Magallona v.

Ermita
Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk
the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power
that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the
resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

Funa v. MECO

Issue: Whether or not MECO is a GOCC covered by the auditing power of COA.

Held: No. Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some
“special function or jurisdiction” they perform or exercise, are allotted “operational autonomy” and are “not
integrated within the department framework.”

The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially
entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without
jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its
non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the “verification fees” it
collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2 (6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001.
Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification
fees” and “consular fees” should be audited by the COA.

Garcia v. hon. judge drilon 2013

Issue: WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust
and violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling:
RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore,
RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

Imbong v. Ochoa

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

Ruling/s:

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization”
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those
that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives
under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s
dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section
5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g.
the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this
mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.”
In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents
or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be
made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the
State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated
a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development
of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior
to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering
of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as
from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the
poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section
14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially
with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise.

Paje v. Casino

Issues:

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan;
and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling:

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan because
the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception
to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends
political and territorial boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC
must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least,
a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed
before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the
aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the
issuance of the ECC.

West tower condominium v. fpic

Issues:
Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether
the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-
interest;
Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to perform
or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies;
and
Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the
environmental protection order.
Ruling:
I. Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[39] Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real... parties-in-interest.[40] In other words, the action must be brought by the person
who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.[41] Alternatively, one who has no right
or interest to protect cannot invoke the... jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is
jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium
unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the
morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit
owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no
gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and
residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium
corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act,[43] it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the
condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may
affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or... users.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang
Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers
International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala
Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the
Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule
7[45] of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly
affected by an environmental... disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court,
including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions.
Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs
with the other recommendations of the CA, with a few... modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL’s
Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a
Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent
FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address
any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning
scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known
as in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years;
(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also undertook
the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known
as segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d)... inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e)
inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.[47] Furthermore, in August
2010, with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI...
inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning
of the pipeline and check it for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for
purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution
and level of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free... from leaks and is safe for
commercial operation, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL
is already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due
consideration of the adoption by FPIC of... the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently
the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the
required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the
adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said
certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case... requires the specialized knowledge
and special expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE
submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August
5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of
the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts
the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC
as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore,
proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is
satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order
allowing FPIC to resume the... operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a
finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it
already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may be... ordered.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance with pipeline
structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis
of the evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL’s... actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the
numerous findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL’s present
structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption
of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities
and timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the
DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial operations is not yet fully
determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical
state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a... short-form integrity audit,[56] that the
factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural
integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution.
Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ of
kalikasan being functus officio at this point.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating
or restoring the environment.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the
creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a
special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already
suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is
but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that the creation of a
special trust fund is misplaced.
The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse,
however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed
by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment... of damages is found warranted.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and the
IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found
FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-
256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint
(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed
against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual
capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of
FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that
in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot... grant the award of damages to individual petitioners
under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the
civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to
ventilate and... determine the individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate
powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum
products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can,
however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
Principles:
Said proviso... pertinently provides:
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. – If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney’s
fees, costs of suit and other litigation... expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to
contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the... court. (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15(e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the
grant of damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners.
The CA’s resolution on petitioners’ September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with
Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee
on Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared by
CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations embodied in the permits issued
by the DENR, and to get a certification from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well taken. DENR is
the government agency tasked to implement the state policy of
“maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment”[57]
and to “promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air, and land pollution.”[58] It is
indubitable that the DENR... has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental remediation
of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.
With regard to petitioners’ March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a recent possible leak in the
pipeline, the CA appropriately found no additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect on the
environs in Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it... fitting that the pipeline be closely
and regularly monitored to obviate another catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of the affected
people, and to preserve and protect the environment not only for the present but also for the future
generations to come.
Petitioner’s January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the CA’s Report need not be discussed
and given consideration. As the CA’s Report contains but the appellate court’s recommendation on how
the issues should be resolved, and not the adjudication by this
Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.
As to petitioner’s October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification, the matters
contained therein have been considered in the foregoing discussion of the primary issues of this case. With
all these, We need not belabor the other arguments raised by the... parties.

