Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 - Wikipedia PDF

Indo-Pakistani
War of 1965
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was

a culmination of skirmishes that took
place between April 1965 and
September 1965 between Pakistan
and India. The conflict began
following Pakistan's Operation
Gibraltar, which was designed to
infiltrate forces into Jammu and
Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency
against Indian rule. India retaliated by
launching a full-scale military attack
on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day
war caused thousands of casualties
on both sides and witnessed the
largest engagement of armored
vehicles and the largest tank battle
since World War II.[18][19] Hostilities
between the two countries ended
after a United Nations-mandated
ceasefire was declared following
diplomatic intervention by the Soviet
Union and the United States, and the
subsequent issuance of the Tashkent
Declaration.[20] Much of the war was
fought by the countries' land forces in
Kashmir and along the border
between India and Pakistan. This war
saw the largest amassing of troops in
Kashmir since the Partition of British
India in 1947, a number that was
overshadowed only during the 2001–
2002 military standoff between India
and Pakistan. Most of the battles
were fought by opposing infantry and
armoured units, with substantial
backing from air forces, and naval
operations. Many details of this war,
like those of other Indo-Pakistani
Wars, remain unclear.[21]
Indo–Pakistani War of 1965

Part of the Indo–Pakistani wars and
conflicts
Geopolitical map of Kashmir provided by

the United States CIA, c. 2004
Date August – 23 September 1965
Location Western Front

Indo-Pakistani border
Line of Control, Working
Boundary, Radcliffe
Line, Sir Creek, and
Zero-Point
Arabian sea
Eastern Front
India-East Pakistan border
Result
Inconclusive
United Nations mandated

ceasefire.
Both sides claim victory
No permanent territorial
changes (see Tashkent
Declaration).
Belligerents
India Pakistan
Commanders and leaders

S. Radhakrishnan Ayub Khan
(President of India) (President of Pakistan)
Lal Bahadur Gen Musa Khan
Shastri Hazara
(Prime Minister of India) (Cdr-in-Chief, Army)
Gen J.N. Lt.Gen Bakhtiar
Chaudhuri Rana
(Chief of the Army Staff) (Commander, I Corps)
Lt Gen Harbaksh Lt.Gen Attiqur
Singh Rahman
(GOC-in-C, Western (Commander, IV Corps)
Command) MGen A.H. Malik
Lt Gen P.O. Dunn (GOC, 12th Infantry
(GOC, I Corps) Division)
Lt Gen Joginder MGen Yahya Khan
Dhillon (GOC, 7th Infantry
(GOC, XI Corps) Division)
Lt Gen Kashmir AM Nur Khan
Singh Katoch (Cdr-in-Chief, Air Force)
(GOC, XV Corps) VAdm A.R. Khan
AM Arjan Singh (Cdr-in-Chief, Navy)
(Chief of the Air Staff) RAdm S.M. Ahsan
Adm Bhaskar ((Cdr. Eastern Naval

Soman Command)
(Chief of the Naval Cdre S.M. Anwar
Staff) (OTC, 25th Destroyer
Sqn)
Strength
700,000 Infantry 260,000 Infantry

(Whole Army)[1] (Whole Army)[1]
700+ aircraft[2] 280 aircraft[2]
720 Tanks[1] 756 Tanks[3]
186 Centurions[3] 352 Pattons[3]

346 Shermans[1] 308 Shermans[3]
90 AMX[1][3] 96 Chaffees[3]
90 PT-76[1] 552 Artillery[3]
628 Artillery[3]
72x105mm How[3]
66x 3.7"How[3] 234X25pdr[3]

450x 25pdr[3] 126x155mm
96x 5.5"[3] How[3]
96x 5.5"[3] How[3]
16x 7.2"[3] 48x8" How[3]

72x3.7" How[3]
Effective strength on
the West Pakistan POK Lt Btys[3]
Border[4] Effective strength on
the West Pakistan
9 Infantry divisions
Border[4]
(4 under-strength)
3 Armored 6 Infantry divisions
brigades 2 Armored
divisions
Casualties and losses
Neutral claims[5][6] Neutral claims[5]
3,000 men[5] 3,800 men[5]

150[7]–190 tanks[5] 200[5]-300
60–75 aircraft[5] Tanks[16]
540 km2 (210 mi2) 20 aircraft[5]

of territory lost Over 1,840 km2
of territory lost Over 1,840 km2
(primarily in (710 mi2) of
Kashmir)[8][9] territory lost (in
Sindh, Lahore,
Indian claims
Sialkot, and
35[10]–59 aircraft Kashmir
lost[11] In addition, sectors)[8][9]
Indian sources
Pakistani claims
claim that there
were 13 IAF 19 aircraft lost[14]
aircraft lost in
Indian claims
accidents, and 3
Indian civilian 5259 men killed or
aircraft shot captured [13]

down.[12] 43[17] −73 aircraft
520 km2 (200 mi2) destroyed [13]
territory lost[13] 471 tanks
Pakistani claims destroyed [13]
1,735 km2
8,200 men killed or
8,200 men killed or
(670 mi2) territory
captured[13]
gained[13]
110[14]–113[13]
aircraft destroyed
500 tanks
captured or
destroyed [13]
2602,[15]
2575 km2[13]
territory gained
1600 square miles
territory gained
according to
Husain Haqqani
India had the upper hand over

Pakistan when the ceasefire was
declared.[22][23][24][25][26][27][28]
Although the two countries fought to
a standoff, the conflict is seen as a
strategic and political defeat for
Pakistan,[29][23][30][31][32][33][34] as it had
neither succeeded in fomenting
insurrection in Kashmir[35] nor had it
been able to gain meaningful support
at an international level.[30][36][37][38]
Internationally, the war was viewed in

the context of the greater Cold War,
and resulted in a significant
geopolitical shift in the
subcontinent.[39] Before the war, the
United States and the United Kingdom
had been major material allies of both
India and Pakistan, as their primary
suppliers of military hardware and
foreign developmental aid. During and
after the conflict, both India and
Pakistan felt betrayed by the
perceived lack of support by the
western powers for their respective
positions; those feelings of betrayal
were increased with the imposition of
an American and British embargo on
military aid to the opposing
sides.[39][40] As a consequence, India
and Pakistan openly developed closer
relationships with the Soviet Union
and China, respectively.[40] The
perceived negative stance of the
western powers during the conflict,
and during the 1971 war, has
continued to affect relations between
the West and the subcontinent. In
spite of improved relations with the
U.S. and Britain since the end of the
Cold War, the conflict generated a
deep distrust of both countries within
the subcontinent which to an extent
lingers to this day.[41][42][43]
Pre-war escalation
A declassified US State Department letter that
confirms the existence of hundreds of
"infiltrators" in the Indian-administered part of

the disputed Kashmir region. Dated during the
events running up to the 1965 war.
Since the Partition of British India in

