122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL.

328, MARCH 14, 2000 123

Niñal vs. Bayadog Niñal vs. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000. * riage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The
petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; A valid marriage
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
pursuant to Article 80 (3) in relation to Article 58.—A valid
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage
such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of
58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
requirement.
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
Same; Same; Same; The five-year common-law
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
as a basic “autonomous social institution.” Specifically, the
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
Constitution considers marriage as an “inviolable social
it not been for the absence of the marriage.—Working on the
institution,” and is the foundation of family life which shall
assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
considers marriage as “a special contract of permanent
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
union” and case law considers it “not just an adventure but a
basis of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
lifetime commitment.”
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate
Same; Same; Same; There are several instances
the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
dispensed with.—There are several instances recognized by
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
the Civil Code wherein a mar-
________________ it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the
*FIRST DIVISION. marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
123 characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity—that prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal
is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
during the entire five years, then the law would be adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have Same; Same; Same; The subsistence of the marriage even
common law relationships and placing them on the same where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The wife.”—Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the had started living with each other that has already lasted for
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid
ground to nul- under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
124 the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
Niñal vs. Bayadog immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
lify their marriage. There should be no exemption from already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
a license is required in order to notify the public that two cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone third party as being one as “husband and wife.”
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the Same; Same; Same; Void marriages can be questioned
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil even after the death of either party but voidable marriages
registrar. can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
Same; Same; Same; Any marriage subsequently after death of either, in
125
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void.—This is the same reason why our civil laws, VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 125
past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of Niñal vs. Bayadog
multiple marriages by the same person during the same which case the parties and their offspring will be left: as
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during if the marriage had been perfectly valid.—The Code is silent
the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A
marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
considered as having never to have taken place and cannot directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or essential to the determination of the case. This is without
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be need arises, a final judgment of decla-
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a 126
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, 126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of Niñal vs. Bayadog
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only ration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
interested party may attack a void marriage. Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; No judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.—Jurisprudence The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “A
Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary,
yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
Same; Same; Same; Other than for purposes of September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
marriage an absolute nullity.—Other than for purposes of resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at 3. (3)Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a assailing the validity of the second marriage
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in after it was dissolved due to their father’s
a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners death. 1

filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage

of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have
void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed filed the action to declare null and void their father’s
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
the second marriage would affect petitioner’s analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since an action for annulment of marriage. Hence, this 2

they are not among the persons who could file an action petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the question of law.
Family Code. This petition was originally dismissed for non-
127 compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 127 of Civil Procedure, and because “the verification failed
Niñal vs. Bayadog to state the basis of petitioner’s averment that the
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct.’ ” It was
of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces
after finding that the Family Code is “rather silent, no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
obscure, insufficient” to resolve the following issues: Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
3

________________
1. (1)Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of 1 The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued

action against defendant in asking for the by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their 59, Toledo City, reads: “WHEREFORE, premises considered,
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case
is hereby ordered dismissed without costs.” (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
specially so when at the time of the filing of this 2 Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is 3 Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

already dead; 128

2. (2)Whether or not the second marriage of 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null Niñal vs. Bayadog
and void ab initio;
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition 8 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in
Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 76, no marriage
for review. 4
shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
The two marriages involved herein having been civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code habitually resides.
9 Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is
129
the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite
5
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 129
of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the 6
Niñal vs. Bayadog
absence of which renders the marriage void ab “autonomous social institution.” Specifically, the
10

initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article

7
Constitution considers marriage as an “inviolable social
58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license
8
institution,” and is the foundation of family life which
is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family
11

participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of Code considers marriage as “a special contract of
which the general public is interested. This interest
9
permanent union” and case law considers it “not just
12

proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the an adventure but a lifetime commitment.” 13

State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of However, there are several instances recognized by
affording protection to the family as a basic the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
__________________ with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman
14

4 Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50. who have lived together and exclusively with each other
5 Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

6 Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be

as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with: period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to
1. (1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
freely given;
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
2. (2)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
3. (3)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
character. the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license
7 Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages
may discourage such
shall be void from the beginning: ________________
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character.
xxx xxx xxx
 10 Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76; See also Tuason v.
CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
11 Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution. Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
12 Article 1, Family Code provides: “Marriage is a special contract period in order to exempt the future spouses from
of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x
x x.
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
13 Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 at 35 (1995); 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 other during the entire five-year continuous period or
Phil. 21, 41 (1995). should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have
14 Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall
lived together and exclusively with each other as
be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband husband and wife during the entire five-year
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before impediment to their being lawfully married, which
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other sometime during the cohabitation period?
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma
impediment to the marriage. have lived together as husband and wife for five years
130 without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
Niñal vs. Bayadog “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the
persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve 15
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip period, which is counted back from the date of
arising from the publication of their names, the law celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
them from that requirement. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any of cohabitation characterized
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an _______________
affidavit stating that “they have attained the age of
Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
15

Rollo, p. 29.
16

husband and wife for at least five years, and that we 131
now desire to marry each other.” The only issue that
16
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 131
 Niñal vs. Bayadog forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under
by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at oath. x x x”
any time within the 5 years and continuity—that is This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year Article 17 provides in part: “x x x. This notice shall request
all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x.”
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each _______________
other during the entire five years, then the law would
be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.
17

have common law relationships and placing them on 132

the same footing with those who lived faithfully with 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship Niñal vs. Bayadog
must be respected as such and its requirements must Article 18 reads in part: “x x x.In case of any impediment
be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention,
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x.”
based on the approximation of the requirements of the
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or
law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
not comply with every single requirement and later use
multiple marriages by the same person during the same
the same missing element as a preconceived escape
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
18

absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or

exception. It should be noted that a license is required
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the
in order to notify the public that two persons are about
civil law in that the contracting of two or more
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
of the two shall make it known to the local civil
adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
registrar. The Civil Code provides:
19
17

Article 63: “x x x. This notice shall request all persons having

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
local civil registrar thereof. x x x.” each other as husband and wife for at least five years
Article 64: “Upon being advised of any alleged prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first
impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had spouse with any third party as being one as “husband
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and and wife.”
respondent had started living with each other that has Having determined that the second marriage
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
five- the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
_______________ initio because of the absence of such element.
18 Article 83, Civil Code provides “Any marriage subsequently
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal marriage void after his death?
and void from its performance, unless: Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of
the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to
20

1. (1)the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

2. (2)the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
petitions
_________________
. . .”
20 Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by

Article 41 of the Family Code reads: “A marriage contracted by any the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:
person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years . . .” 1. (1)For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party
19 Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent,
within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by
133
the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 133 minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of
Niñal vs. Bayadog twenty-one;
year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation 2. (2)For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane
spouse, who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity; or by
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining
sanity;
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
3. (3)For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial injured party, within five years after the discovery of the
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had fraud;
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was 134
actual severance of the filial companionship between 134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Niñal vs. Bayadog number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second years from the time the force, intimidation or undue
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the influence disappeared or ceased; For causes mentioned
trial court, which allows “the sane spouse” to file an in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party,
annulment suit “at any time before the death of either within five years after the marriage.
party” is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the ___________________
grounds, periods and persons who can file an 21 Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v.
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of Retirement Board, 272 111. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code,
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition 1990 ed., p. 271.
22 In re Conza’s Estate, 176 111. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797,
to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is 135
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 135
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered Niñal vs. Bayadog
as having never to have taken place and cannot be the
21

or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its 23

source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or

effect on the children born to such void marriages as
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
provided in Article 50 in relation to Articles 43 and 44
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
as well as Articles 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
after the death of either party but voidable marriages
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged marital
and not after death of either, in which case the parties
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense
22

there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between

for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
death of either extinguished nothing.
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require
24

regarding co-ownership (4) For causes mentioned in

a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
rights or to make the marriage void but though no declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as void, before a party can enter into a second
well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only
27

of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
28

of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the law makes either the action or defense for the
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.” “Under 25 declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party
29

far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. defense, then the same cannot be considered
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its imprescriptible.
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
time, whether before or after the death of either or both limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
______________ of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
23 Articles 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
24 Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
SCRA 499(1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
25 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
Niñal vs. Bayadog
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.” It
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
remarriage.
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding __________________
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on
the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, 26 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
26
 27 Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA
47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32 (1995); 60
SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).
28 Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

29 Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227, s. 1987

and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.
137
VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 137
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Kapun
an, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., On official business abroad.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside. Case
ordered reinstated.
Note.—Per current jurisprudence, “a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact” before any party thereto can marry again;
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void. (Apiag
vs. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the
Mallion vs. Alcantara public tranquility and happiness.
Same; Same; Section 47 pertains to the dual aspect of res
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006. *

judicata which is “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppel by

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA verdict” for par. (b) of Section 47 and res judicata in its
ALCANTARA, respondent. concept as “conclusiveness
Judgment; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res _______________
judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; refers to the rule that a final judgment *SECOND DIVISION.
or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is 337
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all VOL. 506, OCTOBER 31, 2006 337
later suits on points and matters determined in the former Mallion vs. Alcantara
suit.”—Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing of judgment” or “auter action” for par. (c) Section 47.—
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 49 of the Rules of Court outlines
judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or the dual aspect of res judicata. Section 47 (b) pertains to it in
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is its concept as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppel by
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
later suits on points and matters determined in the former prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
suit.” demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47
Same; Same; The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness
pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is of judgment” or otherwise known as the rule of auter action
founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) case between the same parties involving a different cause
the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice of action. Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior
for the same cause.—The doctrine of res judicata is a rule judgment obtains in the present case.
which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence Same; Same; Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment
and is founded upon the following precepts of common law, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is—between
vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would the first and second actions—identity of parties, of subject
subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of matter, and of causes of action.—Res judicata requires the
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter
(3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
is—between the first and the second—identity of parties, of other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.
subject matter, and of causes of action. Same; Same; A party cannot evade or avoid the
Same; Same; The test to determine whether the causes of application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence action or adopting a different method of presenting his case.—
will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions.— application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three action or adopting a different method of presenting his case.
requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth
requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the Court of Appeals.
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is
an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for petitioner.
the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in Reynaldo M. Alcantara for private respondent.
the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
338
AZCUNA, J.:
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mallion vs. Alcantara This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Same; Same; Parties are bound not only as regards every of the Rules of Court raising a question of law: Does a
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims previous final judgment denying a petition for
or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters
incapacity bar a subsequent peti-
that could have been adjudged in that case.—The instant 339
case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and VOL. 506, OCTOBER 31, 2006 339
void because no valid celebration of the same took place due
to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP
Mallion vs. Alcantara
4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the tion for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance marriage license?
with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The The facts are not disputed:
alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion
now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
1

Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of
every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted
7

under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as respondent’s motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion
amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing of which reads:
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The case “WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of
was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is
on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a DISMISSED.
decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding
2
SO ORDERED.” 8

that petitioner “failed to adduce preponderant evidence Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied
to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.” The
3
in an order dated January 21, 2000.
9

appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE
dismissed in a resolution dated June 11, 1998 for
4

DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND

failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful
VOID AB INITIOFOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
fees within the reglementary period. MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND
another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
5
OF HIS WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER
with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT
his marriage with respondent was null and void due to HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN
license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY
motion to dismiss dated August 13, 1999, praying for
6
THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW.
the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR
judicata and forum shopping.
THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE
_______________
FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE,
1 Rollo, pp. 39-42. THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND
2 Id., at pp. 43-53. MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND
3 Id., at p. 53.
CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A
4 Records, p. 33.
CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING. 10

5 Id., at pp. 3-10.

6 Id., at pp. 15-33.

Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the
340 two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED nullity of his
_______________
Mallion vs. Alcantara
 7 Id., at pp. 74-77. the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by
Rollo, p. 28.
Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same
8

