G.R. No.

217426, December 04, 2017

ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., Petitioner, v. LWV CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 11,
2014 and the Resolution3 dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 125451, which affirmed with modification the Decision 4 dated
December 15, 2011 and the Order dated May 25, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 (RTC) in SCA Case No. MC11-879 (Civil Case No.
21881), and thereby ordered herein petitioner St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. (petitioner) to
pay respondent LWV Construction Corporation (respondent) temperate damages in
the amount of P50,000.00.

The Facts

Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment

to Saudi Arabia.5 On the other hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf
Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) and as such,
authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas
employment.6

On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V.

Raguindin (Raguindin) to petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination in
accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. 7 After undergoing the required
examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as
evidenced by a Medical Report8 dated January 11, 2008 (Medical Report).9

Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly

incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41.10 Unfortunately, when Raguindin
underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi
Arabia (General Care Dispensary) on March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive
for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of Raguindin, which the
General Care Dispensary conducted on April 28, 2008.11 However, the results of the
re-examination remained the same, i.e., Raguindin was positive for HCV, which
results were reflected in a Certification12 dated April 28, 2008 (Certification). An
undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report13 likewise conducted by the Ministry of
Health affirmed such finding, thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the
Philippines.14

Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that
Raguindin is "fit for employment" when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia
revealed that he was positive for HCV, respondent filed a Complaint15 for sum of
money and damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 (MeTC). Respondent essentially averred that it relied
on petitioner's declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus, respondent
prayed for the award of damages in the amount of P84,373.41 representing the
expenses it incurred in deploying Raguindin abroad.16

In its Answer with compulsory counterclaim,17 petitioner denied liability and claimed
that: first, respondent was not a proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract
between them; second, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the
interpretation and implementation of a contract of employment; third, the action is
premature as Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-employment medical examination
following his repatriation; and fourth, the complaint failed to state a cause of action as
the Medical Report issued by petitioner had already expired on April 11, 2008, or
three (3) months after its issuance on January 11, 2008.18

The MeTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated December 17, 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the amount of P84,373.41 as actual damages,
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.20

At the onset, the MeTC held that it had jurisdiction over the case, since respondent
was claiming actual damages incurred in the deployment of Raguindin in the amount
of P84,373.41.21 It further ruled that respondent was a real party in interest, as it
would not have incurred expenses had petitioner not issued the Medical Report
certifying that Raguindin was fit to work.

On the merits, the MeTC found that respondent was entitled to be informed accurately
of the precise condition of Raguindin before deploying the latter abroad and
consequently, had sustained damage as a result of the erroneous certification.22 In this
relation, it rejected petitioner's contention that Raguindin may have contracted the
disease after his medical examination in the Philippines up to the time of his
deployment, there being no evidence offered to corroborate the same.23

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC, contending,24 among others, that

respondent failed to comply with the requirements on the authentication and proof of
documents under Section 24,25 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, considering that
respondent's evidence, particularly the April 28, 2008 Certification issued by the
General Care Dispensary and the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the
Ministry of Health, are foreign documents issued in Saudi Arabia.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision26 dated December 15, 2011, the RTC dismissed petitioner's appeal and
affirmed the MeTC Decision in its entirety.27 Additionally, the RTC pointed out that
petitioner can no longer change the theory of the case or raise new issues on appeal,
referring to the latter's argument on the authentication of respondent's documentary
evidence.28

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration29 was denied in an Order30 dated May 25, 2012.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.31
 The CA Ruling

In a Decision32 dated July 11, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with the
modification deleting the award of actual damages and instead, awarding temperate
damages in the amount of P50,000.00.33

The CA held that petitioner failed to perform its duty to accurately diagnose
Raguindin when it issued its Medical Report declaring the latter "fit for employment",
considering that he was subsequently found positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia.34
Further, the CA opined that the Certification issued by the General Care Dispensary is
not a public document and in such regard, rejected petitioner's argument that the same
is inadmissible in evidence for not having been authenticated. Moreover, it remarked
that petitioner's own Medical Report does not enjoy the presumption of regularity as
petitioner is merely an accredited clinic.35 Finally, the CA ruled that petitioner could
not disclaim liability on the ground that Raguindin tested positive for HCV in Saudi
Arabia after the expiration of the Medical Report on April 11, 2008, noting that the
General Care Dispensary issued its Certification on April 28, 2008, or a mere
seventeen (17) days from the expiration of petitioner's Medical Report.36 Hence, the
CA concluded that "it is contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed
overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would immediately contract a serious virus at the
very beginning of a deployment."37

However, as the records are bereft of evidence to show that respondent actually
incurred the amount of P84,373.41 as expenses for Raguindin's deployment, the CA
deleted the award of actual damages and instead, awarded temperate damages in the
amount of P50,000.00.38

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration,39 which the CA denied
in a Resolution40 dated February 27, 2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner
was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit for
employment" and hence, should be held liable for damages.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is granted.