1947, Pakistan and India remained in
contention over several issues.
Although the Kashmir conflict was the
predominant issue dividing the
nations, other border disputes existed,
most notably over the Rann of Kutch,
a barren region in the Indian state of
Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956
which ended with India regaining
control over the disputed area.[44]
Pakistani patrols began patrolling in
territory controlled by India in January
1965, which was followed by attacks
by both countries on each other's
posts on 8 April 1965.[44][45] Initially
involving border police from both
nations, the disputed area soon
witnessed intermittent skirmishes
between the countries' armed forces.
In June 1965, British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson successfully persuaded
both countries to end hostilities and
set up a tribunal to resolve the
dispute. The verdict, which came later
in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350
square miles (910 km2) of the Rann of
Kutch, as against its original claim of
3,500 square miles (9,100 km2).[46]
After its success in the Rann of Kutch,

Pakistan, under the leadership of
General Ayub Khan, believed the
Indian Army would be unable to
defend itself against a quick military
campaign in the disputed territory of
Kashmir as the Indian military had
suffered a loss to China in 1962[21] in
the Sino-Indian War. Pakistan believed
that the population of Kashmir was
generally discontented with Indian
rule and that a resistance movement
could be ignited by a few infiltrating
saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to
ignite the resistance movement by
means of a covert infiltration,
codenamed Operation Gibraltar.[47]
The Pakistani infiltrators were soon
discovered, however, their presence
reported by local Kashmiris,[48] and
the operation ended unsuccessfully.
The war
On 5 August 1965 between 26,000
and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed
the Line of Control dressed as
Kashmiri locals headed for various
areas within Kashmir. Indian forces,
tipped off by the local populace,
crossed the cease fire line on 15
August.[21]
Initially, the Indian Army met with

considerable success, capturing three
important mountain positions after a
prolonged artillery barrage. By the end
of August, however, both sides had
relative progress; Pakistan had made
progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri
and Poonch and India had captured
the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan
administered Kashmir.[49]
On 1 September 1965, Pakistan
launched a counterattack, called
Operation Grand Slam, with the
objective to capture the vital town of
Akhnoor in Jammu, which would
sever communications and cut off
supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub
Khan calculated that "Hindu morale
would not stand more than a couple
of hard blows at the right time and
place"[50][51][52] although by this time
Operation Gibraltar had failed and
India had captured the Haji Pir
Pass.[50][53] At 3:30 hours, on 1
September 1965, the entire Chhamb
area came under massive artillery
bombardment. Pakistan had launched
operation Grand Slam and India's
Army Headquarter was taken by
surprise.[54] Attacking with an
overwhelming ratio of troops and
technically superior tanks, Pakistan
made gains against Indian forces,
who were caught unprepared and
suffered heavy losses. India
responded by calling in its air force to
blunt the Pakistani attack. The next
day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force
attacked Indian forces and air bases
in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's
decision to open up the theatre of
attack into Pakistani Punjab forced
the Pakistani army to relocate troops
engaged in the operation to defend
Punjab. Operation Grand Slam
therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army
was unable to capture Akhnoor; it
became one of the turning points in
the war when India decided to relieve
pressure on its troops in Kashmir by
attacking Pakistan further south. In
the valley, another area of strategic
importance was Kargil. Kargil town
was in Indian hands but Pakistan
occupied high ground overlooking
Kargil and Srinagar-Leh road.
However, after the launch of a
massive anti-infiltration operation by
the Indian army, the Pakistani
infiltrators were forced out of that
area in the month of August.[55]
Indian Army's officers of 4 Sikh Regiment had

captured a Police Station in Lahore, Pakistan
India crossed the International Border

on the Western front on 6
September[56] On 6 September, the
15th Infantry Division of the Indian
Army, under World War II veteran
Major General Niranjan Prasad,
battled a massive counterattack by
Pakistan near the west bank of the
Icchogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was
a de facto border of India and
Pakistan. The General's entourage
itself was ambushed and he was
forced to flee his vehicle. A second,
this time successful, attempt to cross
the Ichhogil Canal was made over the
bridge in the village of Barki, just east
of Lahore. These developments
brought the Indian Army within the
range of Lahore International Airport.
As a result, the United States
requested a temporary ceasefire to
allow it to evacuate its citizens in
Lahore. However, the Pakistani
counterattack took Khem Karan from
Indian forces which tried to divert the
attention of Pakistanis from Khem
Karan by an attack on Bedian and the
adjacent villages.
The thrust against Lahore consisted

of the 1st Infantry Division supported
by the three tank regiments of the 2nd
Independent Armoured Brigade; they
quickly advanced across the border,
reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6
September. The Pakistani Army held
the bridges over the canal or blew up
those it could not hold, effectively
stalling any further advance by the
Indians on Lahore. One unit of the
Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also
crossed the Icchogil canal and
captured[57] the town of Batapore
(Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west
side of the canal. The same day, a
counter offensive consisting of an
armoured division and infantry
division supported by Pakistan Air
Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th
Division to withdraw to its starting
point. Although 3 Jat suffered
minimal casualties, the bulk of the
damage being taken by ammunition
and stores vehicles, the higher
commanders had no information of 3
Jat's capture of Batapore and
misleading information led to the
command to withdraw from Batapore
and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move
brought extreme disappointment[58] to
Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat.
Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3
Jat on 21 September, for the second
time but after a much harder battle
due to Pakistani reinforcements.
On 8 September 1965, a company of 5

Maratha Light Infantry was sent to
reinforce a Rajasthan Armed
Constabulary (RAC) post at
Munabao – a strategic hamlet about
250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their
brief was simple. To hold the post and
to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions
from overrunning the post at bay. But
at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the
post has now been christened – the
Indian company could barely manage
to thwart the intense attack for 24
hours. A company of 3 Guards with
954 heavy mortar battery ordered to
reinforce the RAC post at Munabao
could never reach. The Pakistani Air
Force had strafed the entire area, and
also hit a railway train coming from
Barmer with reinforcements near
Gadra road railway station. On 10
September, Munabao fell into
Pakistani hands, and efforts to
capture the strategic point did not
succeed.[59]
On the days following 9 September,

both nations' premiere formations
were routed in unequal battles. India's
1st Armoured Division, labeled the
"pride of the Indian Army", launched
an offensive towards Sialkot. The
Division divided itself into two prongs,
was forced back by the Pakistani 6th
Armoured Division at Chawinda and
was forced to withdraw after suffering
heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks.
The Pakistanis followed up their

success by launching Operation
Windup, which forced the Indians
back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's
pride, the 1st Armoured Division,
pushed an offensive towards Khem
Karan, with the intent to capture
Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India)
and the bridge on River Beas to
Jalandhar.
The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division