9 Records, p. 90.

10 Rollo, pp. 7-8. proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on

341 the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under
VOL. 506, OCTOBER 31, 2006 341 Article 36 of the Family Code?
Mallion vs. Alcantara Petitioner insists that because the action for
marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration
action in the present case because the operative facts of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of
upon which they were based as well as the evidence marriage license constitute separate causes of action,
required to sustain either were different. Because there the present case would not fall under the prohibition
is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be
that res judicata does not lie to bar the second barred by the principle of res judicata.
petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that 342
there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of Mallion vs. Alcantara
action. The contention is untenable.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing
dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the present judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final
the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
is, the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage, competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration parties or their privies in all later suits on points and
of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends matters determined in the former suit.” 11

that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-
Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon
the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites the following precepts of common law, namely: (1)
in this petition could have been raised during the trial public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. interest of the State that there should be an end to
The petition lacks merit. litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary
Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the
will and neglect of individuals and prefer the their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of commencement of the action or special proceeding,
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and litigating for the same thing and under the same title
happiness. 12
and in the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is
or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final
of Court, thus: order which appears upon its face to have been so
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the included therein or necessary thereto.
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res
or final order, may be as follows:
judicata. Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as
13
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific
thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppel by verdict,” which
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status a second action upon the same claim, demand
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c)
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status of judgment” or otherwise known as the rule of auter
_______________ action pendant which ordains that issues actually and
11 Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82475, January 28,
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
1991, 193 SCRA 437. in any future case between the same parties involving
12Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, February 13, 2006, 482 a different cause of action. Res judicata in its
14

SCRA 379, quoting Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the
Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 27.
343
present case.
VOL. 506, OCTOBER 31, 2006 343 Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence
Mallion vs. Alcantara of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment
or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will
is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima having jurisdiction over the sub-
_______________
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, 13 National Housing Authority v. Baello, G.R. No. 143230, August

with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to 30, 2004, 437 SCRA 86.
any other matter that could have been raised in 14 Spouses Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13,

relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and 2005, 477 SCRA 538.
 344 What differs is the ground upon which the cause of
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner
Mallion vs. Alcantara essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue
ject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an that
order on the merits; and (4) there is—between the first _______________
and the second—identityof parties, of subject matter, 15 Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, G.R. No. 163338,
and of causes of action.15
September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 533.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first 16 Sangalang v. Caparas, G.R. No. L-49749, June 18, 1987, 151

three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the SCRA 53.

17 RULES OFCOURT, Rule 2, Section 2.
fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine
345
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain VOL. 506, OCTOBER 31, 2006 345
whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
Mallion vs. Alcantara
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that
evidence would sustain both, the two actions are is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is marriage.
a bar to the subsequent action. 16
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the
two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of
nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP
of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that
petition which was anchored on the alleged the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
psychological incapacity of respondent is different from accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this
the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license
which is anchored on the purported absence of a which petitioner raises now could have been presented
marriage license. and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply parties are bound not only as regards every matter
offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or
invoking different grounds for the same cause of action.
demand but as to any other admissible matter which
By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. In both
17
might have been offered for that purpose and of all other
matters that could have been adjudged in that case.
petitions, petitioner has the same cause—the
18

declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent.

 It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon
avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
the form of his action or adopting a different method of liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
presenting his case. As this Court stated in Perez v.
19
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest
Court of Appeals: 20

to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.

“x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a
There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same
presentation is allowed.(Citations omitted.)
transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two
actions are not necessarily for different causes of action In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the
simply because the theory of the second would not have been course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief.
open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in
preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of court, the parties must ventilate all matters and
the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories relevant issues therein. The losing party who files
of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. another action regarding the same controversy will be
_______________ needlessly squandering time, effort and financial
18 Carlet v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114275, July 7, 1997, 275
resources because he is barred by law from litigating
SCRA 97. the same controversy all over again. 21

19 Linzag v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122181, June 26, 1998, 291
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded
SCRA 304. the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is
20 G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89.

346
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED this reason, the Court finds that the present action for
Mallion vs. Alcantara declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for
of marriage license is barred by the decision dated
recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
_______________
A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is
bound to set forth in his first action every ground for Carlet v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18.
21

relief which he claims to exist and upon which he 347

relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by VOL. 506, OCTOBER 31, 2006 347
piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same
wrong or injury.
Mallion vs. Alcantara
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
equitable, must present to the court, either by the merit. Costs against petitioner.
 SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Two aspects: “bar by prior judgment,” is the
effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action; “conclusiveness of judgment” precludes the
relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action
between the same parties on a different claim or cause
of action. (National Housing Authority vs. Baello, 437
SCRA 86[2004])
When material facts or questions in issue in a former
action were conclusively settled by a judgment rendered
therein, such facts or questions constitute res
judicata and may not again be litigated in subsequent
action between the same parties or their privies
regardless of the form of the latter. (Barbacina vs. Court
of Appeals, 437 SCRA 300 [2004])

——o0o——

348
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reserved.

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one
can conceive of other instances where a party might well
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993. *

invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action
respondents. for the custody and support of their common children and the
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial delivery of the latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
declaration of such fact under the. Family Code even for evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
purposes other than remarriage.—Came the Family Code documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a instance where a party who has previously contracted a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
contracting a second another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is
required by law to prove that the previous one was an
_______________
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a
*THIRD DIVISION. final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
573 Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 573 ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property, custody
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals and support of children, etc. There is no need of filing a
separate civil action for such purposes.—Based on the
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
Same; Same.—In fact, the requirement for a declaration
their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion that in order for
of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
again cannot be charged with bigamy.
according to the regime of property relations governing them.
Same; Same.—That Article 40 as finally formulated
It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the
included the significant clause denotes that such final
issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise
clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private
regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the respondent.
respondent court committed no reversible
574 ROMERO, J.:
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent
error in finding that the lower court committed no grave court’s ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss lower court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to
SP No. 1989-J. dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
VITUG, J., Concurring: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad
Marriages; Certain effects of a valid marriage can flow A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial
out of a void marriage.—A void marriage, even without its Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of
being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, Marriage and Separation of Property” against
and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged
consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific among others that: they were married on November 29,
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by
flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article
Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage
52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive
with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity of a prior marriage), marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of
conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage
575
such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate
(Article 54, Family Code). VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 575
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued
Appeals. them for bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the
present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. used to come to the Philippines only when she would
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner. avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted
by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present, added that private respondent has no property which is
he has been unemployed and completely dependent in his possession.
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack
properties with a total amount of approximately of merit. She explained:
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and “Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
he was cohabiting with another woman; she further 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
576
properties without her knowledge or consent; she 576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take
of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95
care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute
the possession and administration of said properties to that the second marriage contracted by respondent with
her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman
administer and possess the same on account of the is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
any act of administration and ownership over said And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at (37 SCRA 316, 326)
the time of their void marriage and such properties be The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
placed under the proper management and previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
administration of the attorney-in-fact. Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground has no property in his possession is an issue that may be
that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage determined only after trial on the merits.” 1

being void ab initio,the petition for the declaration of its A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v.
GSIS and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
2
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in
Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the
and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
which to file his answer. proceeding together with the partition and distribution
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52
a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the of the Family Code, it held that private respondent’s
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying marriage may be raised together with other incidents of
the motion to dismiss. their marriage such as the separation of their
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed
3 properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
CA cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v.
4 motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
facts because these cases dealt with the successional reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of
separa- merit.
5

Hence, this petition.

_______________
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the
1Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 28-29. instant case are the following.
2L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315. First, whether or not a petition for judicial
3Annex “J,” Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente and declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
Justices Luis A. Javellana and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring.
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
4L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
577 purposes of remarriage.
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 577 Second, whether or not SP N6. 1989-J is the proper
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
tion of property corollary with the declaration of nullity personal properties allegedly belonging to her
of marriage. It observed that the separation and exclusively.
subsequent distribution of the properties acquired Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v.
during the union can be had only upon proper Aragon and People v. Mendoza, contends that SP. No.
6 7

determination of the status of the marital relationship 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
between said parties, whether or not the validity of the Separation of Property filed by private respondent must
be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 that:
of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for “Though the logician may say that where the former
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it
only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was
No. 1989-J contains no void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. x x x” 10

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority

_______________ position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, the Court abandoned its
11

Annex “M,” Rollo, p. 80.

earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
5

6 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

7 95 Phil. 845 (1954). reversing the lower court’s order forfeiting the
578 husband’s share of the disputed property acquired
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED during the second marriage, the Court stated that “if
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis
allegation of private respondent’s intention to remarry, for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a
said petition should, therefore, be dismissed. judicial declaration thereof, which of course
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the contemplates an action for that purpose.”
necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of System, that
the properties acquired during coverture.
_______________
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and private respondent celebrated while the former’s 8 CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still 41.
subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is void from the 9 Rollo, pp. 102 and 106.
10 See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the
8
11 L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 615, 620-621.

absolute nullity of their marriage. 9

579
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 579
Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is “although the second marriage can be presumed to be
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous void ab initioas it was celebrated while the first
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
judicial declaration of such nullity.” previous marriage void. 15

In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turned

12 The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil
around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now
16

once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife the Family
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse
_______________
and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that “(t)he second 12 L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525.
marriage that he contracted with private respondent 13 G.R. No. 53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499.
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void 14 FAMILY CODE, art. 39.

15 Id., art. 40. See also: arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99,
from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
147, 148.
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of 16 The Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the

a void marriage.” Philippines (IBP) prepared the draft of the revision of Book I of the
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. 580
Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the Consuegra case
13 580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and held that there was “no need of introducing Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to
husband at the time they married each other, for then a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
such a marriage though void still needs according to marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
as a married woman at the time she contracted her This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.” Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A was discussed.
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now “B. Article 39.—
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
14
provided in Article 41.
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Reyes Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
(J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say: provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only. . . marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
On the other hand. Justice Puno suggested that they other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
say: marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno
Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for remarked that if this is so, then the phrase ‘absolute nullity’
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action can stand since it might result in confusion if they change
is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be
the phrase to ‘invalidity’ if what they are referring to in the
modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
of a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and
is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the a party should not declare for himself whether or not the
judgment. Justice Caguioa suggested that they say. marriage is void, which the other members affirmed. Justice
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a
collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that
_______________ there are actions which are brought on the assumption that
the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one
Civil Code of the Philippines. After more than four years, the draft was of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability
turned over to the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center
which reviewed and revised the same for more than three years. because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added
581 that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 581 validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken
up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
declaration that it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as
provided in Article 41. the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may
and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice
be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . . Justice Puno
Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in
suggested that the above be modified as follows:
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
made clear in the provision. on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41. Justice Puno later modified Just over a year ago, the Court made the
the above as follows: pronouncement that there is a necessity for a judicial
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
582
declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED marriage before contracting another in the recent case
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals of Terre v. Terre. The Court, in turning down the
19

marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be defense of respondent Terre who was charged with
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a
except as provided in Article 41. second marriage and living with another woman other
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is than complainant while his prior marriage with the
too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. latter remained subsisting, said that “for purposes of
He proposed that they say: determining whether a person is legally free to
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the _______________
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided
in Article 41. 17August 23, 1986, pp. 4-7.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above 18J. A.V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage THE PHILIPPINES, 46 (1988).
19 Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 11.
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a
previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab 583
initio. VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 583
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
they go back to the original wording of the provision as contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
follows: the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for essential.”
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of
Article 41.”
17 absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal petitioner’s theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who “ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
position in the provision of the word “solely.” As it is solely to an
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify “final 584
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” 584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
conveying the precise intent of the Committee earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
members, the provision in question, as it finally marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party
emerged, did not state “The absolute nullity of a who has previously contracted a marriage which
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remains subsisting desires to enter into another
remarriage . . .,” in which case “solely” would clearly marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required
qualify the phrase “for purposes of remarriage.” Had the by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In
purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the
clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
such previous marriage void.” marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
significant clause denotes that such final judgment purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
declaring the previous marriage void need not be acceptable?
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
one can conceive of other instances where a party might Constitution as an “inviolable social institution, is the
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected
for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of by the State.” In more explicit terms, the Family Code
20

an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and characterizes it as a “special contract of permanent
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, union between a man and a woman entered into in
as well as an action for the custody and support of their accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
common children and the delivery of the latters’ and family life.” So crucial are marriage and the family
21

presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs to the stability and peace of the nation that their
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove “nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous law and not subject to stipulation . . .,” As a matter of
22

policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the

purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished Reverting to the case before us, petitioner’s
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
of one that their union is so defective with respect to the undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to private respondent’s failure to state in the petition that
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect—and the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds emphasis on the term “solely” was in fact anticipated by
for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and the members of the Committee.
farranging as human ingenuity and fancy could “Dean Gupit commented that the word “only” may be
conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an misconstrued to refer to “for purposes of remarriage.” Judge
official state pronouncement through the courts, and Diy stated that “only” refers to “final judgment.” Justice Puno
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. suggested that they say “on the basis only of a final
judgment.” Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal
Not only would such an open and public
term “solely” instead of “only,” which the Committee
_______________ approved.” (Italics supplied)
24

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration

20 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2. for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
21 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.

