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which states that

In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount.....

applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the father and the mother. That
the policy enunciated, in the abovequoted legal provision is of general application, is evident
from the use of the, adjective all — meaning, the whole extent or quantity of, the entire number
of, every one of. 7 It is, therefore, error to argue that if the suit involving a child's custody is
between a parent and a stranger, the law must necessarily award such custody to the parent.
Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely contemplates, among others, a suit between a
parent and a stranger who, in the words of the provision, is "some reputable resident of the
province." And under the authority of the said rule, the court — if it is for the best interest of
the child — may take the child away from its parents and commit it to, inter alia, a benevolent
person.

The petitioner's contention that the answer of the spouses Cabangbang contains no prayer for
the retention by them of the custody of the child, is equally devoid of merit. The several moves
taken by them are clear and definitive enough. First, they asked for her custody pendente lite.
Second, they sought the dismissal of the petition below for lack of merit. Finally, they added a
general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable in the premises. Surely the above reliefs
prayed for are clearly indicative of the Cabangbangs' genuine desire to retain the custody of
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.

III.

Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise expressly provided
by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." The petitioner has not proven that she is entitled to
the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the contrary, by wantonly and
completely shunting aside her legal and moral obligations toward her child, she must be
deemed as having forfeited all legitimate legal and moral claim to her custody. The lower court
acted correctly in dismissing her petition.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.