never made it past Khem Karan,
however, and by the end of 10
September lay disintegrated by the
defences of the Indian 4th Mountain
Division at what is now known as the
Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning –
"Real Answer", or more appropriate
English equivalent – "Fitting
Response"). The area became known
as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town),
because of the large number of US-
made Pakistani Patton tanks.
Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks
were destroyed or abandoned, with
only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or
damaged. The Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division less 5th Armoured
Brigade was next sent to Sialkot
sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured
Division where it didn't see action as
6th Armoured Division was already in
process of routing Indian 1st
Armoured Division which was
superior to it in strength.
The hostilities in the Rajasthan sector

commenced on 8 September. Initially
Pakistan Desert Force and the Hur
militia (followers of Pir Pagaro) was
placed in a defensive role, a role for
which they were well suited as it
turned out. The Hurs were familiar
with the terrain and the local area and
possessed many essential desert
survival skills which their opponents
and their comrades in the Pakistan
Army did not. Fighting as mainly light
infantry, the Hur inflicted many
casualties on the Indian forces as
they entered Sindh. The Hurs were
also employed as skirmishers,
harassing the Indians LOC, a task they
often undertook on camels. As the
battle wore on the Hurs and the
Desert Force were increasingly used
to attack and capture Indian villages
inside Rajasthan.[60]
The war was heading for a stalemate,

with both nations holding territory of
the other. The Indian army suffered
3,000 battlefield deaths, while
Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian
army was in possession of 758.9
miles² (1,920 km²) of Pakistani
territory and the Pakistan army held
210 mile² (550 km²) of Indian
territory.[61] The territory occupied by
India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot,
Lahore and Kashmir sectors,[62][63]
while Pakistani ground gains were
primarily in deserts opposite Sindh
and in the Chumb sector near
Kashmir.[63] Pakistan claims that it
held 1600 square miles of Indian
territory, while lost 450 square miles
of its own territory.[64][65][66][67]
Aerial warfare
The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air

Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force
(PAF) engaging in combat for the first
time since independence. Although
the two forces had previously faced
off in the First Kashmir War during the
late 1940s, that engagement was very
limited in scale compared to the 1965
conflict.
The IAF was flying large numbers of

Hawker Hunters, Indian-manufactured
Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires,
EE Canberra bombers and a squadron
of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force
comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12
F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57
Canberra bombers. During the
conflict, the PAF claimed it was out-
numbered by around 5:1.[68]
The PAF's aircraft were largely of

American origin, whereas the IAF flew
an assortment of British and Soviet
aeroplanes. It has been widely
reported that the PAF's American
aircraft were superior to those of the
IAF.
The F-86 was vulnerable to the
diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed
"Sabre Slayer."[69] The Gnat is credited
by many independent and Indian
sources as having shot down seven
Pakistani Canadair Sabres[a] in the
1965 war.[70][71] while two Gnats were
downed by PAF fighters. The PAF's F-
104 Starfighter of the PAF was the
fastest fighter operating in the
subcontinent at that time and was
often referred to as "the pride of the
PAF". However, according to Sajjad
Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this
reputation. Being "a high level
interceptor designed to neutralise
Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes
above 40,000 feet," rather than
engage in dogfights with agile fighters
at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to
the tactical environment of the
region."[72] In combat the Starfighter
was not as effective as the IAF's far
more agile, albeit much slower,
Folland Gnat fighter.[73][74] Yet it
zoomed into an ongoing dogfight
between Sabres and Gnats, at
supersonic speed, successfully broke
off the fight and caused the Gnats to
egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by
Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh
Sikand, landed at an abandoned
Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur, as he
lacked the fuel to return to his base,
and was captured by the Pakistan
Army. According to the pilot, he got
separated from his formation due to a
malfunctioning compass and
radio.[75][76] This Gnat is displayed as
a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force
Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad
Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft
to Sargodha, and later tested and
evaluated its flight performance, was
of view that Gnat was no "Sabre
Slayer" when it came to dog
fighting.[76] The Pakistan Air Force
had fought well in countering the
much large Indian Air Force and
supported the ground forces.[77]
Captured Indian Folland Gnat on display at the

PAF Museum Karachi.
The two countries have made

contradictory claims of combat
losses during the war and few neutral
sources have verified the claims of
either country. The PAF claimed it
shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19
of its own, while the IAF claimed it
shot down 73 PAF planes and lost
59.[78] According to PAF, It flew 86 F-
86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and
20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon
after the war was over. Thus
disproving the IAF's claim of downing
73 PAF fighters, which at the time
constituted nearly the entire Pakistani
front-line fighter force.[79] Indian
sources have pointed out that, despite
PAF claims of losing only a squadron
of combat craft, Pakistan sought to
acquire additional aircraft from
Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China
within 10 days of the beginning war.
The two air forces were rather equal
in the conflict, because much of the
Indian air force remained farther east
to guard against the possibility of
China entering the war.[80] According
to the independent sources, the PAF
lost some 20 aircraft while the Indians
lost 60–75.[5][6] Pakistan ended the
war having depleted 17 percent of its
front line strength, while India's losses
amounted to less than 10 percent.
Moreover, the loss rate had begun to
even out, and it has been estimated
that another three week's fighting
would have seen the Pakistani losses
rising to 33 percent and India's losses
totalling 15 percent. Air superiority
was not achieved, and were unable to
prevent IAF fighter bombers and
reconnaissance Canberras from flying
daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus
1965 was a stalemate in terms of the
air war with neither side able to
achieve complete air superiority.[80]
However, according to Kenneth
Werrell, the Pakistan Air Force "did
well in the conflict and probably had
the edge".[81] When hostilities broke
out, the Pakistan Air Force with
around 100 F-86s faced an enemy
with five times as many combat
aircraft; the Indians were also
equipped with comparatively modern
aircraft inventory. Despite this, Werrell
credits the PAF as having the
advantage of a "decade's experience
with the Sabre" and pilots with long
flight hours experience. One Pakistani
fighter pilot, MM Alam, was credited
with the record of downing five Indian
aircraft in less than a minute,
becoming the first known flying ace
since the Korean War.[81] However, his
claims were never confirmed by the
PAF and is disputed by Indian
sources[82][83][84] and some PAF
officials.[85][86][87]
Tank battles
The 1965 war witnessed some of the

largest tank battles since World War
II. At the beginning of the war, the
Pakistani Army had both a numerical
advantage in tanks, as well as better
equipment overall.[88] Pakistani
armour was largely American-made; it
consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and
M-48 tanks, but also included many
M4 Sherman tanks, some M24
Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson
tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm
guns.[89] The bulk of India's tank fleet
were older M4 Sherman tanks; some
were up-gunned with the French high
velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold
their own, whilst some older models
were still equipped with the inferior 75
mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4
tanks, India fielded the British-made
Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the
105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and
the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart
light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater
number and more modern artillery; its
guns out-ranged those of the Indian
artillery, according to Pakistan's Major
General T.H. Malik.[90]
At the outbreak of war in 1965,