22 Id.
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have
585 filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 585 properties alleged to have been acquired during their
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed
of the contract of marriage, but the same would be with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and
easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone. ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition
no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by admits that all the properties were acquired with
one of the parties may be gleaned from new information private respondent’s money.
required in the Family Code to be included in the The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and
application for a marriage license, viz, “If previously concluded that “the prayer for declaration of absolute
married, how, when and where the previous marriage nullity of marriage may be raised together with the
was dissolved and annulled.” 23
other incident of their
_______________ beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
Id., art. 11.
23
4. (5)The spouse who contracted the subsequent
See: Note 17, at p. 7.
24

marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit

586
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
succession. (n)
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
marriage such as the separation of their properties.” Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
states that the final judgment therein shall provide for donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
“the liquidation, partition and distribution of the disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the operation of law. (n)” 26

common children, and the delivery of their presumptive Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent’s
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply
previous judicial proceedings.” Other specific effects
25 be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following: declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
“Art. 43. x x x xxx xxx petitioner’s suggestion that in

1. (2)The absolute community of property or the _______________

conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be 25 Art. 50 (2).
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse 26 In relation to Art. 50 (1)—The effects provided for in paragraphs
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
share of the net profits of the community property or proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
favor of the common children or, if there are none, 587
the children of the guilty spouse by a previous VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 587
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
spouse; order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
2. (3)Donations by reason of marriage shall remain civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
valid, except that if the donee contracted the baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
donee are revoked by operation of law;
3. (4)The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
which is the separation of property according to the
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a regime of property relations governing them. It stands
to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of 588
nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed 588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the ily Code in case a party thereto was psychologically
respondent court committed no reversible error in incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where
of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
SP No. 1989-J. prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the
DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, A void marriage, even without its being judicially
1992 are AFFIRMED. declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and
SO ORDERED. justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur. such a declaration, will not give it the status or the
Feliciano, J., On official leave. consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
Vitug, J., With concurring opinion. instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can
CONCURRING OPINION still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these
cases are children of void marriages under Article 36
VITUG, J.: (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, recording thereof following the annulment or
to put in a modest observation. declaration of nullity of a prior marriage), conceived or
Void marriages are inexistent from the very born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such
beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate
establish their nullity, except in the following instances: (Article 54, Family Code).
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is
provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz: to be considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
partnership of gain under the old regime nor the
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
absolute community of property under the new Code
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead,
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the
their property relations shall be governed by the co-
Fam-
ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal
view, however, that the exceptional effects on children
of a void marriage because of the psychological
incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended
to cover even the personal and property relations of the
spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages where
the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts
and with little uncertainty, the term “psychological
incapacity” is so relative and unsettling that until a
judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects
can long and literally hang on the balance not only
insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but
also as regards third persons with whom the spouses
deal.
Petition denied. Questioned decision affirmed.
Notes.—Obligation to give or the right to ask for
support does
589
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 589
Arambulo vs. Court of Appeals
not cease permanently. Right to support subsists
throughout the period that the marriage subsists
(Canonizado vs. Benitez, 127 SCRA 610).
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself (Villanueva vs. Court of
Appeals, 198 SCRA 472).

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass
G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008. *

upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, as it is essential to the determination of the case. However,
respondent. evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
Civil Law; Marriages; Filiation; The validity of a void prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an
marriage may be collaterally attacked; Other than for absolute nullity.
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to _______________
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.—The Court holds
that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity *SECOND DIVISION.
163
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 163
Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), we held: De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial Same; Same; Same; Under the Family Code, the absence
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.—
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment they had been living together for more than five years.
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be the affidavit when she was asked during crossexamination,
obtained only for purpose of remarriage. thus—ATTY. CARPIO: QBut despite of (sic) the fact that you
Same; Same; Same; Court may pass upon the validity of have not been living together as husband and wife for the
a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the Affidavit, is that correct? AYes, sir.
determination of the case.—In Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, Same; Same; Same; Failure to obtain and present a
351 SCRA 127 (2001), the Court ruled that it is clothed with marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.—The
falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law Court of Appeals.
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and Macario D. Carpio & Christine P. Carpio for
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. petitioner.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
Richard Lee for respondent.
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
TINGA, J.:
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for
a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court
1

“scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no

of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, declaring that (1)
2
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license petitioner and respondent is valid until properly
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted
license renders their marriage void ab initio. for that purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate children may establish The facts of the case, as culled from the records,
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the samefollow.
evidence as legitimate children.—Anent the second issue, we Petitioner and respondent met and became
find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and
sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
therefore entitled to support. Illegitimate children may
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They
the same evidence as legitimate children.
164 had their first sexual relation sometime in October
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed March 1995 stating that they had been living together
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous as husband
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other _______________
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 1Rollo, pp. 31-41. that they never lived together as husband and wife and
Captioned Annabelle Assidao—De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B. De
that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
2

Castro.
165 In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court
5

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 165 ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro respondent is not valid because it was solemnized
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married without a marriage license. However, it declared
on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig obliged to give her support. Petitioner ele-
_______________
City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after
the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC,
3

their respective homes and did not live together as presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
husband and wife. Records,
4 p. 3, Complaint.
Rollo, pp. 92-94.
5

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a 166

child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the 166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
her out of her income as a government dentist and from vated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
her private practice. lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when,
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered
support against petitioner before the Regional Trial him to provide support to the child when the latter is
Court of Pasig City (trial court). In her complaint,
3
not, and could not have been, his own child.
respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted
that the latter has “reneged on his by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting
responsibility/obligation to financially support her “as until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the
his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.” 4
appellate court declared that the child was born during
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In
claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the
was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant
with respondent, saying that petitioner’s “forgetfulness
state; and that he was not able to get parental advice should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his
from his parents before he got married. He also averred
obligation and reward him of his being declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate
irresponsible.” Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted
6 child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the
wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court
in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the
legitimate father of the child.
appellant.” 8

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
an action for support, it was improper for the trial court
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence this 9

to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as

petition.
null and void in the very same case. There was no
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court
participation of the State, through the prosecuting
properly annulled his marriage with respondent
attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in
parties, the marriage was celebrated without a
actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in
narration of facts, the truth being that he and
an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the
respondent never lived together as husband and wife.
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial
The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted
court should have been limited to the obligation of
as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis
license. Petitioner additionally argues that there was
10

of the marriage apparently and

_______________ no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in
this case because it is only an ordinary action for
6Id., at p. 37. support and not an action for annulment or declaration
167 of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 167 argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly
voluntarily entered into by petitioner and invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action
respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision
7
for
reads: _______________
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
7 Id., at p. 40.
8 Rollo, p. 41.
National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 9 Id., at pp. 43-44; Resolution dated 1 October 2003.

4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS(1) 10 Id., at pp. 15-20.

 168 adds that despite the challenge from her and from the
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and
support. Citing several authorities, petitioner claims
11 filiation. 15

that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral _______________

attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another 11 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, 1990 Ed.
the marriage between the parties. The refiling of and SEMPIO-DIY,HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 1991 Ed.
another case for declaration of nullity where the same 12 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

13 Id., at p. 135.
evidence and parties would be presented would entail 14 Id., at pp. 119-126.

enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time- 15 Id., at pp. 139-144.

consuming for the parties, and would increase the 169

burden of the courts. Finally, petitioner claims that in
12 VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 169
view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court
as his legitimate child. to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court respondent in the action for support. Citing the case
required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor of Niñal v. Bayadog, it states that courts may pass
16

General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support,
petition.13
since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
In her Comment, respondent claims that the instant
14
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence
petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality presented during the proceedings in the trial court
of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the showed that the marriage between petitioner and
findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in lived together and exclusively with each other as
a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With husband and wife for at least five years) was false.
regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering valid. In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of
17

questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she

the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
petitioner and thus entitled to support. 18 nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
Two key issues are presented before us. First, remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
determine the validity of the marriage between
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.” 20

petitioner and respondent in an action for support

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court 21

and second, whether the child is the daughter of

ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass
petitioner.
upon the validity of two marriages despite the main
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial
case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal,
court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
19

essential to the determination of the case. However,

“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
For to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
_______________ marriage an absolute nullity. 22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the

16 384 Phil. 661, 673; 328 SCRA 122, 136 (2000). essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
17 Rollo, pp. 174-182.
18 Id., at pp. 183-185.
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
19 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 704; 312 SCRA requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the 23

772, 781 (1999), citing TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that
PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I,
petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
1987 ed., p. 265.
170 license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED they presented an affidavit stating that
_______________
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of 20 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 675; 328 SCRA 122, 136 (2000).
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of 21 Cariño v. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861; 351 SCRA 127 (2001).
22 Id., at p. 132.
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
23 FAMILY CODE, Art. 4.
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
171
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 171
is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
they had been living together for more than five 25 TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669; 328 SCRA 122, 129 (2000),
years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted
26
24
citing THEREPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.
the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during 172
cross-examination, thus— 172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ATTY. CARPIO: De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or executed so they could push through with the marriage
before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
correct? They were not exempt from the marriage license
A Yes, sir. 25
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. Anent the second issue, we find that the child is
The law dispenses with the marriage license petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived entitled to support. Illegitimate children may establish
together and exclusively with each other as husband their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at same evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can
27

least five years before the marriage. The aim of this prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s parent concerned, or the open and continuous
name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there
26
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any
was no “scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
there was no cohabitation at all. laws. 28

_______________ The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists

29

24 Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which

petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
provides: affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and woman respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child,
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state thus stating:
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to “1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;” 30
_______________ WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
27 FAMILY CODE, Art. 175.
28 FAMILY CODE, Art. 172. Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and
In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of
Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as examples of “other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws:” (a) the baptismal
Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is
certificate of the child; (b) a judicial admission; (c) the family bible wherein the hereby REINSTATED.
name of the child is entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e) SO ORDERED.
admission by silence; (f) testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Velasco,
Records, p. 6.
29 Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
**