LNL v. Agham partylist

Issues:

1. Whether LAMI violated the environmental laws: the Revised Forestry Code, and Philippine Mining
Act;
2. Whether LAMI flattened any mountain and cause environmental damage of such magnitured as to
prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces

Ruling:

1. No. LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by CENRO and passed the evaluation conducted
after the issuance of the permit so it clearly had the authority to cut trees and did not violate Sec.
68 of the Revised Forestry Code. The Philippine Mining Act is not applicable to the case since
LAMI is not conducting anything on the port site and it secured all the necessary permits and
licenses for the construction of a port and LAMI’s activity was limited to preparatory works for
the port’s construction. The Philippine Mining Act deals with mining operations and other mining
activities.

2. No. The Respondent, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not cite any law allegedly
violated by LAMI in relation to this claim. It did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local residents
in Zambales and those of the towns of Pangaisnan complained of any great danger or harm on the alleged
leveling of the land formation which may affect their lives, health, or properties. Neither was there any
evidence showing of a grave and real environmental damage to the barangay and the surrounding vicinity.

The records of expert testimonies and government entities and offiicials also show that there is in fact no
mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA in denying the petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.
 Pedro arigo v. Scott swift
ISSUE:
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
RULING:

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the
USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the
violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal
action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

Belgica v. hon. Ochoa

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation
of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e)
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation
of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO
SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH
ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES
THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.

Philippine savings bank and pascual M. Garcia v. senate impeachment court

ISSUE:

Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing the
subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?

III. THE RULING

[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the

respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents to COMMENT on the
[merits of the] petition.]

YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ
Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits:
 xxx xxx xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits,
that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court of
Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law is
not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of Government Service Insurance
System v. 15th Division of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for
foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to privacy in
relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has
presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while
impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an exemption
to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.

Boac v. cadapan
ISSUES:

1. Whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible;

2. Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the heads of the
concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino;
3. Whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties; and
4. Whether Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent in this
case.

Held:

1. Yes, Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of
the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of
the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities
in Fort Magsaysay such as the “DTU,” as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be
the “Division Training Unit,” firms up respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said
military facility. The corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a
forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no
compelling reason for the Court to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of
petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
2. No, The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its simplest terms, means the “responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to
their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,
 command responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is
made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators
(as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied). It
bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive
rule that points to criminal or administrative liability. An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor
does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil
or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved
individuals. An amparo proceeding does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance or threats thereof or extrajudicial killings; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance…
3. No, Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an
amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the
proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as
possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
immediately protect. The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding
if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses
with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy
being offered by an amparo proceeding. In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the
very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears
emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.
4. No, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo well-taken,
owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed. Settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any
allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three
missing persons.

Mison v. hon. Gallegos

Issue:
Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted.

Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Section 1 of the Rule in the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
provides:
 Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Amparo rule was intended to address the intractable problem of the “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal
of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of the RA
9851, to wit:
(a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or political
organization;
(c) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d)That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

In probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to
RA 9851.

Guided by the parameters of RA 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not
come under the statutory definition of an enforced disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the
BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to
give information to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. More importantly, there
was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and
the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced
by the Return of Warrant of Deportation.

The RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his
whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded
and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause
the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved
party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of
the writ of amparo in the case at bar.

Legazpi v. City Of Cebu

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests of a valid
ordinance thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted
within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance
with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy).

InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No. 135962,
March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact
traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by
virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the
petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive
tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the
City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the
ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving
away.

Remman enterprises, inc. v. Professional regulatory board of real estate service

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly substantive due
process.
RULING:
No. • The requirements for substantive due process are –
1. Lawful government purpose; and
2. Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose.
• The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and
increase its standards.
§ The law recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the
continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting
national progress.
• The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is
reasonable as it merely regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the
exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.
 • Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and owners of
private who want to sell their private property.
§ Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own
property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the
ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State
to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

Villanueva v. judicial and bar council

Issue:
W/N the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional – YES

Held:
The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the petitioner is constitutional since as stated
in the Sect. 8 (5), Art. VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary.
Consequently, it was also stated in the said provision that only the persons nominated by the JBC is
transmitted to the president that will choose whom to nominate as judge in the judiciary.