Pakistan had about 15 armoured
cavalry regiments, each with about 45
tanks in three squadrons. Besides the
Pattons, there were about 200 M4
Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns,
150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few
independent squadrons of M36B1
tank destroyers. Most of these
regiments served in Pakistan's two
armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th
Armoured divisions – the latter being
in the process of formation.
Destroyed Sherman Tank
The Indian Army of the time

possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and
in the 1950s had begun modernizing
them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-
13 light tanks and 188 Centurions.
The remainder of the cavalry units
were equipped with M4 Shermans and
a small number of M3A3 Stuart light
tanks. India had only a single
armoured division, the 1st 'Black
Elephant' Armoured Division, which
consisted of the 17th Horse (The
Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-
Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse
(Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry,
the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers,
the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry,
the two first named being equipped
with Centurions. There was also the
2nd Independent Armoured Brigade,
one of whose three regiments, the 3rd
Cavalry, was also equipped with
Centurions.
Despite the qualitative and numerical

superiority of Pakistani armour,[91]
Pakistan was outfought on the
battlefield by India, which made
progress into the Lahore-Sialkot
sector, whilst halting Pakistan's
counteroffensive on Amritsar;[92][93]
they were sometimes employed in a
faulty manner, such as charging
prepared defences during the defeat
of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at
Asal Uttar.
After India breached the Madhupur

canal on 11 September, the Khem
Karan counter-offensive was halted,
affecting Pakistan's strategy
substantially.[50] Although India's tank
formations experienced some results,
India's attack at the Battle of
Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured
Division and supporting units, was
brought to halt by the newly raised 6th
Armoured Division (ex-100th
independent brigade group) in the
Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed
that Indians lost 120 tanks at
Chawinda.[94] compared to 44 of its
own[95] But later, Indian official
sources confirmed India lost only 29
tanks at Chawinda.[96][97] Neither the
Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any
great facility in the use of armoured
formations in offensive operations,
whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured
Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st
Armoured Division at Chawinda. In
contrast, both proved adept with
smaller forces in a defensive role
such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade
at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th
Cavalry at Chawinda.
The Centurion battle tank, with its

105 mm gun and heavy armour,
performed better than the overly
complex Pattons.[93]
Naval hostilities
Naval operations did not play a

prominent role in the war of 1965. On
7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan
Navy under the command of
Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a
bombardment of the Indian Navy's
radar station coastal down of Dwarka,
which was 200 miles (320 km) south
of the Pakistani port of Karachi.
Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a
significant naval operation of the
1965 war[98][99][100] contested as a
nuisance raid by some.[101][102] The
attack on Dwarka led to questions
being asked in India's parliament[103]
and subsequent post-war
modernization and expansion of the
Indian Navy, with an increase in
budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115
crores.[104]
According to some Pakistani sources,
one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the
Indian Navy's aircraft carrier
INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay
throughout the war. Indian sources
claim that it was not their intention to
get into a naval conflict with Pakistan,
and wished to restrict the war to a
land-based conflict.[105] Moreover,
they note that the Vikrant was in dry
dock in the process of refitting. Some
Pakistani defence writers have also
discounted claims that the Indian
Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a
single submarine, instead stating that
75% of the Indian Navy was under
maintenance in harbour.[106]
Covert operations
The Pakistan Army launched a

number of covert operations to
infiltrate and sabotage Indian
airbases.[107] On 7 September 1965,
the Special Services Group (SSG)
commandos were parachuted into
enemy territory. According to Chief of
Army Staff General Muhammad Musa,
about 135 commandos were
airdropped at three Indian airfields
(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur).
The daring attempt proved to be an
"unmitigated disaster".[107] Only 22
commandos returned to Pakistan as
planned, 93 were taken prisoner
(including one of the Commanders of
the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and
20 were killed in encounters with the
army, police or civilians. The reason
for the failure of the commando
mission is attributed to the failure to
provide maps, proper briefings and
adequate planning or preparation.[108]
Despite failing to sabotage the

airfields, Pakistan sources claim that
the commando mission affected
some planned Indian operations. As
the Indian 14th Infantry Division was
diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the
Pakistan Air Force found the road
filled with transport, and destroyed
many vehicles.[109]
India responded to the covert activity

by announcing rewards for captured
Pakistani spies or paratroopers.[110]
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors
spread that India had retaliated with
its own covert operations, sending
commandos deep into Pakistan
territory,[108] but these rumors were
later determined to be unfounded.[111]
Assessment of losses
India and Pakistan make widely
divergent claims about the damage
they inflicted on each other and the
amount of damage suffered by them.
The following summarizes each
nation's claims.
Indian claims[112]

Army: 169 commissioned officers
(1 brigadier, 9 lieutenant-colonels,
30 majors, 39 captains, 11
lieutenants, 79 second lieutenants
Casualties 80 junior commissioned officers
(JCO), 1,820 other
ranks[115][116][117][118][119][120][121]
Air force: 19 officers, 21 other
ranks[112]
Combat
flying 4,073+ combat sorties
effort
59 IAF (official), 43 PAF.[11] In

addition, Indian sources claim that
Aircraft
there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in
lost
accidents, and 3 Indian civilian
aircraft shot down.[12]
Aerial
17 + 3 (post war)
victories
128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tank

Tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks
destroyed destroyed. Officially 471 Pakistani
tanks destroyed and 38 captured
Land area 1,500 sq mi (3,900 km2) of Pakistan

won territory
Neutral assessments
There have been several neutral

assessments of the losses incurred
by both India and Pakistan during the
war. Most of these assessments
agree that India had the upper hand
over Pakistan when ceasefire was
declared. Some of the neutral
assessments are mentioned below —
According to the Library of

Congress Country Studies
conducted by the Federal Research
Division of the United States[24] –
The war was militarily

inconclusive; each side held
prisoners and some
territory belonging to the
other. Losses were
relatively heavy—on the
Pakistani side, twenty
aircraft, 200 tanks, and
3,800 troops. Pakistan's
army had been able to
withstand Indian pressure,
but a continuation of the
fighting would only have led
to further losses and
ultimate defeat for Pakistan.
Most Pakistanis, schooled in
the belief of their own
martial prowess, refused to
accept the possibility of
their country's military
defeat by "Hindu India" and
were, instead, quick to
blame their failure to attain
their military aims on what
they considered to be the
ineptitude of Ayub Khan and
his government.
Former New York Times reporter