Id., at p. 160.
30
Petition granted in part, assailed decision and
173
resolution set aside. That of Regional Trial Court of
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 173 Pasig City, Br. 70 reinstated.
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro _______________
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following
findings of the trial court: 31Rollo, pp. 93-94.
**As replacement of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales who inhibited
“That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the herself per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the 174
latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course 174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his
former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to
Quimpo, Sr. vs. Abad Vda. de Beltran
visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they Note.—An illegitimate child born after the
would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual effectivity of the Family Code has no right to use her
dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led father’s surname. Rule applies even if petitioner’s
to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While father admits paternity. (Leonardo vs. Court of
respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the Appeals, 410 SCRA 446 [20003])
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal
otherwise (Exhs. “B,” “B-1,” to “B-3,” “C,” “C-1” and “C-2,” ——o0o——
“D,” “D-1” and “D-2,” “E,” “E-1” and “E-2,” “F,” “F-1” and “F-
2,” “G,” “G-1” and “G-2” and “H,” “H-1” to “H-3”). In one of the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
pictures (Exhs. “D,” “D-1” and “D-2”), defendant is seen reserved.
putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in
another picture (Exhs. “E,” “E-1” and “E-2”) respondent is
seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.” 31
 [No. L-5877. September 28, 1954] subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On
appellee, vs.ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant and Febrauary 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19,
appellant. 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with
BIGAMY; MARRIAGE CONTRACTED DURING Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last
THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE is VOID marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction
AB INITIO; No JUDICIAL DECREE is NECESSARY TO of the crime of bigamy.
ESTABLISH ITS INVALIDITY.—A subsequent marriage The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his
Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore,
espouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no
non-existent, having been contracted while his first
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. A
prosecution for bigamy based on said void marriage will marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in
not lie. effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a
of Laguna. Yatco. J. charge for bigamy because it took place after the death
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however,
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant. argues that, even assuming that appellant's second
Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from
Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee. criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial
846 annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case
846 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED of People vs.Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited. The
People vs. Mendoza decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by
the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is
PARÁS, C. J.: essentially different, because the defendant therein,
Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Appeals found his factual contention to be without
finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and merit.
sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's
term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with costs. second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during
The f following f facts are undisputed: On August 5, the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis.
1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Section 29 of the marriage law (.act 3613), in force at
Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the the time the
 847 Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista
VOL. 95, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954 847 Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L.,
People vs. Mendoza JJ., concur.
appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941,
provides as follows: REYES, J., dissenting:
Illegal marriages.—Any marriage subsequently contracted
I, dissent.
by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prison
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
mayor "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
marriage before the former marriage has
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; been legally dissolved".
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive 848
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse 848 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the Cañaveral and Bautista vs. Encarnacion, etc., et al.
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to Though the logician may say that where the former marriage
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such was void there would be nothing to dissolve still it is not for the
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That
in either case until declared null and void by a competent judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says "La santidad
court. e importancia del matrinonio no permite que los casados
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent juzguen por si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime precisamente al judicio del Tribunal competente, y cuando este
of his first spouse illegal and void from its perf ormance, declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its nulo; mientras no exista esta declaración, la presuncion esta
siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, y de consiguiente,
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaración de
marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo."
second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the (3 Viada, Código penal p. 275.)
belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been "This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of
absent ex or seven consecutive years or generally People vs.Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz., 3145, "and is in line with
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that "until by
competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is
until declared null and void by a competent court. set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and exist.'"
the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
officio so ordered. Judgment reversed.
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 339

Odayat vs. Amante VOL. 77, JUNE 2, 1977 339

Adm. Matter No. P-58. June 2, 1977. *
Odayat vs. Amante
PEDRO ODAYAT, complainant, vs. DEMETRIO word “married” opposite his civil status, and not the
word “single” as alleged in the complaint.—The Investigator
AMANTE, respondent.
found that the complainant failed to prove this charge.
Courts; Attorneys; Clerk of courts; Marriages: There
Contrary to the allegation of the complainant, the document
being no need for judicial declaration of a void marriage, a
in question, shows that the respondent actually placed in
clerk of court who contracted a second marriage is exonerated
“Item 6. Civil Status” therein the word “Married”. In view of
from the charge of immorality.—On the other hand,
the foregoing. We find that the recommendation of the
respondent Demetrio Amante testified, in his behalf, and
Investigator is in accordance with law and the evidence on
presented Atty. Demosthenes Duquilla, as well as Exhibits
record.
“1” and “2”. Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena
Abella on October 16, 1948. He also admits that he has been
ANTONIO, J.:
living with Beatriz Jornada, whom he married on April 4.
1964 during a religious revival in Almagro, Samar, before
In a verified amended letter-complaint dated March 10,
Rev. Fr. John Belly, a Franciscan Missionary, and with
whom he begot six (6) children. Respondent, however, claims 1973, Pedro Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante,
1

he was coerced into marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch IX,
she was already married to another man, and that they Basey, Samar, with oppression, immorality and
separated in 1949 after Filomena Abella told him of her falsification of a public document. 2

previous marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent Briefly stated, complainant’s basic allegations are:
did not hear or receive any communication from Filomena (1) that respondent grabbed a portion of complainant’s
Abella, much less knew of her whereabouts. xxx The land, and, when the latter resented, the former
Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his arrogantly challenged the complainant to bring the
exoneration from this charge, Indeed, there is no question matter to court; (2) that respondent is cohabiting with
that Filomena Abella’s marriage with the respondent was
one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many
void ab initio under Article 80[4] of the New Civil Code, and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still
void marriages. alive; and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely
Same; Same; Same; Criminal law; No falsification of a represented his status as single in the information
public document was committed where respondent clerk of sheet be submitted in connection with his appointment
court put the to his present position as Clerk of Court.
_______________ After respondent Demetrio Amante had submitted
his letter-comment dated April 24, 1973, which was
3
* EN BANC.
considered as his answer to the amended complaint, 2. 2.Immorality.—To prove this charge of
this Court, in its minute resolution of July 16, immorality against respondent, complainant
1974, referred this Administrative Matter No. P-58 to
4 Pedro Odayat testified and presented Exhibits
the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance, “A” to “E”, to the effect that respondent and
Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for investigation, report Filomena Abella were married in Tacloban City
and recommendation, and the matter was docketed on October 16, 1948 before Judge Eugenio Brillo
therein as Administrative Case No. 264. The charges (then Justice of the Peace of Tacloban, Leyte; )7

were investigated by District Judge Segundo M. Zosa of that they had one son, who was born on August
said Court. After appropriate proceedings, Judge Zosa 23, 1949 and baptized on October 1, 1949 by the
submitted to this Court his Report and name of Romeo Amante, in the Sto. Nino
Recommendation dated December 3, 1974. 5 Church, Tacloban City, by Rev. Fr. Magdaleno
_______________ Agnes; that he came to know Filomena Abella,
8

1 This amended letter-complaint was addressed to the Secretary of

who is a native of Sta. Rita, Samar, only after
Justice, Manila, and the latter forwarded the same to this Court, her marriage to the respondent when they took
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 186. up their residence for five years in Basey,
2 Exhibit “A”, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits.
Samar; that he did not know if Filomena Abella
3 SC Rollo, pp. 7-8.

4 Ibid., p. 17
was still single when she married the
5 Ibid., pp. 38-46. respondent; that long before he filed his
340 complaint against respondent on March 10,
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 1973, he came to know that the respondent and
Odayat vs. Amante one Beatriz Jornado were living as husband and
wife in Basey, Samar; that they had several
1. 1.Oppression.—In the course of formal children, two of whom are Maria Felisa J.
investigation on August 26, 1974 before Judge Amante, who was born on April 12, 1967, as per
Zosa, complainant acquiesced to the dropping of certified true copy of the Certificate of Birth of
this charge of oppression against respondent, said child, duly signed and issued on May 7,
9

inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to 1973 by Perfecto Cabuquit, the Local Civil
a boundary dispute between the complainant Registrar, and Alma Amante y Jornada, who
10

and the respondent and admittedly being more was born on April 8, 1965 and baptized on July
properly a cause for a civil action. Hence, the
6 5, 1965, as per Certificate of Baptism, duly
scope of the investigation by Judge Zosa is signed and issued on March 6, 1973 by the
limited to the other two charges.
 Parish Priest, Rev. Fr, Jose M. Lentejas; and 11 not hear or received any communication from Filomena
that one of the reasons why he filed Abella, much less knew of her whereabouts.
To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent
_______________ presented in evidence the certification dated September
6 T.s.n.-Rojas, Session of August 26, 1974, pp. 3-4.
12, 1974 of David C. Jacobe, the Local Civil Registrar of
7 Exhibit “B”, certified true copy of the Marriage Contract, duly Pateros, Rizal attesting that, in accordance with the
15

signed and issued on December 13, 1972 by Dr. Hermilo Quintero, City Register of Marriages in his office, Filomena Abella was
Health Officer and Local Civil Registrar (Exhibit “B-l”). married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948.
Exhibit “C”, certified true copy of the Baptismal Certificate of
Respondent’s contention is that his marriage with
8

Romeo Amante, duly signed and issued on August 6, 1974 by Rev. Fr.
Honorio Ayuyao Pastor (Exhibit “C-2”) and By Gil Ramon J. Abug, Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her
Parish Clerk (Exhibit “C-3”). previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales. The
9 Exhibit “D”. Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends
10Exhibit “D-1”.
11Exhibit “E”.
his exoneration from this charge. Indeed, there is no
341 question that Filomena Abella’s marriage with the
VOL. 77, JUNE 2, 1977 341 respondent was void ab initiounder Article 80 [4] of the
Odayat vs. Amante New Civil code, and no judicial decree is necessary to
his complaint against the respondent was because of establish the invalidity of void marriages. 16

their land dispute. 3. Falsification of a public document—The

On the other hand, respondent Demetrio Amante Investigator found that the complainant failed to prove
testified, in his behalf, and presented Atty. this charge. Contrary to the allegation of the
Demosthenes Duquilla, as well as Exhibits “1” and “2”. complainant, the document in question, shows that the
17

Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena Abella respondent actually placed in “Item
_______________
on October 16, 1948. He also admits that he has been
12

living with Beatriz Jornada, whom he married on April Exhibit “B”, p. 3, Folder of Exhibits; Respondent’s Comment, p.
12

4, 1964 during a religious revival in Almagro, Samar, 7, SC Rollo; t.s.n.-Cabelis, Session of October 28, 1974, p. 28.
before Rev. Fr. John Belly, a Franciscan T.s.n.-Cabelis, Session of October 28, 1974, pp. 21-24.
13

Ibid., p. 30.
14

Missionary, and with whom he begot six (6)

13
Exhibit “2”, p. 10, Folder of Exhibits.
15

children. Respondent, however, claims he was coerced

14
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1083; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845.
16

into marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that she was Exhibit “1-b”.
17

already married to another man, and they separated in 342

1949 after Filomena Abella told him of her previous 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent did Odayat vs. Amante
6 Civil Status” therein the word “Married”. 18 A clerk of court who wilfully ignores the rules of
In view of the foregoing. We find that the issuance of clearance is guilty of dishonesty and
recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance falsification of public document. (Omadto vs.
with law and the evidence on record. Evangelista, 68 SCRA 133).
WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is The imprisonment of a court stenographer who
hereby exonerated from the charges filed against him defies a court’s resolution requiring him to transcribe
by complainant. Let a copy of this decision be attached his stenographic notes is not constitutive of illegal
to his personal record. detention. (Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131).
Castro, A sentence of dismissal was amended to 30 days
C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,Muñoz suspension for wilful failure of a court employee to pay
Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur. a just debt. (Pineda vs. Hizalan, 64 SCRA 160).
Notes.—The issue of ownership of land is not per se a
proper subject of an administrative case against court ——o0o——
employees. (Maspil vs. Romero, 61 SCRA 197).
_______________
A court employee found guilty of insubordination and
inefficiency is liable for suspension without pay. Exhibit “1-a”.
18

(Madrid vs. Razo, Jr., 61 SCRA 357). 343

A clerk of court’s liability is diminished by the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
absence of great harm resulting from her negligence in reserved.
not excercising closer supervision over her
subordinates. (In re: Motion for Reconsideration of Adm.
Order No. 353, 60 SCRA 248).
A branch clerk of court is prohibited from engaging
in the practice of law and appearing as counsel of giving
professional advice to litigants in a law suit as the same
is clearly incompatible with the duties and functions of
his office. (Ranoza vs. Garcia, 62 SCRA 406). The
purpose of such prohibition against unauthorized
practice of law by an officer of the court is to help
maintain public confidence in the courts of justice.
(Ibid.)
 VOL. 143, AUGUST 19, 1986 499 though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986. *

she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, PETITION to review the orders of the Juvenile and
respondents. Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City.
Civil Law; Persons and Family
Relations; Marriage; Nullity of marriage; Proof that first The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
marriage was vitiated by force, not necessary in an action for Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
a declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law
husband; Reason.—There is no need for petitioner to prove
Office for private respondent.
that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the
PARAS, J.:
marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil
Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel
(Art. 80, Civil Code). (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of
_________________ his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy
Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati,
SECOND DIVISION.
Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
*

