Baye 9e Chapter 09 PDF
Baye 9e Chapter 09 PDF
Baye 9e Chapter 09 PDF
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Learning Objectives
1. Explain how beliefs and strategic interaction shape
optimal decisions in oligopoly environments.
2. Identify the conditions under which a firm
operates in a Sweezy, Cournot, Stackelberg, or
Bertrand oligopoly, and the ramifications of each
type of oligopoly for optimal pricing decisions, and
firm profits.
3. Apply reaction (or best-response) functions to
identify optimal decisions and likely competitor
responses in oligopoly settings.
4. Identify the conditions for a contestable market,
and explain the ramifications for market power
and the sustainability of long-run profits.
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Conditions for Oligopoly
Demand2
Demand1
0 𝑄0 Output
Sweezy Oligopoly
Sweezy oligopoly characteristics:
• There are few firms in the market serving
many consumers.
• The firms produce differentiated products.
• Each firm believes its rivals will cut their prices
in response to a price reduction but will not
raise their prices in response to a price
increase.
• Barriers to entry exist.
Sweezy Oligopoly
Price
E MR1
MR Demand2
(rival matches price change)
0 𝑄0 F Output
MR2
Cournot Oligopoly
Cournot oligopoly characteristics
• There are few firms in the market serving
many consumers.
• The firms produce either differentiated or
homogeneous products.
• Each firm believes rivals will hold their output
constant if it changes its output.
• Barriers to entry exist.
Cournot Oligopoly:
Reaction Functions Formula
• Given a linear (inverse) demand function
𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄1 + 𝑄2
and cost functions, 𝐶1 𝑄1 = 𝑐1 𝑄1
𝐶2 𝑄2 = 𝑐2 𝑄2
the reactions functions are:
𝑎 − 𝑐1 1
𝑄1 = 𝑟1 𝑄2 = − 𝑄2
2𝑏 2
𝑎 − 𝑐2 1
𝑄2 = 𝑟2 𝑄1 = − 𝑄1
2𝑏 2
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Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
𝑄2 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦
Cournot equilibrium
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑄2 C
Firm 2’s Reaction Function
D A 𝑄2 = 𝑟2 𝑄1
B
A B C
∗
𝑄2 𝜋1 𝐴
𝜋1 𝐵
𝜋1 𝐶
Firm 1’s profit increases as isoprofit
curves move toward 𝑄1 𝑀
𝑄1 𝐴 𝑄1 𝐵 𝑄1 𝐶 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1
𝑄2 𝑀
Firm 2’s profit increases as isoprofit
curves move toward 𝑄2 𝑀
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2014 by the McGraw-Hill
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Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Cournot Equilibrium
Quantity2
𝜋2 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑄2 𝑀 Cournot Equilibrium
𝑄2 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑄1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1
𝑟1
F
∗∗
𝑄2
Due to decline in
firm 2’s marginal cost
E
𝑄2 ∗ 𝑟2 𝑟2 ∗∗
𝑄1 ∗∗ 𝑄1 ∗ 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1
Collusion outcome
𝑄2 𝑀
𝑄2 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑄1 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑄1 𝑀 Quantity1
𝑄2 𝑀
𝑄2 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝜋1 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡
Stackelberg Oligopoly
Stackelberg oligopoly characteristics:
• There are few firms serving many consumers.
• Firms produce either differentiated or
homogeneous products.
• A single firm (the leader) chooses an output
before all other firms choose their outputs.
• All other firms (the followers) take as given the
output of the leader and choose outputs that
maximize profits given the leader’s output.
• Barriers to entry exist.
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Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Quantity Follower
𝜋2 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑟 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝜋2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑟 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑄2 𝑀
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝜋1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡
𝑄2 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝜋1 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟
Bertrand Oligopoly
Bertrand oligopoly characteristics
• There are few firms in the market serving many
consumers.
• Firms produce identical products at a constant
marginal cost.
• Firms engage in price competition and react
optimally to prices charged by competitors.
• Consumers have perfect information and there
are no transaction costs.
• Barriers to entry exist.
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Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings
Contestable Markets
• Contestable markets involve strategic
interaction among existing firms and potential
entrants into a market.
• A market is contestable if:
– All producers have access to the same technology.
– Consumers respond quickly to price changes.
– Existing firms cannot respond quickly to entry by
lowering price.
– There are no sunk costs.
• If these conditions hold, incumbent firms have
no market power over consumers.
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