Arif Jamal wrote in his book
Shadow War[9] —
This time, India's victory

was nearly total: India
accepted cease-fire only
after it had occupied 740
square miles, though
Pakistan had made
marginal gains of 210
square miles of territory.
Despite the obvious strength
of the Indian wins, both
countries claim to have
been victorious.
Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book

South Asia in world politics[125] –
The invading Indian forces

outfought their Pakistani
counterparts and halted
their attack on the outskirts
of Lahore, Pakistan's
second-largest city. By the
time United Nations
intervened on September 22,
Pakistan had suffered a
clear defeat.
In his book National identity and

geopolitical visions,[126] Gertjan
Dijkink writes –
The superior Indian forces,

however, won a decisive
victory and the army could
have even marched on into
Pakistani territory had
external pressure not forced
both combatants to cease
their war efforts.
An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's

India,[127] summarizing the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1965,
In three weeks the second

Indo-Pak War ended in
what appeared to be a draw
when the embargo placed by
Washington on U.S.
ammunition and
replacements for both
armies forced cessation of
conflict before either side
won a clear victory. India,
however, was in a position
to inflict grave damage to, if
not capture, Pakistan's
capital of the Punjab when
the cease-fire was called,
and controlled Kashmir's
strategic Uri-Poonch bulge,
much to Ayub's chagrin.
In his book titled The greater game:
India's race with destiny and China,
David Van Praagh wrote[8] –
India won the war. It held

on to the Vale of Kashmir,
the prize Pakistan vainly
sought. It gained 1,840 km2
(710 sq mi) of Pakistani
territory: 640 km2
(250 sq mi) in Azad
Kashmir, Pakistan's portion
of the state; 460 km2
(180 sq mi) of the Sailkot
sector; 380 km2 (150 sq mi)
far to the south of Sindh;
and most critical, 360 km2
(140 sq mi) on the Lahore
front. Pakistan took
540 km2 (210 sq mi) of
Indian territory: 490 km2
(190 sq mi) in the Chhamb
sector and 50 km2 (19 sq mi)
around Khem Karan.
Dennis Kux's India and the United

States estranged democracies also
provides a summary of the war,[128]
Although both sides lost

heavily in men and
material, and neither gained
a decisive military
advantage, India had the
better of the war. New Delhi
achieved its basic goal of
thwarting Pakistan's
attempt to seize Kashmir by
force. Pakistan gained
nothing from a conflict
which it had instigated.
A region in turmoil: South Asian

conflicts since 1947 by Robert
Johnson mentions[129] –
India's strategic aims were
modest – it aimed to deny
Pakistani Army victory,
although it ended up in
possession of 720 square
miles (1,900 km2) of
Pakistani territory for the
loss of just 220 square miles
(570 km2) of its own.
An excerpt from William M.

Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's
Asian security handbook: terrorism
and the new security
environment[130] –
A brief but furious 1965 war
with India began with a
covert Pakistani thrust
across the Kashmiri cease-
fire line and ended up with
the city of Lahore
threatened with
encirclement by Indian
Army. Another UN-
sponsored cease-fire left
borders unchanged, but
Pakistan's vulnerability had
again been exposed.
English historian John Keay's India:
A History provides a summary of
the 1965 war[131] –
The 1965 Indo-Pak war

lasted barely a month.
Pakistan made gains in the
Rajasthan desert but its
main push against India's
Jammu-Srinagar road link
was repulsed and Indian
tanks advanced to within a
sight of Lahore. Both sides
claimed victory but India
had most to celebrate.
Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz
write in their book Conflict in Asia:
Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-
Pakistan[132] –
Again India appeared,

logistically at least, to be in
a superior position but
neither side was able to
mobilize enough strength to
gain a decisive victory.
According to the Office of the

Historian within the U.S Department
of State:[133]
Conflict resumed again in
early 1965, when Pakistani
and Indian forces clashed
over disputed territory
along the border between
the two nations. Hostilities
intensified that August
when the Pakistani army
attempted to take Kashmir
by force. The attempt to
seize the state was
unsuccessful, and the
second India-Pakistan War
reached a stalemate.
Ceasefire
The United States and the Soviet
Union used significant diplomatic
tools to prevent any further escalation
in the conflict between the two South
Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led
by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted
ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent
(now in Uzbekistan), where Indian
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri
and Pakistani President Ayub Khan
signed the Tashkent Agreement,
agreeing to withdraw to pre-August
lines no later than 25 February 1966.
With declining stockpiles of
ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared
the war tilting in India's favor.
Therefore, they quickly accepted the
ceasefire in Tashkent.[134] Despite
strong opposition from Indian military
leaders, India bowed to growing
international diplomatic pressure and
accepted the ceasefire.[134] On 22
September, the United Nations
Security Council unanimously passed
a resolution that called for an
unconditional ceasefire from both
nations. The war ended the following
day.
India's Prime Minister, Shastri,
suffered a fatal heart attack soon
after the declaration of the ceasefire.
As a consequence, the public outcry
in India against the ceasefire
declaration transformed into a wave
of sympathy for the ruling Indian
National Congress.[135]
India and Pakistan accused each

other of ceasefire violations; India
charged Pakistan with 585 violations
in 34 days, while Pakistan countered
with accusations of 450 incidents by
India.[136] In addition to the expected
exchange of small arms and artillery
fire, India reported that Pakistan
utilized the ceasefire to capture the
Indian village of Chananwalla in the
Fazilka sector. This village was
recaptured by Indian troops on 25
December. On 10 October, a B-57
Canberra on loan to the PAF was
damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired
from the IAF base at Ambala.[137] A
Pakistani Army Auster AOP was shot
down on 16 December, killing one
Pakistani army captain; on 2 February
1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF
Hunters.
The ceasefire remained in effect until

the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of
1971.
Public perceptions
The ceasefire was criticised by many

Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated
official reports and the controlled
Pakistani press, believed that the
leadership had surrendered military
gains. The protests led to student
riots.[138] Pakistan State's reports had
suggested that their military was
performing admirably in the war –
which they incorrectly blamed as
being initiated by India – and thus the
Tashkent Declaration was seen as
having forfeited the gains.[139] Some
recent books written by Pakistani
authors, including one by ex-ISI chief
Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed
Durrani initially titled The Myth of 1965
Victory,[140] reportedly exposed
Pakistani fabrications about the war,
but all copies of the book were bought
by Pakistan Army to prevent
circulation because the topic was "too
sensitive".[141][142] The book was
published with the revised title History
of Indo Pak War 1965, published by
Services Book Club, a part of the
Pakistan military and printed by
Oxford University Press, Karachi. A
few copies of the book have
survived.[143] A version was published
in India as Illusion of Victory: A Military
History of the Indo-Pak War-1965 by
Lexicon Publishers.[144] Recently a
new Pakistani impression has been
published in 2017.
Intelligence failures
Strategic miscalculations by both
India and Pakistan ensured that the
war ended in a stalemate.
Indian miscalculations
Indian military intelligence gave no
warning of the impending Pakistan
invasion. The Indian Army failed to
recognize the presence of heavy
Pakistani artillery and armaments in
Chumb and suffered significant
losses as a result.
The "Official War History - 1965 ",