500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground
of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Introducing evidence
about existing prior marriage, not necessary as the first
25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
marriage though void, still needs a judicial declaration of Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
such fact; Woman’s marriage to second husband void; Case at subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
bar.—There is likewise no need of introducing evidence null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
time they married each other, for then such a marriage marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue
agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
against both parties): was said prior marriage void or parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage
was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil
pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
opportunity to present evidence— annulment has yet been made, it is dear that when she
501 married respondent she was still validly married to her
VOL. 143, AUGUST 19, 1986 501 first husband, consequently, her marriage to
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence
1. (1)that the first marriage was vitiated by force about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
exercised upon both her and the first husband; at the time they married each other, for then such a
and marriage though void still needs according to this Court
2. (2)that the first husband was at the time of the a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
1

marriage in 1972 already married to someone intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
else. married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
evidence because the existence of force exerted on both regarded VOID under the law.
parties of the first marriage had already been agreed WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED,
upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari for
assailing the following Orders of the respondent ________________
Judge—
1Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315.
502
1. (1)the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
parties were compelled to submit the case for
Valisno vs. Plan
resolution based on “agreed facts;” and
lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
2. (2)the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
petitioner’s motion to allow her to present
SO ORDERED.
evidence in her favor.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutier
rez, Jr., JJ.,concur.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Petition dismissed, orders affirmed.
 Note.—The conclusion that the second marriage is
the better one that deserves the law’s recognition and
protection over the first is a dangerous proposition. It
legalizes a continuing polygamy by permitting a spouse
to just drop at pleasure her consort for another in as
many jurisdiction as would grant divorce on the excuse
that the new marriage is better than the previous one;
and, instead of fitting the concept of marriage as a social
institution, the proposition altogether does away with
the social aspects of marriage in favor of its being a
matter of private contract and personal
adventure. (Tenchavez vs. Escaho, 17 SCRA 674.)

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.
 VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 229 entitled to inherit—Pursuant to these provisions, the net
Yap vs. Court of Appeals remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after money
claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of
No. L-40003. October 28,1986. *

Maning Yap approved by the lower eourt have beeii paid by

SHIRLEY YAP, in her own behalf and in her capacity the administratrix should be equally divided between
as Administratrix of the estate of MANING YAP, Maning Yap and Talina Bianong as their shares. The one-
JAIME YAP, and TALINA BIANONG VDA. DE YAP, half share of Maning Yap would then comprise his intestate
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, estate to be distributed among his heirs.
MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP, JASMIN YAP, and _______________
SAMUEL YAP, respondents.
*SECOND DIVISION.
Successiorty; Eights to inheritance of a person who died 230
after the new Civil Code took effect skall be governed by said
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Code.—We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the
inheritance of a person who died before the ef fectivity of the Yap vs. Court of Appeals
New Civil Code shall be goveraed by the Civil Code of 1889, Same; Same; Same.—Under the law of succession in the
by other previous laws and by the Rules of Court (See New Civii Code, Maning Yap’s iegai heirs are Taiina
Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 PhiL 492; Canales v, Bianong, her chiidren Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the
Arrogante, 91 PhiL 9; and Morales, et al v. Yaftez, 98 Pha children of Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely: Maning Yap,
677), whiie the rights to the inheritance of a person who died Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong,
after the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed the first wife had not lost or relinquished her status as
by the New C4vii Code (Del Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA 68). putative heir of her husband. She is entitled to share in
Marriages; A second marriage (civilj contracted after a Maning Yap’s estate upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33
first marriage (Muslim rites) by a man with another woman SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap, the second wife
is ittegal and void—There is no dispute that the marriage of cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was
Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was vaiid and that the second void ab initio. (Art. 83, New Civil Code; People v. Mendoza,
marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was iiiegal 95 PhiL 845) However, Nancy Yap’s children by Maning Yap
and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, have the status of natural children by legal fiction and are
the Marriage Law which was in foree when the two considered compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap.
marriages were celebrated. (Articles 89 and 997, New Civil Code).
Same; Succession; Where a man dies leaving his Same; Same; How to divide intestate estate where
surviving spouse and children by his first marriage and his decedent has also children by a second marriage.—
spouse and ckildren by his second marriage, the children by Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which
tke second marriage are natural children by legal fiction and is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net rfrmainder of the
entitled to inherit after the conjugal estate is divided equally conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage (Articles
between the decedent and the 1st wife. Tke2nd wife is not 142 and 185, New Civil Code), the other half being the share
of Talina Bianong, should be distributed as follows: a. To the “WHEREFORE, the decisiou appealed from is hereby set
legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap—one-half aside and, after a complete and correct inventory is returned
(1/2) of the resulting net estate to be divided equally between by the administratrix, the entire estate of the deceased
them pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil Code; b. To the Maning Yap shall be divided into two equal parts, one-half
legitimate widow Talina Bianong—one-fourth (1/4) of the net (1/2) corresponding to the petitioner Talina Bianong and her
estate taken from the free portion or disposable half of the children Shiriey Yap and Jaime Yap and the other half
estate pursuani to Article 999 in relation to Article 897 of the corresponding to the oppositors Nancy J. Yap and her
New Civil Code; and c. To the natural children by legal children Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and
fiction—Maning Yap, Jr., Julian Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, without pronouncement as to costs.”
Samuel Yap—the remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to
to be shared equally between them pursuant to the first and Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy Yap on
third paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article 983 of Decemberl 1,1948.
the New Civil Code. Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Bara-as Plantation, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, in
Appeals. accordance with the Muslim rites and practices
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. prescribed by the Islam religion professed by both of
Francisco Vittanueva for petitioners. thein. Immediately, after the marriage, the couple lived
Ramon Tuangco for respondents. in the house of the parents of Maning Yap at the
pobiacion of Malabang, Lanao dei Sur. Out of the
GUTIERREZ,JR., J.:
marriage, four children were born; two of them died in
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of infancy dur~ ing the Japanese occupation, while the two
Appeals which set aside the earlier decision of the then others are petitioners Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap.
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Special While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning
Proceeding No. 1334 Yap married Nancy J. Yap on December 11, 1948 in a
231 civil ceremony performed by District Judge Juan
VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 231 Sarenas of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.
Yap vs. Court of Appeals Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that
(R-61), declaring the petitioners as the legal heirs of the Maning Yap was not a married man. They had four
late Maning Yap entitled to inherit his estate and children, namely respondents Maning Yap, Jr., Julia
dismissing the opposition filed by the private Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. On Febraary 21,
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision on 1964, Maning Yap died in Piagapo, Lanao del Sur, in
appeal reads: the crash of an airplane of the Philippine Air Lines. At
the time of his death, hef therefore, had two families purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
iiving separately about 80 kilometers apart. late Maning Yap and his surviving spouse and to
On March 3,1964, Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap filed determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate
Special Proceeding No. 1334 (Intestate Estate of estate.
Maning Yap) before the Court of First Instance of Lanao After trial, the lower court rendered decision
del Sur, seeking the is- declaring Talina Bianong and her children as the legal
232 heirs of Maning Yap. The dispositive portion of the
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED decision reads:
Yap vs. Court ofAppeals “IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
suance of letters of administration for the estate of rendered:
Maning Yap. Among other things, the petition alleged
that Maning Yap left personal and real properties all 1. "(a)Declaring Talina Bianong, Shirley Yap and Jaime
located at Malabang, Lanao del Sur, with an Yap, the legal heirs of the late Maning Yap and
entitled to inherit or succeed to his intestate estate
approximate value of P100,000.00.
with Talina Bianong. as his surviving spouse, and
The petition was opposed by Nancy J. Yap and her
Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap, as his surviving
minor children on the ground that she is the legitimate legitimate children;
widow of Maning Yap and that Maning Yap, Jr., Julia 2. "(b)Adjudicating to Talina Bianong one-third (1/3) of
Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, all minors, are their the whole intestate estate of the late Maning Yap, as
legitimate children. her share, pursuant to Art. 996 of the New Civil
Talina Bianong was initially appointed special Code; to Shirley Yap, the other one-third (1/3) as her
administratrix of the intestate estate of Maning Yap. share and to Jaime Yap the remaining one-third
However, after a formal hearing and on (1/3), also as his share, pursuant to Art. 980 in
recommendation of Talina, the lower court appointed conjunction with Art. 996 of the new Civil Code.
Shirley Yap as regular administratrix of the intestate
233
estate of Maning Yap.
VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 233
Various claims filed by the creditors against the
intestate estate of Maning Yap were duly approved by Yap vs. Court ofAppeals
“The opposition and claim of the opposition is hereby
the court and paid by the administratrix. Since there
dismissed withoutcosts.”
still existed a residue of the intestate estate consisting
Upon appeal by Nancy Yap and her children, the
of real and personal properties and collectible debts
appellate court reversed and set aside the decision. As
after payments to creditors, the court set the case for
stated earlier, the Court of Appeals ruled that the estate
hearing to arrive at a declaration of heirship for the
of Maning Yap should be equally divided into two equal marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the
parts: one-half (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her children continuance of a first, was early found to work a great
and the other half (1/2) to Nancy Yap and her children. injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage,
The appellate court applied the ruling in Lao and and specially upon the off spring of such second marriage. x
x x.”
Lao v. Dee Tim(45 Phil. 739). The facts in the cited case
234
are similar to the case at bar in that Yap Siong in his 234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
lifetiine contracted two marriages; first to Dee Tim on
Yap vs. Court ofAppeals
Septeinber 14, 1893 in China with whom he had three
The petitioners now contend that Maning Yap died in
children and second to Maria Lao on June 24, 1903 with
1964 when the New Civil Code had already superseded
whom he had one child. Moreover, Maria Lao entered
the old Spanish Civil Code. They state that pursuant to
into the marriage beiieving that Yap Siong was not then
Article 2263 of the New Civil Code, the distribution of
a married man, Yap Siong died on September 1922
the estate of Maning Yap should be in accordance with
leaving properties which were claimed by the two
the new codal provisions and not the Leyes Partidas,
farnilies. In resolving the issue on how the properties of
which is an old law no longer applicable.
Yap Siong should be divided, this Court applied the
We agree.
Leyes de Partidas (Law 1; Title 13, Partida 4), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 2263, a transitional provision in the New
Civil Code which took effect on August 30,1950 states:
“x x x [W]here two women innocently and in good faith are “Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or
legaily united in holy matriinony to the same man, their without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be
children and each family will be entitied to one-half of the governed by the CivilCode of 1889, by other previous laws,
estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with
provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of
law. It justly protects those who innoeently have entered into this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance
the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the
good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they
contrary is positively proved. (Article 69, Civil Code; may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes,
Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines v. Hennen, 65 betterments. legaciea and bequests shall be respeeted;
U.S., 553.) however. their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner
“A woman who is deceived by a man who represents can every compulsory heir be given his full share according
himself as singie and who marries him, she and her children to this Code. (Rule 12a)"
born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are The Report of the Code Commission explains the rule,
entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children, to wit:
The common kw allowing none of the incidents of a true
‘The decisive fact which gives origin to the right of the heirs, absentee being alive, or the absentee being generaliy
devisees and legatees is the death of the decedent. This is the considered as dead and believed to be so by the
basis of the foregoing rule. No heir, devisee or legatee has spouse present at the time of contracting such
any vested right until the moment of such death (Civil Code, subsequent inarriage, the marriage so contracted
Padilla, Volume VII, 1975, p. 712)." being valid in either case until declared nuli and
We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the void by a competent court.”
inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity of
the New Civil Code shall be governed by the Civil Code Bearing this in mind, how must the estate of Maning
of 1889, by other previous laws and by the Rules of Yap be distributed?
Court (See Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. The records show that the real and personai
492; Canales v. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 9; and Morales, et properties under admmistration in the intestate estate
al. v. Yanez, 98 PWl. 677), while the rights to the proceedings of Maning Yap were acquired by Talina
inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of Bianong and the deeeased Maning Yap during their
the New Civil Code shall be governed by the New Civil marriage. Hence, these properties, in the absence of any
Code (Del Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA 68). evidence to the contrary are considered conjugal
235 properties of Talina Bianong and Maning Yap (Article
VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 235 142, New Civil Code). Considering that there was no
Yap vs. Court of Appeals liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains during
There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong the lifetime of Maning Yap, such liquidation must be
to Maning Yap was valid and that the second marriage carried out in the intestate proceedings of Maning Yap,
contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and the deceased spouse as expressly provided in Section 2,
void pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court (Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43
the Marriage Law which was in force when the two SCRA 177).
marriages were celebrated to wit: Article 142 of the New Civil Code provides:
“SEC. 29. lllegal Marriages.—Any marriage subsequently “By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first and wife place in a cominon fund the fruits of their separate
spouse of such person with any person other than such first property and the income from their work or industry, and
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless; divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or
1. "(a)The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; 236
2. "(b)The first spouse had been absent for seven 236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage Yap vs. Court ofAppeals
without the spouse present having news of the
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap
the marriage.” which is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net remainder
and Article 185 thereof states: of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first niarriage
“The net remaincler of the conjugal partnership of gains shall (Articles 142 and 185 New Civil Code), the other half
be divided equally between the husband and the wife or their being the share of Talina Bianong, should be
respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was
distributed as follows:
agreed upon in the marriage settlements.”
a. To the legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime
Pursuant to these provisions, the net remainder of the
Yap—one-half (1/2) of the resulting net estate to be
conjugal partnership of gains after money claims filed
divided
by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap 237
approved by the lower court have been paid by the VOL. 145, OCTOBER 28, 1986 237
administratrix should be equally divided between Yap vs. Court of Appeals
Maning Yap and Talina Bianong as their shares. The
equally between them pursuant to Article 888 of the
one-half share of Maning Yap would then comprise his
New Civil Code;
intestate estate to be distributed among his heirs. (See
b. To the legitimate widow Talina Bianong—one-
also Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216)
fourth (1/4) of the net estate taken from the free portion
Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code,
or disposable half of the estate pursuant to Article 999
Maning Yap’s legal heirs are Talina Bianong, her
in relation to Article 897 of the New Civil Code; and
children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of
c. To the natural children by legal fiction—Maning
Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely: Maning Yap, Jr.,
Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap—the
Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina
remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate to be shared
Bianong, the first wife had not iost or reiinquished her
equally between them pursuant to the first and third
status as putative heir of her husband. She is entitled
paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article 983 of
to share in Maning Yap’s estate upon his death (Gomez
the New Civil Code.
v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy
WHEREFORE, the instant PETITION is
Yap, the second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap
GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of
because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83, New
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Civil Code; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845) However,
widow, Talina Bianong shall receive one half (1/2) of the
Nancy Yap’s children by Maning Yap have the status of
whole intestate estate as her share in the net remainder
natural children by legal f iction and are considered
of the conjugal partnership of gains. The other half,
compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap. (Articles 89
which is the net estate of the late Maning Yap, is
and 887, New Civil Code).
distributed and adjudicated as stated above.
 SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Decision reversed and set aside.
Note.—The compulsory heirs as enumerated in Art.
887 of the New Civil Cotfe may be classified into
primary compulsory heirs and secondary compulsory
heirs. Primary compulsory heirs are those who are
always entitled to their legitime as provided by law
regardless of the class of compulsory heirs with which
they may concur, while secondary compulsory heirs are
those who may be excluded by other classes of
compulsory heirs. The first includes all kinds of
compulsory heirs with the exception of parents or
ascendanis, while the second embraces only parents or
ascendants. (Turado: Comments and Jurisprudence on
Succession, 1970 Fifth Edition, p. 230.)