Ferrer , jr. v. Mayor Bautista

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax ordinances are valid
HELD: Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in
Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL
RATIO:
1. The 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a social function
and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Property has not only an individual
function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also a social function insofar as it has
to provide for the needs of the other members of society. The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, no r injurious to the right of
the community.
Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the government in the exercise of police power. In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may
be made the implement of the state’s police power.
The SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Cities are
allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The
collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects.
The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory
purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city.
It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The
situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an
orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-
abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.

2. In the subject ordinance imposing garbag collection fee, the rates of the imposable fee depend on
land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or
apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is again quoted below:
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a
condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in
size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed
rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is
from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
"promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-
consuming the present resources and in generating waste." Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee
into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment,
respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes
generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age and size,
accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual
occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, WM
service fees may be computed based on minimum factors such as types of solid waste to include special
waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility, capacity
or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction, cost of management, and type of technology. With
respect to utility rates set by municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under
reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service, the purpose for which the service
or the product is received, the quantity or the amount received, the different character of the service
furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of
distinction.

1-UTAK v. COMELEC

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
are constitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints
on speech

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe
on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through
the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during
an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public
utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport
terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of
indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

Disini v. Secretary of justice

Are the following provisions valid and constitutional?

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.

HELD:
Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under
this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that
interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard
since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.

Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of
the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. Since the ethical hacker does his job with
prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section
4(a)(1).

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(3) provides:

(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction
or transmission of viruses.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply
punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully destroying without right the things
that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message.
Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples
computer systems and private documents.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of
circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead,
destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a
personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clausein that, not
being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.

The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical,
without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1)
degree lower.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it
is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy."

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
"constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks." In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v.
Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006).

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded
into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.

Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the
right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of
personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be
hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about
him that could be published.

The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear
since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They express fear that private
communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not
regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in
cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right
granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."This meaning given
to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement
agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.

The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.

Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has
to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775
or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009(ACPA) to cover
identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA
when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs
definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means."

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace.
But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is
rational basis for such higher penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of
child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic communication

with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are
prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the
sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient
to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic
message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any
part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam."
The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the
same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam."

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service
providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful
enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person
sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is
that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their
recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code and Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section
4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.

The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or
any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a
fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the
provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under
this Act:

xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the
future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence
already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.Petitioners argue
that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the
penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in
relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.

The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a sense, they
are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in
cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed
with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users.

Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original
author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and
react to it.

Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It
suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and
abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves
of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the
meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain,
ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the
law.

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous
statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes
hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to
disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that
will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users
will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all
liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of
facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The terms "aiding or
abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.

Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a
nullity.

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is

inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a
chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In
this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers
such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part
of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the
crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to
apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section
4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-
related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None
of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if
committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be
covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case
may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As
the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through
the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means.
In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more
victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be
libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate
libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a
violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and
the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime
but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as
another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.

The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to
actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy;
as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.

Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and
4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment
of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion
temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be
punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act
of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for
in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished
with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not
exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with
imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least
One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges
and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as
determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be
authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type
of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or
recording of the above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and
the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove
has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to
the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in
real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that
data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need
not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the
right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or
information that they send to one another.

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put
order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is within the realm of
reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts
of cybercrimes.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to
live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right
to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the
right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)

Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a
particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and
communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of
electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to
it would have no basis in fact.

In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two
categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those
who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and
uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with
specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 13 provides:
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating
to communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six
(6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months
from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That
once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case,
the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor
shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its
compliance.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation
of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to
issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents
internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.

No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or
recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has
an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By
virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and
those relating to content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders
of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders.
The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional

Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall
issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscribers information,
traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the
disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena.

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function
usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The
prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it
violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure warrant is
properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the
functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to
provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and
examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the
computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty
(30) days from date of approval by the court.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure
procedures.

The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were
taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements
them.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15,
service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely
destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination.

Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination
violates the users right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated,
it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the
data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved
them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider
for a copy before it is deleted.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found to
be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such
computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be
unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that
Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential
guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are
generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that
the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking
Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does
not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional
guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the
orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829
with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
authorities.

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure
to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance
would be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully."
There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes,
defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies
to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
Hence, valid and constitutional.

Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law

Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within thirty (30)
days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for
policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission
of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan
without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two
tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the
only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563 (2007).

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a
national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient
standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training,
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization
and users assets.This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating
the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and
combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the
domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international
cooperation." This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as
sufficient standard.

Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.

Pollo v. Chairperson Constantino-david

Issue:
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and
was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling:
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not
violate his constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated
his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that
the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.”
In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November
3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141,
169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC
Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and
scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19,
2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner
were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor.

Saluday v. People
Issue: Whether or not the inspection conducted in the bus constitutes unreasonable search.
Ruling:
The Constitutional right guaranteed by section 2, article 3 of the Constitution is not a blanket
prohibition it operates against unreasonable searched and seizures only. Conversely, if the search
is reasonable it does not apply.
Since the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures is patterned to the Fourth
Amendment of the US Constitution, in determining what qualifies as “reasonable search” the
pronouncements of the US Supreme Court which are also doctrinal in this jurisdiction were cited
to shed light in this matter.
In the seminal case of Katz vs United States, the US Supreme Court clarified that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his home or office is not protected under the Fourth Amendment. But what he seeks to
protect as private, even accessible to public may be constitutionally protected. Further, Justice
John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the
application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy.
Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Hence, to determine if there exist a reasonable expectation of privacy, first the person must show
a subjective expectation that his activities and items are private and second that his expectation
of privacy is one which the society considers as reasonable.
In this case, the expectations of privacy of the passengers riding in a public transportation were
reduced. The state, in view of its police power can impose non-intrusive security measures and
filter those going in a private premise that is accessible to public to ensure that the safety of others
may be not be put at risk.
The reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason section 2,
article 3 of the Constitution finds no application in this case.

Spouses Bill and victoria hing v. Alexander Choachuy sr. and allan choachuy
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?

HELD:

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way
as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."It is the right of an individual "to be free from
unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the
public is not necessarily concerned."Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse of
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not
even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether there is a
violation of the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether
the expectation has been violated.In Ople v. Torres,we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of
privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-
case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and
safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be
affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No.
4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The
operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the
right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on
respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it
actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting
that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property.
The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in
setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should
revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view
to petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the
right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person."

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent,
is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was
justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of
the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion committed by the court.Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the
CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
Rhonda ave s. Vivares v. st. theresa`a college

The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject
digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of
them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos,
their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are
the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes
to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable
either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs
in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached
to the right to informational privacy.

US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web
page or the photograph itself.

United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with
the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set
at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only”
cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.

Lee v. Ilagan
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances[1]. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals[2], which is defined as “the
right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself[3].”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.”

Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other
words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other[4]. Corollarily, the allegations in the
petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim[5]. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of
habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked
in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful[6].

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this
video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he to failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security.

GMA network, inc. v. COMELEC

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out
and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime
limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such
a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-
cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are
also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people
may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of
suppression of his political speech.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

RULING: YES.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.

SWS and Pulse Asia v. Comelec

ISSUE:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint

RULING/RATIO:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press.

The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space,
and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public
information and forms among candidates.

Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the O’brient
test for content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other
types such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government
interest because the interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.