drafted by the Ministry of Defence of
India in 1992, was a long suppressed
document that revealed other
miscalculations. According to the
document, on 22 September when the
Security Council was pressing for a
ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister
asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if
India could possibly win the war, were
he to delay accepting the ceasefire.
The general replied that most of
India's frontline ammunition had been
used up and the Indian Army had
suffered considerable tank losses. It
was determined later that only 14% of
India's frontline ammunition had been
fired and India held twice the number
of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the
Pakistani Army had used close to 80%
of its ammunition.
Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who

was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during
the conflict, points to the lack of
coordination between the IAF and the
Indian army. Neither side revealed its
battle plans to the other. The battle
plans drafted by the Ministry of
Defence and General Chaudhari, did
not specify a role for the Indian Air
Force in the order of battle. This
attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was
referred to by ACM Lal as the
"Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing
attitude sometimes held by the Indian
army towards the other branches of
the Indian Military.[112]
Pakistani miscalculations
The Pakistani Army's failures started
with the supposition that a generally
discontented Kashmiri people, given
the opportunity provided by the
Pakistani advance, would revolt
against their Indian rulers, bringing
about a swift and decisive surrender
of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people,
however, did not revolt. Instead, the
Indian Army was provided with
enough information to learn of
Operation Gibraltar and the fact that
the Army was battling not insurgents,
as they had initially supposed, but
Pakistani Army regulars.
Telegram from the Embassy of the United
States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda
regarding achievements of Pak forces seems to
have convinced most that only Pak forbearance
saved the Indians from disaster."
The Pakistani Army also failed to

recognize that the Indian policy
makers would order an attack on the
southern sector in order to open a
second front. Pakistan was forced to
dedicate troops to the southern
sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore
instead using them to support
penetrating into Kashmir.
"Operation Grand Slam", which was

launched by Pakistan to capture
Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu
and a key region for communications
between Kashmir and the rest of
India, was also a failure. Many
Pakistani commentators criticised the
Ayub Khan administration for being
indecisive during Operation Grand
Slam. These critics claim that the
operation failed because Ayub Khan
knew the importance of Akhnoor to
India (having called it India's "jugular
vein") and did not want to capture it
and drive the two nations into an all-
out war. Despite progress being made
in Akhnoor, General Ayub Khan
relieved the commanding Major
General Akhtar Hussain Malik and
replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A
24-hour lull ensued the replacement,
which allowed the Indian army to
regroup in Akhnoor and successfully
oppose a lackluster attack headed by
General Yahya Khan. "The enemy
came to our rescue", asserted the
Indian Chief of Staff of the Western
Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain
Malik criticised Ayub Khan for
planning Operation Gibraltar, which
was doomed to fail, and for relieving
him of his command at a crucial
moment in the war. Malik threatened
to expose the truth about the war and
the army's failure, but later dropped
the idea for fear of being banned.[145]
Some authors have noted that

Pakistan might have been
emboldened by a war game –
conducted in March 1965, at the
Institute of Defence Analysis, USA.
The exercise concluded that, in the
event of a war with India, Pakistan
would win.[146][147] Other authors like
Stephen P. Cohen, have consistently
commented that the Pakistan Army
had "acquired an exaggerated view of
the weakness of both India and the
Indian military ... the 1965 war was a
shock".[148]
Pakistani Air Marshal and

Commander-in-Chief of PAF during
the war, Nur Khan, later said that the
Pakistan Army, and not India, should
be blamed for starting the war.[149][150]
However propaganda in Pakistan
about the war continued; the war was
not rationally analysed in
Pakistan,[151][152] with most of the
blame being heaped on the leadership
and little importance given to
intelligence failures that persisted
until the debacle of the Indo-Pakistani
War of 1971.
Involvement of other
nations
The United States and the United
Kingdom had been the principal
suppliers of military materiél to India
and Pakistan since 1947. Both India
and Pakistan were Commonwealth
republics. While India had pursued a
policy of nominal non-alignment,
Pakistan was a member of both
CENTO and SEATO and a purported
ally of the West in its struggle against
Communism.[153] Well before the
conflict began, however, Britain and
the United States had suspected
Pakistan of joining both alliances out
of opportunism to acquire advanced
weapons for a war against India. They
had therefore limited their military aid
to Pakistan to maintain the existing
balance of power in the
subcontinent.[154] In 1959, however,
Pakistan and the United States had
signed an Agreement of Cooperation
under which the United States agreed
to take "appropriate action, including
the use of armed forces" in order to
assist the Government of Pakistan at
its request.[155] By 1965, American
and British analysts had recognised
the two international groupings,
CENTO and SEATO, and Pakistan's
continued alliance with the West as
being largely meaningless.[156]
Following the start of the 1965 war,

both the United States and Britain
took the view that the conflict was
largely Pakistan's fault, and
suspended all arms shipments to
both India and Pakistan.[24] While the
United States maintained a neutral
stance, the British Prime Minister,
Harold Wilson, condemned India for
aggression after its army advanced
towards Lahore; his statement was
met with a furious rebuttal from
India.[157]
Internationally, the level of support

which Pakistan received was limited
at best.[36][158][159] Iran and Turkey
issued a joint communiqué on 10
September which placed the blame on
India, backed the United Nations'
appeal for a cease-fire and offered to
deploy troops for a UN peacekeeping
mission in Kashmir.[160] Pakistan
received support from Indonesia, Iran,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the form
of six naval vessels, jet fuel, guns and
ammunition and financial support,
respectively.[161]
Since before the war, the People's

Republic of China had been a major
military associate of Pakistan and a
military opponent of India, with whom
it had fought a brief war in 1962.
China had also become a foreign
patron for Pakistan and had given
Pakistan $60 million in development
assistance in 1965.[162] During the
war, China openly supported the
Pakistani position. It took advantage
of the conflict to issue a strongly
worded ultimatum to India
condemning its "aggression" in Tibet
and hinting at nuclear retaliation by
China (China had exploded its first
nuclear device the previous year).[159]
Despite strong fears of Chinese
intervention on the side of Pakistan,
the Chinese government ultimately
exercised restraint.[163] This was
partly due to the logistical difficulties
of a direct Chinese military
intervention against India and India's
improved military strength after its
defeat by China in 1962.[158] China
had also received strong warnings by
the American and Soviet governments
against expanding the scope of the
conflict by intervening.[159] In the face
of this pressure, China backed down,
extending the deadline for India to
respond to its ultimatum and warning
India against attacking East
Pakistan.[38] Ultimately, Pakistan
rejected Chinese offers of military aid,
recognising that accepting it would
only result in further alienating
Pakistan internationally.[159]
International opinion considered
China's actions to be dangerously
reckless and aggressive, and it was
soundly rebuked in the world press for
its unnecessarily provocative stance
during the conflict.[159]
India's participation in the Non-