——o0o——

238
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one
can conceive of other instances where a party might well
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993. *

invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action
respondents. for the custody and support of their common children and the
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial delivery of the latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
declaration of such fact under the. Family Code even for evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
purposes other than remarriage.—Came the Family Code documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a instance where a party who has previously contracted a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
contracting a second another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is
required by law to prove that the previous one was an
_______________
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a
*THIRD DIVISION. final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
573 Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 573 ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property, custody
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals and support of children, etc. There is no need of filing a
separate civil action for such purposes.—Based on the
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
Same; Same.—In fact, the requirement for a declaration
their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion that in order for
of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
again cannot be charged with bigamy.
according to the regime of property relations governing them.
Same; Same.—That Article 40 as finally formulated
It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the
included the significant clause denotes that such final
issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise
clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private
regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the respondent.
respondent court committed no reversible
574 ROMERO, J.:
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent
error in finding that the lower court committed no grave court’s ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss lower court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to
SP No. 1989-J. dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
VITUG, J., Concurring: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad
Marriages; Certain effects of a valid marriage can flow A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial
out of a void marriage.—A void marriage, even without its Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of
being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, Marriage and Separation of Property” against
and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
such a declaration, will not give it the status or the docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged
consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific among others that: they were married on November 29,
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by
flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article
Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage
52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive
with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity of a prior marriage), marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of
conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage
575
such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate
(Article 54, Family Code). VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 575
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued
Appeals. them for bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the
present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. used to come to the Philippines only when she would
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner. avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted
by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present, added that private respondent has no property which is
he has been unemployed and completely dependent in his possession.
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack
properties with a total amount of approximately of merit. She explained:
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and “Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
he was cohabiting with another woman; she further 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
576
properties without her knowledge or consent; she 576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take
of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95
care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute
the possession and administration of said properties to that the second marriage contracted by respondent with
her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman
administer and possess the same on account of the is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
any act of administration and ownership over said And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at (37 SCRA 316, 326)
the time of their void marriage and such properties be The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
placed under the proper management and previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
administration of the attorney-in-fact. Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground has no property in his possession is an issue that may be
that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage determined only after trial on the merits.” 1

being void ab initio,the petition for the declaration of its A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v.
GSIS and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
2
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in
Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the
and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
which to file his answer. proceeding together with the partition and distribution
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52
a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the of the Family Code, it held that private respondent’s
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying marriage may be raised together with other incidents of
the motion to dismiss. their marriage such as the separation of their
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed
3 properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the
CA cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v.
4 motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision,
facts because these cases dealt with the successional reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of
separa- merit.
5

Hence, this petition.

_______________
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the
1Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 28-29. instant case are the following.
2L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315. First, whether or not a petition for judicial
3Annex “J,” Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente and declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
Justices Luis A. Javellana and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring.
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
4L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
577 purposes of remarriage.
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 577 Second, whether or not SP N6. 1989-J is the proper
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
tion of property corollary with the declaration of nullity personal properties allegedly belonging to her
of marriage. It observed that the separation and exclusively.
subsequent distribution of the properties acquired Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v.
during the union can be had only upon proper Aragon and People v. Mendoza, contends that SP. No.
6 7

determination of the status of the marital relationship 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
between said parties, whether or not the validity of the Separation of Property filed by private respondent must
be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 that:
of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for “Though the logician may say that where the former
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it
only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was
No. 1989-J contains no void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. x x x” 10

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority

_______________ position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, the Court abandoned its
11

Annex “M,” Rollo, p. 80.

earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
5

6 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

7 95 Phil. 845 (1954). reversing the lower court’s order forfeiting the
578 husband’s share of the disputed property acquired
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED during the second marriage, the Court stated that “if
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis
allegation of private respondent’s intention to remarry, for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a
said petition should, therefore, be dismissed. judicial declaration thereof, which of course
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the contemplates an action for that purpose.”
necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of System, that
the properties acquired during coverture.
_______________
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and private respondent celebrated while the former’s 8 CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still 41.
subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is void from the 9 Rollo, pp. 102 and 106.
10 See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the
8
11 L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 615, 620-621.

absolute nullity of their marriage. 9

579
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 579
Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is “although the second marriage can be presumed to be
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous void ab initioas it was celebrated while the first
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
judicial declaration of such nullity.” previous marriage void. 15

In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turned

12 The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil
around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now
16

once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife the Family
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse
_______________
and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that “(t)he second 12 L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525.
marriage that he contracted with private respondent 13 G.R. No. 53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499.
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void 14 FAMILY CODE, art. 39.

15 Id., art. 40. See also: arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99,
from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
147, 148.
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of 16 The Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the

a void marriage.” Philippines (IBP) prepared the draft of the revision of Book I of the
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. 580
Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the Consuegra case
13 580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and held that there was “no need of introducing Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to
husband at the time they married each other, for then a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
such a marriage though void still needs according to marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
as a married woman at the time she contracted her This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.” Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39,
the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A was discussed.
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now “B. Article 39.—
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
14
provided in Article 41.
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Reyes Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
(J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say: provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only. . . marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
On the other hand. Justice Puno suggested that they other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
say: marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno
Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for remarked that if this is so, then the phrase ‘absolute nullity’
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action can stand since it might result in confusion if they change
is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be
the phrase to ‘invalidity’ if what they are referring to in the
modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
of a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and
is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the a party should not declare for himself whether or not the
judgment. Justice Caguioa suggested that they say. marriage is void, which the other members affirmed. Justice
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a
collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that
_______________ there are actions which are brought on the assumption that
the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one
Civil Code of the Philippines. After more than four years, the draft was of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability
turned over to the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center
which reviewed and revised the same for more than three years. because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added
581 that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 581 validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken
up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
declaration that it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as
provided in Article 41. the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may
and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice
be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . . Justice Puno
Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in
suggested that the above be modified as follows:
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
made clear in the provision. on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41. Justice Puno later modified Just over a year ago, the Court made the
the above as follows: pronouncement that there is a necessity for a judicial
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
582
declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED marriage before contracting another in the recent case
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals of Terre v. Terre. The Court, in turning down the
19

marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be defense of respondent Terre who was charged with
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a
except as provided in Article 41. second marriage and living with another woman other
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is than complainant while his prior marriage with the
too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. latter remained subsisting, said that “for purposes of
He proposed that they say: determining whether a person is legally free to
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the _______________
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided
in Article 41. 17August 23, 1986, pp. 4-7.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above 18J. A.V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage THE PHILIPPINES, 46 (1988).
19 Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 11.
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a
previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab 583
initio. VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 583
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
they go back to the original wording of the provision as contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
follows: the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for essential.”
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of
Article 41.”
17 absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal petitioner’s theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who “ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
position in the provision of the word “solely.” As it is solely to an
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify “final 584
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” 584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
conveying the precise intent of the Committee earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
members, the provision in question, as it finally marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party
emerged, did not state “The absolute nullity of a who has previously contracted a marriage which
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remains subsisting desires to enter into another
remarriage . . .,” in which case “solely” would clearly marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required
qualify the phrase “for purposes of remarriage.” Had the by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In
purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the
clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
such previous marriage void.” marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
significant clause denotes that such final judgment purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
declaring the previous marriage void need not be acceptable?
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
one can conceive of other instances where a party might Constitution as an “inviolable social institution, is the
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected
for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of by the State.” In more explicit terms, the Family Code
20

an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and characterizes it as a “special contract of permanent
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, union between a man and a woman entered into in
as well as an action for the custody and support of their accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
common children and the delivery of the latters’ and family life.” So crucial are marriage and the family
21

presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs to the stability and peace of the nation that their
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove “nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous law and not subject to stipulation . . .,” As a matter of
22

policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the

purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished Reverting to the case before us, petitioner’s
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
of one that their union is so defective with respect to the undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to private respondent’s failure to state in the petition that
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect—and the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds emphasis on the term “solely” was in fact anticipated by
for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and the members of the Committee.
farranging as human ingenuity and fancy could “Dean Gupit commented that the word “only” may be
conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an misconstrued to refer to “for purposes of remarriage.” Judge
official state pronouncement through the courts, and Diy stated that “only” refers to “final judgment.” Justice Puno
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. suggested that they say “on the basis only of a final
judgment.” Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal
Not only would such an open and public
term “solely” instead of “only,” which the Committee
_______________ approved.” (Italics supplied)
24

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration

20 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2. for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
21 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.