Note: Justice Kapunan’s dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is
inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of
balancing by weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by
the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other
considerations (for example, prevention of last minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of
freedom of expression.
davao city water district v. aranjuez
DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was done within government office hours, such act
was not permissible
Notably, however, a prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 021316
but in Sec. 5
Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action. - As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase
"prohibited concerted activity or mass action" shall be understood to refer to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by... themselves or through their employees organizations, with the
intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession,
economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government.
Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited.
It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives
was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service
As pointed out by the respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa "to be there" at the fun run.
Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay
required, to wear. Else, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom
of expression.[40] This, then, being the... fact, we have to rule against the findings of both the CSC and
Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
More importantly we need to refer to GSIS v. Villaviza (GSIS case).[41] It was there ruled that the acts of
GSIS employees wearing similarly colored shirts while attending a public hearing inside the GSIS Office,
with clenching of fists and orating... against the then President Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a
prohibited activity but were only an exercise of their constitutional freedom of expression
DCWD also found that Cagula and the rest of the officials violated MC No. 33
DCWD also argues that a violation of this circular constitutes as a serious violation of CSC Rules as the
circular is a CSC-issued Memorandum and not... just a mere issuance of DCWD.
CSC issued MC No. 33 in recognition of the rights of the government employees to air their grievances
balanced by the delivery of services to the public which should not be prejudiced
MC No. 33 sets down rules governing the posting of posters and other similar materials within... the
premises of government agencies
Clearly, the DCWD Office Memorandum hews close and faithfully to MC No. 33. It is a reasonable rule
issued by the heads of the agencies in order to regulate posting of grievances of the employees.
It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of
limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their
constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens... just by reason of their employment.
a citizen who accepts public employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there
are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a... contract
for public employment. It is the Court's responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.
Apparently, DCWD, not satisfied by the CSC ruling that a violation of the memorandum is punishable with
reprimand, argues that what occurred was a serious violation implying that a higher penalty is warranted.
Under Section 52 (C) (3), Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936,[48] violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations is punishable with reprimand on the first offense and suspension ranging from one to thirty days
for the second offense.
a violation of an office memorandum, which was issued as an internal rule to regulate the area for posting
of grievances inside the office premise, is only a light offense punishable by... reprimand.

Perfecto v. Esidera
Issue:
Wether or not the respondent judge was guilty of immoral conduct based on, among others, her alleged
affair and her failure to comport herself according to the roman catholic faith.
Held:
 This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not have
jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious
doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that
affects the public or its interest.

 Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral
conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the
public’s confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court
decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court’s supervision. At best,
religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.

 Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of contracting a second
marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an alleged "illicit" affair
are "immoral" based on her Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of religious morality.

 We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right to
participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other people’s rights
and with no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we
accommodate respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they have
secular counterparts under our laws.

 However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield respondent judge
from liability for misconduct under our laws. Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil
marriage with her first husband. She knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with
her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting.

 Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another person during the
subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression. Legal implications and
 obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless of how
civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion.

Spark v. Quezon City

ISSUE: The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances
are unconstitutional.

HELD: The petition is partly granted. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court
hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local
government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance
No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

Void for Vagueness. The assailed pieces of ordinance are NOT void for being vague.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle."[48]

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do
not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that
one may act accordingly.[49] The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations,
which are absent from this particular claim.

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the
proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct
the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement
guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters
of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of
curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous
provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited
or not prohibited.

The pieces of ordinance have sufficient standards as provided by special law.

Petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law
enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when
implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.[53] Pursuant to Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,[54] minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children
at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.[55] It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with
law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."[56] Hence, by necessary
implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Right of Parents to Rear their ChildrenPetitioners are NOT CORRECT that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth
without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine
whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given
that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in
imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.[57]

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents
in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic
efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but
also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority
over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of
this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood
that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these
[obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and
elements of good citizenship."[58] "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept
and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens." [59]

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning
the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to
promote these legitimate interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health
of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state
interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."[67]

[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a
vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such
a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."[69] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being.

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not -
whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves
as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the
importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the
only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow
minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.[73]

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more
time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active
role in their children's upbringing.

Petitioners are partially correct that the Curfew Ordinances violate the people's right to travel.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right[88] under Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines.[89] It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.[90] Liberty
- a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion[91] and the right of citizens to be free to
use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
ends of life.[92]

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the
rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.[93]

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence
provides that this right is not absolute.[95] As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State[96] may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.[97]

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention
of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement
and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period
is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and
criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA
7610,[98] as amended, RA 9775,[99] RA 9262,[100] RA 9851, [101] RA 9344,[102] RA 10364,[103] RA
9211,[104] RA 8980,[105] RA 9288,[106] and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,[107] as amended.

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have
done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to
travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,[108] but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.[109] They are always
subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.[110] Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these
limitations do not generally apply to adults.