Aligned Movement yielded little
support from its members.[164]
Support given by Indonesia to
Pakistan was seen as a major Indian
diplomatic failure, as Indonesia had
been among the founding members
of the Non-Aligned Movement along
with India. Despite its close relations
with India, the Soviet Union was more
neutral than other nations during the
war, inviting both nations to peace
talks under its aegis in Tashkent.[165]
Aftermath
India
Despite the declaration of a ceasefire,

India was perceived as the victor due
to its success in halting the Pakistan-
backed insurgency in Kashmir.[31] In
its October 1965 issue, the TIME
magazine quoted a Western official
assessing the consequences of the
war[166] —
Now it's apparent to

everybody that India is
going to emerge as an Asian
power in its own right.
In light of the failures of the Sino-

Indian War, the outcome of the 1965
war was viewed as a "politico-
strategic" victory in India. The Indian
premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was
hailed as a national hero in India.[167]
While the overall performance of the

Indian military was praised, military
leaders were criticised for their failure
to effectively deploy India's superior
armed forces so as to achieve a
decisive victory over Pakistan.[168] In
his book War in the modern world
since 1815, noted war historian
Jeremy Black said that though
Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965
war, India's hasty decision to call for
negotiations prevented further
considerable damage to the Pakistan
Armed Forces. He elaborates[169] —
India's chief of army staff

urged negotiations on the
ground that they were
running out ammunition
and their number of tanks
had become seriously
depleted. In fact, the army
had used less than 15% of
its ammunition compared to
Pakistan, which had
consumed closer to 80
percent and India had
double the number of
serviceable tanks.
In 2015, Marshal of the Indian Air

Force Arjan Singh, the last surviving
armed force commander of the
conflict, gave his assessment that the
war ended in a stalemate, but only
due to international pressure for a
ceasefire, and that India would have
achieved a decisive victory had
hostilities continued for a few days
more:[170]
For political reasons,

Pakistan claims victory in
the 1965 war. In my
opinion, the war ended in a
kind of stalemate. We were
in a position of strength.
Had the war continued for a
few more days, we would
have gained a decisive
victory. I advised then
prime minister Lal Bahadur
Shastri not to agree for
ceasefire. But I think he was
under pressure from the
United Nations and some
countries.
As a consequence, India focussed on

enhancing communication and
coordination within and among the tri-
services of the Indian Armed Forces.
Partly as a result of the inefficient
information gathering preceding the
war, India established the Research
and Analysis Wing for external
espionage and intelligence. Major
improvements were also made in
command and control to address
various shortcomings and the positive
impact of these changes was clearly
visible during the Indo-Pakistani War
of 1971 when India achieved a
decisive victory over Pakistan within
two weeks.
China's repeated threats to intervene
in the conflict in support of Pakistan
increased pressure on the
government to take an immediate
decision to develop nuclear
weapons.[171] Despite repeated
assurances, the United States did little
to prevent extensive use of American
arms by Pakistani forces during the
conflict, thus irking India.[172] At the
same time, the United States and
United Kingdom refused to supply
India with sophisticated weaponry
which further strained the relations
between the West and India.[173]
These developments led to a
significant change in India's foreign
policy – India, which had previously
championed the cause of non-
alignment, distanced itself further
from Western powers and developed
close relations with the Soviet Union.
By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet
Union emerged as the biggest
supplier of military hardware to
India.[174] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of
India's arms imports were from the
Soviet Union.[175] After the 1965 war,
the arms race between India and
Pakistan became even more
asymmetric and India was
outdistancing Pakistan by far.[176]
Pakistan
At the conclusion of the war, many

Pakistanis considered the
performance of their military to be
positive. 6 September is celebrated as
Defence Day in Pakistan, in
commemoration of the successful
defence of Lahore against the Indian
army. The performance of the
Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was
praised.
However, the Pakistani government

was accused by analysts of spreading
disinformation among its citizens
regarding the actual consequences of
the war.[177] In his book Mainsprings
of Indian and Pakistani foreign
policies, S.M. Burke writes[125] —
After the Indo-Pakistani

war of 1965 the balance of
military power had
decisively shifted in favor of
India. Pakistan had found it
difficult to replace the heavy
equipment lost during that
conflict while her adversary,
despite her economic and
political problems, had been
determinedly building up
her strength.
Pakistani commentator Haidar Imtiaz

remarked:[178]
The myth of ‘victory’ was

created after the war had
ended, in order to counter
Indian claims of victory on
the one hand and to shield
the Ayub regime and the
army from criticism on the
other.
A book titled Indo-Pakistan War of
1965: A Flashback,[179] produced by
the Inter-Services Public Relations of
Pakistan, is used as the official
history of the war, which omits any
mention of the operations Gibraltar
and Grand Slam, and begins with the
Indian counter-offensive on the
Lahore front. The Pakistan Army is
claimed to have put up a "valiant
defense of the motherland" and
forced the attack in its tracks.[178]
Most observers agree that the myth of

a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army
was badly dented in the war, as
critical breakthroughs were not
made.[180] Several Pakistani writers
criticised the military's ill-founded
belief that their "martial race" of
soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in
the war.[181][182] Rasul Bux Rais, a
Pakistani political analyst wrote[183] –
The 1965 war with India

proved that Pakistan could
neither break the
formidable Indian defences
in a blitzkrieg fashion nor
could she sustain an all-out
conflict for long.
Historian Akbar S Zaidi notes that
Pakistan "lost terribly in the 1965
war".[184]
The Pakistan airforce on the other

hand gained a lot of credibility and
reliability among Pakistan military and
international war writers for
successful defence of lahore and
other important areas of Pakistan and
heavy retaliation to India on the next
day. The alertness of the airforce was
also related to the fact that some
pilots were scrambled 6 times in less
than an hour on indication of Indian
air raids. The Pakistan airforce along
with the army is celebrated on
Defence day and Airforce day in
commemoration of this in Pakistan (6
and 7 September
respectively).[185][186]
Moreover, Pakistan had lost more

ground than it had gained during the
war and, more importantly, failed to
achieve its goal of capturing Kashmir;
this result has been viewed by many
impartial observers as a defeat for
Pakistan.[32][33][34]
Many senior Pakistani officials and