I.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that a re-examination of factual findings cannot
be done acting on a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of
facts but reviews only questions of law.41 Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari,
only questions of law may generally be put into issue. This rule, however, admits of
certain exceptions, such as "when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible"; or "when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based."42 Finding a confluence of certain exceptions in
this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court would not apply, and the Court
retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom.43

II.

An action for damages due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis
of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault
or negligence in the performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a
causal connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-
existing contractual relation.44

As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Article 2176 gives
rise to a cause of action under quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a claim of
damages.45 Notably, quasi-delict is one among several sources of obligation. Article
1157 of the Civil Code states:

Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.

However, as explained by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen)

in his opinion in Alano v. Magud-Logmao46 (Alano), "Article 2176 is not an all-
encompassing enumeration of all actionable wrongs which can give rise to the
liability for damages. Under the Civil Code, acts done in violation of Articles 19,
20, and 21 will also give rise to damages."47 These provisions - which were cited as
bases by the MTC, RTC and CA in their respective rulings in this case - read as
follows:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his

rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully

or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
 Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

"[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties."48 Case law states that
"[w]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would [then] be proper."49
Between these two provisions as worded, it is Article 20 which applies to both willful
and negligent acts that are done contrary to law. On the other hand, Article 21 applies
only to willful acts done contra bonos mores.50

In the Alano case, Justice Leonen aptly elaborated on the distinctive applications of
Articles 19, 20 and 21, which are general provisions on human relations, vis-a-vis
Article 2176, which particularly governs quasi-delicts:

Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct

of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an
actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care
required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is
alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.

Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis

for an injury. It allows recovery should the act have
been willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the
intention to do the act and the desire to achieve the
outcome which is considered by the plaintiff in tort
action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a situation
where the act was consciously done but without intending
the result which the plaintiff considers as injurious.

Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may

be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by
law. This article requires that the act be willful, that
is, that there was an intention to do the act and a
desire to achieve the outcome. In cases under Article 21,
the legal issues revolve around whether such outcome
should be considered a legal injury on the part of the
plaintiff or whether the commission of the act was done
in violation of the standards of care required in Article
19.

Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens

through an act or omission of the defendant. When it
 involves a positive act, the intention to commit the
outcome is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a
breach of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual
obligation. What will be considered is whether there is
"fault or negligence” attending the commission of the
act which necessarily leads to the outcome considered as
injurious by the plaintiff. The required degree of
diligence will then be assessed in relation to the
circumstances of each and every case.51 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore be discerned that
Article 20 of the Civil Code concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an
injury", whereas Article 2176 applies when the negligent act causing damage to
another does not constitute "a breach of an existing law or a pre-existing
contractual obligation."

In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the
provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because respondent did
not proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages
may be recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its amended complaint,
respondent mainly avers that had petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical
Report to Raguindin, respondent would not have processed his documents, deployed
him to Saudi Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent findings that Raguindin
was positive for HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered actual damages in the
amount of P84,373.41.52 Thus, as the claimed negligent act of petitioner was not
premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no
pre-existing contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176
- instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the Civil Code should govern.

III.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.53

As early as the case of Picart v. Smith,54 the Court elucidated that "the test by which
to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case is: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence."55 Corollary thereto, the Court stated that "[t]he question as to
what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value
x x x: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before
them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of
the future. Hence[,] they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger."56
Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular.57 In
effect, negligence cannot be presumed, and thus, must be proven by him who
alleges it.58 In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.:59

[T]he negligence or fault should be clearly established

as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is
upon [the plaintiff]. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law." It is then up for the
plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the
defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the
plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has
the burden of proving such negligence. It is even
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance
of evidence.60 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by
respondent to establish petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification61 dated April
28, 2008; and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test Report.62 However, these issuances
only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own
medical examination of Raguindin finding him to be positive for HCV. Notably, the
examination conducted by the General Care Dispensary, which was later affirmed by
the Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at least two (2)
months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11, 2008. Hence,
even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later
tested positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the
same medical state at the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on January 11,
2008. In this regard, it was therefore incumbent upon respondent to show that there
was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was issued, may it be
through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not carefully
observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness
for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when respondent only proffered
evidence which demonstrate that months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued,
Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV
and as such, was no longer "fit for employment".

