[go: up one dir, main page]

0% found this document useful (0 votes)
276 views33 pages

Baye 9e Chapter 09 PDF

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1/ 33

CHAPTER 9

Basic Oligopoly Models

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Learning Objectives
1. Explain how beliefs and strategic interaction shape
optimal decisions in oligopoly environments.
2. Identify the conditions under which a firm
operates in a Sweezy, Cournot, Stackelberg, or
Bertrand oligopoly, and the ramifications of each
type of oligopoly for optimal pricing decisions, and
firm profits.
3. Apply reaction (or best-response) functions to
identify optimal decisions and likely competitor
responses in oligopoly settings.
4. Identify the conditions for a contestable market,
and explain the ramifications for market power
and the sustainability of long-run profits.
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 2
Conditions for Oligopoly

Conditions for Oligopoly


• Oligopoly market structures are characterized by
only a few firms, each of which is large relative to
the total industry.
– Typical number of firms is between 2 and 10.
– Products can be identical or differentiated.
• An oligopoly market composed of two firms is
called a duopoly.
• Oligopoly settings tend to be the most difficult to
manage since managers must consider the likely
impact of his or her decisions on the decisions of
other firms in the market.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.


9-3
Role of Beliefs and Strategic Interaction

Strategic Interaction: A Firm’s Demand


Depends on Actions of Rivals
Price
Demand if rivals
C match price changes

Demand if rivals do not


A
B match price changes
𝑃0

Demand2
Demand1

0 𝑄0 Output

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-4


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Sweezy Oligopoly
Sweezy oligopoly characteristics:
• There are few firms in the market serving
many consumers.
• The firms produce differentiated products.
• Each firm believes its rivals will cut their prices
in response to a price reduction but will not
raise their prices in response to a price
increase.
• Barriers to entry exist.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-5


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Sweezy Oligopoly
Price

Sweezy Demand MC0


A
B
𝑃0
MC1
C Demand1
(rival holds price
constant)

E MR1
MR Demand2
(rival matches price change)

0 𝑄0 F Output
MR2

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-6


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Oligopoly
Cournot oligopoly characteristics
• There are few firms in the market serving
many consumers.
• The firms produce either differentiated or
homogeneous products.
• Each firm believes rivals will hold their output
constant if it changes its output.
• Barriers to entry exist.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-7


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Cournot Oligopoly: Reaction
Functions
• Consider a Cournot duopoly. Each firm makes
an output decision under the belief that is rival
will hold its output constant when the other
changes its output level.
– Implication: Each firm’s marginal revenue is
impacted by the other firms output decision.
• The relationship between each firm’s profit-
maximizing output level is called a best-
response or reaction function.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-8


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Oligopoly:
Reaction Functions Formula
• Given a linear (inverse) demand function
𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄1 + 𝑄2
and cost functions, 𝐶1 𝑄1 = 𝑐1 𝑄1
𝐶2 𝑄2 = 𝑐2 𝑄2
the reactions functions are:
𝑎 − 𝑐1 1
𝑄1 = 𝑟1 𝑄2 = − 𝑄2
2𝑏 2
𝑎 − 𝑐2 1
𝑄2 = 𝑟2 𝑄1 = − 𝑄1
2𝑏 2
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-9
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Reaction Functions


Quantity2

Firm 1’s Reaction Function


𝑄1 = 𝑟1 𝑄2

𝑄2 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦
Cournot equilibrium
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑄2 C
Firm 2’s Reaction Function
D A 𝑄2 = 𝑟2 𝑄1
B

𝑄1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑄1 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦 Quantity1

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-10


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Oligopoly: Equilibrium


• A situation in which neither firm has an
incentive to change its output given the other
firm’s output.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-11


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Oligopoly: Isoprofit Curves


• A function that defines the combinations of
outputs produced by all firms that yield a
given firm the same level of profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-12