22 Id.
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have
585 filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 585 properties alleged to have been acquired during their
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed
of the contract of marriage, but the same would be with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and
easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone. ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition
no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by admits that all the properties were acquired with
one of the parties may be gleaned from new information private respondent’s money.
required in the Family Code to be included in the The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and
application for a marriage license, viz, “If previously concluded that “the prayer for declaration of absolute
married, how, when and where the previous marriage nullity of marriage may be raised together with the
was dissolved and annulled.” 23
other incident of their
_______________ beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
Id., art. 11.
23
4. (5)The spouse who contracted the subsequent
See: Note 17, at p. 7.
24

marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit

586
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
succession. (n)
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
marriage such as the separation of their properties.” Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
states that the final judgment therein shall provide for donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
“the liquidation, partition and distribution of the disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the operation of law. (n)” 26

common children, and the delivery of their presumptive Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent’s
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply
previous judicial proceedings.” Other specific effects
25 be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following: declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
“Art. 43. x x x xxx xxx petitioner’s suggestion that in

1. (2)The absolute community of property or the _______________

conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be 25 Art. 50 (2).
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse 26 In relation to Art. 50 (1)—The effects provided for in paragraphs
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
share of the net profits of the community property or proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
favor of the common children or, if there are none, 587
the children of the guilty spouse by a previous VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 587
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
spouse; order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
2. (3)Donations by reason of marriage shall remain civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
valid, except that if the donee contracted the baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
donee are revoked by operation of law;
3. (4)The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
which is the separation of property according to the
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a regime of property relations governing them. It stands
to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of 588
nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed 588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the ily Code in case a party thereto was psychologically
respondent court committed no reversible error in incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where
of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss an action or defense for the declaration of nullity
SP No. 1989-J. prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the
DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, A void marriage, even without its being judicially
1992 are AFFIRMED. declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and
SO ORDERED. justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of,
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur. such a declaration, will not give it the status or the
Feliciano, J., On official leave. consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
Vitug, J., With concurring opinion. instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can
CONCURRING OPINION still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these
cases are children of void marriages under Article 36
VITUG, J.: (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, recording thereof following the annulment or
to put in a modest observation. declaration of nullity of a prior marriage), conceived or
Void marriages are inexistent from the very born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such
beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate
establish their nullity, except in the following instances: (Article 54, Family Code).
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is
provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz: to be considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
partnership of gain under the old regime nor the
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
absolute community of property under the new Code
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead,
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the
their property relations shall be governed by the co-
Fam-
ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal
view, however, that the exceptional effects on children
of a void marriage because of the psychological
incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended
to cover even the personal and property relations of the
spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages where
the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts
and with little uncertainty, the term “psychological
incapacity” is so relative and unsettling that until a
judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects
can long and literally hang on the balance not only
insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but
also as regards third persons with whom the spouses
deal.
Petition denied. Questioned decision affirmed.
Notes.—Obligation to give or the right to ask for
support does
589
VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993 589
Arambulo vs. Court of Appeals
not cease permanently. Right to support subsists
throughout the period that the marriage subsists
(Canonizado vs. Benitez, 127 SCRA 610).
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself (Villanueva vs. Court of
Appeals, 198 SCRA 472).

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.
 VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 221 the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Same; Same; When the common-law spouses suffer from
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996. *

a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live

ANTONIO A.S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL exclusively with each other, only the property acquired by
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents. property or industry shall be owned in common and in
Civil Law; Family Code; In a void marriage, regardless proportion to their respective contributions.—When the
of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.— (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, them through their actual joint contribution of money,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the property or industry shall be owned in common and
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
be, of the Family Code. facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
Same; Same; Property acquired by both spouses through married to another shall accrue to the absolute community
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
equal co-ownership.—Under this property regime, property under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad
acquired by both spouses through faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
their workand industry shall be governed by the rules be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the Same; Same; The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
union Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
_______________
Article 43 relates only by its explicit terms, to voidable
*FIRST DIVISION. marriages and exceptionally, to void marriages under Article
222 40 of the Code.—The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled),
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having
Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3),
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in
(4) and (5)of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
the care and maintenance of the family household.” Unlike
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of
a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were
latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
inexistent
223
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 223 (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in
1

from the very beginning and no judicial decree is

necessary to establish their nullity. its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
PETITION for review of a decision of the Regional “(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 102.
and void under
________________
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los 1 Hon. Perlita Tria Tirona, presiding.
Angeles for petitioner. 224
Roco, Buñag, Kapunan & Migallos for private 224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
respondent. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
VITUG, J.: psychological incapacity to comply with their essential
marital obligations;
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of “(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio
law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they
Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers would want to stay with.
that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law “Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the
that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdes.
in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab
“The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation
initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of rights over the children who are in the custody of the other.
either or both of the parties to the contract. “(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
and large, not in dispute. defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, In addressing specifically the issue regarding the
within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
“Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil “Considering that this Court has already declared the
Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and
recording in the registry of marriages.” (Italics ours.)
2
void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on
the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 co-ownership.
and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family “The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure
liquidation of common property in “unions without for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and
marriage.” Parenthetically, during the hearing on the Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the absolute community of property.”
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
4

their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The
herein petitioner. motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that
the following clarification: Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
“Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family controlling; he argues that:
Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both “I
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
“Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the
the parties are psychologically incapacitated.
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their ‘family
“II
home’ and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. “Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129
_________________
of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family
2Rollo, p. 22. dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
225 including a marriage declared void by reason of the
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 225 psychological incapacity of the spouses.
_________________
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
“In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in 3 Rollo, p. 42.
common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co- 4 Rollo, pp. 38-39.
ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.” (Emphasis
3
226
supplied.) 226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
“III and of the household.
“Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
“Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read the other, until after the
consistently with Article 129. __________________

“IV
5 Rollo, pp. 24-25.
6 See Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 187; Aznar, et
al. vs. Garcia, et al., 102 Phil. 1055.
“It is necessary to determine the parent with whom 227
majority of the children wish to stay.”
5
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 227
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property termination of their cohabitation.
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation “When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it 6 or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
provides: respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
“ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a of the cohabitation.”
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the each other, so exclusively live together as husband and
rules on co-ownership. wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
“In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties marriage. The term “capacitated” in the provision (in
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any “male
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37
and 38” of the Code.
7
___________________ household.” Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
8

7 Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards

the fruits of the couple’s separate property are not
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, included in the co-ownership.
may contract marriage. Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil
from the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be
legitimate or illegitimate:
Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides
that—
1. (1)Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by
2. (2)Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full-or half- act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
blood. without the consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning
for reasons of public policy: (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad
faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership
1. (1)Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or in favor of their common children; in default thereof or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; waiver by any or all of the common children, each
2. (2)Between step-parents and stepchildren;
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
3. (3)Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. (4)Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent
5. (5)Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
the adopted child; termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity
9

of the marriage. 10

228
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City with each
Under this property regime, property acquired by both __________________
spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any 1. (6)Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
property acquired during the union is prima
2. (7)Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
facie presumed to have been obtained through their adopter;
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the 3. (8)Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as 4. (9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own
having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s “efforts spouse.
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
 8 Article 147, Family Code. _______________
9 Article 147, Family Code.
10 Articles 43, 50 and 51, Family Code. 11 Article 148, Family Code.
229 12 Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraph (2), (3), (4) and (5)
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 229 of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
by both of them through their actual joint contribution partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
of money, property or industry shall be owned in presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
common and in proportion to their respective previous judicial proceedings.
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
The share of any party who is married to another shall In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a 230
valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
is not validly married to another, his or her share shall Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
be forfeited in the manner already heretofore should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
expressed. 11
liquidation of either the absolute community or the
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on conjugal partnership
the settlement of the parties’ common property, the trial __________________
court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a
Articles 102 and 129.
court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of
nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of
to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
private respondent own the “family home” and all their The children or their guardian, or the trustee of their property,
common property in equal shares, as well as in may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall
property owned in common by them, the provisions on in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children
accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value
co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the
12
absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
Family Code,
 Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the value between the market value of the community property at the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the
spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall time of its dissolution.
be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons. 1. (5)The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
following procedure shall apply: 2. (6)Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
1. (1)An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
properties of each spouse. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
2. (2)The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise.
be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide,
the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
3. (3)Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses the following procedure shall apply;
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
4. (4)The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
1. (1)An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
properties of each spouse.
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
2. (2)Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be
such share as provided in this Code. For purposes of
credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
3. (3)Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value
be the increase in
of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has
been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
231 4. (4)The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 231 be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance
of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract 5. (5)Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co- shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
6. (6)Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever
ownership source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the
_________________
benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the
conjugal
 232 property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City default of children, the innocent spouse;
that exists between common-law spouses. The first 3. (3)Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates 13
law;
only, by its explicit terms, to 4. (4)The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
________________ other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as ir-
1. funds, if any.
2. (7)The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties 233
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 233
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
share as provided in this Code.
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
14
3. (8)The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition in accordance with Article 51. declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
4. (9)In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before
the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a
upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children choose to remain.
special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by
13 Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to
final judgment of the previously contracted void
in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
1. (1)The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
its termination shall be considered legitimate, and their Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the
15 16

custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the

court in a proper proceeding; Family
2. (2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal _________________
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in 1. revocable; and
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
 2. (5)The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad between common-law spouses or spouses of void
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse
by testate and intestate succession.
marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision
14 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family
15 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before Code on the “family home,” i.e., the provisions found in
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well- and effect regardless of the property regime of the
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of spouses.
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May
of only two years shall be sufficient. 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the AFFIRMED. No costs.
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
SO ORDERED.
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance Padilla (Chairman), Kapunan and Hermosisima,
of the absent spouse. Jr., JJ.,concur.
16 Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
Orders affirmed.
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio. ——o0o——
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the ________________
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a 235
previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law reserved.
has also meant to have coincident property relations, on
the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Same; Same; Same; Absent that declaration, Court
Mercado vs. Tan holds that one may be charged with and convicted of
bigamy.—The statutory mooring of the ruling
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000. *

in Mendoza and Aragon—that there is no need for a judicial

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. declaration of nullity of a void marriage—has been cast aside
MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now
respondent. necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Family Code; Jurisprudence that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the convicted of bigamy.
previous marriage has been characterized as Same; Same; Same; By contracting a second marriage
“conflicting”; Under the Family Code, a declaration of the while the first was still subsisting, petitioner committed the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
as a cause of action or a ground for defense.—Jurisprudence Code.—Petitioner contracted a second marriage although
regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
previous marriage has been characterized as “conflicting.” x marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
x x x x x x x x In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a
recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: “The committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting Revised Penal Code.
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the Same; Same; Same; Fact that he subsequently obtained
a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
_______________
immaterial.—That he subsequently obtained a judicial
*THIRD DIVISION. declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
123 immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 123 consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively
Mercado vs. Tan encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or Court of Appeals.
her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.” The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 Tan, Acut & Madrid for petitioner. The Facts
Julius C. Baldado for private respondent. The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the
124 trial court’s judgment, as follows:
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no
Mercado vs. Tan dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant
Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before
PANGANIBAN, J.: MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgo-

_______________
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally 1 Penned by J. Salome A. Montoya, Division chairman; with the

contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage concurrence of JJ.Conchita Carpio Morales and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is members.
2 RTC Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 136-137. This was written by Judge

guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the Edgar G. Garvilles.

earlier union is characterized by statutes as “void.” 125
The Case VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 125
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Mercado vs. Tan
the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals nio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was
(CA) in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999
1 duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said
Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed document, the status of accused was ‘single.’ There is no
Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the
(RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows: man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva
“WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by
Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per
of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which
Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur
court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart
term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church
sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both
provided by law. marriages were consummated when out of the first
Costs against accused.” 2
consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children,
while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with Mercado vs. Tan
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. dared null and void and that the private complainant had
“On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
filed by complainant through counsel with the City “It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
the institution of the present case before this Court against accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
said accused, Dr. Vincent C. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
an Information dated January 22, 1993. judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
“On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against time of his, second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a married man when he contracted such second marriage with
Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time
C. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and validly married to his first wife.”3

void. Ruling of the Court of Appeals

“Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals
the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second
stated:
marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on
“Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of
June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally
such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment
dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by
declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present,
before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried
married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act
dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse
of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
(3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and
dissolved.”4

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the

Hence, this Petition. 5
essential requisites for validity, x x x
“While acknowledging the existence of the two The Issues
marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following
marriage ha[d] been judicially de- issues:
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________
 3 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 45-47. “The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
4 Ibid., p. 6; rollo, p. 13. person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
5 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 26, 2000,
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
upon receipt by this Court of the OSG Memorandum signed by Sol.
Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M. Martinez and Sol. before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
Jesus P. Castelo. Respondent’s Memorandum, which was signed by dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
Atty. Julius C. Baldado, was received on November 11, 1999; while proceedings.”
petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Attys. Bernard B. Lopez and The elements of this crime are as follows:
Maritoni Z. Liwanag, had been filed earlier on September 30, 1999.
127
1. “1.That the offender has been legally married;
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 127
2. 2.That the marriage has not been legally
Mercado vs. Tan dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
“A
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is 3. 3.That he contracts a second or subsequent
present in order to convict petitioner. marriage;
4. 4.That the second or subsequent marriage has all
“B the essential requisites for validity.” 7

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of _______________

petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing
bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, 6Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 215.
negates the guilt of petitioner. 7Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 828.
128
“C 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mercado vs. Tan
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993,
basis of reasonable doubt.”
all the elements of bigamy were present. It is
6

The Court’s Ruling

undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on
The Petition is not meritorious.
April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was
Main Issue:
still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this
Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of
subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
 Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a 8 Citing Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 265.
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under 9 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 12th ed. (1981), p. 907.

Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it 10 Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per
void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are Romero, J.
11 95 Phil. 845, September 28, 1954.
considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he
129
argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. Thus, he concludes that there is no
8
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 129
first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the Mercado vs. Tan
commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that “it is
9
wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife
now settled that if the first marriage is void from the then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the
beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the Court held that the second marriage was void ab
first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.” initio because it had been contracted while the first
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage
marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that
the Family Code, but she points out that that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity.
declaration came only after the Information had been Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he
filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by
consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of the Court in People v. Aragon, which involved 12

nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained substantially the same facts.
before a person can marry for a subsequent time. But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the
We agree with the respondent. need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a Consuegra v. GSIS, Jose Consuegra married for the
13

judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage second time while the first marriage was still
has been characterized as “conflicting.” In People v.
10
subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half
Mendoza, a bigamy case involving an accused who
11
of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first
married three times, the Court ruled that there was no wife and the other half to the second wife and her
need for such declaration. In that case, the accused children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the
contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of second marriage. It held: “And with respect to the right
the first. When the first of the second wife, this Court observes that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as
_______________ it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about
such nullity.” the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
In Tolentino v. Paras however, the Court again held
14 time they married each other, for then such a marriage
that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a
was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents
In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.”
Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that “the Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to
16

second marriage that he contracted with private the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was
respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null no need for such declaration of nullity.
and void from the beginning and of no force and In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a
17

effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the
invalidity of a void marriage.” recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile
spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared:
_______________
“The Family Code has settled once and for all the
12 100 Phil. 1033, February 28, 1957. conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration
13 37 SCRA 315, 326, January 30, 1971, per Zaldivar, J. Emphasis of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
supplied. See also Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615, June 30, 1970. required either as a cause of action or a ground for
122 SCRA 525, 529, May 30, 1983; per Melencio-
defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of
14

Herrera, J. Emphasis supplied.

130 absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
Mercado vs. Tan illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, the Court stressed the need
15
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel person who marries again cannot be charged with
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his bigamy.” 18

marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the
latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution
asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the
among others, that her first husband had previously need for a judicial declaration of
been married to another woman. In holding that there ________________
was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: “x x x
 15 143 SCRA 499, August 19, 1986, per Paras, J. Emphasis supplied judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
145 SCRA 229, October 28, 1986.
distinguished from mere annulable marriages.”
16
19
17 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J, citing
SempioDiy, Handbook of the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 p. The provision appeared in substantially the same
46. form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article
18 Supra, p. 579.
41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the
131
Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 131 judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage,
Mercado vs. Tan as follows:
nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision “ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
of the Family Code, which came into effect several years be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon. a final judgment declaring such marriage void.”
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final
29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided: judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary.
“Illegal marriages.—Any marriage subsequently contracted Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier
by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall ruling in Wiegel.
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
_______________
1. (a)The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
2. (b)The first spouse had been absent for seven
19People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845, 847, September 28, 1954, per
Paras, CJ. See also People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033, 1034-1035,
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
February 28, 1957, per Labrador, J.
without the spouse present having news of the 132
absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such
Mercado vs. Tan
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil
being valid in either case until declared null and Code Revision Commitee has observed:
void by a competent court.” “[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null
The Court held in those two cases that the said and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such
provision “plainly makes a subsequent marriage fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. SempioDiy, Aug.
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
315). This provision changes the old rule that where a
marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. 211 SCRA 6, 11, July 3, 1992, per curiam.
21

Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033) 20 133

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 133
in Mendoza and Aragon—that there is no need for a Mercado vs. Tan
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage—has a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the
been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such nullity of a void marriage before contracting a
declaration is not necessary before one can contract a subsequent marriage: 22

second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that “It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void
one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As
The present ruling is consistent with our with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which involved an
21

second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x

administrative Complaint against a lawyer for
x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
he was free to enter into a second marriage because the marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure
first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: “for a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free should be allowed to marry again, x x x.”
to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second
that the first marriage was null and void ab marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration
initio is essential.” The Court further noted that the said of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the
rule was “cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only
Family Code.” Significantly, it observed that the second after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging
marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage
the first marriage was void, was “bigamous and while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
criminal in character.” acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Code.
Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration
changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To
the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that repeat, the crime had already been consummated by
then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in
_______________
the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could
20 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
1995 ed., p. 56. void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2)
allow that. children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no
guilty of the charge against him. longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already
living with another man.
Damages
“Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court
case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her
set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it act. She should have known that she would suffer
denied her claim of damages and attorney’s fees. 23
humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did
in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If
_______________
there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are
22 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 829. of her own willful making.” 25

Emphasis supplied. Petitioner had cited the statement of Justice WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
Reyes that “if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
defense in a big-amy charge.” This statement, however, appeared in
SO ORDERED.
the 1981 edition of Reyes’ book, before the enactment of the Family
Code. Melo (Chairman), Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes,
23 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 259. JJ.,concur.
134 Vitug, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Opinion.
Mercado vs. Tan
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling _______________

of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain 24 Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330, May 21, 1998; Dio

affirmative relief from this Court. In any event, we find

24
v. Concepcion, 296 SCRA 579, September 25, 1998.
no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of 25 CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 50-52.

the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder: 135

“We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 135
in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that Mercado vs. Tan
she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr.
Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove VITUG, J.:
this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxx xxx xxx At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the
“Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an indictment
aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief,
for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my is between persons of the same sex or when either or
esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, both parties had not at all given consent to the
enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed prior void “marriage.” Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the
marriage which can constitute a defense against the Family Code has been meant and in-
criminal charge. 136
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family 136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Code is a given but I have strong reservations on its Mercado vs. Tan
application beyond what appears to be its expressed tended to refer only to marriages declared void under
context. The subject of the instant petition is a criminal the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
prosecution, not a civil case, and the ponenciaaffirms In fine, the Family Code I respectfully submit, did
the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G. Mercado for not have the effect of overturning the rule in criminal
bigamy. law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code
Article 40 of the Family Code reads: expresses:
“ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may “Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision mayor shall be
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
The phrase “for purposes of remarriage” is not at all legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of rendered in the proper proceedings.
exception that the Family Code requires a judicial Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by Article
subsequent marriage is contracted; without such 349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it
declaration, the validity and the full legal consequence obviously being valid and subsisting until set aside by a
of the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon, this 1

jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article 52, of Court has underscored:
the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that “x x x Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and
had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been
marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held within the contemplation of the legislature, an express
to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a provision to that effect would or should have been inserted
marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still interpretation.”
be deemed essential when the “marriage,” for instance,
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until
judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in
bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to
the decree of annulment), the complete nullity however,
of a previously contracted marriage, being a total
nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being
independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal
case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule
in criminal law and that of the Family Code, and each
may be applied within the respective spheres of
governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
_______________

1100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

137
VOL. 337, AUGUST 1, 2000 137
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
Note.—While it is true that bigamy is a public
offense, it is entirely incorrect to state that only the
State is the offended party in such case and, therefore,
only the State’s discovery of the crime could effectively
commence the running of the period of prescription
therefor. (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
678 [1997])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.
 [No. L-10016. February 28, 1957] Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and Iloilo City.
appellee, vs.PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant and “The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were
appellant. Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of the
MARRIAGE LAW; NULL AND VOID Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa,
MARRIAGES; JUDICIAL DECREE TO ESTABLISH a clerk in the said office (Exhibit “A", and testimonies of
INVALIDITY, NOT NECESSARY.—A subsequent Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established
his first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained
invalidity as distinguished from mere annulable Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his
1034
marriages. (People vs. Mendoza, L-5877, September 28,
1954.) 1034 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance People vs. Aragon
of Cebu. Mejia, J. first wife, Maria Gorrea. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. August 5, 1939 (Exhibit “2")- After Maria Gorrea’s death, and
seeing that the coast was clear in Cebu, the accused brought
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a
Adolfo Brillantes for appellee. teachernurse.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio “It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not
Abad Tornis for defendant and appellant. live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in 1949
and 1950,. Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because
LABRADOR, J.: of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On
January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo,
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her
of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The facts are eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third
not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3,
follows: 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits “C", “D", “E" and “F").
“On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of “The accused admitted having contracted marriage with
Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3, 1953.
Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous
(Exhibits “1" and “1-A"). While his mariage with Maria marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes
Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second
Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of
the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol
and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null
the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See and void by a subsequent court.”
Exhibits “A" and “B"; t.s.n. pp. 32–33, 40, 41, hearing of April We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by
27, 1954)." Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in the case above-
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in quoted But these weighty reasons notwithstanding, the
the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 very fundamental principle of strict construction of
authorizing the filing of an action for judicial penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we
declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-
initio,defendant could not legally contract marriage cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal
with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his Code is of recent enactment and had the rule
marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial
latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been
marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given within the contemplation of the legislature, an express
for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 provision to that effect would or should have been
American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said
212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N.H. 466, 69 A. 579. rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon
of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the
4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared: appellant was not renewed after the death of the first
“The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or wife and before the third marriage was entered into.
Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
contracted by any
appellant’s prosecution for contracting this marriage
1035
VOL. 100, FEBRUARY 28, 1957 1035 can not prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment ap-,
People vs. Aragon
pealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the
annulable marriages. There is here no pretense that second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
appellant’s second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted Parás, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.
in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been L.,Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as
REYES, A., J., dissenting:
I dissent. Judgment reversed.
1036
1036 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED _____________
Phil. Bank of Commerce vs. Santos
Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
by the majority, I there said: reserved.
“Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision
mayor ‘any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.’
“Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it
is- not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was
void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada
says, ‘La satidad e importancia del matrimonio no permite
que los casados juzguen por si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha
de someterse precisamente al juicio del Tribunal competente,
vs cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, vs solo
entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta
declaración, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez
del matrimonio, vs de consiguiente, el que contrae otro
segundo antes de dicha declaracion de nulidad, no puede
menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo.’ (3 Viada, Codigo
Penal, p. 275.)
“‘This is a sound opinion,’ says Mr. Justice Tuason in the
case of People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, ‘and is
in line with the well-known rule established in cases of
adultery, that “until by competent authority in a final
judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to
the vows taken and the attack on the family exists.’ "
I may add that the construction placed by the majority
upon the law penalizing bigamy would frustrate the
legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.
Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.