military experts later criticised the
faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar,
which ultimately led to the war. The
Tashkent declaration was also
criticised in Pakistan, though few
citizens realised the gravity of the
situation that existed at the end of the
war. Political leaders were also
criticised. Following the advice of
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign
minister, Ayub Khan had raised very
high expectations among the people
of Pakistan about the superiority – if
not invincibility – of its armed
forces,[187] but Pakistan's inability to
attain its military aims during the war
created a political liability for
Ayub.[188] The defeat of its Kashmiri
ambitions in the war led to the army's
invincibility being challenged by an
increasingly vocal opposition.[189]
One of the farthest reaching

consequences of the war was the
wide-scale economic slowdown in
Pakistan.[190][191] The war ended the
impressive economic growth Pakistan
had experienced since the early
1960s. Between 1964 and 1966,
Pakistan's defence spending rose
from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting a
tremendous strain on Pakistan's
economy. By 1970–71, defence
spending comprised a whopping
55.66% of government
expenditure.[192] According to
veterans of the war, the war greatly
cost Pakistan economically,
politically, and militarily.[193] Nuclear
theorist Feroze Khan maintained that
the 1965 war was a last conventional
attempt to snatch Kashmir by military
force, and Pakistan's own position in
the international community,
especially with the United States,
began to deteriorate from the point
the war started, while on the other
hand, the alliance with China saw
improvements.[193] Chairman joint
chiefs General Tariq Majid claims in
his memoirs that Chou En-Lai had
longed advised the government in the
classic style of Sun Tzu: "to go slow,
not to push India hard; and avoid a
fight over Kashmir, 'for at least, 20–30
years, until you have developed your
economy and consolidated your
national power'."[193] General Majid
maintained in Eating Grass that the
"sane, philosophical and political
critical thinking" was missing in
Pakistan, and that the country had
lost extensive human resources by
fighting the war.[193]
Pakistan was surprised by the lack of
support from the United States, an ally
with whom the country had signed an
Agreement of Cooperation. The US
turned neutral in the war when it cut
off military supplies to Pakistan (and
India);[21] an action that the Pakistanis
took as a sign of betrayal.[194] After
the war, Pakistan would increasingly
look towards China as a major source
of military hardware and political
support.
Another negative consequence of the

war was growing resentment against
the Pakistani government in East
Pakistan (present day
Bangladesh),[148] particularly for West
Pakistan's obsession with
Kashmir.[195] Bengali leaders accused
the central government of not
providing adequate security for East
Pakistan during the conflict, even
though large sums of money were
taken from the east to finance the war
for Kashmir.[196] In fact, despite some
Pakistan Air Force attacks being
launched from bases in East Pakistan
during the war, India did not retaliate
in that sector,[197] although East
Pakistan was defended only by an
understrengthed infantry division
(14th Division), sixteen planes and no
tanks.[198] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
was critical of the disparity in military
resources deployed in East and West
Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy
for East Pakistan, an action that
ultimately led to the Bangladesh
Liberation War and another war
between India and Pakistan in 1971.
Pakistan celebrates "Defence Day"

every year to commemorate 6
September 1965 to pay tribute to the
soldiers killed in the war.[199] However,
Pakistani journalists, including Taha
Siddiqui [200] and Haseeb Asif [201]
have criticized the celebration of
Defence Day.
Awards
National awards
Joginder Singh Dhillon, Lt. Gen,

awarded the Padma Bhushan in
1966 by the Government of India for
his role in the 1965 war,[202]
becoming the first Indian Army
officer to receive the award.[203]
Gallantry awards
For bravery, the following soldiers

were awarded the highest gallantry
award of their respective countries,
the Indian award Param Vir Chakra
and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-
Haider:
India
Company Quarter Master Havildar
Abdul Hamid[204] (Posthumous)
Lieutenant-Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji
Tarapore[204] (Posthumous)
Pakistan
Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed[205]
(Posthumous)
Battle honours
After the war, a total of 16 battle

honours and 3 theatre honours were
awarded to units of the Indian Army,
the notable amongst which are:[206]
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other

politicians visit Shauryanjali, a commemorative
exhibition on the 1965 war, 17 September 2015
Jammu and Kashmir 1965 (theatre

honour)
Punjab 1965 (theatre honour)
Rajasthan 1965 (theatre honour)
Assal Uttar
Burki
Dograi
Hajipir
Hussainiwala
Kalidhar
OP Hill
Phillora
See also
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
Post–World War II air-to-air combat
losses
Notes
a. Licence-built North American F-
86 Sabres with Canadian engines.
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Sources and external links
Wikiquote has quotations related

to: Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
IAF Combat Kills – 1965 war ,

(Center for Indian Military History)
Mohammed Muhammad Musa
(1983). My Version: India-Pakistan
War 1965. Wajidalis.
United States Library of Congress
Country Studies – India
Official History of the Indian Armed
Forces in the 1965 War with
Pakistan
GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan
War 1965
Pakistan Columnist AH Amin
analyses the war.
Grand Slam – A Battle of lost
Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha
Humayun Amin – very detailed roll
of events and analysis
The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40
Years On – From Rediff.com
Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily
Times (Pakistan)
Spirit of '65 & the parallels with
today – Ayaz Amir
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title=Indo-
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Indo-Pakistani

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was

Indo–Pakistani War of 1965

Geopolitical map of Kashmir provided by

Date August – 23 September 1965

Location Western Front

United Nations mandated

Commanders and leaders

Adm Bhaskar ((Cdr. Eastern Naval

700,000 Infantry 260,000 Infantry

186 Centurions[3] 352 Pattons[3]

66x 3.7"How[3] 234X25pdr[3]

16x 7.2"[3] 48x8" How[3]

Casualties and losses

Neutral claims[5][6] Neutral claims[5]

3,000 men[5] 3,800 men[5]

540 km2 (210 mi2) 20 aircraft[5]

aircraft shot captured [13]

India had the upper hand over

Internationally, the war was viewed in

"infiltrators" in the Indian-administered part of

Since the Partition of British India in

After its success in the Rann of Kutch,

Initially, the Indian Army met with

Indian Army's officers of 4 Sikh Regiment had

India crossed the International Border

The thrust against Lahore consisted

On 8 September 1965, a company of 5

On the days following 9 September,

The Pakistanis followed up their

The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division

The hostilities in the Rajasthan sector

The war was heading for a stalemate,

The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air

The IAF was flying large numbers of

The PAF's aircraft were largely of

Captured Indian Folland Gnat on display at the

The two countries have made

The 1965 war witnessed some of the

At the outbreak of war in 1965,

The Indian Army of the time

Despite the qualitative and numerical

After India breached the Madhupur

The Centurion battle tank, with its

Naval operations did not play a

The Pakistan Army launched a

Despite failing to sabotage the

India responded to the covert activity

59 IAF (official), 43 PAF.[11] In

128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tank

Land area 1,500 sq mi (3,900 km2) of Pakistan

There have been several neutral

According to the Library of

The war was militarily

Former New York Times reporter

This time, India's victory

Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book

The invading Indian forces