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Isoprofit Curves for Firm 1


1. Every point on a given
isoprofit curve yields Firm
1 the same level of profits.
2. Isoprofits curves tat lie
closer to Firm 1’s
monopoly output are
associated with higher
profits for that firm.
3. The isoprofit curves for
Firm 1 reach their peak
where they intersect Firm
1’s reaction function.
4. The isoprofit curves do not
interest one another. 13
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Firm 1’s Best Response to Firm 2’s
Quantity
2
Output
𝑟1 (Firm 1’s reaction function)

A B C

𝑄2 𝜋1 𝐴
𝜋1 𝐵
𝜋1 𝐶
Firm 1’s profit increases as isoprofit
curves move toward 𝑄1 𝑀

𝑄1 𝐴 𝑄1 𝐵 𝑄1 𝐶 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-14


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Firm 2’s Reaction Function and


Quantity 2
Isoprofit Curves
Monopoly
point for
firm 2

𝑄2 𝑀
Firm 2’s profit increases as isoprofit
curves move toward 𝑄2 𝑀

𝜋3 𝐶 𝑟2 (Firm 2’s reaction function)


𝐵
𝜋2
𝜋1 𝐴
Quantity1

Copyright
© 2017 ©by
2014 by the McGraw-Hill
McGraw-Hill Education.Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
All Rights Reserved. 9-15
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Equilibrium
Quantity2
𝜋2 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡

𝑄2 𝑀 Cournot Equilibrium

𝑄2 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡

𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡

𝑄1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-16


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Effect of Decline in Firm 2’s Marginal
Quantity
Cost on Cournot Equilibrium
2

𝑟1

F
∗∗
𝑄2
Due to decline in
firm 2’s marginal cost

E
𝑄2 ∗ 𝑟2 𝑟2 ∗∗

𝑄1 ∗∗ 𝑄1 ∗ 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-17


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Oligopoly: Collusion


• Markets with only a few dominant firms can
coordinate to restrict output to their benefit at
the expense of consumers.
– Restricted output leads to higher market prices.
• Such acts by firms is known as collusion.
• Collusion, however, is prone to cheating
behavior.
– Since both parties are aware of these incentives,
reaching collusive agreements is often very difficult.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-18


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Incentive to Collude in a Cournot


Quantity 2𝜋
Oligopoly 2
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝜋2 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

Collusion outcome
𝑄2 𝑀

𝑄2 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑄1 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-19


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Incentive to Renege on Collusive
Agreements
Quantity
in Cournot Oligopoly
2
𝜋2 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋21𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡

𝑄2 𝑀

𝑄2 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋1 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡

𝑄1 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑄1 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-20


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Stackelberg Oligopoly
Stackelberg oligopoly characteristics:
• There are few firms serving many consumers.
• Firms produce either differentiated or
homogeneous products.
• A single firm (the leader) chooses an output
before all other firms choose their outputs.
• All other firms (the followers) take as given the
output of the leader and choose outputs that
maximize profits given the leader’s output.
• Barriers to entry exist.
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-21
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Stackelberg Equilibrium
Quantity Follower
𝜋2 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑟 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝜋2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

𝑟 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑄2 𝑀

𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑄2 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

𝜋1 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟

𝑄1 𝑀 𝑄1 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 Quantity Leader

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-22


Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Stackelberg Oligopoly:
Equilibrium Output Formulae
• Given a linear (inverse) demand function
𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄1 + 𝑄2
and cost functions 𝐶1 𝑄1 = 𝑐1 𝑄1 and 𝐶2 𝑄2 =
𝑐2 𝑄2 .
– The follower sets output according to the reaction
function
𝑎 − 𝑐2 1
𝑄2 = 𝑟2 𝑄1 = − 𝑄1
2𝑏 2
– The leader’s output is
𝑎 + 𝑐2 − 2𝑐1
𝑄1 =
2𝑏
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-23
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Stackelberg Oligopoly In Action:
Problem
• Suppose the inverse demand function for two
firms in a homogeneous-product, Stackelberg
oligopoly is given by
𝑃 = 50 − 𝑄1 + 𝑄2
and their costs are zero. Firm 1 is the leader,
and firm 2 is the follower.
– What is firm 2’s reaction function?
– What is firm 1’s output?
– What is firm 2’s output?
– What is the market price?
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-24
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Stackelberg Oligopoly In Action:


Answer
• The follower’s reaction function is: 𝑄2 =
1
𝑟2 𝑄1 = 24 − 𝑄1 .
2
50+2−4
• The leader’s output is: 𝑄1 = = 24.
2
1
• The follower’s output is: 𝑄2 = 24 − 24 =
2
12.
• The market price is: 𝑃 = 50 − 24 + 12 =
$14.
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-25
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Bertrand Oligopoly
Bertrand oligopoly characteristics
• There are few firms in the market serving many
consumers.
• Firms produce identical products at a constant
marginal cost.
• Firms engage in price competition and react
optimally to prices charged by competitors.
• Consumers have perfect information and there
are no transaction costs.
• Barriers to entry exist.
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-26
Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Bertrand Oligopoly: Equilibrium


• The conditions for a Bertrand oligopoly imply
that firms in this market will undercut one
another to capture the entire market leaving
the rivals with no profit. All consumers will
purchase at the low-price firm.
• This “price war” would come to an end when
the price each firm charged equaled marginal
cost.
• In equilibrium, 𝑃1 = 𝑃2 = 𝑀𝐶.
– Socially efficient level of output.
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-27
Comparing Oligopoly Models

Comparing Oligopoly Models


• Consider the following inverse market demand
function:
𝑃 = 1,000 − 𝑄1 + 𝑄2
and the cost function for each firm in this
market is identical, and given by
𝐶𝑖 𝑄𝑖 = 4𝑄𝑖
• Under these condition, the different oligopoly
outputs, prices and profits are examined.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-28


Comparing Oligopoly Models

Comparing Oligopoly: Cournot


• The Cournot oligopoly reaction functions are
1
𝑄1 = 498 −
2
1
𝑄2 = 498 −
2
• These reaction functions can be solved for the
equilibrium output. These quantities can be used
to compute price and profit.
– 𝑄1 = 𝑄2 = 332
– 𝑃 = $336
– 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 = $110,224
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-29
Comparing Oligopoly Models

Comparing Oligopoly: Stackelberg


• The Stackelberg leader’s output is
1,000 + 4 − 2 × 4
𝑄𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = = 498
2×1
1
𝑄𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 498 − × 498 = 249
2
• The market price is: 𝑃 = 1,000 − 498 − 249 = $253
• 𝜋𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = $124,002
• 𝜋𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = $62,001

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-30


Comparing Oligopoly Models

Comparing Oligopoly: Bertrand


• Since 𝑃 = 𝑀𝐶, 𝑃 = $4.
• Total output is found by: $4 = 1,000 − 𝑄
– Solving yields: 𝑄 = 996
– Given symmetric firms, each firm gets half the
market, or 498 units.
– 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 = $0

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-31


Comparing Oligopoly Models

Comparing Oligopoly: Collusion


• Since the output associated with collusion is the
same as monopoly output, the inverse market
demand function implies that monopoly marginal
revenue function is:
𝑀𝑅 = 1,000 − 2𝑄
• Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost
yields:
1,000 − 2𝑄 = 4
– Solving this: 𝑄 = 498 units. Each firm will produce half
of these units.
• Price is: 𝑃 = 1,000 − 498 = $502
• Each firm earns profits of $124,002.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-32


Contestable Markets

Contestable Markets
• Contestable markets involve strategic
interaction among existing firms and potential
entrants into a market.
• A market is contestable if:
– All producers have access to the same technology.
– Consumers respond quickly to price changes.
– Existing firms cannot respond quickly to entry by
lowering price.
– There are no sunk costs.
• If these conditions hold, incumbent firms have
no market power over consumers.
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 9-33

You might also like