In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV
only after his medical examination with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based on
published reports from the World Health Organization, HCV or the hepatitis C virus
causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV infection is usually
asymptomatic,63 and is only very rarely associated with life-threatening diseases. The
incubation period64 for HCV is two (2) weeks to six (6) months, and following
initial infection, approximately 80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms.65
Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after
petitioner's medical examination and hence, could have possibly contracted the same
only when he arrived thereat. In light of the foregoing, the CA therefore erred in
holding that "[h]ad petitioner more thoroughly and diligently examined Raguindin, it
would likely have discovered the existence of the HCV because it was contrary to
human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would
immediately have contracted the disease at the beginning of his deployment"66

While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an expiration of April 11, 2008, the Court
finds it fitting to clarify that the same could not be construed as a certified guarantee
coming from petitioner that Raguindin's medical status at the time the report was
issued on January 11, 2008 (i.e., that he was fit for employment) would remain the
same up until that date (i.e., April 11, 2008). As earlier intimated, the intervening
period could very well account for a number of variables that could have led to a
change in Raguindin's condition, such as his deployment to a different environment in
Saudi Arabia. If at all, the expiration date only means that the Medical Report is valid
- and as such, could be submitted - as a formal requirement for overseas employment
up until April 11, 2008; it does not, by any means, create legal basis to hold the issuer
accountable for any intervening change of condition from the time of issuance up
until expiration. Truly, petitioner could not be reasonably expected to predict, much
less assure, that Raguindin's medical status of being fit for employment would remain
unchanged. Thus, the fact that the Medical Report's expiration date of April 11, 2008
was only seventeen (17) days away from the issuance of the General Care
Dispensary's April 28, 2008 Certification finding Raguindin positive for HCV should
not - as it does not - establish petitioner's negligence.

IV.

At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been
properly established since the courts a quo, in the first place, erred in admitting and
giving probative weight to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary, which
was written in an unofficial language. Section 33, Rule 132 ofthe Rules of Court
states that:

Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial

language. - Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied
with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid
interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys
are directed to have such translation prepared before
trial.67

A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains
English words, the majority of it is in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in
English or Filipino provided by respondent, the same should not have been admitted
in evidence; thus their contents could not be given probative value, and deemed to
constitute proof of the facts stated therein.

Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven
in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
 Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
(b)
the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which
(c)
it is claimed to be.

Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall within
the classes of public documents under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court68 -
and hence, must be considered as private. It has been settled that an unverified and
unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value.69 In addition,
case law states that "since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who
must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit
unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. It
is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right
and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are
attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other
party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay
evidence, failure to present the author of the medical certificate renders its contents
suspect and of no probative value,"70 as in this case.

Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health of
Saudi Arabia should have also been excluded as evidence. Although the same may be
considered a public document, being an alleged written official act of an official body
of a foreign country,71 the same was not duly authenticated in accordance with Section
24,72 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. While respondent provided a translation73
thereof from the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, Bureau of External
Relations, Office of the President, the same was not accompanied by a certificate of
the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
Saudi Arabia, where the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.74

To be sure, petitioner - contrary to respondent's contention75 - has not changed its

theory of the case by questioning the foregoing documents. As petitioner correctly
argued, it merely amplified its defense76 that it is not liable for negligence when it
further questioned the validity of the issuances of the General Care Dispensary and
Ministry of Health. In Limpangco Sons v. Yangco77, the Court explained that "[t]here
is a difference x x x between a change in the theory of the case and a shifting of the
incidence of the emphasis placed during the trial or in the briefs." "Where x x x the
theory of the case as set out in the pleadings remains the theory throughout the
progress of the cause, the change of emphasis from one phase of the case as presented
by one set of facts to another phase made prominent by another set of facts x x x does
not result in a change of theory x x x".78 In any case, petitioner had already questioned
the validity of these documents in its Position Paper79 before the MeTC.80 Hence,
there is no change of theory that would preclude petitioner's arguments on this score.

All told, there being no negligence proven by respondent through credible and
admissible evidence, petitioner cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2176
of the Civil Code as above-discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July

11, 2014 and the Resolution dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 125451 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered,
DISMISSING the complaint of respondent LWV Construction Corporation for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.