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness
of classifications.[122] The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes.[123]The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve
suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on
gender and legitimacy.[124] Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the
first two tests.[125]

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test[126] is the applicable test.[127] At this juncture, it should be emphasized
that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader
authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.[128]

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of
minors vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.[131] Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.[132]

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances
is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if
not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and
influences which may even include themselves as denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City
Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors.

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their
police power under the general welfare clause.[140] In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on
public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means
to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should
not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While
rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the
purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations
to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so
narrowly drawn.[141]

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they
are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or
civic.[142] Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal
constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights. [143]

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the
Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances do not.
genuino v. de lima

Issue:
Whether or not the issued DOJ circular 41 infringes the constitutional rights of the petitioners to
travel and thus an ultra vires to the constitution.

Ruling of the Court:

The constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation; it is deemed written
in every statute and contract. If a law or administrative rule violates any norm of the constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect.
In this case, the right to travel is a guarantee of the constitution under the Bill of rights. There are
allowable restrictions in the exercise of this right which are for the interest of national security, public safety
or public health as may be provided by law.
The ground of the respondent in the issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the petitioners to be present
during the preliminary investigation of their cases which is outside the allowable restrictions provided by
the constitution, hence, it is an ultra vires and has no effect.

Sereno v. Committee

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the
minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern and the State’s policy of full public disclosure?
RULING:
NO. The people’s right to information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
the constitutional guarantee to information “does not open every door to any and all information.” It is
limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise,
the State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

DFA v. BCA International

Issue:

Whether or not an petition for review by certiorari is availing in a pending arbitration process.

Held:

In an earlier case filed by petitioner entitled Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International
Corporation,22docketed as G.R. No. 210858, the Court ruled therein RA 9285, its IRR, and the Special ADR
Rules are applicable to the present arbitration proceedings.

RA No. 9285 declares the policy of the State to actively promote pa1iy autonomy in the resolution of
disputes or the freedom of the parties to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes.23 Towards
this end, the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution as an
important means to achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog court dockets.24

Court intervention is allowed under RA No. 9285 in the following instances: (1) when a party in the
arbitration proceedings requests for an interim measure of protection;25 (2) judicial review of arbitral
awards26 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC); and (3) appeal from the RTC decisions on arbitral awards to
the Court of Appeals.27

Rule 19.37 of Special ADR Rules provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals issued pursuant to these Special ADR Rules may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth.

It is clear that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court is from a judgment or final order or resolution
of the Court of Appeals and only questions of law may be raised. There have been instances when we
overlooked the rule on hierarchy of courts and took cognizance of a petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion by the Regional Trial Court when it granted interim relief to a party and issued an Order
assailed by the petitioner, considering the transcendental importance of the issue involved therein 35 or to
better serve the ends of justice when the case is determined on the merits rather on technicality.36 However,
in this case, the appeal by certiorari is not from a final Order of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial
Court, but from an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal; hence, the petition must be dismissed for
failure to observe the rules on court intervention allowed by RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules,
specifically Rule 19.36 and Rule 19.37 of the latter, in the pending arbitration proceedings of the parties to
this case.

Goldenway v. equitable bank

ISSUE:
Whether or not the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act 3135, and not the
shorter period under RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that foreclosure would be in accordance with
Act 3135
RULING: The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply.
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. In
this case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioner’s default and the
latter’s entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially
in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
But under Sec 47 of RA 8791, an exception is thus made in the case of juridical persons which are allowed
to exercise the right of redemption only "until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure
sale" and in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only
modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act
No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon
registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise
no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights
under Act No. 3135.
We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical
persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135.
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the
properties foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption
period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to
dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000,
crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking
Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system. In this
context, the amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of such safe and sound practices aimed at
ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our banks. It cannot therefore be disputed that the said provision
amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was based on a reasonable classification and germane to the
purpose of the law.
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and
within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as with other individual rights to contract
and to property, it has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. The concept of police power
is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Its scope, ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the
greatest benefits.
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations
must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or
as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s
power of regulation. Such authority to regulate businesses extends to the banking industry which, as this
Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with public interest.
Having ruled that the assailed Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is constitutional, we find no reversible error
committed by the CA in holding that petitioner can no longer exercise the right of redemption over its
foreclosed properties after the certificate of sale in favor of respondent had been registered.